Datasets:

DanCip

/

github-issues-references-proto

like 0

CVE-2019-9956

2019-03-24T00:29:00.213

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-35 Q16, there is a stack-based buffer overflow in the function PopHexPixel of coders/ps.c, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or code execution via a crafted image file.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1523

github.com

### Prerequisites - [Y] I have written a descriptive issue title - [Y] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [Y] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in PopHexPixel of ps.c which could lead to code execution. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> [poc](https://drive.google.com/open?id=15oA65eaHZi7lMmx6fJU2MkKQ8IlVBpBv) magick convert $poc ./test.ps `root@ubuntu:/home/test# ./ImageMagick_as/utilities/magick convert ./stack-buffer-overflow-in-ps ./test.ps` `=================================================================` `==80022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc0dc5d3c0 at pc 0x00000067e3f4 bp 0x7ffc0dc5c7d0 sp 0x7ffc0dc5c7c0` `WRITE of size 1 at 0x7ffc0dc5d3c0 thread T0` ` #0 0x67e3f3 in PopHexPixel coders/ps.c:1184` ` #1 0x682bf3 in WritePSImage coders/ps.c:2232` ` #2 0x84b8e7 in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159` ` #3 0x84c60c in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376` ` #4 0xbf328d in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3305` ` #5 0xcdf3de in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184` ` #6 0x4103f1 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149` ` #7 0x4105d2 in main utilities/magick.c:180` ` #8 0x7fb06d32b82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)` ` #9 0x40ff08 in _start (/home/.test/test/ImageMagick_as/utilities/magick+0x40ff08)` `` `Address 0x7ffc0dc5d3c0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 2752 in frame` ` #0 0x67e48e in WritePSImage coders/ps.c:1191` `` ` This frame has 13 object(s):` ` [32, 48) 'delta'` ` [96, 112) 'resolution'` ` [160, 176) 'scale'` ` [224, 256) 'geometry'` ` [288, 320) 'media_info'` ` [352, 384) 'page_info'` ` [416, 448) 'bounds'` ` [480, 520) 'geometry_info'` ` [576, 664) 'pixel'` ` [704, 2752) 'pixels' <== Memory access at offset 2752 overflows this variable` ` [2784, 6880) 'buffer'` ` [6912, 11008) 'date'` ` [11040, 15136) 'page_geometry'` `HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext` ` (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)` `SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow coders/ps.c:1184 PopHexPixel` `Shadow bytes around the buggy address:` ` 0x100001b83a20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` `=>0x100001b83a70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83a90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83aa0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83ab0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` ` 0x100001b83ac0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` `Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):` ` Addressable: 00` ` Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ` ` Heap left redzone: fa` ` Heap right redzone: fb` ` Freed heap region: fd` ` Stack left redzone: f1` ` Stack mid redzone: f2` ` Stack right redzone: f3` ` Stack partial redzone: f4` ` Stack after return: f5` ` Stack use after scope: f8` ` Global redzone: f9` ` Global init order: f6` ` Poisoned by user: f7` ` Container overflow: fc` ` Array cookie: ac` ` Intra object redzone: bb` ` ASan internal: fe` `==80022==ABORTING` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-35 Q16 x86_64 2019-03-22 https://imagemagick.org Copyright: ? 1999-2019 ImageMagick Studio LLC License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php Features: Cipher DPC HDRI OpenMP Delegates (built-in): bzlib djvu fftw fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lqr lzma openexr pangocairo png tiff webp wmf x xml zlib - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

stack-buffer-overflow in PopHexPixel of ps.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1523/comments

2019-03-22T10:37:33Z

2019-03-26T09:38:55Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1523

CVE-2019-10649

2019-03-30T14:29:00.240

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-36 Q16, there is a memory leak in the function SVGKeyValuePairs of coders/svg.c, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1533

github.com

### Prerequisites - [Y] I have written a descriptive issue title - [Y] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [Y] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a memory leak vulnerability in function SVGKeyValuePairs of coders/svg.c. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> [poc](https://drive.google.com/open?id=178I9vAWVNgp4Fwn9PZxaVZuLHaJyTPC-) magick convert $poc /dev/null `=================================================================` `==8783==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks` `Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:` ` #0 0x7f1f6d7c1961 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98961)` ` #1 0x441b30 in ResizeMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1302` ` #2 0x441bb4 in ResizeQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1366` ` #3 0x6d3c1c in SVGKeyValuePairs coders/svg.c:752` ` #4 0x6df888 in SVGEndElement coders/svg.c:2811` ` #5 0x7f1f6a0ae91c (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2+0x4c91c)` `Direct leak of 80 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:` ` #0 0x7f1f6d7c1602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x440828 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478` ` #2 0x44087c in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551` ` #3 0x6d3b13 in SVGKeyValuePairs coders/svg.c:733` ` #4 0x6df888 in SVGEndElement coders/svg.c:2811` ` #5 0x7f1f6a0ae91c (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2+0x4c91c)` `Indirect leak of 71185 byte(s) in 17 object(s) allocated from:` ` #0 0x7f1f6d7c1602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x440828 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478` ` #2 0x44087c in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551` ` #3 0x4c22c5 in AcquireString MagickCore/string.c:142` ` #4 0x6d3cad in SVGKeyValuePairs coders/svg.c:760` ` #5 0x6df888 in SVGEndElement coders/svg.c:2811` ` #6 0x7f1f6a0ae91c (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2+0x4c91c)` `Indirect leak of 8194 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:` ` #0 0x7f1f6d7c1602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x440828 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478` ` #2 0x44087c in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551` ` #3 0x4c22c5 in AcquireString MagickCore/string.c:142` ` #4 0x6d3dd3 in SVGKeyValuePairs coders/svg.c:766` ` #5 0x6df888 in SVGEndElement coders/svg.c:2811` ` #6 0x7f1f6a0ae91c (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2+0x4c91c)` `SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 79603 byte(s) leaked in 21 allocation(s).` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-36 Q16 x86_64 2019-03-28 https://imagemagick.org Copyright: ? 1999-2019 ImageMagick Studio LLC License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php Features: Cipher DPC HDRI OpenMP Delegates (built-in): bzlib djvu fftw fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lqr lzma openexr pangocairo png tiff wmf x xml zlib - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

memory leak in SVGKeyValuePairs of coders/svg.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1533/comments

2019-03-28T15:41:27Z

2019-06-27T04:31:35Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1533

CVE-2019-10650

2019-03-30T14:29:00.303

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-36 Q16, there is a heap-based buffer over-read in the function WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or information disclosure via a crafted image file.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1532

github.com

### Prerequisites - [Y] I have written a descriptive issue title - [Y] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [Y] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in function WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> [poc](https://drive.google.com/open?id=1VPmM34DHDhFYJCMKvRYIAH4iT14hVsOE) magick convert $poc /dev/null `=================================================================` `==18861==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000b6b8 at pc 0x7fef0e998935 bp 0x7ffec33e6c90 sp 0x7ffec33e6438` `READ of size 512 at 0x60200000b6b8 thread T0` ` #0 0x7fef0e998934 in __asan_memcpy (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x8c934)` ` #1 0x7fef0dfa102b (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtiff.so.5+0x1802b)` ` #2 0x7a392b in WriteTIFFImage coders/tiff.c:4309` ` #3 0x84807b in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159` ` #4 0x848da0 in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376` ` #5 0xbefa57 in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3305` ` #6 0xcdbba8 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184` ` #7 0x40fff1 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149` ` #8 0x4101d2 in main utilities/magick.c:180` ` #9 0x7fef0a20682f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)` ` #10 0x40fb08 in _start (/home/ImageMagick_as/utilities/magick+0x40fb08)` `` `0x60200000b6b8 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x60200000b6b0,0x60200000b6b8)` `allocated by thread T0 here:` ` #0 0x7fef0e9a4602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x7fef0df923d4 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtiff.so.5+0x93d4)` `` `SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ??:0 __asan_memcpy` `Shadow bytes around the buggy address:` ` 0x0c047fff9680: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff9690: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff96a0: fa fa fd fa fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff96b0: fa fa 05 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 fa` ` 0x0c047fff96c0: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 00` `=>0x0c047fff96d0: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00[fa]fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa` ` 0x0c047fff96e0: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa` ` 0x0c047fff96f0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 02 fa fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff9700: fa fa 05 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 fa` ` 0x0c047fff9710: fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa` ` 0x0c047fff9720: fa fa fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fa` `Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):` ` Addressable: 00` ` Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ` ` Heap left redzone: fa` ` Heap right redzone: fb` ` Freed heap region: fd` ` Stack left redzone: f1` ` Stack mid redzone: f2` ` Stack right redzone: f3` ` Stack partial redzone: f4` ` Stack after return: f5` ` Stack use after scope: f8` ` Global redzone: f9` ` Global init order: f6` ` Poisoned by user: f7` ` Container overflow: fc` ` Array cookie: ac` ` Intra object redzone: bb` ` ASan internal: fe` `==18861==ABORTING` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-36 Q16 x86_64 2019-03-28 https://imagemagick.org Copyright: ? 1999-2019 ImageMagick Studio LLC License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php Features: Cipher DPC HDRI OpenMP Delegates (built-in): bzlib djvu fftw fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lqr lzma openexr pangocairo png tiff wmf x xml zlib - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1532/comments

2019-03-28T15:33:16Z

2019-05-18T13:35:30Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1532

CVE-2019-1002100

2019-04-01T14:29:00.483

In all Kubernetes versions prior to v1.11.8, v1.12.6, and v1.13.4, users that are authorized to make patch requests to the Kubernetes API Server can send a specially crafted patch of type "json-patch" (e.g. `kubectl patch --type json` or `"Content-Type: application/json-patch+json"`) that consumes excessive resources while processing, causing a Denial of Service on the API Server.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/74534

github.com

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) (6.5, medium) Users that are authorized to make patch requests to the Kubernetes API Server can send a specially crafted patch of type “json-patch” (e.g. `kubectl patch --type json` or `"Content-Type: application/json-patch+json"`) that consumes excessive resources while processing, causing a Denial of Service on the API Server. Thanks to Carl Henrik Lunde for reporting this problem. CVE-2019-1002100 is **fixed** in the following Kubernetes releases: * [v1.11.8](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.11.md/#v1118) * [v1.12.6](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.12.md/#v1126) * [v1.13.4](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.13.md/#v1134) ### Affected components: * Kubernetes API server ### Affected versions: * Kubernetes v1.0.x-1.10.x * Kubernetes v1.11.0-1.11.7 (fixed in [v1.11.8](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.11.md/#v1118)) * Kubernetes v1.12.0-1.12.5 (fixed in [v1.12.6](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.12.md/#v1126)) * Kubernetes v1.13.0-1.13.3 (fixed in [v1.13.4](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/master/CHANGELOG-1.13.md/#v1134)) ### Mitigations: * Remove ‘patch’ permissions from untrusted users. Note: If you are using binaries or packages provided by a distributor (not the ones provided in the open source release artifacts), you should contact them to determine what versions resolve this CVE. Distributors may choose to provide support for older releases beyond the ones maintained by the open source project. ### Post-mortem: * [Document](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/files/3005552/PM-CVE-2019-1002100.pdf)

CVE-2019-1002100: json-patch requests can exhaust apiserver resources

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/74534/comments

2019-02-25T19:39:09Z

2022-05-16T21:57:19Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/74534

CVE-2019-10714

2019-04-02T21:29:00.250

LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1495

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description ```C 1522 MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c) 1523 { 1524 #if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT) 1525 if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL) 1526 return(tolower_l(c,c_locale)); 1527 #endif 1528 return(tolower(c)); 1529 } ``` The parameter `c` missing check in function LocaleLowercase, which may lead to out-of-boundary vulnerability. ### Steps to Reproduce https://github.com/Dk0n9/MyFuzzy/blob/master/oob_LocaleLowercase_crash `magick convert oob_LocaleLowercase_crash /dev/null` In the gdb: ``` Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0x00007ffff6ddd857 in __tolower_l (c=0x14f3cf, l=0x7ffff7197960 <_nl_C_locobj>) at ctype_l.c:42 42 in ctype_l.c 2: c_locale = (volatile locale_t) 0x7ffff7197960 <_nl_C_locobj> gdb-peda$ bt #0 0x00007ffff6ddd857 in __tolower_l (c=0x14f3cf, l=0x7ffff7197960 <_nl_C_locobj>) at ctype_l.c:42 #1 0x00007ffff777f8ac in LocaleLowercase (c=0x14f3cf) at MagickCore/locale.c:1526 #2 0x00007ffff782a575 in GlobExpression ( expression=0x7ffffffedf82 "\365\217\217\217\217MMa\\-d-\n", pattern=0x7ffff7a8bb98 "EPSF-*", case_insensitive=MagickTrue) at MagickCore/token.c:544 #3 0x00007ffff782a0af in GlobExpression ( expression=0x7ffffffedf82 "\365\217\217\217\217MMa\\-d-\n", pattern=0x7ffff7a8bb98 "EPSF-*", case_insensitive=MagickTrue) at MagickCore/token.c:411 #4 0x00007ffff795385e in ReadPSImage (image_info=0x555555775d60, exception=0x55555576ab10) at coders/ps.c:617 #5 0x00007ffff769f8fa in ReadImage (image_info=0x555555772a70, exception=0x55555576ab10) at MagickCore/constitute.c:547 #6 0x00007ffff76a0fe3 in ReadImages (image_info=0x55555576f780, filename=0x555555769bb0 "./crash", exception=0x55555576ab10) at MagickCore/constitute.c:917 #7 0x00007ffff72163a1 in ConvertImageCommand (image_info=0x55555576f780, argc=0x3, argv=0x55555576a190, metadata=0x7fffffffbc10, exception=0x55555576ab10) at MagickWand/convert.c:644 #8 0x00007ffff72e9d0f in MagickCommandGenesis (image_info=0x55555576c490, command=0x7ffff72150f2 <ConvertImageCommand>, argc=0x3, argv=0x7fffffffdf90, metadata=0x0, exception=0x55555576ab10) at MagickWand/mogrify.c:184 #9 0x0000555555555347 in MagickMain (argc=0x3, argv=0x7fffffffdf90) at utilities/magick.c:149 #10 0x0000555555555484 in main (argc=0x4, argv=0x7fffffffdf88) at utilities/magick.c:180 #11 0x00007ffff6dceb97 in __libc_start_main (main=0x555555555464 <main>, argc=0x4, argv=0x7fffffffdf88, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffdf78) at ../csu/libc-start.c:310 #12 0x000055555555504a in _start () ``` ### System Configuration - ImageMagick version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-30 Q16 x86_64 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Ubuntu 18.04 - Additional information: Credit: dk from Chaitin Tech

Out-of-boundary in function LocaleLowercase of MagickCore/locale.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1495/comments

2019-03-04T14:35:44Z

2019-04-03T01:40:39Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1495

CVE-2019-11024

2019-04-08T23:29:00.790

The load_pnm function in frompnm.c in libsixel.a in libsixel 1.8.2 has infinite recursion.

https://github.com/saitoha/libsixel/issues/85

github.com

**Description** : we Observerd an infinite recursive loop at function load_pnm( ) at file frompnm.c which can lead to a denial of service attack. **Command** : ./img2sixel -78eIkiugv -w 4 -h 8 -q auto -l force -o out $POC **POC** : [REPRODUCER](https://github.com/SegfaultMasters/covering360/blob/master/libsexel/POC_l1?raw=true) **DEBUG** : ~~~ Gdb: [ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ] ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── registers ──── $rax : 0x00007fffffffd160 → 0x43434380f0314300 $rbx : 0x00007fffffffd2a0 → 0x00007fffffffd660 → 0x0000000000000000 $rcx : 0x00007fffffffd100 → 0x0000000000000000 $rdx : 0x0 $rsp : 0x00007fffffffcf50 → 0x000060400000dfd0 → 0xbebebebe00000003 $rbp : 0x00007fffffffd2c0 → 0x00007fffffffd690 → 0x00007fffffffd780 → 0x00007fffffffd7f0 → 0x00007fffffffddb0 → 0x0000000000401c00 → <__libc_csu_init+0> push r15 $rsi : 0x0 $rdi : 0x0 $rip : 0x00007ffff6c08ec1 → <load_pnm+2222> mov rax, QWORD PTR [rbp-0x2f0] $r8 : 0x3 $r9 : 0x184d0 $r10 : 0x2b1 $r11 : 0x00007ffff6ef6ab0 → <__asan_memset+0> push rbp $r12 : 0x00000ffffffff9fc → 0x0000000000000000 $r13 : 0x00007fffffffcfe0 → 0x0000000041b58ab3 $r14 : 0x00007fffffffcfe0 → 0x0000000041b58ab3 $r15 : 0x0 $eflags: [CARRY PARITY ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume virtualx86 identification] $cs: 0x0033 $ss: 0x002b $ds: 0x0000 $es: 0x0000 $fs: 0x0000 $gs: 0x0000 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── stack ──── 0x00007fffffffcf50│+0x0000: 0x000060400000dfd0 → 0xbebebebe00000003 ← $rsp 0x00007fffffffcf58│+0x0008: 0x000060700000dfd4 → 0x0000000000000003 0x00007fffffffcf60│+0x0010: 0x000060700000dfd0 → 0x00000003ffffffff → 0x0000000000000000 0x00007fffffffcf68│+0x0018: 0x0000000000000000 0x00007fffffffcf70│+0x0020: 0x000060700000dfcc → 0xffffffff00000000 0x00007fffffffcf78│+0x0028: 0x000060700000dfc8 → 0x0000000000000000 0x00007fffffffcf80│+0x0030: 0x000060700000dfb8 → 0x000060300000efb0 → 0xffff000000000000 0x00007fffffffcf88│+0x0038: 0x000060400000dfd0 → 0xbebebebe00000003 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── code:x86:64 ──── 0x7ffff6c08eac <load_pnm+2201> mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x328], rax 0x7ffff6c08eb3 <load_pnm+2208> lea rax, [rbx-0x140] 0x7ffff6c08eba <load_pnm+2215> mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x2f0], rax → 0x7ffff6c08ec1 <load_pnm+2222> mov rax, QWORD PTR [rbp-0x2f0] 0x7ffff6c08ec8 <load_pnm+2229> mov rdx, rax 0x7ffff6c08ecb <load_pnm+2232> shr rdx, 0x3 0x7ffff6c08ecf <load_pnm+2236> add rdx, 0x7fff8000 0x7ffff6c08ed6 <load_pnm+2243> movzx edx, BYTE PTR [rdx] 0x7ffff6c08ed9 <load_pnm+2246> test dl, dl ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── source:frompnm.c+229 ──── 224 for (y = 0 ; y < height ; y++) { 225 for (x = 0 ; x < width ; x++) { 226 b = (maps == 2 ? 3 : 1); 227 for (i = 0 ; i < b ; i++) { 228 if (ascii) { // s=0x00007fffffffcfd0 → [...] → 0x43434380f0314300 → 229 while (*s == '\0') { 230 if (p >= end) { 231 break; 232 } 233 p = pnm_get_line(p, end, tmp); 234 s = tmp; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── threads ──── [#0] Id 1, Name: "img2sixel", stopped, reason: SIGINT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── trace ──── [#0] 0x7ffff6c08ec1 → load_pnm(p=0x62d00000a427 "\027", '\276' <repeats 4056 times>, length=0x28, allocator=0x60400000dfd0, result=0x60700000dfb8, psx=0x60700000dfc8, psy=0x60700000dfcc, ppalette=0x0, pncolors=0x60700000dfd0, ppixelformat=0x60700000dfd4) [#1] 0x7ffff6c077b3 → load_with_builtin(pchunk=0x60300000efe0, fstatic=0x0, fuse_palette=0x0, reqcolors=0x100, bgcolor=0x0, loop_control=0x1, fn_load=0x7ffff6c16ad6 <load_image_callback>, context=0x610000007f40) [#2] 0x7ffff6c0836f → sixel_helper_load_image_file(filename=0x7fffffffe2b1 "hang10", fstatic=0x0, fuse_palette=0x0, reqcolors=0x100, bgcolor=0x0, loop_control=0x1, fn_load=0x7ffff6c16ad6 <load_image_callback>, finsecure=0x1, cancel_flag=0x606ac0 <signaled>, context=0x610000007f40, allocator=0x60400000dfd0) [#3] 0x7ffff6c16f5b → sixel_encoder_encode(encoder=0x610000007f40, filename=0x7fffffffe2b1 "hang10") [#4] 0x4019ce → main(argc=0xd, argv=0x7fffffffde98) ~~~

infinite recursive loop in load_pnm( )

https://api.github.com/repos/saitoha/libsixel/issues/85/comments

2019-03-29T05:47:49Z

2019-12-18T20:34:07Z

https://github.com/saitoha/libsixel/issues/85

CVE-2019-11025

2019-04-08T23:29:00.853

In clearFilter() in utilities.php in Cacti before 1.2.3, no escaping occurs before printing out the value of the SNMP community string (SNMP Options) in the View poller cache, leading to XSS.

https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/issues/2581

github.com

**Describe the bug** There's no escape being done before printing out the value of `SNMP community string` (SNMP Options) in the `View poller cache`. **To Reproduce** Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Login as normal user ( should have device creation explicitly enabled ). 2. Select create a new device from the console menu. 3. Enter the below shared payload into the "`SNMP community string" field & save the device. Payload - `<script> alert('XSS'); document.location.replace('//google.com');</script>` 4. Now login as an `Admin` user & go to Utilities > System utils > View poller cache, XSS would be trigerred & redirected to google.com as specified in the payload. . **Expected behavior** Proper filtration & escaping needs to be done, before taking in the data from the user. **Screenshots** <img width="515" alt="Screenshot_6" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/42465102/55149049-71901b00-516f-11e9-8332-e0af9200f2d5.png"> **Desktop (please complete the following information):** - OS: Ubuntu 16.04 - Browser: Firefox **Smartphone (please complete the following information):** **Additional context** Vulnerable snippet: [Line 1849](https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/blob/develop/utilities.php#L1849) in utilities.php ` __('Community:') . ' ' . $item['snmp_community'] `

When viewing poller cache, Device SNMP community is not properly escaped

https://api.github.com/repos/Cacti/cacti/issues/2581/comments

2019-03-28T10:14:04Z

2020-06-30T03:46:01Z

https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/issues/2581

CVE-2018-15631

2019-04-09T16:29:01.087

Improper access control in the Discuss App of Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier, and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier allows remote authenticated attackers to e-mail themselves arbitrary files from the database, via a crafted RPC request.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32516

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-3 Improper access control in the Discuss App of Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier, and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier allows remote authenticated attackers to e-mail themselves arbitrary files from the database, via a crafted RPC request. **Affects**: Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier **Component**: Discuss **Credits**: Benoît Chenal (Excellium-services – Application Security) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-15631](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15631) ## I. Background Odoo includes an integrating messaging system that allows users to post notes and messages on business documents, automatically track email replies, records lifecycle events for documents, and provides a real-time chat. ## II. Problem Description The messaging system did not properly restrict access to private files stored in the database. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: User account required **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 6.5 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) Malicious users with a valid account (internal or external/portal) may obtain a copy of arbitrary files stored in the database, even on documents that they cannot access, by crafting special RPC packets. This may allow them to access sensitive data, including invoice PDFs or any confidential data that may be attached to business documents in the target database. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround This vulnerability can only be exploited by users who are allowed to create records for the "mail.message" and "mail.mail" models. Restricting `create` and `write` access to these models via ACLs is enough to prevent exploiting this issue. However, such restrictions would be quite drastic, especially when applied to internal users, and may prevent users to use most features of the system. It is strongly recommended to update your installation to the latest version instead (or apply the patch) in order to fix the issue without impacting other features. ## V. Solution Update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download If updating is not an option, you may instead apply the patch corresponding to your Odoo installation. For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/12.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 10.0: 9043305fa01fc21dc8a7dd996aa20765dbc7d93c - 11.0: bb8df1b79a086f403bfe431a9d46586dc50274df - 12.0: 863f3275d2ea7b726b3670ded4112664ccfdea6e - 12.0-ent, 11.0-ent and 10.0-ent (Enterprise): see 12.0, 11.0 and 10.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-3 (CVE-2018-15631) - Improper access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32516/comments

2019-04-08T13:40:55Z

2019-04-08T13:40:57Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32516

CVE-2018-15635

2019-04-09T16:29:01.130

Cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Discuss App of Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier, and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script in the browser of an internal user of the system by tricking them into inviting a follower on a document with a crafted name.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32515

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-2 Cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Discuss App of Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier, and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script in the browser of an internal user of the system by tricking them into inviting a follower on a document with a crafted name. **Affects**: Odoo Community 12.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 12.0 and earlier **Component**: Discuss **Credits**: Juba Baghdad, Adan Álvarez (A2secure), Bharath Kumar (Appsecco) and Subash SN (Appsecco) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-15635](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15635) ## I. Background The Discuss App provides generic productivity components to other Odoo Apps, including a "follower" system allowing users to subscribe to status updates and other discussions related to a given document. ## II. Problem Description The Discuss component for inviting a follower on a document did not properly sanitize the document information when generating the invitation text. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: No privileged account necessary **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 5.9 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N) A remote attacker could employ various techniques to inject a document with a malicious name into a vulnerable Odoo deployment, via contact forms, job forms, email routes (aliases), etc. The attacker could then use social engineering techniques to trick an internal user of the system into inviting them on the document with a crafted name, which could trigger the execution of arbitrary web script in the victim's browser. This could lead to the leak of sensitive data, or even complete session takeover. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but the issue is mitigated by the fact that the attacker will have to create a document with a suspicious name containing scripting code, so the victim is likely to notice it before inviting them. Applying the patch is strongly recommended. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download If updating is not an option, you may instead apply the patch corresponding to your Odoo installation. For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/12.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 10.0: 5472bbded51056a2322a24304db62e1d65dca464 - 11.0: 4d89b5e70b9718890453e0cde8fc2c7c9b5696e0 - 12.0: cb097e05ea7aa6e0931581fae395541160688f12 - 12.0-ent, 11.0-ent and 10.0-ent (Enterprise): see 12.0, 11.0 and 10.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-2 (CVE-2018-15635) - Cross-site scripting vulnerabil...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32515/comments

2019-04-08T13:40:52Z

2019-04-08T13:40:54Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32515

CVE-2018-15640

2019-04-09T16:29:01.193

Improper access control in the Helpdesk App of Odoo Enterprise 10.0 through 12.0 allows remote authenticated attackers to obtain elevated privileges via a crafted request.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32514

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-1 Improper access control in the Helpdesk App of Odoo Enterprise 10.0 through 12.0 allows remote authenticated attackers to obtain elevated privileges via a crafted request. **Affects**: Odoo 10.0 Enterprise through 12.0 (Enterprise Editions only) **Component**: Helpdesk **Credits**: Martin Trigaux and Jérôme Maes **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-15640](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15640) ## I. Background Odoo's Helpdesk App provides multi-channel customer service, with tools for managing SLA rules, automated actions and team productivity objectives. ## II. Problem Description The web route used to allow helpdesk agents to change their own productivity targets did not properly control access, and could allow any user to modify arbitrary attributes of their own user profile. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: User account required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 8.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) A malicious user (including external portal users) could craft a request to alter arbitrary attributes of their own user profile, including sensitive attributes like the user group they belong to. This would allow them to gain elevated privileges on the system. This vulnerability only affects Odoo Enterprise deployments where the Helpdesk application is installed. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround Uninstalling the Helpdesk App is the only known workaround to prevent exploiting this vulnerability, at the expense of losing all the features of that App, and causing other parts of the Odoo deployment to stop working (depending on the version and other installed Apps). Applying the patch is strongly recommended. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download If updating is not an option, you may instead apply the patch corresponding to your Odoo installation. For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/12.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 10.0-ent: odoo/enterprise@410e038dd4e561143d741862203e7f3ed69f326a - 11.0-ent: odoo/enterprise@f4598e62c342f4a80eba3fc9e04136af8e2ceeea - 12.0-ent: odoo/enterprise@677d637ae7ff15a8be19063a049ca22f19851857 - Community Editions of Odoo are not impacted by this vulnerability.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-11-28-1 (CVE-2018-15640) - Improper access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32514/comments

2019-04-08T13:40:48Z

2019-04-08T13:40:50Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32514

CVE-2019-11221

2019-04-15T12:31:36.477

GPAC 0.7.1 has a buffer overflow issue in gf_import_message() in media_import.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1203

github.com

There is a buffer overflow issue in gf_import_message () function, media_import.c szMsg overflow when srt file contains more than one txt line and the line is long enough. GF_Err gf_import_message(GF_MediaImporter *import, GF_Err e, char *format, ...) { if (gf_log_tool_level_on(GF_LOG_AUTHOR, e ? GF_LOG_WARNING : GF_LOG_INFO)) { va_list args; char szMsg[1024]; va_start(args, format); vsprintf(szMsg, format, args); va_end(args); GF_LOG((u32) (e ? GF_LOG_WARNING : GF_LOG_INFO), GF_LOG_AUTHOR, ("%s\n", szMsg) ); } return e; } //////////////////////debug///////////////////// (gdb) set args -srt 0 crafted_text.srt (gdb) r Starting program: /opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box -srt 0 crafted_text.srt [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Timed Text (SRT) import - text track 400 x 60, font Serif (size 18) Bad SRT formatting - expecting number got "hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hello world hel" *** stack smashing detected ***: /opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box terminated Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 56 ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 #1 0x00007ffff725f028 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:89 #2 0x00007ffff72982a4 in __libc_message (do_abort=do_abort@entry=1, fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff73a4113 "*** %s ***: %s terminated\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:175 #3 0x00007ffff732fbbc in __GI___fortify_fail (msg=<optimized out>, msg@entry=0x7ffff73a40fb "stack smashing detected") at fortify_fail.c:38 #4 0x00007ffff732fb60 in __stack_chk_fail () at stack_chk_fail.c:28 #5 0x00007ffff78b28eb in gf_import_message (import=0x7fffffff9b60, e=GF_CORRUPTED_DATA, format=0x7ffff7b3d7f0 "Bad SRT formatting - expecting number got \"%s\"") at media_tools/media_import.c:59 #6 0x00007ffff795db01 in gf_text_import_srt (import=0x7fffffff9b60) at media_tools/text_import.c:505 #7 0x00007ffff7966e38 in gf_import_timed_text (import=0x7fffffff9b60) at media_tools/text_import.c:2673 #8 0x00007ffff78ded42 in gf_media_import (importer=0x7fffffff9b60) at media_tools/media_import.c:10663 #9 0x000000000041c71c in mp4boxMain (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:4129 #10 0x0000000000423d05 in main (argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:5712 (gdb) Guoxiang Niu, EaglEye Team

buffer overflow issue 6#

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1203/comments

2019-02-12T03:44:32Z

2019-04-19T09:00:55Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1203

CVE-2019-11222

2019-04-15T12:31:36.507

gf_bin128_parse in utils/os_divers.c in GPAC 0.7.1 has a buffer overflow issue for the crypt feature when encountering a crafted_drm_file.xml file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1204

github.com

there is a buffer overflow issue for crypt feature when use a crafted_drm_file.xml file. overflow occur when use a crafted key value. root@ubuntu:/opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc# gdb ./MP4Box (gdb) set args -crypt crafted_drm_file.xml overview.mp4 -out overview_encrypted.mp4 (gdb) r Starting program: /opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box -crypt crafted_drm_file.xml overview.mp4 -out overview_encrypted.mp4 [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". [CORE] 128bit blob is not 16-bytes long: 5544694d47473326622665665a396b3611111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 [CENC] Cannnot parse key value *** Error in `/opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box': free(): corrupted unsorted chunks: 0x0000000000692030 *** Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 56 ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 #1 0x00007ffff725f028 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:89 #2 0x00007ffff72982a4 in __libc_message (do_abort=do_abort@entry=1, fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff73a66b0 "*** Error in `%s': %s: 0x%s ***\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:175 #3 0x00007ffff72a455e in malloc_printerr (ptr=<optimized out>, str=0x7ffff73a6800 "free(): corrupted unsorted chunks", action=1) at malloc.c:4996 #4 _int_free (av=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>, have_lock=0) at malloc.c:3840 #5 0x00007ffff6812e1b in inflateEnd () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1 #6 0x00007ffff68183d9 in gzclose_r () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1 #7 0x00007ffff76609fd in xml_sax_read_file (parser=0x68ba30) at utils/xml_parser.c:1177 #8 0x00007ffff7660db2 in gf_xml_sax_parse_file (parser=0x68ba30, fileName=0x7fffffffe7d3 "crafted_drm_file.xml", OnProgress=0x0) at utils/xml_parser.c:1269 #9 0x00007ffff794c69a in load_crypt_file (file=0x7fffffffe7d3 "crafted_drm_file.xml") at media_tools/ismacryp.c:388 #10 0x00007ffff79552ad in gf_crypt_file (mp4=0x670c20, drm_file=0x7fffffffe7d3 "crafted_drm_file.xml") at media_tools/ismacryp.c:2882 #11 0x000000000042188c in mp4boxMain (argc=6, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:5202 #12 0x0000000000423d05 in main (argc=6, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:5712 (gdb) Guoxiang Niu, EaglEye Team

buffer overflow issue 7#

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1204/comments

2019-02-13T07:12:39Z

2019-04-19T08:50:59Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1204

CVE-2019-11222

2019-04-15T12:31:36.507

gf_bin128_parse in utils/os_divers.c in GPAC 0.7.1 has a buffer overflow issue for the crypt feature when encountering a crafted_drm_file.xml file.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1205

github.com

there is a buffer overflow issue for crypt feature when use a crafted_drm_file.xml file. overflow occur when use a crafted ID128 value. root@ubuntu:/opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc# gdb ./MP4Box (gdb) set args -crypt drm_file.xml overview.mp4 -out overview_encrypted.mp4 (gdb) r Starting program: /opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box -crypt drm_file.xml overview.mp4 -out overview_encrypted.mp4 [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". [CORE] 128bit blob is not 16-bytes long: 6770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C316770616363656E6364726D746F6F6C31 [XML/NHML] Cannot parse ID128 *** stack smashing detected ***: /opt/niugx/cov_product/gpac/gpac-master/bin/gcc/MP4Box terminated Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 56 ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff725bc37 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56 #1 0x00007ffff725f028 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:89 #2 0x00007ffff72982a4 in __libc_message (do_abort=do_abort@entry=1, fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff73a4113 "*** %s ***: %s terminated\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:175 #3 0x00007ffff732fbbc in __GI___fortify_fail (msg=<optimized out>, msg@entry=0x7ffff73a40fb "stack smashing detected") at fortify_fail.c:38 #4 0x00007ffff732fb60 in __stack_chk_fail () at stack_chk_fail.c:28 #5 0x00007ffff7664910 in gf_xml_parse_bit_sequence_bs (bsroot=0x6950d0, bs=0x695200) at utils/xml_parser.c:2173 #6 0x00007ffff766495f in gf_xml_parse_bit_sequence (bsroot=0x6950d0, data=0x7ffffffbdcb8, data_size=0x7ffffffbdc84) at utils/xml_parser.c:2181 #7 0x00007ffff7954e85 in gf_cenc_parse_drm_system_info (mp4=0x670c20, drm_file=0x7fffffffe7db "drm_file.xml") at media_tools/ismacryp.c:2817 #8 0x00007ffff79553ec in gf_crypt_file (mp4=0x670c20, drm_file=0x7fffffffe7db "drm_file.xml") at media_tools/ismacryp.c:2898 #9 0x000000000042188c in mp4boxMain (argc=6, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:5202 #10 0x0000000000423d05 in main (argc=6, argv=0x7fffffffe548) at main.c:5712 Guoxiang Niu, EaglEye Team

buffer overflow issue 8#

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1205/comments

2019-02-13T09:49:56Z

2019-04-19T08:50:26Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1205

CVE-2019-11344

2019-04-19T19:29:00.233

data/inc/files.php in Pluck 4.7.8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by uploading a .htaccess file that specifies SetHandler x-httpd-php for a .txt file, because only certain PHP-related filename extensions are blocked.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/72

github.com

Location: https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/blob/master/data/inc/files.php#L40 Code: ```php <?php // ...... $blockedExtentions = array('.php','php3','php4','php5','php6','php7','phtml'); if (in_array($lastfour, $blockedExtentions) or in_array($lastfive, $blockedExtentions) ){ if (!rename('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']), 'files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']).'.txt')){ show_error($lang['general']['upload_failed'], 1); } chmod('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']).'.txt', 0775); }else{ chmod('files/'.latinOnlyInput($_FILES['filefile']['name']), 0775); } // ...... ?> ``` When the uploaded file hits the suffix in `$blockedExtentions`, the file will be renamed to `.{ext}.txt`, and missed `$blockedExtentions` will not be renamed. So you can upload a webshell by overriding the `.htaccess` file. **Step1. Upload a file `.htaccess`** File content:  **Step2. Upload file `phpinfo.txt`** File content:  **Step3. Request** 

file-upload vulnerability in data/inc/files.php

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/72/comments

2019-04-09T14:45:54Z

2019-05-29T16:19:45Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/72

CVE-2019-11243

2019-04-22T15:29:00.790

In Kubernetes v1.12.0-v1.12.4 and v1.13.0, the rest.AnonymousClientConfig() method returns a copy of the provided config, with credentials removed (bearer token, username/password, and client certificate/key data). In the affected versions, rest.AnonymousClientConfig() did not effectively clear service account credentials loaded using rest.InClusterConfig()

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76797

github.com

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N The `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` method returns a copy of the provided config, with credentials removed (bearer token, username/password, and client certificate/key data). In the following versions, `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` did not effectively clear service account credentials loaded using `rest.InClusterConfig()`: * v1.12.0-v1.12.4 * v1.13.0 **What is the impact?** * `k8s.io/client-go` users that use the `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` method directly with client config loaded with `rest.InClusterConfig()` receive back a client config which can still send the loaded service account token with requests. **How was the issue fixed?** * In 1.12.5+ and 1.13.1+, `rest.InClusterConfig()` was modified to return a client config that is safe to use with the `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` method (https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/71713) * In v1.15.0, the `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` will also exclude the `config.Transport` and `config.WrapTransport` fields, in addition to the explicit credential-carrying fields. (https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/75771) **How do I resolve the issue?** * Upgrade `k8s.io/client-go` to `kubernetes-1.12.5`, `kubernetes-1.13.1`, `kubernetes-1.14.0`, or higher * or manually clear the `config.WrapTransport` and `config.Transport` fields in addition to calling `rest.AnonymousClientConfig()` Thanks to Oleg Bulatov of Red Hat for reporting this issue. /area security /kind bug /sig auth /sig api-machinery /assign /close

CVE-2019-11243: v1.12.0-v1.12.4, v1.13.0: rest.AnonymousClientConfig() does not remove the serviceaccount credentials from config created by rest.InClusterConfig()

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76797/comments

2019-04-18T21:31:53Z

2022-05-16T21:59:22Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76797

CVE-2019-11244

2019-04-22T15:29:00.837

In Kubernetes v1.8.x-v1.14.x, schema info is cached by kubectl in the location specified by --cache-dir (defaulting to $HOME/.kube/http-cache), written with world-writeable permissions (rw-rw-rw-). If --cache-dir is specified and pointed at a different location accessible to other users/groups, the written files may be modified by other users/groups and disrupt the kubectl invocation.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76676

github.com

In kubectl v1.8.0+, schema info is cached in the location specified by `--cache-dir` (defaulting to `$HOME/.kube/http-cache`), written with world-writeable permissions (rw-rw-rw-). If `--cache-dir` is specified and pointed at a different location accessible to other users/groups, the written files may be modified by other users/groups and disrupt the kubectl invocation. CVSS score: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (3.3, low) **What versions are affected?** kubectl v1.8.0+ **What configurations are affected?** Invocations that point `--cache-dir` at world-writeable locations **Impact** Malformed responses written to the cache directory can disrupt the kubectl invocation **Workaround** Use the default `--http-cache` location in the $HOME directory or point it at a directory that is only accessible to desired users/groups. (original description follows) ==== What happened: The files inside of ".kube/http-cache" are world writeable (rw-rw-rw-). While the default for these files appears to be the home directory, using the "--cache-dir" flag could put these files into a place where world writeable files would allow any user / process to modify the cache files. Modification of the cache files could influence the kubectl utility in a negative way for other users. What you expected to happen: Apply stricter file permissions to the http-cache files. How to reproduce it (as minimally and precisely as possible): Run any generic kubectl command which is successful and then list the cache directory ~/.kube/http-cache/* $ kubectl get pods --all-namespaces $ ls -la ~/.kube/http-cache/* Anything else we need to know?: I estimate this is a low severity security issue with a CVSS score of "3.3 / CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N" - https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Environment: Linux Kubernetes version (use kubectl version):Client Version: version.Info{Major:"1", Minor:"12", GitVersion:"v1.12.6", GitCommit:"ab91afd7062d4240e95e51ac00a18bd58fddd365", GitTreeState:"clean", BuildDate:"2019-02-26T12:49:28Z", GoVersion:"go1.10.8", Compiler:"gc", Platform:"linux/amd64"} Server Version: version.Info{Major:"1", Minor:"12", GitVersion:"v1.12.6", GitCommit:"ab91afd7062d4240e95e51ac00a18bd58fddd365", GitTreeState:"clean", BuildDate:"2019-02-26T12:49:28Z", GoVersion:"go1.10.8", Compiler:"gc", Platform:"linux/amd64"} Cloud provider or hardware configuration: AWS. Running kube api server in hyperkube. OS (e.g: cat /etc/os-release): NAME="CentOS Linux" VERSION="7.1808 (Core)" ID="centos" ID_LIKE="rhel fedora" VERSION_ID="7" PRETTY_NAME="CentOS Linux 7.1808 (Core)" ANSI_COLOR="0;31" CPE_NAME="cpe:/o:centos:centos:7" HOME_URL="https://www.centos.org/" BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.centos.org/" CENTOS_MANTISBT_PROJECT="CentOS-7" CENTOS_MANTISBT_PROJECT_VERSION="7" REDHAT_SUPPORT_PRODUCT="centos" REDHAT_SUPPORT_PRODUCT_VERSION="7" OSTREE_VERSION=7.1808 Kernel (e.g. uname -a): Linux hackit.internal 3.10.0-862.11.6.el7.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Aug 14 21:49:04 UTC 2018 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux Install tools: Manual installation. Others: n/a

CVE-2019-11244: `kubectl --http-cache=<world-accessible dir>` creates world-writeable cached schema files

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76676/comments

2019-04-16T20:14:25Z

2022-10-14T02:06:00Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/76676

CVE-2019-11470

2019-04-23T14:29:00.600

The cineon parsing component in ImageMagick 7.0.8-26 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (uncontrolled resource consumption) by crafting a Cineon image with an incorrect claimed image size. This occurs because ReadCINImage in coders/cin.c lacks a check for insufficient image data in a file.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description Cineon image may be mistakenly parsed with incorrect pixel information, causing converting to take too much CPU resource. ### Steps to Reproduce convert c.cin /tmp/test.tmp ``` work/imagemagick > gdb --args ./ImageMagick-orig/install/bin/convert ./convert-report/c.cin /tmp/test.bmp Reading symbols from ./ImageMagick-orig/install/bin/convert...done. gdb$ run Starting program: /home/ubuntu/work/imagemagick/ImageMagick-orig/install/bin/convert ./convert-report/c.cin /tmp/test.bmp [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". ^C Program received signal SIGINT, Interrupt. SetImageBackgroundColor (image=0x63aab0, exception=0x6244d0) at MagickCore/image.c:2464 2464 q+=GetPixelChannels(image); gdb$ b MagickCore/image.c:2464 Breakpoint 1 at 0x7ffff777ed88: file MagickCore/image.c, line 2464. gdb$ p image->columns $1 = 0x40002 gdb$ p image->Quitmns gdb$ display image->columns 1: image->columns = 0x40002 gdb$ display image->rows 2: image->rows = 0x70000 gdb$ display x 3: x = 0x1bd43 gdb$ display y 4: y = 0x21d gdb$ c 100 Not stopped at any breakpoint; argument ignored. Continuing. Breakpoint 1, SetImageBackgroundColor (image=0x63aab0, exception=0x6244d0) at MagickCore/image.c:2464 2464 q+=GetPixelChannels(image); 1: image->columns = 0x40002 2: image->rows = 0x70000 3: x = 0x1bd44 4: y = 0x21d gdb$ c 100 Will ignore next 255 crossings of breakpoint 1. Continuing. Breakpoint 1, SetImageBackgroundColor (image=0x63aab0, exception=0x6244d0) at MagickCore/image.c:2464 2464 q+=GetPixelChannels(image); 1: image->columns = 0x40002 2: image->rows = 0x70000 3: x = 0x1be44 4: y = 0x21d gdb$ c 1000 Will ignore next 4095 crossings of breakpoint 1. Continuing. Breakpoint 1, SetImageBackgroundColor (image=0x63aab0, exception=0x6244d0) at MagickCore/image.c:2464 2464 q+=GetPixelChannels(image); 1: image->columns = 0x40002 2: image->rows = 0x70000 3: x = 0x1ce44 4: y = 0x21d ``` [cin.zip](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/files/2830725/cin.zip) ### System Configuration - ImageMagick version:7.0.8-26 Q16 x86_64 2019-02-05 (6b3bdb65b) - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Ubuntu 18.04 x86_64 - Additional information: Version 6.9.7-4 Q16 x86_64 20170114 seems fine with error message "width or height exceeds limit `c.cin'". <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

Incorrect parsing Cineon causing `convert` to take ridiculous time

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472/comments

2019-02-05T04:29:35Z

2019-04-23T16:45:43Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472

CVE-2019-11472

2019-04-23T14:29:00.837

ReadXWDImage in coders/xwd.c in the XWD image parsing component of ImageMagick 7.0.8-41 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (divide-by-zero error) by crafting an XWD image file in which the header indicates neither LSB first nor MSB first.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description When using `identify -verbose $FILE` on XWD files, it may emit FPE errors at multiple locations. ### Steps to Reproduce * run `identify -verbose $FILE` * ASAN messages may be like: fpe_xwd.c:490_1.xwd ``` ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==19029==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: FPE on unknown address 0x7f0623a03210 (pc 0x7f0623a03210 bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffc86dbd220 T0) #0 0x7f0623a0320f (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libX11.so.6+0x2720f) #1 0x7f0627deb295 in ReadXWDImage coders/xwd.c:490 #2 0x7f06276d4854 in ReadImage MagickCore/constitute.c:547 #3 0x7f06276d778b in ReadImages MagickCore/constitute.c:917 #4 0x7f0626f69817 in IdentifyImageCommand MagickWand/identify.c:321 #5 0x7f0626ffdde0 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184 #6 0x55c1ef27bf00 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149 #7 0x55c1ef27c186 in main utilities/magick.c:180 #8 0x7f062675ab96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x55c1ef27b979 in _start (/home/hongxu/work/imagemagick/ImageMagick-asan/install/bin/magick+0x1979) ``` fpe_xwd.c:520_1.xwd ``` ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==28450==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: FPE on unknown address 0x7f20a562e210 (pc 0x7f20a562e210 bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffd19f36b80 T0) #0 0x7f20a562e20f (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libX11.so.6+0x2720f) #1 0x7f20a9a166c9 in ReadXWDImage coders/xwd.c:520 #2 0x7f20a92ff854 in ReadImage MagickCore/constitute.c:547 #3 0x7f20a930278b in ReadImages MagickCore/constitute.c:917 #4 0x7f20a8b94817 in IdentifyImageCommand MagickWand/identify.c:321 #5 0x7f20a8c28de0 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184 #6 0x55b4ed9adf00 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149 #7 0x55b4ed9ae186 in main utilities/magick.c:180 #8 0x7f20a8385b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x55b4ed9ad979 in _start (/home/hongxu/work/imagemagick/ImageMagick-asan/install/bin/magick+0x1979) ``` ### System Configuration - ImageMagick version:7.0.8-41 Q16 x86_64 2019-04-14 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Ubuntu 18.04 LTS, x84_64 - Additional information: This was firstly detected in GraphicsMagick, but I found this also happens in ImageMagick 6/7. POCs: [im.zip](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/files/3077110/im.zip)

FPE errors when reading XWD images

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546/comments

2019-04-14T07:21:12Z

2019-04-24T01:24:42Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546

CVE-2019-11597

2019-04-29T16:29:00.407

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-43 Q16, there is a heap-based buffer over-read in the function WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or possibly information disclosure via a crafted image file.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1555

github.com

### Prerequisites - [X] I have written a descriptive issue title - [X] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [X] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in function WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> [poc](https://drive.google.com/open?id=1VPmM34DHDhFYJCMKvRYIAH4iT14hVsOE) magick convert $poc /dev/null `=================================================================` `==2369==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000ab14 at pc 0x7f24afc30935 bp 0x7ffe0bdcba20 sp 0x7ffe0bdcb1c8` `READ of size 131072 at 0x60200000ab14 thread T0` ` #0 0x7f24afc30934 in __asan_memcpy (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x8c934)` ` #1 0x7f24af23823a (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtiff.so.5+0x1823a)` ` #2 0x7a3fed in WriteTIFFImage coders/tiff.c:4314` ` #3 0x848ecb in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159` ` #4 0x849bf0 in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376` ` #5 0xbf1565 in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3305` ` #6 0xcdf015 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185` ` #7 0x4100a1 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149` ` #8 0x410282 in main utilities/magick.c:180` ` #9 0x7f24ab49d82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)` ` #10 0x40fbb8 in _start (/home/ImageMagick/utilities/magick+0x40fbb8)` `` `0x60200000ab14 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4-byte region [0x60200000ab10,0x60200000ab14)` `allocated by thread T0 here:` ` #0 0x7f24afc3c602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x7f24af2293d4 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtiff.so.5+0x93d4)` `` `SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ??:0 __asan_memcpy` `Shadow bytes around the buggy address:` ` 0x0c047fff9510: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff9520: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff9530: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa` ` 0x0c047fff9540: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa` ` 0x0c047fff9550: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa` `=>0x0c047fff9560: fa fa[04]fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd` ` 0x0c047fff9570: fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa` ` 0x0c047fff9580: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd` ` 0x0c047fff9590: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff95a0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa` ` 0x0c047fff95b0: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 04 fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd` `Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):` ` Addressable: 00` ` Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ` ` Heap left redzone: fa` ` Heap right redzone: fb` ` Freed heap region: fd` ` Stack left redzone: f1` ` Stack mid redzone: f2` ` Stack right redzone: f3` ` Stack partial redzone: f4` ` Stack after return: f5` ` Stack use after scope: f8` ` Global redzone: f9` ` Global init order: f6` ` Poisoned by user: f7` ` Container overflow: fc` ` Array cookie: ac` ` Intra object redzone: bb` ` ASan internal: fe` `==2369==ABORTING` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: `Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-43 Q16 x86_64 2019-04-27 https://imagemagick.org` `Copyright: ? 1999-2019 ImageMagick Studio LLC` `License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php` `Features: Cipher DPC HDRI OpenMP(4.0) ` `Delegates (built-in): bzlib djvu fftw fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lqr lzma openexr pangocairo png tiff wmf x xml zlib` - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): `Distributor ID: Ubuntu` `Description: Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS` `Release: 16.04` `Codename: xenial` - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap_buffer_overflow in WriteTIFFImage of coders/tiff.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1555/comments

2019-04-27T13:08:13Z

2019-05-04T14:21:50Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1555

CVE-2019-11598

2019-04-29T16:29:00.470

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-40 Q16, there is a heap-based buffer over-read in the function WritePNMImage of coders/pnm.c, which allows an attacker to cause a denial of service or possibly information disclosure via a crafted image file. This is related to SetGrayscaleImage in MagickCore/quantize.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1540

github.com

### Prerequisites - [X] I have written a descriptive issue title - [X] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [X] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in function WritePNMImage of coders/pnm.c. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> [poc](https://drive.google.com/open?id=14WjaSf3CMM-h6HnuQ1xufVGkC_swvJma) magick convert $poc ./test.pnm `=================================================================` `==16178==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000b6f0 at pc 0x0000009f987d bp 0x7fff206e34b0 sp 0x7fff206e34a0` `READ of size 8 at 0x60200000b6f0 thread T0` `==16178==AddressSanitizer: while reporting a bug found another one. Ignoring.` ` #0 0x9f987c in SetGrayscaleImage._omp_fn.4 MagickCore/quantize.c:3453` ` #1 0x7f12195becbe in GOMP_parallel (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1+0xbcbe)` ` #2 0x9f676d in SetGrayscaleImage MagickCore/quantize.c:3432` ` #3 0x9f3ee7 in QuantizeImage MagickCore/quantize.c:2677` ` #4 0x7cf518 in SetImageType MagickCore/attribute.c:1364` ` #5 0x6766a7 in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1938` ` #6 0x8485ba in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159` ` #7 0x8492df in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376` ` #8 0xbf05a1 in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3305` ` #9 0xcdc6f2 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184` ` #10 0x410091 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149` ` #11 0x410272 in main utilities/magick.c:180` ` #12 0x7f1218cea82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)` ` #13 0x40fba8 in _start (/home/ImageMagick/utilities/magick+0x40fba8)` `` `0x60200000b6f4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4-byte region [0x60200000b6f0,0x60200000b6f4)` `allocated by thread T0 here:` ` #0 0x7f121d489602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)` ` #1 0x4408a5 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478` ` #2 0x4408f9 in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551` ` #3 0x4c3f69 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713` ` #4 0x43d3e0 in AcquireMagickInfo MagickCore/magick.c:193` ` #5 0x6747aa in RegisterPNMImage coders/pnm.c:1456` ` #6 0x49fc1d in RegisterStaticModule MagickCore/static.c:257` ` #7 0x43df66 in GetMagickInfo MagickCore/magick.c:642` ` #8 0x42164a in SetImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:2855` ` #9 0x849087 in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1336` ` #10 0xbf05a1 in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3305` ` #11 0xcdc6f2 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:184` ` #12 0x410091 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149` ` #13 0x410272 in main utilities/magick.c:180` ` #14 0x7f1218cea82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)` `` `SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/quantize.c:3453 SetGrayscaleImage._omp_fn.4` `Shadow bytes around the buggy address:` ` 0x0c047fff9680: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff9690: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff96a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff96b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` ` 0x0c047fff96c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa` `=>0x0c047fff96d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 04 fa fa fa[04]fa` ` 0x0c047fff96e0: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa` ` 0x0c047fff96f0: fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa` ` 0x0c047fff9700: fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff9710: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04` ` 0x0c047fff9720: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04` `Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):` ` Addressable: 00` ` Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ` ` Heap left redzone: fa` ` Heap right redzone: fb` ` Freed heap region: fd` ` Stack left redzone: f1` ` Stack mid redzone: f2` ` Stack right redzone: f3` ` Stack partial redzone: f4` ` Stack after return: f5` ` Stack use after scope: f8` ` Global redzone: f9` ` Global init order: f6` ` Poisoned by user: f7` ` Container overflow: fc` ` Array cookie: ac` ` Intra object redzone: bb` ` ASan internal: fe` `==16178==ABORTING` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: ``` Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-40 Q16 x86_64 2019-04-08 https://imagemagick.org Copyright: ? 1999-2019 ImageMagick Studio LLC License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php Features: Cipher DPC HDRI OpenMP Delegates (built-in): bzlib djvu fftw fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lqr lzma openexr pangocairo png tiff wmf x xml zlib ``` - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): ``` Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial ``` - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in WritePNMImage of coders/pnm.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1540/comments

2019-04-08T03:10:13Z

2019-05-12T11:30:48Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1540

CVE-2019-11632

2019-05-01T14:29:00.483

In Octopus Deploy 2019.1.0 through 2019.3.1 and 2019.4.0 through 2019.4.5, an authenticated user with the VariableViewUnscoped or VariableEditUnscoped permission scoped to a specific project could view or edit unscoped variables from a different project. (These permissions are only used in custom User Roles and do not affect built in User Roles.)

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5528

github.com

# Prerequisites - [x] We are ready to publicly disclose this vulnerability or exploit according to our [responsible disclosure process](https://octopushq.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IN/pages/2430143/Security+Disclosure+Policy). - [x] I have raised a CVE according to our [CVE process] (https://octopushq.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IN/pages/8290305/Requesting+a+CVE+ID) - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have tagged the issue appropriately (area/security, kind/bug, tag/regression?) ## Description The `VariableViewUnscoped` and `VariableEditUnscoped` permissions can be scoped to projects. As part of the permissions redesign we did during the spaces project, this behavior was lost, which means these permissions can no longer be scoped to projects. Granting a user these permissions gives them access to unscoped variables in _all_ projects, regardless of how this permission has been scoped. ### Repro steps 1. Create a project (eg OctoFX) with some variables that are unscoped, and some variables that are scoped to an environment (eg Development)  2. Create another unrelated project (eg Foo) 3. Configure a separate user that has the following permissions - The "Project Contributor" role scoped to [OctoFX, Development] - `VariableViewUnscoped` scoped to [Foo] 4. As that user, try to view the variables for the project OctoFX ### Expected result This user should not be able to view the Unscoped variable within OctoFX, because their `VariableViewUnscoped` permissions was not scoped to the OctoFX project. ### Actual result This user is able to see the unscoped variables from the project OctoFX, regardless of how their `VariableViewUnscoped` permission has been scoped. ## Screenshots ### In 2018.10.6 (working) With this permissions setup  You can only view the one variable in OctoFX  ### In 2019.4.4 (failing) With this permissions setup  You can view all unscoped variables in OctoFX  ## Details These affected permissions are not used by an built in roles in Octopus. If you are using built in roles only, then you will not be affected. ## Affected versions of Octopus Server `2019.1.0` - `2019.3.1` (inclusive), and `2019.4.0` - `2019.4.5` (inclusive) ## Workarounds There is no known way of preserving the same access control that existed before this regression was introduced. Until an upgrade can be performed to a version of Octopus Server where this bug has been fixed, It is recommended that the `VariableViewUnscoped` and `VariableEditUnscoped` permissions are revoked where possible and only highly privileged users (eg. admins or space managers) are granted these permissions.

Variable[View/Edit]Unscoped permissions don't comply with project scoping (CVE-2019-11632)

https://api.github.com/repos/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5528/comments

2019-05-01T05:11:04Z

2019-07-31T08:42:24Z

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5528

CVE-2019-11632

2019-05-01T14:29:00.483

In Octopus Deploy 2019.1.0 through 2019.3.1 and 2019.4.0 through 2019.4.5, an authenticated user with the VariableViewUnscoped or VariableEditUnscoped permission scoped to a specific project could view or edit unscoped variables from a different project. (These permissions are only used in custom User Roles and do not affect built in User Roles.)

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5529

github.com

This bug represents [this issue](https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5528) in LTS 2019.3

Variable[View/Edit]Unscoped permissions don't comply with project scoping (CVE-2019-11632)

https://api.github.com/repos/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5529/comments

2019-05-01T05:15:06Z

2019-07-31T08:42:27Z

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5529

CVE-2019-11837

2019-05-09T14:29:00.510

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a segmentation fault in String.prototype.toBytes for negative arguments, related to nxt_utf8_next in nxt/nxt_utf8.h and njs_string_offset in njs/njs_string.c.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/155

github.com

```js >> "A".repeat(38).toBytes(-5) ASAN:SIGSEGV ================================================================= ==16054==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6090000168e0 (pc 0x00000042c455 bp 0x7fffa72fbb30 sp 0x7fffa72fbaf0 T0) #0 0x42c454 in nxt_utf8_next nxt/nxt_utf8.h:44 #1 0x42c454 in njs_string_offset njs/njs_string.c:2058 #2 0x4282cd in njs_string_prototype_to_bytes njs/njs_string.c:1047 #3 0x45f1f2 in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:587 #4 0x41bd8f in njs_vmcode_function_call njs/njs_vm.c:2061 #5 0x413d10 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #6 0x412be5 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #7 0x4049a7 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #8 0x4037ad in njs_interactive_shell njs/njs_shell.c:500 #9 0x402a03 in main njs/njs_shell.c:270 ``` Minified test from [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff) report.

Segfault in String.prototype.toBytes() for negative arguments.

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/155/comments

2019-05-07T18:38:36Z

2019-05-31T12:13:12Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/155

CVE-2019-11838

2019-05-09T14:29:00.557

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer overflow in Array.prototype.splice after a resize, related to njs_array_prototype_splice in njs/njs_array.c, because of njs_array_expand size mishandling.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/153

github.com

```js var v0=[] var x = new Array(10) var i = 0 while (i < 100) { v0.shift(v0.splice(0, "AAAA", "BBBB")) i++; } ``` ```js $ njs test.js ==21010==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60d00000c700 at pc 0x000000447d20 bp 0x7fffbdc99110 sp 0x7fffbdc99100 WRITE of size 16 at 0x60d00000c700 thread T0 #0 0x447d1f in njs_array_prototype_splice njs/njs_array.c:876 #1 0x45f1f2 in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:587 #2 0x41bd8f in njs_vmcode_function_call njs/njs_vm.c:2061 #3 0x413d10 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #4 0x412be5 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #5 0x4049a7 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #6 0x403f7d in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #7 0x402aa9 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 0x60d00000c700 is located 0 bytes to the right of 128-byte region [0x60d00000c680,0x60d00000c700) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f5803b3a076 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x99076) #1 0x4b5c7d in nxt_memalign nxt/nxt_malloc.c:26 #2 0x4100ec in njs_align njs/njs.c:41 #3 0x40b5aa in nxt_mp_alloc_large nxt/nxt_mp.c:594 #4 0x40b3cf in nxt_mp_align nxt/nxt_mp.c:353 #5 0x444eb8 in njs_array_alloc njs/njs_array.c:148 #6 0x4145ee in njs_vmcode_array njs/njs_vm.c:342 #7 0x413d10 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #8 0x412be5 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #9 0x4049a7 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #10 0x403f7d in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #11 0x402aa9 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow njs/njs_array.c:876 njs_array_prototype_splice Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1a7fff9890: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c1a7fff98e0:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1a7fff98f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff9900: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1a7fff9910: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c1a7fff9920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa ``` Probably is the same as #152 (memory corruption while resizing). Minified test from [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff) report.

heap-buffer-overflow in Array.prototype.splice() after resize.

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/153/comments

2019-05-07T17:43:35Z

2019-05-14T17:37:45Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/153

CVE-2019-11839

2019-05-09T14:29:00.637

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer overflow in Array.prototype.push after a resize, related to njs_array_prototype_push in njs/njs_array.c, because of njs_array_expand size mishandling.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/152

github.com

```js var v0=[], i = 0; while (i++ < 100) { v0.push(v0.shift(0)); } ``` ```sh $ njs test.js ==13374==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60d00000c7d0 at pc 0x000000447165 bp 0x7ffd25e422b0 sp 0x7ffd25e422a 0 WRITE of size 16 at 0x60d00000c7d0 thread T0 #0 0x447164 in njs_array_prototype_push njs/njs_array.c:679 #1 0x45f1f2 in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:587 #2 0x41bd8f in njs_vmcode_function_call njs/njs_vm.c:2061 #3 0x413d10 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #4 0x412be5 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #5 0x4049a7 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #6 0x403f7d in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #7 0x402aa9 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 0x60d00000c7d0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 128-byte region [0x60d00000c750,0x60d00000c7d0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f297b5a5076 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x99076) #1 0x4b5c7d in nxt_memalign nxt/nxt_malloc.c:26 #2 0x4100ec in njs_align njs/njs.c:41 #3 0x40b5aa in nxt_mp_alloc_large nxt/nxt_mp.c:594 #4 0x40b3cf in nxt_mp_align nxt/nxt_mp.c:353 #5 0x444eb8 in njs_array_alloc njs/njs_array.c:148 #6 0x4145ee in njs_vmcode_array njs/njs_vm.c:342 #7 0x413d10 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #8 0x412be5 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #9 0x4049a7 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #10 0x403f7d in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #11 0x402aa9 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow njs/njs_array.c:679 njs_array_prototype_push Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1a7fff98a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff98e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c1a7fff98f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff9900: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1a7fff9910: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c1a7fff9920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 0x0c1a7fff9930: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1a7fff9940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ``` Minified test from [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff) report.

heap-buffer-overflow in Array.prototype.push() after resize.

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/152/comments

2019-05-07T17:30:56Z

2019-05-08T22:22:13Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/152

CVE-2017-12805

2019-05-09T16:29:00.327

In ImageMagick 7.0.6-6, a memory exhaustion vulnerability was found in the function ReadTIFFImage, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/664

github.com

``` root@ubuntu:/home/hjy/Desktop# convert oom-ReadTIFFImage /dev/null ==27669==ERROR: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0x80002000 (-2147475456) bytes of LargeMmapAllocator: 12 ==27669==Process memory map follows: 0x08048000-0x09714000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x09714000-0x09715000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x09715000-0x0979f000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x0979f000-0x097a3000 0x1ffff000-0x24000000 0x24000000-0x28000000 0x28000000-0x40000000 0xb2500000-0xb2600000 0xb2700000-0xb2800000 0xb2900000-0xb2a00000 0xb2b00000-0xb2c00000 0xb2d00000-0xb2e00000 0xb2f00000-0xb3000000 0xb3100000-0xb3200000 0xb3300000-0xb3400000 0xb3500000-0xb3600000 0xb3700000-0xb3800000 0xb3900000-0xb3a00000 0xb3b00000-0xb3c00000 0xb3d00000-0xb3e00000 0xb3f00000-0xb4100000 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive 0xb4100000-0xb4200000 0xb4300000-0xb4400000 0xb4500000-0xb4600000 0xb4700000-0xb4800000 0xb4900000-0xb4a00000 0xb4b00000-0xb4c00000 0xb4d00000-0xb4e00000 0xb4f00000-0xb5000000 0xb5100000-0xb5200000 0xb5300000-0xb5400000 0xb5500000-0xb5600000 0xb5700000-0xb5800000 0xb5900000-0xb5a00000 0xb5ae0000-0xb5c00000 0xb5c05000-0xb5c6a000 0xb5c6a000-0xb5c6b000 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive 0xb5c6b000-0xb6e21000 0xb6e21000-0xb6e45000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e45000-0xb6e46000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e46000-0xb6e47000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e47000-0xb6e4a000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e4a000-0xb6e4b000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e4b000-0xb6e4c000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e4c000-0xb6ff5000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6ff5000-0xb6ff7000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6ff7000-0xb6ff8000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6ff8000-0xb6ffb000 0xb6ffb000-0xb7013000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb7013000-0xb7014000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb7014000-0xb7015000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb7015000-0xb7017000 0xb7017000-0xb7032000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb7032000-0xb7033000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb7033000-0xb7034000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb7034000-0xb7035000 0xb7035000-0xb7079000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb7079000-0xb707a000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb707a000-0xb707b000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb707b000-0xb70a9000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb70a9000-0xb70aa000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb70aa000-0xb70ab000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb70ab000-0xb70c3000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70c3000-0xb70c4000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70c4000-0xb70c5000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70c5000-0xb721a000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb721a000-0xb721b000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb721b000-0xb721f000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb721f000-0xb7220000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb7220000-0xb7221000 0xb7221000-0xb7247000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb7247000-0xb7248000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb7248000-0xb7249000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb7249000-0xb724a000 0xb724a000-0xb7293000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb7293000-0xb7294000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb7294000-0xb7295000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb7295000-0xb72a5000 0xb72a5000-0xb7344000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb7344000-0xb7346000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb7346000-0xb7347000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb7347000-0xb77a0000 0xb77a0000-0xb77b6000 0xb77b6000-0xb77b7000 [vdso] 0xb77b7000-0xb77d7000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xb77d7000-0xb77d8000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xb77d8000-0xb77d9000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xbfd8c000-0xbfdad000 [stack] ==27669==End of process memory map. ==27669==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.cc:66 "(("unable to mmap" && 0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xb72f94c1 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x544c1) #1 0xb72fd6a9 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x586a9) #2 0xb7302e22 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x5de22) #3 0xb72bd99b (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x1899b) #4 0xb72be488 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x19488) #5 0xb72f384a in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x4e84a) #6 0x8baef7a in AcquireQuantumPixels MagickCore/quantum.c:175 #7 0x8baef7a in SetQuantumDepth MagickCore/quantum.c:693 #8 0x877f852 in ReadTIFFImage coders/tiff.c:1655 #9 0x88baf5e in ReadImage MagickCore/constitute.c:497 #10 0x88bea44 in ReadImages MagickCore/constitute.c:866 #11 0x8ec36d8 in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:641 #12 0x8fc9e99 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:183 #13 0x8077d9a in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149 #14 0x80579ca in main utilities/magick.c:180 #15 0xb6e65a82 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x19a82) #16 0x807737a (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x807737a) ``` POC https://github.com/whiteHat001/FUZZ_POC/blob/master/oom-ReadTIFFImage

memory exhaustion in ReadTIFFImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/664/comments

2017-08-10T05:00:53Z

2019-05-10T01:41:54Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/664

CVE-2017-12806

2019-05-09T16:29:00.373

In ImageMagick 7.0.6-6, a memory exhaustion vulnerability was found in the function format8BIM, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/660

github.com

``` root@ubuntu:/home/hjy/Desktop# convert oom-format8BIM /dev/null ==8638==ERROR: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0x72e8d000 (1927860224) bytes of LargeMmapAllocator: 12 ==8638==Process memory map follows: 0x08048000-0x0971a000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x0971a000-0x0971b000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x0971b000-0x097a5000 /usr/local/bin/magick 0x097a5000-0x097a9000 0x1ffff000-0x24000000 0x24000000-0x28000000 0x28000000-0x40000000 0xb1f00000-0xb2000000 0xb2100000-0xb2200000 0xb2300000-0xb2400000 0xb2500000-0xb2600000 0xb2700000-0xb2800000 0xb2900000-0xb2a00000 0xb2b00000-0xb2c00000 0xb2d00000-0xb2e00000 0xb2f00000-0xb3000000 0xb3100000-0xb3200000 0xb3300000-0xb3400000 0xb3500000-0xb3600000 0xb3700000-0xb3800000 0xb3900000-0xb3a00000 0xb3b00000-0xb3c00000 0xb3d00000-0xb3e00000 0xb3f00000-0xb4100000 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive 0xb4100000-0xb4200000 0xb4300000-0xb4400000 0xb4500000-0xb4600000 0xb4700000-0xb4800000 0xb4900000-0xb4a00000 0xb4b00000-0xb4c00000 0xb4d00000-0xb4e00000 0xb4f00000-0xb5000000 0xb5100000-0xb5200000 0xb5300000-0xb5400000 0xb5500000-0xb5600000 0xb5700000-0xb5800000 0xb5900000-0xb5a00000 0xb5abb000-0xb5c10000 0xb5c10000-0xb5c50000 0xb5c50000-0xb5c51000 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive 0xb5c51000-0xb6e07000 0xb6e07000-0xb6e2b000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e2b000-0xb6e2c000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e2c000-0xb6e2d000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblzma.so.5.0.0 0xb6e2d000-0xb6e30000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e30000-0xb6e31000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e31000-0xb6e32000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.19.so 0xb6e32000-0xb6fdb000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6fdb000-0xb6fdd000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6fdd000-0xb6fde000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so 0xb6fde000-0xb6fe1000 0xb6fe1000-0xb6ff9000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb6ff9000-0xb6ffa000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb6ffa000-0xb6ffb000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.19.so 0xb6ffb000-0xb6ffd000 0xb6ffd000-0xb7018000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb7018000-0xb7019000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb7019000-0xb701a000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0xb701a000-0xb701b000 0xb701b000-0xb705f000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb705f000-0xb7060000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb7060000-0xb7061000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.19.so 0xb7061000-0xb708f000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb708f000-0xb7090000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb7090000-0xb7091000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgomp.so.1.0.0 0xb7091000-0xb70a9000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70a9000-0xb70aa000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70aa000-0xb70ab000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.8 0xb70ab000-0xb7200000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb7200000-0xb7201000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb7201000-0xb7205000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb7205000-0xb7206000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libxml2.so.2.9.1 0xb7206000-0xb7207000 0xb7207000-0xb722d000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb722d000-0xb722e000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb722e000-0xb722f000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpng12.so.0.50.0 0xb722f000-0xb7230000 0xb7230000-0xb7279000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb7279000-0xb727a000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb727a000-0xb727b000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libjpeg.so.8.0.2 0xb727b000-0xb728b000 0xb728b000-0xb732a000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb732a000-0xb732c000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb732c000-0xb732d000 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1.0.0 0xb732d000-0xb7786000 0xb7786000-0xb779c000 0xb779c000-0xb779d000 [vdso] 0xb779d000-0xb77bd000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xb77bd000-0xb77be000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xb77be000-0xb77bf000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.19.so 0xbfa59000-0xbfa7a000 [stack] ==8638==End of process memory map. ==8638==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.cc:66 "(("unable to mmap" && 0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xb72df4c1 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x544c1) #1 0xb72e36a9 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x586a9) #2 0xb72e8e22 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x5de22) #3 0xb72a399b (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x1899b) #4 0xb72a4488 (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x19488) #5 0xb72d984a in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libasan.so.1+0x4e84a) #6 0x83de42c in format8BIM coders/meta.c:2184 #7 0x83e285c in WriteMETAImage coders/meta.c:2315 #8 0x88c579f in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1114 #9 0x88c733a in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1333 #10 0x8ed049c in ConvertImageCommand MagickWand/convert.c:3280 #11 0x8fd1411 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:183 #12 0x80775f2 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149 #13 0x805791a in main utilities/magick.c:180 #14 0xb6e4ba82 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x19a82) #15 0x8076c5a (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x8076c5a) ```POC https://github.com/whiteHat001/FUZZ_POC/blob/master/oom-format8BIM

memory exhaustion in format8BIM

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/660/comments

2017-08-08T03:28:18Z

2019-05-10T01:41:26Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/660

CVE-2019-11840

2019-05-09T16:29:00.607

An issue was discovered in the supplementary Go cryptography library, golang.org/x/crypto, before v0.0.0-20190320223903-b7391e95e576. A flaw was found in the amd64 implementation of the golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20 and golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20/salsa packages. If more than 256 GiB of keystream is generated, or if the counter otherwise grows greater than 32 bits, the amd64 implementation will first generate incorrect output, and then cycle back to previously generated keystream. Repeated keystream bytes can lead to loss of confidentiality in encryption applications, or to predictability in CSPRNG applications.

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/30965

github.com

If more than 256 GiB of keystream is generated, or if the counter otherwise grows greater than 32 bits, the amd64 implementation will first generate incorrect output, and then cycle back to previously generated keystream. Repeated keystream bytes can lead to loss of confidentiality in encryption applications, or to predictability in CSPRNG applications. The issue might affect uses of golang.org/x/crypto/nacl with extremely large messages. Architectures other than amd64 and uses that generate less than 256 GiB of keystream for a single salsa20.XORKeyStream invocation are unaffected. This issue was discovered and reported by Michael McLoughlin.

x/crypto/salsa20: keystream loop in amd64 implementation after 256GiB

https://api.github.com/repos/golang/go/issues/30965/comments

2019-03-20T22:32:56Z

2020-05-09T07:00:19Z

https://github.com/golang/go/issues/30965

CVE-2019-12086

2019-05-17T17:29:00.483

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.9. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint, the service has the mysql-connector-java jar (8.0.14 or earlier) in the classpath, and an attacker can host a crafted MySQL server reachable by the victim, an attacker can send a crafted JSON message that allows them to read arbitrary local files on the server. This occurs because of missing com.mysql.cj.jdbc.admin.MiniAdmin validation.

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2326

github.com

A new gadget type (see https://medium.com/@cowtowncoder/on-jackson-cves-dont-panic-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-54cd0d6e8062) was reported, and CVE id allocated was `CVE-2019-12086`. CVE description is available at: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12086 for full details, but the specific variation (in addition to needing "default typing", attacker being able to craft specific json message) is that: * If service has jar `mysql-connector-java` in its classpath vulnerability applies, and attacker is able to read arbitrary files from service's local file system. Original vulnerability discoverer: 618 from College of software, Nankai University ----- Fixed in: * 2.9.9 and later * 2.8.11.4 * 2.7.9.6 * 2.6.7.3

Block one more gadget type (mysql, CVE-2019-12086)

https://api.github.com/repos/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2326/comments

2019-05-11T17:31:34Z

2019-10-16T04:36:08Z

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2326

CVE-2019-12206

2019-05-20T14:29:00.697

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer overflow in nxt_utf8_encode in nxt_utf8.c.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/162

github.com

NJS version ``` changeset: 965:e0fdef4eb478 tag: tip user: Dmitry Volyntsev <[email protected]> date: Thu May 16 15:20:31 2019 +0300 summary: Fixed uninitialized-memory-access in Object.defineProperties(). ``` JavaScript testcase: ```js var v0="@褀+Qh" while (((((((((((((v0)>>>v0.toUpperCase())+() => { })+(((((((v0)>>>v0.toUpperCase())+() => { })+(ReferenceError))+(0>>>0))+0)+0))+0)+0)+0)+0)+0)+0)+0)+0)) { } ``` JavaScript testcase (b64): ``` dmFyIHYwPSIAAEDopIAAACtRaAAAAAAiCndoaWxlICgoKCgoKCgoKCgoKCh2MCk+Pj52MC50b1VwcGVyQ2FzZSgpKSsoKSA9PiB7Cn0pKygoKCgoKCh2MCk+Pj52MC50b1VwcGVyQ2FzZSgpKSsoKSA9PiB7Cn0pKyhSZWZlcmVuY2VFcnJvcikpKygwPj4+MCkpKzApKzApKSswKSswKSswKSswKSswKSswKSswKSswKSkgewp9Cgo= ``` Valgrind output: ``` ==5361== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==5361== Copyright (C) 2002-2017, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==5361== Using Valgrind-3.13.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==5361== Command: ./build/njs /home/fuzz/encode.js ==5361== ==5361== Invalid write of size 1 ==5361== at 0x242704: nxt_utf8_encode (nxt_utf8.c:32) ==5361== by 0x155F04: njs_string_prototype_to_upper_case (njs_string.c:2243) ==5361== by 0x1CF36B: njs_function_native_call (njs_function.c:587) ==5361== by 0x130E2D: njs_vmcode_function_call (njs_vm.c:2061) ==5361== by 0x12BF6F: njs_vmcode_interpreter (njs_vm.c:159) ==5361== by 0x128E0B: njs_vm_start (njs.c:594) ==5361== by 0x1179E4: njs_process_script (njs_shell.c:770) ==5361== by 0x1123C4: njs_process_file (njs_shell.c:619) ==5361== by 0x1123C4: main (njs_shell.c:281) ==5361== Address 0x5efcb00 is 0 bytes after a block of size 8,192 alloc'd ==5361== at 0x4C31E76: memalign (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==5361== by 0x4C31F91: posix_memalign (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==5361== by 0x24923C: nxt_memalign (nxt_malloc.c:26) ==5361== by 0x11E52F: nxt_mp_alloc_cluster (nxt_mp.c:549) ==5361== by 0x11E52F: nxt_mp_alloc_page (nxt_mp.c:514) ==5361== by 0x11F12C: nxt_mp_alloc_small (nxt_mp.c:426) ==5361== by 0x1421F9: njs_string_alloc (njs_string.c:218) ==5361== by 0x12B1B1: njs_string_concat (njs_vm.c:1205) ==5361== by 0x136EC1: njs_vmcode_addition (njs_vm.c:1170) ==5361== by 0x12BF6F: njs_vmcode_interpreter (njs_vm.c:159) ==5361== by 0x128E0B: njs_vm_start (njs.c:594) ==5361== by 0x1179E4: njs_process_script (njs_shell.c:770) ==5361== by 0x1123C4: njs_process_file (njs_shell.c:619) ==5361== by 0x1123C4: main (njs_shell.c:281) ``` Found by [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff)

heap-buffer-overflow in nxt_utf8_encode (nxt_utf8.c:32)

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/162/comments

2019-05-20T08:18:34Z

2019-05-30T14:15:14Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/162

CVE-2019-12207

2019-05-20T14:29:00.773

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer over-read in nxt_utf8_decode in nxt/nxt_utf8.c.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/168

github.com

Testcase (in base64): ``` bmV3IFJlZ0V4cChuZXcgUmVnRXhwKFJlZ0V4cCgobmV3IE9iamVjdCgiADs7Ozs7Ozs7Ozs7Ozs7Ozs7Ozs7GDtzOzskOzs7OzsiLCAobmV3IEVycm9yKG5ldyBFcnJvcihuZXcgRXJyb3IobmV3IEVycm9yKG5ldyBJbnRlcm5hbEVycm9yKG5ldyBJbnRlcm5hbEVycm9yKG5ldyBJbnRlcm5hbEVycm9yKG5ldyBJbnRlcm5hbEVycm9yKCgwLTApKSkpKSkpKSk8PTApKSswKSkpKQo= ``` njs version: `changeset: 965:e0fdef4eb478` Stack trace (from ASAN): ``` ==22308==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x62500000c100 at pc 0x555c148621d9 bp 0x7ffdddc241c0 sp 0x7ffdddc241b0 READ of size 1 at 0x62500000c100 thread T0 #0 0x555c148621d8 in nxt_utf8_decode nxt/nxt_utf8.c:72 #1 0x555c14862905 in nxt_utf8_length nxt/nxt_utf8.c:271 #2 0x555c147b5a06 in njs_regexp_prototype_source njs/njs_regexp.c:674 #3 0x555c147b5a06 in njs_regexp_constructor njs/njs_regexp.c:131 #4 0x555c147a9cdb in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:587 #5 0x555c146d1d82 in njs_vmcode_function_call njs/njs_vm.c:2061 #6 0x555c146c7d47 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #7 0x555c146c2b83 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #8 0x555c146a5cc3 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #9 0x555c1469ef48 in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #10 0x555c1469ef48 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 #11 0x7fcc25e56b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #12 0x555c146a0ef9 in _start (/home/build/njs/build/njs+0x2aef9) ``` Found by [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff)

heap-buffer-overflow in nxt_utf8_decode nxt/nxt_utf8.c:72

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/168/comments

2019-05-20T09:01:01Z

2019-06-20T12:24:14Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/168

CVE-2019-12208

2019-05-20T14:29:00.837

njs through 0.3.1, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer overflow in njs_function_native_call in njs/njs_function.c.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/163

github.com

NJS version ``` changeset: 965:e0fdef4eb478 tag: tip user: Dmitry Volyntsev <[email protected]> date: Thu May 16 15:20:31 2019 +0300 summary: Fixed uninitialized-memory-access in Object.defineProperties(). ``` JavaScript testcase: ```js var v0=Array() while(v0.includes(v0.u,(Object()+((Boolean))),(Boolean),((({}>(Boolean)))),(0),v0.toString(([URIError]+Object))){} ``` ASAN log: ``` ==32113==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x619000000480 at pc 0x5561174c6af1 bp 0x7ffd29774220 sp 0x7ffd29774210 WRITE of size 16 at 0x619000000480 thread T0 #0 0x5561174c6af0 in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:623 #1 0x5561173e36b1 in njs_vmcode_continuation njs/njs_vm.c:2308 #2 0x5561173e3d47 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #3 0x5561173deb83 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #4 0x5561173c1cc3 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:770 #5 0x5561173baf48 in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:619 #6 0x5561173baf48 in main njs/njs_shell.c:281 #7 0x7f37a800db96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #8 0x5561173bcef9 in _start (/home/build/njs/build/njs+0x2aef9) ``` Found by [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff)

heap-buffer-overflow in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:623

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/163/comments

2019-05-20T08:30:18Z

2019-05-24T16:00:19Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/163

CVE-2019-12481

2019-05-30T23:29:00.267

An issue was discovered in GPAC 0.7.1. There is a NULL pointer dereference in the function GetESD at isomedia/track.c in libgpac.a, as demonstrated by MP4Box.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1249

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [ ] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ # MP4Box ## version MP4Box 0.7.1 ## description ```txt GPAC version 0.7.1-rev0-g440d475-HEAD ``` ## download link ## others please send email to [email protected] if you have any questions. --------------------- ## [email protected]:2058-65___null-pointer-dereference ### description An issue was discovered in MP4Box 0.7.1, There is a/an null-pointer-dereference in function DumpTrackInfo at filedump.c:2058-65 ### commandline MP4Box -info @@ ### source ```c 2054 esd = gf_isom_get_esd(file, trackNum, 1); 2055 if (!esd) { 2056 fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Broken MPEG-4 Track\n"); 2057 } else { >2058 const char *st = gf_odf_stream_type_name(esd->decoderConfig->streamType); 2059 if (st) { 2060 fprintf(stderr, "MPEG-4 Config%s%s Stream - ObjectTypeIndication 0x%02x\n", 2061 full_dump ? "\n\t" : ": ", st, esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication); 2062 } else { 2063 fprintf(stderr, "MPEG-4 Config%sStream Type 0x%02x - ObjectTypeIndication 0x%02x\n", ``` ### my dbg ```c Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0x0000000000428432 in DumpTrackInfo (file=0x655010, trackID=0x2, full_dump=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:2058 2058 const char *st = gf_odf_stream_type_name(esd->decoderConfig->streamType); gdb-peda$ p esd $1 = (GF_ESD *) 0x659bb0 gdb-peda$ p esd->decoderConfig $2 = (GF_DecoderConfig *) 0x0 ``` ### bug report ```txt [iso file] more than one stts entry at the end of the track with sample_delta=0 - forbidden ! Fixing to 1 [ODF] Error reading descriptor (tag 4 size 47): Invalid MPEG-4 Descriptor [iso file] Unknown box type .... [iso file] Read Box type .... (0x01000000) has size 0 but is not at root/file level, skipping [iso file] Unknown box type ... [iso file] Unknown box type ...< [iso file] Unknown box type ...< [iso file] Unknown box type ...< [iso file] Unknown box type <JC. [iso file] Incomplete box UNKN [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing * Movie Info * Timescale 600 - 2 tracks Computed Duration 00:00:04.966 - Indicated Duration 00:00:04.966 Fragmented File: no File suitable for progressive download (moov before mdat) File Brand mp42 - version 1 Compatible brands: mp42 mp41 Created: GMT Fri Oct 28 17:46:46 2005 Modified: GMT Fri Oct 28 17:46:46 2005 File has no MPEG4 IOD/OD Track # 1 Info - TrackID 1 - TimeScale 32000 Media Duration 00:00:00.004 - Indicated Duration 00:00:04.992 Track has 1 edit lists: track duration is 00:00:04.966 Media Info: Language "English (eng)" - Type "soun:mp4a" - 156 samples MPEG-4 Config: Audio Stream - ObjectTypeIndication 0x40 MPEG-4 Audio AAC LC - 2 Channel(s) - SampleRate 32000 Self-synchronized RFC6381 Codec Parameters: mp4a.40.2 All samples are sync Track # 2 Info - TrackID 2 - TimeScale 30 Media Duration 00:00:00.000 - Indicated Duration 00:00:04.966 Track has 1 edit lists: track duration is 00:00:04.966 Media Info: Language "English (eng)" - Type "vide:mp4v" - 0 samples Visual Track layout: x=0 y=0 width=190 height=240 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4953==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x0000005794e8 bp 0x7ffde6e30af0 sp 0x7ffde6e0aba0 T0) ==4953==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4953==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x5794e7 in DumpTrackInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2058:65 #1 0x587ca2 in DumpMovieInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2950:3 #2 0x54d944 in mp4boxMain /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4305:9 #3 0x7f7c7de2f82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #4 0x4244e8 in _start (/src/gpac/installed-asan/bin/MP4Box+0x4244e8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2058:65 in DumpTrackInfo ==4953==ABORTING ``` ### others from fuzz project None crash name None-00000322-1558597650.mp4 Auto-generated by pyspider at 2019-05-23 16:16:43 please send email to [email protected] if you have any questions. ## gf_isom_get_original_format_type@drm_sample.c:540-33___null-pointer-dereference ### description An issue was discovered in MP4Box 0.7.1, There is a/an null-pointer-dereference in function gf_isom_get_original_format_type at drm_sample.c:540-33 ### commandline MP4Box -info @@ ### source ```c 536 Media_GetSampleDesc(trak->Media, sampleDescriptionIndex, &sea, NULL); 537 if (!sea) return GF_BAD_PARAM; 538 539 sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox*)gf_list_get(sea->protections, 0); > 540 if (outOriginalFormat && sinf->or \*bug=>*\ iginal_format) { 541 *outOriginalFormat = sinf->original_format->data_format; 542 } 543 return GF_OK; 544 } 545 ``` ### my debug ```c Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0x00007ffff7865711 in gf_isom_get_original_format_type (the_file=0x655010, trackNumber=0x2, sampleDescriptionIndex=0x1, outOriginalFormat=0x7ffffffcbf94) at isomedia/drm_sample.c:540 540 if (outOriginalFormat && sinf->original_format) { $1 = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) 0x0 ``` ### bug report ```txt AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4969==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000020 (pc 0x7fd4b273ace9 bp 0x7ffc1d1f1070 sp 0x7ffc1d1f0fc0 T0) ==4969==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4969==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7fd4b273ace8 in gf_isom_get_original_format_type /src/gpac/src/isomedia/drm_sample.c:540:33 #1 0x7fd4b2961ecc in gf_media_get_rfc_6381_codec_name /src/gpac/src/media_tools/dash_segmenter.c:429:8 #2 0x580975 in DumpTrackInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2647:3 #3 0x587ca2 in DumpMovieInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2950:3 #4 0x54d944 in mp4boxMain /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4305:9 #5 0x7fd4b112682f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #6 0x4244e8 in _start (/src/gpac/installed-asan/bin/MP4Box+0x4244e8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /src/gpac/src/isomedia/drm_sample.c:540:33 in gf_isom_get_original_format_type ==4969==ABORTING ``` ### others from fuzz project None crash name None-00000995-1558597651.mp4 Auto-generated by pyspider at 2019-05-23 16:16:43 please send email to [email protected] if you have any questions. ## [email protected]:271-28___null-pointer-dereference ### description An issue was discovered in MP4Box 0.7.1, There is a/an null-pointer-dereference in function GetESD at track.c:271-28 ### commandline MP4Box -info @@ ### source ```c 267 if ( 268 #ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_FRAGMENTS 269 moov->mvex && 270 #endif > 271 (esd->decoderConfig->streamType==GF_STREAM_VISUAL)) { 272 esd->slConfig->hasRandomAccessUnitsOnlyFlag = 0; 273 esd->slConfig->useRandomAccessPointFlag = 1; 274 if (trak->moov->mov->openMode!=GF_ISOM_OPEN_READ) 275 stbl->SyncSample = (GF_SyncSampleBox *) gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSS); 276 } else { ``` ### mydebug ```c Stopped reason: SIGSEGV 0x00007ffff78a6829 in GetESD (moov=0x656790, trackID=0x2, StreamDescIndex=0x1, outESD=0x7ffffffcbfe0) at isomedia/track.c:271 271 (esd->decoderConfig->streamType==GF_STREAM_VISUAL)) { gdb-peda$ p esd->decoderConfig $1 = (GF_DecoderConfig *) 0x0 ``` ### bug report ```txt [iso file] Unknown box type schh ICC colour profile not supported [iso file] Unknown box type .... [iso file] Incomplete box UNKN [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing * Movie Info * Timescale 90000 - 2 tracks Computed Duration 00:00:00.000 - Indicated Duration 00:00:00.000 Fragmented File: yes - duration 00:00:05.589 1 fragments - 1 SegmentIndexes File suitable for progressive download (moov before mdat) File Brand iso5 - version 1 Compatible brands: avc1 .so5 dash Created: GMT Wed Mar 26 00:20:53 2014 Modified: GMT Wed Mar 26 00:20:54 2014 File has root IOD (9 bytes) Scene PL 0xff - Graphics PL 0xff - OD PL 0xff Visual PL: AVC/H264 Profile (0x7f) Audio PL: High Quality Audio Profile @ Level 2 (0x0f) No streams included in root OD iTunes Info: Encoder Software: HandBrake 0.9.9 2013052900 1 UDTA types: meta (1) Track # 1 Info - TrackID 1 - TimeScale 90000 Media Duration 00:00:00.000 - Indicated Duration 00:00:00.000 Media Info: Language "Undetermined (und)" - Type "vide:encv" - 0 samples Fragmented track: 15 samples - Media Duration 00:00:00.500 Visual Track layout: x=0 y=0 width=560 height=320 MPEG-4 Config: Visual Stream - ObjectTypeIndication 0x21 AVC/H264 Video - Visual Size 560 x 320 AVC Info: 0 SPS - 0 PPS - Profile Baseline @ Level 3 NAL Unit length bits: 32 Chroma format YUV 4:2:0 - Luma bit depth 8 - chroma bit depth 8 Self-synchronized *Encrypted stream - unknown scheme [ISOM Tools] Unkown protection scheme type  RFC6381 Codec Parameters: avc1.42C01E All samples are sync Track # 2 Info - TrackID 2 - TimeScale 48000 Media Duration 00:00:00.000 - Indicated Duration 00:00:00.000 Media Info: Language "English (eng)" - Type "soun:enca" - 0 samples Fragmented track: 24 samples - Media Duration 00:00:00.512 1 UDTA types: name (1) AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==4998==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x7f500d1be119 bp 0x7ffeb6a2b510 sp 0x7ffeb6a2b2c0 T0) ==4998==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==4998==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7f500d1be118 in GetESD /src/gpac/src/isomedia/track.c:271:28 #1 0x7f500d0e230a in gf_isom_get_esd /src/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:1086:6 #2 0x57946a in DumpTrackInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2054:9 #3 0x587ca2 in DumpMovieInfo /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:2950:3 #4 0x54d944 in mp4boxMain /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4305:9 #5 0x7f500baaa82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #6 0x4244e8 in _start (/src/gpac/installed-asan/bin/MP4Box+0x4244e8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /src/gpac/src/isomedia/track.c:271:28 in GetESD ==4998==ABORTING ``` ### others from fuzz project None crash name None-00001079-1558597651.mp4 Auto-generated by pyspider at 2019-05-23 16:16:45 please send email to [email protected] if you have any questions. ## ReadGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener@ipmpx_code.c:1103-54___heap-buffer-overflow ### description An issue was discovered in MP4Box 0.7.1, There is a/an heap-buffer-overflow in function ReadGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener at ipmpx_code.c:1103-54 ### commandline MP4Box -info @@ ### source ```c 1099 { 1100 u32 i; 1101 GF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener*p = (GF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener*)_p; 1102 p->eventTypeCount = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 8); >1103 for (i=0; i<p->eventTypeCount; i++) p->eventType[i] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 8); 1104 return GF_OK; 1105 } 1106 static u32 SizeGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener(GF_IPMPX_Data *_p) 1107 { 1108 GF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener*p = (GF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener*)_p; ``` ### bug report ```txt [iso file] Unknown box type .... ================================================================= ==5055==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000023c at pc 0x7fd7187bb791 bp 0x7ffc7c0c1d10 sp 0x7ffc7c0c1d08 WRITE of size 4 at 0x60400000023c thread T0 #0 0x7fd7187bb790 in ReadGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1103:54 #1 0x7fd7187bb790 in GF_IPMPX_ReadData /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1981 #2 0x7fd7187b42a3 in gf_ipmpx_data_parse /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:293:6 #3 0x7fd7187bae47 in ReadGF_IPMPX_MutualAuthentication /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:440:7 #4 0x7fd7187bae47 in GF_IPMPX_ReadData /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1985 #5 0x7fd7187b42a3 in gf_ipmpx_data_parse /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:293:6 #6 0x7fd718790176 in gf_odf_read_ipmp /src/gpac/src/odf/odf_code.c:2421:8 #7 0x7fd71876cf30 in gf_odf_read_descriptor /src/gpac/src/odf/desc_private.c:310:10 #8 0x7fd71876fe7f in gf_odf_parse_descriptor /src/gpac/src/odf/descriptors.c:161:8 #9 0x7fd71879bb29 in gf_odf_desc_read /src/gpac/src/odf/odf_codec.c:302:6 #10 0x7fd71856a82a in esds_Read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_base.c:1259:7 #11 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1323:9 #12 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_parse_ex /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:196 #13 0x7fd71857f524 in audio_sample_entry_Read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_base.c:3952:8 #14 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1323:9 #15 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_parse_ex /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:196 #16 0x7fd71861dcdf in gf_isom_box_array_read_ex /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1217:7 #17 0x7fd71858fdd3 in stsd_Read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_base.c:5604:9 #18 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_read /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1323:9 #19 0x7fd71861bc3c in gf_isom_box_parse_ex /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:196 #20 0x7fd71861ab97 in gf_isom_parse_root_box /src/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:42:8 #21 0x7fd71864182a in gf_isom_parse_movie_boxes /src/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c:204:7 #22 0x7fd718645e05 in gf_isom_open_file /src/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c:604:19 #23 0x7fd71864e478 in gf_isom_open /src/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_read.c:412:11 #24 0x54acf5 in mp4boxMain /src/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:4106:11 #25 0x7fd71701c82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #26 0x4244e8 in _start (/src/gpac/installed-asan/bin/MP4Box+0x4244e8) 0x60400000023c is located 0 bytes to the right of 44-byte region [0x604000000210,0x60400000023c) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e8718 in malloc /work/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:88 #1 0x7fd7187b4c06 in NewGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1091:2 #2 0x7fd7187b4c06 in gf_ipmpx_data_new /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1714 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /src/gpac/src/odf/ipmpx_code.c:1103:54 in ReadGF_IPMPX_RemoveToolNotificationListener Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8000: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 05 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c087fff8010: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8020: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c087fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c087fff8040: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==5055==ABORTING ``` ### others from fuzz project None crash name None-00001119-1558597651.mp4 Auto-generated by pyspider at 2019-05-23 16:16:46 please send email to [email protected] if you have any questions. ## other info ```txt Linux 47851981ba92 3.19.0-79-generic #87~14.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Wed Dec 21 18:12:31 UTC 2016 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux clang version 6.0.0 (tags/RELEASE_600/final) Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu with Asan ``` [POC](https://github.com/TeamSeri0us/pocs/tree/master/gpac/MP4Box/vuln)

4 bugs found in gpac v0.7.1 release

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1249/comments

2019-05-27T07:11:13Z

2019-07-10T08:47:22Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1249

CVE-2019-12814

2019-06-19T14:15:10.897

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x through 2.9.9. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has JDOM 1.x or 2.x jar in the classpath, an attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON message that allows them to read arbitrary local files on the server.

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2341

github.com

Similar to other polymorphic types with no limits, but for XXE with `jdom2.jar`, tracked as `CVE-2019-12814`. See https://medium.com/@cowtowncoder/on-jackson-cves-dont-panic-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-54cd0d6e8062 for description of the general problem. Fixed in: * 2.9.10 * 2.8.11.4 * 2.7.9.6 * 2.6.7.3

Block yet another gadget type (jdom, CVE-2019-12814)

https://api.github.com/repos/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2341/comments

2019-06-04T04:08:07Z

2019-10-16T04:53:30Z

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2341

CVE-2018-16247

2019-06-20T16:15:11.087

YzmCMS 5.1 has XSS via the admin/system_manage/user_config_add.html title parameter.

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/3

github.com

http://127.0.0.1/yzmcms/admin/system_manage/user_config_add.html XSS, payload ：<script>alert(1);</script> POC： POST /yzmcms/admin/system_manage/user_config_add.html HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:61.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/61.0 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://127.0.0.1/yzmcms/admin/system_manage/user_config_add.html Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 67 Cookie: joomla_remember_me_c40951350a7b1d9e2f1f81bd68d4c7af=yDotjSEyelPNb7k2.SOiDnuEJcliS7ROVynsH; iCMS_USER_AUTH=ea3c82fdxtNpijGe2IcYUlDjKfAAXlWqnxWAp7EojSadbYwHa%252Bh3Zq7%252BjCfDqMKPx6pkNpj3ZZT92FQuoAyytZfdEbYtT1A34Gne45d1INF5iaFBjIuVIWDHBGQOgw4IGmsPnt5i5%252BmnAvgfU4L3K0orglxQZCniWdUDVNOI%252BCJ29iJAExa2971EW14stwOFgWpU8%252BDTRj2RBu0dYPKIfSAKSW7RAKXO%252FUey1bqkg2V9hcb1gr4bUZhW2Zri3MuvJHdG6PLowrW77vi%252FoiaT6keckp7NNtr%252B1rr89QNrGyMk0AGNWZBUZdiD3BWuRSb8SKeUqVkkSCR%252B4Nb8tx1Nt0cmy%252F5QoZI3zDDRO8lQtpsGvyXIQdEPozb3eoBpLQijBAH%252BSrJodfsx8It3Sx%252FifTTVjKoLaieUNJVp%252B1HWBSbp%252BdeDefD8lKlayAlNoUe6L8v25JgkYFQJk9ty6plHu9KMxnk5ez9K%252BJX94d34X0d9uNSl16evfTh7ChrQNVlGiI5Xr7Yzwljydw7GbFYMuJhva%252BtfsTM; iCMS_userid=ae106e82Um%252F8Sl5cXKohwNL7HAT%252BJ8wbzRQrQxqC7ED5A4UZuw; iCMS_nickname=95d20a9ecX5js7g1ZjSe%252BO2PfWuvEpHcyf48apmBlHwSdCYM; iCMS_article_category_tabs=tree; bdshare_firstime=1534386202388; iCMS_redirect_num=1; 4a6f86430a9361b19459111df44aa326=aq59ps9ldq5c7598mm3lvcgdu0; joomla_user_state=logged_in; 12abbf4bf5e97f8392f838840fa944c4=74c507ed3havfnb90ts30iqlm3; iCMS_iCMS_AUTH=440aab71gT2MFtBaHQPwHaJS37c4iboInDqYaXOVjDSZkAHQHUM%252FvSDaZZV2tJKP%252ByH6FOQF7EtDBwXRZWs1h82dc11QZVBKHEz%252FB6E5tVplvHn4ARKu; PHPSESSID=f9trn71r781tg75v2fpqi9uel6; yzmphp_adminid=57c4QWyUo5m6tWVXPMc6uWaZHWa2O_83YBC3hx7W; yzmphp_adminname=dfd3xEcjriOWbvrIYHMl0gTppKSR0jGTHCnGQdsl9yuF Connection: close name=1&fieldtype=textarea&value=test&title=<script>alert(1);</script>&status=1&dosubmit=1   ——中科卓信软件测评技术中心

yzmcms v5.1 XSS

https://api.github.com/repos/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/3/comments

2018-08-16T05:18:39Z

2020-01-02T07:59:45Z

https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/3

CVE-2019-12974

2019-06-26T18:15:10.167

A NULL pointer dereference in the function ReadPANGOImage in coders/pango.c and the function ReadVIDImage in coders/vid.c in ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1515

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a null pointer deference vulnerablity in function ReadPANGOImage in coders/pango.c ``` option=GetImageOption(image_info,"filename"); if (option == (const char *) NULL) property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image, image_info->filename,exception); else if (LocaleNCompare(option,"pango:",6) == 0) property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image,option+6, exception); else property=InterpretImageProperties((ImageInfo *) image_info,image,option, exception); (void) SetImageProperty(image,"caption",property,exception); ``` (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/pango.c#L202) The return value of InterpretImageProperties may be NULL, and then there is a null pointer deference. See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=6152 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/93a9ccc85bd62b21bc4246fc6a8c2b7a32f8d678 for details.

Null pointer deference in function ReadPANGOImage in coders/pango.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1515/comments

2019-03-21T03:25:02Z

2019-06-27T01:28:59Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1515

CVE-2019-12975

2019-06-26T18:15:10.213

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a memory leak vulnerability in the WriteDPXImage function in coders/dpx.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1517

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a possible but rare memory leak in function `WriteDPXImage` in coders/dpx.c. ``` pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info); for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL) break; (void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info, quantum_type,pixels,exception); count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels); if (count != (ssize_t) extent) break; status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y, image->rows); if (status == MagickFalse) break; } quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info); (void) CloseBlob(image); return(status); ``` We should call `ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToWriteImageData");` when condition `y < (ssize_t) image->rows` satisfies behind for-loop. See commit https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f1cc2eb986dc8f4a7727bce689a17566f896fde6 for more details.

Possible but rare memory leak in function WriteDPXImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1517/comments

2019-03-21T06:25:46Z

2019-06-27T01:29:21Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1517

CVE-2019-12976

2019-06-26T18:15:10.277

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a memory leak in the ReadPCLImage function in coders/pcl.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1520

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a memory leak in function ReadPCLImage in coders/pcl.c. ``` (void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",(double) page.width,(double) page.height); if (image_info->monochrome != MagickFalse) delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("pcl:mono",(char *) NULL,exception); else if (cmyk != MagickFalse) delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("pcl:cmyk",(char *) NULL,exception); else delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("pcl:color",(char *) NULL,exception); if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL) return((Image *) NULL); ``` We should call `DestroyImage` before return statement. ``` if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL) - return((Image *) NULL); + { + image=DestroyImage(image); + return((Image *) NULL); + } ```

Memory leak in function ReadPCLImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1520/comments

2019-03-21T07:25:10Z

2019-06-27T01:29:46Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1520

CVE-2019-12977

2019-06-26T18:15:10.323

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a "use of uninitialized value" vulnerability in the WriteJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1518

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There a use-of-uninitialized-value vulnerability in function WriteJP2Image in coders/jp2.c. ``` if (image_info->extract != (char *) NULL) { RectangleInfo geometry; int flags; /* Set tile size. */ flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->extract,&geometry); parameters.cp_tdx=(int) geometry.width; parameters.cp_tdy=(int) geometry.width; if ((flags & HeightValue) != 0) parameters.cp_tdy=(int) geometry.height; if ((flags & XValue) != 0) parameters.cp_tx0=geometry.x; if ((flags & YValue) != 0) parameters.cp_ty0=geometry.y; parameters.tile_size_on=OPJ_TRUE; } ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/jp2.c#L853 We should call `(void) memset(&geometry,0,sizeof(geometry));` after declaration. See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=6441, https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/eeb68ee77dfb2b508284e4ea7d49e8b807d32783 and 81bfff2759854654bf07e452bf3b9b329f3c55e5 for detail.

Use-of-uninitialized-value in function WriteJP2Image

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1518/comments

2019-03-21T06:44:34Z

2019-06-27T01:30:10Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1518

CVE-2019-12978

2019-06-26T18:15:10.370

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a "use of uninitialized value" vulnerability in the ReadPANGOImage function in coders/pango.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1519

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There a use-of-uninitialized-value vulnerability in function ReadPANGOImage in coders/pango.c. ``` assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature); if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", image_info->filename); assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL); assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature); image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception); (void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0"); ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/pango.c#L179 We should call `SetImageBackgroundColor` when condition `image->columns !=0 && image->rows !=0` satisfies. Otherwise, there will be a use-of-unintialized-value vulnerablity. See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=11930, https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=6616, https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/18df5773b5efbd2c9dc54c9caa021febf486bd22 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f1fb7816a60c7c68d7ac037975c5aa95b6dcf8dd for more details.

Use-of-uninitialized-value in function ReadPANGOImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1519/comments

2019-03-21T06:54:58Z

2019-06-27T01:30:41Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1519

CVE-2019-12979

2019-06-26T18:15:10.417

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a "use of uninitialized value" vulnerability in the SyncImageSettings function in MagickCore/image.c. This is related to AcquireImage in magick/image.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1522

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is an issue in function SyncImageSettings in MagickCore/image.c. The issue is similar to https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=6385 which was fixed in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/56a19e7ae07f40299f3afd4994d690f2c9b81993. ``` if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL) { GeometryInfo geometry_info; flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info); image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho; image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma; if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0) image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x; } ``` Below is the proposal patch. ``` - image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho; - image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma; - if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0) - image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x; + if ((flags & RhoValue) != 0) + image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho; + image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x; + if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0) + image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma; ```

Use-of-uninitialized-value in function SyncImageSettings.

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1522/comments

2019-03-21T11:58:29Z

2019-08-10T06:30:27Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1522

CVE-2018-14867

2019-06-28T18:15:10.410

Incorrect access control in the portal messaging system in Odoo Community 9.0 and 10.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 and 10.0 allows remote attackers to post messages on behalf of customers, and to guess document attribute values, via crafted parameters.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32503

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-3 Incorrect access control in the portal messaging system in Odoo Community 9.0 and 10.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 and 10.0 allows remote attackers to post messages on behalf of customers, and to guess document attribute values, via crafted parameters. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: website_mail **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz), Naglis Jonaitis, Andrew Grasso **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14867](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14867) ## I. Background Odoo's messaging engine allows visitors on the website to post messages on existing documents. That mechanism is used to chat with unauthenticated users or to allow portal users to comment on their documents such as orders or tickets. This feature is limited by a security check that only allow users to post on documents when they have received a direct secure link to the document. ## II. Problem Description A programming error in the security check of the message post feature makes it easy to circumvent. It can also turn it into a vector for leaking limited information about arbitrary documents. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: No user account required **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 6.5 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N) A remote unauthenticated attacker could craft a request in order to post messages on any document of the database which includes a message history, as if they had been posted by the customer linked to the document. This attack also allows the attacker to guess, by trial and error, the value of a limited number of fields on such document. This is mitigated by the fact that it is very time consuming and will cause messages to be posted on the document. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is available, applying the patch is strongly recommended. Uninstalling the "website_mail" module can prevent exploiting this vulnerability, at the expense of making some parts of the Odoo deployment stop working (depending on the version and other modules installed). Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 6033439c67d696f5accb7e17ac42de6f9c0bd0b3 - 10.0: e00370e194ffa0c527bb4669401949cc6a15f55f - 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 10.0 and 9.0. The version 11.0 is not impacted by this vulnerability.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-3 (CVE-2018-14867) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32503/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:31Z

2019-04-08T13:37:33Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32503

CVE-2018-14868

2019-06-28T18:15:10.473

Incorrect access control in the Password Encryption module in Odoo Community 9.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 allows authenticated users to change the password of other users without knowing their current password via a crafted RPC call.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32507

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-7 Incorrect access control in the Password Encryption module in Odoo Community 9.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 allows authenticated users to change the password of other users without knowing their current password via a crafted RPC call. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: auth_crypt module **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14868](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14868) ## I. Background As of Odoo 8.0, when local passwords are used, the passwords are stored by default as salted cryptographic hashes (derived via PBKDF2 using SHA-512 hashing). This is provided by the "Password Encryption" module (auth_crypt), which is automatically installed. ## II. Problem Description Improper access control in the auth_crypt module allows authenticated users to change user passwords without any control. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: User account required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 8.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) By crafting a malicious RPC request, remote authenticated attackers (including portal users) could force a chosen password on any user, without knowing their current password. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround There is no known workaround, other than restricting remote access to the system to trustworthy network addresses only. Uninstalling the "Password Encryption" module (auth_crypt) would work too, with the side-effect of denying access to all users currently authenticated with hashed passwords. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: e9624a846048188e5282f65926f98dc297467245 - 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 9.0. Versions 10.0 and later are not impacted by this vulnerability.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-7 (CVE-2018-14868) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32507/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:42Z

2019-04-08T13:37:43Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32507

CVE-2018-14885

2019-06-28T18:15:10.520

Incorrect access control in the database manager component in Odoo Community 10.0 and 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 10.0 and 11.0 allows a remote attacker to restore a database dump without knowing the super-admin password. An arbitrary password succeeds.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32512

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-12 Incorrect access control in the database manager component in Odoo Community 10.0 and 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 10.0 and 11.0 allows a remote attacker to restore a database dump without knowing the super-admin password. An arbitrary password succeeds. **Affects**: Odoo 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Database Manager **Credits**: Yenthe Van Ginneken and Erwin van der Ploeg (Odoo Experts) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14885](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14885) ## I. Background Odoo provides an interface to manage databases, and create, backup and restore databases, in order to ease testing and development tasks. Access to these sensitive operations is normally protected by a super-admin password, chosen by the system administrator. ## II. Problem Description A programming error in the database restore feature rendered the super-admin password protection ineffective. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: Public **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 8.2 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H) When the database manager screen is not deactivated, an attacker could restore a database backup without knowning the super-admin password. This would allow the injection of data, and the execution of requests on the server with local database administration privileges. On a properly configured server, this could degrade the performance of the targeted server without gaining any access on the other databases on the server. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround Only servers with the database manager enabled are vulnerable to this issue. On production servers, deactivating the database manager will prevent attackers from abusing the issue, and is strongly recommended. See also the Odoo Deployment Guide: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/deploy.html Revoking database creation rights for the PostgreSQL user configured for the Odoo service will also prevent the attack. Odoo Cloud servers are not vulnerable to this issue, because the database manager is not enabled. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 10.0: b0203084133bee0dadc004debf3b0fb2835d0ffd - 11.0: 5decf4ab3da7484f8418d648688fbe4250ea7fdd - 11.0-ent and 10.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0 and 10.0. The version 9.0 is not impacted by this vulnerability.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-12 (CVE-2018-14885) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32512/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:55Z

2019-04-08T13:37:57Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32512

CVE-2018-14886

2019-06-28T18:15:10.567

The module-description renderer in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier does not disable RST's local file inclusion, which allows privileged authenticated users to read local files via a crafted module description.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32513

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-13 The module-description renderer in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier does not disable RST's local file inclusion, which allows privileged authenticated users to read local files via a crafted module description. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Core **Credits**: Stephane Bidoul (ACSONE SA) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14886](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14886) ## I. Background The description of Odoo modules can be written in several formats, including reStructuredText (RST) format. RST syntax provides a directive to include local system files, as a way to reuse text components. ## II. Problem Description The directive to include local system files is not deactivated by the module description renderer. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: Privileged user account required **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 6.8 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) An attacker with a privileged user account could craft a fake module description in order to retrieve the content of local files that may contain sensitive information. This could be used to access the contents of Odoo configuration files and other system files readable by the Odoo service, which could include sensitive data such as passwords. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can only access files readable by the system user executing Odoo. Sensitive files might therefore be protected by using filesystem-level permissions to block access to the Odoo user. It is very hard to effectively secure a system in this manner, so applying the patch or updating is strongly recommended. Odoo Cloud servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 9b4dfd99783447fb2aec6028880805e5050a4655 - 10.0: 4c7e74f5e93a4832db8b8e15beb70a4aa90b2eee - 11.0: 7fbf7e233ce9ca485ef89f90872042a0a247274e - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-13 (CVE-2018-14886) - The module-description renderer...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32513/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:58Z

2019-04-08T13:38:00Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32513

CVE-2018-14887

2019-06-28T18:15:10.613

Improper Host header sanitization in the dbfilter routing component in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows a remote attacker to deny access to the service and to disclose database names via a crafted request.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32511

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-11 Improper Host header sanitization in the dbfilter routing component in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows a remote attacker to deny access to the service and to disclose database names via a crafted request. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Odoo Framework **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14887](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14887) ## I. Background System administrators can configure a database filter in their Odoo service, in order to host multiple databases on the same Odoo server, and dynamically assign each request to the right database. This is set using the "dbfilter" config parameter, which can use regular expressions patterns, and placeholders that will be replaced by the domain (%d) and host (%h) of the request. ## II. Problem Description The placeholders were not properly sanitized before being injected in the final db_filter expression used for the dynamic assignation. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: Public **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 6.5 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H) If the web server in front of the Odoo service is configured to allow arbitrary domain names (VHosts), for example with a wildcard expression for subdomains, or if the Odoo service is directly exposed to the internet, an attacker could craft a request to cause a malicious db_filter evaluation. This could be used to trigger: - a leak of the names of available databases hosted on the same server, even if database listing was disabled by the administrator - a denial of service (via a voluntarily inefficient regular expression) The specific configuration necessary to make this exploitable is considered very rare and unlikely in practice. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround Only systems relying on db_filter with a %d or %h placeholder **and** a wildcard virtual host in their web server (or directly exposing the Odoo service) are vulnerable. If that is your case, a workaround is to make sure you have properly setup a web server in front of Odoo (e.g. nginx or Apache), and remove any wildcard expression from virtual hosts configured in the web server. You can replace those expressions with fixed host names, or with stricter expressions that only allows alphanumeric characters. Odoo Cloud servers were never vulnerable to this, as they do not use db_filter. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: afde870da4d2af0d9b40f907261d1ea5d48864d2 - 10.0: 4e4dd4dfa2b898c064df93199f882c3829574d44 - 11.0: 6d83f700144b29150050900430e8166d3d3345f7 - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0 (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-11 (CVE-2018-14887) - Improper Host header sanitizati...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32511/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:52Z

2019-04-08T13:37:55Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32511

CVE-2019-13067

2019-06-30T00:15:11.283

njs through 0.3.3, used in NGINX, has a buffer over-read in nxt_utf8_decode in nxt/nxt_utf8.c. This issue occurs after the fix for CVE-2019-12207 is in place.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/183

github.com

NJS version: ``` changeset: 1011:2fb43ddbce84 tag: tip user: hongzhidao <[email protected]> date: Mon Jun 10 22:23:56 2019 -0400 summary: Added property getter/setter support in Object.defineProperty(). ``` JS Testcase: ```js (new InternalError(new Object(), RegExp().source.replace((Object((ReferenceError()+{get: function () { }}))||Object.isExtensible()), RegExp().source.replace((RegExp()||ignoreCase.startsWith()), function v0() { }, Number(), Boolean(), Error(), TypeError(), Boolean(), Error(), Object(), 0)))+0) ``` ASAN log: ``` ================================================================= ==3788==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x5566629c2ab8 at pc 0x55666274915c bp 0x7ffefaee9990 sp 0x7ffefaee9980 READ of size 1 at 0x5566629c2ab8 thread T0 #0 0x55666274915b in nxt_utf8_decode nxt/nxt_utf8.c:72 #1 0x556662749796 in nxt_utf8_length nxt/nxt_utf8.c:271 #2 0x5566625d3857 in njs_string_replace_join njs/njs_string.c:3661 #3 0x5566625e40ee in njs_string_replace_regexp_join njs/njs_string.c:3280 #4 0x5566625e40ee in njs_string_replace_regexp njs/njs_string.c:3163 #5 0x5566625e40ee in njs_string_prototype_replace njs/njs_string.c:3058 #6 0x55666268dc13 in njs_function_native_call njs/njs_function.c:587 #7 0x5566625b0592 in njs_vmcode_continuation njs/njs_vm.c:2336 #8 0x5566625b0cb3 in njs_vmcode_interpreter njs/njs_vm.c:159 #9 0x5566625ab693 in njs_vm_start njs/njs.c:594 #10 0x55666258e8a9 in njs_process_script njs/njs_shell.c:772 #11 0x556662587cc8 in njs_process_file njs/njs_shell.c:621 #12 0x556662587cc8 in main njs/njs_shell.c:283 #13 0x7f67abf81b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #14 0x556662589db9 in _start (/home/build/njs/build/njs+0x2bdb9) 0x5566629c2ab8 is located 40 bytes to the left of global variable '__compound_literal.29' defined in 'njs/njs_object.c:2284:18' (0x5566629c2ae0) of size 56 0x5566629c2ab8 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable '__compound_literal.30' defined in 'njs/njs_object.c:2292:18' (0x5566629c2a80) of size 56 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow nxt/nxt_utf8.c:72 in nxt_utf8_decode Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0aad4c530500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aad4c530510: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aad4c530520: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0aad4c530530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 0x0aad4c530540: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x0aad4c530550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x0aad4c530560: 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0aad4c530570: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0aad4c530580: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0aad4c530590: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0aad4c5305a0: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==3788==ABORTING ``` Found by [fluff](https://github.com/Samsung/Fluff)

global-buffer-overflow in nxt_utf8_decode nxt/nxt_utf8.c:72

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/183/comments

2019-06-20T12:23:30Z

2019-07-02T14:04:00Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/183

CVE-2019-13072

2019-06-30T02:15:09.163

Stored XSS in the Filters page (Name field) in ZoneMinder 1.32.3 allows a malicious user to embed and execute JavaScript code in the browser of any user who navigates to this page.

https://github.com/ZoneMinder/zoneminder/issues/2642

github.com

- ZoneMinder version 1.32.3 - Installed from PPA (Ubuntu Xenial) - Ubuntu 16.04 Xenial The 'Filters' page in ZoneMinder 1.32.3 is vulnerable to stored cross site scripting due to improper input sanitation in the 'Name' field. This is the latest version available in the Ubuntu 16.04 PPA. Please see attached screenshots. <img width="1423" alt="1" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/7573003/59644743-e30ab480-9133-11e9-950c-93eab20fd308.png"> <img width="1434" alt="2" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/7573003/59644744-e30ab480-9133-11e9-8d5f-bd3a68c01b59.png"> Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. Go to the "Filters" page. 2. In the "Name" field paste in a javascript payload such as "<script>alert('Vulnerable')</script>" 3. Refresh the page to verify that the payload executes and remains stored through browser sessions. Expected behavior: The user input fields should be sanitized. Special characters should be limited or escaped to prevent injection of malicious code.

Stored Cross Site Scripting - Filters

https://api.github.com/repos/ZoneMinder/zoneminder/issues/2642/comments

2019-06-18T00:07:40Z

2019-12-26T10:04:57Z

https://github.com/ZoneMinder/zoneminder/issues/2642

CVE-2019-13108

2019-06-30T23:15:09.970

An integer overflow in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (SIGSEGV) via a crafted PNG image file, because PngImage::readMetadata mishandles a zero value for iccOffset.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/789

github.com

There is a bug at [pngimage.cpp:469](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/pngimage.cpp#L469). If `iccOffset == 0`, which happens if `chunkLength == 0`, then Exiv2 crashes with a SIGSEGV. Here is the PoC, which I have tested on master ([55dfdb9](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305)): . You can run the PoC like this: ``` $ exiv2 poc1.png Segmentation fault (core dumped) ```

SIGSEGV in PngImage::readMetadata()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/789/comments

2019-04-24T15:24:45Z

2019-07-01T08:58:12Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/789

CVE-2019-13109

2019-06-30T23:15:10.017

An integer overflow in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (SIGSEGV) via a crafted PNG image file, because PngImage::readMetadata mishandles a chunkLength - iccOffset subtraction.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/790

github.com

This issue is closely related to #789, but the consequences of this bug are different. The calculation of `chunkLength - iccOffset` at [pngimage.cpp:472](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/pngimage.cpp#L472) can have a negative integer overflow which leads to an 8GB memory allocation in `zlibToDataBuf`. Also, the zlib decompression is run on uninitialized memory beyond the end of the buffer, so there is a potential info leak vulnerability here. Here is the PoC, which I have tested on master ([55dfdb9](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305)): . The simplest way to see the bug is to use `ulimit` to reduce the amount of available memory to less than 8GB: ``` $ ulimit -v 8000000 $ exiv2 poc2.png Uncaught exception: std::bad_alloc ```

Integer overflow, leading to very large allocation in PngImage::readMetadata()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/790/comments

2019-04-24T15:39:42Z

2019-07-01T09:01:35Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/790

CVE-2019-13110

2019-06-30T23:15:10.067

A CiffDirectory::readDirectory integer overflow and out-of-bounds read in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (SIGSEGV) via a crafted CRW image file.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/843

github.com

The problem is that the calculation of `o+2` can overflow at [crwimage_int.cpp:284](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/f4a37c63f2f890c16ff7192fc89a75a7c34ae82b/src/crwimage_int.cpp#L284).  Reproducible on the 0.27-maintenance branch ([f4a37c6](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/f4a37c63f2f890c16ff7192fc89a75a7c34ae82b)): ``` exiv2 issue_843_poc.jpg ```

Integer overflow causes out-of-bounds read in CiffDirectory::readDirectory()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/843/comments

2019-05-13T12:58:33Z

2019-07-01T09:02:45Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/843

CVE-2019-13111

2019-06-30T23:15:10.113

A WebPImage::decodeChunks integer overflow in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (large heap allocation followed by a very long running loop) via a crafted WEBP image file.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/791

github.com

There is a bug at [webpimage.cpp:515](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/webpimage.cpp#L515). If `filesize < io_->tell()` then the subtraction overflows and the bounds check on `size` is ineffective. There is an additional problem in this function, which is that the error conditions are not checked after the calls to `io_->read`. Calls to `io_->read` should always be followed by calls to `io_->error()` and `io_->eof()`, to make sure that the buffer was read successfully. This means that the code does not notice that the file size is much smaller than the value of `size` would suggest. This has enabled me to write a PoC which causes exiv2 to run for almost a minute, scanning 4GB of uninitialized memory. Here is the PoC, which I have tested on master ([55dfdb9](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305)): . You can run the PoC like this to see the long-running behavior: ``` $ time exiv2 poc1.jpg File name : poc1.jpg File size : 28 Bytes MIME type : image/webp Image size : 0 x 0 poc1.jpg: No Exif data found in the file real 0m52.738s user 0m50.621s sys 0m2.108s ``` Or if you use `ulimit` to lower the maximum allocation size to less than 4GB then exiv2 will crash: ``` $ ulimit -v 4000000 $ exiv2 poc1.jpg Uncaught exception: std::bad_alloc ```

Integer overflow, leading to very large allocation in WebPImage::decodeChunks()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/791/comments

2019-04-24T16:03:00Z

2019-07-01T09:03:36Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/791

CVE-2019-13112

2019-06-30T23:15:10.160

A PngChunk::parseChunkContent uncontrolled memory allocation in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (crash due to an std::bad_alloc exception) via a crafted PNG image file.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/845

github.com

The attached file causes a `std::bad_alloc` exception in `exiv2`.  The bug is that there is no bounds check on the value of `length` at [pngchunk_int.cpp:669](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/f4a37c63f2f890c16ff7192fc89a75a7c34ae82b/src/pngchunk_int.cpp#L669). Reproducible on the 0.27-maintenance branch ([f4a37c6](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/f4a37c63f2f890c16ff7192fc89a75a7c34ae82b)): ``` exiv2 issue_845_poc.png ```

Out of memory error due to unchecked allocation size in PngChunk::parseChunkContent()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/845/comments

2019-05-13T13:42:43Z

2019-07-01T09:04:40Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/845

CVE-2019-13113

2019-06-30T23:15:10.207

Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (crash due to assertion failure) via an invalid data location in a CRW image file.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/841

github.com

The attached file causes an assertion failure in `exiv2`.  Reproducible on the 0.27-maintenance branch ([f4a37c6](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/f4a37c63f2f890c16ff7192fc89a75a7c34ae82b)): ``` exiv2 issue_841_poc.jpg ```

Invalid data location in CRW image causes exiv2 to crash

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/841/comments

2019-05-13T11:53:23Z

2019-07-01T09:05:47Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/841

CVE-2019-13114

2019-06-30T23:15:10.267

http.c in Exiv2 through 0.27.1 allows a malicious http server to cause a denial of service (crash due to a NULL pointer dereference) by returning a crafted response that lacks a space character.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/793

github.com

There is a null pointer deference bug at [http.cpp:364](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/http.cpp#L364). If the http server sends back a reply that does not contain a space character, then `strchr` will return `NULL`, leading to a null pointer dereference in `atoi`. To reproduce the bug (tested on master: [55dfdb9](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305)) open two terminals. In the first terminal, start a fake webserver using [response1.txt](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/files/3113957/response1.txt): ``` cat response1.txt | sudo nc -l -p 80 ``` In the second terminal, try to connect to the fake webserver: ``` exiv2 http://127.0.0.1/test.jpg ``` There are several other calls to `strcat` and `strstr` in the same [block of code](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/http.cpp#L339-L396). I have not written PoCs for them, but the calls to `strchr` on lines [351](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/http.cpp#L351) and [362](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/blob/55dfdb9ab007d6e6d1d06240048690eaac23b305/src/http.cpp#L362) also look vulnerable to me.

null pointer dereference in http.cpp

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/793/comments

2019-04-24T20:14:50Z

2019-07-01T09:07:49Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/793

CVE-2019-13133

2019-07-01T20:15:11.180

ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadBMPImage in coders/bmp.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There are two memory leak issues in ReadBMPImage in coder/bmp.c and ReadVIFFImage in coder/viff.c. There is a patch https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/3b48d20df53ad048af05107aa1850c344466b082, which fixed multiple memory leak vulnerabilities. However, the patch for ReadBMPImage is wrong. ``` if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) { - image=DestroyImageList(image); + status=MagickFalse; return((Image *) NULL); } ``` Below is the correct logic. ``` if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) { - image=DestroyImageList(image); - return((Image *) NULL); + status=MagickFalse; + break; } ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/bmp.c#L1508 At the same time, there is the same issue in ReadVIFFImage. ``` if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) { image=DestroyImageList(image); return((Image *) NULL); } ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/viff.c#L774 ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): - Additional information: <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

Memory leak in ReadBMPImage in coder/bmp.c and ReadVIFFImage in coder/viff.c.

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600/comments

2019-06-18T10:55:16Z

2019-07-03T01:29:51Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600

CVE-2019-13135

2019-07-01T20:15:11.337

ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a "use of uninitialized value" vulnerability in the function ReadCUTImage in coders/cut.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> ``` /* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */ BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk, sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/ if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory; offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET); ``` (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/cut.c#L552) We should initialize the BImgBuff, otherwise an use-of-uninitialized vulnerability occurs, which is similar to https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=6780 (fixed in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/a85ab26099152be3dab0bd377670abfc815b9fe7 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/81bfff2759854654bf07e452bf3b9b329f3c55e5 ) and https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=5710 (fixed in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/ce433f8048b120b2a0413b4ac3ef59fca35a9788 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/81bfff2759854654bf07e452bf3b9b329f3c55e5). <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

Use of uninitialized value in function ReadCUTImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599/comments

2019-06-18T10:33:40Z

2019-07-03T01:30:23Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599

CVE-2019-13136

2019-07-01T20:15:11.417

ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has an integer overflow vulnerability in the function TIFFSeekCustomStream in coders/tiff.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a possible integer overflow vulnerability in TIFFSeekCustomStream in coder/tiff.c ``` case SEEK_CUR: { if ((profile->offset+offset) < 0) return(-1); profile->offset+=offset; break; } ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/tiff.c#L259 This issue is similar to the one which was fixed in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8b28a8708ca994c7c9f211d562a8109621cf4d15 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/114be1716d0a8a10df6f772ef558968a2ad9ab68.

Possible integer overflow in TIFFSeekCustomStream in coder/tiff.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602/comments

2019-06-18T11:47:50Z

2019-07-03T01:30:44Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602

CVE-2019-13137

2019-07-01T20:15:11.493

ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadPSImage in coders/ps.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601

github.com

### Prerequisites - [ Y ] I have written a descriptive issue title - [ Y ] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [ Y ] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a memory leak issue in ReadPSImage in coder/ps.c ``` page_geometry=GetPageGeometry(option); flags=ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&page.x,&page.y,&page.width, &page.height); if (flags == NoValue) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError, "InvalidGeometry","`%s'",option); image=DestroyImage(image); return((Image *) NULL); } page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*image->resolution.x/delta.x) -0.5); page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*image->resolution.y/ delta.y) -0.5); page_geometry=DestroyString(page_geometry); fitPage=MagickTrue; ``` https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/master/coders/ps.c#L740 It is possible that page_geometry is not destroyed since there is a return statement before it. It is the issue which is similar to the one fixed in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/15be797d622655244e4c57cc5e9e4cba013011f8

Memory leak in ReadPSImage in coder/ps.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601/comments

2019-06-18T11:02:58Z

2019-07-03T01:31:05Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601

CVE-2018-14866

2019-07-03T18:15:10.317

Incorrect access control in the TransientModel framework in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated attackers to access data in transient records that they do not own by making an RPC call before garbage collection occurs.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32509

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-9 Incorrect access control in the TransientModel framework in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated attackers to access data in transient records that they do not own by making an RPC call before garbage collection occurs. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Core **Credits**: Florent de Labarre **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14866](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14866) ## I. Background The Odoo framework includes a mechanism for managing temporary records, known as TransientModels, for the purpose of containing transient data while a certain screen or operation is in progress. Such records are regularly deleted by a garbage collector job. The security model for regulating access to TransientModels is different from regular non-transient ones, in that there are not customizable access rights. A default, hardcoded security policy makes those transient records accessible only to the user who created them (the owner), and to the administrator. ## II. Problem Description The implementation of the security model for TransientModels was incomplete, to the effect that some operations were possible by users on transient records that they did not own. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: Unprivileged user account required **CVSS3 Score**: Low :: 3.5 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) An attacker with an unprivileged user account (even portal users) may be able to retrieve values of fields from transient records that they did not own, via specially crafted RPC requests, in the interval between their creation and the automatic garbage collection. Such transient records may include limited business or sensitive data that should not have been accessible to the attacker. Exploitation would however be difficult in practice, limited by the need to actually have TransientModels that include sensitive data (which depends on installed modules), by the need to have a privileged user populate transient records with the data, and by the need to execute the attack in the limited time window before the automatic garbage collection. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is known, so applying the patch or updating is strongly recommended. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 67bf250ea5035e2e8e4da7e32f2671beb75cfab4 - 10.0: e93fa785629500e997330731d84853eb2edac299 - 11.0: 4b1b70a77a482926aa87503a8ef9d0aec5c5293f - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-9 (CVE-2018-14866) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32509/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:46Z

2019-04-08T13:37:49Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32509

CVE-2018-14861

2019-07-03T19:15:10.503

Improper data access control in Odoo Community 10.0 and 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 10.0 and 11.0 allows authenticated users to perform a CSV export of the secure hashed passwords of other users.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32506

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-6 Improper data access control in Odoo Community 10.0 and 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 10.0 and 11.0 allows authenticated users to perform a CSV export of the secure hashed passwords of other users. **Affects**: Odoo 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Odoo Framework **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz), Swapnesh Shah **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14861](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14861) ## I. Background As of Odoo 8.0, when local passwords are used, the passwords are stored by default as salted cryptographic hashes (derived via PBKDF2 using SHA-512 hashing). In order to protect the cryptographic hashes from being accessed by users, a special security rule prevents reading the fields where the password hashes are stored. ## II. Problem Description A programming error made this special security rule ineffective when the CSV/Excel export mechanism is used. This is a regression of the correction for Security Advisory 2016-04a-password-export. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: "Employee" access required **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 4.3 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) By using the CSV export functionality, users with internal "Employee" access might export the password hashes of other database users, including those of privileged users. Exploiting these password hashes to retrieve user passwords is difficult but not necessarily impossible, for example in the presence of weak passwords or passwords that may be subject to dictionary attacks. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but users that are exclusively authenticated via remote authentication methods such as LDAP (auth_ldap) are not vulnerable, as they have no local password. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 10.0: 0dbed816b90db5be06c60bf0e4a74411c9cf962e - 11.0: 698314e5d4c145c0b7b9fc323fccc7c3a19de0fc - 11.0-ent and 10.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0 and 10.0. Version 9.0 is not impacted by this vulnerability.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-6 (CVE-2018-14861) - Improper data access control in...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32506/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:39Z

2019-04-08T13:37:41Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32506

CVE-2018-14862

2019-07-03T19:15:10.580

Incorrect access control in the mail templating system in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated internal users to delete arbitrary menuitems via a crafted RPC request.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32504

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-4 Incorrect access control in the mail templating system in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated internal users to delete arbitrary menuitems via a crafted RPC request. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: mail **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14862](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14862) ## I. Background Odoo's chatter engine allows users to create templates for commonly used messages. To make it faster to use, the system allows template authors to create a shortcut action to reuse the template. ## II. Problem Description The shortcut removal mechanism can be abused to remove other part of the interface. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: User account required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 7.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H) A malicious employee could craft malicious RPC requests to cause the deletion of arbitrary menu entries of the user interface. While there is no loss of business data, removing the shortcut would make the system very difficult to use, until repaired. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround Restricting the create and write access to the mail.template model to trusted users only is a way to mitigate the attack until the patch can be applied. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 91486656ab584cbb7a1f48543ccfe37fb386d850 - 10.0: 2d32609440239bd284fd472851a5c7936aa516ed - 11.0: 1e42cbc1f425d31bbc83f3994f3bd8836aa201a2 - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-4 (CVE-2018-14862) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32504/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:34Z

2019-04-08T13:37:36Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32504

CVE-2018-14863

2019-07-03T19:15:10.643

Incorrect access control in the RPC framework in Odoo Community 8.0 through 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 through 11.0 allows authenticated users to call private functions via RPC.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32508

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-8 Incorrect access control in the RPC framework in Odoo Community 8.0 through 11.0 and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 through 11.0 allows authenticated users to call private functions via RPC. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Odoo Framework **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14863](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14863) ## I. Background As of Odoo 8.0, the Odoo framework was considerably changed by the introduction of a new abstraction layer to communicate with the database, dubbed the "new API". To simplify the transition, the new API was initially written with a backwards-compatibility layer so that it could support modules written for older versions with limited changes. ## II. Problem Description A programming error in the backwards-compatibility layer allows bypassing the access control and remotely accessing private functions. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: User account required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 8.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) By crafting a specific RPC request, malicious users (including portal users) may call private methods, not normally exposed via the RPC API. An attacker may be able to use them outside of the intended scope to retrieve or alter information stored in the database. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is known, applying the patch is strongly recommended. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: a1b92ad2b8aa2873e8707ef13660771fd75dba8e - 10.0: 2c9c7e770addb152f6d424c3ea0f6ac9bcc25a56 - 11.0: ff45f227505df644c70bd02d804f48b3c3e54601 - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-8 (CVE-2018-14863) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32508/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:44Z

2019-04-08T13:37:45Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32508

CVE-2018-14864

2019-07-03T19:15:10.707

Incorrect access control in asset bundles in Odoo Community 9.0 through 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 through 11.0 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script via a crafted attachment.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32502

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-2 Incorrect access control in asset bundles in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script via a crafted attachment. **Affects**: Odoo 8.0, 9.0, 10.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Core **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14864](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14864) ## I. Background Odoo's framework includes an automatic mechanism for minifying and bundling web assets, in order to speed up page loads. This works by grouping related assets in "bundles", and minifying them together as a simple file that can be compressed and loaded faster. As computing and compiling assets is an expensive operation, asset bundles are cached and stored in the database and file store. ## II. Problem Description The mechanism used to locate and serve cached assets bundles did not sufficiently validate the origin of the cached files. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: Unprivileged user account required **CVSS3 Score**: Medium :: 6.3 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N)/E:P/RL:O/RC:C An attacker with a non privileged user account (including a simple portal user account) could upload a specially crafted attachment in order to poison the asset bundle cache, and inject arbitrary assets (JavaScript and CSS code). This could be used to hijack the sessions of any user accessing the Odoo database via a web browser and allow the attacker to gain elevated privileges. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround For portal users: administrators can modify the Access Control for Attachments (`ir.attachment`) and prevent external users (also know as "portal users") from creating or modifying attachments. External users do not normally need this permission except for posting messages with attachments in the portal, which is an acceptable trade-off. For internal users: administrators could further modify Access Control to prevent everyone from creating/modifying Attachments (`ir.attachment`). This will entirely prevent exploiting this vulnerability, but comes with a great functional impact. Many business processes will be disrupted, so this should only be used as a temporary solution, until the patch can be applied. For Odoo Online: all servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: e5984fbfc3141d83184c13b627a918f4d9913d0c - 10.0: 19ac9fba0d4be4e30d6103e6ebd49b466adb74b5 - 11.0: bfffe39f1376a56226572295b945a2cc73ba50ce - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-2 (CVE-2018-14864) - Incorrect access control in ass...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32502/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:25Z

2019-04-08T13:37:30Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32502

CVE-2018-14865

2019-07-03T19:15:10.767

Report engine in Odoo Community 9.0 through 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 9.0 through 11.0 and earlier does not use secure options when passing documents to wkhtmltopdf, which allows remote attackers to read local files.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32501

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-1 Report engine in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier does not use secure options when passing documents to wkhtmltopdf, which allows remote attackers to read local files. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Core **Credits**: Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14865](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14865) ## I. Background Odoo's report engine relies on the external program "wkhtmltopdf" to generate PDF documents from HTML files rendered from report templates. Wkhtmltopdf supports loading remote resources such as images or stylesheets, but also permits loading local files. ## II. Problem Description The report engine does not prevent access to local files during rendering by Wkhtmltopdf. ## III. Impact **Attack Vector**: Network exploitable **Authentication**: Unprivileged user account required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 7.7 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) Untrusted administrators on hosted databases may alter their report templates in order to trick the report engine into including local server files. External non-privileged users may also be able to trick the report engine into including local files, by crafting malicious RPC requests. Both methods could result in the disclosure of system files that are readable by the Odoo server process, including Odoo configuration files or other system files that could possibly include passwords or sensitive data. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can only access files readable by the Odoo server process. Sensitive files might therefore be protected by using filesystem-level permissions. However, it is very hard to effectively secure a system in this manner, so applying the patch or updating your installation is strongly recommended instead. Alternatively, the wkhtmltopdf executable could be replaced by a command script that executes the actual wkhtmltopdf command with an extra parameter "--disable-local-file-access". Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: d5efba256138464618a7bfa8f52beb3eaae50509 - 10.0: dae282279947e1f9cccad5ec0244ee654132509b - 11.0: d255628ecf564d54825a55c662eeee552e66377a - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-1 (CVE-2018-14865) - Report engine in Odoo Community...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32501/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:23Z

2019-04-08T13:37:25Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32501

CVE-2018-14859

2019-07-03T20:15:10.777

Incorrect access control in the password reset component in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated users to reset the password of other users by being the first party to use the secure token.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32510

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-10 Incorrect access control in the password reset component in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated users to reset the password of other users by being the first party to use the secure token. **Affects**: Odoo 9.0, 10.0, 11.0 (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Odoo Framework **Credits**: Swapnesh Shah, Nils Hamerlinck (Trobz) **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14859](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14859) ## I. Background The "External Signup" module (auth_signup) allows external users to create accounts on databases where the feature is installed and enabled. It also provides a password reset feature, so that users can recover their accounts by clicking on a secure link received by email. ## II. Problem Description A secret field used to contruct the secure reset password link was not properly protected againt access by internal users of the systems. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Low **Authentication**: "Employee" access required **CVSS3 Score**: High :: 8.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) A malicious internal user (a regular "Employee" account) could trigger a reset password for a user, and use the value of the secret field to change the password of other users before they could react to the email. This would work even when targetting administrator accounts. The victim would likely notice both a suspicious reset password message and the fact that they would now be unable to sign in with their usual password, but possibly not before the attacker was able to abuse the credentials of the user. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability. ## IV. Workaround An administrator may disable the reset password feature to prevent the attack. As the reset password is a convenient feature exepcted by users registering on a system, applying the patch or updating is strongly recommended. Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 57ea939edac7ae4fa19306bf827231027f3c245c - 10.0: 7501691da9a9dae832b7d6e78c6a5f57fc983b5c - 11.0: cbce12642570e6b65d7b21738712c189f6cdee5d - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0 (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-10 (CVE-2018-14859) - Incorrect access control in the...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32510/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:50Z

2019-04-08T13:37:51Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32510

CVE-2018-14860

2019-07-03T20:15:10.837

Improper sanitization of dynamic user expressions in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated privileged users to escape from the dynamic expression sandbox and execute arbitrary code on the hosting system.

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32505

github.com

# Security Advisory - ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-5 Improper sanitization of dynamic user expressions in Odoo Community 11.0 and earlier and Odoo Enterprise 11.0 and earlier allows authenticated privileged users to escape from the dynamic expression sandbox and execute arbitrary code on the hosting system. **Affects**: Odoo 11.0 and earlier (Community and Enterprise Editions) **Component**: Odoo Framework **Credits**: \<Undisclosed\> **CVE ID**: [CVE-2018-14859](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14859) ## I. Background Odoo includes a sandbox for interpreting dynamic business logic components, such as the definition of workflows, automated actions, or the dynamic expressions used within report templates. The mechanism behind this sandbox is called 'safe eval' and keeps the system safe while allowing advanced customizations. Its role is to execute user-provided Odoo business logic, while preventing any undesired effects on the data or the hosting platform - such as could be caused by accident or by malicious users. In order to be allowed to customize any of these dynamic business logic components, one must usually be an administrator of an Odoo database, or have otherwise received elevated privileges. ## II. Problem Description The default 'safe eval' sandbox environment was not sufficiently sanitized, so an attacker with sufficient privileges might be able to escape the sandbox through the use of specially crafted dynamic expressions. Systems who host Odoo databases for untrusted users are particularly at risk, (e.g. SaaS platforms), as they typically allow users to become administrators of their own Odoo database. This is sufficient to exploit the vulnerability. ## III. Impact Access Vector: Network exploitable Access Complexity: Medium **Authentication**: Privileged user account required **CVSS3 Score**: Critical :: 9.1 **CVSS3 Vector**: [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) Malicious users with access to an administrator account on an Odoo database might craft special code expressions specifically targeted at escaping the sandbox protection. This could in turn be used to execute arbitrary code as the user running the Odoo service, to launch system commands with access to local files and local services. Files and environments accessed in this manner may contain sensitive information such as passwords that could also allow the user to gain elevated privileges on the hosting machine itself, in addition to being able to run commands. Exploiting this vulnerability requires remote network access and administrator (or privileged) account on a database hosted on a vulnerable Odoo installation. Odoo S.A. is not aware of any use of this vulnerability in the wild. ## IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems that do not provide administrator or otherwise privileged access to untrusted users are not vulnerable. All Odoo Online servers have been patched as soon as the correction was available. ## V. Solution Apply the patches corresponding to your Odoo installation, or update to the latest revision, either via GitHub or by downloading it: https://www.odoo.com/page/download For the actual update procedure, please refer to our update instructions, valid for all versions: https://www.odoo.com/documentation/11.0/setup/update.html If you choose to apply the patch instead, change into the main directory of your Odoo installation (the one containing "odoo" and "addons" directories), then execute the patch command, typically: patch -p0 -f < /path/to/the_patch_file.patch This command assumes your installation layout corresponds to the latest source code layout of the Odoo project on GitHub. If your installation differs, please extract the various patch hunks from the files and apply them in the appropriate locations. ## VI. Correction details The following list contains the revisions after which the vulnerability is corrected: - 9.0: 779ceac97309fd69086446bc14e6d613aeb9bbdd - 10.0: ef017ab1ab7bc5988ad30ab92a445079e245cf03 - 11.0: 21bb14d17764f16ca2727622d7892d38104e2ec3 - 11.0-ent, 10.0-ent and 9.0-ent (Enterprise): see 11.0, 10.0 and 9.0.

[SEC] ODOO-SA-2018-08-07-5 (CVE-2018-14860) - Improper sanitization of dynami...

https://api.github.com/repos/odoo/odoo/issues/32505/comments

2019-04-08T13:37:37Z

2019-04-08T14:38:16Z

https://github.com/odoo/odoo/issues/32505

CVE-2019-13238

2019-07-04T14:15:10.853

An issue was discovered in Bento4 1.5.1.0. A memory allocation failure is unhandled in Core/Ap4SdpAtom.cpp and leads to crashes. When parsing input video, the program allocates a new buffer to parse an atom in the stream. The unhandled memory allocation failure causes a direct copy to a NULL pointer.

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/396

github.com

A memory allocation failure unhandled in Ap4SdpAtom.cpp and leads to crashes. `./mp42aac input_file /dev/null` In file Source/C++/Core/Ap4SdpAtom.cpp <img width="640" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/7632714/58334121-73c1dd80-7e71-11e9-88a2-c9fbd2129068.png"> AP4_SdpAtom allocate a new buffer to parse the atom in the stream. The unhandled memory allocation failure cause the read content memcpy to a null pointer. <img width="553" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/7632714/58333799-d23a8c00-7e70-11e9-9bc3-89b928919860.png"> This is the start points. In file In file Source/C++/Core/Ap4ByteStream.cpp   AP4_CopyMemory is the macro define of memcpy and the path formed. Asan trace report: > ==79431==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_allocator.cc:147 "((0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0xf725e797 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x9f797) #1 0xf7263a69 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa4a69) #2 0xf71d507b (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1607b) #3 0xf7261e80 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0xa2e80) #4 0xf71da229 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x1b229) #5 0xf7256e16 in operator new[](unsigned int) (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.2+0x97e16) #6 0x873013b in AP4_SdpAtom::AP4_SdpAtom(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4SdpAtom.cpp:60 #7 0x82dcab1 in AP4_SdpAtom::Create(unsigned int, AP4_ByteStream&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4SdpAtom.h:54 #8 0x82dcab1 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:595 #9 0x83016d3 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:221 #10 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::ReadChildren(AP4_AtomFactory&, AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:194 #11 0x82b6bae in AP4_ContainerAtom::AP4_ContainerAtom(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:139 #12 0x82be680 in AP4_ContainerAtom::Create(unsigned int, unsigned long long, bool, bool, AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4ContainerAtom.cpp:88 #13 0x82dc711 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:764 #14 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, unsigned long long&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:221 #15 0x82fa1f7 in AP4_AtomFactory::CreateAtomFromStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_Atom*&) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4AtomFactory.cpp:151 #16 0x809a044 in AP4_File::ParseStream(AP4_ByteStream&, AP4_AtomFactory&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:104 #17 0x809a044 in AP4_File::AP4_File(AP4_ByteStream&, bool) /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Core/Ap4File.cpp:78 #18 0x8082ce7 in main /mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Source/C++/Apps/Mp42Aac/Mp42Aac.cpp:250 #19 0xf69df636 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) #20 0x808df1b (/mnt/data/playground/mp42-a/Build/mp42aac+0x808df1b) [input_file.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3217304/input_file.zip)

Exhaustive memory misunhandle

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/396/comments

2019-05-24T14:17:26Z

2019-08-25T16:31:09Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/396

CVE-2019-13295

2019-07-05T01:15:09.907

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/threshold.c in AdaptiveThresholdImage because a width of zero is mishandled.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/threshold.c:323:33 in AdaptiveThresholdImage ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:logo +repage ")" "(" magick:wizard -lat 0x564-42% ")" -quiet tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ==10393==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f8ba61737f0 at pc 0x7f8bb5c0f9fa bp 0x7ffc04d5fad0 sp 0x7ffc04d5fac8 READ of size 4 at 0x7f8ba61737f0 thread T0 #0 0x7f8bb5c0f9f9 in AdaptiveThresholdImage MagickCore/threshold.c:323:33 #1 0x7f8bb51c1cb6 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2571:21 #2 0x7f8bb51b6c78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #3 0x7f8bb51dc315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #4 0x7f8bb501da99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #5 0x7f8bb501ed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #6 0x7f8bb5068ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #7 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #8 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #9 0x7f8bafadfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x7f8ba61737f0 is located 16 bytes to the left of 4331520-byte region [0x7f8ba6173800,0x7f8ba6595000) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f8bb5a57ed6 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f8bb57aeccc in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0x7f8bb579c13b in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5070:12 #4 0x7f8bb5793b05 in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0x7f8bb57b1ea6 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0x7f8bb5c0ef20 in AdaptiveThresholdImage MagickCore/threshold.c:257:7 #7 0x7f8bb51c1cb6 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2571:21 #8 0x7f8bb51b6c78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #9 0x7f8bb51dc315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #10 0x7f8bb501da99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f8bb501ed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f8bb5068ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f8bafadfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/threshold.c:323:33 in AdaptiveThresholdImage ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/threshold.c:323:33 in AdaptiveThresholdImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608/comments

2019-06-21T05:58:31Z

2019-07-08T01:48:18Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608

CVE-2019-13296

2019-07-05T01:15:09.983

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has direct memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in CLIListOperatorImages in MagickWand/operation.c for a NULL value.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There're a direct memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory of MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 and many indirect memory leaks. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:netscape +repage ")" "(" magick:granite +repage ")" -append -fft -compare tmp` and this cmd also can trigger them. cmd: `magick -seed 0 -bias 0% "(" magick:rose +repage ")" "(" magick:rose -despeckle -threshold 26 -wave 55x83 ")" -sampling-factor 3.65x3.408 -channel RGBA -compare -mosaic -compare tmp` Here's ASAN result. ``` ==5674==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 13504 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7a1154 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7fdfed7a5709 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:823:25 #4 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #5 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #6 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #7 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 940032 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed7f3f66 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fdfed53c6ac in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7fdfed542991 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7fdfed52a330 in QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:4156:28 #5 0x7fdfed52a001 in GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:1324:10 #6 0x7fdfed54ca4e in GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:312:10 #7 0x7fdfed7b43e1 in SetImageAlpha MagickCore/image.c:2372:7 #8 0x7fdfed8356d5 in ConformPixelInfo MagickCore/pixel.c:235:12 #9 0x7fdfed7a84e7 in SetImageBackgroundColor MagickCore/image.c:2441:3 #10 0x7fdfed7a4c47 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:533:10 #11 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #12 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #13 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 22616 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7f41af in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7fdfed7a6b3d in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:879:43 #4 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #5 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #6 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #7 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 13024 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7a1154 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7fdfed7a3793 in AcquireImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:350:28 #4 0x7fdfed7ac553 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:945:14 #5 0x7fdfed7a36b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #6 0x7fdfed7baea6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #7 0x7fdfecf78153 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5243:14 #8 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 9152 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed7f3f66 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fdfed526a04 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:195:28 #3 0x7fdfed527f8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #4 0x7fdfed7a75df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #5 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #6 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #7 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #8 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 512 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7f41af in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7fdfed834f7a in AcquirePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:101:35 #4 0x7fdfed835154 in ClonePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:139:13 #5 0x7fdfed7a638f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:849:28 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 288 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed504284 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7fdfed505d5d in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:554:27 #4 0x7fdfed7a6848 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #5 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #6 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #7 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #8 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7f41af in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7fdfed5275df in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:271:29 #4 0x7fdfed526f8d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #5 0x7fdfed527f8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #6 0x7fdfed7a75df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #7 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #8 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #9 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 96 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed94f073 in AddValueToSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:189:21 #3 0x7fdfed94ff7c in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:12 #4 0x7fdfed884f23 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #5 0x7fdfed7a5f99 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed9540c4 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7fdfed950155 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7fdfed94fd64 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7fdfed884f23 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7fdfed7a5f99 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #8 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #9 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 80 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7f41af in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7fdfed987963 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7fdfed94ff66 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:373:7 #5 0x7fdfed884f23 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7fdfed7a5f99 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #8 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #9 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed9397c1 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7fdfed939003 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7fdfed7a69df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:871:26 #4 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #5 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #6 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #7 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed9397c1 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7fdfed939003 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7fdfed5061ae in GetBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:1745:24 #4 0x7fdfed505d6a in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:555:3 #5 0x7fdfed7a6848 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed9397c1 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7fdfed939003 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7fdfed527383 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:231:30 #4 0x7fdfed527f8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7fdfed7a75df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed9397c1 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7fdfed939003 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7fdfed5272f4 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:229:25 #4 0x7fdfed527f8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7fdfed7a75df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed7f3f66 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fdfed5274e2 in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:267:29 #3 0x7fdfed526f8d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #4 0x7fdfed527f8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7fdfed7a75df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #7 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #8 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fdfed9397c1 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7fdfed939003 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7fdfed9503c9 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7fdfed94fd64 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7fdfed884f23 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7fdfed7a5f99 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #8 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #9 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7fdfed7f4146 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7fdfed7f41af in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7fdfed987963 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7fdfed94fee1 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43 #5 0x7fdfed884f23 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7fdfed7a5f99 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7fdfed7a4a81 in AppendImages MagickCore/image.c:520:16 #8 0x7fdfecf6bd2d in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3795:22 #9 0x7fdfecf7834e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7fdfecdb9a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fdfecdbad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fdfece04ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fdfe787bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 1000000 byte(s) leaked in 24 allocation(s). ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-18 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

Direct memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory and indirect memory leaks

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604/comments

2019-06-18T17:22:26Z

2019-07-08T01:48:39Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604

CVE-2019-13297

2019-07-05T01:15:10.047

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/threshold.c in AdaptiveThresholdImage because a height of zero is mishandled.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/threshold.c:328:11 in AdaptiveThresholdImage. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -dispose Background "(" magick:netscape -lat 514x0-41 ")" "(" magick:granite -charcoal 3 -level 0%,125,0.328 ")" -combine -print "" tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ==22189==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x620000001090 at pc 0x7fd7e5dd4be2 bp 0x7ffd816c3a30 sp 0x7ffd816c3a28 READ of size 4 at 0x620000001090 thread T0 #0 0x7fd7e5dd4be1 in AdaptiveThresholdImage MagickCore/threshold.c:328:11 #1 0x7fd7e5386cb6 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2571:21 #2 0x7fd7e537bc78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #3 0x7fd7e53a1315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #4 0x7fd7e51e2a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #5 0x7fd7e51e3d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #6 0x7fd7e522dba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #7 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #8 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #9 0x7fd7dfca4b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) Address 0x620000001090 is a wild pointer. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/threshold.c:328:11 in AdaptiveThresholdImage ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/threshold.c:328:11 in AdaptiveThresholdImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609/comments

2019-06-21T06:02:04Z

2019-07-08T01:48:56Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609

CVE-2019-13298

2019-07-05T01:15:10.110

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h in SetPixelViaPixelInfo because of a MagickCore/enhance.c error.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:804:56 in SetPixelViaPixelInfo. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:netscape -random-threshold 66x4 -resize 72%+20-45 ")" "(" magick:netscape -shear 40 -enhance ")" tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ================================================================= ==6928==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7faaff40fa80 at pc 0x7fab0dddcb45 bp 0x7fff3e3ee2b0 sp 0x7fff3e3ee2a8 WRITE of size 4 at 0x7faaff40fa80 thread T0 #0 0x7fab0dddcb44 in SetPixelViaPixelInfo ./MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:804:56 #1 0x7fab0ddf1234 in EnhanceImage MagickCore/enhance.c:1976:7 #2 0x7fab0d63a171 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2284:21 #3 0x7fab0d632c78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #4 0x7fab0d658315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #5 0x7fab0d499a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #6 0x7fab0d49ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #7 0x7fab0d4e4ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #8 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #9 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #10 0x7fab07f5bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x7faaff40fa80 is located 0 bytes to the right of 905856-byte region [0x7faaff332800,0x7faaff40fa80) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fab0ded3ed6 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fab0dc1c61c in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7fab0dc22901 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7fab0dc28bc9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5488:28 #5 0x7fab0de87831 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0x7fab0dde375f in EnhanceImage MagickCore/enhance.c:1891:7 #7 0x7fab0d63a171 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2284:21 #8 0x7fab0d632c78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #9 0x7fab0d658315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #10 0x7fab0d499a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7fab0d49ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7fab0d4e4ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7fab07f5bb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ./MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:804:56 in SetPixelViaPixelInfo ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:804:56 in SetPixelViaPixelInfo

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611/comments

2019-06-21T06:07:48Z

2019-07-08T01:49:17Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611

CVE-2019-13299

2019-07-05T01:15:10.187

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h in GetPixelChannel.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1610

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:116:10 in GetPixelChannel. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:netscape -monochrome ")" "(" magick:netscape +repage ")" -geometry 433%-80-57 -adjoin -evaluate-sequence Median tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ==30168==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7febb7ba1400 at pc 0x7febc5808632 bp 0x7ffd269baff0 sp 0x7ffd269bafe8 READ of size 4 at 0x7febb7ba1400 thread T0 #0 0x7febc5808631 in GetPixelChannel ./MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:116:10 #1 0x7febc5805ff6 in EvaluateImages MagickCore/statistic.c:587:33 #2 0x7febc4e1a5bf in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4084:22 #3 0x7febc4e2435e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #4 0x7febc4c65a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #5 0x7febc4c66d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #6 0x7febc4cb0ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #7 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #8 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #9 0x7febbf727b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x7febb7ba1400 is located 0 bytes to the right of 248832-byte region [0x7febb7b64800,0x7febb7ba1400) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7febc569fed6 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7febc53e861c in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7febc53ee901 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7febc53f4bc9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5488:28 #5 0x7febc5653831 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0x7febc54187e2 in AcquireImageColormap MagickCore/colormap.c:144:10 #7 0x7febc575d137 in AssignImageColors MagickCore/quantize.c:514:7 #8 0x7febc5753f38 in QuantizeImage MagickCore/quantize.c:2724:14 #9 0x7febc53ae56c in SetImageType MagickCore/attribute.c:1495:14 #10 0x7febc4e0cace in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2792:18 #11 0x7febc4dfec78 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x7febc4e24315 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5273:16 #13 0x7febc4c65a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x7febc4c66d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x7febc4cb0ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7febbf727b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ./MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:116:10 in GetPixelChannel ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/pixel-accessor.h:116:10 in GetPixelChannel

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1610/comments

2019-06-21T06:05:24Z

2019-10-25T13:50:32Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1610

CVE-2019-13300

2019-07-05T01:15:10.250

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling columns.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in MagickCore/statistic.c:654:41 in .omp_outlined._debug__.10 ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick "-black-point-compensation" "-interlace" "none" "(" "magick:rose" "-density" "302x531" ")" "(" "magick:granite" "+repage" ")" "-antialias" "-evaluate-sequence" "Log" ""` This is about heap-buffer-overflow log using ASAN. ``` ==27479==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x629000018800 at pc 0x0000006205ab bp 0x7ffd7a503310 sp 0x7ffd7a503308 WRITE of size 8 at 0x629000018800 thread T0 #0 0x6205aa in .omp_outlined._debug__.10 MagickCore/statistic.c:654:41 #1 0x621c5e in .omp_outlined..11 MagickCore/statistic.c:618:7 #2 0x7f79836bd452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7f79836771b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7f79836782b5 in __kmp_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x372b5) #5 0x7f798366b7be in __kmpc_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x2a7be) #6 0x61c9ca in EvaluateImages MagickCore/statistic.c:615:15 #7 0x13fcdb9 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4081:22 #8 0x1406ec5 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f7983059b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #15 0x425819 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x425819) 0x629000018800 is located 0 bytes to the right of 17920-byte region [0x629000014200,0x629000018800) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4efb47 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4efb47) #1 0x5824e7 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x58254f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x61cfee in AcquirePixelThreadSet MagickCore/statistic.c:175:33 #4 0x61ba43 in EvaluateImages MagickCore/statistic.c:493:19 #5 0x13fcdb9 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4081:22 #6 0x1406ec5 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #7 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7f7983059b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/statistic.c:654:41 in .omp_outlined._debug__.10 ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-10 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/statistic.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586/comments

2019-06-10T15:57:48Z

2019-07-08T01:49:56Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1586

CVE-2019-13301

2019-07-05T01:15:10.297

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an AnnotateImage error.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1585

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description There is a heap buffer overflow/heap-use-after-free vulnerability in MagickCore/resize.c:2823:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.72 with the same input. And also memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory of MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 this still exists [#1558](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1558) It sometimes doesn't occur so needs to be executed for several times. I found that this bug was not reproduced but it is reproduced with certain arguments. [#1500](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1500) <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick "-black-point-compensation" "-weight" "63" "(" "magick:logo" "-normalize" "-resize" "892%-38-49" ")" "(" "magick:wizard" "-preview" "Spiff" "-solarize" "35%" "-cycle" "813" ")" "(" "magick:granite" "-preview" "Blur" "-draw" ""rotate" "205"" "-colors" "109" ")" "-crop" "333x497" "-print" "" ` This is about the heap-buffer-overflow. ``` ================================================================= ==19621==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fc8b5310d28 at pc 0x000000f00dff bp 0x7ffc7c6a9a50 sp 0x7ffc7c6a9a48 READ of size 4 at 0x7fc8b5310d28 thread T0 #0 0xf00dfe in .omp_outlined._debug__.72 MagickCore/resize.c:2823:28 #1 0xf019b6 in .omp_outlined..73 MagickCore/resize.c:2706:3 #2 0x7fc8c2077452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7fc8c20311b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7fc8c20322b5 in __kmp_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x372b5) #5 0x7fc8c20257be in __kmpc_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x2a7be) #6 0xef317f in VerticalFilter MagickCore/resize.c:2703:11 #7 0xef0442 in ResizeImage MagickCore/resize.c:2961:14 #8 0xefb6bd in ThumbnailImage MagickCore/resize.c:3703:21 #9 0xd0cdfd in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2337:15 #10 0x13f0c33 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #11 0x13e0af5 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x1406e7c in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #13 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7fc8c1a13b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #19 0x425819 in _start (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x425819) 0x7fc8b5310d28 is located 1832 bytes to the right of 1175040-byte region [0x7fc8b51f1800,0x7fc8b5310600) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4f09b0 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x4f09b0) #1 0x5822fa in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0xb11bac in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0xb188c5 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0xb1f66b in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5494:28 #5 0x53f46e in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0xef2791 in VerticalFilter MagickCore/resize.c:2681:7 #7 0xef0442 in ResizeImage MagickCore/resize.c:2961:14 #8 0xefb6bd in ThumbnailImage MagickCore/resize.c:3703:21 #9 0xd0cdfd in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2337:15 #10 0x13f0c33 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #11 0x13e0af5 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x1406e7c in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #13 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7fc8c1a13b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/resize.c:2823:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.72 ``` And this is about heap-use-after-free. ``` ================================================================= ==24235==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f2fd1712c88 at pc 0x000000f00dff bp 0x7ffef1b2acd0 sp 0x7ffef1b2acc8 READ of size 4 at 0x7f2fd1712c88 thread T0 #0 0xf00dfe in .omp_outlined._debug__.72 MagickCore/resize.c:2823:28 #1 0xf019b6 in .omp_outlined..73 MagickCore/resize.c:2706:3 #2 0x7f2fde527452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7f2fde4e11b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7f2fde4e22b5 in __kmp_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x372b5) #5 0x7f2fde4d57be in __kmpc_fork_call (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x2a7be) #6 0xef317f in VerticalFilter MagickCore/resize.c:2703:11 #7 0xef0442 in ResizeImage MagickCore/resize.c:2961:14 #8 0xefb6bd in ThumbnailImage MagickCore/resize.c:3703:21 #9 0xd0cdfd in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2337:15 #10 0x13f0c33 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #11 0x13e0af5 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x1406e7c in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #13 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7f2fddec3b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #19 0x425819 in _start (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x425819) 0x7f2fd1712c88 is located 1160 bytes inside of 1566720-byte region [0x7f2fd1712800,0x7f2fd1891000) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x4ef768 in __interceptor_free (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x4ef768) #1 0x583e5c in RelinquishAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 #2 0xafde01 in RelinquishPixelCachePixels MagickCore/cache.c:972:40 #3 0xb12119 in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3757:19 #4 0xb188c5 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #5 0xb1f66b in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5494:28 #6 0x53f46e in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #7 0xef2791 in VerticalFilter MagickCore/resize.c:2681:7 #8 0xef0442 in ResizeImage MagickCore/resize.c:2961:14 #9 0xefb6bd in ThumbnailImage MagickCore/resize.c:3703:21 #10 0xd0cdfd in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2337:15 #11 0x13f0c33 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #12 0x13e0af5 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #13 0x1406e7c in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #14 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #15 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #16 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #17 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #18 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #19 0x7f2fddec3b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4f09b0 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (/usr/local/bin/magick+0x4f09b0) #1 0x5822fa in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0xb11bac in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0xb188c5 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0xb1f66b in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5494:28 #5 0x54833f in SetImageExtent MagickCore/image.c:2668:10 #6 0x53f1c3 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:911:7 #7 0xef0272 in ResizeImage MagickCore/resize.c:2940:18 #8 0xefb6bd in ThumbnailImage MagickCore/resize.c:3703:21 #9 0xd0cdfd in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2337:15 #10 0x13f0c33 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #11 0x13e0af5 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x1406e7c in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #13 0x128a9db in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x128bcf2 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x128e457 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x531745 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x531091 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7f2fddec3b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free MagickCore/resize.c:2823:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.72 ``` About memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory of MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 ``` ==7040==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 73928 byte(s) in 18 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e53b7 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e53b7) #1 0x7f26dee6f8b6 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f26dee6f91f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f26df03be77 in AcquireString MagickCore/string.c:142:24 #4 0x7f26df03ca21 in CloneString MagickCore/string.c:300:20 #5 0x7f26dec7b28a in CloneDrawInfo MagickCore/draw.c:310:12 #6 0x7f26dea7108b in AnnotateImage MagickCore/annotate.c:267:12 #7 0x7f26dee7e6ba in MontageImageList MagickCore/montage.c:842:22 #8 0x7f26dee78821 in MontageImages MagickCore/montage.c:316:17 #9 0x7f26decf1ba4 in PreviewImage MagickCore/effect.c:2747:17 #10 0x7f26de4f3581 in CLISimpleOperatorImage MagickWand/operation.c:2964:21 #11 0x7f26de4e39b8 in CLISimpleOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3685:12 #12 0x7f26de509045 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5270:16 #13 0x7f26de348749 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #14 0x7f26de3499ba in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #15 0x7f26de3940d2 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #16 0x526fb5 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #17 0x526901 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #18 0x7f26d8925b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 73928 byte(s) leaked in 18 allocation(s). ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-10 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 (heap-buffer-overflow/heap-use-after-free are triggered when compiled with option '--disable-shared') (memory leak is triggered when compiled without option '--disable-shared') <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory of MagickCore/memory.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1585/comments

2019-06-10T14:34:22Z

2019-10-05T02:53:40Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1585

CVE-2019-13301

2019-07-05T01:15:10.297

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an AnnotateImage error.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There are a heap-use-after-free(sometimes heap-buffer-overflow) vulnerability in MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 and a double-free bug in RelinquishAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 with the same input. For each run, different bugs are triggered so please run the command for several times. related: [#1344](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1344) ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick -seed 0 -black-point-compensation -units Undefined "(" magick:granite -opaque "rgb(224,28,104)" -gaussian-blur 2 -strip ")" "(" magick:rose -black-threshold 15 -preview Despeckle ")" -density 3x83 -stretch ExtraCondensed -copy "937x560ls" "-52-59" ""` This is about Heap-use-after-free in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 ``` ==26215==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x62800000036c at pc 0x000000efe4dc bp 0x7f637b304e90 sp 0x7f637b304e88 READ of size 4 at 0x62800000036c thread T1 #0 0xefe4db in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 #1 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #2 0x7f6383e13452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7f6383dcd1b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7f6383dcbb20 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x34b20) #5 0x7f6383e0b417 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x74417) #6 0x7f63864476da in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76da) #7 0x7f63838af88e in clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12188e) 0x62800000036c is located 620 bytes inside of 14400-byte region [0x628000000100,0x628000003940) freed by thread T2 here: #0 0x4ef768 in __interceptor_free (install/bin/magick+0x4ef768) #1 0x583e5c in RelinquishAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 #2 0xafe7c6 in RelinquishCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:1089:12 #3 0xb0d5db in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5080:9 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0xefd9e9 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2542:7 #7 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #8 0x7f6383e13452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7f6383dcd1b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) previously allocated by thread T1 here: #0 0x4f09b0 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4f09b0) #1 0x5822fa in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0xb24539 in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0xb0d587 in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5076:12 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0xefd9e9 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2542:7 #7 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #8 0x7f6383e13452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7f6383dcd1b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x43fcd0 in pthread_create (install/bin/magick+0x43fcd0) #1 0x7f6383e09110 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x72110) Thread T2 created by T0 here: #0 0x43fcd0 in pthread_create (install/bin/magick+0x43fcd0) #1 0x7f6383e09110 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x72110) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 ``` This is about the heap-buffer-overflow in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2604 ``` ==26841==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61d00001d670 at pc 0x000000efe4dc bp 0x7f78c5104e90 sp 0x7f78c5104e88 READ of size 4 at 0x61d00001d670 thread T1 #0 0xefe4db in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 #1 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #2 0x7f78cdc28452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7f78cdbe21b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7f78cdbe0b20 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x34b20) #5 0x7f78cdc20417 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x74417) #6 0x7f78d025c6da in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76da) #7 0x7f78cd6c488e in clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12188e) Address 0x61d00001d670 is a wild pointer. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/resize.c:2604:28 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 ``` This is about double-free bug in RelinquishAlignedMemory of MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 ``` ==26601==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x61d00001fe80 in thread T1: #0 0x4ef768 in __interceptor_free (install/bin/magick+0x4ef768) #1 0x583e5c in RelinquishAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 #2 0xafe7c6 in RelinquishCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:1089:12 #3 0xb0d5db in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5080:9 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0xefd9e9 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2542:7 #7 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #8 0x7fed18cb6452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7fed18c701b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #10 0x7fed18c6eb20 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x34b20) #11 0x7fed18cae417 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x74417) #12 0x7fed1b2ea6da in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76da) #13 0x7fed1875288e in clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12188e) 0x61d00001fe80 is located 0 bytes inside of 2240-byte region [0x61d00001fe80,0x61d000020740) freed by thread T2 here: #0 0x4ef768 in __interceptor_free (install/bin/magick+0x4ef768) #1 0x583e5c in RelinquishAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:1037:3 #2 0xafe7c6 in RelinquishCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:1089:12 #3 0xb0d5db in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5080:9 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0xefd9e9 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2542:7 #7 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #8 0x7fed18cb6452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7fed18c701b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) previously allocated by thread T1 here: #0 0x4f09b0 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4f09b0) #1 0x5822fa in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0xb24539 in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0xb0d587 in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5076:12 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0xefd9e9 in .omp_outlined._debug__.69 MagickCore/resize.c:2542:7 #7 0xeff106 in .omp_outlined..70 MagickCore/resize.c:2488:3 #8 0x7fed18cb6452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7fed18c701b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x43fcd0 in pthread_create (install/bin/magick+0x43fcd0) #1 0x7fed18cac110 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x72110) Thread T2 created by T0 here: #0 0x43fcd0 in pthread_create (install/bin/magick+0x43fcd0) #1 0x7fed18cac110 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x72110) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: double-free (install/bin/magick+0x4ef768) in __interceptor_free ==26601==ABORTING ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-10 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-use-after-free in MagickCore/resize.c and double-free in RelinquishAlignedMemory of MagickCore/memory.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589/comments

2019-06-11T05:31:32Z

2019-07-09T13:21:32Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589

CVE-2019-13302

2019-07-05T01:15:10.373

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImages.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1597

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c:305:45 in ComplexImages. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -treedepth 71 "(" magick:logo +repage ")" "(" magick:granite -white-threshold 0% -cycle 256 -lat 815 ")" -bordercolor rgb"("101,151,20")" -blue-primary 638,241 -print "0O." -complex multiply tmp ` Second one also can trigger. cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:logo +repage ")" "(" magick:logo +repage ")" -render -size 2872 -complex multiply -quiet tmp ` Here's ASAN result. ``` ==16842==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61e000000a80 at pc 0x7fea5bb0c52f bp 0x7fff5c11c590 sp 0x7fff5c11c588 READ of size 4 at 0x61e000000a80 thread T0 #0 0x7fea5bb0c52e in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:305:45 #1 0x7fea5b3328c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #2 0x7fea5b33e34e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #3 0x7fea5b17fa99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #4 0x7fea5b180d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #5 0x7fea5b1caba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #6 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #7 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #8 0x7fea55c41b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x61e000000a80 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2560-byte region [0x61e000000080,0x61e000000a80) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fea5bbb9666 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fea5b910d5c in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0x7fea5b8fe1c4 in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5076:12 #4 0x7fea5b8f5b05 in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0x7fea5b913f36 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0x7fea5bb0ae5d in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:250:8 #7 0x7fea5b3328c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #8 0x7fea5b33e34e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fea5b17fa99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fea5b180d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fea5b1caba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fea55c41b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/fourier.c:305:45 in ComplexImages ``` Here's the ASAN result for second cmd ``` ==16863==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f2a0831b800 at pc 0x7f2a1747e649 bp 0x7ffd7c094350 sp 0x7ffd7c094348 WRITE of size 4 at 0x7f2a0831b800 thread T0 #0 0x7f2a1747e648 in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:305:18 #1 0x7f2a16ca48c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #2 0x7f2a16cb034e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #3 0x7f2a16af1a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #4 0x7f2a16af2d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #5 0x7f2a16b3cba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #6 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #7 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #8 0x7f2a115b3b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x7f2a0831b800 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3686400-byte region [0x7f2a07f97800,0x7f2a0831b800) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f2a1752b666 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f2a172746ac in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7f2a1727a991 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7f2a17280c59 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5494:28 #5 0x7f2a174defc1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0x7f2a1747c4f7 in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:185:7 #7 0x7f2a16ca48c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #8 0x7f2a16cb034e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7f2a16af1a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f2a16af2d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f2a16b3cba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f2a115b3b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/fourier.c:305:18 in ComplexImages ``` Thanks. ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-17 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c:305:45 in ComplexImages

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1597/comments

2019-06-17T03:51:17Z

2019-07-08T01:50:56Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1597

CVE-2019-13303

2019-07-05T01:15:10.437

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer over-read in MagickCore/composite.c in CompositeImage.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1603

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/composite.c:666:45 in CompositeImage. I compiled ImageMagick with --disable-openmp option. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -sampling-factor 3.307x3.198 "(" magick:granite +repage ")" "(" magick:rose +repage ")" "(" magick:rose +repage ")" -encoding AdobeStandard -extract 285x52^-70-70 -region 75x310-64-51 -evaluate-sequence Min -layers compare-overlay tmp` and run this cmd: `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:logo -region 306%-74-69 -lat 886 ")" "(" magick:netscape -level 64 ")" "(" magick:granite -opaque rgb"("12,57,57")" -modulate 94,59,3 -frame 4%-82+23 ")" -comment "B>%C%o" -style Any -layers compare-any tmp` Here's ASAN result. ``` ==5479==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x626000008900 at pc 0x7f9c528f0e7d bp 0x7ffd8cc41710 sp 0x7ffd8cc41708 READ of size 4 at 0x626000008900 thread T0 #0 0x7f9c528f0e7c in CompositeImage MagickCore/composite.c:666:45 #1 0x7f9c52b23aa0 in CompareImagesLayers MagickCore/layer.c:792:10 #2 0x7f9c522d035c in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4199:26 #3 0x7f9c522d934e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #4 0x7f9c5211aa99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #5 0x7f9c5211bd0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #6 0x7f9c52165ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #7 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #8 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #9 0x7f9c4cbdcb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x626000008900 is located 0 bytes to the right of 10240-byte region [0x626000006100,0x626000008900) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c52b54f66 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f9c528abd5c in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0x7f9c528991c4 in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5076:12 #4 0x7f9c52890b05 in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0x7f9c528aef36 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0x7f9c528f0bae in CompositeImage MagickCore/composite.c:637:11 #7 0x7f9c52b23aa0 in CompareImagesLayers MagickCore/layer.c:792:10 #8 0x7f9c522d035c in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4199:26 #9 0x7f9c522d934e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #10 0x7f9c5211aa99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c5211bd0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c52165ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c4cbdcb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/composite.c:666:45 in CompositeImage ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-18 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/composite.c:666:45 in CompositeImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1603/comments

2019-06-18T17:08:25Z

2019-07-08T01:51:18Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1603

CVE-2019-13304

2019-07-05T01:15:10.500

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of a misplaced assignment.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a stack buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c:1762 in WritePNMImage. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -render "(" magick:rose -sample 846x913^+16+22 -white-threshold 112 ")" -compress None -adjoin tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ================================================================= ==9828==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffcc293daa0 at pc 0x7f71ad7e3477 bp 0x7ffcc293a0f0 sp 0x7ffcc293a0e8 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7ffcc293daa0 thread T0 #0 0x7f71ad7e3476 in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1762:21 #1 0x7f71ad07c065 in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159:16 #2 0x7f71ad07cf8c in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376:13 #3 0x7f71aca4050d in CLINoImageOperator MagickWand/operation.c:4796:14 #4 0x7f71aca441cc in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5258:7 #5 0x7f71ac885f6d in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:529:3 #6 0x7f71ac886d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #7 0x7f71ac8d0ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #8 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #9 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #10 0x7f71a7347b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) Address 0x7ffcc293daa0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 14752 in frame #0 0x7f71ad7e1daf in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1522 This frame has 6 object(s): [32, 4128) 'buffer' (line 1523) [4256, 8352) 'magick' (line 1523) [8480, 12576) 'type117' (line 1675) [12704, 14752) 'pixels' (line 1736) <== Memory access at offset 14752 overflows this variable [14880, 16928) 'pixels255' (line 1788) [17056, 19104) 'pixels381' (line 1857) HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow coders/pnm.c:1762:21 in WritePNMImage ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

stack-buffer-overflow at coders/pnm.c:1762 in WritePNMImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614/comments

2019-06-21T06:36:50Z

2019-08-10T11:27:40Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1614

CVE-2019-13305

2019-07-05T01:15:10.563

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of a misplaced strncpy and an off-by-one error.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1613

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a stack-buffer-overflow at coders/pnm.c:1906 in WritePNMImage. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -undercolor rgb"("67,255,32")" -compress None "(" magick:rose -solarize 1% ")" "(" magick:logo +repage ")" -size 2338x1505+3581 -print "" tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ================================================================= ==25473==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffe4120cba0 at pc 0x7f1d07f024d8 bp 0x7ffe412080f0 sp 0x7ffe412080e8 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7ffe4120cba0 thread T0 #0 0x7f1d07f024d7 in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1906:21 #1 0x7f1d0779a065 in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159:16 #2 0x7f1d0779af8c in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376:13 #3 0x7f1d0715e50d in CLINoImageOperator MagickWand/operation.c:4796:14 #4 0x7f1d071621cc in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5258:7 #5 0x7f1d06fa3f6d in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:529:3 #6 0x7f1d06fa4d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #7 0x7f1d06feeba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #8 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #9 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #10 0x7f1d01a65b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #11 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) Address 0x7ffe4120cba0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 19104 in frame #0 0x7f1d07effdaf in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1522 This frame has 6 object(s): [32, 4128) 'buffer' (line 1523) [4256, 8352) 'magick' (line 1523) [8480, 12576) 'type117' (line 1675) [12704, 14752) 'pixels' (line 1736) [14880, 16928) 'pixels255' (line 1788) [17056, 19104) 'pixels381' (line 1857) <== Memory access at offset 19104 overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow coders/pnm.c:1906:21 in WritePNMImage ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

stack-buffer-overflow at coders/pnm.c:1906 in WritePNMImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1613/comments

2019-06-21T06:23:44Z

2019-07-08T01:52:06Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1613

CVE-2019-13306

2019-07-05T01:15:10.623

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a stack-based buffer overflow at coders/pnm.c in WritePNMImage because of off-by-one errors.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a stack-buffer-overflow at coders/pnm.c:1902 in WritePNMImage. I think this is related with [#1540](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1540), but it was heap and this issue is about the stack buffer overflow. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -dispose Previous -compress None "(" magick:rose +repage ")" "(" magick:logo -level 64,0%,0.874 ")" -loop 5 tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ==12131==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc7100b060 at pc 0x0000004477c4 bp 0x7ffc710065b0 sp 0x7ffc71005d60 WRITE of size 10 at 0x7ffc7100b060 thread T0 #0 0x4477c3 in strncpy (install/bin/magick+0x4477c3) #1 0x7f1cca22b433 in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1902:20 #2 0x7f1cc9ac3065 in WriteImage MagickCore/constitute.c:1159:16 #3 0x7f1cc9ac3f8c in WriteImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1376:13 #4 0x7f1cc948750d in CLINoImageOperator MagickWand/operation.c:4796:14 #5 0x7f1cc948b1cc in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5258:7 #6 0x7f1cc92ccf6d in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:529:3 #7 0x7f1cc92cdd0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #8 0x7f1cc9317ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #9 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #10 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #11 0x7f1cc3d8eb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #12 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) Address 0x7ffc7100b060 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 19104 in frame #0 0x7f1cca228daf in WritePNMImage coders/pnm.c:1522 This frame has 6 object(s): [32, 4128) 'buffer' (line 1523) [4256, 8352) 'magick' (line 1523) [8480, 12576) 'type117' (line 1675) [12704, 14752) 'pixels' (line 1736) [14880, 16928) 'pixels255' (line 1788) [17056, 19104) 'pixels381' (line 1857) <== Memory access at offset 19104 overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (install/bin/magick+0x4477c3) in strncpy ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-21 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

stack-buffer-overflow at coders/pnm.c:1902 in WritePNMImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612/comments

2019-06-21T06:13:39Z

2019-07-08T01:52:26Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612

CVE-2019-13307

2019-07-05T01:15:10.687

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c in EvaluateImages because of mishandling rows.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c:559:43 in EvaluateImages. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -monitor -bias 63 "(" magick:rose -colorize 172,35,77 ")" "(" magick:logo +repage ")" -crop 507x10'!'+20-54 -evaluate-sequence Median tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ================================================================= ==10817==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x611000000c80 at pc 0x7f0648490e06 bp 0x7ffce3c96900 sp 0x7ffce3c968f8 WRITE of size 8 at 0x611000000c80 thread T0 #0 0x7f0648490e05 in EvaluateImages MagickCore/statistic.c:559:43 #1 0x7f0647aa55bf in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4084:22 #2 0x7f0647aaf35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #3 0x7f06478f0a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #4 0x7f06478f1d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #5 0x7f064793bba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #6 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #7 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #8 0x7f06423b2b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x611000000c80 is located 0 bytes to the right of 256-byte region [0x611000000b80,0x611000000c80) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f064832b0b6 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f064832b11f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f06484926e7 in AcquirePixelThreadSet MagickCore/statistic.c:182:33 #4 0x7f0648490b21 in EvaluateImages MagickCore/statistic.c:499:19 #5 0x7f0647aa55bf in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4084:22 #6 0x7f0647aaf35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #7 0x7f06478f0a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7f06478f1d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7f064793bba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7f06423b2b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/statistic.c:559:43 in EvaluateImages ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-22 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow at MagickCore/statistic.c:559:43 in EvaluateImages

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615/comments

2019-06-22T02:11:22Z

2019-08-10T11:30:08Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615

CVE-2019-13308

2019-07-05T01:15:10.750

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has a heap-based buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c in ComplexImage.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c:299:18 in ComplexImage, and I compiled the lasted version with --disable-openmp option. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick -seed 0 -mattecolor rgb"("225,230,14")" -debug Configure "(" magick:wizard +repage ")" "(" magick:netscape +repage ")" -fuzz 82 -caption "j$Y%Be" -blue-primary 727,475 -crop 405%-43-16 -crop 832x886>+11-13 -complex magnitude-phase tmp` and also this command `magick -seed 0 "(" magick:netscape +repage ")" "(" magick:wizard -resample 24x44 -resample 47x83 ")" "(" magick:netscape -charcoal 4 -random-threshold 42x71 -shade 81x21 ")" -complex magnitude-phase tmp112 ` Here's ASAN result. ``` ==9231==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fd97efce800 at pc 0x7fd98dbdd221 bp 0x7ffff99e9790 sp 0x7ffff99e9788 WRITE of size 4 at 0x7fd97efce800 thread T0 #0 0x7fd98dbdd220 in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:299:18 #1 0x7fd98d4038c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #2 0x7fd98d40f34e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #3 0x7fd98d250a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #4 0x7fd98d251d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #5 0x7fd98d29bba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #6 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #7 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #8 0x7fd987d12b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) 0x7fd97efce800 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3686400-byte region [0x7fd97ec4a800,0x7fd97efce800) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7fd98dc8a666 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7fd98d9d36ac in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7fd98d9d9991 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7fd98d9dfc59 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5494:28 #5 0x7fd98dc3dfc1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0x7fd98dbdb4f7 in ComplexImages MagickCore/fourier.c:185:7 #7 0x7fd98d4038c1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3890:22 #8 0x7fd98d40f34e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5276:14 #9 0x7fd98d250a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7fd98d251d0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7fd98d29bba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7fd987d12b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/fourier.c:299:18 in ComplexImages ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-17 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c:299:18 in ComplexImage

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595/comments

2019-06-17T02:21:01Z

2019-08-13T11:59:01Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595

CVE-2019-13309

2019-07-05T01:15:10.813

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of mishandling the NoSuchImage error in CLIListOperatorImages in MagickWand/operation.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's memory leaks in MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 This issue is maybe related with [#1604](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604). ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run_cmd: `magick -seed 0 -quality 3 "(" magick:logo +repage ")" "(" magick:wizard +repage ")" -quiet -caption "%h%U" -compare -insert 2 tmp` Here's ASAN log. ``` ==22113==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 13504 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c3e5114 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f9c4c3e96c9 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:823:25 #4 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #5 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #6 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #7 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #8 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 6553600 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c437f26 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f9c4c18061c in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3728:46 #3 0x7f9c4c186901 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1754:18 #4 0x7f9c4c16e330 in QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:4156:28 #5 0x7f9c4c16e001 in GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:1324:10 #6 0x7f9c4c1909be in GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:312:10 #7 0x7f9c4c3f83a1 in SetImageAlpha MagickCore/image.c:2372:7 #8 0x7f9c4c479695 in ConformPixelInfo MagickCore/pixel.c:235:12 #9 0x7f9c4c3ec4a7 in SetImageBackgroundColor MagickCore/image.c:2441:3 #10 0x7f9c4c5e88b5 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1138:10 #11 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #12 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #13 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #14 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #15 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #16 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #17 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #18 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #19 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 22616 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c3eaafd in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:879:43 #4 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #5 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #6 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #7 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #8 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 13024 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c3e5114 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f9c4c3e7753 in AcquireImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:350:28 #4 0x7f9c4c3f0513 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:945:14 #5 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #6 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #7 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #8 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 9152 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c437f26 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f9c4c16aa04 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:195:28 #3 0x7f9c4c16bf8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #4 0x7f9c4c3eb59f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #5 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #6 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #7 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #8 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #9 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 512 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c478f3a in AcquirePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:101:35 #4 0x7f9c4c479114 in ClonePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:139:13 #5 0x7f9c4c3ea34f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:849:28 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 288 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c148284 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f9c4c149d5d in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:554:27 #4 0x7f9c4c3ea808 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #5 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #6 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #7 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #8 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #9 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c16b5df in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:271:29 #4 0x7f9c4c16af8d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #5 0x7f9c4c16bf8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #6 0x7f9c4c3eb59f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #7 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #8 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #9 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #10 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #11 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 96 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c593033 in AddValueToSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:189:21 #3 0x7f9c4c593f3c in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:12 #4 0x7f9c4c4c8ee3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #5 0x7f9c4c3e9f59 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c598084 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f9c4c594115 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7f9c4c593d24 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f9c4c4c8ee3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f9c4c3e9f59 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #8 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #9 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #10 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #11 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c598084 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f9c4c594115 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7f9c4c593d24 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f9c4c4698c0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f9c4c3f2018 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c16b383 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:231:30 #4 0x7f9c4c16bf8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7f9c4c3eb59f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c16b2f4 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:229:25 #4 0x7f9c4c16bf8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7f9c4c3eb59f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c594389 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7f9c4c593d24 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f9c4c4698c0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f9c4c3f2018 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c437f26 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f9c4c16b4e2 in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:267:29 #3 0x7f9c4c16af8d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #4 0x7f9c4c16bf8d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:513:28 #5 0x7f9c4c3eb59f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:910:22 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c593033 in AddValueToSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:189:21 #3 0x7f9c4c593f3c in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:12 #4 0x7f9c4c4698c0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #5 0x7f9c4c3f2018 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #6 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #7 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #8 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #9 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c3ea99f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:871:26 #4 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #5 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #6 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #7 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #8 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c14a1ae in GetBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:1745:24 #4 0x7f9c4c149d6a in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:555:3 #5 0x7f9c4c3ea808 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #6 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #7 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #8 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f9c4c57d781 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f9c4c57cfc3 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f9c4c594389 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7f9c4c593d24 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f9c4c4c8ee3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f9c4c3e9f59 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #8 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #9 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #10 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #11 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 62 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c5cb9d3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f9c4c593f26 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:373:7 #5 0x7f9c4c4c8ee3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f9c4c3e9f59 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #8 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #9 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #10 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #11 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 35 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c5cb9d3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f9c4c593ea1 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43 #5 0x7f9c4c4c8ee3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f9c4c3e9f59 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f9c4c5e8885 in ExtentImage MagickCore/transform.c:1134:16 #8 0x7f9c4c1c5d00 in CompareImages MagickCore/compare.c:188:20 #9 0x7f9c4bbb06f1 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3880:22 #10 0x7f9c4bbbc35e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5279:14 #11 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 16 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c5cb9d3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f9c4c593ea1 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43 #5 0x7f9c4c4698c0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f9c4c3f2018 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) Indirect leak of 7 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in __interceptor_malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f9c4c438106 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f9c4c43816f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f9c4c5cb9d3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f9c4c593f26 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:373:7 #5 0x7f9c4c4698c0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f9c4c3f2018 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f9c4c3e7678 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f9c4c3fee66 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f9c4bbbc163 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5246:14 #10 0x7f9c4b9fda99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f9c4b9fed0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f9c4ba48ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f9c464bfb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 6613792 byte(s) leaked in 32 allocation(s). ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-23 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

memory leaks is detected at AcquireMagickMemory

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616/comments

2019-06-23T08:45:54Z

2019-07-08T01:55:00Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616

CVE-2019-13311

2019-07-05T01:15:10.937

ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of a wand/mogrify.c error.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's memory leaks which are detected at AcquireMagickMemory. This maybe relates with [#1616](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616). ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run following cmd: `magick -seed 0 -label "%r%W&%tZRD%r%A" -units PixelsPerCentimeter -caption "%s%m%w" "(" magick:logo +repage ")" "(" magick:granite -shade 13x85 ")" -compress RLE -combine -ift -complex magnitude-phase tmp` Here's Asan Log. ``` ==26664==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 13504 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121151bb54 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f1211520109 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:823:25 #4 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #5 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #6 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #7 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 3686400 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f121156ea36 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f12112b6ede in OpenPixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:3732:46 #3 0x7f12112bd1c1 in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1756:18 #4 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #5 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #6 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #7 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #8 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #9 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 22616 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f121152153d in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:879:43 #4 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #5 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #6 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #7 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 13024 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121151bb54 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f121151e193 in AcquireImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:350:28 #4 0x7f1211526f53 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:945:14 #5 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #6 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #7 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #8 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 9152 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f121156ea36 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f12112a11d4 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:195:28 #3 0x7f12112a275d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:515:28 #4 0x7f12112bcf3b in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1724:29 #5 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #6 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #7 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 512 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12115afa4a in AcquirePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:101:35 #4 0x7f12115afc24 in ClonePixelChannelMap MagickCore/pixel.c:139:13 #5 0x7f1211520d8f in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:849:28 #6 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #7 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #8 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #9 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 288 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121127eb74 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f121128064d in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:554:27 #4 0x7f1211521248 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #5 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #6 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #7 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #8 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #9 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #10 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #11 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #12 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #13 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12112a1daf in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:271:29 #4 0x7f12112a175d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #5 0x7f12112a275d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:515:28 #6 0x7f12112bcf3b in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1724:29 #7 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #8 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #9 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #10 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #11 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #12 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #13 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #14 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #15 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #16 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #17 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 128 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f12116c9dd3 in AddValueToSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:189:21 #3 0x7f12116cacdc in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:12 #4 0x7f12115a03d0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #5 0x7f1211528a58 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #6 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #7 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #8 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #9 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 128 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f12116c9dd3 in AddValueToSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:189:21 #3 0x7f12116cacdc in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:12 #4 0x7f12115ff9f3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #5 0x7f1211520999 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #6 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #7 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #8 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #9 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 115 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12117027c3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f12116cacc6 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:373:7 #5 0x7f12115ff9f3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f1211520999 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f12116cee24 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f12116caeb5 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f12115ff9f3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f1211520999 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f12116cee24 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f12116caeb5 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f12115a03d0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f1211528a58 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 88 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f12116cee24 in AcquireCriticalMemory ./MagickCore/memory-private.h:64:10 #3 0x7f12116caeb5 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1148:32 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f1211272c4a in CloneImageArtifacts MagickCore/artifact.c:118:24 #6 0x7f12115209ac in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:840:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12112a1ac4 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:229:25 #4 0x7f12112a275d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:515:28 #5 0x7f12112bcf3b in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1724:29 #6 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #7 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #8 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #9 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #10 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #11 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f121156ea36 in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0x7f12112a1cb2 in AcquirePixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:267:29 #3 0x7f12112a175d in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:212:26 #4 0x7f12112a275d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:515:28 #5 0x7f12112bcf3b in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1724:29 #6 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #7 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #8 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #9 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #10 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #11 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12115213df in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:871:26 #4 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #5 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #6 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #7 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #8 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #9 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #10 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #11 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #12 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f1211280a9e in GetBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:1745:24 #4 0x7f121128065a in CloneBlobInfo MagickCore/blob.c:555:3 #5 0x7f1211521248 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:867:25 #6 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #7 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #8 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #9 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #10 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #11 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #12 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #13 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #14 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12116cb129 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f1211272c4a in CloneImageArtifacts MagickCore/artifact.c:118:24 #6 0x7f12115209ac in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:840:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12116cb129 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f12115ff9f3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f1211520999 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12116cb129 in NewSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:1159:25 #4 0x7f12116caac4 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:360:14 #5 0x7f12115a03d0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f1211528a58 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 64 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e6200 in posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4e6200) #1 0x7f12116b4521 in AcquireSemaphoreMemory MagickCore/semaphore.c:154:7 #2 0x7f12116b3d63 in AcquireSemaphoreInfo MagickCore/semaphore.c:200:36 #3 0x7f12112a1b53 in AcquirePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:231:30 #4 0x7f12112a275d in ClonePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:515:28 #5 0x7f12112bcf3b in GetImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:1724:29 #6 0x7f12112c35b9 in SyncImagePixelCache MagickCore/cache.c:5499:28 #7 0x7f12115222c1 in SetImageStorageClass MagickCore/image.c:2627:10 #8 0x7f12112ce980 in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:523:7 #9 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #10 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #11 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #12 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #13 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #14 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #15 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #16 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 46 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12117027c3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f12116cacc6 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:373:7 #5 0x7f12115a03d0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f1211528a58 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 38 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12117027c3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f12116cac41 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43 #5 0x7f12115ff9f3 in CloneImageProperties MagickCore/property.c:196:25 #6 0x7f1211520999 in CloneImage MagickCore/image.c:839:10 #7 0x7f12112ce94b in CombineImages MagickCore/channel.c:520:17 #8 0x7f1210cfc574 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:3848:22 #9 0x7f1210d0839e in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5282:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 Indirect leak of 29 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4e5397 in malloc (install/bin/magick+0x4e5397) #1 0x7f121156ec16 in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:478:10 #2 0x7f121156ec7f in AcquireQuantumMemory MagickCore/memory.c:551:10 #3 0x7f12117027c3 in ConstantString MagickCore/string.c:713:26 #4 0x7f12116cac41 in CloneSplayTree MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43 #5 0x7f12115a03d0 in CloneImageOptions MagickCore/option.c:2144:27 #6 0x7f1211528a58 in CloneImageInfo MagickCore/image.c:1010:10 #7 0x7f121151e0b8 in SyncImageSettings MagickCore/image.c:4242:21 #8 0x7f12115358a6 in SyncImagesSettings MagickCore/image.c:4000:12 #9 0x7f1210d081a3 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5249:14 #10 0x7f1210b49a99 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #11 0x7f1210b4ad0a in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #12 0x7f1210b94ba1 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #13 0x526f95 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #14 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #15 0x7f120b60bb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3746948 byte(s) leaked in 43 allocation(s). ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-52 Q16 x86_64 2019-07-02 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 ./configure --disable-openmp --without-png and I also tested on Ubuntu 16.04 with clang-3.8 and gcc-5. <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

memory leaks is detected at AcquireMagickMemory

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623/comments

2019-07-01T18:19:43Z

2019-07-08T10:31:06Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623

CVE-2019-13391

2019-07-07T22:15:10.503

In ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16, ComplexImages in MagickCore/fourier.c has a heap-based buffer over-read because of incorrect calls to GetCacheViewVirtualPixels.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There is a heap buffer overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c:314:19 in .omp_outlined._debug__ Heap buffer overflow sometimes occur. To trigger this bug, please run the command for several times. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run cmd: `magick "-seed" "0" "-black-point-compensation" "-fuzz" "238" "(" "magick:logo" "-normalize" "-cycle" "615" ")" "(" "magick:rose" "-gaussian-blur" "4" ")" "(" "magick:granite" "-convolve" "207,117,126,202,52,59,196,21,46,216,32,49,172,14,116,115,203,20,219,21,194,58,155,117,148,208,229,218,151,151,171,239,212,207,77,212,81,32,23,137,63,164,67,85,47,13,85,96,85,86,244,168,218,41,98,108,208,221,77,5,45,117,102,5,89,150,47,36,214,0,20,255,14,83,77,191,109,40,32,245,112" ")" "-strokewidth" "58" "-complex" "subtract" "-layers" "compare-overlay" "" ` ASAN log about heap buffer over-flow. ``` ==18953==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x619000020200 at pc 0x0000014f4b4e bp 0x7fa64464bc30 sp 0x7fa64464bc28 READ of size 4 at 0x619000020200 thread T2 #0 0x14f4b4d in .omp_outlined._debug__ MagickCore/fourier.c:314:19 #1 0x14f56cc in .omp_outlined. MagickCore/fourier.c:231:3 #2 0x7fa64f983452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #3 0x7fa64f93d1b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) #4 0x7fa64f93bb20 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x34b20) #5 0x7fa64f97b417 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x74417) #6 0x7fa651fb76da in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76da) #7 0x7fa64f41f88e in clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12188e) 0x619000020200 is located 0 bytes to the right of 896-byte region [0x61900001fe80,0x619000020200) allocated by thread T2 here: #0 0x4f09b0 in __interceptor_posix_memalign (install/bin/magick+0x4f09b0) #1 0x5822fa in AcquireAlignedMemory MagickCore/memory.c:265:7 #2 0xb24539 in AcquireCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:4968:37 #3 0xb0d587 in SetPixelCacheNexusPixels MagickCore/cache.c:5076:12 #4 0xb04b7c in GetVirtualPixelCacheNexus MagickCore/cache.c:2751:10 #5 0xb28621 in GetCacheViewVirtualPixels MagickCore/cache-view.c:664:10 #6 0x14f2984 in .omp_outlined._debug__ MagickCore/fourier.c:249:8 #7 0x14f56cc in .omp_outlined. MagickCore/fourier.c:231:3 #8 0x7fa64f983452 in __kmp_invoke_microtask (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x7c452) #9 0x7fa64f93d1b6 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x361b6) Thread T2 created by T0 here: #0 0x43fcd0 in pthread_create (install/bin/magick+0x43fcd0) #1 0x7fa64f979110 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libomp.so.5+0x72110) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/fourier.c:314:19 in .omp_outlined._debug__ ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 x86_64 2019-06-10 - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

heap-buffer-overflow in MagickCore/fourier.c

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588/comments

2019-06-11T03:25:05Z

2019-07-08T01:55:44Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588

CVE-2018-11307

2019-07-09T16:15:12.807

An issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.5. Use of Jackson default typing along with a gadget class from iBatis allows exfiltration of content. Fixed in 2.7.9.4, 2.8.11.2, and 2.9.6.

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2032

github.com

A new potential gadget type from MyBatis (https://github.com/mybatis/mybatis-3) has been reported. It may allow content exfiltration (remote access by sending contents over ftp) when untrusted content is deserialized with default typing enabled. See https://medium.com/@cowtowncoder/on-jackson-cves-dont-panic-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-54cd0d6e8062 for description of the general problem. Mitre id: CVE-2018-11307 Original vulnerability discoverer: 吴桂雄 Wuguixiong Fixed in * 2.9.5 and later * 2.8.11.2 * 2.7.9.4 * 2.6.7.3

Block one more gadget type (mybatis, CVE-2018-11307)

https://api.github.com/repos/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2032/comments

2018-05-10T04:23:03Z

2020-12-02T04:03:22Z

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2032

CVE-2019-13454

2019-07-09T17:15:11.850

ImageMagick 7.0.8-54 Q16 allows Division by Zero in RemoveDuplicateLayers in MagickCore/layer.c.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629

github.com

### Prerequisites - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have verified that I am using the latest version of ImageMagick - [x] I have searched [open](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues) and [closed](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed) issues to ensure it has not already been reported ### Description <!-- A description of the bug or feature --> There's a division by zero at MagickCore/layer.c:1616:30 ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- List of steps, sample code, failing test or link to a project that reproduces the behavior. Make sure you place a stack trace inside a code (```) block to avoid linking unrelated issues --> run following cmd: `magick "-seed" "0" "-delay" "34<" "(" "magick:rose" "+repage" ")" "(" "magick:rose" "+repage" ")" "-encoding" "Symbol" "-layers" "remove-dups" "-quiet" "tmp"` This is triggered at `time = curr->delay*1000/curr->ticks_per_second;` due to curr->ticks_per_second. ``` 1605 for (; (next=GetNextImageInList(curr)) != (Image *) NULL; curr=next) 1606 { 1607 if ( curr->columns != next->columns || curr->rows != next->rows 1608 || curr->page.x != next->page.x || curr->page.y != next->page.y ) 1609 continue; 1610 bounds=CompareImagesBounds(curr,next,CompareAnyLayer,exception); 1611 if ( bounds.x < 0 ) { 1612 /* 1613 the two images are the same, merge time delays and delete one. 1614 */ 1615 size_t time; 1616 time = curr->delay*1000/curr->ticks_per_second; 1617 time += next->delay*1000/next->ticks_per_second; 1618 next->ticks_per_second = 100L; 1619 next->delay = time*curr->ticks_per_second/1000; 1620 next->iterations = curr->iterations; 1621 *images = curr; 1622 (void) DeleteImageFromList(images); 1623 } 1624 } ``` Here's USAN log. ``` MagickCore/layer.c:1616:30: runtime error: division by zero SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore/layer.c:1616:30 in AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==28916==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: UNKNOWN SIGNAL on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x7fe11baee9e7 bp 0x7ffc60e12250 sp 0x7ffc60e11ec0 T0) #0 0x7fe11baee9e6 in RemoveDuplicateLayers MagickCore/layer.c:1616:30 #1 0x7fe11a2600a8 in CLIListOperatorImages MagickWand/operation.c:4266:15 #2 0x7fe11a273102 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5308:14 #3 0x7fe119c6aef4 in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:477:7 #4 0x7fe119c6dc54 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:796:5 #5 0x7fe119d1400e in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/mogrify.c:185:14 #6 0x527976 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:149:10 #7 0x5268e1 in main utilities/magick.c:180:10 #8 0x7fe113884b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x41b069 in _start (install/bin/magick+0x41b069) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: UNKNOWN SIGNAL MagickCore/layer.c:1616:30 in RemoveDuplicateLayers ==28916==ABORTING ``` ### System Configuration <!-- Tell us about the environment where you are experiencing the bug --> - ImageMagick version: Version: ImageMagick 7.0.8-54 Q16 x86_64 2019-07-07 https://imagemagick.org - Environment (Operating system, version and so on): Description: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS Release: 18.04 Codename: bionic - Additional information: CC=clang-7 CXX=clang++-7 CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -g" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -g" ./configure --disable-openmp --without-png <!-- Thanks for reporting the issue to ImageMagick! -->

Division by Zero at MagickCore/layer.c:1616

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629/comments

2019-07-07T02:34:55Z

2019-08-18T16:37:24Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629

CVE-2019-1010062

2019-07-16T13:15:11.410

PluckCMS 4.7.4 and earlier is affected by: CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The impact is: get webshell. The component is: data/inc/images.php line36. The attack vector is: modify the MIME TYPE on HTTP request to upload a php file. The fixed version is: after commit 09f0ab871bf633973cfd9fc4fe59d4a912397cf8.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/44

github.com

Hi! I found a Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerability on PluckCMS 4.7.4. I found i can bypass the filetype detection on background site by modifying the MIME type on HTTP request. And with uploading a PHP File, i can get a webshell.  Please fix it ASAP and contact me to get more details(i did not find you email) : My email:[email protected]

[Vulnerability] Unrestricted File Upload in background site

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/44/comments

2017-04-11T17:52:00Z

2018-09-03T08:40:42Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/44

CVE-2019-13617

2019-07-16T17:15:12.753

njs through 0.3.3, used in NGINX, has a heap-based buffer over-read in nxt_vsprintf in nxt/nxt_sprintf.c during error handling, as demonstrated by an njs_regexp_literal call that leads to an njs_parser_lexer_error call and then an njs_parser_scope_error call.

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/174

github.com

Hello, I am shuoz of alpha lab of topsec. I fuzz njs and found a heap overflow bug. ./njs ./tmp.js ``` fuzz@fuzz:~/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/build$ ./njs ./tmp.js INFO: Seed: 2208882516 INFO: Loaded 1 modules (8780 guards): [0x8a15a0, 0x8a9ed0), ./njs: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. Running: crash-0c9fced77823aa506239627a5473e8c4bb55ec96 ================================================================= ==16711==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61100000039b at pc 0x0000004dc4e2 bp 0x7ffc117a8770 sp 0x7ffc117a7f20 READ of size 217 at 0x61100000039b thread T0 #0 0x4dc4e1 in __asan_memcpy (/home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/build/njs+0x4dc4e1) #1 0x521ce2 in nxt_vsprintf /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/nxt/nxt_sprintf.c:429:15 #2 0x5ada7b in njs_parser_scope_error /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:2365:9 #3 0x5ada7b in njs_parser_lexer_error /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:2395 #4 0x58ab62 in njs_regexp_literal /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_regexp.c:364:5 #5 0x5b55fc in njs_parser_terminal /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_terminal.c:106:17 #6 0x5bcd95 in njs_parser_call_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:748:17 #7 0x5bc19b in njs_parser_post_inc_dec_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:689:13 #8 0x5bc19b in njs_parser_inc_dec_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:649 #9 0x5bc19b in njs_parser_unary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:553 #10 0x5bbb9b in njs_parser_exponential_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:476:13 #11 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #12 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #13 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #14 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #15 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #16 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #17 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #18 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #19 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #20 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #21 0x5bafec in njs_parser_conditional_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:352:13 #22 0x5bafec in njs_parser_assignment_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:228 #23 0x5bab67 in njs_parser_binary_expression /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser_expression.c:421:13 #24 0x5af3f1 in njs_parser_statement /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:413:21 #25 0x5a9f04 in njs_parser_statement_chain /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:280:13 #26 0x5b3af6 in njs_parser_block_statement /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:465:17 #27 0x5ae2a2 in njs_parser_statement /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:365:16 #28 0x5a9f04 in njs_parser_statement_chain /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:280:13 #29 0x5a940a in njs_parser /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_parser.c:131:17 #30 0x527ae4 in njs_vm_compile /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs.c:254:11 #31 0x517338 in njs_process_script /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_shell.c:780:11 #32 0x516714 in njs_process_file /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_shell.c:637:11 #33 0x516714 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_shell.c:298 #34 0x6046a4 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerLoop.cpp:451:13 #35 0x6048d1 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerLoop.cpp:408:3 #36 0x5fab41 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerDriver.cpp:268:6 #37 0x5fda01 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerDriver.cpp:585:9 #38 0x5fa8c0 in main /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10 #39 0x7f07973cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #40 0x41d769 in _start (/home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/build/njs+0x41d769) 0x61100000039b is located 0 bytes to the right of 219-byte region [0x6110000002c0,0x61100000039b) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4ddaa0 in realloc (/home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/build/njs+0x4ddaa0) #1 0x516488 in njs_process_file /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_shell.c:569:20 #2 0x516488 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/njs/njs_shell.c:298 #3 0x6046a4 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerLoop.cpp:451:13 #4 0x6048d1 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerLoop.cpp:408:3 #5 0x5fab41 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerDriver.cpp:268:6 #6 0x5fda01 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerDriver.cpp:585:9 #7 0x5fa8c0 in main /home/fuzz/Desktop/libfuzzer-workshop-master/libFuzzer/Fuzzer/./FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10 #8 0x7f07973cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/home/fuzz/Desktop/fuzzproject/njs/build/njs+0x4dc4e1) in __asan_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c227fff8020: 00 00 00 03 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff8030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff8040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff8060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c227fff8070: 00 00 00[03]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff8080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff8090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==16711==ABORTING ``` pocfile:https://github.com/xcainiao/poc/blob/master/tmp.js

heap-buffer-overflow in nxt_sprintf.c:429

https://api.github.com/repos/nginx/njs/issues/174/comments

2019-06-03T14:46:39Z

2019-08-26T16:01:44Z

https://github.com/nginx/njs/issues/174

CVE-2019-13618

2019-07-16T17:15:12.830

In GPAC before 0.8.0, isomedia/isom_read.c in libgpac.a has a heap-based buffer over-read, as demonstrated by a crash in gf_m2ts_sync in media_tools/mpegts.c.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1250

github.com

hello，I found a heap buffer overflow bug in gpac. [bug details](http://blog.topsec.com.cn/gpac-heap-buffer-overflow-in-gf_m2ts_sync/) [heap-over-flow.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/3251236/heap-over-flow.zip)

heap buffer overflow in gf_m2ts_sync

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1250/comments

2019-06-04T08:09:07Z

2019-06-24T15:28:33Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1250

CVE-2019-13959

2019-07-18T19:15:11.520

In Bento4 1.5.1-627, AP4_DataBuffer::SetDataSize does not handle reallocation failures, leading to a memory copy into a NULL pointer. This is different from CVE-2018-20186.

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/394

github.com

Hi, recently when I experience the new version of bento4. I find an NPD bug in program "mp42aac". `./mp42acc inputs` The bug logic is that when the data size is not large enough and apply reallocation, the reallocation does not check whether the new buffer is successfully allocated. This is the execution trace. 4c7a.png"> <img width="1369" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/7632714/58330114-c4810880-7e68-11e9-82e1-cc33671c63dc.png"> In SetDataSize, the function realloc buffer when new size is larger than the current one. This means the two values of two size variable are not zero.  In reallocation, there is no null pointer check for the return value of the allocation and leads to the crash when apply AP4_CopyMemory which is an alias of memcpy function.  I have uploaded the report and related bug trace to help understand this problem. [report_input.zip](https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/files/3176121/report_input.zip)

Null Pointer Dereference(npd) Bug

https://api.github.com/repos/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/394/comments

2019-05-14T06:23:56Z

2019-08-25T16:30:37Z

https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/394

CVE-2019-1010176

2019-07-25T14:15:11.623

JerryScript commit 4e58ccf68070671e1fff5cd6673f0c1d5b80b166 is affected by: Buffer Overflow. The impact is: denial of service and possibly arbitrary code execution. The component is: function lit_char_to_utf8_bytes (jerry-core/lit/lit-char-helpers.c:377). The attack vector is: executing crafted javascript code. The fixed version is: after commit 505dace719aebb3308a3af223cfaa985159efae0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/2476

github.com

Version: 4e58ccf68070671e1fff5cd6673f0c1d5b80b166 Build command: `python3 ./tools/build.py --clean --jerry-libc=off --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --strip=OFF` Testcase: `cat testcase | ./jerry` Where testcase is as following: ``` 0 /ð/ ``` (`300a 2ff0 2f0a` in hex). Stack trace: ``` ==2342==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf580073b at pc 0x080f1a7a bp 0xffbb2b48 sp 0xffbb2b38 WRITE of size 1 at 0xf580073b thread T0 #0 0x80f1a79 in lit_char_to_utf8_bytes jerry-core/lit/lit-char-helpers.c:377 #1 0x811f6d8 in ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8_converted_to_cesu8 jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:376 #2 0x811f6d8 in lexer_construct_regexp_object jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2175 #3 0x817e286 in parser_parse_unary_expression jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1116 #4 0x817e286 in parser_parse_expression jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1858 #5 0x8193a71 in parser_parse_statements jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2030 #6 0x80effc7 in parser_parse_source.lto_priv.160 jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2368 #7 0x804d1ef in parser_parse_script jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2881 #8 0x804d1ef in ecma_op_eval_chars_bufferjerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-eval.c:101 #9 0x804d1ef in jerry_eval jerry-core/api/jerry.c:551 #10 0x804d1ef in main jerry-main/main-unix.c:814 #11 0xf702e636 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18636) #12 0x804f1eb (build/bin/jerry+0x804f1eb) ```

Heap buffer overflow in lit_char_to_utf8_bytes

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/2476/comments

2018-08-16T15:19:04Z

2018-08-21T04:53:56Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/2476

CVE-2019-14268

2019-07-25T16:15:13.260

In Octopus Deploy versions 3.0.19 to 2019.7.2, when a web request proxy is configured, an authenticated user (in certain limited circumstances) could trigger a deployment that writes the web request proxy password to the deployment log in cleartext. This is fixed in 2019.7.3. The fix was back-ported to LTS 2019.6.5 as well as LTS 2019.3.7.

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5739

github.com

Relates to: OctopusDeploy/OctopusDeploy#4112. # Prerequisites - [x] We are ready to publicly disclose this vulnerability or exploit according to our [responsible disclosure process](https://octopushq.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IN/pages/2430143/Security+Disclosure+Policy). - [x] I have raised a CVE according to our [CVE process](https://octopushq.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IN/pages/8290305/Requesting+a+CVE+ID) - [x] I have written a descriptive issue title - [x] I have linked the original source of this report - [x] I have tagged the issue appropriately (area/security, kind/bug, tag/regression?) ## Description In certain limited circumstances, the password for a proxy configured via the Octopus Server Manager may be logged in cleartext to the deployment log. CVE: CVE-2019-14268 ## Affected versions **Octopus Server:** 3.0.19 to 2019.7.3 ## Mitigation Only customers using a proxy which requires authentication are affected. Unfortunately, there are no good mitgations for this. ## Workarounds Unfortunately, nothing good. Use of a transparent proxy over ones that require configuration is good practice. ## Source Source: [Internally reported](https://octopusdeploy.slack.com/archives/C0K9DNQG5/p1534924799000100)

Proxy password may be logged in clear text in certain circumstances

https://api.github.com/repos/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5739/comments

2019-07-25T01:42:06Z

2019-10-24T00:11:58Z

https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/5739

CVE-2019-14295

2019-07-27T19:15:12.050

An Integer overflow in the getElfSections function in p_vmlinx.cpp in UPX 3.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a skewed offset larger than the size of the PE section in a UPX packed executable, which triggers an allocation of excessive memory.

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/286

github.com

<!--- IF YOU REMOVE THIS TEMPLATE WE WILL CLOSE YOUR ISSUE WITHOUT RESPONSE. Just read it and fill in the details we're asking, it saves so much of our time. Thanks! --> ## What's the problem (or question)? <!--- If describing a bug, tell us what happens instead of the expected behavior --> <!--- If suggesting a change/improvement, explain the difference from current behavior --> upx.out -l @@ /dev/null An issue was discovered in upx 3.95, There is a/an Integer-overflow in function getElfSections at p_vmlinx.cpp:119 In the add operation, the result of (p->sh_size + p->sh_offset) is equal to zero because of overflow. So the execution can pass the condition check on line 114 and applicate excessive memory line 119, resulting in denial of service. ## What should have happened? <!--- If you're describing a bug, tell us what should happen --> <!--- If you're suggesting a change/improvement, tell us how it should work --> list compressed file ## Do you have an idea for a solution? <!--- Not obligatory, but suggest a fix/reason for the bug, --> <!--- or ideas how to implement the addition or change --> check for integer overflow correctly ## How can we reproduce the issue? <!--- Provide unambiguous set of steps to reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant --> upx.out -l @@ /dev/null the poc is attached [poc](https://github.com/aheroine/libming-bin/raw/master/crashes/upx/poc-Integer-overflow) ### source ```c file: p_vmlinx.cpp function: getElfSections() 104 template <class T> 105 typename T::Shdr const *PackVmlinuxBase<T>::getElfSections() 106 { 107 Shdr const *p, *shstrsec=0; 108 shdri = new Shdr[(unsigned) ehdri.e_shnum]; 109 fi->seek(ehdri.e_shoff, SEEK_SET); 110 fi->readx(shdri, ehdri.e_shnum * sizeof(*shdri)); 111 int j; 112 for (p = shdri, j= ehdri.e_shnum; --j>=0; ++p) { 113 if (Shdr::SHT_STRTAB==p->sh_type 114 && (p->sh_size + p->sh_offset) <= (unsigned long)file_size 115 && p->sh_name < p->sh_size 116 && (10+ p->sh_name) <= p->sh_size // 1+ strlen(".shstrtab") 117 ) { 118 delete [] shstrtab; 119 shstrtab = new char[1+ p->sh_size]; 120 fi->seek(p->sh_offset, SEEK_SET); 121 fi->readx(shstrtab, p->sh_size); 122 shstrtab[p->sh_size] = '\0'; 123 if (0==strcmp(".shstrtab", shstrtab + p->sh_name)) { 124 shstrsec = p; 125 break; 126 } 127 } 128 } 129 return shstrsec; 130 } ``` ### debug ```c (gdb) p (unsigned long long)p->sh_size + (unsigned long long)p->sh_offset $4 = 0 (gdb) p (unsigned long long)p->sh_size $5 = 576460752303423488 (gdb) p (unsigned long long)p->sh_offset $6 = 17870283321406128128 (gdb) p p->sh_size $7 = {d = "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\b"} (gdb) p p->sh_offset $8 = {d = "\000\000\000\000\000\000", <incomplete sequence \370>} (gdb) x/gx &p->sh_size 0x61c00000ff20: 0x0800000000000000 (gdb) x/gx &p->sh_offset 0x61c00000ff18: 0xf800000000000000 ``` ### bug report ```txt ================================================================= ==6768==WARNING: AddressSanitizer failed to allocate 0x800000000000001 bytes ==6768==AddressSanitizer's allocator is terminating the process instead of returning 0 ==6768==If you don't like this behavior set allocator_may_return_null=1 ==6768==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_allocator.cc:147 "((0)) != (0)" (0x0, 0x0) #0 0x7f935b1a2631 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa0631) #1 0x7f935b1a75e3 in __sanitizer::CheckFailed(char const*, int, char const*, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa55e3) #2 0x7f935b11f425 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x1d425) #3 0x7f935b1a5865 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0xa3865) #4 0x7f935b124b4d (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x22b4d) #5 0x7f935b19b67e in operator new[](unsigned long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x9967e) #6 0x6f73e2 in PackVmlinuxBase<N_Elf::ElfClass_64<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::getElfSections() /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/p_vmlinx.cpp:119 #7 0x70949a in PackVmlinuxBase<N_Elf::ElfClass_64<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::canUnpack() /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/p_vmlinx.cpp:569 #8 0x7a7e1d in try_unpack /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:114 #9 0x7abe70 in PackMaster::visitAllPackers(Packer* (*)(Packer*, void*), InputFile*, options_t const*, void*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:177 #10 0x7b5282 in PackMaster::getUnpacker(InputFile*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:248 #11 0x7b694b in PackMaster::list() /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:279 #12 0x8604db in do_one_file(char const*, char*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/work.cpp:164 #13 0x8615fa in do_files(int, int, char**) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/work.cpp:271 #14 0x468b28 in main /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/main.cpp:1539 #15 0x7f935989982f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #16 0x4030f8 in _start (/home/jl/work/up_projects/fuzz-upx/crashes/upx.out.debug+0x4030f8) ``` ## Please tell us details about your environment. <!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in --> * UPX version used (`upx --3.95`): * Host Operating System and version: ubuntu 16.04 * Host CPU architecture: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz * Target Operating System and version: ubuntu 16.04 * Target CPU architecture: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz

Integer-overflow in function getElfSections at p_vmlinx.cpp:119

https://api.github.com/repos/upx/upx/issues/286/comments

2019-07-19T06:15:54Z

2022-09-14T06:46:05Z

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/286

CVE-2019-14296

2019-07-27T19:15:12.097

canUnpack in p_vmlinx.cpp in UPX 3.95 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (SEGV or buffer overflow, and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted UPX packed file.

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/287

github.com

<!--- IF YOU REMOVE THIS TEMPLATE WE WILL CLOSE YOUR ISSUE WITHOUT RESPONSE. Just read it and fill in the details we're asking, it saves so much of our time. Thanks! --> ## What's the problem (or question)? <!--- If describing a bug, tell us what happens instead of the expected behavior --> <!--- If suggesting a change/improvement, explain the difference from current behavior --> An issue was discovered in upx 3.95, There is a/an buffer-overflow in function canUnpack at p_vmlinx.cpp:583 upx.out -l @@ /dev/null ## What should have happened? <!--- If you're describing a bug, tell us what should happen --> <!--- If you're suggesting a change/improvement, tell us how it should work --> list compressed file ## Do you have an idea for a solution? <!--- Not obligatory, but suggest a fix/reason for the bug, --> <!--- or ideas how to implement the addition or change --> check for buffer overflow correctly ## How can we reproduce the issue? <!--- Provide unambiguous set of steps to reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant --> upx.out -l @@ /dev/null the poc is attached [poc](https://github.com/aheroine/libming-bin/raw/master/crashes/upx/poc-buffer-overflow) ### source ```c 574 // check for .text .note .note and sane (.sh_size + .sh_offset) 575 p_note0 = p_note1 = p_text = 0; 576 int j; 577 Shdr *p; 578 for (p= shdri, j= ehdri.e_shnum; --j>=0; ++p) { 579 if ((unsigned)file_size < (p->sh_size + p->sh_offset) 580 || shstrsec->sh_size < (5+ p->sh_name) ) { 581 continue; 582 } 583 if (0==strcmp(".text", shstrtab + p->sh_name)) { 584 p_text = p; 585 } 586 if (0==strcmp(".note", shstrtab + p->sh_name)) { 587 if (0==p_note0) { 588 p_note0 = p; 589 } else 590 if (0==p_note1) { 591 p_note1 = p; 592 } 593 } 594 } ``` ### debug ```c pwndbg> p shstrtab $5 = 0x611000009f00 "\200" pwndbg> p p->sh_name $6 = { d = "\377\377\377\377" } pwndbg> p sizeof(p->sh_name ) $7 = 4 pwndbg> p/x p->sh_name $8 = { d = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff} } pwndbg> ``` ### bug report ```txt ASAN:SIGSEGV ================================================================= ==8931==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x611100009eff (pc 0x7f66aca7d05e bp 0x7fff0bf97d90 sp 0x7fff0bf97520 T0) #0 0x7f66aca7d05d (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x4705d) #1 0x6d3087 in PackVmlinuxBase<N_Elf::ElfClass_32<N_BELE_CTP::LEPolicy> >::canUnpack() /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/p_vmlinx.cpp:583 #2 0x7a7e1d in try_unpack /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:114 #3 0x7ac2e4 in PackMaster::visitAllPackers(Packer* (*)(Packer*, void*), InputFile*, options_t const*, void*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:178 #4 0x7b5282 in PackMaster::getUnpacker(InputFile*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:248 #5 0x7b694b in PackMaster::list() /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/packmast.cpp:279 #6 0x8604db in do_one_file(char const*, char*) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/work.cpp:164 #7 0x8615fa in do_files(int, int, char**) /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/work.cpp:271 #8 0x468b28 in main /home/jl/work/projects/upx/upx/src/main.cpp:1539 #9 0x7f66ab1cd82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #10 0x4030f8 in _start (/home/jl/work/up_projects/fuzz-upx/crashes/upx.out.debug+0x4030f8) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV ??:0 ?? ==8931==ABORTING ``` ## Please tell us details about your environment. <!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in --> * UPX version used (`upx --3.95`): * Host Operating System and version: ubuntu 16.04 * Host CPU architecture: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz * Target Operating System and version: ubuntu 16.04 * Target CPU architecture: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz

canUnpack@p_vmlinx.cpp:583___buffer-overflow

https://api.github.com/repos/upx/upx/issues/287/comments

2019-07-19T06:25:38Z

2019-07-30T09:33:45Z

https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/287

CVE-2019-14368

2019-07-28T19:15:10.903

Exiv2 0.27.99.0 has a heap-based buffer over-read in Exiv2::RafImage::readMetadata() in rafimage.cpp.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/952

github.com

**Describe the bug** in my research , a heap overflow found in RafImage::readMetadata rafimage.cpp:296. **To Reproduce** exiv2 -pv $poc [exiv2poc.zip](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/files/3384707/exiv2poc.zip) **Expected behavior** ``` root@ubuntu:~/fuzz/exiv2# /home/tim/exiv2-asan/build/bin/exiv2 /home/tim/fuzz/exiv2/out/master/queue/id:000174,src:000124,op:ext_AO,pos:24,+cov ================================================================= ==108944==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6030000001b4 at pc 0x7f55a6829733 bp 0x7ffeff406e20 sp 0x7ffeff4065c8 READ of size 4 at 0x6030000001b4 thread T0 #0 0x7f55a6829732 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) #1 0x7f55a5dc4723 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 0x7f55a5dc4723 in Exiv2::MemIo::read(unsigned char*, unsigned long) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/basicio.cpp:1354 #3 0x7f55a5f65c98 in Exiv2::RafImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/rafimage.cpp:296 #4 0x7f55a5f0fa9c in Exiv2::PgfImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/pgfimage.cpp:153 #5 0x5636c0fbc644 in Action::Print::printSummary() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:260 #6 0x5636c0fc1304 in Action::Print::run(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:215 #7 0x5636c0f39692 in main /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/exiv2.cpp:77 #8 0x7f55a526db96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x5636c0f3a359 in _start (/home/tim/exiv2-asan/build/bin/exiv2+0x18359) 0x6030000001b4 is located 12 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000000190,0x6030000001a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f55a6890458 in operator new(unsigned long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xe0458) #1 0x7f55a5eb05e9 in Exiv2::ImageFactory::open(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/image.cpp:902 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 06 fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8010: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 06 =>0x0c067fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==108944==ABORTING ``` **Desktop (please complete the following information):** - ubuntu18 - gcc 7.4.0 - -fsanitize=address -g

AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in RafImage::readMetadata

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/952/comments

2019-07-12T02:22:41Z

2019-07-29T16:51:35Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/952

CVE-2019-14369

2019-07-28T19:15:10.983

Exiv2::PngImage::readMetadata() in pngimage.cpp in Exiv2 0.27.99.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image file.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/953

github.com

**Describe the bug** in my research , a heap overflow found in Exiv2::readChunk(Exiv2::DataBuf&, Exiv2::BasicIo&) /src/pngimage.cpp:410. **To Reproduce** exiv2 -pv $poc [poc.zip](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/files/3384823/poc.zip) **Expected behavior** ``` ================================================================= ==6866==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6030000001b0 at pc 0x7f6fac214733 bp 0x7ffdf4470950 sp 0x7ffdf44700f8 READ of size 8 at 0x6030000001b0 thread T0 #0 0x7f6fac214732 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) #1 0x7f6fab7af723 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 0x7f6fab7af723 in Exiv2::MemIo::read(unsigned char*, unsigned long) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/basicio.cpp:1354 #3 0x7f6faba0b142 in Exiv2::readChunk(Exiv2::DataBuf&, Exiv2::BasicIo&) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/pngimage.cpp:410 #4 0x7f6faba182f9 in Exiv2::PngImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/pngimage.cpp:438 #5 0x7f6fab8faa9c in Exiv2::PgfImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/pgfimage.cpp:153 #6 0x559495100458 in Action::Print::printList() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:483 #7 0x55949510629d in Action::Print::run(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:218 #8 0x55949507e692 in main /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/exiv2.cpp:77 #9 0x7f6faac58b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x55949507f359 in _start (/home/tim/exiv2-asan/build/bin/exiv2+0x18359) 0x6030000001b0 is located 2 bytes to the right of 30-byte region [0x603000000190,0x6030000001ae) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f6fac27b618 in operator new[](unsigned long) (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xe0618) #1 0x7f6fab97f0e3 in Exiv2::DataBuf::DataBuf(unsigned long) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/types.cpp:144 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 06 fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8010: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 fa =>0x0c067fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 06[fa]fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==6866==ABORTING ``` **Desktop (please complete the following information):** - ubuntu18 - gcc 7.4.0 - -fsanitize=address -g

AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in PngImage::readMetadata() pngimage.cpp:438

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/953/comments

2019-07-12T03:07:03Z

2019-07-22T09:21:12Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/953

CVE-2019-14370

2019-07-28T19:15:11.030

In Exiv2 0.27.99.0, there is an out-of-bounds read in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata() in mrwimage.cpp. It could result in denial of service.

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/954

github.com

**Describe the bug** in my research , a heap overflow found in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/mrwimage.cpp:131. **To Reproduce** exiv2 -pv $poc [poc1.zip](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/files/3385271/poc1.zip) **Expected behavior** ``` asan output rASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==45838==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6030ededef5d (pc 0x7f7971f0157e bp 0x7fffb45f5a30 sp 0x7fffb45f5198 T0) ==45838==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f7971f0157d (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb57d) #1 0x7f79734236ce (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x796ce) #2 0x7f79729be723 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #3 0x7f79729be723 in Exiv2::MemIo::read(unsigned char*, unsigned long) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/basicio.cpp:1354 #4 0x7f7972aff426 in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/mrwimage.cpp:131 #5 0x7f7972b09a9c in Exiv2::PgfImage::readMetadata() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/pgfimage.cpp:153 #6 0x55ab241e8644 in Action::Print::printSummary() /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:260 #7 0x55ab241ed304 in Action::Print::run(std::__cxx11::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char> > const&) /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/actions.cpp:215 #8 0x55ab24165692 in main /home/tim/exiv2-asan/src/exiv2.cpp:77 #9 0x7f7971e67b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #10 0x55ab24166359 in _start (/home/tim/exiv2-asan/build/bin/exiv2+0x18359) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0xbb57d) ==45838==ABORTING gdb output gdb-peda$ r /home/tim/poc1 Starting program: /home/tim/fuzz/exiv2/exiv2 /home/tim/poc1 [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] RAX: 0x7fffffffdf60 --> 0xedededededededed RBX: 0xffffffff12121221 RCX: 0xedededededededed RDX: 0x8 RSI: 0x55564368c1dd RDI: 0x7fffffffdf60 --> 0xedededededededed RBP: 0x8 RSP: 0x7fffffffdec8 --> 0x7ffff79796bf (<Exiv2::MemIo::read(unsigned char*, unsigned long)+63>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [r13+0x10]) RIP: 0x7ffff70d1b53 (<__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+131>: mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rsi+rdx*1-0x8]) R8 : 0x5555557ad3a0 --> 0x7ffff7db10d0 (:MemIo+16>: 0x00007ffff7974450) R9 : 0x0 R10: 0xa ('\n') R11: 0x7ffff79fa3d0 (<Exiv2::getULong(unsigned char const*, Exiv2::ByteOrder)>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [rdi]) R12: 0x8 R13: 0x5555557ad3a0 --> 0x7ffff7db10d0 (:MemIo+16>: 0x00007ffff7974450) R14: 0x7fffffffdf61 --> 0xededededededed R15: 0x7ffff7db1438 (:IoCloser>: 0x0000000000000000) EFLAGS: 0x10246 (carry PARITY adjust ZERO sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0x7ffff70d1b48 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+120>: vmovdqu XMMWORD PTR [rdi],xmm0 0x7ffff70d1b4c <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+124>: vmovdqu XMMWORD PTR [rdi+rdx*1-0x10],xmm1 0x7ffff70d1b52 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+130>: ret => 0x7ffff70d1b53 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+131>: mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rsi+rdx*1-0x8] 0x7ffff70d1b58 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+136>: mov rsi,QWORD PTR [rsi] 0x7ffff70d1b5b <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+139>: mov QWORD PTR [rdi+rdx*1-0x8],rcx 0x7ffff70d1b60 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+144>: mov QWORD PTR [rdi],rsi 0x7ffff70d1b63 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+147>: ret [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0x7fffffffdec8 --> 0x7ffff79796bf (<Exiv2::MemIo::read(unsigned char*, unsigned long)+63>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [r13+0x10]) 0008| 0x7fffffffded0 --> 0x7ffff7db1438 (:IoCloser>: 0x0000000000000000) 0016| 0x7fffffffded8 --> 0x5555557aca60 --> 0x7ffff7db22f8 (:MrwImage+16>: 0x00007ffff79d4f90) 0024| 0x7fffffffdee0 --> 0xededee05 0032| 0x7fffffffdee8 --> 0x7fffffffdf60 --> 0xedededededededed 0040| 0x7fffffffdef0 --> 0xf7ffffff 0048| 0x7fffffffdef8 --> 0x7ffff79d471b (<Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata()+603>: mov rdi,QWORD PTR [rbx+0x8]) 0056| 0x7fffffffdf00 --> 0x7ffff7db1448 (:IoCloser+16>: 0x00007ffff7988490) [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:299 299 ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S: No such file or directory. gdb-peda$ bt #0 __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memmove-vec-unaligned-erms.S:299 #1 0x00007ffff79796bf in memcpy (__len=<optimized out>, __src=<optimized out>, __dest=<optimized out>) at /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 Exiv2::MemIo::read (this=0x5555557ad3a0, buf=<optimized out>, rcount=0x8) at /home/tim/exiv2/src/basicio.cpp:1354 #3 0x00007ffff79d471b in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata (this=0x5555557aca60) at /home/tim/exiv2/src/mrwimage.cpp:131 #4 0x00007ffff79d7d82 in Exiv2::PgfImage::readMetadata (this=0x5555557ac920) at /home/tim/exiv2/src/pgfimage.cpp:153 #5 0x000055555557f40d in Action::Print::printSummary (this=0x5555557ada50) at /home/tim/exiv2/src/actions.cpp:260 #6 0x00005555555808c5 in Action::Print::run (this=0x5555557ada50, path="/home/tim/poc1") at /home/tim/exiv2/src/actions.cpp:215 #7 0x000055555555e304 in main (argc=argc@entry=0x2, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe578) at /home/tim/exiv2/src/exiv2.cpp:77 #8 0x00007ffff6f64b97 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555555e100 <main(int, char* const*)>, argc=0x2, argv=0x7fffffffe578, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe568) at ../csu/libc-start.c:310 #9 0x000055555555e6da in _start () gdb-peda$ vmmap Start End Perm Name 0x0000555555554000 0x0000555555597000 r-xp /home/tim/fuzz/exiv2/exiv2 0x0000555555796000 0x0000555555798000 r--p /home/tim/fuzz/exiv2/exiv2 0x0000555555798000 0x0000555555799000 rw-p /home/tim/fuzz/exiv2/exiv2 0x0000555555799000 0x00005555557ba000 rw-p [heap] 0x00007ffff5b67000 0x00007ffff6536000 r--p /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive 0x00007ffff6536000 0x00007ffff66d3000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm-2.27.so 0x00007ffff66d3000 0x00007ffff68d2000 ---p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm-2.27.so 0x00007ffff68d2000 0x00007ffff68d3000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm-2.27.so 0x00007ffff68d3000 0x00007ffff68d4000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm-2.27.so 0x00007ffff68d4000 0x00007ffff68ee000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.27.so 0x00007ffff68ee000 0x00007ffff6aed000 ---p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.27.so 0x00007ffff6aed000 0x00007ffff6aee000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.27.so 0x00007ffff6aee000 0x00007ffff6aef000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread-2.27.so 0x00007ffff6aef000 0x00007ffff6af3000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff6af3000 0x00007ffff6b22000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1.6.7 0x00007ffff6b22000 0x00007ffff6d22000 ---p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1.6.7 0x00007ffff6d22000 0x00007ffff6d24000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1.6.7 0x00007ffff6d24000 0x00007ffff6d25000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1.6.7 0x00007ffff6d25000 0x00007ffff6d41000 r-xp /usr/local/lib/libz.so.1.2.11 0x00007ffff6d41000 0x00007ffff6f41000 ---p /usr/local/lib/libz.so.1.2.11 0x00007ffff6f41000 0x00007ffff6f42000 r--p /usr/local/lib/libz.so.1.2.11 0x00007ffff6f42000 0x00007ffff6f43000 rw-p /usr/local/lib/libz.so.1.2.11 0x00007ffff6f43000 0x00007ffff712a000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so 0x00007ffff712a000 0x00007ffff732a000 ---p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so 0x00007ffff732a000 0x00007ffff732e000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so 0x00007ffff732e000 0x00007ffff7330000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so 0x00007ffff7330000 0x00007ffff7334000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff7334000 0x00007ffff734b000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0x00007ffff734b000 0x00007ffff754a000 ---p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0x00007ffff754a000 0x00007ffff754b000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0x00007ffff754b000 0x00007ffff754c000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 0x00007ffff754c000 0x00007ffff76c5000 r-xp /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.25 0x00007ffff76c5000 0x00007ffff78c5000 ---p /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.25 0x00007ffff78c5000 0x00007ffff78cf000 r--p /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.25 0x00007ffff78cf000 0x00007ffff78d1000 rw-p /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6.0.25 0x00007ffff78d1000 0x00007ffff78d5000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff78d5000 0x00007ffff7b86000 r-xp /home/tim/exiv2/build/lib/libexiv2.so.0.27.99.0 0x00007ffff7b86000 0x00007ffff7d85000 ---p /home/tim/exiv2/build/lib/libexiv2.so.0.27.99.0 0x00007ffff7d85000 0x00007ffff7db7000 r--p /home/tim/exiv2/build/lib/libexiv2.so.0.27.99.0 0x00007ffff7db7000 0x00007ffff7dba000 rw-p /home/tim/exiv2/build/lib/libexiv2.so.0.27.99.0 0x00007ffff7dba000 0x00007ffff7dd5000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff7dd5000 0x00007ffff7dfc000 r-xp /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.27.so 0x00007ffff7fda000 0x00007ffff7fe0000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff7ff5000 0x00007ffff7ff7000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffff7ff7000 0x00007ffff7ffa000 r--p [vvar] 0x00007ffff7ffa000 0x00007ffff7ffc000 r-xp [vdso] 0x00007ffff7ffc000 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r--p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.27.so 0x00007ffff7ffd000 0x00007ffff7ffe000 rw-p /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.27.so 0x00007ffff7ffe000 0x00007ffff7fff000 rw-p mapped 0x00007ffffffde000 0x00007ffffffff000 rw-p [stack] 0xffffffffff600000 0xffffffffff601000 r-xp [vsyscall] ``` **Desktop (please complete the following information):** - ubuntu18 - gcc 7.4.0 - -fsanitize=address -g

heap-buffer-overflow in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata()

https://api.github.com/repos/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/954/comments

2019-07-12T06:36:56Z

2019-07-22T09:36:16Z

https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/954

CVE-2019-14379

2019-07-29T12:15:16.633

SubTypeValidator.java in FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.9.9.2 mishandles default typing when ehcache is used (because of net.sf.ehcache.transaction.manager.DefaultTransactionManagerLookup), leading to remote code execution.

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2387

github.com

Another gadget type reported regarding a class of ehcache package. See https://medium.com/@cowtowncoder/on-jackson-cves-dont-panic-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-54cd0d6e8062 for description of the general problem. ----- Fixed in: * 2.9.10 * 2.8.11.4 * 2.7.9.6 * 2.6.7.3

Block one more gadget type (ehcache, CVE-2019-14379)

https://api.github.com/repos/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2387/comments

2019-07-23T06:28:01Z

2019-10-16T04:54:58Z

https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2387