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462664e4-01e1-462f-aea6-c5f9379d907f | State v. Autele | null | S070046 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 22
June 13, 2024
489
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
TASI AUTELE,
aka Brian Mulivai Autele,
aka Tasi Mulivai Autele,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 17CR69755) (CA A172873) (SC S070046)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 7, 2024, at University of
Oregon School of Law, Eugene, Oregon.
Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Ernest Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
BUSHONG, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
______________
* Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Ricardo J. Menchaca,
Judge. 323 Or App 594 (2023) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion).
490
State v. Autele
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
491
BUSHONG, J.
This criminal case implicates a fundamental right
protected by the Oregon and federal constitutions—the right
to counsel—but our resolution of this case turns on the lack
of an adequate record demonstrating that the trial court
had discretion to deny defendant’s request to be represented
by the attorneys that he had retained. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the record was insufficient for it to determine
whether the trial court had abused its discretion, and, based
on that conclusion, affirmed defendant’s conviction because
it “[was] not in a position in which [it] [could] say” that the
trial court had erred. State v. Autele, 323 Or App 594, 597
(2023) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion).
We allowed review and now reverse. We agree with
the Court of Appeals’ assessment that the record in this
case was inadequate, but we conclude that a trial court’s
discretionary decision to deny a defendant’s request to be
represented by retained counsel of their choice may be
affirmed on appeal only if the record created by the trial
court establishes that its exercise of discretion was per-
missible. Because the record in this case does not do so, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Court Proceedings
Defendant retained attorneys Mackeson and Hall to
represent him after he was indicted on charges of second-
degree assault and strangulation. At defendant’s request on
the morning of his first trial date, the trial was delayed so
that defense counsel could investigate photographs that had
been anonymously left at Hall’s office the previous day. On
the next date set for trial, defendant sought to exclude the
photographs on grounds that they were subject to an ongoing
criminal investigation regarding their authenticity. The trial
court initially granted defendant’s motion, but, when pressed
by the prosecutor, the court indicated that the state might be
able to use the photographs in cross-examining defendant.
The prosecutor then expressed concerns about
defense counsel’s ethical obligations if defendant were to be
492
State v. Autele
confronted with those photographs on the stand. That led to
an off-the-record discussion in chambers. When they went
back on the record, the court provided the following sum-
mary of that discussion:
“I *
*
* met with the attorneys in chambers, with
Mr. Gerhard, Mr. Mackeson and Mr. Hall. It’s my under-
standing that Mr. Mackeson [and Mr. Hall] at this point
[have] a conflict with—[they have] requested to withdraw.
I don’t know that it’s appropriate for me to go into the con-
flict, but [they have] motioned the court for a withdrawal.
Based on [their] ethical conflict, I’m going to allow the with-
drawal. The State opposed that based primarily on the age
of the case. It’s a 2017 case. But based on my understanding
of the conflict, I don’t know that I have a choice. So I will
reluctantly grant the withdrawal.”
Defense counsel did not submit a written motion to with-
draw, and the court did not identify on the record the pre-
cise ethical issue that led to defense counsel’s request. The
court told defendant that it would give him some time to
retain another lawyer, and, if that effort was unsuccessful,
the court would appoint counsel to represent him. The court
set a status hearing nine days later.
At that hearing, Mackeson and Hall appeared with
defendant and asked, on defendant’s behalf, that they be
allowed to represent defendant, which led to another off-the-
record discussion in chambers. When they went back on the
record, counsel did not state whether or how the conflict that
they had previously raised had been resolved, but they did
ask the court to put defendant’s request on the record:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I think I’d like the
record to reflect that in chambers, we made the request to
be permitted to represent [defendant]. I know the Court’s
going to address that—at least I think—that request. And
then, otherwise, I have [defendant’s] file.”
The state did not object on the record to Mackeson and
Hall’s request to represent defendant, and the court did
not inquire further on the record or receive any evidence or
other information about a conflict or potential conflict. The
court denied the request with the following explanation:
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
493
“THE COURT: Okay. I met with the attorneys in cham-
bers the last time we were in open court. The exact date
escapes me. I want to say it was two weeks ago. Correct me
if I’m wrong, both of you. At that point in time, without get-
ting into specifics, I—[defense counsel] had made a motion
in my office and—and we put it on the record to withdraw
based on some ethical considerations, which, in my mind
and in his at the time, were significant. And so I withdrew
[defense counsel] and set over the trial of this very old case.
I directed [defendant] to be here today with new counsel
or I would appoint counsel. I met with the attorneys in
my office just a few moments ago and Mr. Mackeson and
Mr. Hall asked to be reappointed.[1]
“The conflict may or may not have resolved itself, but, in
my mind, the Court’s mind, my concerns about the ethical
obligations that were raised in the last hearing we had, I’m
just not willing to reappoint Mr. Mackeson or Mr. Hall to
represent [defendant].”
The court then appointed counsel for defendant and set
another status hearing. Defendant later retained a different
lawyer, who represented him for the remainder of the case.
The disputed photographs were not used at trial, and the
jury found defendant guilty of third-degree assault, a lesser-
included offense. Defendant appealed, contending that the
trial court had wrongly denied him his constitutional right
to be represented by counsel of his choice.
B. Appellate Proceedings
On appeal, defendant argued that, because there
was no evidence of an existing conflict of interest that would
have delayed or disrupted the trial, the trial court erred by
interfering with defendant’s choice of retained counsel. The
state responded that defendant had failed to make a record
adequate for appellate review of that issue. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the state and affirmed the conviction,
explaining that it could not say whether the trial court had
erred:
1 By stating that Mackeson and Hall had requested to be “reappointed,” the
court either misspoke or misunderstood the nature of their requested represen-
tation. It is undisputed that Mackeson and Hall had been retained by defen-
dant; they had not been “appointed” by the court and were not asking to be
“reappointed.”
494
State v. Autele
“We are faced with a situation in which we do not have the
information on which the trial court based its decision. The
court stated that it believed defense counsel’s conflict of
interest was significant and indicated that it also believed
that it presented a risk that defense counsel would again
have to withdraw. Also, from the record that was made, we
can discern that the conflict was one that would arise, if at
all, during the trial. If that happened, it would be a ‘dis-
ruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ Without further
information about the nature of the conflict or whether the
risk of the conflict arising during trial had been resolved, we
are not in a position in which we can say that the trial court
erred under the circumstances of this case.”
Autele, 323 Or App at 596-97 (emphasis added). Given the
importance of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel, we allowed review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Parties’ Contentions
The parties agree on several predicate issues. The
state does not dispute defendant’s contention that his consti-
tutional right to counsel includes the right to be represented
by retained counsel of choice under both Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. And defendant does not dis-
pute the state’s contention that his right may be overcome if
allowing the requested representation would unduly delay
or disrupt the trial court proceedings or violate ethical or
professional standards of conduct.
However, the parties disagree about the application
of those principles in this case. Defendant contends that a
trial court must do more than allude to general concerns
about unspecified ethical obligations to overcome his con-
stitutional right to be represented by retained counsel of
his choice. And the state contends, as it did in the Court
of Appeals, that defendant’s failure to develop a record
that is adequate for review requires this court to affirm.
Alternatively, the state contends that the trial court prop-
erly declined to permit Mackeson and Hall to represent
defendant after they withdrew based on an ethical conflict
that the trial court described as “significant.”
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
495
We begin our discussion with the constitutional
right to counsel that is implicated in this case because that
context informs our analysis of the record and the appropri-
ate disposition of this case.
B. Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Counsel
As noted above, the parties do not dispute that a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to counsel includes
the right to be represented by counsel of their choice.
That important right is well-established under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144, 126 S Ct 2557,
165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006) (stating that “an element of [the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel] is the right of a defen-
dant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who
will represent him”); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 US
153, 158-59, 108 S Ct 1692, 100 L Ed 2d 140 (1988) (noting
that the Sixth Amendment “secures the right to the assis-
tance of counsel, by appointment if necessary” and that the
right may include “the right to select and be represented by
one’s preferred attorney”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 69,
53 S Ct 55, 77 L Ed 158 (1932) (stating that it would violate
the Sixth Amendment and “due process in the constitutional
sense” if a court “were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party
by counsel, employed by and appearing for him”).
Whether the same right also exists under the par-
allel provision of the Oregon Constitution—Article I, section
11—has not been as clearly established.3 Accordingly, defen-
dant suggests that we could decide this case based on the
Sixth Amendment without addressing Article I, section 11.
2 The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right *
*
* to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”
3 Article I, section 11, provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right *
*
* to be heard by himself and counsel[.]” The Article I, sec-
tion 11, right to counsel includes the right to court-appointed counsel, see State v.
Smith, 339 Or 515, 526, 123 P3d 261 (2005), but it does not include “the right to
court-appointed counsel ‘of the defendant’s own choosing.’
” State v. Stanton, 369
Or 707, 715, 511 P3d 1 (2022) (quoting State v. Langley, 351 Or 652, 664, 273 P3d
901 (2012)). Thus, a trial court “is not required to appoint a substitute lawyer for
a defendant in the absence of a legitimate complaint concerning the one already
appointed for him.” Stanton, 369 Or at 715 (quotations omitted). But we have not
squarely addressed whether a defendant’s Article I, section 11, right to counsel
includes a right to be represented by retained counsel of choice.
496
State v. Autele
However, defendant fully briefed the issue under Article I, sec-
tion 11, and, as noted above, the state does not dispute that
Article I, section 11, also protects a criminal defendant’s right
to retained counsel of choice. We ordinarily address state con-
stitutional issues before turning to the federal constitution, see
State v. Babson, 355 Or 383, 393, 326 P3d 559 (2014) (applying
that principle), and we adhere to that approach in this case.
As explained below, we conclude that Article I, section 11, like
the Sixth Amendment, protects a criminal defendant’s right
to be represented by retained counsel of choice, and we fur-
ther conclude that the Article I, section 11 right, like the Sixth
Amendment right, may be overcome by other considerations,
including the need to avoid undue delay or disruption of the
trial or violation of ethical and professional standards.
Article I, section 11, was part of the original Oregon
Constitution. When construing such a provision, we exam-
ine the text of the provision in its context, the historical cir-
cumstances surrounding its adoption, and the case law that
has construed it. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840
P2d 65 (1992). Our goal is “to identify, in light of the mean-
ing understood by the framers, relevant underlying princi-
ples that may inform our application of the constitutional
text to modern circumstances.” State v. Davis, 350 Or 440,
446, 256 P3d 1075 (2011).
Employing that analysis in Davis, we concluded
that law enforcement officers did not violate the defendant’s
Article I, section 11, right to counsel when they elicited
incriminating statements from the defendant before he had
been arrested or charged with a criminal offense. Although
Davis dealt with a different issue—namely, at what point
in a criminal proceeding the right to counsel attaches—its
analysis of Article I, section 11, is instructive. The text of
that provision—which states that, in criminal prosecutions,
the accused “shall have the right *
*
* to be heard by *
*
*
counsel”—certainly suggests that, if the accused has the
means to retain a lawyer, the accused’s right “to be heard
by *
*
* counsel” includes the right to be represented by the
lawyer that they chose to retain. Our historical analysis in
Davis of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
the state constitutional counterparts that existed when the
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
497
Oregon Constitution was adopted support that conclusion.
There, we noted that there was “general agreement among
historians” that those provisions were originally understood
“as a guarantee only of the right to retained counsel.” 350 Or
at 467 (emphasis in original). Although that right was later
expanded under both the Sixth Amendment and Article I,
section 11, to include a right to court-appointed counsel, see,
e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 339-40, 83 S Ct 792,
9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963); State v. Smith, 339 Or 515, 526, 123
P3d 261 (2005), the original understanding of the scope of
that right certainly supports the conclusion that a defen-
dant’s Article I, section 11, right to counsel includes the
right to be represented by retained counsel of choice.
The case law also supports that conclusion. As
noted above, the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Sixth Amendment to include the right to be rep-
resented by retained counsel of choice, and this court has
suggested that the same is also true under Article I, section
11. See State v. Delaney, 221 Or 620, 639, 332 P2d 71 (1958)
(stating that the Article I, section 11, right to counsel went
“no further than to assure the defendant that he may be
heard by himself and the counsel which he chose to employ”
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, we conclude that a criminal
defendant’s Article I, section 11, right to counsel includes
the right to be represented by retained counsel of choice.
We have also recognized, however, that a defen-
dant’s Article I, section 11, rights may be overcome by other
considerations. For example, in State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282,
301, 4 P3d 1261 (2000), we indicated that a defendant’s
Article I, section 11, right to be heard “by himself” may be
overcome by the court’s responsibility to conduct a trial in
an orderly and expeditious manner:
“[A] trial court is obliged to accommodate the exercise of
all pertinent constitutional and statutory rights by all par-
ties within the context of an orderly and expeditious trial.
Nothing in the text of Article I, section 11, suggests that the
framers intended that a defendant’s right to be heard ‘by
himself’ should override the court’s authority and respon-
sibility to conduct the trial as an orderly and expeditious
proceeding. The historical circumstances and case law sur-
rounding Article I, section 11, support that reading.”
498
State v. Autele
Id. at 301; see also State v. Hightower, 361 Or 412, 417-18,
393 P3d 224 (2017) (stating that “a number of interests” can
overcome a defendant’s Article I, section 11, rights, including
“the trial court’s overriding obligation to ensure the fairness
and integrity of the trial and its inherent authority to con-
duct proceedings in and orderly and expeditious manner”).
In that respect, Article I, section 11, also parallels
the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has stated that
a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be repre-
sented by retained counsel of their choice “is circumscribed
in several important respects.” Wheat, 486 US at 159. Among
them, standards of professional ethics and conduct can be a
basis for overcoming a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to retained counsel of choice.
For example, the defendant in Wheat had asked the
trial court to allow a substitution of counsel so that he could
be represented by an attorney who was also representing
two codefendants. Although the defendant attempted to
waive any ethical conflict, the trial court refused to accept
the waiver and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, stating that a trial court,
“confronted with and alerted to possible conflicts of inter-
est[,] must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the
conflicts warrant separate counsel.” Id. at 160. The Court
explained that the Sixth Amendment’s “presumption in
favor of counsel of choice” may be overcome by a court’s
“independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are
conducted within the ethical standards of the profession[.]”
Id. The Court further explained that a trial court “must be
allowed substantial latitude” in refusing a conflict waiver
where an actual or potential conflict exists, id. at 163, con-
cluding that, “where a court justifiably finds an actual con-
flict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a
proffer of waiver, and insist that defendants be separately
represented.” Id. at 162.
The Supreme Court also explained how ethical
considerations may overcome a defendant’s right to be rep-
resented by retained counsel of choice in Gonzalez-Lopez.
There, the trial court had denied a request by the defen-
dant’s retained attorney to be admitted pro hac vice because
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
499
the attorney had violated a rule of professional conduct.4 In
accepting the government’s concession that the defendant
had been denied his right to counsel of choice and concluding
that harmless error analysis did not apply in that context,
the Court acknowledged that a trial court has “an ‘indepen-
dent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted
within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.’
” 548 US
at 152 (quoting Wheat, 486 US at 160). The Court further
observed that trial courts have “wide latitude in balancing
the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness
and against the demands of its calendar[.]” Id. (internal cita-
tion omitted).5
Because we conclude that defendant’s right to coun-
sel of choice under Article I, section 11, reflects the same
fundamental interests protected by the Sixth Amendment,
we likewise conclude that that right may be overcome by
the same general considerations that can override a crimi-
nal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.6 As a result, trial
courts have some discretion under Article I, section 11, in
assessing whether defendant’s right to be represented by
retained counsel of choice is outweighed by ethical require-
ments or the potential for unduly delaying or disrupting the
trial.
4 An attorney who is a member of the bar in one state may be admitted pro
hac vice to appear in court in another state on a particular matter. In Gonzales-
Lopez, the defendant retained a California lawyer to represent him on criminal
charges in Missouri. The district court denied the attorney’s request for admis-
sion pro hac vice stating that, by passing notes to co-counsel, the attorney “had
violated a court rule restricting the cross-examination of a witness to one coun-
sel.” 548 US at 142.
5 The Court ultimately concluded that “[n]one of [those] limitations on the
right to choose one’s counsel [were] relevant” in Gonzales-Lopez because the gov-
ernment had conceded the constitutional violation and a violation of the defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice “is not subject to harmless-
error analysis.” 548 US at 152.
6 By reaching that conclusion, we are not suggesting that we must follow
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment when we interpret
Article I, section 11. We have interpreted those rights differently in other con-
texts. See State v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or 16, 26-37, 376 P3d 255 (2016) (discussing
how the Article I, section 11, right to counsel in the context of police questioning
differs from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right
in Texas v. Cobb, 532 US 162, 168-72, 121 S Ct 1335, 149 L Ed 2d 321 (2001));
State v. Savinsky, 364 Or 802, 814, 441 P3d 557 (2019) (noting that Prieto-Rubio
“endors[ed] the conclusion and reasoning of the Cobb dissent”).
500
State v. Autele
Defendant contends, however, that, for his convic-
tion to be affirmed on appeal, the record must affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court assessed the relevant con-
siderations and made a decision that was within the per-
missible range of its discretion. Because the record does not
demonstrate that in this case, defendant contends that his
conviction must be reversed. As explained below, we agree
with defendant.
C. The Trial Court’s Obligation to Make an Adequate
Record
We have not previously addressed the extent
to which a trial court has an obligation to make an ade-
quate record supporting its decision to deny a defendant’s
request to be represented by retained counsel of choice. But
we have addressed the trial court’s record-making obli-
gations in denying a defendant’s request to waive counsel
and exercise their right of self-representation. Because we
have recognized that the right to be represented by coun-
sel is “the counterpart” to the right of self-representation,
Hightower, 361 Or at 416; see also Rogers, 330 Or at 297 (not-
ing that Article I, section 11, establishes the right to self-
representation “in conjunction with the right to be heard by
counsel”), our analysis of the consequences of a trial court’s
failure to make an adequate record in connection with a
defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is informative.7
In that context, our cases clearly establish that, where the
record is insufficient to show that a defendant knowingly
and intentionally waived their right to counsel, thereby
exercising their right to self-representation, a defendant’s
conviction must be reversed.
For example, in State v. Langley, 351 Or 652, 665,
273 P3d 901 (2012), we explained: “Because courts are
reluctant to find that a defendant has waived fundamen-
tal constitutional rights, we will not presume a waiver of
7 We have explained that the Article I, section 11, right to “to be heard” by
oneself “includes the right to self-representation.” Hightower, 361 Or at 416. Thus,
a defendant may waive his right to counsel. State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 131, 831
P2d 666 (1992). By waiving the right to counsel, “a defendant necessarily asserts
the right to self-representation.” Hightower, 361 Or at 417. Conversely, “by assert-
ing the right to counsel, a defendant waives the right to self-representation.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
501
the right to counsel from a silent record.” See also State v.
Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 132, 831 P2d 666 (1992) (a valid waiver
of the right to counsel “will not be presumed from a silent
record”); State v. Stanton, 369 Or 707, 716, 511 P3d 1 (2022)
(same). In that context, we have indicated that “courts
should strive to demonstrate on the record that a defendant
understands the implications of the waiver.” Meyrick, 313
Or at 133 n 9.
Although this case does not involve a waiver of the
constitutional right to counsel or a request to exercise the
right of self-representation, our decisions in Stanton and
Hightower nonetheless inform our conclusion that the bur-
den to make a record is on the court exercising discretion
to deny retained counsel of choice, rather than on unrepre-
sented defendants. The defendant in Stanton had been rep-
resented by several different court-appointed lawyers after
he was charged with multiple felonies. During trial, there
were three motions involving the representation of defen-
dant pending at the same time: (1) defendant’s motion for
substitute counsel on the ground that his lawyer was not
providing adequate representation; (2) the lawyer’s request
to withdraw on the ground that she could not continue to
represent the defendant under the Rules of Professional
Conduct; and (3) the prosecutor’s assertion that defendant
had waived his right to counsel through misconduct. The
trial court did not address any of those motions expressly,
instead proceeding “as if [the] defendant’s only options were
to continue with [his current] court-appointed counsel or go
without court-appointed counsel.” 369 Or at 719. The defen-
dant opted to proceed without counsel for the remainder
of the trial. He was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy
prison sentence.
We reversed and remanded for a new trial. We
explained that “the record [was] not clear as to why the
trial court allowed the trial to proceed without counsel for
[the] defendant.” 369 Or at 722. On the record before it, the
trial court “could not conclude that [the] defendant [had]
waived his right to counsel, either impliedly or expressly.”
Id. Ultimately, we concluded that, “[b]ecause the record does
not establish that [the] defendant made an intentional and
502
State v. Autele
knowing waiver of his right to counsel, and because we can-
not determine what the outcome of the case would have been
had [the] defendant been represented by counsel, we must
remand this case for a new trial.” Id. at 723.
In Hightower, the defendant attempted to waive his
right to counsel and begin representing himself in the mid-
dle of trial. The trial court denied that request, concluding
as a matter of law that the defendant could not invoke the
right to self-representation after the trial had commenced.
We reversed. We acknowledged that the trial court had some
discretion in deciding whether to accept the defendant’s
waiver, but concluded that “the record must include some
indication of how the trial court actually weighed the rele-
vant competing interests for an appellate court to be able to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion[.]”
361 Or at 421. We explained that express findings are not
required, “so long as the record reveals the reasons for the
trial court’s actions.” Id. at 421 (citing State v. Guzek, 358 Or
251, 269, 363 P3d 480 (2015)).
But it was not sufficient, we emphasized, “that an
appellate court may be able to speculate about what might
have been the trial court’s rationale for its decision.” 361 Or
at 421 (emphasis in original). And we rejected the state’s
argument that the trial court “reasonably could have deter-
mined that the interest in [an] orderly and expeditious
trial outweighed any prejudice to defendant’s right to self-
representation.” Id. at 422. The applicable test, we explained,
“is not whether the court reasonably could have made that
determination. The test is whether the record reflects that
the trial court’s actual decision amounted to a reasonable
exercise of its discretion.” Id.
Applying Stanton and Hightower in this case sug-
gests that, because the record does not demonstrate that the
court’s decision to deny defendant’s constitutional right to be
represented by retained counsel of choice was a permissible
exercise of its discretion, the appropriate result is to reverse
and remand for a new trial. The state protests, arguing that,
under the general principle that a party asserting error has
the burden to make a record demonstrating the error, the
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
503
appropriate result is to affirm.8 But that principle does not
apply to every claimed error in a criminal case.
As discussed above, the general principle that the
party asserting error has the burden to make a record
showing that the trial court erred does not apply where the
claimed error is the trial court’s acceptance of a defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel, as in Stanton, or the trial
court’s refusal to allow a defendant to represent himself, as
in Hightower. A defendant claiming that a trial court erred
in those contexts is entitled to a reversal and remand for a
new trial if the record does not support the trial court’s exer-
cise of discretion.
In addition, we have recognized in other contexts
that trial courts have an affirmative obligation to create a
record supporting a discretionary decision affecting a defen-
dant’s rights at trial. For example, although we have “long
recognized the right of a criminal defendant to appear free of
physical restraints during a jury trial,” State v. Washington,
355 Or 612, 627, 330 P3d 596 (2014) (quoting State v. Bowen,
340 Or 487, 495, 135 P3d 272 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1214
(2007)), that right is subject to some limitations. Thus, a
trial court “has discretion to order physical restraint of a
defendant if there is sufficient evidence of a substantial risk
of dangerous or disruptive behavior[.]” Washington, 355 Or
at 628. When that occurs, evidence of that risk “should be
placed on the record in a hearing for that purpose.” Id. After
hearing such evidence, “the trial court must make a record
of its factual findings and reasoning in support of its order.”
Id. The purpose of making those findings on the record “is to
facilitate appellate review.” Guzek, 358 Or at 268. As we have
explained, appellate review “is better facilitated by a record
of findings that is direct, express, and clearly delineated.”
Id. at 269. In that context, “the standard for determining
error in the sufficiency of the judicial record is a functional
8 In one of the cases on which the state relies, State v. Bowen, 340 Or 487, 135
P3d 272 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1214 (2007), we declined to address a defendant’s
claim that the trial court had erred in excluding testimony because defendant
had failed to make an offer of proof of the testimony he expected to elicit. There,
we affirmed the conviction, explaining that “[w]ithout an offer of proof *
*
* [the]
defendant failed to make an adequate record for this court to review.” Id. at 501.
504
State v. Autele
one—namely, whether the record reveals the findings and
reasoning for the court’s actions.” Id.
Additionally, we held in State v. Lutz, 306 Or 499,
760 P2d 249 (1988), that the trial court’s failure to make
a record that the defendant had consented to finishing his
criminal trial with eleven jurors after the court excused
a juror who had become ill required reversing the defen-
dant’s conviction. Although the defendant did not object
at the time, the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction,
concluding that the defendant’s consent to continuing with
fewer than twelve jurors must be stated affirmatively on the
record. We agreed, explaining that the trial court’s decision
to discharge a juror and proceed with the remaining eleven
jurors “are matters of importance bearing on the conduct of
a trial.” Id. at 503. We concluded that proceeding “without
[the] defendant’s consent on the record was reversible error.”
Id. Accordingly, we held that the Court of Appeals “correctly
vacated [the] defendant’s conviction.” Id.
We further held in Lutz that the Court of Appeals
had erred in remanding to the trial court to determine
whether the defendant had consented “off the record” to
continuing the trial with only eleven jurors. We explained:
“A criminal trial should be conducted on the record. The
trial courts of this state are courts of record and nothing of
importance bearing on the conduct of the trial should be ‘off
the record.’
” Id.; see also State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 624
n 7, 912 P2d 364 (1996) (“Discussion off the record of mat-
ters as to which issues on appeal could arise is ill-advised,
either because no official record is made of the matters or
because whatever record that is made often is summary in
nature.”). Dismissing a juror and continuing a trial with the
remaining eleven jurors “are matters of such importance”
that the “[f]ailure to show [the defendant’s consent] on the
record” may not be cured by a remand. Lutz, 306 Or at 503.
Instead, we concluded, the defendant was entitled to a new
trial.
When a trial court declines to accommodate a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be represented
at trial by their retained counsel of choice, that decision
affects an important constitutional right bearing on how
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
505
trial is conducted. We should not presume from a silent or
inadequate record that a trial court did not err in denying a
defendant’s request to be represented by retained counsel of
choice, just as we would not presume from a silent or inade-
quate record that a trial court did not err in finding that a
defendant had waived his right to be represented by coun-
sel. The trial court is in the best position to make a record
that shows why it determined that overcoming a defendant’s
Article I, section 11, right to be represented by retained
counsel of choice was a permissible exercise of its discretion.
Accordingly, we conclude that, when a trial court denies a
criminal defendant’s request to be represented by retained
counsel of their choice, the record must demonstrate that
the trial court’s decision was a permissible exercise of its
discretion.
D. The Record in this Case
The record in this case reveals that: (1) defendant
retained attorneys Mackeson and Hall to represent him
after he was indicted on criminal charges; (2) on the first
scheduled trial date, the court granted defense counsel’s
request to postpone the trial so that they could investigate
photographs that had been anonymously delivered to Hall’s
office; (3) on the next scheduled trial date, the trial court
granted defense counsel’s request to withdraw due to an
ethical conflict that would likely arise from the prosecutor’s
plan to cross-examine defendant about those photographs;
(4) nine days later, at the next court appearance, the same
attorneys appeared and asked to be allowed to represent
defendant; and (5) the trial court noted that the ethical
conflict “may or may not have resolved itself,” but it denied
defendant’s request due to its “concerns” about the ethical
obligations that had been previously raised.
Although that record shows that the trial court gen-
erally understood that defendant’s right to be represented
by retained counsel of his choice could be qualified by ethi-
cal or efficiency concerns, it does not demonstrate that the
trial court weighed the relevant considerations and acted
within the permissible range of its discretion in denying
defendant’s request to be represented by Mackeson and Hall.
This record does not reveal whether there was a sufficient
506
State v. Autele
risk that allowing that representation would unduly delay
or disrupt the trial, or whether Mackeson and Hall’s rep-
resentation of defendant at trial would have violated any
ethical or professional standards of conduct.
Here, most of the discussions about a potential con-
flict of interest occurred off the record, and the trial court
did not make a record sufficiently demonstrating that its
concerns about a continuing ethical issue were justified
and threatened to delay or disrupt the trial. Instead, the
trial court just stated that it had concerns, and although
it described the prior ethical conflict as “significant,” it
acknowledged that the prior conflict “may or may not” have
been resolved. On this record, those generalized concerns
do not outweigh defendant’s constitutional right to be repre-
sented by retained counsel of his choice.
Under the Sixth Amendment, as the United States
Supreme Court explained in Wheat, although a trial court
has “substantial latitude” in denying a defendant’s right
to retained counsel of choice due to ethical concerns, the
trial court “must take adequate steps to ascertain” whether
taking that action is warranted. 486 US at 163; 160. After
taking those steps, where a trial court “justifiably finds”
an actual or potential conflict of interest exists, it has dis-
cretion under the Sixth Amendment to decline defendant’s
choice of retained counsel. Id. at 162. The same analytical
process is required under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution. But the record in this case does not show what
steps, if any, the trial court took to “ascertain” whether its
concerns about an ethical conflict were justifiable, or even
whether an ethical conflict continued to exist.
The possibility that one or more of the off-the-record
discussions might have justified the trial court’s exercise of
discretion is insufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction.
As we explained in Lutz, “nothing of importance bearing on
the conduct of the trial should be ‘off the record.’
” 306 Or at
503. And as we stated in Hightower, “the test is not whether
the court reasonably could have” denied defendant’s request
in the exercise of its discretion. 361 Or at 422. Rather, “[t]
he test is whether the record reflects that the trial court’s
Cite as 372 Or 489 (2024)
507
actual decision amounted to a reasonable exercise of its dis-
cretion.” Id.
Applying that test, the record in this case does not
reflect that the trial court’s decision amounted to a rea-
sonable exercise of its discretion. Because the state did not
object on the record to defendant’s request to be represented
by Mackeson and Hall, the court’s decision was based on
its own lingering concerns about possible ethical issues that
might disrupt or delay the trial. But trial courts are always
alert for something that might disrupt or delay a trial. To
overcome a defendant’s constitutional right to retained
counsel of their choice, the record must reflect that those
concerns were reasonable under the circumstances, thereby
showing that its decision was a permissible exercise of its
discretion.
Contrary to the state’s assertion, characterizing the
ethical conflict that led Mackeson and Hall to withdraw in
the first place as “significant” is not enough to support the
trial court’s exercise of discretion, especially considering the
court’s acknowledgment that the original conflict “may or
may not” have been resolved. Instead, to show that its deci-
sion was a permissible exercise of discretion, the court itself
needed to explain the nature of its concerns, why it deter-
mined that those concerns were justifiable under the cir-
cumstances, and why it determined that they might unduly
delay or disrupt the trial. Making an adequate record does
not mean that trial courts must invade the attorney-client
privilege or pressure a defendant to waive that privilege,
and it may require the court to address the defendant or
defense counsel on the record but outside the presence of the
prosecutor, and to seal the record to preserve confidentiality.
The record in this case does not demonstrate that
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s constitutional right
to be represented by the attorneys he retained to represent
him at trial was a permissible exercise of its discretion.
Accordingly, as in Stanton and Hightower, the appropriate
result is to reverse and remand for a new trial.9
9 The state does not contend that any error should be considered harmless
under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, “but we have
an independent obligation to consider whether defendant was prejudiced.” State
508
State v. Autele
The Court of Appeals’ decision is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
v. Sperou, 365 Or 121, 140, 442 P3d 581 (2019). The “harmless error” test asks a
single question: is there little likelihood that a particular error affected the ver-
dict? State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). We cannot say that there
was “little likelihood” that this error affected the verdict because, as in Stanton,
we “cannot determine what the outcome of the case would have been” if defendant
had been represented by different counsel. Stanton, 369 Or at 723; see also State
v. Cole, 323 Or 30, 36-37, 912 P2d 907 (1996) (concluding that trial court’s failure
to obtain a valid waiver of counsel was prejudicial and not harmless because this
court was “unable to determine the outcome” had the hearing been conducted
with the assistance of counsel). Because we remand for a new trial based on
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, we need not decide whether the
trial court also violated defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. | a6e1f9e34f000a659d818ef72c7865d7af3e63f1bbb49eefb1f5ea30818905c7 | 2024-06-13T00:00:00Z |
42020fe1-86be-42ff-8ddc-9b0f55539368 | BAYRIDGE ASSO. LTD. PART. v. Dept. of Rev. | 321 Or. 21, 892 P.2d 1002 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 892 P.2d 1002 (1995)
321 Or. 21
BAYRIDGE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, formerly known as A & G Builders, Ltd., Respondent,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Oregon, Appellant.
DURHAM PARK LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondent,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Oregon, Appellant.
OTC 3271, OTC 3272; SC S41163.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted January 5, 1995.
Decided April 21, 1995.
*1003 Robert B. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
David P. Weiner and Anne L. Meagher, of Samuels, Yoelin, Weiner, Kantor & Seymour, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.
GRABER, Justice.
This case involves the valuation, for ad valorem tax purposes in the tax year 1990-91, of two apartment complexesthe Durham Park Apartments, located in Tigard, and the Bayridge Apartments, located in Beaverton. The Tax Court found that the true cash value of the Durham Park property was $6,535,000 and that the true cash value of the Bayridge property was $4,412,000. Bayridge Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 24, 31, 1994 WL 33368 (1994). On de novo review, ORS 305.445, we affirm.
Durham Park Limited Partnership and Bayridge Associates Limited Partnership (taxpayers) receive federal income tax credits, under 26 U.S.C. § 42 (IRC § 42), in return for operating the properties at issue as low-income housing. The Tax Court held that that arrangement, as applied by the Oregon Housing Authority (OHA),[1] constitutes a "governmental restriction as to use" of the properties under ORS 308.205(2) (1989).[2] 13 OTR at 27-28. The Tax Court concluded that the "governmental restriction as to use" made taxpayers' appraisal based on actual or contract rents more accurate in determining the true cash value of the properties than the appraisal based on market rents conducted by the Department of Revenue (department). Id. at 31.
The department appealed. The issue presented on appeal is a legal one: whether a property owner's participation in the section 42 low-income housing program constitutes a "governmental restriction as to use" of the property, thereby requiring a reduction in the assessed value of the property pursuant to ORS 308.205(2) (1989). There are no factual issues. The department and taxpayers agree about the operative facts, and they do not quarrel with each other's calculations; we simply must determine whose appraisal to accept.
Durham Park was completed in 1989. The project contains 224 living units in 28 eight-unit (8-plex) buildings. The 8-plexes are all three-story buildings. There are separate one-story buildings that contain garages, offices, and a recreation area. Durham Park *1004 was constructed, and is operated, as a low-income housing project.
The Bayridge complex is similar to the Durham Park project. It is a multi-building, 246-unit development. Bayridge was constructed, and is operated, as a low-income housing project. Bayridge was 60 percent complete as of the assessment date.
Under 26 IRC § 42, the owner of an apartment complex may qualify for substantial income tax credits. As the Tax Court properly noted, "[t]he laws governing income tax credits and low-income housing are complex." 13 OTR at 26. See generally Andrew Zack Blatter and Elena Marty-Nelson, An Overview of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 17 U.Balt.L.Rev. 253 (1988) (providing a detailed examination of the operation of the low-income housing tax credit). A brief overview of that law will suffice for our purposes here.
The low-income housing tax credit is available for certain low-income housing projects. IRC § 42(a), (c)(2), (g). In order to qualify for that credit, the owner of, or investor in, an apartment complex must make available a certain number of rental units in the project for use by the general public on a residential (i.e., non-transient and non-commercial) basis for not less than 15 years. IRC § 42(g), (i)(1). If the owner or investor qualifies, section 42 provides income tax credits to the owner or investor over a 10-year period, IRC § 42(f)(1), based on the cost of the building and the proportion of the building used by low-income tenants, IRC § 42(a)-(d).
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) places a limit of $1.25 per capita on the aggregate amount for each taxable year that may be claimed as credits by all the taxpayers in a given state. IRC § 42(h)(3)(C). The Code requires that "the State housing credit ceiling for each calendar year shall be allocated to the housing credit agency of" each state. IRC § 42(h)(3)(B). The state agency allocates those credits to owners or investors. IRC § 42(h)(3)(A). In 1990, Oregon had $2,643,750 in tax credits to allocate.
If a project fails to comply with the tenant and rent limitations in IRC § 42 at any time during the 15-year compliance period, the taxpayer is subject to a recapture of a portion of the credit claimed. IRC § 42(j). Additional taxes, plus interest, will be due as a result. IRC § 42(j)(2). When a sale occurs before the end of the 15-year compliance period, it is possible to avoid recapture on the sale of a low-income housing project that qualifies for tax credits under IRC § 42. To accomplish that, the seller of the project must post a bond in an amount satisfactory to, and for the period required by, the Secretary of the Treasury, if it reasonably is expected that the project will continue to be operated as a qualified low-income project for the remainder of the building's compliance period. IRC § 42(j)(6). The amount of the required bond generally equals or exceeds the value of the credits claimed or available. See Rev.Rul. 90-60, 1990-2, CB 2 (explaining bond).
In Oregon, for the tax year in question, the OHA administered the distribution of federal tax credits for low-income housing. ORS 456.559(1)(f) (1989). That agency was established by statute, ORS 456.553(1) (1989), in response to the legislature's conclusion that there was an inadequate supply of low-income housing in Oregon and that it was the desire of the state to ensure an adequate supply of such housing. ORS 456.550 (1989). If a taxpayer received credits under IRC § 42 and later failed to comply with the federal statutory requirement, OHA would report that noncompliance to the Internal Revenue Service. See Treas.Reg. § 1.42-5(e)(1).
Under IRC § 42, as already noted, the taxpayer claiming the credit must limit rents in the complex to obtain the tax credits. OHA set additional requirements. For example, OHA's allocation document pertaining to the properties in question incorporated by reference the terms and conditions set forth in taxpayers' applications for tax credits. Those applications provide that taxpayers must
"[a]gree to rent, or hold available for occupancy, for 15 years at least 20% of the dwelling as Rent Restricted Units for low-income tenants whose incomes are 50% or less of area median gross income adjusted for family size, or at least 40% of the *1005 dwelling as Rent Restricted Units for low-income tenants whose incomes are 60% or less of area median gross income adjusted for family size."
Against that background, we examine the applicable Oregon statutes. ORS 308.232 (1989) required all property to be assessed at 100 percent of its true cash value. ORS 308.205 (1989), quoted at note 1, ante, defined "true cash value" as "the market value" of the property. However, ORS 308.205(2) (1989) also provided that, when a property was "subject to governmental restriction as to use," true cash value must be adjusted to reflect or take into account that restriction.
Taxpayers argue (and the Tax Court held) that the federal low-income housing tax credit program, as administered by OHA, constitutes a "governmental restriction as to use" that needs to be taken into account in determining the true cash value of the property pursuant to ORS 308.205(2) (1989). The department counters that the section 42 program is not a "governmental restriction," because a "governmental restriction" must be involuntary and it must not be to a taxpayer's financial advantage. The department further contends that, even if the program is a "governmental restriction," it is not a governmental restriction "as to use" of the property. For the reasons that follow, we agree with taxpayers and the Tax Court.
In interpreting a statute, our task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The text of the statutory provision in question is the best evidence of the legislature's intent and the starting point for our inquiry. Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. Words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Griffin v. Tri-Met, 318 Or. 500, 508, 870 P.2d 808 (1994).
We use the foregoing principles in interpreting ORS 308.205(2) (1989). That statute did not define "restriction." In ordinary usage, a "restriction" is:
A restriction thus is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property, without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute or by contract), and without any necessary reference to the absence of an economic benefit in exchange for placement of that restriction.
ORS 308.205(2) (1989) also used, without defining it, the adjective "governmental" to modify the noun "restriction." In ordinary usage, "governmental" means "of or relating to government or to the government of a particular political unit." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 983. A "governmental" restriction thus is a limitation "of * * * the government of a particular political unit," placed on the use or enjoyment of property. There is no necessary reference to who initiated the process that led to the government's placement of a restriction on the property, nor is there a necessary reference to how the restriction is expressed (e.g., by statute or by contract), nor is there a necessary reference to whether the restriction was placed in exchange for an economic benefit.
As noted above, the department first argues that the availability of section 42 tax credits does not create a "governmental restriction," because (a) the taxpayer chooses to participate in the program and (b) the program results in financial gain to the taxpayer. We are not persuaded.
Nothing in the text of ORS 308.205(2) (1989) suggests that a "governmental restriction" must be involuntary at its inception. Neither does the text suggest that a taxpayer may not derive an economic benefit from a "governmental restriction." The text of ORS 308.205(2) (1989) does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary, or between beneficial and non-beneficial, "governmental restrictions." We are not at liberty to read in such requirements. See ORS 174.010 (when this court interprets a statute, it may *1006 not "insert what has been omitted, or * * * omit what has been inserted").[3]
Taxpayers entered into an agreement with OHA that limited the rents that taxpayers could charge to tenants residing in taxpayers' properties and limited the pool of tenants to whom they could rent apartments. Taxpayers agreed to those limitations for a period of 15 years. As of the assessment date, those limitations restrained how taxpayers could enjoy their property. Those limitations came from a binding agreement with a governmental agency, the breach of which would entail serious financial consequences to taxpayers. Thus, the limitations were "governmental restrictions."
The department next argues that, even if participation in the section 42 low-income housing credit program is a "governmental restriction," it is a "governmental restriction as to income" but not a "governmental restriction as to use." (Emphasis added.) Again, we disagree.
The noun "use" means, among other things, "a method or manner of using something"; "the legal enjoyment of property that consists in its employment, occupation, exercise, or practice." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 2523. Utilizing that definition, a "governmental restriction as to use" includes a governmental restriction as to the method or manner of using the property in question, or as to how the property is employed or occupied.
As already explained, taxpayers are subject to governmental restrictions concerning the persons to whom they may rent, as well as how much they may charge those to whom they rent. Furthermore, under those governmental restrictions, taxpayers must provide a certain number of residential housing units. That is, taxpayers must maintain at least a part of the complexes as residential. Even if taxpayers wanted to use the properties for non-residential purposes (such as commercial purposes), and even if those uses were permitted by applicable zoning laws, the governmental restrictions placed on those properties would inhibit such a use. Those limits on what taxpayers may do with their properties, resulting from taxpayers' participation in the section 42 program, constitute "governmental restriction[s] as to use."
The context of ORS 308.205(2) (1989) supports the view that the legislature intended that the phrase "governmental restriction as to use" to encompass a broad realm of potential governmental limitations. The context of a statute includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.
The provision that became ORS 308.205(2) (1989), containing the phrase "governmental restriction as to use," was added to the statute in 1977 as part of Senate Bill 827. Or. Laws 1977, ch. 423, § 2. Senate Bill 827 contained six sections:
Section 1 added a new provision to ORS chapter 308 to address downzoning, a situation in which "the assessed value of any real property is reduced by reason of the adoption of or a change in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, or zoning designation for such property not at the request of the owner." (Emphasis added.) Section 1 provided that the owner of a downzoned property may have that property reassessed to take into account the loss in value caused by the downzoning. Section 1 is codified as ORS 308.341.
Section 2 added what became ORS 308.205(2) (1989), the statute that we are called on to apply in this case. The remaining substantive sections of Senate Bill 827 addressed the notification of property owners and assessors concerning the downzoning of their property and are codified as ORS 308.342 and .343.
Section 2 embraced all forms of "governmental restriction[s] as to use," in contrast to *1007 the other sections, which were directed more specifically at downzoning. Moreover, while section 1 expressly limited the tax benefit to involuntary downzoning, section 2 contained no similar requirement for other forms of governmental restriction as to use. In addition, downzoning is defined to result in an economic detriment to the taxpayer, while other forms of governmental restriction as to use are not.
This court assumes that, when the legislature includes a provision in one section of an act, but omits it from another, it does so intentionally. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. Thus, we must give effect to the distinctions drawn by the legislature (a) between voluntary downzoning, from which a taxpayer may not receive a tax benefit, and other forms of governmental restriction as to use, which omit the concept of voluntariness; and (b) between downzoning, which is defined to result in an economic detriment to the taxpayer, and other forms of governmental restriction as to use, which omit the requirement of economic detriment. We conclude that a "governmental restriction as to use," ORS 308.205(2) (1989), need not be involuntary and may result in an economic benefit to the taxpayer.
So understood, ORS 308.205(2) (1989) encompasses, as a "governmental restriction as to use," taxpayers' participation in the section § 42 program. Because the intent of the legislature when it enacted ORS 308.205(2) (1989) is clear from the text and context of the statute, further inquiry is not required. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (stating principle).
As noted at the outset, the parties do not attack the calculations made by each others' appraisers. The department's data do not reflect the limits placed on the properties as a result of the "governmental restriction[s] as to use"; taxpayers' data do reflect the limitations placed on the properties. Accordingly, we adopt taxpayers' valuations.
The department does argue that, even if we treat participation in the section 42 program as a "governmental restriction as to use," we should "consider the receipt of tax credits as additional income that increases the value of the property." The Tax Court reasoned that
We agree with that reasoning. OAR 150-308.205(A)(1)(a) (1989) defined market value as "the most probable price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market." The most probable price depends on what the buyer will receive in exchange for that price; the buyer will pay only for what it will receive. Thus, the most probable price to be received for the properties at issue would not include the tax credits, because the record shows that the credits would be recaptured if the property were not maintained as low-income housing. For the foregoing reasons, we find that, for tax year 1990-91, the true cash value of the Durham Park property was $6,535,000 and the true cash value of the Bayridge property was $4,412,000.
The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
VAN HOOMISSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which FADELEY, J., joined.
VAN HOOMISSEN, Justice, dissenting.
ORS 308.205(2) (1989) provided:
The question is: "Do the low-income housing restrictions voluntarily placed on the property [by the owner] constitute `governmental restrictions [as to use]' under ORS 308.205(2)?" Bayridge Assoc. Ltd. Partnership *1008 v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 24, 26, 1994 WL 33368 (1994).[1]
ORS 308.232 (1989) required all property to be assessed at 100 percent of its true cash value. True cash value was defined by ORS 308.205 as "the market value" of the property. See also ORS 308.235(1) (factors to be considered in assessing taxable real property). The general rule is that market rents are used in appraising income-producing property. OAR 150-308-205(A)(2)(g) (1989).[2] We are asked to determine whether, by enacting ORS 308.205(2) (1989), the legislature intended to change that general rule in the circumstances of this case.
The majority holds that taxpayer's voluntary choice to participate in the federal low income housing program to maximize the return on its investment amounts to a "governmental restriction as to use" of the taxpayer's property. 321 Or. at 30, 892 P.2d at 1007. ORS 308.205(2) (1989). I disagree and would hold that taxpayer's voluntary choice to receive federal income tax credits under IRC § 42 in return for charging below-market rents, a choice which I believe it is fair to assume was driven by taxpayer's interest in maximizing the return on its investment, does not create a "governmental restriction" on taxpayer's property.[3] Moreover, even if taxpayer's choice had created a "governmental restriction," the restriction would be as to income only and not as to taxpayer's "use" of the property. ORS 308.205(2). For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
The majority begins its statutory construction analysis with a dictionary definition of "restriction." 321 Or. at 27, 892 P.2d at 1005. That definition indicates that a restriction is "something that restricts." If one looks further in the dictionary at that point, one discovers that "restrict" is defined as:
"1: to set bounds or limits to: hold within bounds: as a: to check free activity, motion, progress, or departure of: RESTRAIN ; also: HAMPER, DIMINISH b: to check, bound, or decrease the range, scope, or incidence of: set what is to be included or embraced by: bar or carefully govern addition or increment to 2: to place (land) under restrictions as to use (as by zoning ordinances)." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1937 (unabridged 1993). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, a zoning ordinance is clearly within the common meaning of "restriction." Something of value has been taken from the property owner for the benefit of the public. The majority offers unpersuasive justification for its conclusion that a taxpayer's voluntary choice to participate in a federal low-income housing program for the taxpayer's own financial gain likewise is a "restriction." Nothing of value has been taken from the property owner, because the property owner is compensated by the federal income tax credit. The property owner expects to have more value, i.e., financial return, not less, as a result of its agreement with the federal government.
There are numerous differences between a voluntary choice to financially structure one's property in a certain manner in order to maximize the financial return on one's investment, on the one hand, and having the use of one's property restricted without one's consent by the government as a result of a zoning ordinance, on the other.[4] Generally, zoning, by its very nature, is involuntary in *1009 the sense that individual property owners may not elect how they wish to use their property and have it zoned accordingly. Zoning is an absolute governmental restriction on the use of property, in force until the zoning is changed or some sort of variance is obtained from the government. Moreover, zoning is generally, but not always, unilateral. That is, it is imposed by the government rather than the result of voluntary and bilateral consent of the parties.
The tax credit available to taxpayers here through IRC § 42, however, involves no such restriction on the "use" of property.[5] These apartments were built for multi-family housing and that is how they are being used by taxpayers. Under IRC § 42, the property owner claiming the credit voluntarily agrees to limit the rents. That is, the owner voluntarily trades reduced rental income for a tax credit. This is nothing more than a financial arrangement, voluntarily *1010 chosen by the owner, for its own financial benefit. It is not a "restriction" on the use of the property involuntarily imposed by the government. As the majority opinion recognizes, 321 Or. at 26, 892 P.2d at 1004, taxpayers may change the use of the property any time it wants to do so. Taxpayers may sell the property to a buyer who may charge market rents. Of course, there may be some financial (tax) consequences resulting from taxpayers' voluntary choice to change the use of the property; however, those consequences are within the control of taxpayers, they are not involuntarily imposed on taxpayers by the government. Moreover, under the IRC § 42 program, the "use" of taxpayers' property is in no way "restricted" by any governmental action. Nothing in the law affects the "use" of the property; rather, income is limited in return for credits usable against federal income tax liability. The property in this case is operated as multifamily apartment buildings, which taxpayers and the department agree is the "highest and best" use of the property. When a taxpayer chooses to participate in a voluntary program that offers certain financial incentives in return for certain detriments, the taxpayer's property is not subject to a "governmental restriction" as to "use." Thus, ORS 308.205(2) (1989) does not support the Tax Court's decision.
The majority characterizes taxpayers' use of the property for low-income housing as coming "from a binding agreement with a governmental agency, the breach of which would entail serious financial consequences to taxpayers." 321 Or. at 29, 892 P.2d at 1006. This evidences a misunderstanding of the facts. No "binding agreement" with the federal government is shown. Taxpayers may withdraw from the low-income housing program at any time. It is true that, should taxpayers withdraw from the program, the recapture provisions of the law provide that the claimed tax credits may be lost. In essence, by failing to continue using the apartments as low-income housing for the required number of years, taxpayers may lose certain tax advantages. While the choice not to use the property for low-income housing in the future may indeed result in financial consequences to taxpayers, it is free to make that choice, forego the tax credits provided by IRC § 42, and charge market rents or use the property for another purpose. The availability of tax credits, however, does not "impose" a restriction. Taxpayers voluntarily chose to participate in the federal low-income housing program, because taxpayers thought it was financially advantageous to do so.
A choice not to abide by a zoning ordinance, however, results in much more serious consequences than failing to receive a tax incentive in the form of a federal credit. See, e.g., ORS 215.185 (where use violates ordinance implementing a comprehensive plan, local government may "in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate proceedings to prevent, temporarily or permanently enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful * * * use"). A zoning ordinance is clearly a "governmental restriction as to use * * * under applicable law[.]" A voluntary choice to make use of one's property in a certain manner to maximize the return on one's investment, however, is not a "governmental restriction as to use."
The majority has confused the federal government's offer of a financial incentive (tax credits) to a property owner who voluntarily agrees to use its property in a certain manner and a taxpayer's voluntary acceptance of that offer, i.e., an economic impediment created by contract, with a "governmental restriction as to use" of that property. The text of ORS 308.205 (1989) and IRC § 42 do not support the majority's result. I reject the majority's reliance on the fact that "[e]ven if taxpayers wanted to use the properties for commercial or industrial purposes, and even if those purposes were permitted by applicable zoning laws, the governmental restrictions placed on those properties would inhibit such a use." 321 Or. at 30, 892 P.2d at 1006. Although a sale or a change in use might be in some ways "inhibited" by the tax credit elections, it would not be "prohibited." Taxpayers may withdraw from the federal program and lose the tax credits. Taxpayers *1011 may sell the property to a new buyer, who could raise the rents to market rates and lose the tax credits.
The context of the pertinent provisions of ORS 308.205 (1989) does not support the majority's result. The relevant provisions of that statute were added as part of Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 423.[6] The Act pertained to changes in assessed value of land due to changes in zoning. Viewed in context with the rest of the Act, the purpose of the amendment to ORS 308.205 (1989), which provided a definition of "true cash value," was to conform that definition with the newly enacted provisions found in sections 1 and 4 of the Act. Certainly, there is nothing in the text and context of the Act to suggest that the amendment to the definition of "true cash value" was meant to apply to a taxpayer's voluntary choice to use its property in a certain way in order to maximize the return on its investment in commercial real estate.
From the text and context of ORS 308.205 (1989), I conclude that taxpayers' voluntary *1012 election to participate in a federal low-income housing program in order to maximize the return on its investment does not make the property subject to "governmental restriction as to use * * * under applicable law or regulation[.]"[7] Nor has the government restricted the "use" of taxpayers' property. This is nothing more than a financial arrangement voluntarily chosen by taxpayers, whereby taxpayers has substituted one income stream (higher rents) for another (lower rents and tax credits), because taxpayers believe that will maximize the return on their investment. The below-market rents charged by taxpayers are not the result of a "governmental restriction"; rather, they are the result of a quid pro quofederal income tax credits (a financial benefit) in return for charging the favored class below-market rents (a financial detriment).
The majority's interpretation of ORS 308.205 allows taxpayers to shift the burden of their taxation obligations to other taxpayers within the taxing unit, while reaping the benefits of a federal tax credit as well. Because of this result, taxpayers are able to reduce the valuation of its properties by more than $5,100,000, a loss other taxpayers of the taxing district will be expected to assume.[8] I find no support in the text and context of the statute for the conclusion that the legislature intended to shift the burden of taxation in this manner.
The legislature knows how to provide property tax relief to owners of low-income housing. For example, ORS 307.515-.537 provides for exemption from property taxation of low-income rental housing. Similarly, a property tax exemption is provided for low-income housing owned by a non-profit corporation under ORS 307.540-.547. Had the legislature intended owners of property that qualified under IRC § 42 to be entitled to property tax relief on that basis, it surely would have provided for an explicit exemption or reduction. It did not. See generally Keyes v. Chambers et al, 209 Or. 640, 645-46, 307 P.2d 498 (1957) (tax exemption statutes shall be strictly construed).
I would hold that the Tax Court erred in considering taxpayers' voluntary financing arrangement to be a "governmental restriction." Bayridge and Durham Park are not subject to "governmental restrictions." And, even if taxpayers' voluntary contractual agreement to accept lower than market rents could be considered to be a "governmental restriction," it is as to income only and not to "use" of taxpayers' property. ORS 308.205(2) (1989).
I would reverse the decision of the Tax Court and remand this case for entry of a judgment that the January 1990 true cash *1013 value of the property is as was determined by the department.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
FADELEY, J., joins in this dissent.
[1] The Oregon Housing Authority has been succeeded by the Housing and Community Services Department. ORS 456.555.
[2] ORS 308.205 (1989) provided in part:
"True cash value of all property, real and personal, means the market value of the property as of the assessment date. True cash value in all cases shall be determined by methods and procedures in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Revenue and in accordance with the following:
"* * * * *
"(2) If the property is subject to governmental restriction as to use on the assessment date under applicable law or regulation, true cash value shall not be based upon sales that reflect for the property a market value that the property would have if the use of the property were not subject to the restriction unless adjustments in value are made reflecting the effect of the restrictions."
[3] We also note that prior decisions from this court indicate that voluntarily incurred limitations on the use of property may be considered in assessing the value of a piece of property. See, e.g., Tualatin Development v. Dept. of Rev., 256 Or. 323, 473 P.2d 660 (1970) (when the taxpayer voluntarily agreed with county planning commission to set aside "open areas" to be retained as a golf course in return for a zone change permitting a planned residential community, and the golf course is operated at a loss, court affirmed Tax Court's decision that golf course had no "true cash value" for tax years at issue).
[1] Taxpayers are Bayridge Associates Limited Partnership and Durham Park Limited Partnership. The persons entitled to the IRC § 42 tax credit are the owners of the limited partnerships.
[2] Pertaining to real property valuation for tax purposes, OAR 150-308-205(A)(2)(g) (1989) provided in part that the income to be used in the Income Approach to Valuation "shall be the economic rent that the property would most probably command in the open market as indicated by current rents being paid, and asked, for comparable space."
[3] Taxpayer has never suggested that its motivation for participating in the federal low-income housing program is anything other than to maximize the return on its investment (which is a lawful and reasonable motivation).
[4] The Tax Court stated:
"The fact that governmental restrictions are voluntarily incurred by an owner in exchange for income tax benefits is irrelevant. The statute is not limited to involuntarily incurred governmental restrictions. Many restrictions on property, including zoning restrictions, are sought and obtained at the request of the property owner. This court has previously held that where a landowner voluntarily grants a scenic easement to government, the land in the hands of the owner may have no real market value. Marchel v. Dept. of Rev., 9 OTR 317 (1983). Also, where an owner voluntarily imposes `open space limitations' on property, it may result in a zero taxable value. Tualatin Development v. Dept. of Rev., 256 Or. 323, 473 P2d 660 (1970)." Bayridge Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 24, 27-28.
The Tax Court's reliance on Marchel and Tualatin Development is misplaced. In each of those cases, the court found that the subject real property had no real market value to the taxpayer. Unlike Marchel, this case is not about taxation of property that has "no immediate market value." Marchel, 9 OTR at 319-20.
In Tualatin Development, this court upheld the Tax Court's holding that the golf course in a "planned residential community" had no value for property tax purposes. In Tualatin Development, "restrictions placed upon the initial development of [the property] by the Washington County Planning Commission required the [taxpayer] to set aside `open areas' in various places in the development." 256 Or. at 325, 473 P.2d 660 (quoting Tax Court opinion). In that case, a county ordinance required a developer seeking to develop a planned residential community to apply for and receive certain zoning changes. The taxpayer did so. This court held that "[t]he requirement that [the golf course] be maintained as open space determines or substantially affects its value." Id. at 326, 473 P.2d 660. This court's determination that the golf course had no value was based on two factors: First, the court stated, the taxpayer could not "sell the land free of the zoning restrictions or put it to any use which would interfere with its functions as `open space.'" Id. at 327, 473 P.2d 660. Second, the value of the golf course was reflected in the higher prices commanded by residential lots bordering on the course. Ibid. This court looked to cases from other states after stating that "[t]he question of the proper assessment valuation of land where the use is so severely restricted that its owner derives no benefit from the ownership is a new one in Oregon." Id. at 329, 473 P.2d 660 (emphasis added). The court noted the significance of "the limitations on plaintiff's own use" of the property. Id. at 330, 473 P.2d 660 (emphasis added).
The decision in Tualatin Development is consistent with the department's position in this case. The restrictions in Tualatin Development were "governmental restrictions as to use" of the golf course. The restrictions were (1) imposed by a local governmental unit; (2) zoning or land use restrictions; (3) restrictions as to the use of the property; (4) so severe that the taxpayer derived no benefit from the property; and (5) restrictions that resulted in an increased value for surrounding property.
In contrast, taxpayers in this case chose to forego certain financial benefits in return for others; they traded one income stream for another. The requirements of IRC § 42 and the Oregon Housing Authority are not so severe as to prevent taxpayers from deriving any benefit from the properties. Nothing in the law affects the use of the property; rather, income is limited in return for the receipt of federal income tax credits. In short, although the zoning law in Tualatin Development created a "governmental restriction as to use" of the golf course, that is not the case with respect to Bayridge and Durham Park.
[5] The Tax Court stated:
"It is important to note that the restrictions here are not imposed by IRC § 42. That law merely sets forth the requirements to obtain the tax credits. While the property owner must limit the rent to obtain the tax credits, there is no `governmental' restriction on the property. The restriction on the property arises as a condition imposed by the state for receiving the allocation. The owner must specifically agree to limit the rental fees and this agreement is binding on any subsequent owners." 13 OTR at 28 (emphasis added).
I disagree. Under IRC § 42, the Oregon Housing Authority (OHA) merely serves as a conduit for the management of the federal low-income housing program. See generally ORS ch 456 (powers of housing authority). OHA's role is little more than that of a policeman, who must report to the federal government if the owner defaults under the program.
[6] Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 423, provided:
"SECTION 1: (1) If the assessed value of any real property is reduced by reason of the adoption of or a change in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or zoning designation for such property not at the request of the owner, the owner on the date of the adoption or change may file a claim for exemption with the assessor. The claim shall be filed on or before April 1 of any year, but not later than two years after April 1 of the assessment year for which the assessed value was so reduced. The claim shall be on forms furnished by the assessor and approved by the Department of Revenue.
"(2) The assessor shall compute the difference in assessed value attributable to such reduction, between the assessed value of the property as of the January 1 assessment date for which the assessed value was so reduced, and the assessed value as of the January 1 immediately prior to such reduction. Beginning in the year in which the claim is filed and for four consecutive years thereafter, the assessor shall reduce the true cash value of the real property so affected by an amount equal to the difference in value so computed. In no case shall the true cash value be reduced below zero. The assessor shall notify the person in whose name the property is assessed of the amount of the reduction in value and of the approximate dollar amount of tax reduction, based upon the tax rate extended against the property on the last tax roll. The notice shall be mailed to the address of the person as indicated on the claim for exemption.
"SECTION 2. ORS 308.205 is amended to read:
"308.205. True cash value of all property, real and personal, means market value as of the assessment date. True cash value in all cases shall be determined by methods and procedures in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Revenue. With respect to property which has no immediate market value, its true cash value shall be the amount of money that would justly compensate the owner for loss of the property. With respect to property that is subject to governmental restriction as to use on the assessment date under applicable law or regulation, true cash value shall not be based upon sales that reflect for the property a market value that the property would have if the use of the property were not subject to the restriction unless adjustments in value are made reflecting the effect of the restrictions.
"SECTION 3. Section 4 of this Act is added to and made a part of ORS chapter 308.
"SECTION 4. (1) The directors of county and city planning activities within the county shall notify the county assessor of the adoption of or changes in comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and zoning designations within 90 days after the date of the change.
"(2) The assessor shall notify the owner of property that has received a reduction in assessed value due to the adoption of or change in comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or zoning designation. The notice shall include a brief description of the plan or zoning change reflected in the reduced assessment. The notice shall inform the owner that he may apply for the exemption granted by section 1 of this 1977 Act and state the address from which further information pertaining to the exemption may be obtained. The notice shall be mailed to the last-known address of the person to whom the property is assessed at the address appearing in the tax records or to any new address reported in writing prior to the mailing of the notice. The notice shall be mailed within the time required and is subject to the provisions for notice of increased assessed valuation contained in subsection (5) of ORS 308.280.
"SECTION 5. Sections 1 and 4 of this Act shall apply only to that property assessed pursuant to ORS 308.205 and 308.232 for the assessment year for which a reduction in value as described in section 1 of this Act occurs and for the immediately preceding assessment year.
"SECTION 6. Sections 1 and 4 of this Act and the amendments to ORS 308.205 by section 2 of this Act shall first apply to assessment years beginning on or after January 1, 1978, with respect to changes in comprehensive plans and zoning effective on or after January 1, 1977."
[7] The Tax Court stated:
"The legislative intent in enacting this section is not clear. The law was enacted in 1977 as part of Senate Bill 827 (Or Laws 1977, chapter 423, § 2). The purpose of Senate Bill 827 was to compensate small property owners for loss of value due to `down' zoning. However, that proposal was modified and the law as enacted provides only a partial exemption from taxation. See ORS 308.341." 13 OTR at 27.
The parties and the majority opinion here agree that the text and context of the statute are unambiguous, so that resort to legislative history is unnecessary. However, it is interesting to note that one of the sponsors of the bill described it as follows:
"The compensation plan I propose uses the existing property assessment and taxation mechanism. Land values, and thus property taxes, are determined by the `highest and best use' of the land. When government restrictions remove some of these uses and thereby reduce[] the value of the land, my compensation formula goes into effect. When the landowner's property is downzoned he qualifies for a property tax credit." Senate Environment and Energy Subcommittee 2 on Land Use, May 9, 1977, Exhibit A (submitted by committee chair, Senator Dell Isham) (emphasis added).
"When zoning restrictions remove some of these uses and thereby reduce[] the value of the land and this is reflected in reduced property taxes, the tax relief formula goes into effect." Joint Trade and Economic Development Committee, June 13, 1977, Exhibit 212 (submitted by Senator Dell Isham) (emphasis added).
It would appear from these statements that Senator Isham was not drawing any distinction between "zoning restrictions" and "government restrictions."
[8] The department found that the true cash value of taxpayers' property was $16,137,900. The Tax Court found that the true cash value was $10,947,000. 13 OTR at 31. | 508cb429383df0af2e83fb64d6816cddce94b19387de440ff8889cdc0bc4ce1f | 1995-04-21T00:00:00Z |
a8d550f5-f16b-4600-8a0e-9d802c3ad12e | STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. Hewett Professional Group | 321 Or. 118, 895 P.2d 755 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 895 P.2d 755 (1995)
321 Or. 118
STATE of Oregon, By and Through its DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent
v.
HEWETT PROFESSIONAL GROUP, a joint venture comprised of John B. Brams, Thomas S. Miller, M.D., Corinne D. Miller, and Peter Lyon, M.D., Petitioner on Review, and
Capital Consultants, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Defendant.
CC 9108-05286; CA A77301; SC S41575.
Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted January 6, 1995.
Decided May 18, 1995.
*757 James N. Westwood, of Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition and brief was Dennis P. Rawlinson.
Jas. Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Dorothy S. Cofield, Tigard, filed briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Oregonians In Action.
Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, GRABER and DURHAM, JJ.[*]
GRABER, Justice.
In this condemnation action, defendant appealed from the judgment of the circuit court. Defendant argued that it was improperly precluded from pursuing at trial its affirmative defenses and counterclaims that addressed issues of valuation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that any error was harmless. Dept. of Transportation v. Hewett Professional Group, 128 Or.App. 480, 483, 876 P.2d 844 (1994). We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds.
The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) initiated a proceeding in the circuit court to condemn property owned by defendant, Hewett Professional Group, for use in the Westside Corridor Projecta light rail transportation system that was being developed as an alternative to automobile traffic between Washington and Multnomah counties. The condemned property is located near the Sylvan Interchange on Highway 26 in Portland.
According to defendant, ODOT misrepresented to defendant that it would not take the property, or that part of the property containing a then-existing structure called the Sylvan Building. At the time ODOT made such alleged representations to defendant, defendant was in the process of planning, and applying for permission from Multnomah County, to demolish the Sylvan Building and to construct a new office facility on the property. By the time that ODOT notified defendant of its intent to take the property, defendant had demolished the Sylvan Building and had started, but not completed, construction of the new facility.
In the trial court, defendant asserted that ODOT planned to take the property before the Sylvan Building was demolished, but that ODOT concealed that intention until after the building was demolished. Defendant argued that ODOT effectively minimized the compensable value of the property, by luring defendant into razing the existing structure and leaving only the bare ground and a partially constructed new building at the time of the taking. Defendant argued that ODOT's aim was to eliminate the value of the Sylvan Building from the amount of just compensation that it must pay for the taking. In pursuit of this theory, defendant pleaded affirmative *758 defenses of equitable estoppel and "timing manipulation" in violation of ORS 281.060 and other statutes, and filed counterclaims for misrepresentation, "inverse condemnation," and "condemnation blight."
The trial court granted ODOT's motion for partial summary judgment as to those defenses and counterclaims. On ODOT's motion, the trial court also struck defendant's allegations concerning the value of the Sylvan Building. Nonetheless, at trial, the court allowed defendant to introduce evidence about the course of dealings between it and ODOT and about the value of the Sylvan Building before it was demolished. The trial court allowed the jury to consider whether to award compensation for the value of the Sylvan Building, under the following instruction:
The jury fixed defendant's compensation at $562,000, which was ODOT's estimate of just compensation for the property.
Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the above-listed affirmative defenses and counterclaims and when it struck the allegations concerning the Sylvan Building's value. ODOT argued that, because defendant was able to present all its evidence about the value of the Sylvan Building and ODOT's alleged misconduct, and because the jury was allowed to take into account the value and removal costs associated with the Sylvan Building, the trial court's rulings subtracted nothing of substance from defendant's case. The Court of Appeals agreed with that argument and affirmed the judgment. 128 Or.App. at 483, 876 P.2d 844. On defendant's petition, we allowed review.[1]
As noted, the Court of Appeals relied on the doctrine of "harmless error" to resolve the issues relating to summary judgment on the counterclaims and defenses. That court explained:
"The defenses and counterclaims that defendant asserted are not the `frame' of a case for just compensation; indeed, the theories in defendant's defenses and counterclaims have no factual or legal bearing on the value of the building and the removal costs independent of the condemnation claim itself. The error, if any, in granting the partial summary judgments, was harmless. So too was the striking of the allegations of value, in view of the fact that defendant was permitted to produce evidence of and argument concerning value at trial. We reject the five assignments that challenge the partial summary judgments and the striking of the allegations." 128 Or.App. at 483, 876 P.2d 844 (emphasis in original).
That discussion misses the point. Although defendant was able to present its evidence of ODOT's alleged acts of deception and of the value of the Sylvan Building, being able to present that evidence is not the same as being able to attach that evidence to a legal theory. The jury was instructed: "i[f] you find that the fair market value of the bare land after removal of the Sylvan Building includes the value of the Sylvan Building and the costs associated with its removal, you should include these amounts in your conclusion of just compensation." The jury was not instructed, however, about why and under what circumstances it "should include" the value of the building and its removal costs. If even one of defendant's affirmative defenses or counterclaims was a permissible legal theory, in view of the evidence, then *759 defendant was denied the opportunity to obtain a jury instruction that would have framed the matters of law relevant to its theory of the case.
For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that any error was harmless. We therefore turn our attention to the claimed errors.
The issues pertinent to our review were decided on summary judgment. Because we are reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fields v. Jantec, 317 Or. 432, 437, 857 P.2d 95 (1993). The following facts were established without contradiction in the record.
On February 22, 1991, the governor signed into law Senate Bill 573. Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3. S.B. 573 addressed the development of the Westside Corridor Project. S.B. 573, which was effective upon its passage, was enacted by the legislature to expedite the development of the project, so that the project would qualify for federal funding. Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3, preamble. That statute consolidated final authority for determining the location of the light rail line, and necessary corresponding highway improvements, in the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District (Tri-Met). Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3, preamble & § 6.[3]
At all material times, defendant owned the Sylvan Building, which was located on the property later condemned in this action. Late in 1990, defendant made plans to develop the property further by demolishing the Sylvan Building and constructing a new office building on the site. In December 1990, defendant filed a design review application with Multnomah County, as a first step toward obtaining a building permit.
In January 1991, Mark Hess, a Multnomah County Planner responsible for reviewing requests for building permits, telephoned Brett Richards, an assistant project manager in ODOT's "location design group." Hess asked Richards whether ODOT had any plans to acquire, for the Westside Corridor Project, the property on which the replacement building would be constructed. Richards conferred with his supervisor, James McClure, and returned Hess' call. Richards said that ODOT's plans at the time did not require the property. Nothing in Hess' conversation with Richards suggested that the property might be condemned. Richards was aware that what he told Hess would affect defendant's application for the building permit.
If Hess had been aware that the property was slated for condemnation, he would have notified the applicant or the designer of the project that condemnation was possible. If he had known that condemnation was likely for the property, the building permit would not have been issued until the condemnation questions had been resolved between the state and the applicant. Unaware of the possibility of ODOT's taking of the property, Multnomah County issued a building permit to defendant on March 29, 1991.
In fact, ODOT was considering the condemnation of defendant's property during the time that defendant's application for a *760 building permit was being processed. One plan under consideration by ODOT from as early as November 1990, known as Option 108, would have placed a roadway immediately next to the Sylvan Building and would have required the taking of the property. ODOT was considering Option 108 in January 1991. On January 14, 1991, Richards asked another ODOT employee for an estimate of what it would cost to take the subject property with the Sylvan Building on it. Richards received an estimate of $1.1 million. On January 18, 1991, Tri-Met and ODOT staff held a joint meeting, at which ODOT employees McClure, Collins, and Richards (along with Tri-Met employees, Multnomah County employees, and a City of Portland employee) were assigned to deal with the "new office building" on the property.
ODOT abandoned Option 108 in February 1991. On March 30 and 31, 1991, ODOT developed Option 107A, which called for the taking of the Sylvan Building and property. Richards notified Hess of the plan and said that defendant's property would be taken. On or about April 1, 1991, Hess told Richards that a building permit had been issued for the property. Neither Richards nor anyone from ODOT notified defendant that Option 107A called for the taking of its property.
Because implementation of the Westside Corridor Project was a "land use decision," a statutory notice of Tri-Met's proposed final order, concerning the location of the light rail line, was published, and a land use hearing was scheduled. See Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3, § 6 (providing procedure). Defendant acknowledges that that notice was proper. The time and location of the meeting were described in the notice. Pursuant to that notice, Tri-Met held a land use hearing on April 12, 1991. Defendant did not attend. At the hearing, Tri-Met determined the location of the light rail line; the location of the line, with the necessary highway improvements, necessitated the taking of defendant's property.
Demolition of the Sylvan Building occurred on or about May 17 through 19, 1991. On May 21, 1991, McClure sent a memorandum to a subordinate in ODOT, stating: "[T]he abandoned office building [the Sylvan Building] * * * has now been torn down. * * * I would like you to advise the property owner that the property will be [taken]." On May 28, 1991, ODOT informed defendant of its plans for the taking. On August 16, 1991, this condemnation proceeding was initiated.
In its affirmative defense of equitable estoppel, defendant alleged that ODOT falsely and misleadingly represented to defendant, through the Multnomah County Planning Division, that its real property would not be taken, and that the county thereafter issued a building permit. Defendant alleged that its reliance on ODOT's representation caused it to remove the Sylvan Building and that ODOT was estopped from claiming the nonexistence of the Sylvan Building for the purpose of calculating just compensation. Hewett does not argue that ODOT is estopped from bringing this condemnation action; rather, Hewett argues only that ODOT should be estopped from asserting a specific valuation for the property because of its alleged misrepresentation.
This court previously has accepted the general proposition that, under appropriate circumstances, an agency of the government may be estopped to assert a claim inconsistent with a previous position taken by it. See Belton v. Buesing, 240 Or. 399, 411, 402 P.2d 98 (1965) (accepting abstract proposition, but finding no basis for application of doctrine under the specific facts of that case). For estoppel to be established, the party claiming it must (among other things) have relied on the governmental agency's misstatements, and the party's reliance must have been reasonable. Committee in Opposition v. Oregon Emergency Correc., 309 Or. 678, 686, 792 P.2d 1203 (1990).[4]See also Wiggins v. Barrett & Associates, Inc., 295 Or. 679, 697, 669 P.2d 1132 (1983) (one element necessary for reasonable reliance in a *761 claim for equitable estoppel was that it "was within the lawful powers of the [agency]" to make the statements relied on).
Those principles dispose of defendant's estoppel claim here.[5] Upon passage of SB 573 in February of 1991, only Tri-Met had the legal authority to determine where the light rail line would go. Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3, preamble & §§ 3, 6. See also Or.Laws 1991, ch. 3, § 7(1)(a) (requiring local and state governments to "[a]mend their comprehensive or functional plans, including public facility plans, and their land use regulations to the extent necessary to make them consistent with a final order [from Tri-Met setting forth the location of the light rail]"). Under those applicable statutes, Tri-Met had to determine where the light rail line would go before ODOT could start condemning property for the highway improvements related to the location of the light rail line.
Assuming that the statements made by Richards to Hess in January 1991 (that ODOT's plans at the time did not require the property) were inaccurate or misleading when made, defendant could not reasonably have relied on them after passage of SB 573 in February 1991. Given the publication of the relevant law and the fact that that law did not permit ODOT to reach a final determination as to what property would be condemned, any reliance by defendant in May 1991 (when it destroyed the Sylvan Building) "was patently unreasonable, precluding estoppel." See Committee in Opposition, 309 Or. at 686, 792 P.2d 1203 (stating quoted standard).
Additionally, defendant could not reasonably have relied on the alleged representations because of the notice that was published before it acted to demolish the Sylvan Building. Defendant acknowledges that the April 12 meeting was public and that notice of it was proper. The notice effectively told defendant that: (1) the final determination as to where the light rail line will go will be made at the April 12 hearing; (2) Tri-Met, not ODOT, is making that final determination; (3) under plans to be considered at that meeting, the light rail line and concurrent highway improvements are slated to run through your land; and (4) if you do not like this proposal, come to the hearing. Defendant did not attend the hearing. Nonetheless, after notice was published, defendant could not reasonably have relied on a prior statement respecting the location of the light rail line. Defendant acted in alleged reliance on ODOT's statements more than a month after notice was published.
The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to ODOT on defendant's affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming that ruling.
2. "Timing Manipulation" in Violation of Statutes.
As its second affirmative defense, defendant alleged that ODOT violated ORS 281.060(3) and (6), 42 U.S.C. § 4651(7), and ODOT's internal policy, when ODOT "deferred negotiations and condemnation and took other action coercive in nature in order to acquire [defendant's] Property at an unjust and inequitably low price." Specifically, defendant alleged that ODOT had an affirmative, statutory duty to notify it of plans to take the property; that ODOT failed so to notify it; that ODOT knew that it could reduce the cost of the taking by acting in that manner; and that ODOT manipulated the timing of the taking so as to deprive defendant of the value of the Sylvan Building. Defendant refers to this theory as "timing manipulation."
Defendant argues that the cited statutes required ODOT to notify defendant of its plans to take the property, at the latest, immediately after Tri-Met entered its final order (in April 1991) concerning the location of the light rail line. ORS 281.060 provides in part:
"Whenever any program or project is undertaken by a public entity which program or project will result in the acquisition of real property, notwithstanding any *762 other statute, charter, ordinance, or rule or regulation, the public entity shall:
"* * * * *
42 U.S.C. § 4651 provides that, when agencies are condemning land, they
"* * * * *
42 U.S.C. § 4602 specifies that the provisions of § 4651 create no rights or liabilities and that the federal law does not give rise to issues of valuation in eminent domain proceedings:
"(a) The provisions of section 4651 of this title create no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation.
In other words, Oregon law looks to federal law to determine how an agency should go about taking land in certain eminent domain proceedings. The referenced federal law expressly provides no basis for a claim.
Defendant also relies on 49 CFR § 24.102(b), which provides for notification of a property owner "[a]s soon as feasible" when an agency is interested in acquiring real property, and on two paragraphs in Section 8.170 of ODOT's Right of Way Manual. The first paragraph of Section 8.170 provides that condemnation "shall be carried out in conformance to" federal and state law. The second paragraph contains the same wording as does 42 U.S.C. § 4651(7).
Defendant cannot rely successfully on those sources, because ORS 281.060 provides that, "notwithstanding any other statute, charter, ordinance, or rule or regulation, the [agency] shall" be guided by the federal law. The federal law, in turn, pertinently specifies that its timing policy provisions shall not create rights or liabilities. It would be contrary to the federal law, and thus contrary to ORS 281.060, to use a regulation or internal policy to create such rights or liabilities.
The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to ODOT on defendant's affirmative defense of "timing manipulation." The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming that ruling.
With respect to its counterclaim for misrepresentation, defendant asserts that ODOT made material misrepresentations, by false statements and by silence. Defendant argues that the false statement that Richards made to Hess in January 1991that ODOT had no plans for condemnation of defendant's propertywas a misrepresentation. Defendant also argues that, because ODOT knew that defendant was carrying out costly plans for development of the property in reliance on those misrepresentations and failed to inform defendant of the impending condemnation, ODOT's silence was a misrepresentation as well. Finally, defendant argues that it relied on those misrepresentations to its detriment.
A claim for misrepresentation requires that there be a representation made with either (a) knowledge of its falsity or (b) awareness of lack of knowledge as to its truth or falsity. Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 294 Or. 213, 222, 656 P.2d 293 (1982). The "[mis]representation must be justifiably relied upon by [the party] in taking *763 action or in refraining from it to his damage." Meader v. Francis Ford, Inc., 286 Or. 451, 456, 595 P.2d 480 (1979) (emphasis added).
As already discussed above, in the circumstances, defendant could not justifiably have relied on the alleged misrepresentations. See 321 Or. at 125-127, 895 P.2d at 760-761 (discussing issue of justifiable reliance). Accordingly, defendant failed to establish an element necessary to sustain its counterclaim for misrepresentation.
The trial court did not err when it granted ODOT's motion for summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim for misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals did not err when it sustained that ruling.
Defendant's next counterclaim was for an "inverse condemnation." An inverse condemnation occurs when a governmental entity effectively takes property without actually exercising its power of eminent domain. This court's first detailed discussion of such a claim was in Tomasek v. Oregon Highway Com'n, 196 Or. 120, 147-51, 248 P.2d 703 (1952). In Tomasek, the court stated that "it manifestly would be absurd * * * that the state might destroy the right and protection given the owner of property and evade the payment of just compensation, simply through the medium of failing or refusing to institute condemnation proceedings." Id. at 147, 248 P.2d 703. More recently, this court has defined inverse condemnation this way:
The dispositive issue, then, in an inverse condemnation claim is whether property was taken, in fact, by the government even though no formal eminent domain proceedings were initiated. Under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution,[6] a property is taken when there is a "destruction, restriction or interruption of the necessary use and enjoyment of [the] property of a person for a public purpose. Most cases boil this definition down to a test of whether there has been a `substantial' interference with property rights." Hawkins, 315 Or. at 68, 843 P.2d 400 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).[7] Under either formulation, the government must interfere with a property owner's rights, and that interference must cause the harm suffered by the property owner.
Here, it was defendant, not ODOT, that demolished the Sylvan Building. The diminution in value of the property thus resulted from the acts of defendant, not of the government. ODOT's failure to reveal its plans to condemn property might, in a proper case, support a claim for misrepresentation or other relief, but that failure does not *764 transform a property owner's actions into actions by the government. Additionally, the existence of ODOT's plans to condemn property cannot support a claim for inverse condemnation, as this court's prior cases have explained.
In Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or. 591, 593-95, 581 P.2d 50 (1978), a property owner challenged the validity of a county's zoning plan, on its face and as applied to the landowner's land. The landowner alleged that the zoning regulations adopted by the county had rendered the landowner's property "substantially valueless" and had deprived the landowner "totally of the economic use and benefit" of the property. Id. at 608, 581 P.2d 50. In part, the landowner argued that the "designation for eventual public use of portions of [landowner's] property" constituted a taking. Id. at 610, 581 P.2d 50. This court affirmed the trial court's sustaining of the defendant county's demurrer. Id. at 614, 518 P.2d 50.
In reaching that conclusion, the court said:
See also Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 256-57, 656 P.2d 306 (1982) (noting with approval that, in Fifth Avenue Corp., this court stated that "planning for future acquisition as such does not constitute a compensable taking of property").
Defendant's theory can be read to contend that, because ODOT induced it to demolish the Sylvan Building, defendant's act of demolishing its own property was in fact the act of the government, thus meeting that element of a claim for inverse condemnation. Assuming, without deciding, that such an approach is permissible under a claim for inverse condemnation, our answer to defendant's affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and its counterclaim for misrepresentation fully answers the approach in this case. Defendant was not entitled to rely on what it was told, so its act of demolishing the Sylvan Building cannot be transmogrified into an act of the government.
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to ODOT on defendant's counterclaim for inverse condemnation. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming that ruling of the trial court.
Finally, defendant counterclaimed for "condemnation blight." We are aware of only one case from this court in which that phrase appears. In Lincoln Loan v. State Hwy. Comm., 274 Or. 49, 51, 545 P.2d 105 (1976), this court used the term "condemnation blight" to describe an inverse condemnation action
Condemnation blight, as discussed in Lincoln Loan, occurs when the actions of the government reduce the value of the property before the actual taking. As discussed above, it was defendant, not the government, that reduced the value of the property by demolishing the Sylvan Building.
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to ODOT on defendant's *765 counterclaim for condemnation blight. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming that ruling.
The Court of Appeals erred when it held that any error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment to ODOT on defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims was harmless.
On the merits, however, the trial court did not err when it granted ODOT's motion for summary judgment on defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed on different grounds. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
[*] Unis, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1] Defendant did not petition for review with respect to the striking of the allegations concerning the value of the Sylvan Building. Accordingly, we do not consider that issue.
[2] ODOT argues that ORS 35.295 does not authorize defendant to assert its affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Because we hold that defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims lack merit as a matter of law, we need not decide whether ODOT's procedural argument is well taken. For the same reason, we need not address the constitutional arguments made by defendant and amici.
[3] In a separate bill, House Bill 2128, the legislature provided that, once the location of the light rail and corresponding highway improvements had been determined, Tri-Met and ODOT would manage the construction phases of the light rail project. Or.Laws 1991, ch. 575, § 5(1). That act was signed by the governor on July 17, 1991, and was effective upon its passage. Section 5(1), codified at ORS 391.150(1), provides that ODOT will "manage and oversee the construction of highway improvements related to the extension of the light rail system." Defendant's property was taken because of necessary highway improvements related to the extension of the light rail system; thus, it was within ODOT's authority, under ORS 391.150(1), to take defendant's property. Defendant does not contend otherwise.
[4] The parties do not dispute those general principles, but dispute only their application in this case.
[5] Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ORCP 47 C.
[6] Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in part:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use * * * without just compensation * * *."
[7] The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987).
Defendant offers no different analysis under the state and federal constitutions. Therefore, we will assume, without deciding, that the analysis is the same. See Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 572 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641 (stating same principle), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 467, 121 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1992). | 11a55d60d7c65385d8e04bb06984545ad0fe7fba70b9d084498d5e0078e4ff34 | 1995-05-18T00:00:00Z |
9558fc76-2c2d-4ff6-b1ed-7dd06548529f | Morris v. Dept. of Rev. | 320 Or. 579, 889 P.2d 1294 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 889 P.2d 1294 (1995)
320 Or. 579
John D. MORRIS, Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, State of Oregon, Respondent.
OTC 3435; SC S41275.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted October 31, 1994.
Decided March 9, 1995.
John Eric Wilkes of Callaghan & Wilkes, Salem, argued the cause and filed a reply brief for appellant. John D. Morris, appellant, filed the opening brief pro se.
*1295 Jerry Bronner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen.
CARSON, Chief Justice.
This case comes before us on direct appeal of a Tax Court judgment sustaining an assessment of personal income taxes, penalties, and interest by the Department of Revenue (the department) against plaintiff for the 1985 tax year. Plaintiff argues that he was not an Oregon resident in 1985 and that, consequently, he is not required to pay Oregon income tax for that year. The department responds that plaintiff's argument was one that he first had to make before the director of the department, that he did not do so, and that the failure to do so forecloses plaintiff from making that argument now. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the department.
Plaintiff did not file an Oregon tax return for the 1985 tax year. He did, however, file a timely federal tax return for 1985, showing an Oregon address. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified the department that plaintiff had filed a federal return with an Oregon address. In December 1988, and in January 1989, the department sent plaintiff letters informing him that the department had not received a 1985 tax return and asking him to file a return. In March 1989, the department sent plaintiff another letter demanding that he file a return within 30 days. Plaintiff did not respond to any of the letters. In July 1989, the department mailed a Notice of Determination and Assessment to plaintiff.[1] The envelope was returned to the department, marked "AttemptedNot Known." Plaintiff again did not respond to the department. All three letters and the notice of determination and assessment were sent to an address in St. Helens, Oregon, which was provided by the IRS and was confirmed by the department by checking the records of the Motor Vehicles Division (MVD).
In August 1990, plaintiff communicated with the department about the 1985 assessment, for the purpose of removing a tax lien arising from the unpaid assessment. In April 1991, plaintiff requested an appeal of the assessment before the director of the department. The director granted plaintiff a hearing but, after the hearing, concluded that he would not disturb the final assessment because plaintiff had not appealed from the notice of determination and assessment within 90 days, as required by statute. ORS 305.280(2)[2] ("An appeal * * * from any notice of assessment * * * shall be filed within 90 days from the date of the notice."). The director also determined that plaintiff was not entitled to relief under ORS 305.295,[3] because he was an Oregon resident in 1985, and the State of Oregon may tax all the income of its residents under the Oregon Constitution and federal law. See, e.g., Keller v. Dept. of Rev., 319 Or. 73, 78, 872 P.2d 414 (1994) ("The state's taxing authority extends to all of the income earned by its residents, including income earned outside the state."). The director of the department dismissed the appeal and concluded that plaintiff owed $4,863.68 (plus accruing interest) in income taxes, penalties, and interest.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the Tax Court, arguing that he had not been an Oregon resident during the 1985 tax year and, therefore, that he was not subject to Oregon *1296 income taxation for that year. The Tax Court concluded that plaintiff had been an Oregon resident during the 1985 tax year and sustained the director's order and opinion.
Plaintiff seeks direct review in this court, again arguing that he was not a resident of Oregon during the 1985 tax year and, thus, that he was not subject to personal income taxation for that year. In response, the department argues, among other things, that the Tax Court and this court do not have a basis upon which to address the merits of plaintiff's appeal because an assessment of income taxes by the department becomes final if it is not appealed to the director within 90 days and because plaintiff failed to pursue, and to exhaust, his administrative remedies in a timely manner.
Before we turn to the merits of plaintiff's argument, we must decide whether the Tax Court had a basis upon which to hear this appeal. ORS 305.275(4) provides, in part: "[N]o person shall appeal to the Oregon Tax Court * * * on any matter arising under the revenue and tax laws administered by the department unless the person first exhausts the administrative remedies provided before the department and the director." (Emphasis added.)
ORS 305.275(1) provides that any person aggrieved by an act of the department "may appeal to the Director of the Department of Revenue in the manner provided by this section." As stated above, ORS 305.280(2) requires that an appeal to the director of the department from a notice of determination and assessment "shall be filed within 90 days from the date of the notice."
In order to exhaust administrative remedies sufficient to satisfy ORS 305.275(4), a taxpayer must pursue the available administrative remedies in a timely manner. See, e.g., Ebert v. Dept. of Rev., 307 Or. 649, 652-53, 771 P.2d 1018 (1989) (holding that Tax Court did not have a statutory basis upon which to hear a challenge of an assessment of income tax because plaintiff failed to challenge the assessment before the department within 90 days). ORS 305.265(11) provides that "[m]ailing of notice to the person at the person's last-known address shall constitute the giving of notice as prescribed in this section." Once notice is given, the 90-day appeal period begins to run. ORS 305.280(2). Plaintiff argues that, because the department did not send the notice of determination and assessment to his "last-known address," the department did not provide notice of determination and assessment as required by the statute and, therefore, that plaintiff was not untimely in challenging the assessment.
We disagree. Although this court heretofore has not interpreted the meaning of "last-known address," we conclude that the department satisfied its obligation to provide notice under ORS 305.265(11).[4] "Last-known address" ordinarily refers to the address provided on the last Oregon income tax return filed by the taxpayer. Cf. United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 469 U.S. 830, 105 S. Ct. 116, 83 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984) (under Internal Revenue Code, last-known address is the one on the most recent tax return unless taxpayer gives clear and concise notice of a change of address); Eshweiler v. U.S., 946 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1991) (under Internal Revenue Code, last-known address is the one on the return being audited unless taxpayer gives "clear and concise" notification of a change).[5]
However, the "last-known address" changes if the department has actual notice that the taxpayer's address has changed. Once the department has such notice, it is required to use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the taxpayer's last-known address. Cf. Eshweiler v. U.S., supra, 946 F.2d at 48 *1297 ("The IRS need only exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the taxpayer's last known address.").
In this case, plaintiff's last Oregon tax return was filed in 1981. The department, on its own, determined that that address was too old to use as the last-known address. In October 1988, after the IRS notified the department that plaintiff had filed a return with an Oregon address, the department requested a "federal transcript," which provided the department with the information from plaintiff's 1987 federal tax return. Plaintiff's 1987 return showed a St. Helens address.
The department sent the three preliminary letters to that address. The department received no notice that those letters were undeliverable at that address. In May 1989, the department obtained a MVD computer printout, which showed the same St. Helens address. Plaintiff had an obligation to notify the MVD of any change of address. See ORS 807.560 (it is a Class D infraction to fail to notify the MVD within 30 days of a change of address from the address noted on a driver license).
Based on the foregoing information, the department concluded that the St. Helens address was the last-known address and, on July 12, 1989, sent the notice of determination and assessment to that address. As previously observed, that letter was returned, marked "AttemptedNot Known." Plaintiff argues that the department was obligated to continue looking for his new address at that point. We disagree. The last-known address is determined at the time when the notice of determination and assessment is sent. Cf. Armstrong v. CIR, 15 F.3d 970, 975 (10th Cir.1994) ("We agree with the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, as well as the [United States] Tax Court, that the IRS's duty to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining a taxpayer's last known address extends only to the point in time when the deficiency notice is mailed.").
We conclude that the department exercised reasonable diligence in determining that the St. Helens address provided by the IRS and confirmed by the MVD was plaintiff's last-known address. Thus, the department gave notice of the assessment, as required by ORS 305.265(11), on July 12, 1989. Accordingly, plaintiff was required to appeal the assessment to the director within 90 days from that date. Plaintiff did not appeal within the statutorily required time. His appeal to the director was not timely under ORS 305.280(2).
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that his appeal was not an appeal of the assessment, but rather an appeal from a denial of a claim for a refund under ORS 305.270 (governing claims for refunds). ORS 314.415(1)(b) provides that "[n]o refund shall be allowed or made after three years from the time the return was filed, or two years from the time the tax or a portion thereof was paid." Plaintiff argues that he challenged the denial of a refund within two years and, therefore, that he made a timely claim and exhausted his administrative remedies.
That argument is unpersuasive. As this court held in Van Tran v. Dept. of Rev., 320 Or. 170, 174, 880 P.2d 924 (1994), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1112, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1995), a taxpayer may not fail to appeal an assessment within the appointed time and then later seek a refund, arguing that the basis for the assessment was improper.[6] The taxpayer is required to challenge the assessment within 90 days or the *1298 assessment becomes final. ORS 305.265(14) and 305.280(2). Plaintiff did not challenge the assessment within 90 days; therefore, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the Tax Court had no basis upon which to address the merits of plaintiff's appeal. ORS 305.275(4).
One further issue deserves mention. Plaintiff argued before the director of the department that the department did not have jurisdiction to tax him because he was not a resident of Oregon. The director treated that argument as an appeal of the department's denial of a request to cancel a tax pursuant to ORS 305.295(1). That statute provides, in part:
"* * * * *
The director considered plaintiff's argument that the department did not have jurisdiction to tax him and concluded that plaintiff was an Oregon resident, giving the department the authority to tax him. Plaintiff is not entitled to review of that decision either in the Tax Court or in this court. ORS 305.295(6).
Plaintiff is not excused from the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies, nor did he exhaust those remedies; therefore, under Oregon statutory law, the Tax Court had no basis upon which to address plaintiff's claim on the merits.
The decision of the Tax Court is vacated. The case is remanded to the Tax Court with instructions to dismiss the proceeding.
[1] This notice advised plaintiff that the department had assessed taxes, penalties, and interest against him for the 1985 tax year.
[2] The statutes in effect in 1989, the year in which the taxes were assessed, control this case. Because there have been no pertinent changes in the code since that time, we cite to the 1993 version of the statutes throughout this opinion.
[3] ORS 305.295(1) provides, in part:
"[T]he Department of Revenue may in its discretion, cancel any tax, penalty or interest for which an assessment has become final, if any of the following conditions exist:
"(a) The assessment is based upon an asserted tax deficiency calculated upon income that the state is expressly prohibited from taxing under the Oregon Constitution or the laws of the United States."
[4] In 1992, the department promulgated a rule that instructs the department how to determine a taxpayer's "last-known address." See OAR 150-305.265(11) (setting forth procedure for ascertaining a taxpayer's last-known address).
[5] Federal tax law does not control the tax law of Oregon. We cite federal cases only when we find them persuasive.
[6] In fact, plaintiff's argument in this case is even farther afield than the argument made by the taxpayer in Van Tran. In Van Tran, the taxpayer paid the money due pursuant to the assessment before claiming a refund. Van Tran v. Dept. of Rev., 320 Or. 170, 174, 880 P.2d 924 (1994), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1112, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1995). In this case, plaintiff argues that, even though he did not pay any taxes pursuant to the assessment, he was granted a hardship exception under ORS 305.419(3) by the Tax Court that extends to an appeal of a denial of refund as well as to a challenge of an assessment. Based on that leap of logic, plaintiff claims that he may file for a tax refund before he pays any of the assessed taxes. We do not find that argument persuasive. | a244fea86eb2ff8a41515110b8fe2119554797ba285011b6ea924437df5488d4 | 1995-03-09T00:00:00Z |
60c44be0-bda1-432e-b10f-d6026ca399be | State v. Stewart/Billings | 321 Or. 1, 892 P.2d 1013 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 892 P.2d 1013 (1995)
321 Or. 1
STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Matthew Wayne STEWART, Petitioner on Review.
STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Jesse Allen BILLINGS, aka Running Deer, Petitioner on Review.
CC 10-90-07017C; CA A71065; SC S40693; CC 9202-0365, 9202-0366; CA A76560 (Control), A76561; SC S40890.
Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted January 6, 1995.
Resubmitted January 19, 1995.
Decided April 21, 1995.
Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioners on review. With him on the briefs were Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, and Louis R. Miles, Deputy Public Defender, Salem.
Janet A. Metcalf, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With her on the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Angela Sherbo, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Juvenile Rights Project, Inc.
*1014 Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, UNIS and GRABER, JJ.[*]
VAN HOOMISSEN, Justice.
The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the sentencing courts erred in denying defendants' motions to preclude the use of their juvenile adjudications in calculating their "criminal history scores" under the sentencing guidelines. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentencing courts' rulings. State v. Stewart, 123 Or.App. 147, 151, 859 P.2d 545 (1993), adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 126 Or.App. 456, 868 P.2d 794 (1994); State v. Billings, 124 Or.App. 682, 865 P.2d 1340 (1993). We also affirm.
Defendant Stewart was convicted by a jury of two counts of burglary in the first degree. Before sentencing, he moved to preclude the use of his juvenile adjudications for burglary and unauthorized use of vehicle in calculating his criminal history score under the sentencing guidelines.[1] He argued that, because he had not been afforded jury trials in his juvenile proceedings, the use of those juvenile adjudications in assessing his criminal history score violated the jury trial provision of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.[2] The sentencing court denied Stewart's motion. The court then determined that Stewart fell within gridblock 8-G on the guidelines matrix and sentenced him to a prison term of 22 months, with 36 months of post-prison supervision, on the primary offense. If the sentencing court had not used Stewart's juvenile adjudications, his maximum presumptive prison sentence would have been 18 months. Thus, his sentence was increased by at least 4 months as a consequence of considering his juvenile adjudications.
Defendant Billings was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual abuse and first degree attempted sodomy. Before sentencing, he moved to preclude the use of his juvenile adjudications for burglary, sodomy, and assault in calculating his criminal history score under the sentencing guidelines. Essentially, his argument was the same as that of Stewart. The sentencing court denied Billings' motion. The court then determined that Billings' conviction for sexual abuse fell under gridblock 8-C on the guidelines matrix and, accordingly, sentenced him to a presumptive prison sentence of 34 months. The court separately sentenced Billings on the attempted sodomy conviction under gridblock 8-C and again imposed a presumptive prison sentence of 34 months, to be served consecutively to his sentence for sexual abuse. Billings' juvenile adjudication for sodomy changed his criminal history score from 8-E to 8-C.
Stewart and Billings appealed. The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc, rejected Stewart's argument, holding that "[a]n adjudication sufficient to commit a juvenile to a juvenile facility can later be used to enhance a sentence as an adult." Stewart, 123 Or.App. at 151, 859 P.2d 545.[3] In a dissenting opinion in Stewart, four Court of Appeals judges opined that, because Article I, section 11, guarantees adult criminal defendants a right to a jury trial, non-jury juvenile adjudications may not be used in a later criminal proceeding "because [that outcome] is inconsistent with the constitutional underpinnings that permit juvenile adjudications without juries." Stewart, 123 Or.App. at 152, 859 P.2d 545 (De Muniz, J., dissenting). Billings, which presented the same legal issue, was affirmed *1015 from the bench.[4] We allowed review in both cases.
We first consider the state's position that defendants' argument under Article I, section 11, is an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of their juvenile adjudications. The state relies primarily on Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 128 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1994). Custis held that, under federal sentencing guidelines, an adult offender may not attack collaterally the validity of a prior state conviction used at the offender's sentencing hearing on the ground that the offender had inadequate assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding. In Custis, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that federal sentencing guidelines do not provide specific statutory authority for such a challenge and that the Constitution of the United States does not require that collateral attacks be allowed. 511 U.S. at ___-___, 114 S. Ct. at 1735-37, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 525-26. Collateral attacks are permitted only where the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the offender's right to be appointed counsel. Id. at ___- ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1736-39, 128 L. Ed. at 526-28 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963)).
The Supreme Court's decision in Custis was based on the fact that "failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant [is] a unique constitutional defect" that "rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect"; that allowing other collateral attacks during sentencing on a subsequent crime "would require a sentencing court to rummage through" the records of prior cases; and that allowing additional collateral attacks would deprive earlier judgments of their finality and "inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice." Custis, 511 U.S. at___-___, 114 S. Ct. at 1738-39, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 528. We conclude, however, that defendant's argument is not a collateral attack, because defendants could not have made a direct attack on the future consequences of their juvenile adjudications in juvenile court. Thus, defendants' argument is not the sort of impermissible collateral attack discussed by the Court in Custis.
We also agree with defendants that, unlike in Custis, there is a statutory basis for their challenge. ORS 137.079 contains the requirement that presentence reports are to be considered by a sentencing court. ORS 137.079(5) provides in part:
"* * * * *
ORS 138.222(4) provides:
"In any appeal, the appellate court may review a claim that:
We hold that defendants' state constitutional challenge to the use of their juvenile adjudications in sentencing in these cases is authorized by ORS 137.079(5), that the sentencing courts had authority to hear defendants' challenge on the ground asserted, and that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review that challenge under ORS 138.222(4).
We turn to the merits of defendants' claim.[5] Defendants and the Court of Appeals dissenters have relied most heavily on Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980) as persuasive authority for their proposed interpretation of Article I, section 11. However, that case was overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994).
As summarized in Nichols:
The Court in Nichols then analyzed the conflicting concurrences in Baldasar, further noting that lower courts have had difficulty trying to apply Baldasar and, consequently, have regularly limited its application to its facts. In overruling Baldasar, the Nichols Court said:
"[A]n uncounseled conviction valid under Scott [v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979),] may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that sentence entails imprisonment. Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing Guidelines, or recidivist statutes which are common in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1923, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 754 (citations omitted).
Noting that sentencing courts have traditionally considered a wide variety of factors, including a defendant's past criminal behavior, the Nichols Court stated:
The Nichols Court concluded that prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions could be used at a later sentencing hearing. Id. at ___-___, 114 S. Ct. at 1928-29, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755.
The state argues that, because a juvenile has no right under Article I, section 11, to a jury trial, State ex rel Juv. Dept. of Klamath County v. Reynolds, 317 Or. 560, 575, 857 P.2d 842 (1993), including consideration of juvenile adjudications in a guidelines criminal history score does not violate Article I, section 11.[6] We are not persuaded by defendants' *1017 argument, based on Baldasar, that, even if their juvenile adjudications are not invalid per se, later consideration of those adjudications for adult sentencing purposes creates a state constitutional infirmity. As Reynolds shows, there was no constitutional infirmity in defendants' juvenile adjudications. Defendants cite no persuasive authority for the proposition that a constitutionally valid juvenile adjudication is not relevant to and may not be used for later adult sentencing purposes. City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 297 Or. 725, 688 P.2d 68 (1984), and State v. Grenvik, 291 Or. 99, 628 P.2d 1195 (1981), cited by defendants, are inapposite. Those cases involved questions regarding the use of constitutionally invalid convictions in later prosecutions.
Before the enactment of the sentencing guidelines, a sentencing judge was entitled to take into consideration a vast array of circumstances in trying to determine the appropriate sentence. The judge frequently considered adjudicated and unadjudicated wrongdoing, other scrapes with the law, and many other types of pertinent information in reaching the sentencing decision. The sentencing guidelines purport to narrow somewhat that range of considerations, but they do not narrow it entirelythey still permit the judge to consider an offender's prior scrapes with the law that have resulted in a formal adjudication by a juvenile court that the offender had committed an act which, had it been committed by an adult, would have been punishable as a felony. Defendants do not suggest that, before the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, it would have been impermissible for a sentencing judge to consider their juvenile adjudications, and they offer no persuasive reason why their use is not permissible now.
Defendants also rely on Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977), for the proposition that juvenile adjudications are "criminal prosecutions" for purposes of Article I, section 11. Defendants ask this court to apply the test from Brown and to conclude that in this context their prior juvenile adjudications are "criminal prosecutions." We agree with the state's characterization of defendants' argument as a "thinly veiled attack on this court's recent holding in Reynolds." We decline defendants' invitation to retreat from our analysis and holding in Reynolds.[7]
There are any number of circumstances that may have collateral consequences in a later case without transforming the earlier circumstances into criminal prosecutions. In these cases, defendants are being punished for their present crimes only, as to which they each have received a jury trial in accordance with all constitutional requirements. We hold that using defendants' juvenile adjudications in calculating their criminal history scores under the sentencing guidelines did not violate the jury trial provision of Article I, section 11.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. The judgments of the circuit courts are affirmed.
FADELEY, Justice, dissenting.
I agree with the majority that a sentencing judge may consider prior behavior of the convicted person, including behavior as a juvenile, before determining what sentence is appropriate. However, I agree with the dissent that a prior juvenile adjudication, entered without the constitutional safeguards required for criminal cases, may not be treated as the equivalent of an adult conviction. Thus, I think it the law that prior behavior as a juvenile may be used in sentencing, but only as it represents an individual feature of an individual's past, not as if it were a prior criminal conviction.
There would be no necessary conflict between the majority and the dissent had the *1018 majority stopped with deciding "the only question" before us. A footnote in the majority opinion states:
With that "at all" point, and the bare bones of its resolution by the majority, I have no quarrel. However, the majority goes leagues further, across a stormy sea, to permit use of a juvenile adjudication as, in every respect, the equivalent of a criminal conviction. The juvenile court adjudication was not a criminal conviction. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or. 560, 857 P.2d 842 (1993).
I cannot join in any implication that the law regarding the future effect of a jury-less adjudication permits that adjudication to be used as a criminal conviction. Nor can I join in the holding that all adjudicated juveniles are to be viewed forever as ex-convicts in the eyes of the law.
This dissent expresses my separate views, and I concur in the dissent of UNIS, J.
UNIS, Justice, dissenting.
The majority holds that "using defendants' juvenile adjudications in calculating their criminal history scores under the sentencing guidelines [does] not violate the jury trial provision of Article I, section 11," of the Oregon Constitution. 321 Or. at___, 892 P.2d at 1017. As the primary justification for its holding, the majority states:
I find that analysis flawed, incomplete, and unpersuasive. I would hold that, under this court's decision in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or. 560, 857 P.2d 842 (1993), Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution[1] prevents the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications[2] from being used under the sentencing guidelines by a sentencing court to establish a longer sentence for an adult offender than the offender would have received in the absence of those adjudications. I respectfully dissent.
The Court of Appeals, in a 5-4 decision, upheld the use of juvenile adjudications under the sentencing guidelines in State v. Stewart, 123 Or.App. 147, 859 P.2d 545 (1993), adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 126 Or.App. 456, 868 P.2d 794 (1994). In State v. Billings, 124 Or.App. 682, 865 P.2d 1340 (1993), a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's sentence from the bench. This court allowed review and consolidated the cases of Stewart and Billings.
In Stewart, the majority of the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's Article I, section 11 argument, holding that "[a]n adjudication *1019 sufficient to commit a juvenile to a juvenile facility can later be used to enhance a sentence as an adult." Stewart, 123 Or. App. at 151, 859 P.2d 545. In essence, the majority of the Court of Appeals held that, because most due process guarantees are afforded a juvenile during the jurisdictional phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the use of the juvenile adjudication later to enhance an adult offender's criminal sentence does not violate due process.
A dissenting opinion, which I find consistent with this court's decision in Reynolds, states:
"* * * * *
I agree with the dissent in the Court of Appeals that this court's opinion in Reynolds means that Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution prevents the use of juvenile adjudications under the sentencing guidelines to establish a longer sentence for an adult offender than the offender would have received in the absence of those adjudications. In Reynolds, in determining whether a trial by jury was required by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution or the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution during the jurisdictional phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding,[3] this court inquired into the history and purpose of the juvenile system in Oregon. The court concluded that "[f]rom 1907 to the present, juvenile justice in Oregon has been based primarily on a `rehabilitation' model, rather than on a `due process' or `crime control' model." Reynolds, 317 Or. at 567, 857 P.2d 842 (emphasis added). In Reynolds, this court said that the juvenile courts
"* * * * *
"The clear and unequivocal message of Oregon's juvenile code is to notify and involve parents whenever possible and to focus on the family, to involve schools and appropriate social agencies as early as possible, to handle matters informally, and to approach each child's alleged delinquency *1020 as an equitable problem rather than a criminal problem. * * *
"* * * * *
"* * * In no way is the adult criminal justice system comparable to that [rehabilitation] model." Id. at 568-74, 857 P.2d 842 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
Ultimately, this court concluded:
"* * * * *
As is clear from the foregoing quotations, this court in Reynolds recognized the crucial difference between adult criminal courts and juvenile delinquency proceedings. Underlying this court's decision in Reynolds is the principle that the juvenile justice system has a greater need for experimentation and flexibility than adult criminal courts because juvenile courts are concerned with rehabilitation, not punishment. Accordingly, the decision in Reynolds implies that formal, adversarial proceedings are unnecessary and that informality in juvenile proceedings is permissible under Article I, section 11, because the focus of juvenile adjudications is on non-criminal, non-punitive (rehabilitative) purposes.
In these consolidated cases, however, defendants are not faced with the type of rehabilitative, non-punitive situation described in Reynolds. Rather, defendants are faced with incarceration in the adult criminal justice system, where effective rehabilitation and the best interests of the offender are not among the primary goals stated by the sentencing guidelines. OAR 253-02-001(1) provides that the primary objectives of the sentencing guidelines are "to punish each offender appropriately, and to insure the security of the people in person and property." (Emphasis added.)
The sentencing guidelines operate on a matrix system, which uses grid blocks to determine the presumptive sentence to be imposed. One side of the matrix is the "crime seriousness scale," based on the seriousness of the crime for which the person is being sentenced. OAR 253-04-001(1). The other side of the matrix is the "criminal history scale," which increases the penalty range based on the person's prior "criminal" record. Id. Each of the grid blocks formed by the intersection of a crime seriousness category and a criminal history category represents a presumptive sentence classification. OAR 253-04-001(2).
The grid block assigned to a defendant is used to establish a presumptive sentence under the guidelines. See ORS 137.669 ("[t]he guidelines * * * shall control the sentences for all crimes committed after the effective date of such guidelines. Except [for departure sentences for specific reasons], the incarcerative guidelines and other guidelines so designated by the board shall be mandatory and constitute presumptive sentences") (emphasis added). In all cases, the sentencing judge must use the grid block to establish the presumptive sentence for the offender. OAR 253-04-001(2). The presumptive sentence in the guidelines is the sentence that should be imposed in the usual case. OAR 253-08-001. In cases of departure, the grid block is used to establish the maximum length of departure that a sentencing court may impose. OAR 253-08-004.
The sentencing guidelines combine nonjury juvenile adjudications with adult convictions to determine a person's criminal history category. The criminal history category, which is one of the two factors used to establish *1021 a presumptive sentence, is determined by examining only prior adult convictions and juvenile adjudications. See OAR 253-04-006(2) ("[a]n offender's criminal history is based upon the number of adult felony and Class A misdemeanor convictions and juvenile adjudications in the offender's criminal history at the time the current crime or crimes of conviction are sentenced"). Thus, non-jury juvenile adjudications of "person felonies" are treated identically to "adult person felonies" to determine a person's criminal history category. OAR 253-04-007 (describing calculation of criminal history categories). In addition, non-jury juvenile adjudications of non-person felonies are given a specific value under the guidelines. Id.
In Stewart, the trial court used four juvenile adjudications to calculate defendant's criminal history category, which resulted in a longer sentence than he would have received in the absence of those adjudications. Without the juvenile adjudications, defendant's maximum presumptive sentence would have been 18 months. The use of juvenile adjudications to calculate defendant's criminal history category resulted in the imposition of a presumptive sentence of 22 months in prison and 36 months of post-prison supervision.
In Billings, the trial court used several non-person felonies and a juvenile adjudication for sodomy to calculate defendant's criminal history category, which resulted in a longer sentence than he would have received in the absence of those adjudications. The trial court imposed a 34-month sentence for each of defendant's convictions. Without the juvenile adjudication for sodomy, defendant's maximum presumptive sentence would have been 26 months under the sentencing guidelines.
Thus, in both Stewart and Billings, defendants were sentenced to periods of incarceration, parts of which were attributable to earlier non-jury juvenile adjudications. Incarceration in the penitentiary (or extended incarceration) attributable to non-jury juvenile adjudications does not comport with nonpunitive, rehabilitative consequences that this court envisioned in Reynolds. In each of these cases, the non-jury juvenile adjudication at issue had significant punitive consequences. Thus, the holding of the majority conflicts with the foundational underpinnings of this court's decision in Reynolds.
In fact, the majority does not address directly the rationale behind Reynolds. As quoted above, the majority's major argument is that, because judges historically have been able to consider offenders' "prior scrapes with the law," there is no reason why juvenile adjudications may not be considered under the sentencing guidelines. I disagree with that illogical leap. I agree that juvenile adjudications were one of the factors considered by the sentencing judge under an indeterminate sentencing regime. See State v. Scott, 237 Or. 390, 399-400, 390 P.2d 328 (1964) (setting forth considerations sentencing court may use under indeterminate sentencing scheme that preceded sentencing guidelines). That historical fact does not mean, however, that juvenile adjudications arrived at without a trial by jury may be used to enhance an adult offender's sentence under the sentencing guidelines.[4]
Unlike the historical method of indeterminate sentencing, under the sentencing guidelines, the trial court is not entitled to weigh the circumstances surrounding a particular non-jury juvenile adjudication or to disregard the adjudication altogether if the trial court believes it is appropriate. The sentencing judge must impose a presumptive sentence, calculated in part by considering juvenile adjudications, unless the judge has "substantial or compelling reasons to impose a departure." OAR 253-08-001. The sentencing guidelines contain a "nonexclusive" list of departure factors that does not include *1022 discretionary review of prior juvenile adjudications in mitigating a presumptive sentence. OAR 253-08-002(1). As a result, unlike the indeterminate sentencing regime, under the sentencing guidelines, juvenile adjudications have significant punitive consequences. The sentencing guidelines require trial courts to consider non-jury juvenile adjudications in a structured, non-discretionary format. Through the use of juvenile adjudications in adult sentencing, those adjudications are used for "crime control" and "punitive" purposes rather than for the rehabilitative purposes touted in Reynolds.
In Reynolds, this court held that juries are not constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency proceedings because such proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. Although, under Reynolds, a child may be adjudicated without a jury for the purposes of juvenile, non-punitive proceedings, the constitutionality of that adjudication dissipates when the adjudication is used indistinguishably with an adult criminal conviction to calculate an adult offender's criminal history category.[5]
The juvenile justice system cannot be used as both a sword and a shield. Under Reynolds, because juvenile adjudications are designed to ascertain and protect the best interests of the child, the state is shielded from having to provide a trial by jury. I would not allow, as the majority does today, the state to turn around and use a juvenile adjudication obtained without a trial by jury as a sword to imprison a criminal defendant in an adult facility. As this court stated in Reynolds, if the state wishes to punish a juvenile offender, it must remand the child to adult court for a criminal prosecution that includes the right to a trial by jury. Reynolds, 317 Or. at 574, 857 P.2d 842.
As the Supreme Court of the United States warned nearly thirty years ago:
The majority opinion creates the worst of both worlds for juveniles brought under the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in Oregona juvenile offender need not receive an adjudication by an impartial jury, yet that adjudication later may be used under the sentencing guidelines to establish a longer sentence in adult prison for an offender than that offender would have received in the absence of that adjudication. Moreover, the majority gives the state the best of both worldsthe state need not provide a trial by jury in a juvenile adjudication, yet it later may use that same adjudication to have an adverse effect on an adult offender's length of sentence.
Under Reynolds, Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution does not require a *1023 trial by jury in the jurisdictional phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. However, I do not believe that a non-jury juvenile adjudication later may be used to establish a longer sentence in an adult prison for an offender than that offender would have received in the absence of that adjudication. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, vacate the sentences of each defendant, and remand the cases to the circuit court for resentencing.
I respectfully dissent.
FADELEY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
[*] Durham, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1] OAR 253-04-006(2) provides in part:
"An offender's criminal history is based upon the number of adult felony and Class A misdemeanor convictions and juvenile adjudications in the offender's criminal history at the time the current crime or crimes of conviction is sentenced."
"Juvenile adjudications" are defined as "formal adjudication or finding by a court that the juvenile has committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable as a felony." OAR 253-03-001(11).
[2] Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury[.]"
[3] In Stewart, the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing on Count II. On review, the state does not challenge that decision.
[4] In his Court of Appeals brief and in his petition for review, Billings also raised claims under Article I, sections 20 (equal protection) and 21 (ex post facto laws), of the Oregon Constitution. Those claims were not preserved for review and they are not mentioned in defendants' brief on the merits. Accordingly, we do not consider them. Billings also argued in the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it used the same criminal history classification to order both of his consecutive sentences. Because that claim has not been asserted on review, we do not consider it.
[5] We note here that defendants have based their entire argument on a single theory, viz., that it is impermissible to consider at all their earlier juvenile court adjudications. Therefore, that is the only question that we consider. We do not consider or address issues that might be raised concerning, for example, any limitations that may exist on the weight that may be given to such adjudications, assuming that they may in fact be considered for some purpose.
[6] As noted, defendants were convicted after jury trials of the crimes for which they are being sentenced, and the validity of their convictions is not at issue here.
[7] During oral argument in these cases, defendants argued that, in Reynolds, this court did not consider the precise issue presented in these cases, viz., the "collateral consequences" of an adjudication for juvenile delinquency. Defendants are mistaken. In Reynolds, that issue was briefed, argued, and ultimately rejected by this court. Reynolds, 317 Or. at 565 n. 3, 857 P.2d 842.
[1] Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed."
[2] "`Juvenile Adjudication' means formal adjudication or finding by a court that the juvenile has committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable as a felony." OAR 253-03-001(11).
[3] "Juvenile court delinquency proceedings have two aspects: (a) the adjudicatory or jurisdictional phase, in which the court must decide whether the young person's conduct warrants juvenile court jurisdiction; and (b) the dispositional phase, in which the judge is faced with the task of what to do with a youth over whom jurisdiction has been established." Robert H. Mnookin and D. Kelly Weisberg, Child, Family and State: Problems and Materials on Children and the Law 1008 (2d ed 1989).
[4] In addition, the majority does not analyze whether the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications in (pre-guidelines) indeterminate sentencing was constitutional. It merely asserts that courts did consider that type of adjudication and that these defendants do not argue that it was impermissible for judges to consider such information before the sentencing guidelines. A constitutional holding should not be based on the premise that "it has always been that way" and that "the parties did not raise it." If the majority chooses to rely on historical practice, I believe that the majority should at least do an independent analysis as to whether the earlier practice on which it relies was constitutional.
[5] The dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that "[t]he fact that defendant's previous juvenile adjudications were constitutionally valid for certain purposes does not mean that they were `valid for all purposes.' Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226, 100 S. Ct. 1585 [1587], 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)." State v. Stewart, 123 Or.App. 147, 155, 859 P.2d 545 (1993) (De Muniz, J., dissenting), adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 126 Or.App. 456, 868 P.2d 794 (1994).
The majority dismisses that argument by noting that the Supreme Court's opinion in Baldasar was overruled by Nichols v. United States, 522 U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994). 321 Or. at 15-16, 892 P.2d 1016-1017. Although that is true, Baldasar was not offered as anything more than persuasive authority. Baldasar involved an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction that was valid at the time that it was imposed because no prison time was actually imposed. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that the uncounselled conviction was not valid to enhance a later sentence that did involve incarceration. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 222-23, 100 S. Ct. at 1585. That holding was overruled in Nichols.
The analogy is appropriate in this case, regardless of whether Baldasar was overruled. In my view, the majority must grapple with the merits of the argument rather than dismiss it simply because the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately rejected a similar argument. Just because a juvenile adjudication is valid under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution for its consequences in the juvenile system does not make it valid for all purposes and at all times. | b76cef7f40fafd60b192f3745fe6fc1d3b6b81e6c4ce85377f99bebb70874d11 | 1995-04-21T00:00:00Z |
d87b6330-798b-468e-aebe-f9313ede1ea3 | State v. Skotland | null | S070410 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 17
May 16, 2024
319
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JEFFERY JERALD SKOTLAND,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 19CR77935) (CA A176291) (SC S070410)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 7, 2024, at the University
of Oregon School of Law, Eugene, Oregon.
Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public
Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section.
JAMES, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
_____________
* Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Erik Buchér, Judge. 326
Or App 469, 533 P3d 55 (2023).
320
State v. Skotland
Cite as 372 Or 319 (2024)
321
JAMES, J.
In this criminal case, we consider the efficacy of
“preemptive objections”—that is, objections made to an
anticipated future action by opposing counsel—to preserve
an issue for appeal. Defendant raised a preemptive objection
prior to closing arguments, contending that the state should
not be permitted to make “burden-shifting” arguments or
mention related topics; he relatedly informed the trial court
of relevant caselaw. The trial court engaged in a lengthy col-
loquy on defendant’s objection and largely agreed with the
legal principles that he had articulated. The trial court then
instructed both counsel on guidelines for closing argument;
defendant neither objected to those guidelines nor indicated
that he thought that the trial court had erred in its under-
standing of the law. The state delivered its closing argument
without objection from defendant.
On appeal, defendant assigned error to a purport-
edly impermissible burden-shifting argument the prosecu-
tion made in closing. Defendant’s appellate arguments, on
the one hand, argued that the trial court had erred in lim-
iting the prosecutor’s closing in advance, and on the other
hand, that the prosecutor’s closing was prohibited under the
law presented to the trial court in the preemptive objection,
and possibly under the trial court’s ruling on the preemp-
tive objection. A divided Court of Appeals treated defen-
dant’s assignment as preserved, relying on defense counsel’s
preemptive objection made before closing arguments, and
reversed. State v. Skotland, 326 Or App 469, 470, 474-77,
533 P3d 55 (2023). As we will explain, focusing on the prac-
tical purposes of preservation, we conclude that defendant’s
assignment of error was not preserved. We therefore vacate
the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for that
court to consider in the first instance whether the purported
error that defendant identifies qualifies as plain error, and if
not, to address defendant’s other assignment of error.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with unlawful purchase of
a firearm, false information in connection with the trans-
fer of a firearm, and attempted felon in possession of a
322
State v. Skotland
firearm. Defendant had attempted to buy a firearm; on the
form required for purchase, he checked “no” to the question
whether he had been convicted of a felony, but he had in
fact been previously convicted of two felonies in the State of
Washington.
At trial, defendant testified that he had “assumed
or was hoping” that his prior felony convictions had been
expunged, as he had consulted an attorney and filled out
paperwork to that end. On cross-examination, defendant
declined to identify the attorney, stated that he did not have
the paperwork with him, and asserted that his papers at
home had all been destroyed in a fire.
Prior to closing arguments, defendant made a pre-
emptive objection to the state’s closing argument. As that
objection was the sole basis for defendant’s later asser-
tion that he had preserved the alleged error, we quote the
exchange at length.
Defendant first offered his objection to any “burden
shifting” argument that the state might make in closing
argument, and the trial court agreed that defendant was
correct:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So I do want to just make
a preemptive kind of objection just to make sure we’re not
getting into an issue that comes up during closing.
“Not that I’m assuming the state’s going to do any-
thing, but I see the potential that the state could be saying
that[,] if the defense is going to rely [on the fact] that my
client spoke to an attorney, we should be bringing in that
attorney. We should bring in whatever documents for the
expungement.
“*
*
* It’s the state’s burden. I don’t have to present
anything, and they can’t stand up and say I should have
brought stuff in[.]”
The trial court agreed with defense counsel:
“THE COURT: Oh, yeah. They can’t burden shift. So
I guess it would be how they make the argument, as long
as it’s not burden-shifting, for example, like when someone
doesn’t testify. ‘He could have gotten on the stand and said’
you know, it’s like, no. No. We don’t have to do anything.”
Cite as 372 Or 319 (2024)
323
The court then added a qualification, and defendant
expressly agreed that the qualification accurately stated the
law:
“[THE COURT:] But he [the prosecutor] can comment
on things your client did state, though.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
“THE COURT: [Defendant] did talk about—
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
“THE COURT: —because that’s not burden-shifting
because it’s just talking about the facts in evidence.”
(Emphases added.)
The trial court then gave defendant an opportunity
to provide an example of an argument that he would find
objectionable:
“[THE COURT:] Do you have more of a specific exam-
ple of what that you would find objectionable of what—
where [the prosecutor] might go to?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That—
“THE COURT: Because you can’t unring the bell.”
Defendant did not offer any additional examples; instead, he
simply restated his position:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So the idea that we should
have brought in the attorney to testify as to what occurred,
we should have brought it may be the expungement paper-
work as evidence.
“THE COURT: Oh, right. Right. And he can’t do that.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL] He can’t do that.”
The court then reiterated the prior distinction
between burden-shifting and commenting on the evidence.
If defendant thought at that point that the court had misun-
derstood his position, he did not say so:
“THE COURT: But [the prosecutor] could say things
like, ‘Hey, the defendant was testifying, and he didn’t say
the attorney’s name, and he didn’t have to, but he could
324
State v. Skotland
have if he wanted to, you know, because he was asked about
that.’
“I told [defendant during trial that] you could—you can
say the [attorney’s] name if you want to. I’m not requiring it
because I can’t, but you can if you want to. And he decided
not to.”
The remainder of the trial court’s comments were
directed to the prosecutor, summarizing what was and was
not permitted:
“[THE COURT]: You can’t say that [defendant] should
have brought in the attorney. He should have brought in
expungement paperwork or whatever. Yeah. You can just
talk about how—what happened on the stand—and he
talked about. You said, did you have the stuff with him
now—with you now, and he said no. Right?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Right, Judge.
“THE COURT: As opposed to—so it’s a real fine line
there. Do you understand?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Judge. And I intended to say
that we don’t have that before us.
“THE COURT: Right, we don’t. Exactly. And you can
talk about that.
“[PROSECUTOR]: But I’m not saying—I was not
going to say that they should have or that they could have.
“THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. Like,
‘This guy, he could have brought this stuff in with him.’
We’re just like, ‘No, no, no. He’s not required to,’ but, yeah.
“But you can talk about what he testified to and
exactly—you know where that fine line is, but as long as
it’s not burden-shifting, you’ll be totally fine.
“Anything else for the defense?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor referred
to defendant’s testimony about the expungement. Defense
counsel did not object to those statements by counsel,
although he did respond to it in his own closing. The jury
convicted defendant on all three counts.
Cite as 372 Or 319 (2024)
325
Defendant appealed. As relevant here, he contended
on appeal that the trial court had erred in allowing the pros-
ecutor to make comments in closing, discussing defendant’s
testimony, that defendant characterized as impermissible
“burden-shifting.”1 Specifically, defendant highlighted the
following statements:
“He claimed that he filled out a bunch of paperwork in the
[S]tate of Washington. We don’t have that paperwork here
today. He claims that the paperwork was lost in a fire, or his
dog ate it, or we don’t know. But perhaps it doesn’t exist.
“He also claims that an attorney, who he refused to
name, told him that he could mark ‘no’ on the ATF form.
And that’s what he told officers when he was confronted.
“But, today, he said that attorney who he refuses to
name told him that he needed to wait. So which is it? Was
he told to wait, or *
*
* was he told he was good to go ahead
and write ‘no’?
“We don’t know who that attorney is or if that attorney
exists because he refuses to tell us.”
The state responded (among other things) that defendant
had not preserved the error.
A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed defen-
dant’s conviction. The majority concluded that defendant’s
preemptive objection had been sufficient to preserve the
issue identified on appeal and that defendant did not need to
renew the objection when the prosecutor’s closing argument
allegedly exceeded the scope of his proposed rule of law.
Skotland, 326 Or App at 476-77. The majority then held that
the prosecutor’s closing had in fact impermissibly shifted
the burden of proof in a way that invited the jury to convict
defendant for his failure to present evidence. Id. at 481.
Judge Kamins dissented, disagreeing with the
majority’s analysis both as to preservation, and on the mer-
its. Id. at 483 (Kamins, J., dissenting).
The state petitioned this court for review, which we
allowed.
1 Defendant made an additional assignment of error that the Court of
Appeals did not reach. Skotland, 326 Or App at 470 n 1.
326
State v. Skotland
ANALYSIS
The parties did not raise preservation of error in
their briefs to this court, instead focusing on the underlying
merits of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the prose-
cutor’s closing argument had improperly shifted the bur-
den of proof to defendant.2 However, preservation is not an
issue that the parties must raise for this court to consider it;
an appellate court has an independent obligation to deter-
mine whether a claimed error was preserved. As we have
explained in a number of cases,
“neither the state’s failure to raise preservation as an issue
in the Court of Appeals, nor the state’s erroneous conces-
sion that the sanction issue had been preserved at trial,
conferred authority on that court to consider defendant’s
unpreserved claim of error.”
State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 346, 15 P3d 22 (2000); see also
Lawrence v. Oregon State Fair Council, 370 Or 764, 770-72,
525 P3d 464 (2023) (noting that, “[a]lthough defendant did
not question preservation in the Court of Appeals, it does so
here,” and proceeding to determine that the issue had been
preserved); State v. Gerhardt, 360 Or 629, 634, 385 P3d 1049
(2016) (citing Wyatt for the proposition that “appellate courts
always have [an] obligation to address preservation”).
At its heart, preservation is a doctrine rooted in
practicality, not technicality. Preservation serves a number
of policy purposes, but chief among them is fairness and effi-
ciency—affording both opposing parties and trial courts a
meaningful opportunity to engage an argument on its merits
and avoid error at the outset. As we have previously stated:
“Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and
rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error
altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn
may obviate the need for an appeal.”
Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008); see
also Thompson v. Fhuere, 372 Or 81, 102-03, 545 P3d 1233
(2024) (to same effect).
2 The Court of Appeals’ disposition meant that neither party had an incen-
tive to raise preservation in this court. The state sought to have the Court of
Appeals’ opinion reversed on the merits, while defendant would have injured his
own cause by arguing preservation.
Cite as 372 Or 319 (2024)
327
To accomplish that goal, preservation requires a
party to explain its objection clearly enough for the oppos-
ing party, and the trial court, to understand the issue and
either avoid an error, or correct an error if one has occurred.
See Wyatt, 331 Or at 343 (explanation must be “specific
enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error
with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the
error immediately, if correction is warranted”). Ideally, this
is accomplished through articulating an issue, stating a
source of law, and advancing an argument. See State v. Hitz,
307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (“We have previously
drawn attention to the distinctions between raising an issue
at trial, identifying a source for a claimed position, and mak-
ing a particular argument. *
*
* The first ordinarily is essen-
tial, the second less so, the third least.” (Emphasis in origi-
nal.)). But preservation is an inherently contextual inquiry,
and it “is not something that can be explained by a neat
verbal formula.” State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548, 258 P3d
1228 (2011). In some cases, a “short-hand reference” may be
sufficient to preserve an issue, when “such short-hand refer-
ences [are] used in a way and context that the other parties
and the court would understand from that single reference
the essential contours of the full argument.” State v. K. J.
B., 362 Or 777, 790, 416 P3d 291 (2018) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). In other instances, preserva-
tion may require a deeper explanation of the law with sup-
porting argument.
Preemptive objections can be a useful mechanism
to obtain rulings on the legality of anticipated evidence,
argument, or other trial events for which an after-the-fact
objection may prove ineffective at curing prejudice. In that
way, a preemptive objection operates akin to a motion in
limine, which we have indicated can, in some circumstances,
be wise trial practice:
“The reasons for seeking pre-trial rulings are, among
others, to obtain guidance on how to conduct voir dire and
opening statements and, more importantly, to prevent the
jury from hearing a trial scenario [that would lead to the
admission of unduly prejudicial evidence] *
*
*. If counsel
must wait to make an objection and receive a ruling in
front of the jury, the client could be prejudiced even though
328
State v. Skotland
the ruling was in the client’s favor. With famous legal rhet-
oric, Justice Cardozo addressed this problem in Shepard
v. United States, 290 US 96, 104, 54 S Ct 22, 78 L Ed 196
(1933), when he referred to the procedure of a judge telling a
jury it may accept part of a statement but must reject other
portions of it: ‘The reverberating clang of those accusatory
words would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary
minds, not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evidence
are framed.’
”
State v. Foster, 296 Or 174, 183, 674 P2d 587 (1983).
It also is possible that preemptive objections can, in
the appropriate circumstance, preserve an issue for appeal.
In State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461, 800 P2d 277 (1990),
we said that, “[w]hen the trial court excludes an entire class
of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is inadmissible
as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further offer futile.”
Reasoning from Olmstead, consider the example of a party
raising a preemptive objection about an anticipated line of
closing argument, but the trial court denies that objection
and suggests that such an argument would be permitted,
because it disagrees with the moving party about the appli-
cable legal requirements. If the disputed line of argument
then actually occurs in closing argument, it could be appro-
priate for an appellate court to disregard the lack of any con-
temporaneous objection, given the nature of the trial court’s
response to the preemptive objection. In that instance, we do
not foreclose the possibility that an appellate court, weigh-
ing the practical nature of preservation, might conclude that
a contemporaneous objection would have been unnecessary
to preserve the issue.
However, as we explain, the preemptive objection in
this case did not serve the practical interests of preserva-
tion with respect to the arguments raised on appeal. When
defendant first made his preemptive objection, the trial
court thought that it was ruling in defendant’s favor. The
court added that it understood the relevant legal principle
relating to impermissible burden-shifting but would allow
the prosecutor to make at least some form of comment on
defendant’s testimony. Defendant did not dispute that qual-
ification. In fact, he expressly agreed that the qualification
was correct.
Cite as 372 Or 319 (2024)
329
The trial court then invited defendant to give
a specific example of a potential problematic argument.
Defendant did not do so.
After that, the trial court gave the prosecutor
detailed directions about what arguments could and could
not be made. Defendant, again, did not tell the court that he
disagreed. To the extent defendant’s arguments on appeal
can be construed to argue that the trial court erred in lim-
iting the scope of closing argument, an objection would have
needed to occur at this point to render that argument pre-
served. But no such objection was made.
Finally, when the prosecutor actually addressed
defendant’s testimony during the closing argument, defen-
dant again did not object. At that time, the question was
no longer abstract; the prosecutor’s actual statements were
now available, and defendant—as shown by his appeal—
thought that they were objectionable. To the extent defen-
dant’s arguments on appeal can be construed to claim that
the prosecutor had exceeded the scope of the trial court’s
earlier ruling, defendant could have, and should have, raised
that issue and alerted the trial court. He did not.
Sometimes, the winds of preservation can be gauged
by looking to the weathervane of trial court surprise: Would
the trial court be taken aback to find itself reversed on this
issue, for this reason? Here, the answer is yes.
That result can be seen from defendant’s interme-
diate appeal to the Court of Appeals. As explained earlier,
that court reasoned that defendant’s preliminary objection
“regarding burden shifting” had preserved an aspect of his
later appellate argument that the trial court’s “ruling at the
outset” (in response to defendant’s preemptive objection) had
not been “properly tailor[ed].” Skotland, 326 Or App at 475.
Yet the record shows that the trial court thought that it had
ruled in defendant’s favor—that is, that it had “tailored”
the prosecutor’s upcoming closing argument in accord with
defendant’s request. From the trial court’s perspective, once
the prosecutor’s closing argument then proceeded without
objection from defendant, the Court of Appeals’ subsequent
reversal would have come out of the blue; objectively, the
330
State v. Skotland
trial court had been given no reason to think that its ruling
had been controversial, contested, or exceeded.
In the absence of any objection from defendant to
the trial court’s ruling on his pre-closing argument preemp-
tive objection, or any subsequent objection by defendant to
the actual statements made in the prosecutor’s closing argu-
ment that those statements either exceeded the scope of the
ruling, or exposed a flaw in that ruling, we cannot conclude
that the issue here is preserved. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals should not have reached the merits of the burden-
shifting issue that defendant raised on appeal. We therefore
vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.
That conclusion does not fully resolve this case, how-
ever. Defendant had alternatively argued on appeal that,
even if unpreserved, the “burden-shifting” issue qualified
for plain error review under ORAP 5.45(1). See, e.g., State
v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629-31, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (dis-
cussing requirements for plain error review). If the Court of
Appeals were to conclude that defendant was correct about
plain error review—a matter as to which we offer no opin-
ion—then that court might reaffirm its decision on the mer-
its. Beyond that, even if the Court of Appeals cannot reach
the “burden shifting” assignments of error as plain error, the
court would need to address defendant’s remaining assign-
ment of error. We therefore remand to permit the Court of
Appeals to address those issues in the first instance.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. | 082d73a5e460fb8c3ae9ecb890d004c8efeb715bc13d2ed6123611de9c60f797 | 2024-05-16T00:00:00Z |
aa2b755a-dca1-486e-95d2-62493240d861 | State v. Satter | null | S069880 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 14
May 9, 2024
273
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GENE RAYMOND SATTER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 09P50867; 20CR42984; 20CR45176)
(CA A175001 (Control); A175002; A175003) (SC S069880)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 16, 2023.
Nora E. Coon, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender.
Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General,
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, James, and Masih, Justices, and Nakamoto, Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
FLYNN, C.J.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
______________
* On review of Court of Appeals Order Denying Reconsideration, Erin C.
Lagesen, Chief Judge (Sept 7, 2022), of Order of Dismissal, Theresa M. Kidd,
Appellate Commissioner (July 8, 2022). Appeal from Polk County Circuit Court,
Diane M. Morse, Judge.
** Bushong, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case. Baldwin, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argument
but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
274
State v. Satter
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
275
FLYNN, C.J.
After a jury found defendant guilty of driving under
the influence of intoxicants, he fled the state. His flight
delayed by more than ten years the trial court’s ability to
impose a sentence and enter a judgment of conviction, which
defendant then asked the Court of Appeals to reverse. The
case comes to us because the Court of Appeals dismissed
defendant’s appeal based on concerns that the state would
suffer delay-based prejudice in any retrial. The court relied
on its “former fugitive doctrine,” which presumes that an
appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss a criminal
defendant’s direct appeal if the defendant formerly was a
fugitive from justice and the flight “significantly interfered
with the appellate process.” See Sills v. State of Oregon, 370
Or 240, 244, 518 P3d 582 (2022) (explaining but not adopting
doctrine). Although this court has long held that appellate
courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an appeal
when the criminal defendant is a current fugitive, we have
not endorsed the “former fugitive doctrine,” and we decline
the state’s request to do so in this context.
We share the Court of Appeals’ concerns about the
consequences of a defendant’s flight from justice in the event
of a retrial and the disregard that the flight shows for the
authority of Oregon courts. But because defendant’s flight
ended before his case moved to an appellate court, and the
delay has not interfered with the appellate court’s ability
to address the merits of the appeal, we conclude that defen-
dant’s former fugitive status lacks the kind of connection to
the appellate process that justifies an appellate court dis-
missing his direct appeal. Instead, concerns about potential
prejudice that would arise in the trial court in relation to
a retrial are most appropriately left for the trial court to
address on any remand, should the Court of Appeals deter-
mine that a reversible error had occurred.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to our review are undisputed. A
jury found defendant guilty of driving under the influence
of intoxicants in 2009, and he failed to appear for his sen-
tencing. He later sent a letter to the trial court announcing
276
State v. Satter
that he had left Oregon and did not intend to return unless
the court dismissed his conviction. However, defendant was
eventually arrested in Oregon in 2020, permitting the court
finally to impose sentence and enter the judgment for defen-
dant’s 2009 conviction.
Defendant appealed from that judgment, assign-
ing error to the trial court’s failure to caution the jury that
a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be considered
evidence of guilt. In response, the state asked the Court of
Appeals to dismiss defendant’s appeal under the former fugi-
tive doctrine. Emphasizing that defendant had demanded a
new trial more than a decade after his conviction, the state
argued that the “passage of time has undoubtedly preju-
diced the state by making it difficult if not impossible to
locate witnesses and present evidence” and that “[d]efendant
should not be allowed to benefit from his choice to flout the
authority of the court by absconding and absenting himself
from the jurisdiction for over ten-and-a-half years.”
The Appellate Commissioner agreed and dismissed
defendant’s appeal. Relying on Court of Appeals’ precedent,
the Commissioner reasoned that the court has “inherent
judicial authority” to dismiss a former fugitive’s appeal
when “the defendant’s former fugitive status significantly
interfered with the appellate process.” The Commissioner
concluded that dismissal of defendant’s appeal was war-
ranted because “(1) there ha[d] been a significant passage
of time, caused by defendant, since the incident producing
the challenged judgment of conviction; (2) that passage of
time makes it difficult for the state to locate key witnesses;
and (3) even assuming that those witnesses could be located,
their memories of the events surrounding the crime at issue
would have likely diminished.” Defendant unsuccessfully
sought reconsideration and then petitioned for review in
this court, which we allowed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court of Appeals has adopted two related doc-
trines under which it will dismiss a direct appeal to address
a criminal defendant’s flight from justice. The first is the
“fugitive dismissal doctrine,” which this court embraced
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
277
nearly a century ago, announcing that “it was ‘unqualifiedly
committed’ to the rule that, when ‘a convicted criminal has
fled from the jurisdiction of the court, it is within the power
of that court to refuse to hear his appeal.’
” Sills, 370 Or at
247 (quoting State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 210, 253 P 1044
(1927)); see also State v. Moss, 352 Or 46, 50-54, 279 P3d
200 (2012) (describing history of the fugitive dismissal doc-
trine). The second is the “former fugitive doctrine,” on which
the Court of Appeals relied to justify dismissing defendant’s
appeal. We have described that doctrine as a common-law
principle “under which an appellate court will dismiss the
direct appeal of a defendant who is no longer a fugitive if
the former fugitive status significantly interfered with the
appellate process.” Sills, 370 Or at 244 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
This court has yet to decide whether to embrace that
common-law doctrine for Oregon appellate courts. See id. at
245-46 (declining to address “[w]hether to adopt the former
fugitive doctrine”). But we limited the possible applications
of the doctrine in Sills. That case involved a statutory claim
for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who had been
a fugitive from justice during the underlying criminal trial,
resulting in delay that, the state contended, would prejudice
it in any retrial. In that context, we held that the state’s
concerns about delay-based prejudice on retrial did not jus-
tify dismissing the petitioner’s claim for relief, because the
identified prejudice lacked “the kind of connection to the
proceedings that would justify the reviewing court refusing
to carry out a process to which the former fugitive is statuto-
rily entitled.” Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reaching that conclusion, however, we noted dif-
ferences between a claim for post-conviction relief and a
direct appeal, including that the post-conviction relief stat-
utory process contemplates delay. Id. at 252-53; see also id.
at 254 (emphasizing that the post-conviction court could
order a retrial only if the petitioner established “such a sub-
stantial denial of constitutional rights that his conviction
is rendered void” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And
we expressly did not consider whether a defendant’s former
fugitive status could ever justify dismissing a direct appeal
278
State v. Satter
in order to prevent prejudice in any retrial. Id. at 245-46.
That question is now squarely presented by the parties’
arguments in this case.
According to the state, appellate courts have inher-
ent authority to dismiss an appeal under the former fugitive
doctrine to ensure “the dignity, integrity, and efficient func-
tioning of the appellate process,” a proposition for which it
relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision Ortega-
Rodriguez v. U.S., 507 US 234, 113 S Ct 1199, 122 L Ed 2d
581 (1993), and its progeny. In particular, the state cites cases
from other jurisdictions that have “relied on the former fugi-
tive doctrine to dismiss appeals where a lengthy flight has
so delayed the appeal that the state would be prejudiced in
the event [of] a retrial.” See, e.g., U.S. v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F3d
1205, 1206 (9th Cir 1994). And the state asserts that dis-
missal of defendant’s appeal was similarly justified based on
“general delay-based prejudice”—that the “passage of time
has undoubtedly prejudiced the state by making it difficult
if not impossible to locate witnesses and present evidence.”
The state in this court also raises new and more
specific reasons that, it argues, would cause prejudice in the
event of a retrial. According to the state, one of the officers
who testified in the original trial died in 2012, the other
officer no longer works in law enforcement, and the state
has been unable to locate the video from the traffic stop
or the police reports associated with defendant’s case. The
state also now argues that it is unlikely “that defendant will
appear for retrial,” which the state contends raises concerns
that the trial court would be unable to enter an enforceable
judgment if defendant’s case were sent back for a new trial.
Defendant contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing his appeal. According to defendant, although
an appellate court may have inherent authority to take cer-
tain actions necessary to perform its judicial function, that
authority does not extend to dismissing a direct appeal in
order to address the appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Alternatively, defendant argues, even if
this court agrees that appellate courts have some authority
to dismiss an appeal because of an appellant’s former fugi-
tive status, we should conclude that the Court of Appeals did
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
279
not properly exercise that authority when it dismissed defen-
dant’s appeal to address prejudice that the state claimed
would arise on remand. According to defendant, if former
fugitive status is ever a basis to deny a new trial to a defen-
dant whose original trial included reversible error, then that
decision should be made by the trial court on remand, follow-
ing a hearing at which the state would be required to prove
that the defendant’s former fugitive status will cause actual
prejudice to a retrial. See, e.g., State v. Baughman, 361 Or
386, 410-11, 393 P3d 1132 (2017), abrogated in part on other
grounds by State v. Jackson, 368 Or 705, 498 P3d 788 (2021)
(describing a similar process of reversal and remand for a
post-remand hearing at which the trial court would deter-
mine whether a new trial was “necessary or appropriate”).
Given the parties’ framing of the dispute, we
assume without deciding that the Court of Appeals has
inherent authority to dismiss a defendant’s appeal when
the defendant’s former fugitive status “significantly inter-
fered with the appellate process.”1 Sills, 370 Or at 244; see
also id. at 245-46 (declining to decide whether to adopt that
formulation of the former fugitive doctrine). And we accept
the state’s premise that prejudice resulting from a criminal
defendant’s former flight from justice sometimes will jus-
tify denying the defendant a new trial. As we will explain,
however, when the fugitive status is confined to the trial
court and the identified prejudice will arise only on remand,
the defendant’s flight lacks “
‘the kind of connection’
” to
the appellate process that would justify an appellate court
“refusing to carry out a process to which the former fugitive
is statutorily entitled.” Id. at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez,
507 US at 251).
We are persuaded that defendant’s alternative argu-
ment describes the proper exercise of an appellate court’s
authority in such cases: When confronted with concerns that
1 In defendant’s briefing to this court, he also argued that any inherent
authority that an appellate court possesses to dismiss a defendant’s appeal
under the former fugitive doctrine has been constrained by the Oregon Rules of
Appellate Procedure (ORAPs) and by the defendant’s statutory right to an appeal
in the Court of Appeals. We understand defendant to have abandoned those argu-
ments at oral argument. And our determination that the Court of Appeals did
not properly exercise its inherent authority in this case makes it unnecessary to
determine whether that authority is further limited by rule or statute.
280
State v. Satter
a defendant’s former flight from the jurisdiction of the trial
court would cause actual prejudice in any retrial, or that
the defendant might again fail to appear for any retrial, the
Court of Appeals should nevertheless proceed to the merits
of the appeal, leaving those concerns to be addressed by the
trial court on any remand, as the trial court will be in a
superior position to resolve factual disputes and tailor an
appropriate remedy—including by determining that actual
prejudice to the state justifies denying the defendant a new
trial and reinstating the original judgment. Accordingly, we
reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and remand for
consideration of the merits of defendant’s appeal.
This court recently discussed the origins and justi-
fications of the former fugitive doctrine in Sills. We observed
that the former fugitive doctrine is sometimes described as
a “corollary” to the fugitive dismissal doctrine, which to reit-
erate, allows appellate courts to refuse to hear the appeal of
a defendant who is currently a fugitive from justice. 370 Or
at 244-45. We also explained that, in extending the fugitive
dismissal doctrine to defendants whose flight and recapture
both occurred before they initiated their appeal, the Court of
Appeals had relied on dicta in the Supreme Court’s Ortega-
Rodriguez decision. Id. at 248. This court likewise relied on
Ortega-Rodriguez on review in Sills, but for a different pur-
pose: to explain our conclusion that the state’s generic claim
of delay-based prejudice lacked “
‘the kind of connection’
” to
the post-conviction relief “proceedings that would justify the
reviewing court refusing to carry out a process to which the
former fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Id. at 250 (quoting
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251). Accordingly, we describe
Ortega-Rodriguez in detail, and then turn back to Sills.
In Ortega-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that
the federal circuit court erred in applying a blanket rule of
dismissal to all appeals filed by former fugitives—those who
had fled while their case was pending in the trial court but
had been recaptured before sentencing and appeal. 507 US
234. The Court began its analysis by discussing the various
rationales that it had previously offered to justify dismissals
in cases pursued by defendants who were current fugitives
while their cases were pending in an appellate court. Those
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
281
rationales included the concern that any judgment that the
Court issued would be unenforceable against the defendant;
the theory that flight “disentitles” the defendant to “call
upon the resources of the Court” such that their flight is con-
strued as “tantamount to waiver or abandonment” of their
appeal; and the belief that dismissal “serves an important
deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dig-
nified appellate practice.” Id. at 239-42 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Court then explained that those rationales
“all assume some connection between a defendant’s fugi-
tive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an
appellate sanction a reasonable response.” Id. at 244. And
the Court explained that those “justifications are neces-
sarily attenuated when *
*
* a defendant’s fugitive status at
no time coincides with [their] appeal.” Id. For example, the
Court reasoned that a “defendant returned to custody before
[they] invoke[
] the appellate process presents no risk” that
the judgment of the reviewing court will be unenforceable,
and a flight that ends before an appeal is filed is unlikely to
cause delay or otherwise interfere with the appellate pro-
cess. Id. at 244. In addition, the Court observed that, to the
extent dismissal is justified as a sanction on the theory that
the defendant’s “flight operates as an affront to the dignity
of the court’s proceedings,” it is the trial court that “has the
authority to defend its own dignity, by sanctioning an act
of defiance that occurred solely within its domain.” Id. at
246. Finally, to the extent that dismissal is used as a sanc-
tion to deter or punish escape, the court emphasized that
those goals are better addressed by the trial court, which
can deter flight “with the threat of a wide range of penalties
available to” it. Id. at 247.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, “[a]bsent some
connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and [their]
appeal, as provided when a defendant is at large during
the ongoing appellate process, the justifications advanced
for dismissal of fugitives’ pending appeals generally will
not apply.” Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). And without “the kind of connection to the
appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of
282
State v. Satter
dismissal,” the Court concluded, “fugitivity while a case is
pending before a [trial] court *
*
* is best sanctioned by the
[trial] court itself.” Id. at 251.
The Court in dicta, however, allowed for “the possi-
bility that some actions by a defendant, though they occur
while [their] case is before the [trial] court, might have an
impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant an
appellate sanction.” Id. at 249. The Court offered as an exam-
ple the possibility that “a long escape, even if ended before
sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of appellate
proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in
locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after
a successful appeal,” which the Court suggested “might, in
some instances, make dismissal an appropriate response.”
Id. And the Court declined to “hold that a court of appeals
is entirely without authority to dismiss an appeal because of
fugitive status predating the appeal.” Id.
As we explained in Sills, that dicta from Ortega-
Rodriguez was the authority to which the Court of Appeals
pointed in adopting its “former fugitive doctrine.” 370 Or
at 248. But it was the reasoning and ultimate holding of
Ortega-Rodriguez that this court relied on in Sills to explain
our conclusion that the lower courts were not justified in
applying the former fugitive doctrine to dismiss the peti-
tioner’s claim for post-conviction relief.
The petitioner in Sills, like defendant here, fled the
state immediately after his conviction and had remained in
fugitive status for a decade before being returned to Oregon
for sentencing. Id. at 242-43. As mentioned above, when
that petitioner later pursued a collateral claim for post-
conviction relief, the post-conviction court invoked the for-
mer fugitive doctrine to dismiss that claim, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 243-44. This court accepted review
and reversed. Id. at 254.
In doing so, we agreed with the Court’s observation in
Ortega-Rodriguez that the rationales underlying the fugitive
dismissal doctrine “
‘are necessarily attenuated when applied
[by a reviewing court] to a case in which both flight and
recapture occur while the case is pending before’ the criminal
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
283
trial court.” Id. at 247-48 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US
at 244 (brackets in Sills)); see also id. at 249 (observing that
the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez had held that “former fugitive
status, alone, is insufficient to justify dismissing an appeal”).
And we emphasized that nothing about the holding of Ortega-
Rodriguez “support[s] extending the fugitive dismissal rule
to cases filed by former fugitives.” Id.
We assumed “that a petitioner’s former fugitive sta-
tus might sometimes justify a post-conviction court refusing
to carry out the statutorily prescribed post-conviction relief
process,” but we emphasized an “important caution” from
the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez: “[N]ot every delay during
trial court proceedings has ‘the kind of connection to the
appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of
dismissal.’
” 370 Or at 246, 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez,
507 US at 251). We agreed with that caution and rephrased
it to address the post-conviction relief process, explaining
that, “[w]hatever merit there may be to dismissing a former
fugitive’s challenge to a conviction out of concern that the
state would be prejudiced in any retrial,” the claimed preju-
dice “must have ‘the kind of connection’ to the proceedings
that would justify the reviewing court refusing to carry out
a process to which the former fugitive is statutorily enti-
tled.” Id. at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251).
We allowed for the possibility—as had the Court
in Ortega-Rodriguez—”that there could be circumstances
under which a flight that predated the appeal ‘might have
an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant
an appellate sanction.’
” Id. at 245-46, 249 (quoting Ortega-
Rodriguez, 507 US at 249). But we explained that the preju-
dice on which the state had relied in Sills consisted of obsta-
cles to presenting witness testimony in any retrial due to
fading memories after the passage of 13 years and aging
of the child victims. Id. at 250. And we concluded that the
identified prejudice lacked “
‘the kind of connection’ to the
post-conviction process that could justify dismissal without
reaching the merits of a petition for post-conviction relief.”
Id.
Thus, although both Sills and Ortega-Rodriguez rec-
ognized the possibility that there might be circumstances
284
State v. Satter
under which a former fugitive’s flight during trial court
proceedings has had an impact on the appellate court pro-
ceedings sufficient to justify dismissal of the defendant’s
appeal, neither court endorsed any particular circumstance
under which a concluded period of flight would have suffi-
cient impact on the appellate process to justify dismissal
of the defendant’s appeal. Both opinions emphasized that
the rationales that justify dismissal when the defendant is
a current fugitive “are necessarily attenuated” when “both
flight and recapture occur while the case is pending before”
the trial court. 370 Or at 247-48; 507 US at 244. And Sills
specifically concluded that general, “delay-based obstacles to
the presentation of evidence in a new trial” did not justify
invoking the former fugitive doctrine to dismiss the peti-
tioner’s claim for post-conviction relief. 370 Or at 252.
Nevertheless, the state emphasizes Sills’s acknowl-
edgment of that possibility to argue that dismissal of a direct
criminal appeal is warranted when the defendant’s former
fugitive status affects the “dignity, integrity, and efficient
functioning of the appellate process.” And the state contends
that those interests are adversely affected in this case in
ways that are distinguishable from Sills.
First, the state argues that the nature of a direct
appeal makes its general, delay-based claim of prejudice
more significant than they were in Sills. The state empha-
sizes that this court in Sills described delay-based prejudice
as “a risk that is inherent” in post-conviction relief proceed-
ings, id. at 252, and described other characteristics of post-
conviction relief that, the state contends, might make the
risk of retrial prejudice in those cases distinguishable from
retrial prejudice in a direct appeal. See id. at 254 (emphasiz-
ing “that, in this post-conviction case, retrial could be ordered
only if petitioner establishes that his criminal trial involved
such a substantial denial of constitutional rights that his
conviction is rendered void, and only because the legislature
has directed that post-conviction relief shall be granted by
the court to such a petitioner” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). According to the state, those differences between
direct criminal appeals and the post-conviction relief process
weigh in favor of an appellate court dismissing an appeal to
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
285
address general delay-based prejudice, especially when the
state identifies actual prejudice from lost evidence.
Second, the state contends that it has identified
concerns beyond the general, delay-based obstacles that
were the source of the claim of prejudice in Sills. It empha-
sizes that—in this court—it has offered evidence that a key
trial exhibit is missing. And it argues that defendant might
again fail to appear if the original judgment is reversed.
According to the state, “defendant is no longer in custody
or under any form of supervision” and has “previously indi-
cated” that “he had no intention of appearing in the case,”
and thus is likely to prevent entry of an enforceable judg-
ment of conviction if the case is remanded for a new trial.
We are not persuaded that those differences
between this case and Sills permit a different answer for
defendant. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing defendant’s appeal, because—despite the factual
and procedural differences between this case and Sills—the
concerns on which the state relies here similarly lack “
‘the
kind of connection’
” to appellate proceedings that justify the
appellate court “refusing to carry out a process to which the
former fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Sills, 370 Or at 250
(quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 251).
Although Sills did not decide whether that stan-
dard would govern dismissals of direct appeals, we are
persuaded by the reasoning of Ortega-Rodriguez that, even
assuming appellate courts have inherent authority to dis-
miss a former fugitive’s direct criminal appeal, an appellate
court errs in relying on that authority to dismiss the appeal
when the defendant’s former fugitive status does not signifi-
cantly interfere with the appellate process. And we conclude
that neither the generic, delay-based prejudice on which the
Court of Appeals based its dismissal, nor the state’s new
assertion of actual prejudice and concerns that defendant
might again flee, has the kind of impact on the appellate
process that is required to justify dismissal.2 We reach that
conclusion for three reasons.
2 Like the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez, “[w]e do not ignore the possibility that
some actions by a defendant, though they occur while [their] case is before the
[trial] court, might have an impact on the appellate process sufficient to warrant
286
State v. Satter
First, even the specific prejudice that the state iden-
tifies in this court would arise—if at all—only if the Court
of Appeals reverses defendant’s conviction and only after
the case is remanded to the trial court. In other words, the
state’s assertion that it no longer has access to testimony
and exhibits that it relied on in the original trial does not
describe prejudice to the appellate proceedings, because
defendant’s claim of instructional error will be decided on a
trial court record that undisputedly is complete. As Ortega-
Rodriguez emphasized in explaining why it was vacating
the dismissal, there was no “indication in the record below”
that the “petitioner’s former fugitivity was deemed to pres-
ent an obstacle to orderly appellate review.” 507 US at 251.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that defendant’s former
fugitive status affected the “dignity” or “integrity” of the
appellate court or that the delay caused by his abscond was
“sufficiently disruptive of the appellate process that dis-
missal would be a reasonable response.” Id.
Second, all of the state’s concerns about enforce-
ability of the judgment are limited to enforceability in the
trial court; defendant was returned to custody before invok-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and served his
sentence while this appeal proceeded. Thus, if the Court of
Appeals affirms, the punishment for defendant’s conviction
has already been enforced. More significantly, however, if
the Court of Appeals reverses and remands, any new fail-
ure to appear would be a flight from the jurisdiction of the
trial court. Although we emphasize that any flight from jus-
tice—whether a flight that concluded prior to the appeal or
a potential flight if the case is remanded—evinces a lack
of respect for judicial authority, that disrespect is aimed
most directly at the trial court when the defendant fails to
appear in that court. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 246
an appellate sanction.” 507 US at 249; see also id. (opining that “a defendant’s
misconduct at the [trial] court level might somehow make meaningful appeal
impossible, or otherwise disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanc-
tion is reasonably imposed” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But
we emphasize, as we did in Sills, that dismissal of a party’s case under the former
fugitive doctrine requires “
‘the kind of connection’ to the proceedings that would
justify the reviewing court refusing to carry out a process to which the former
fugitive is statutorily entitled.” Sills, 370 Or at 250 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez,
507 US at 251).
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
287
(emphasizing that the “contemptuous disrespect manifested
by [the defendant’s] flight was directed at the [trial court],
before which his case was pending during the entirety of his
fugitive period”).3
And third, the trial court is a superior forum to
resolve and address both the state’s claim of prejudice in
a retrial and any new failure to appear on remand. In this
case, for example, the state asserts that it has been unable to
locate the video or the police reports and that one of the tes-
tifying officers has since died. It also argues that the other
officer is no longer working as a police officer and likely has
a diminished memory. Although defendant acknowledges
that the state may be able to prove its factual claim of actual
prejudice, he emphasizes that the determination whether
evidence has disappeared or witness memories faded is “the
stuff of an evidentiary hearing, which trial courts routinely
undertake.” We agree. And conversely, appellate courts are
ill equipped to undertake the factual inquiry necessary to
determine the extent to which a period of flight will obstruct
the state’s ability to present evidence in a retrial.
Determining how to address actual prejudice to
the state in a retrial is a task that is “the daily stuff of our
trial courts.” See Baughman, 361 Or at 410 (explaining that
“fairly assessing how to ensure a fair trial for all parties” is
“the daily stuff of our trial courts”). And only the trial court
can address that prejudice with an appropriately calibrated
response. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 247 (“While an
appellate court has access only to the blunderbuss of dis-
missal, the [trial] court can tailor a more finely calibrated
response.”); see also Sills, 370 Or at 253 (explaining that the
trial court can use the rules of evidence to “partly amelio-
rate the kind of prejudice that parties can sometimes suffer
in a retrial years after the original trial”). Addressing prej-
udice with an appropriately calibrated response is critical
because, as we observed in Sills, “if we assume that there
is merit” to defendant’s appeal, then dismissing that appeal
“because of his former fugitive status ‘is tantamount to an
3 We emphasize that defendant’s rejection of the authority of the trial court
in this case demonstrates the kind of disregard for the rule of law that ultimately
harms the entire justice system. We in no way condone that conduct in concluding
that the Court of Appeals is not the appropriate body to address it.
288
State v. Satter
additional punishment *
*
* for the same offense of flight’
”
that may be punishable as a separate crime. 370 Or at 254
(quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 US at 248); see also ORS
162.195 (defining crime of second-degree failure to appear);
ORS 162.155 (defining crime of second-degree escape).
The trial court also is uniquely equipped to address
any new failure of defendant to appear on remand, just as
it was equipped to address the original failure to appear,
through its authority to hold a defendant in contempt
or otherwise impose punitive sanctions. See ORS 33.105
(describing the contempt sanctions authorized by statute,
including fines, confinement for up to six months, and proba-
tion or community service); see also Ortega-Rodriguez, 507
US at 247 (“While a case is pending before the [trial] court,
flight can be deterred with the threat of a wide range of pen-
alties available to the [trial] court judge.”).
Thus, we conclude that neither concerns about the
prejudice that the state claims will arise in a retrial nor
a generalized interest in addressing defendant’s flouting of
judicial authority justified the Court of Appeals dismissing
defendant’s appeal to address a period of flight that began
and ended while the case was pending in the trial court.
Instead, we emphasize, as we have emphasized in other con-
texts, the value of leaving to the trial court on any remand
those questions that a trial court is in the “best position
to assess.” See Baughman, 361 Or at 410-11 (concluding,
in the context of evidentiary error, that the trial court on
remand should determine “whether a new trial is required
or appropriate”). In this context as well, it is the trial court
on remand that should determine whether a defendant’s for-
mer fugitive status caused prejudice that justifies denying
the defendant a new trial.
Our opinion in Baughman, and an earlier opin-
ion in State v. Cartwright, 336 Or 408, 85 P3d 305 (2004),
illustrate how an appellate court can instruct a trial court
that additional remand proceedings are necessary to deter-
mine whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial. In
Baughman, we concluded that the trial court had erred in
analyzing whether evidence of the defendant’s uncharged
acts could be admitted, but we specified that the trial court
Cite as 372 Or 273 (2024)
289
on remand should conduct additional proceedings before
deciding whether a new trial was “appropriate.” 361 Or at
406, 410. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of convic-
tion and “remanded to the circuit court for further proceed-
ings,” consistent with the opinion. Id. at 411. Baughman
modeled that remand approach on Cartwright, in which
this court vacated the defendant’s judgment of conviction,
because we concluded that the trial court had committed
reversible error by failing to require the state to produce
evidence, but we remanded with instructions that the trial
court address the state’s contention that a new trial was
unnecessary. 336 Or at 420-21. The opinion specifies that
the trial court on remand would afford an opportunity for
a hearing on whether there was any chance the evidence
had affected the verdict and then either order a new trial or
make findings to support reinstating the original judgment
of conviction. Id. at 421.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ order dis-
missing defendant’s appeal, because we conclude that the
delay caused by defendant’s former fugitive status lacked
the required connection to the appellate process that would
justify dismissing the appeal. Although we accept the state’s
premise that a defendant’s former fugitive status may cause
such significant prejudice to the state that denying the
defendant a new trial could be justified, we conclude that the
trial court on any remand would be the appropriate court to
make that determination. We emphasize, however, that, if
the Court of Appeals determines that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error, nothing in this opinion precludes
the Court of Appeals from remanding with instructions for
the trial court to determine whether actual prejudice to the
state in a retrial justifies denying the defendant a new trial
and reinstating the judgment of conviction.
The order of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. | 4e9d1f8c3b062a6a2c8fb8b3261eadb17482981696862dd5702c0ce900e584ea | 2024-05-09T00:00:00Z |
9399742d-df0b-4588-b49f-d9aab95f183c | Dale v. Kulongoski | 321 Or. 108, 894 P.2d 462 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 894 P.2d 462 (1995)
321 Or. 108
Alice DALE and Robert Crumpton, Petitioners,
v.
Theodore R. KULONGOSKI, Respondent.
SC S41780.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted December 13, 1994.
Decided May 18, 1995.
James S. Coon, of Royce, Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland argued the cause for petitioners on review. With him on the petition was Paul B. Gamson, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland.
Richard D. Wasserman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the answering memorandum were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
FADELEY, Justice.
In this ballot title review case, petitioners challenge a ballot title proposed for use with an initiative measure. The text of the measure is printed as an appendix hereto. The standards to be applied by this court to the present challenge are spelled out by statutes that in summary provide:
The ballot title proposed[1] by the Attorney General for use with the measure in the present case provides:
There is no controversy or challenge in this case about the proposed Caption. We therefore certify that Caption.
Petitioners contend that the proposed Question does not plainly state the chief purpose of the measure as required by ORS 250.035(1)(b). They argue:
"* * * * *
"* * * This chief purpose and major effect should be stated * * *, not concealed behind language which misstates existing law."
It is clear that the measure prohibits fair share agreements,[2] which are agreements mandating that members of a bargaining unit who are not union members pay a pro rata share of the costs for union representation services concerning employment terms and conditions for everyone within that employment unit.[3] Petitioners argue that the statement in the measure at subparagraph (a) of section (10) that "[i]t is not the primary purpose of this provision that public employees receive union representation at no cost" does not overcome the fact that the measure, if adopted, would entitle public employees who do not join a union to become "free *464 riders"[4] by securing bargaining and representation services without cost.
The Attorney General in response relies on the ballot title certified in Crumpton, which he essentially resurrected for use in this measure. However, there are substantial and significant differences between this measure and that addressed in Crumpton.
Petitioners here contend that the proposed Question and Summary imply that existing law "requires" union membership and payment of union dues by all public employees against their will. Petitioners' argument in the present case was not addressed or decided in Crumpton.
In Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or. 654, 663 n. 12, 791 P.2d 489 (1990), this court said that, in determining whether a ballot title question states the "chief purpose" of a measure,
"`[c]hief purpose' suggests the most significant aim or end which a measure is designed to bring about. The `chief purpose' requirement[ ] suggests that it should be determined in a manner analogous to legislative determination. The proposed measure should be reviewed for its unambiguous language and the context in which it was drafted and for statements made by its sponsors. Context would include the legal context, as well as the more particular circumstances under which a measure is drafted. Glerum v. Roberts, 308 Or 22, 28, 774 P2d 1093 (1989)."
Thus, this court reviews the words in a proposed question to determine, among other things, whether they distort the legal context of the measure and thereby misstate the most significant aim or end of the measure.
Two cases illustrate this principle. In Christenson v. Paulus, 297 Or. 78, 80, 682 P.2d 266 (1984), this court reviewed a ballot title for an initiative relating to land use and held that the proposed question was statutorily insufficient. That question asked, in part, "[s]hall * * * local comprehensive plans and zoning remain?" The court observed that, if the measure were adopted, what would "remain" was the existing legal requirement to plan and zone, not the plans and zoning already in place.
In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or. 169, 174, 777 P.2d 406 (1989), this court reviewed a ballot title question that asked whether the constitution should "protect" a right of gathering initiative petition signatures in shopping centers. This court found that question to be misleading, because it erroneously implied that the law already recognized the described "right" and that the measure simply asked voters to confirm the existing state of the law. In fact, the existing state of the law was in dispute, and the measure was designed to create, not "protect," a constitutional right to petition in shopping malls. This court modified the question by replacing the word "protect" with "permit" in order to state correctly the measure's chief purpose. Id. at 175, 777 P.2d 406. The court also modified the language of the caption and summary to eliminate the same misleading inference.
The manner in which the phrase, "ban requiring," is used in the proposed Question presents difficulties that support petitioners' contention that the proposed ballot title misstates the existing law. The phrase "ban requiring" can be read to imply that compulsory union membership presently is required by law and that the measure bans that requirement. Use of the word "ban," without more, would be sufficient to signify that what the proposed measure would do is prevent compulsory membership. Adding the verb "requiring" creates the mischief. "Ban requiring" is not accurate unless there is a law "requiring." With respect to compulsory union membership, there is none. See Whitty v. Roberts, 309 Or. 448, 452, 788 P.2d 452 (1990) (rejecting argument that word "ban" must be used in ballot title where not all environmentally unsound packaging was "banned" by the measure, and thus use of "banned" would be inaccurate).
A ballot title should not misstate existing law, even by implication, and thereby create a spurious argument to support the measure's passage. Fred Meyer, Inc., 308 Or. at *465 174-75, 777 P.2d 406; Christenson, 297 Or at 80, 682 P.2d 266. Joining the word "requiring" with the word "ban"while acceptable with respect to one of the subjects mentioned in the Question, viz., paying a fair share of labor representation costsmay, when related to the subject of union memberships, mislead the voter into believing that the law now requires union membership for all public employees. That is not accurate.[5] Accordingly, we modify the proposed Question as follows:
In our view, the Summary of the contested ballot measure fails to comply with ORS 250.035(1)(c), because it fails to state the measure's major effects. It does not disclose that employees who are not members of the union, but who are members of the bargaining unit, will receive representation without cost. The parties agree that that effect is an important change from the present law. The phrase "ban requiring," which is used once again in the Summary, also should be limited in its scope for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, we modify the Summary by including this revised sentence:
The measure also prohibits payroll deduction of a member's dues, as noted above in the Question. We modify the Summary to state that effect.
The measure at subparagraph (f) of section (10) also declares that: "All expenditures not directly related to * * * bargaining or labor representation shall be considered political expenditures." The measure also would give each union member a right to prevent collection of funds for such expenditures. The measure also states that members of a union have the power to direct that an expenditure be made, in the name of each member, to a recipient chosen by that member. The Summary should state those major effects of the measure.
As this court has stated:
Accord, Deras v. Roberts, 309 Or. 410, 419, 788 P.2d 987 (1990). We can comply with that rule by using the words of the measure itself to describe those major effects of the measure.
Applying that rule, and incorporating the other modifications noted above, we certify the following modified ballot title:
SUMMARY: Amends state constitution. Bans requiring nonunion public employees to share union representation costs; unions must represent such employees without charge. Prohibits compelling union membership and dues payment. Bans union security clauses. Bans payroll deduction of dues. Memberships expire each year, may be canceled at any time, or renewed annually. Union each year must tell members of all proposed uses of dues other than for bargaining or labor representation. Members may opt not to pay or *466 may direct a different expenditure of such portion of dues.
Ballot title certified as modified. This decision takes effect as provided in ORAP 11.30(9).
WHEREAS public employees are as diverse in their political opinions as the rest of society, and should not be required to financially support political candidates, parties or agendas inconsistent with their personal views; to protect and preserve the rights of public employees to free political expression;
Be in Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
Paragraph 1. Notwithstanding any existing State or Federal laws, the Oregon Constitution is amended by creating new sections to be added and made a part of Article XV; the new sections, Sections 10, 11, and 12 shall read:
Section 10. (a) No public employee or applicant for a position with the state, local government, or any other taxing district or political subdivision of the state, shall be required or unduly pressured to join or otherwise be connected to, or pay dues, or contribute fair share, or pay fees or assessments to a public employee union, association, or similar organization for any reason. It is not the primary purpose of this provision that public employees receive union representation at no cost, but that public employees have the free choice to have limited association with labor unions or associations, or not be associated with such organizations at all.
(b) Public employees shall not be subject to any form of union security clause, or clauses that have the same or similar effect as union security clauses or fair share agreements.
(c) No public employee or applicant for a public sector job shall be discriminated against in any way because of affiliation or non-affiliation with a union.
(d) Membership in public employee unions, associations, or similar organizations shall automatically expire annually, but may be renewed by the employee each year. Public employees may sever such memberships at will.
(e) So as to maintain and preserve the voluntary nature of union or association membership, dues and any other moneys collected from public employees by their unions, associations, or similar organizations may only be collected directly from employees, not garnished or otherwise deducted from their paychecks, and not collected by means of an automatic account withdrawal agreement or similar mechanism.
(f) All public employee unions, associations, or similar organizations shall at the end of each calendar year provide each public employee from which dues, fees or assessments were collected during that year, a detailed, comprehensive, easily read report clearly stating each and all expenditures of dues, fees, or assessments, including in-kind contributions, for political purposes during that year. All expenditures not directly related to collective bargaining or labor representation shall be considered political expenditures.
(g) Public employees who join public employee unions, associations, or similar organizations may (1) elect to not pay the portion of dues, fees, assessments, or similar payments, which would be used for political purposes, or (2) specify the political party, candidate or committee to which the political portion of that employee's dues, fees, assessments or other moneys shall be made, which designation shall be binding upon the union, association, or similar organization, which immediately shall carry out such instruction(s), making the contribution(s) in the name of the employee.
Section 11. If any part or parts of Section 10 of this Article is held to be invalid when applied to public employees who are members of public employee unions, associations, or similar organizations at the time of implementation of this Act, the requirements and restrictions set forth in Section 10 shall continue in full force in regard to employees hired after implementation of this Act. *467 Section 12. SEVERABILITY. If any part of Sections 10 or 11 of this Article is held to be invalid, the remaining parts shall remain in full force and effect.
GRABER, Justice, dissenting.
I would certify the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General and, accordingly, dissent.
The majority's ballot title may be "better" than the Attorney General's. The problem is that the Attorney General's ballot title complies substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035. In other words, the statutorily required premise for modification of this ballot title is absent. This court is required to certify a title that complies substantially with ORS 250.035.[1] ORS 250.085(5).
The measure provides in part that the Oregon Constitution be amended to include this wording:
There presently is no provision in the Oregon Constitution on that topic.
The Attorney General's Caption is:
The Attorney General's Question asks, in part:
The Attorney General's Summary states, in part:
In my view, it takes the most strained of readings to say that the Attorney General's ballot title does not tell voters what the measure says and does.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
CARSON, C.J., joins in this dissent.
[1] This opinion labels as "proposed" the title certified to the Secretary of State by the Attorney General to avoid confusion with the "certified title" that this court produces at the end of a ballot title challenge proceeding.
[2] The measure uses the term "fair share." ORS 243.650(10) defines the term:
"`Fair-share agreement' means an agreement between the public employer and the recognized or certified bargaining representative of public employees whereby employees who are not members of the employee organization are required to make an in-lieu-of-dues payment to an employee organization except as provided in ORS 243.666."
[3] See Elvin v. OPEU, 313 Or. 165, 167, 832 P.2d 36 (1992) (under Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, ORS 243.650 to 243.782, a union that is an exclusive representative of a bargaining unit "must represent all public employees fairly," including nonunion members).
[4] The Supreme Court of the United States used that descriptive terminology in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 222, 262, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 1813, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1977).
[5] As noted, use of the phrase"ban requiring"is accurate as to fair-share or union representation costs because such costs presently must to be paid by nonmembers who receive the benefit of those expenditures. But no law requires anyone to join the union or pay union dues, per se, and that difference in statutory context requires a difference in phraseology.
[1] No challenge is made in this case under ORS 250.039. | f4583b4204d041280d8bcacef34a735ea85a508a9204b0c39ea0dc3a5e517586 | 1995-05-18T00:00:00Z |
d146fb3c-9929-403b-932c-3b1c0bd2fb4f | Tualatin v. City-County Ins. Serv. Trust | 321 Or. 164, 894 P.2d 1158 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 894 P.2d 1158 (1995)
321 Or. 164
CITY OF TUALATIN, Petitioner on Review,
v.
CITY-COUNTY INSURANCE SERVICES TRUST, Ted Lopuszynski, Trustee, Kent Taylor, Trustee, Daniel J. Ahern, Trustee, Laura Pryor, Trustee, Nels Hanson, Trustee, Larry Lehman, Trustee, Respondents on Review.
DC 91D301739; CA A79184; SC S41660.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted March 9, 1995.
Decided May 25, 1995.
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr. of Foley and Duncan, P.C., Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition were M. Elizabeth Duncan of Foley and Duncan, P.C., and Mark E. Pilliod, City Atty., City of Tualatin.
James E. Mountain, Jr. of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C., Salem, argued the cause and filed the response for respondent on review.
FADELEY, Justice.
The question in this case is whether an insurer is obligated to defend a local government officer named in a complaint filed with the Oregon Government Ethics Commission,[1] alleging that the officer violated an ethics statute. Disposition of that issue depends on the proper interpretation of the first sentence *1159 of ORS 30.287(1), which we quote later in this opinion.
City-County Insurance Services Trust and its trustees (Defendants, hereafter defendant or defendant insurer) provided comprehensive liability insurance to plaintiff City of Tualatin. The parties dispute whether their insurance contract covers defense of the ethics complaint. The insurance contract promised:
The statute sections cited comprise the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA).
The trial court determined that a complaint alleging an ethics violation was not a "tort claim or demand" under ORS 30.260(8) and granted defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed on that basis. City of Tualatin v. City-County Ins. Services Trust, 129 Or. App. 198, 878 P.2d 1139 (1994). Because we conclude that defense of a complaint for an ethics violation does not fall within the parameters of the OTCA, we also affirm.
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. In April 1990, the Oregon Government Ethics Commission (commission) received a complaint against Mayor Stolze of Tualatin. The complaint alleged that the mayor had violated ORS 244.040 when he voted on a particular land use matter that was under consideration by the Tualatin City Council. The complaint alleged that, when the mayor voted, he had a financial interest,[2] because he was a general business competitor of complainant. The mayor tendered the defense of that complaint to the City of Tualatin (plaintiff). Subsequently, plaintiff tendered the defense to its insurer, City-County Insurance Services Trust, which declined to defend the mayor. Defendant insurer justified its refusal to provide coverage to plaintiff for the mayor's defense of the ethics complaint by arguing that the ethics complaint was not a "tort claim or demand" arising under the OTCA, ORS 30.260 to 30.300, and that no other coverage applied. The mayor obtained a defense elsewhere. The ethics complaint was dismissed without hearing. The mayor submitted the bill for his lawyer's fees to plaintiff city, and it requested reimbursement of those defense costs from defendant insurer. Defendant again refused.
Plaintiff filed an action for the cost of defense against defendant insurer. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that an ethics complaint did not come within the OTCA, because it did not constitute a claim of "tort" as defined in ORS 30.260(8). That court held that, to qualify as a tort claim, the claim must assert a "civil right of action for damages or a protective remedy for specific persons claiming injury due to a violation of [law]," and that state ethics statutes do not provide such a right of action. 129 Or.App. at 202, 878 P.2d 1139.
On review, plaintiff first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that ORS 30.287(1) only covers the defense of tort actions. Plaintiff relies on the words of ORS 30.287(1), which provide:
"If any civil action, suit or proceeding is brought against any officer, employee or agent of a local public body other than the state which on its face falls within the provisions of ORS 30.285(1), or which the officer, employee or agent asserts to be based in fact upon an alleged act or omission in the performance of duty, the officer, employee or agent may file a written request for counsel with the governing body of the public body. The governing body shall thereupon engage counsel to appear and defend the officer, employee or agent unless after investigation it is determined that the claim or demand does not arise out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty, or *1160 that the act or omission complained of amounted to malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty, in which case the governing body shall reject defense of the claim." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues that the legislature employed the word "or," emphasized in the above-quoted first sentence of ORS 30.287(1), for the specific purpose of signaling a separate class of claims for which public bodies must provide a defense. Plaintiff contends that ORS 30.287(1) applies either to a "tort claim or demand * * * arising out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty" as provided in ORS 30.285(1) or, although no tort claim or demand has been made, to any other kind of complaint against a public officer,[3] whenever the officer asserts that such complaint is "based * * * on an alleged act or omission in the performance of duty."
In response, defendant argues that, in context, both the words "claim or demand," which appear in ORS 30.287(1) by reason of an internal reference therein to ORS 30.285(1), and the words "civil action, suit or proceeding," which are found in ORS 30.287(1), and in ORS 30.285(3) alike, refer only to tort claims. Therefore, defendant argues, the reference in ORS 30.287(1) to "an act or omission in the performance of duty," found within the same sentence that refers to "tort claim or demand," also refers only to acts or omissions that give rise to tort claims.
"In interpreting a statute, the court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020." PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). In attempting to discern the intent of the legislature, the first level of analysis is to examine the text and context of the statute. The context of a statute includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes. If the legislature's intent is clear from the text and context, further inquiry is inappropriate. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.
Thus, we first turn to the text and context of the provision to be construed, ORS 30.287(1). We initially focus on the text of the dispositive first sentence of ORS 30.287(1). The subject of the sentence appears in the last clause. That clause provides that the public "officer * * * may file a written request for [defense] counsel" with the local public body. The remaining clauses of that sentence describe the conditions that must be present before the officer "may" file the request for defense.
The first of those clauses"[i]f any civil action, suit or proceeding is brought against any officer"requires an action or proceeding and that it be brought against an officer of the government. The next clause specifies that the action or proceeding must either show on its face that it falls within the provisions of ORS 30.285(1) by being, in the words of that referenced subsection, "any tort claim or demand * * * arising out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty" or must be an action or proceeding which the public "officer * * * asserts to be based in fact upon an alleged act or omission in the performance of [governmental] duty." The first alternative condition under which a claim for defense may be filed is that the claim shows on its face that it allegedly arose from performance of duty; the second alternative is that the officer asserts that the claim arose from performance of duty. The two alternatives are each introduced by the word "which." In this instance, that word is used as a parallel construction device. The parallel clauses have a common referent. They refer to the "civil action, suit or proceeding" with which the sentence begins.
Under context, we begin with the statute directly announcing the disputed duty to defend. ORS 30.285(1) provides:
"The governing body of any public body shall defend, save harmless and indemnify any of its officers, employees and agents, whether elective or appointive, against any tort claim or demand, whether groundless or otherwise, arising out of an alleged act *1161 or omission occurring in the performance of duty." (Emphasis added.)
Before its amendment by Oregon Laws of 1975, chapter 609, section 16, ORS 30.285(1) provided that any public body "may" defend and indemnify an officer. After those amendments, that subsection mandated that any public body "shall" defend and indemnify against any tort claim or demand arising out of performance of duty as an officer. Section 16 of the 1975 act further amended ORS 30.285 by adding a completely new subsection (3) which spells out the procedure and the conditions under which a state officer may claim entitlement to the new mandatory right to a defense and indemnity. That subsection provides in part:
The 1975 act made several other relevant changes to the OTCA. Section 20 of that act created a new statute section which is now codified as ORS 30.287, the section we are called on to interpret in this case.[4] That new section provided the procedure and conditions under which a local government officer or employee may claim entitlement to the new, mandatory right to a defense and indemnity created by section 16.
Significantly, subsection (1) of the new section 20, now ORS 30.287(1), used wording identical to that used in the also new subsection (3) of ORS 30.285 to describe the conditions and procedure under which a state officer or employee may claim the new, mandatory right to defense and indemnity. Both subsection (1) of ORS 30.287, relating to local government employees and subsection (3) of ORS 30.285 contain the same internal reference to subsection (1) of ORS 30.285. That subsection, referred to in common, defines the right to defense and indemnity as being "against any tort claim or demand * * * arising out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty." This is significant context indicating that ORS 30.287(1) is about a "tort claim or demand."
The major difference between ORS 30.287(1) and 30.285(3) is that ORS 30.287(1) extends to local public bodies, including municipalities, while ORS 30.285 applies to the state. Nonetheless, ORS 30.287(1) is almost identical to ORS 30.285(3) which, like ORS 30.287(1), provides a procedure for implementing the public officer's right to a defense under ORS 30.285(1). Also relevant context is ORS 30.287(3), which provides in part:
"If the governing body rejects defense of a claim under subsection (1) of this section, no public funds shall be paid in settlement of the claim or in payment of any judgment against such officer, employee or agent. Such action by the governing body shall not prejudice the right of the officer, employee or agent to assert and establish in an appropriate proceedings that the claim or demand in fact arose out of an alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty * * *." (Emphasis added.)
The wording of ORS 30.287(3) tracks the "claim or demand" and "performance of duty" wording of ORS 30.285(1), wherein that wording is related only to a tort claim. The two sections were enacted by the same 1975 act. The context of ORS 30.287(1) makes it clear that that statute refers to torts, not to other claims.
We agree with defendant's construction of the dispositive sentence; it refers only to tort claims. In so doing, we do not overlook the disjunctive "or." Nor do we overlook its grammatical functions. Instead, that word is given full meaning and function by our holding that the word "or" in that sentence functions to separate the two dissimilar methods of describing claims against a public officer *1162 that presumptively fall within the scope of ORS 30.287(1): The first method looks at the allegations of the claim to determine whether the claim shows on its face that it is a tort claim or demand that arises out of performance of duty as a public officer; the second method looks to an assertion by the officer that such a claim or demand arose from performance of duty.
Plaintiff next argues that, even if ORS 30.287(1) refers only to tort claims, a complaint alleging an ethics violation comes within the OTCA's definition of a tort. For purposes of the OTCA, a tort is defined by ORS 30.260(8):
The Court of Appeals held that an ethics complaint, filed under ORS chapter 244 and claiming that a government ethics law has been violated, cannot provide damages to, or a protective remedy for, specific persons who claim to have been injured by the ethics violation and, therefore, that a claimed ethics violation is not itself a tort claim. 129 Or. App. at 202, 878 P.2d 1139. That court further held that an ethics complaint that turns out to be frivolous or ill-founded serves no public good and provides no "protective remedy" for the public, let alone a remedy that benefits an individual, as would be required to come within the definition of "tort" in ORS 30.260(8). Ibid.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. ORS chapter 244 is designed "to deter violation of the legislative policy of safeguarding the public trust inherent in holding a public office." Groener v. Oregon Gov't Ethics Comm., 59 Or.App. 459, 469, 651 P.2d 736 (1982). Thus, the ethics law was created to benefit the public, not to create a civil claim for or against an individual. ORS 244.040, which the complaint alleged that Mayor Stolze violated, does not create a civil right of action for damages or any other protective remedy for an individual.[5] Therefore, violation of that statute does not fit within the definition of a tort in ORS 30.260(8) that is applicable to ORS 30.287. It follows that defendant had no duty to provide a defense for plaintiff's officer in relation to the ethics violation complaint.
In summary, ORS 30.287(1) does not impose on municipalities a duty to defend its officers, employees, or agents against an ethics complaint. An ethics violation does not constitute a "tort" under the definition provided in the OTCA. Under the provisions of the insurance contract between the parties, plaintiff had no right arising from ORS 30.287(1) to recover from defendant insurer the cost of defending an ethics complaint filed against plaintiff's officer.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the district court are affirmed.
[1] The Commission is now named the Oregon Government Standards and Practices Commission. ORS 244.020(4).
[2] ORS 244.040 in part provides:
"No public official shall use * * * official position or office to obtain financial gain [for the public official] * * * other than official salary, honoraria * * * reimbursement of expenses or * * * for any business with which the public official * * * is associated."
[3] This case involves a public officer although ORS 30.287 covers a public "employee or agent" as well. We refer herein only to "officer."
[4] Section 20 was, by the provisions of section 18, "added to and made a part of ORS 30.260 to 30.300," the OTCA.
[5] Plaintiff contends that the ethics laws provide a protective remedy analogous to "specific relief." Plaintiff's Petition for Review 12. The complaint indicates that the complainant and the mayor are both in the business of land development, that complainant perceives them as competitors in that business and that, when the mayor voted on a land use request of the complainant, the mayor was in a position to further his own business by holding back that of the complainant.
The remedies available to the commission do not provide any relief to an individual complainant. Civil penalties and forfeitures assessed by the commission under ORS 244.350 and 244.360 accrue to the state general fund. ORS 244.370(3). Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded only to the officer complained against and then only if the officer "prevails following a contested case hearing under [chapter 244] or a lawsuit under ORS 244.260[ (8) ]." ORS 244.400(1). | 4fe17d7dad40e6350bbad24b3eaa003bdf3733dd785703653a0123eb61d2d96e | 1995-05-25T00:00:00Z |
c62dbcac-6484-4ce9-8aaf-034b3f6132f3 | Harris v. Board of Parole | 288 Or. 495, 605 P.2d 1181 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 605 P.2d 1181 (1980)
288 Or. 495
Arnold HARRIS, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE, State of Oregon, Respondent.
No 315335; CA 11130; SC 26265.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.[*]
Argued and Submitted December 3, 1979.
Decided January 29, 1980.
Gene B. Mechanic, Prisoners' Legal Services of Oregon, Salem, appeared for the petitioner.
James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., Walter L. Barrie, Sol. Gen., and William F. Nessly, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, appeared contra.
TONGUE, Justice.
Petitioner, an inmate in the Oregon State Penitentiary, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for review of an order by the Board of Parole setting the initial date of his release on parole for March 1983, following 96 months of imprisonment. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction. The court allowed that motion upon the ground that ORS 144.335(1), as previously construed by it in Sterling v. Board of Parole, 16 Or. App. 481, 519 P.2d 1047, rev. den. (1974), granted that court jurisdiction "only to review orders terminating or revoking parole and orders reinstating parole on the same conditions or granting parole after revocation on modified or different conditions." 39 Or. App. 913, 915, 593 P.2d 1292, 1293 (1979). That court also noted that in 1977 the Oregon Legislature made substantial changes in statutory provisions relating to sentencing and parole (1977 Or. Laws c. 372), but did not amend ORS 144.335(1) or make additional provisions for appeal of Parole Board orders despite its presumed knowledge of the decision by that court in Sterling.
Petitioner then filed with this court a petition for review of that decision by the Court of Appeals. In support of that petition it is contended that the decision by the Court of Appeals in Sterling was wrong and that even if it was correct ORS 144.335 was amended by implication by the legislature in 1977, a contention also rejected by the Court of Appeals.
We allowed the petition for review because the question whether such orders by the Board of Parole are subject to judicial review is one of importance to the functioning of the statutory program for sentencing and parole of persons convicted of crimes and is also a question of importance to many inmates of the Oregon State Penitentiary.
*1182 ORS 144.335(1) provides as follows:
In Sterling the Court of Appeals recognized (16 Or. App. at 486, 519 P.2d at 1049) that this statutory provision "standing alone, would seem to support judicial review of the granting process contained in ORS 144.210-144.270 * * *."
The court also noted that 1973 Oregon Laws, Chapter 694 extensively amended the parole and probation process and included detailed provisions relating to two kinds or classifications of parole board proceedings one dealing with the granting of parole (Sections 4 through 7) and the other dealing with revocation or modification of parole previously granted (Sections 8 through 17); that ORS 144.335(1) was Section 24 of that Act and that Section 21 of that Act provided that:
The Court of Appeals then held (at 487-88, 519 P.2d at 1050) that because ORS 144.310 to 144.400 related to the termination of parole, rather than the granting of parole, which was provided for in ORS 144.210 to 144.270, it followed that by reason of what the court referred to as "the clear language of Section 21," that the legislature must have intended to provide for judicial review of only those parole board orders relating to the termination of parole and that it did not intend to provide for judicial review of board orders relating to the granting of parole. To support that conclusion the court then quoted as follows (at 488, 519 P.2d at 1050) from Curly's Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture, 244 Or. 15, 21, 415 P.2d 740 (1966):
The Court of Appeals also supported that conclusion by references (at 489, 519 P.2d 1047) to testimony at the 1973 legislative hearings on SB 379 (later 1973 Or. Laws, c. 694) from which it concluded that 1973 Oregon Laws, Chapter 694 "had its genesis" in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), which imposed standards of due process relating to the revocation of parole for violations by the parolee and noted (16 Or. App. at 491, 519 P.2d at 1051) that "Morrissey did not deal with the procedural rights of inmates relating to the initial granting of parole."
Upon examination of 1973 Oregon Laws, Chapter 694 and its legislative history, we conclude that we must disagree with the analysis of that statute by the Court of Appeals.
Chapter 694 of the 1973 Oregon Laws was the result of a combination of two separate bills SB 379 and SB 385 both offered by the same sponsors.[2] SB 379 provided procedures for parole revocation, including a provision (Section 15) for judicial review of any order by the Board of *1183 Parole "affecting his parole * * *." That bill may well have had its "genesis" in Morrissey. SB 385, however, prescribed procedures for granting parole and provided (by Section 8) for "judicial review of any Board order affecting his release on parole * * *." That bill, which related solely to the granting of paroles, could not have had its "genesis" in Morrissey, which was concerned solely with requirements of due process relating to the revocation of parole for violations by the parolee. By "Senate Amendments to SB 379," sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 were added which, for the first time, provided procedures relating to the granting of parole, as did SB 385.
Thus, as the result of these amendments which combined the two bills, SB 379 then had two purposes or "objects": one purpose was to provide procedures relating to the revocation of parole and the other purpose to provide procedures relating to the granting of parole. SB 379 thus must be construed "with reference to" both of these "objects" or purposes. Curly's Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra.
Section 22, (later Section 21 of 1973 Or. Laws, c. 694) and Section 25 (later Section 24 of 1973 Or. Laws, c. 694, and now ORS 144.335(1) and (2)) were also added. Section 22 provided:
Section 25, however, (now ORS 144.335(1) and (2)) provided as follows:
Despite the fact that by Section 22 (later 21), this provision for judicial review was "added to and made a part" of the statutory provisions relating to the revocation of parole, we are unable, for the reasons previously stated, to escape the conclusion that Section 25 demonstrates, by clear and unambiguous terms, a legislative intent to provide for the judicial review of "a final order of the board related to the granting * * * of parole," as well as "a final order of the board related to the * * * revoking or discharge of parole."
In addition, it is of interest to note the specific reference in Section 25 to "the inmate." Had the legislature intended to provide for judicial review only of final orders "related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole," such a reference to "the inmate" would hardly appear to be appropriate because, although a person whose parole is revoked may then be in custody, a person on parole is no longer an "inmate" of the penitentiary, nor is a person being discharged from parole. This specific reference to "the inmate," although by no means controlling, makes it further clear, in our opinion, that the legislature intended to provide for judicial review of final orders related to the granting of parole to "inmates."
This conclusion, in our judgment, is confirmed by the fact that as a result of these Senate amendments the subject matters of the original SB 385 (providing procedures for the granting of parole) and SB 379 (providing procedures for the revocation of parole), both of which provided for judicial review, were combined in one bill.
We have searched the legislative history of 1973 Oregon Laws, Chapter 694 for any indication, other than the provisions of Section 21, to support a conclusion that the legislature intended to limit judicial review to parole revocation proceedings or that it *1184 intended by the adoption of Section 25 (later Section 24) to mean other than that "a person * * * adversely affected * * by a final order of the board related to the granting * * * parole * * * is entitled to judicial review of the final order," as expressly provided by its terms. We find nothing to support such a conclusion.[3]
We have also examined the legislative history of 1977 Oregon Laws, Chapter 372, by which the Oregon Legislature enacted further extensive changes in the statutes relating to the procedure for the granting of parole. We find nothing to indicate that the legislature considered the holding by the Court of Appeals in Sterling and declined to adopt legislation to overrule the effects of that decision.[4]
We need not consider or decide whether the legislature intended in 1977 not to overrule Sterling or whether by the adoption of 1977 Oregon Laws, Chapter 372, ORS 144.335 was amended by implication so as to provide for judicial review of final orders relating to the granting of parole, as contended by petitioner, because we have already held that ORS 144.335, as enacted in 1973, provided for judicial review of such orders.
It should be noted, however, that by the terms of 1977 Oregon Laws, Chapter 372, which sets forth the legislative plan to eliminate disproportionate sentences, trial courts must consider presentence reports and must state on the record the reasons for sentences imposed (ORS 144.790(1) and 137.120(2)). The sentences imposed by trial courts are for indeterminate periods of time, with the trial court stating only a maximum term to be served and, in its discretion, a minimum sentence up to one-half of that maximum sentence (ORS 137.120(2) and 144.110(1)). Appeals may be taken from sentences claimed to be excessive, and such sentences must be reviewed by the Court of Appeals (ORS 138.040 and 138.050). Moreover, and regardless of the sentences imposed by the courts, the legislature has provided by ORS 144.780 and 144.785 that it is the Board of Parole that determines the actual duration of imprisonment and in doing so it must seek to achieve "[p]unishment which is commensurate with the seriousness of the prisoner's criminal conduct," after considering "aggravating or mitigating circumstances."
It would indeed be incongruous to suppose that the Oregon Legislature intended to provide for judicial review of sentences claimed to be excessive, but intended not to provide for judicial review of final orders by the Board of Parole, which determines the actual duration of imprisonment, particularly in view of the express provisions enacted by the legislature as set forth in ORS 144.335. For reasons previously stated, we hold that ORS 144.335 was intended to provide for judicial review of final orders by the Board of Parole relating to the granting of parole and that the Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary.
As previously noted, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to it for judicial review upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not consider the merits of the petition, including the question whether the order of the Board of Parole was a "final order" for purposes of *1185 ORS 144.335(1) and, if so, whether it was improper, as contended by petitioner.
It may well be that not all orders by the Board of Parole relating to the granting of parole are final orders, so as to be subject to judicial review. This case was disposed of by the Court of Appeals, however, by the granting of respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based solely upon its previous decision in Sterling v. Board of Parole, supra. The only question briefed in the Court of Appeals was the question whether Sterling was correctly decided. The question whether the order of the Board of Parole in this case was such a final order and, if so, the question whether it was an improper order were not briefed either in that court or in this court.
On this state of the record, and for these reasons, this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
[*] Holman, J., did not participate in this decision.
[1] The same conclusion was reached by Schwab, C.J., specially concurring, as follows (16 Or. App. at 493, 519 P.2d at 1052-1053):
"The legislature, albeit by ambiguous language, provided for judicial review by this court of orders in the revocation and modification classification, but did not provide for review by this court of orders entered pursuant to hearings that determine whether and under what conditions parole should be granted."
As also stated by Schwab, C.J.:
"We have, and I think properly, resolved this case on a point which the parties did not raise by determining that our statutes do not provide for appellate review by this court of parole board orders denying as distinguished from revoking parole."
[2] As stated by Senator Elizabeth Browne, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Co-sponsor of SB 379 and SB 385, before the Senate Committee on Judiciary on May 16, 1973, "I understand somebody is going to propose an amendment that would put Senate Bill 379, 385 and House Bill 2110 together." Amended SB 379 also included provisions of HB 2110, but those provisions are not relevant to our inquiry.
[3] The House and Senate Judiciary Committees relied heavily upon a proposed compromise amendment prepared by Mr. Terry Johnson, a member of the Board of Parole, and Mr. Victor C. Pagel of Marion-Polk County Legal Aid. The compromise amendment was submitted by Mr. Johnson in his letter of May 15, 1973, to Senator Browne, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Mr. Johnson's letter does not limit review to parole revocations, stating, among other things, that "The Board supports the concept of judicial review based on the record to the Court of Appeals * *." A statement by Mr. Pagel also demonstrates his understanding that the amendments provided for review of orders granting, as well as revoking, parole. (Hearings before the Senate committee on Judiciary on SB 379, SB 385 and HB 2110, May 16, 1973.)
[4] We also find that at least some persons appearing before legislative committees, including Mr. Ira Blalock, then Chairman of the Board of Parole, had the understanding that "[a]ll parole decisions are appealable." (House Committee on Judiciary Transcript, April 26, 1977.) | 6b311c473e0f5aed18c9ab7818ca49ec6a5d55539c297a0fe0bef4d36f4ed5c4 | 1980-01-29T00:00:00Z |
5551e477-a96b-42b3-9e24-2ffdf065800f | Novick v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48603)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted August 7, 2001.
Steven Novick, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petition for himself as petitioner.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With him on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General,
and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
CARSON, C.J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
CARSON, C.J.
This ballot title review proceeding under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
has denominated as Initiative Petition 47 (2002). Petitioner
challenges the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements, and the summary of the Attorney General's certified
ballot title. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the
"yes" vote result statement does not comply substantially with
the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b). We refer the ballot title
to the Attorney General for modification. See ORS 250.085(8)
(authorizing such disposition); Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318,
323-25, 30 P3d 408 (2001) (explaining why referral to Attorney
General ordinarily is appropriate).
The proposed initiative measure would amend the Oregon
Constitution by adding the following text to Article IX:
"Section 3c. Whereas revenue derived from taxes on
motor vehicle fuel will decline as vehicles become more
efficient and alternative sources of energy are
discovered and employed, therefore, for tax years
beginning on or after July 1, 2004, 10 percent (10%) of
the state's income tax revenue shall be dedicated to
the building and maintaining of public roads. These
funds shall be divided equally between the Oregon
Department of Transportation, which shall receive 50
percent of the aforementioned income tax revenue, and
the cities and counties of Oregon, which shall receive
the remainder. For purposes of this section 3a, income
tax revenue means revenue derived from personal and
corporate income taxes and corporate excise taxes.
"(a) The Oregon Department of Transportation and each
city and county receiving these funds shall maintain a
segregated account dedicated solely to the
construction, reconstruction, improvement, repair,
maintenance, operation and use of public highways,
roads, streets and roadside rest areas, and shall place
into this fund the aforementioned state income tax
revenue, all highway funds received directly or
indirectly from the federal government and all other
revenue derived from taxes and fees on motor vehicle
fuel and use.
"(b) The state shall distribute equitably to cities and
counties, using a formula established by law, not less
than 40 percent of all revenue derived from state taxes
and fees on motor vehicle fuel and use, including
vehicle registration fees.
"(c) To insure that funds dedicated by this Article are
indeed used for the purposes to which they are
dedicated, the Secretary of State shall audit all such
accounts to confirm that the dedicated funds are not
commingled with other funds or used for other purposes;
and shall pursue any court action necessary to enforce
this section and to insure that a public official who
uses or authorizes the use of these dedicated funds for
a purpose not authorized by this Constitution is held
accountable."
For that proposed initiative measure, the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOCATES TEN
PERCENT OF INCOME TAX REVENUES FOR
HIGHWAYS; DISTRIBUTES SOME REVENUE
TO CITIES, COUNTIES
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allocates ten
percent of state income tax revenue to supplement
existing funding for highway construction and
maintenance; distributes some revenue to cities,
counties.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
manner of funding public highway construction and
maintenance through dedicated fuel taxes, registration
and licensing fees, and federal and local money.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently federal
and state money, dedicated funds (fuel taxes,
registration, licensing fees) finance highway
construction and maintenance. Measure supplements
existing highway funding by allocating ten percent of
state income and excise tax revenue (divided equally
between state, local entities) along with federal
highway money and all taxes, fees on vehicle fuel and
use to segregated fund for highway construction and
maintenance. Requires 40 percent or more of state
taxes and fees on motor vehicle fuel and use (including
vehicle registration fees) to be 'equitably'
distributed to cities and counties; they currently
receive 39.95 percent. Does not define 'equitably.'
Reduces revenue available for other state expenditures;
provides no replacement funding. Eliminates current
authority to use highway funds for administration, bond
retirement, parks. Other provisions."
Petitioner challenges all aspects of the ballot title
-- the caption, result statements, and summary. We have
considered each of petitioner's arguments and conclude that only
his challenge to the "yes" vote result statement is well taken.
We confine our discussion to that argument.
The "yes" vote result statement must contain a "simple
and understandable statement of not more than 25 words that
describes the result if the * * * measure is approved." ORS
250.035(2)(b). To the extent practicable, the "yes" and "no"
vote result statements must be written so that they are parallel.
ORS 250.035(3).
Petitioner claims that the "yes" vote result statement
does not comply substantially with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(b) because it fails to state that, in dedicating 10
percent of the income tax to highway funding, the proposed
measure correspondingly would result in a reduction in the State
General Fund (General Fund). Income tax revenues currently are
deposited into the General Fund, which funds education, public
safety, health care, and other state services. Because the
proposed measure would dedicate 10 percent of the income tax
revenues to highway funding, petitioner submits that, if
approved, it would result both in an increase in the amount of
funds available for highways and in a decrease in the amount of
funds available for services paid from the General Fund.
The Attorney General concedes that petitioner "is
largely accurate" respecting the impact that the proposed measure
would have on the General Fund. The Attorney General defends the
"yes" vote result statement on the ground that the primary result
of the proposed measure would be to establish additional
dedicated highway funding. Because the "yes" vote result
statement states as much, the Attorney General argues that it
substantially complies with the statute. According to the
Attorney General, any reduction in the General Fund that would
result if the proposed measure is approved would be an incidental
fiscal consequence that properly should be, and in fact is,
addressed in the summary. (1)
We disagree with the Attorney General's
characterization that the impact that the proposed measure would
have on the General Fund is "incidental." Because the proposed
measure does not provide alternative funding sources, a direct
result of the proposed measure, if approved, would be a decrease
in the source of General Fund revenues.
As noted, under ORS 250.035(2)(b), the "yes" vote
result statement must describe the result of a proposed measure
if approved. Because the Attorney General's "yes" vote result
statement does not describe the reduction in the General Fund
that would result from the proposed measure the ballot title does
not comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and must be
modified. In addition, although we reject petitioner's challenge
to the "no" vote result statement, the Attorney General may
modify the "no" vote result statement if he desires. See ORS
250.035(2)(b) (setting out requirements for "no" vote result
statement); ORS 250.035(3) (to extent practicable result
statements shall be parallel).
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
1. Specifically, the Attorney General notes that the
summary states that the proposed measure "[r]educes revenue
available for other state expenditures; provides no replacement
funding." | 3a5fba97b272c7c8e84b0e1175003770ae22f2f013f74d3266703c59256cce36 | 2001-11-30T00:00:00Z |
83cf5c36-a769-4e44-8690-39c292e0df64 | Novick v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 17, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48603)
En Banc
On modified ballot title filed December 7, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioner.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With him on
the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*333 Or 12, ___ P3d ___ (November 30, 2001) (referring
ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 47 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Novick v. Myers, 333 Or
12, ___ P3d ___ (November 30, 2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001,
chapter 802, section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the
court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification. The Attorney General has filed a modified ballot
title for the proposed initiative measure, and no party to the
ballot title review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9)
(setting out period within which party may object to modified
ballot title and requiring court to certify modified ballot title
if no objection filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 47 (2002)
states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOCATES TEN
PERCENT OF INCOME TAX REVENUES FOR
HIGHWAYS; DISTRIBUTES SOME REVENUE
TO CITIES, COUNTIES
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allocates ten
percent of income tax revenue to supplement highway
funding; distributes some revenue to cities, counties;
reduces revenue for other state expenditures.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
manner of funding public highway construction and
maintenance through dedicated fuel taxes, registration
and licensing fees, and federal and local money.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently federal
and state money, dedicated funds (fuel taxes,
registration, licensing fees) finance highway
construction and maintenance. Measure supplements
existing highway funding by allocating ten percent of
state income and excise tax revenue (divided equally
between state, local entities) along with federal
highway money and all taxes, fees on vehicle fuel and
use to segregated fund for highway construction and
maintenance. Requires 40 percent or more of state
taxes and fees on motor vehicle fuel and use (including
vehicle registration fees) to be 'equitably'
distributed to cities and counties; they currently
receive 39.95 percent. Does not define 'equitably.'
Reduces revenue available for other state expenditures;
provides no replacement funding. Eliminates current
authority to use highway funds for administration, bond
retirement, parks. Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 4f7e4d28b88d800e1f33e54994747d57579048add731aaea53c1c492ce60702f | 2001-12-17T00:00:00Z |
6173e742-d66c-4301-9ab2-92f6baf84608 | State v. Meiser | null | S070059 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 438
June 13, 2024
No. 21
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ERIK JOHN MEISER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR1201547) (CA A166534) (SC S070059)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2023.
Daniel J. Casey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.
Joanna R. Hershey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
Bushong, James and Masih, Justices, and Nakamoto, Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
DUNCAN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
Bushong, J., concurred and filed an opinion, in which
Nakamoto, S.J., joined.
James, J., concurred and filed an opinion, in which
Masih, J., joined.
______________
* Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Katherine E. Weber,
Judge. 323 Or App 674, 524 P3d 130 (2023).
** DeHoog, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
439
440
State v. Meiser
DUNCAN, J.
This criminal case requires us to construe ORS
161.295, which defines the “guilty except for insanity” (GEI)
defense. Subsection (1) of ORS 161.295 provides that
“[a] person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of
mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in crimi-
nal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the
conduct to the requirements of law.”
By its terms, ORS 161.295(1) requires a connection between
the person’s lack of capacity and the person’s mental dis-
ease or defect: The lack of capacity must be “a result of” the
mental disease or defect. The issue in this case concerns the
meaning of “as a result of.”
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that
“as a result of” must be given its plain, natural, and ordi-
nary meaning, and, therefore, to prove the GEI defense,
a defendant must show that their lack of capacity was a
“consequence” or “effect” of their mental disease or defect.
The defendant’s mental disease or defect may combine with
another condition to cause the lack of capacity, and the
mental disease or defect need not be sufficient on its own
to cause the lack of capacity. Because the Court of Appeals
held otherwise, we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
This is the second time that this case is before this
court. The historical facts of the case are recounted in the
earlier decisions of both the Court of Appeals and this court.
State v. Meiser, 308 Or App 570, 572-76, 481 P3d 375 (2021),
rev’d, 369 Or 347, 506 P3d 402 (2022) (Meiser I); State v.
Meiser, 369 Or 347, 350-52, 506 P3d 402 (2022) (Meiser II);
State v. Meiser, 323 Or App 674, 676-77, 524 P3d 130 (2023)
(Meiser III). For the purposes of this decision, a summary of
the trial and appellate proceedings is sufficient.
A. Trial Court Proceedings
Based on an incident in 2012, defendant was
charged with multiple crimes, including several counts of
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
441
aggravated murder and burglary. The aggravated murder
charges were based on the killing of one person, FH.
The trial court repeatedly found defendant unfit to
stand trial by reason of incapacity. See ORS 161.360 (provid-
ing that a defendant may be found incapacitated if unable
to understand the nature of the proceedings, to assist and
cooperate with defense counsel, or to participate in the
defense). Defendant spent nearly four years confined at the
Oregon State Hospital before the trial court found him fit to
stand trial.
Defendant waived his right to a jury, and the case
proceeded to a bench trial. Defendant did not dispute that
he had committed the charged acts, but he raised a GEI
defense. As mentioned, the GEI defense is defined by ORS
161.295, which provides, in full:
“(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result
of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in crimi-
nal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the
conduct to the requirements of law.
“(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality
constituting solely a personality disorder.”
ORS 161.295 (2011), amended by Or Laws 2017, ch 634, § 3.1
1 Because the crimes charged in this case were committed in 2012, the 2011
version of ORS 161.295 applies. All references to the statute in this opinion are to
the 2011 version.
In ORS 161.295(2), the reference to “chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971,” is to the
Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, of which the GEI defense is a part. Or Laws 1971,
ch 743, § 36.
In 2017, the legislature amended ORS 161.295 to replace the term “men-
tal disease or defect” with the term “qualifying mental disorder,” a term that
the legislature thought had fewer negative connotations. Or Laws 2017, ch 634,
§ 3. In the preamble to the bill that made the change, the legislature explained
that it did not intend to “mak[e] a substantive change” in the law and wanted
to preserve “the validity of all previous court decisions interpreting” the prior
wording. Id., preamble. Although we are mindful of the negative connotations of
the phrase “mental disease or defect,” we use it in this opinion because it is the
applicable statutory phrase.
442
State v. Meiser
The GEI defense is an affirmative defense. ORS
161.305. A defendant bears the burden of proving the ele-
ments of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
ORS 161.055(2). As ORS 161.295(1) provides, to prove the
GEI defense, a defendant must prove three elements:
(1) they suffered from a mental disease or defect
(2) that resulted in
(3) a lack of substantial capacity either (a) to appreci-
ate the criminality of their conduct or (b) to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law.
In addition, as ORS 161.295(2) provides, a mental disease
or defect does not include two types of abnormalities, spe-
cifically, (1) those manifested only by repeated criminal or
antisocial conduct and (2) those constituting solely a person-
ality disorder.
At trial, defendant called four mental health pro-
fessionals to testify in support of his GEI defense. As we
recounted in our prior decision, defendant
“offered the testimony of a psychologist and three psychia-
trists, all of whom opined that defendant was suffering from
schizophrenia but recognized that he had a co-occurring
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. One of the psy-
chiatrists explained that, as a symptom of defendant’s schizo-
phrenia, defendant experienced ‘command auditory hallu-
cinations’—voices that defendant believed to be telepathic
communications from unseen entities—although defendant
did not experience ‘the kind of overwhelming command audi-
tory hallucinations some other psychotic individuals have.’
“Two of the experts addressed the other elements of the
GEI defense. Both testified that, at the time of the crimes,
defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of the law. And both testified that,
if not for the psychosis, defendant would not have commit-
ted the crimes. One of the experts specifically rejected
the suggestion that defendant’s ‘conduct [was] a result of
antisocial personality disorder rather than schizophrenia.’
The other opined that both of defendant’s conditions were
‘active’ at the time of the murder but that defendant’s psy-
chosis associated with his schizophrenia ‘was more the pre-
dominant driver of his behaviors.’
”
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
443
Meiser II, 369 Or at 351-52 (brackets in Meiser II). The
state did not offer any contrary expert testimony; instead,
it raised arguments about the applicable legal tests for the
defense and the sufficiency of defendant’s evidence.
Sitting as the factfinder, the trial court found that
defendant had proved the GEI defense for some counts, but
not for the aggravated murder counts or for one of the bur-
glary counts. On the aggravated murder counts, the trial
court found defendant guilty of murder as a lesser-included
offense and merged the guilty verdicts into a single convic-
tion. On the burglary count, the trial court found defendant
guilty of second-degree burglary as charged.
The trial court did not address either the parties’
disputes regarding what defendant was required to show
to prove the elements of the GEI defense or their disputes
regarding whether defendant’s evidence was sufficient to
prove those elements. Instead, the trial court stated its ver-
dicts without elaboration, as a jury does in the absence of a
special verdict form.
B. Meiser I
Defendant appealed, raising several assignments of
error, including one asserting that the trial court had erred
by rejecting his GEI defense to the murder charge.2 Because
the trial court had not expressed the basis for its rejection of
the defense, defendant addressed all three elements of the
defense. The first element—that defendant suffered from a
qualifying mental disease or defect at the time of the mur-
der, specifically, schizophrenia—was not disputed. The sec-
ond and third elements—whether, as a result of his schizo-
phrenia, defendant lacked the requisite capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law—were disputed. As
to each of those elements, the parties disagreed about what
a defendant must show to prove the element and whether
defendant’s evidence compelled a finding that he had made
that showing.
2 Defendant did not challenge the trial court’s rejection of his GEI defense on
the burglary charge.
444
State v. Meiser
Regarding the second element—that a defendant’s
lack of capacity must be “a result of” a mental disease or
defect—defendant asserted that, as a legal matter, a defen-
dant’s lack of capacity is “a result of” a mental disease or
defect if the mental disease or defect is a cause of the lack
of capacity, even if it combines with other causes. Therefore,
if his schizophrenia was a cause of his lack of capacity, he
could establish the second element, even if his personality
disorder was also a cause of his lack of capacity. The state,
on the other hand, argued that a defendant’s lack of capacity
must be solely attributable to the defendant’s mental disease
or defect. So, the state urged, if defendant’s schizophrenia
combined with his personality disorder to cause his lack of
capacity, defendant could not prove the second element. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the state, ruling that, to prove
the second element of the GEI defense, a defendant must
show that their lack of capacity resulted solely from a men-
tal disease or defect. Meiser I, 308 Or App at 582. Therefore,
the court concluded, the GEI defense is not available to a
defendant if the defendant’s lack of capacity resulted from a
combination of a mental disease or defect and a personality
disorder. Id.
The Court of Appeals then applied its understand-
ing of the GEI defense to the evidence in the case. Id. at 582-
86. Because the GEI defense is an affirmative defense and
the trial court had determined that defendant had failed
to carry his burden in proving it, the question for the court
was whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the state, compelled a conclusion that defendant had
proved that his asserted lack of capacity at the time of the
murder was solely attributable to his schizophrenia. Id. at
572, 582 (describing standard of review). The court summa-
rized defendant’s evidence and noted that he had presented
expert testimony that his lack of capacity was caused by his
schizophrenia. Id. at 585. But, based on the experts’ tes-
timony and defendant’s statements about the crimes, the
court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find that
any lack of capacity that defendant experienced was caused
by a combination of his schizophrenia and his personality
disorder. Id. That is, “the evidence permitted the factfinder
to conclude, at the least, that defendant’s schizophrenia and
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
445
antisocial personality disorder were both active impair-
ments.” Id. “Therefore, defendant did not establish, as a
matter of law, the causation element of the GEI defense.” Id.
at 585-86.3
C. Meiser II
On defendant’s petition, we allowed review of
Meiser I to address the parties’ disagreement about the ele-
ments of the GEI defense, specifically, their disagreement
“about whether ORS 161.295 requires proof that defendant
experienced the requisite incapacity solely ‘as a result of’
his schizophrenia, and not in any part as a result of his
co-occurring antisocial personality disorder.” Meiser II, 369
3 The Court of Appeals noted, but did not resolve, the parties’ disputes about
the third element of the GEI defense, specifically, their disputes about (1) what
a defendant must show to prove that they lacked the requisite capacity to appre-
ciate the criminality of their conduct, and (2) whether the evidence compelled
either a conclusion that defendant lacked the requisite capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or a conclusion that he lacked the requisite capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Id. at 586-87 (noting the par-
ties’ dispute about whether a defendant’s ability to “appreciate the criminality”
of their conduct depends on a “subjective moral standard” and explaining that
it did not need to resolve that dispute because “the trial court’s rejection of the
GEI defense is already justified by the facts that permit the trial court to have
found that defendant’s asserted incapacity, in whatever form, is not the result of a
mental disease or defect”); id. at 587-88 (noting that it did not need to determine
whether the evidence compelled a finding that defendant had been unable to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law because “[t]he evidence permitted
the trial court, sitting as factfinder, to reject the GEI defense” on the ground that
defendant had failed to prove that any incapacity he experienced at the time of
the murder was solely attributable to his schizophrenia).
In addition, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s other assignments of
error, including one asserting that the trial court had erred by declining to set
out its conclusions of law regarding his GEI defense. Id. at 588-92. Defendant
based that assignment of error on State v. Colby, 295 Or App 246, 433 P3d 447
(2018). In Colby, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred when,
during a bench trial in which the parties disputed the required elements of a
crime, it declined the defendant’s request that it identify its understanding of the
elements. Id. at 251-53. Based on Colby, the Meiser I court noted that,
“in a bench trial, ‘there is no fixed procedural means of preserving a chal-
lenge to the trial court’s determinations as to the elements of a crime, nor
is the trial court required to express its ruling in a particular way.’ Yet, a
request may be appropriate, even if made unconventionally, as when pointing
out in a bench trial a dispute that is reflected in conflicting jury instructions
before the court.”
308 Or App at 590 (quoting Colby, 295 Or App at 251 (internal citations omitted)).
But the Meiser I court did not reach defendant’s argument regarding the trial
court’s failure to set out its conclusions of law because defendant “did not ade-
quately preserve [his] request for a ruling on a disputed point of law.” Id.
446
State v. Meiser
Or at 349 (emphasis in original). Applying our methodology
for statutory interpretation, we examined the text and leg-
islative history of ORS 161.295. Meiser II, 369 Or at 355-61.
We began by looking at ORS 161.295(2), which
establishes exclusions to the term “mental disease or defect.”
Meiser II, 369 Or at 356. Again, that subsection provides:
“As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms
‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antiso-
cial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constitut-
ing solely a personality disorder.”
ORS 161.295(2). We explained that the exclusion of “
‘an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise antisocial conduct’
” has been a part of ORS 161.295
since the statute’s enactment as a section of the Oregon
Criminal Code of 1971. Meiser II, 369 Or at 360 (quoting
Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 36 (emphasis in Meiser II)). We fur-
ther explained that the exclusion was intended to prevent
the GEI defense from being used by “a category of offend-
ers whom the drafters did not view as possessing ‘a men-
tal disease or defect.’
” Meiser II, 369 Or at 360. “[T]he cate-
gory of concern was ‘psychopaths’ (or ‘sociopaths’),” and the
legislature addressed that concern “by specifying that ‘the
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct.’
” Id. (quoting Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 36
(emphasis in Meiser II)). The purpose of the exclusion was
“to prevent ‘recidivists’ from ‘qualify[ing] for the defense
merely by being labeled psychopaths.’
” Meiser II, 369 Or
at 360 (quoting Commentary to Criminal Law Revision
Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft
and Report § 36, 35 (July 1970) (brackets in Meiser II)).
Based on the text of the exclusion and its legislative history,
we concluded that, although the legislature intended to pre-
clude defendants from using the GEI defense based solely
on having been labeled a psychopath or a sociopath, it did
not intend to preclude defendants who suffered from both a
mental disease or defect and another condition from using
the defense. Id. We explained that,
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
447
“[b]y structuring the statute to exclude those who were
‘merely’ labeled as ‘psychopaths,’ (or those demonstrating
‘an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct,’) the legislature left open the
possibility that the defense could be available to offenders
who suffered from ‘a mental disease or defect’ in addition
to whatever label attached to their repeated criminal or
antisocial conduct. And we understand the legislature to
have intentionally struck that balance.”
Id. (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
We also examined the other exclusion in ORS
161.295(2), that is, the exclusion of “any abnormality con-
stituting solely a personality disorder.” Meiser II, 369 Or at
358. We explained that the legislature added that exclusion
in 1983, and the legislative history regarding the exclusion
showed that the legislature intended to remove “the cate-
gory of disorders characterized only as personality disorders
from the larger group of ‘mental disease or defect’ that can be
relied on for use of the insanity plea under ORS 161.295(1).”
Meiser II, 369 Or at 358-59 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). We noted that the legislative history also showed that
the legislature’s choice to use the term “only” was intended
“to indicate that a person who has ‘a personality disorder
plus a psychosis *
*
* may still qualify’
” for the defense.
Id. at 357 (quoting Tape Recording, House Committee on
Judiciary, HB 2075, May 13, 1983, Tape 324, Side A (state-
ment of Jeffrey Rogers) (ellipses in Meiser II)). Based on its
text and legislative history, we concluded that the exclusion
“specifies certain mental conditions that are not included
within the broader terms ‘mental disease or defect,’ and in
doing so, narrows access to the defense set out in subsec-
tion (1). But it does not make the defense so narrow as to
require that a person who can demonstrate the requisite
lack of substantial capacity ‘as a result of mental disease or
defect’ also prove that a co-occurring personality disorder
in no part contributed to the incapacity.”
Meiser II, 369 Or at 360-61. Therefore, we concluded that
the Court of Appeals had erred in holding that “defendant
could prevail on his GEI defense only if he proved that his
co-occurring personality disorder played no part in causing
the requisite lack of substantial capacity.” Id. at 361 (emphasis
448
State v. Meiser
in original). Because the Court of Appeals “did not consider—
except under the ‘sole cause’ test *
*
*—whether the evidence
compelled a finding that defendant proved that he had experi-
enced any qualifying incapacity ‘as a result of mental disease
or defect,’
” we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. Id.
We noted that, to determine whether defendant had proved
the required connection, the Court of Appeals might have to
determine whether the legislature intended to require that a
mental disease or defect be “sufficient, on its own,” to bring
about the requisite lack of capacity, or whether it intended a
“lesser degree of causal contribution.” Id.4
D. Meiser III
On remand, the Court of Appeals asked the parties
to submit supplemental briefs regarding the nature of the
required connection between a defendant’s mental disease or
defect and the requisite lack of capacity, and the parties did.
Based on the text and context of the phrase “as a
result of,” defendant argued that “result” should be given its
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning, that is, “something
that proceeds or arises as a consequence, effect, or conclu-
sion of something else.” Applying that meaning, defendant
further argued that the evidence that he had presented
compelled the conclusion that, at the time of the murder, he
was incapacitated “as a consequence or effect proceeding or
arising from his schizophrenia.”
The state, on the other hand, argued that the phrase
“as a result of” should be construed to impose a “standard
of independent sufficiency.” Therefore, the state argued, if a
defendant raising a GEI defense has both a mental disease
or defect and a personality disorder, the defendant must
show that the mental disease or defect would have brought
about the requisite lack of capacity on its own. Applying
that standard, the state argued that defendant’s evidence
did not compel a conclusion that defendant’s schizophrenia
was sufficient, on its own, to bring about the requisite lack
of capacity.
4 We also noted that the issue of whether defendant’s evidence compelled a
conclusion that he had proved the third element of the defense—that he lacked
the requisite capacity—was still an open one, because the Court of Appeals had
not needed to address it in Meiser I. Meiser II, 369 Or at 361.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
449
The Court of Appeals agreed with the state, rul-
ing that, in order for a defendant to prove that their lack
of capacity was “a result of” their mental disease or defect,
the defendant must show that, “standing alone,” the mental
disease or defect “was sufficient, at the time of the crimi-
nal conduct, to bring about the incapacity.” Meiser III, 323
Or App at 683; see also id. at 685 (the required causal con-
nection is “one of independent sufficiency” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals held
that the record did not show that defendant had proved the
causation element of his GEI defense as a matter of law. Id. at
686. That is, the record—viewed in the light most favorable
to the state as it had to be, see Meiser I, 308 Or App at 572
(setting out standard of review)—did not compel a finding
that, at the time of the murder, defendant’s schizophrenia
was sufficient, by itself, to bring about the requisite lack of
capacity. Meiser III, 323 Or App at 686. The court acknowl-
edged that both a psychologist, Beaver, and a psychiatrist,
Choi, had testified that defendant “was experiencing com-
mand-auditory hallucinations, a hallmark of schizophre-
nia, on the day of the murder.” Id. It also acknowledged that
Beaver had testified that, at the time of the murder, defen-
dant was “floridly psychotic” and would not have committed
the crimes if not for his “active psychosis,” and that Choi
had testified that, during and after the murder, defendant
was “highly psychotic,” and without the psychosis “would
not have committed the crimes.” Id. at 687. The experts’ tes-
timony was corroborated by evidence that defendant “was
suffering from hallucinations and delusions at the time of
his crimes,” including that
“he had been ‘deleted’ from society; that he was being ‘sys-
tematically persecuted by *
*
* a large portion of American
society,’ as well as the police, who would only protect people
of a certain class; that he needed a condo to get a ‘toehold
into society’ as a property owner so that police would pro-
tect him and his family; that his daughter would be turned
into a cannibal by the voices he heard; and that his son was
being poisoned and would also be harmed by the entities
represented by the voices.”
450
State v. Meiser
Id. at 687 (ellipses in original). The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the evidence “would certainly permit a finding”
that “defendant’s asserted lack of substantial capacity *
*
*
was ‘the result of’ his schizophrenia under [an] independent
sufficiency measure.” Id. at 688 (emphasis in original). But
the court went on to say that that was “not the only find-
ing that could reasonably be derived from [the] record.” Id.
Pointing to Choi’s testimony that defendant’s schizophrenia
and personality disorder “both were active” and defendant’s
statement that he had “lashed out” in anger when he killed
FH, the court concluded that a factfinder could find that
defendant’s schizophrenia was not sufficient, on its own, to
bring about his lack of capacity:
“[E]ven accepting Choi’s opinion that defendant’s schizo-
phrenia ‘played a major role in’ and ‘was more the pre-
dominant driver of’ defendant’s criminal conduct in killing
FH—and that, if not for that psychosis, defendant would
not have committed the act—a reasonable trier of fact
would not be required to find that defendant’s schizophre-
nia was sufficient—independent of his antisocial personal-
ity disorder—to bring about his lack of substantial capacity
at the time of the act.”
Id. at 689-90 (emphasis in original). Consequently, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 690.
On defendant’s petition, we allowed review to
determine the connection that a defendant must establish
between their mental disease or defect and their lack of
capacity in order to prove the GEI defense.
II. ANALYSIS
The issue on review presents a question of statutory
interpretation, to which we apply the methodology set out
in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).
Our goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature that
enacted the provision at issue. SAIF v. Ward, 369 Or 384,
394, 506 P3d 386 (2022). To do so, we look first to the text
of the provision, in context, which is the best evidence of
the legislature’s intent. Gaines, 346 Or at 171. We may then
look to the legislative history of the provision, giving it the
weight we deem appropriate. Id. at 172.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
451
A. Text
We begin with the text of ORS 161.295, which we
set out again:
“(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result
of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in crimi-
nal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the
conduct to the requirements of law.
“(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality
constituting solely a personality disorder.”
As discussed, to prove the GEI defense, a defendant
must show that, “as a result of” a mental disease or defect,
they lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the crim-
inality of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law. Thus, the defendant must show a
connection between their mental disease or defect and their
lack of capacity. The key term in the legislature’s expression
of the required connection is “result.” The legislature did not
define that term, and it is a term of common usage. “When
the legislature has not specially defined a term of common
usage, we generally assume that the legislature intended to
use the term in a manner consistent with its ‘plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning,’ and we often consult dictionaries for
guidance in determining what the legislature would have
understood a term to mean.” Kinzua Resources v. DEQ, 366
Or 674, 681, 468 P3d 410 (2020).
The term “result,” when used as a noun, as it is
in ORS 161.295(1), is defined as “something that results as
a consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion.” Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary 1937 (unabridged ed 2002). That defi-
nition uses the verb form of “result,” which means “to pro-
ceed, spring, or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclu-
sion.” Id. Neither definition indicates that a “result” must
be attributable to a single cause or an independently suffi-
cient cause.
452
State v. Meiser
The definitions of “result” as a noun and a verb
use several terms, and, of those terms, “consequence” and
“effect” fit best in the context of the GEI defense. See Jenkins
v. Board of Parole, 356 Or 186, 194, 335 P3d 828 (2014) (rely-
ing on context to determine which, among multiple dictio-
nary definitions, the legislature intended); State v. Fries,
344 Or 541, 546, 185 P3d 453 (2008) (same). Although it is
possible to say that a person’s lack of capacity “issued from”
or was “a conclusion of” their mental disease or defect, it is
more natural to say that their lack of capacity was “a conse-
quence of” or an “effect of” their mental disease or defect.
The definitions of “consequence” and “effect” support
the view that a “result” may have multiple causes. The term
“consequence” is defined as “something that is produced by a
cause or follows from a form of necessary connection or from
a set of conditions,” as in the phrase “this refined taste is the
[result] of education and habit.” Webster’s at 482. Similarly,
the term “effect” is defined as “something that is produced
by an agent or cause : something that follows immediately
from an antecedent : a resultant condition,” as in the exam-
ple “low mortality, the [result] of excellent social services
available in every village.” Id. at 724. Thus, the fact that
“result” is defined as a “consequence” or “effect” indicates
that a “result” may flow from “a set of conditions.” Id. at 482.
To summarize, the legislature’s use of the term
“result”—a term of common usage—indicates that the GEI
defense applies if a defendant proves that they lacked the
requisite capacity as a “consequence” or “effect” of their men-
tal disease or defect. Id. at 1937. It further indicates that the
lack of capacity need not be solely attributable to the mental
disease or defect; a “set of conditions” can combine to result
in the lack of capacity. Id. at 482.5
5 Because “result” is a word of common usage and there is no indication that
the legislature intended it to have a specialized meaning, we look to its common
meaning. But, even if we were to assume that the legislature intended “result”
to have a legal meaning, the meaning would be the same, because the common
meaning of the term, as set out in Webster’s, tracks the legal meaning, as set out
in Black’s Law Dictionary. When the Oregon Criminal Code was enacted, Black’s
defined the noun “result” to mean “[t]hat which results, the conclusion or end to
which any course or condition of thing leads, or which is obtained by any pro-
cess or operation; consequence or effect.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1478 (rev 4th ed
1968). Similarly, it defined the verb version of “result” as “[t]o proceed, to spring,
or arise, as a consequence, effect, or conclusion *
*
*.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
453
B. Context
Those indications are supported by the immediate
context of the phrase “as a result of.” Notably, the legisla-
ture did not modify “result.” ORS 161.295(1) simply provides
that “[a] person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result
of mental disease or defect at the time of engaging in crim-
inal conduct,” the person lacked the requisite capacity. The
statute does not say, for example, that “a person is guilty
except for insanity if, solely as a result of mental disease or
defect *
*
*.” Nor does it say that “a person is guilty except for
insanity if, primarily as a result of mental disease or defect
*
*
*.” Nothing in the text of ORS 161.295(1) suggests that a
defendant’s lack of capacity can be “a result of” the defen-
dant’s mental disease or defect only if the mental disease or
defect rises to a certain degree or amount or accounts for a
certain portion of the defendant’s lack of capacity. The provi-
sion does not require, for example, that a defendant’s mental
disease or defect must be a major cause or an independently
sufficient cause of the defendant’s lack of capacity.
The fact that, in ORS 161.295(1), the legislature did
not modify “result” with a quantitative descriptor is signif-
icant on its own. But its significance is heightened because
another subsection of the same statute, ORS 161.295(2),
shows that, when the legislature first enacted the GEI stat-
ute in 1971 and when it later amended it in 1983, it was
aware that a person’s mental condition can result from a com-
bination of causes. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (a statutory term’s
context includes other sections of the same statute).
As we explained in Meiser II, when ORS 161.295
was originally enacted in 1971, subsection (2) of the stat-
ute limited the definition of “mental disease or defect” by
providing that “the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated crimi-
nal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” Or Laws 1971, ch 743,
§ 36 (emphasis added). The purpose of that exclusion was
“to prevent ‘recidivists’ from ‘qualify[ing] for the defense
merely by being labeled psychopaths.’
” Meiser II, 369 Or at
360 (quoting Commentary § 36 at 35 (brackets in Meiser II;
emphasis added)). In 1983, the legislature amended ORS
454
State v. Meiser
161.295(2) to add an exclusion for “any abnormality consti-
tuting solely a personality disorder.” Or Laws 1983, ch 800,
§ 1 (emphasis added). The exclusions in ORS 161.295(2) show
that, in both 1971 and 1983, the legislature was alert to the
fact that an “abnormality” can result from a combination of
conditions. They also show that the legislature intended to
prevent abnormalities resulting “only” or “solely” from cer-
tain conditions—specifically, psychopathy and personality
disorders—from being the basis for a GEI defense. They do
not, however, show that the legislature intended to prevent
abnormalities resulting from a combination of conditions
from being the basis of a GEI defense. If the legislature
had intended to limit the availability of the GEI defense to
situations where a defendant’s lack of capacity was “only”
or “solely” the result of the defendant’s mental disease or
defect, it could have. Likewise, if it had wanted to limit the
availability of the defense to situations where the defen-
dant’s lack of capacity was an “independent” result of the
defendant’s mental disease or defect, it could have.
The broader context of ORS 161.295 further indi-
cates that “result” should be given its plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning and that a “result” may flow from a com-
bination of conditions. As mentioned, ORS 161.295 was
enacted as part of the Oregon Criminal Code. Or Laws
1971, ch 743, § 36. As we will explain, this court has already
construed similar causation requirements in other statutes
enacted as part of the code and held both that the term
“cause” should be given its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning and that, in situations where multiple acts com-
bine to bring about a result, each act is a “cause.” We did so
first in State v. Murray, 343 Or 48, 162 P3d 255 (2007), and
then in State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364, 374 P3d
853 (2016).
In Murray, we construed ORS 163.165, which pro-
vides that a person commits third-degree assault if the per-
son “[r]ecklessly causes serious physical injury to another by
means of a deadly or dangerous weapon.” (Emphasis added.)
The parties disputed the meaning of “cause.” Murray, 343
Or at 51. We noted that the legislature had not defined the
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
455
term and that it was a term of common usage, and we looked
to the term’s dictionary definition:
“The word ‘cause’ is not defined in the criminal statutes.
It is, however, a word of common usage, which we presume
the legislature intended to be given its plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning. The dictionary defines the verb ‘cause’
as follows: ‘1: to serve as a cause or occasion of : bring into
existence: MAKE (careless driving *
*
* accidents) *
*
* 2: to
effect by command, authority or force.’ Webster’s [at 356].”
Id. at 52 (first citation omitted; second ellipses in Murray).
Accordingly, we ruled that a person “causes” serious physi-
cal injury to another if the person “brings about, makes, or
effects by force the serious injury of another person.” Id.
We applied that rule to the facts of the case. In
Murray, the defendant had been charged with third-degree
assault for injuring the victim in a car crash. Id. at 51. The
defendant owned an automobile shop that converted conven-
tional cars into race cars, and the victim was his employee.
Id. at 50. The car crash occurred while the defendant was
test driving a race car and the victim was voluntarily riding
with him. Id. At trial, the defendant moved for a judgment
of acquittal on the third-degree assault charge, asserting
that he was not criminally responsible for the victim’s inju-
ries because the victim was a voluntary participant in the
reckless activity that led to his injuries. Id. at 51. This court
rejected that argument, ruling that a person commits third-
degree assault if the person recklessly causes serious physi-
cal injury to another person, “no matter the role of the other
person in the reckless conduct.” Id. at 52.
This court followed Murray in Turnidge. In that
case, we construed the criminal homicide statute, ORS
163.005(1), which applies when a person “causes the death
of another.” We reviewed the text, context, and legislative
history of the homicide statute, and we concluded that the
term “cause” should be given its plain, natural, and ordi-
nary meaning. Turnidge, 359 Or at 483. As in Murray, we
derived that meaning from the term’s dictionary definition.
Id. at 474-77. We then applied that meaning to the facts of
the case and again concluded that a result may follow from
a combination of conditions. Id. at 483.
456
State v. Meiser
In Turnidge, the defendant was charged with multi-
ple crimes, including aggravated murder, attempted aggra-
vated murder, and assault. Id. at 380. The charges were
based on an incident during which a bomb was found outside
a bank and then brought inside the bank, where it exploded
when law enforcement officers attempted to disarm it. Id.
at 367-69. The explosion killed two persons and injured two
others. Id. at 369. The state’s theory was that the defendant
had helped build and place the bomb. Id. at 481-82. The
state did not contend that the defendant had detonated the
bomb; its evidence suggested that the bomb was detonated
as a result of how it was handled after it was found or as
a result of a stray radio signal. Id. at 458-59. The defen-
dant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that
the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he had
caused the deaths and injuries. Id. at 454-55. On review,
we rejected that argument, holding that the state’s evidence
of the defendant’s conduct provided an ample basis for the
jury to find that he had caused the deaths and injuries, and
we noted that the defendant’s role “did not have to be the
last link in the chain, or the only one, for the jury to make
that determination.” Id. at 482. Later, when discussing jury
instructions on causation, we stated that “a defendant’s con-
duct ‘causes’ a result if it brings about, makes, or effects by
force that result, ‘no matter the role’ of another person and
regardless of [the] other person’s reckless participation.” Id.
at 483 (quoting Murray, 343 Or at 52); see also id. (explain-
ing that, for the purposes of the criminal statutes at issue,
causation does not “depend on a comparison of a defendant’s
causal role with that of the victim or some third party”).
To summarize, the context of the phrase “as a
result of” in ORS 161.295(1) indicates that “result” should
be given its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. It shows
that the legislature was alert to the fact that conditions can
combine to cause a lack of capacity and that it knew how to
use quantitative descriptors to address situations involving
a single condition. The fact that the drafters did not use a
quantitative descriptor to modify “result” indicates that the
legislature did not intend to impose a quantitative require-
ment on the connection between a defendant’s mental dis-
ease or defect and their lack of capacity. In addition, the GEI
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
457
defense is part of the Oregon Criminal Code, and Murray
and Turnidge show that, when construing statutes in the
code, this court has given a similar term, “cause,” its plain,
natural, and ordinary meaning. Murray and Turnidge also
illustrate that multiple factors may combine to bring about
a result, and, if they do, each of the factors is a “cause.”
Murray, 343 Or at 52; Turnidge, 359 Or at 482-83. And they
illustrate that whether a factor is a “cause” does not depend
on its relative contribution to bringing about the result.
Murray, 343 Or at 52; Turnidge, 359 Or at 483.
C. Legislative History
The legislative history does not indicate otherwise.
The commentary to the final draft of the Oregon Criminal
Code states that section 36 of the final draft, which became
ORS 161.295, was based on section 4.01 of the Model Penal
Code (MPC). Commentary § 36 at 34. The parties have not
identified, and we have not found, anything in the legisla-
tive history of either the Oregon Criminal Code or the MPC
that indicates that the drafters of either code intended
“result” to have anything but its plain, natural, and ordi-
nary meaning. They have not identified, and we have not
found, any discussions of the nature of the connection that
must exist between a defendant’s mental disease or defect
and their lack of capacity in order for the GEI defense to
apply. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the
legislature intended to make the GEI defense available only
if a defendant’s mental disease or defect rose to a certain
degree or amount or accounted for a certain portion of their
lack of capacity. In other words, nothing in the legislative
history indicates that the legislature intended to attach a
quantitative requirement to the connection between a defen-
dant’s mental disease or defect and their lack of capacity. If
we were to attach one, we would be adding words to the stat-
ute and wholly speculating about what the degree, amount,
or portion should be.
It is true, of course, in both 1971 and 1983, the leg-
islature intended to put some limits on the GEI defense.
They did so through ORS 161.295(2), which narrows the
definition of “mental disease or defect.” But, as we explained
in Meiser II, the legislative history from 1971 shows that
458
State v. Meiser
the legislature did not intend to preclude defendants who
suffered from both a mental disease or defect and another
condition from being able to use the defense. Meiser II,
369 Or at 360. As we further explained, the 1983 legisla-
ture “intended to retain that balanced approach when it
amended subsection (2) to also exclude ‘personality disor-
ders’ from the definition of ‘mental disease or defect.’
” Id.
That additional exclusion narrowed the availability of the
GEI defense, but it did not make the defense “so narrow as
to require that a person who can demonstrate the requisite
lack of substantial capacity ‘as a result of mental disease or
defect’ also prove that a co-occurring personality disorder in
no part contributed to the incapacity.” Id. at 360-61.
Just as we have not found anything in the legisla-
tive history of ORS 161.295 to indicate that the legislature
intended a defendant’s mental disease or defect to be the
sole cause of their lack of capacity, we have not found any-
thing in the legislative history to indicate that the legisla-
ture intended a defendant’s mental disease or defect to be
an independently sufficient cause of their lack of capacity.
Thus, nothing in the legislative history leads to a conclusion
other than the one that follows from the plain text and con-
text of ORS 161.295. To the contrary, the legislative history
reinforces the idea that, in both 1971 and 1983, the legisla-
ture was aware that conditions can combine to result in a
lack of capacity and that, contrary to the Court of Appeals’
conclusion in Meiser III, it did not intend to limit the avail-
ability of the GEI defense to situations where a defendant’s
mental disease or defect, “standing alone,” was sufficient to
bring about the requisite lack of capacity.
D. Summary and Conclusion
As we have explained, the plain text of ORS
161.295(1) states that a person is “guilty except for insan-
ity” if, “as a result of” their mental disease or defect, the
person “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the
requirements of law.” To determine the meaning of “as a
result of,” we have applied our established method of statu-
tory interpretation and examined the text, context, and leg-
islative history of ORS 161.295(1). Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
459
Each of those indicators of legislative intent support giving
“result” its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning: “conse-
quence” or “effect.”
First, the text. The legislature did not define
“result,” and it is a term of common usage that means, as
relevant here, “consequence” or “effect.” Webster’s at 1937.
And a “consequence” or “effect” may flow from a “set of con-
ditions.” Id. at 482.
Multiple aspects of the context of ORS 161.295(1)
support giving “result” its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning. The legislature did not modify the term “result”
in ORS 161.295(1); it did not include any quantitative limita-
tions on the term. The legislature’s failure to do so is signif-
icant on its own, but its significance is heightened because
the legislature used such limitations—specifically, “only”
and “solely”—in ORS 161.295(2). Altogether, ORS 161.295
shows that the legislature intended the GEI defense to be
available if a defendant’s lack of capacity was a consequence
or effect of the defendant’s mental disease or defect, even if
it was also the consequence or effect of another condition.
In addition, giving “result” its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning and recognizing that a result may flow from a com-
bination of conditions is consistent with what this court did
in Murray and Turnidge when construing a similar term
in criminal statutes that were also enacted as part of the
Oregon Criminal Code. In those cases, this court used the
dictionary definition of “cause” and held that multiple fac-
tors may combine to bring about a result, and that each is a
“cause,” regardless of the relative contribution of each factor.
Murray, 343 Or at 52; Turnidge, 359 Or at 482-83.
The legislative history is consistent with the text
and context. It indicates that the legislature intended to
impose some limits on the availability of the GEI defense
but that it did not intend to impose a quantitative require-
ment on the connection between a defendant’s mental dis-
ease or defect and their lack of capacity.
Consequently, we reject the Court of Appeals’ conclu-
sion that a defendant’s mental disease or defect must be “suf-
ficient by itself” to bring about the requisite lack of capacity.
460
State v. Meiser
E. Response to Justice Bushong’s Concurrence
We now address Justice Bushong’s concurrence, in
which he argues that (1) we could have resolved the meaning
of “as a result of” in Meiser II; (2) our conclusion that “result”
should be given its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning
fails to provide sufficient guidance to mental health experts
and trial courts; and (3) we should interpret “as a result of”
to require application of a “substantial factor” causation
standard he draws from civil negligence cases decided in the
1960s and 1970s. ___ Or at ___, ___, ___ (Bushong, J., con-
curring) (slip op at 4:8 - 5:5, 6:6 - 7:2, 12:13 - 13:7).6 As we will
explain, (1) in Meiser II, we did not address the issue that
we resolve in this opinion because the Court of Appeals had
not addressed it and the parties had not briefed it; (2) giving
“result” its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning is not con-
fusing and is consistent with what we have done when con-
struing required causal connections in other criminal cases;
and (3) we should not import the concurrence’s “substantial
factor” causation standard because (a) this court has already
stated that civil negligence standards of causation are an
“uneasy fit in the criminal law context,” Turnidge, 359 Or
at 472 n 62; (b) the concurrence’s assertion that, when the
legislature adopted the Oregon Criminal Code, it intended
to import a “substantial factor” causation standard from
civil negligence law and reject a “but for” causation standard
is not supported by the legislative history that the concur-
rence relies on; and (c) the concurrence’s “substantial factor”
causation standard (i) would cause uncertainty and confu-
sion because the term “substantial factor” is not defined and
has been understood in different ways, at different times and
in different contexts, and (ii) could be misleading because it
could suggest a quantitative requirement or a comparison of
the relative contributions of different factors, which—as the
6 We note that no party has advocated for use of a “substantial factor” test
in this case. The state has argued for an “independently sufficient” test: “[T]o
qualify for the GEI defense, a defendant must prove that his mental disease or
defect was independently sufficient to bring about the requisite lack of substan-
tial capacity.” Defendant has argued that we give “result” its dictionary defi-
nition: Based on the “plain-meaning/ordinary-usage definition of ‘result,’
” the
legislature “intended merely that the substantial incapacity be a consequence,
effect, issue, or conclusion proceeding or arising from mental disease or defect.”
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
461
text, context, and legislative history just discussed show—
the legislature did not intend.
1. The Meiser II remand was appropriate.
The concurrence appears to argue that we should
have resolved the meaning of “result” in Meiser II. ___ Or
at ___ (Bushong, J., concurring) (slip op at 4:8 - 5:5). We dis-
agree. In Meiser II, the issue on review was whether the Court
of Appeals had erred in ruling that the GEI defense is not
available if a defendant’s lack of capacity resulted from both
a mental disease or defect and a personality disorder. Meiser
II, 369 Or at 349-50 (identifying issue on review); id. at 361
(same). Accordingly, the parties’ briefs focused on whether
the legislature intended to allow “combined causation” at
all. They did not address whether, if the legislature intended
to allow “combined causation,” it also intended to require
a certain degree of causal contribution from a defendant’s
mental disease or defect. We resolved the issue presented by
the Court of Appeals opinion and the parties’ briefing, hold-
ing that the Court of Appeals had “erred in concluding that
defendant could prevail on his GEI defense only if he proved
that his co-occurring personality disorder played no part in
causing the requisite lack of substantial capacity.” Meiser II,
369 Or at 361 (emphasis in original).
We then explained that “[t]hat conclusion answers
the question that this court allowed review to address, but
it does not fully resolve whether defendant was entitled to
prevail on his GEI defense.” Id. That was, in part, because
the Court of Appeals had not considered—“except under the
‘sole cause’ test” that we rejected—“whether the evidence
compelled a finding that defendant proved that he had expe-
rienced any qualifying incapacity ‘as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect.’
” Id. We observed that,
“[a]s the state emphasizes, any answer to [that] question
may turn on whether the phrase ‘as a result of’ in ORS
161.295(1) means that the qualifying ‘mental disease or
defect’ must be sufficient, on its own, to bring about the
requisite incapacity, or whether the legislature intended to
require some lesser degree of causal contribution from the
qualifying ‘mental disease or defect.’
”
462
State v. Meiser
Id. We also observed that defendant had not argued for a
specific standard of causation and that the amicus curiae
had argued for a “but for” standard of causation, that is,
“but for” the mental disease or defect the incapacity would
not have occurred. Id. at 361 n 10. We took no position on the
issue, and we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, so
that the parties and the Court of Appeals could address it,
id. at 361-62, which they did.
On remand, the parties submitted supplemental
briefing. Based on that briefing, the Court of Appeals issued
Meiser III, in which it ruled that, in order to prove the GEI
defense, a defendant must show that their mental disease or
defect was an independently sufficient cause of their lack of
capacity. 323 Or App at 683. We allowed review to address
that new ruling, and we have done so in this opinion.
The concurrence comments that, “if the dictionary
definition alone is sufficient,” we could have just said so in
Meiser II. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong, J., concurring) (slip op
at 4:18 - 5:2). To the extent that that comment is critical of
our reliance on the dictionary definition, we note that, when
construing a statutory term of common usage, “we gener-
ally assume that the legislature intended to use the term in
a manner consistent with its ‘plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning,’ and we often consult dictionaries for guidance in
determining what the legislature would have understood a
term to mean.” Kinzua Resources, 366 Or at 681. Of course,
“[i]n construing statutes, we do not simply consult dictio-
naries and interpret words in a vacuum. Dictionaries, after
all, do not tell us what words mean, only what words can
mean, depending on their context and the particular man-
ner in which they are used.” State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 96,
261 P3d 1234 (2011) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we
apply our method of statutory construction and look beyond
the text at issue to its context and legislative history. Id. at
96, 101; Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72. We have done that here,
and our conclusion regarding the meaning of “result” is sup-
ported by those sources.
The concurrence asserts that, in Meiser II, we
implicitly suggested that “result” should not be given its dic-
tionary definition. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong, J., concurring)
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
463
(slip op at 5:6-8). We disagree with that reading. Nothing in
Meiser II was intended to prejudge issues that the parties
and the Court of Appeals had not yet addressed.
The concurrence points out that, in Meiser II, we
quoted the definition of “result.” ___ Or at ___ (Bushong,
J., concurring) (slip op at 5:2-5). That is true. We did so in
the context of explaining that the definition of “result” did
not support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a defen-
dant’s mental disease or defect had to be the sole cause of
the defendant’s lack of capacity. We stated:
“In ordinary usage, the term ‘result’ is not limited to the
concept of sole causation. See Webster’s at 1937 (defining
noun ‘result,’ most pertinently, as ‘something that results
as a consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion’).”
Meiser II, 369 Or at 359-60. That was the full extent of our
reference to the dictionary definition of “result.” We used
the definition in our analysis of the statutory construction
issue presented in Meiser II. We were not addressing any
other statutory construction issue. In fact, we explicitly
stated that, although, as a matter of judicial efficiency, “this
court sometimes resolves issues beyond those as to which
we allowed review, rather than remanding to the Court of
Appeals to resolve remaining issues,” we were declining to
do so because “the remaining statutory construction issue
would benefit from consideration in the first instance by
the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 361-62. Thus, contrary to the
concurrence’s assertion, our reference to the dictionary defi-
nition of “result” was not an implicit suggestion that the
term should not be given its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning. We used that meaning in our Gaines analysis of
the question presented then, just as we have used it in our
Gaines analysis of the question presented now.
2. The plain meaning of “result” is clear and using it is
consistent with case law.
The concurrence’s second argument is that our
opinion does not clearly identify the test that the legislature
intended and does not provide adequate guidance to mental
health experts and trial courts. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong, J.,
concurring) (slip op at 6:6 - 7:2). We disagree. We are giving
464
State v. Meiser
the term “result” its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning,
taken from its dictionary definition. We do not think that
that meaning is unclear. It is straightforward, and fact-
finders—whether judges or juries—will be able to apply it.
Moreover, using the dictionary definition is consistent with
our case law. As recounted above, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at
19:2 - 21:19), we did the same thing with “cause” in both
Murray and Turnidge. Murray, 343 Or at 52 (applying dic-
tionary definition of “cause”); Turnidge, 359 Or at 482-83
(same).
3. It is not appropriate to import the concurrence’s “sub-
stantial factor” causation standard into the GEI
statute.
Instead of giving “result” its plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning, the concurrence would hold that, to deter-
mine whether a defendant’s lack of capacity was “a result of”
their mental disease or defect, a court must apply a “sub-
stantial factor” test for causation. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong,
J., concurring) (slip op at 3:5-8). More specifically, it appears
that the concurrence would hold that a court must apply the
“substantial factor” test used in civil tort cases decided in
the 1960s and 1970s. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong, J., concurring)
(slip op at 12:13 - 13:7). We do not believe it is appropriate
to import the concurrence’s “substantial factor” causation
standard into the GEI statute for three reasons.
a. This court has cautioned against importing
civil law tort principles into criminal law.
First, in Turnidge, we cautioned against import-
ing civil law tort principles into criminal law. 359 Or at 472
n 62. We noted that “long-standing observations” by scholars
“point out that civil law tort principles of causation are an
uneasy fit in the criminal law context,” both because tort and
criminal law involve different policy objectives and because
tort law issues are generally governed by common law, while
criminal law issues are generally governed by statute. Id.
Those observations predate the legislature’s enactment
of the Oregon Criminal Code. See id. (citing Paul K. Ryu,
Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U Pa L Rev 773, 773, 803
(1958) for the proposition that “causation has received ‘scant
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
465
attention’ in area of criminal law, as opposed to civil tort
law; in criminal law field, courts have not applied a uniform
law of causation, and principles should not necessarily track
civil law principles, because the policy objectives of tort and
criminal law are not the same”).
b. The concurrence’s “substantial factor” test is
not supported by legislative history.
Second, the legislative history of ORS 161.295 does
not support the concurrence’s claim that the legislature
intended to adopt a “substantial factor” causation standard.
As noted, nothing in the legislative history of either the
Oregon Criminal Code or the MPC indicates the nature of
the connection that must exist between a defendant’s men-
tal disease or defect and their lack of capacity. And, the term
“substantial factor” does not appear anywhere in the legis-
lative history of the GEI provision to the Oregon Criminal
Code. In fact, the term does not appear anywhere in the
commentary to the Oregon Criminal Code. Nothing in the
legislative history of the GEI statute indicates that the leg-
islature intended to import a “substantial factor” causation
standard from civil negligence law into the GEI statute.
To support its position, the concurrence relies on
the fact that the drafters of both the MPC and the Oregon
Criminal Code disfavored the rule regarding insanity set
out in Durham v. United States, 214 F2d 862, 874-75 (DC
Cir 1954), abrogated by United States v. Brawner, 471 F2d
969 (DC Cir 1972). But, as we will explain, Durham did not
concern the standard of causation.
As we have explained, the GEI statute was based
on section 4.01 of the MPC. Commentary § 36 at 34. The
commentary to that section of the Oregon Criminal Code
explains that both the MPC and Oregon drafters declined
to adopt the Durham rule.
The Durham rule was that “an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of men-
tal disease or defect.” Durham, 214 F2d at 874-75 (emphasis
added). Thus, under the Durham rule, whether a defendant
was criminally responsible turned on whether their mental
disease or defect caused their conduct, not whether it caused
466
State v. Meiser
a lack of capacity. That was a problem because, under the
rule, a defendant was not criminally responsible if their
conduct was a product of their mental disease or defect,
regardless of whether they had the capacity to appreciate
the criminality of their conduct or conform their conduct to
the requirements of the law.
To illustrate the problem, the MPC drafters pro-
vided a hypothetical: a situation where a person murders
a wealthy relative because, as a result of a mental disease
or defect, the person believes that they will inherit a large
amount of money. Model Penal Code § 4.01 comment 3 at 173
n 24 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Under
the Durham rule, the person could raise a defense based
on their mental disease or defect because there would be a
causal connection between the mental disease or defect and
their criminal conduct, even if they had been fully capable
of understanding the criminal nature of their conduct and
conforming their conduct to the requirements of the law.
The MPC and Oregon drafters rejected the Durham rule
because of that problem. Model Penal Code § 4.01 comment
5 at 159 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955); Commentary § 36 at
35-36. They wanted to make sure that there was a causal
connection between a person’s mental disease or defect and
the requisite lack of capacity, and they did that by provid-
ing that a person is GEI when, as a result of a mental dis-
ease or defect, the person lacks the requisite capacity. Model
Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ORS
161.295(1). Thus, the drafters’ rejection of the Durham rule
says nothing about the requisite standard of causation. The
rule did not set out any standard of causation, and the draft-
ers’ rejection of it does not provide any support for the con-
currence’s conclusion that the drafters intended to adopt a
“substantial factor” causation standard.
The concurrence also mentions United States
v. Currens, 290 F2d 751, 774 (3rd Cir 1961), to which the
Oregon drafters referred. ___ Or at ___ n 13, ___, ___ n 16
(Bushong, J., concurring) (slip op at 19:5 n 13, 21:7, 21:7
n 16). In Currens, the court stated that “[t]he jury must be
satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
467
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law which he is alleged to have violated.” 290
F2d at 774. That rule is essentially the same as the rule in
ORS 161.295. It simply provides that the defendant’s lack of
capacity must result from the defendant’s mental disease or
defect. And, like ORS 161.295, it does not specify an amount
of causation. It does not say, for example, that the lack of
capacity must result solely from, primarily from, or substan-
tially from the mental disease or defect.
The Currens court explained that its rule allows for
consideration of the “total mental condition.” 290 F2d at 774.
That supports our interpretation of “result” as meaning a
“consequence” or “effect.” Giving “result” its plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning allows for consideration of a defen-
dant’s “total mental condition,” because, as discussed above,
a “result” may flow from “a set of conditions.” Webster’s
at 482. Therefore, a defendant raising a GEI defense can
show the required connection between their mental disease
or defect and their lack of capacity by showing that their
mental disease or defect was a condition that contributed to
their lack of the requisite capacity.
c. The concurrence’s test is unclear, would
cause uncertainty and confusion, and could be
misleading.
Third, although the concurrence asserts that using
the “substantial factor” causation standard would provide
clarity, ___ Or at ___, ___, ___ (Bushong, J., concurring)
(slip op at 1:18-19, 7:3-6, 17:2-9), it is difficult to see how that
would be the case because the concurrence does not define
“substantial factor” causation. This court had not defined
the term before 1971, nor had Black’s Law Dictionary. In
fact, this court has still not defined the term. The concur-
rence notes that the term has been used in civil negligence
cases and employment discrimination cases. ___ Or at ___
(Bushong, J., concurring) (slip op at 9:1 - 12:2). In both of those
contexts, the commentaries to the uniform jury instructions
relating to the term state that this court has not defined
“substantial factor.” The comment to the Uniform Civil Jury
Instruction on substantial factor causation in the negligence
context, UCJI 23.02, states that “the UCJI Committee could
468
State v. Meiser
find no Oregon case defining substantial factor in this con-
text.” Comment to UCJI 23.02, Oregon State Bar Committee
on Uniform Civil Jury Instructions (Dec 2014) (emphasis in
original). Likewise, the comment to the “substantial factor”
instruction in the employment discrimination context, UCJI
59A.03, states that “[t]he Oregon Supreme Court has estab-
lished the ‘substantial factor’ standard but has not defined
precisely what substantial factor means.” Comment to UCJI
59A.03, Oregon State Bar Committee on Uniform Civil Jury
Instructions (Dec 2011) (emphasis in original).
Not only is the term “substantial factor” undefined,
it also has been used in different ways at different times and
in different contexts. See Burrage v. United States, 571 US
204, 217, 134 S Ct 881, 187 L Ed 2d 715 (2014) (“The judicial
authorities invoking a ‘substantial’ or ‘contributing’ factor
test in criminal cases differ widely in their application of
it.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 26 comment j
(2010) (“The ‘substantial factor’ rubric is employed alter-
nately to impose a more rigorous standard for factual cause
or to provide a more lenient standard.”).
The concurrence relies heavily on civil negligence
cases from the 1960s and 1970s. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong,
J., concurring) (slip op at 9:1 - 10:13). It asserts that “a sub-
stantial factor test was widely used” in those cases, and it
further asserts that the legislature intended to import that
causation standard into the GEI statute when it enacted the
Oregon Criminal Code in 1971. ___ Or at ___, ___ (Bushong,
J., concurring) (slip op at 12:13 - 13:1, 18:3 - 21:13). But, as
discussed above, nothing in the legislative history indicates
that the legislature intended to do so. And there is reason
to believe that they did not, given that they were creating a
statutory code, as opposed to relying on common law, and
given the different policy objectives of civil negligence and
criminal law. See Turnidge, 359 Or at 472 n 62. Moreover,
even assuming for the sake of argument that the legislature
intended to import “substantial factor” causation, it is not
clear what they would have understood “substantial factor”
to mean because, as we will explain, that term was used
in different ways during that time period, including in the
authorities cited by the concurrence.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
469
It is important to understand that in the 1960s,
civil negligence law was evolving. Commentators and courts
were trying to disentangle factual causation, which asks
whether the defendant’s conduct was a cause of the plaintiff’s
injury, from the other policy limits on the scope of liability
that had been included within the element of proximate or
legal cause. See Turnidge, 359 Or at 471 (“Legal or proxi-
mate cause *
*
* expresses a policy judgment as to whether
conduct that factually caused harm should result in liability
or responsibility. The idea generally is that some conduct,
although an actual cause of harm, nevertheless should not
result in liability or responsibility for that harm.” (Emphasis
in original.)); see also Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp. et al,
232 Or 567, 572, 375 P2d 812 (1962) (“
‘Legal cause,’ or, ‘prox-
imate cause,’ in its larger aspect, covers, in general, all of
the limitations placed by the law upon the responsibility of
a person for his negligent conduct.” (Citing W. Page Keeton
et al, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 9, 252 (2d ed
1955).)).
The concurrence asserts that the term “substan-
tial factor” was used to refer to factual causation. ___ Or
at ___, ___, ___ (Bushong, J., concurring) (slip op at 9:3,
9:10, 12:14). But that was not how it was always used in
the 1960s and 1970s. At times, this court used it to cap-
ture legal or proximate cause and concepts of relativity. For
example, in Sworden v. Gross, 243 Or 83, 86, 409 P2d 897
(1966), this court stated that whether “proximate cause”
existed depended on whether a defendant’s negligence was
“a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or damage
in question.” Similarly, in Hills v. McGillvrey, 240 Or 476,
482, 402 P2d 722 (1965), this court equated “substantial”
and “proximate” cause. See also Furrer v. Talent Irrigation
District, 258 Or 494, 511, 466 P2d 605 (1970) (stating that
“[t]he term ‘substantial factor’ expresses a concept of relativ-
ity which is difficult to reduce to further definiteness”).
Moreover, even when the term “substantial factor”
was used in connection with factual causation, it was under-
stood in different ways, as the authorities cited by the con-
currence illustrate. Some of the authorities regarded “but
for” causation as overinclusive and preferred “substantial
470
State v. Meiser
factor” causation as an alternative that excluded some causes
that would satisfy the “but for” test. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong,
J., concurring) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431
comment a (1965)) (slip op at 12:8-12). But other authorities
did not view the “substantial factor” test as excluding any
“but for” causes and viewed the “substantial factor” test as
an improvement in rare situations where conduct should
satisfy the causation element but would fail the “but for”
test, such as when there were two independently sufficient
causes. ___ Or at ___ (Bushong, J., concurring) (citing Haas
v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 750, 525 P3d
451 (2023)) (slip op at 8:8-13). Thus, even assuming that we
should look to authorities from the 1960s and 1970s, those
authorities used the term “substantial factor” in different
ways. That fact would have been a reason for the legislature
not to import the term into the criminal law.
The concurrence also cites post-1971 cases to sup-
port its view that the GEI statute requires “substantial fac-
tor” causation. ___ Or at ___, ___, ___ (Bushong, J., concur-
ring) (slip op at 8:8 - 9:8, 10:14 - 12:2, 16:9 - 17:9). Of course,
those cases cannot inform our understanding of what the
1971 legislature meant. The concurrence uses them to say
that juries have been able to apply “substantial factor”
causation. But those cases apply different versions of “sub-
stantial factor” causation. If “substantial factor” causation
states different standards, then it is not a clear statement of
any standard.
For
example,
sometimes
“substantial
factor”
causation is understood as “but for” causation. See, e.g., UCJI
59A.03 (“A substantial factor is one that made a difference
in an employment decision; that is, the decision would not
have been made without it. It need not be the only factor.”);
Comment to UCJI 59A.03 (noting that the Court of Appeals
has described the standard as a “but for” test). Sometimes it
is understood to exclude remote or trivial but-for causes. See,
e.g., California Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 430 (2024)
(defining “substantial factor” as a cause that is “more than
a remote or trivial factor”). And sometimes it is understood
to supplement “but for” causation to capture conduct that
should satisfy the causation element but would fail the “but
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
471
for” test. See, e.g., Turnidge, 359 Or at 470 n 61 (the “sub-
stantial factor” test applies in those circumstances where
the “but for” test “provides an inadequate test of cause-in-
fact” (citing W. Page Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on The
Law of Torts § 41, 266 (5th ed 1984))); Haas, 370 Or at 750-51
(same).
In addition, experience with “substantial factor”
causation has led commentators and courts, including this
one, to recommend tests and jury instructions that more
directly address causation issues. Restatement (Third)
§ 27 comment b; Haas, 370 at 754 n 8, 757 n 9; see David
W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex
L Rev 1765, 1776, 1780 (1997) (“[C]ourts seem to feel that
it is appropriate to shift to the substantial factor vocabu-
lary whenever the but-for test is proving difficult to work
with for whatever reason. *
*
* When courts begin turning
to the substantial factor vocabulary in a broader range of
cases [beyond multiple sufficient causes], valuable precision
of analysis is lost and nothing is gained.”). For example, in
Haas, we noted that “a substantial factor instruction may
not be the best way to instruct a jury on factual causation
because of the ambiguity that it can create.” 370 Or at 757
n 9 (citing Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts
§ 41 at 268 (recommending directly instructing the jury on
multiple sufficient causes rather than using substantial
factor instruction) and Restatement (Third) § 27 comment
b); see also Haas, 370 at 754 n 8 (noting that, in situations
where a “substantial factor” test has been used to capture
causes that would fail the “but for” test, such as a “multi-
ple-sufficient-causal-set situation,” it may be appropriate “to
use an instruction that is specific to that situation rather
than a typical but-for or substantial factor instruction.”).
Finally, “a substantial factor instruction that
informs a jury that, to find factual causation, it must find
that a defendant’s negligence was a ‘substantial’ or ‘import-
ant’ factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury may be mislead-
ing.” Haas, 370 Or at 755. Such an instruction
“can lead a jury erroneously to believe that it must search for
a most significant causal factor, when that is not required.
This court has made it plain that, in considering the
472
State v. Meiser
factual cause element of a negligence claim, the jury is not
to examine whether one defendant’s causal role was rela-
tively more important than that of another defendant.”
Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
Thus, the concurrence’s “substantial factor” test
would not provide the guidance that the concurrence says
is needed. To the contrary, because “substantial factor” is
undefined and can mean different things to different fact-
finders, and because it may cause factfinders to believe that
they must quantify and compare relative contributions of
different causes, the “substantial factor” test could cause
uncertainty and confusion, and it could cause factfinders to
believe—contrary to what the legislature intended, as evi-
denced by the text, context, and legislative history of the
GEI statute—that the GEI defense does not apply unless
a defendant proves that their mental disease or defect
accounted for a specific (but unspecified) amount or portion
of their lack of capacity.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Court of Appeals erred in its conclu-
sion regarding what a defendant must show to prove the
required connection between their mental disease or defect
and their lack of capacity, we again remand the case to the
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
BUSHONG, J., concurring.
The majority opinion concludes that the Court of
Appeals erred in interpreting ORS 161.295, which required
defendant to prove that his requisite lack of capacity occurred
“as a result of “ a mental disease or defect to establish his
“guilty except for insanity” (GEI) defense. I agree with the
majority opinion that the “sufficient by itself” test adopted
by the Court of Appeals to establish that causal link was not
what the legislature intended, and I agree with the majority
opinion that, to establish a GEI defense, a defendant’s mental
disease or defect may combine with other conditions to cause
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
473
the required lack of capacity. I also agree that the appropriate
disposition is to reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I write separately because, in my view, the majority
opinion’s conclusion that the dictionary definition of the word
“result” is sufficient to define the causal link, neither reflects
what the legislature intended nor provides enough guidance
to mental health experts and trial courts when confront-
ing the causation element of a GEI defense. Rather, when
the legislature adopted ORS 161.295 as part of Oregon’s
Criminal Code in 1971, I conclude that it intended for courts
to use substantial factor causation—which was widely used
by Oregon courts at that time—as the causal link required
to establish the GEI defense. In my view, that interpretation
provides appropriate guidance to mental health experts and
trial courts in resolving this complex factual issue.
The majority opinion declines to adopt substan-
tial factor causation, concluding that (1) the absence of a
“quantitative descriptor” in ORS 161.295(1) shows that
the legislature did not intend to adopt substantial factor
causation; (2) substantial factor causation is taken from
civil negligence law, and we have cautioned against using
civil negligence standards in the criminal law context; and
(3) unlike the dictionary definition adopted by the major-
ity opinion, substantial factor causation is unclear, would
cause uncertainty and confusion, and could be misleading
to juries. But the majority opinion reads too much into the
absence of a “quantitative descriptor” in the statute, and
not enough from the fact that substantial factor causation
was widely used in civil negligence and other cases in the
1960s and 1970s. That fact alone suggests that the legisla-
ture intended to adopt substantial factor causation when it
enacted ORS 161.295(1) in 1971. Many juries have applied
substantial factor causation, suggesting that it is not as
unclear, uncertain, confusing, or misleading as the majority
opinion states. Those criticisms fairly apply to the major-
ity opinion’s approach because, although it defines the term
“result,” it declines to endorse any established legal test for
the causation element of the GEI defense.
Ultimately,
although
the
difference
between
our approaches boils down to the word “substantial,” the
474
State v. Meiser
distance between them is relatively short. Under the major-
ity opinion’s decision, a defendant asserting a GEI defense
could establish the defense if the factfinder concludes that
their lack of capacity was “a result” or “a consequence” or
“an effect” of a mental disease or defect. That appears to be
just another way of saying that the mental disease or defect
must be a factor in causing the requisite lack of capacity.
Under the approach set forth below, to establish the GEI
defense, a defendant’s mental disease or defect must be a
substantial factor in causing the requisite lack of capacity.
As I will explain, “substantial factor” is no less clear
than the dictionary definition of “result” adopted by the
majority opinion, and it is more likely what the legislature
intended when it enacted ORS 161.295(1) in 1971 against
the backdrop of well-established Oregon law at that time.
The test is also demonstrably well-suited to juries evalu-
ating the factual complexity of co-occurring mental condi-
tions. Accordingly, I would conclude that, to prevail on a GEI
defense, a defendant must prove that, when they committed
the offense at issue, their mental disease or defect was a
substantial factor in bringing about their lack of substan-
tial capacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct
or to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. And
I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to decide
whether the evidentiary record compelled a finding that
defendant was GEI under that standard.
I begin with a brief explanation of why the majority
opinion’s dictionary definition provides no more clarity than
substantial factor causation before turning to why substan-
tial factor causation is what the legislature likely intended
when it adopted the GEI statute.
THE MAJORITY OPINION’S DICTIONARY
DEFINITION
The first time we addressed this case, we deter-
mined that the Court of Appeals had erred in State v. Meiser,
308 Or App 570, 481 P3d 375 (2021) (Meiser I), when it con-
cluded that “defendant could prevail on his GEI defense
only if he proved that his co-occurring personality disorder
played no part in causing the requisite lack of substantial
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
475
capacity.” State v. Meiser, 369 Or 347, 361, 506 P3d 402 (2022)
(Meiser II) (emphasis in original). We remanded to the Court
of Appeals to address two unresolved questions: whether the
evidence in the record compelled findings that (1) defendant
lacked the substantial capacity either to appreciate the crim-
inality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law;
and (2) defendant lacked that requisite capacity “as a result
of” a mental disease or defect. Id. We indicated that resolu-
tion of the second question “may turn on whether the phrase
‘as a result of’ in ORS 161.295(1) means that the qualifying
‘mental disease or defect’ must be sufficient, on its own, to
bring about the requisite incapacity, or whether the legisla-
ture intended to require some lesser degree of causal contri-
bution from the qualifying ‘mental disease or defect.’
” Id.
Thus, in Meiser II, we identified—but did not
decide—another specific statutory interpretation issue
regarding the GEI statute, directed the Court of Appeals
to interpret that provision, and indicated that one inter-
pretation that it could consider was the “sufficient by itself”
standard that the Court of Appeals ultimately adopted. Now
we reverse, indicating that the Court of Appeals erred in
adopting an interpretation that we had suggested it could
consider, and concluding that the dictionary definition of
“result” is sufficient to define the necessary causal link.1
I do not see the point in allowing review twice in
this case to interpret ORS 161.295(1) without clearly decid-
ing what causal link the legislature intended. Nor do I think
that a dictionary definition of the term “result” provides
mental health experts and trial courts adequate guidance
when they are confronted with a GEI defense. If the dictio-
nary definition alone is sufficient, we could have just said so
in our discussion of that definition when we first addressed
the statutory interpretation question. See Meiser II, 369 Or
at 360 (noting that the dictionary defines “result,” when used
as a noun, to mean “something that results as a consequence,
1 In Meiser II, we explained that, to prove the affirmative defense of GEI
under this statute, a defendant must establish that three elements existed at the
time of engaging in criminal conduct: (1) a mental disease or defect; (2) a lack of
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to con-
form the conduct to the requirements of law; and (3) “a causal link between the
two.” 369 Or at 354.
476
State v. Meiser
effect, issue, or conclusion” (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 1937 (unabridged ed 2002) (emphasis added))).
The fact that we did not decide the issue when we
cited the dictionary definition in Meiser II implicitly sug-
gests that the definition of the term “result” does not resolve
the issue.2 Moreover, “we have cautioned against relying
solely on dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of
statutory terms ‘without critically examining how the defi-
nition fits into the context of the statute itself.’
” Marshall v.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 371 Or 536, 543, 539 P3d 766
(2023) (quoting State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 461,
365 P3d 116 (2015)). That is because “[d]ictionary definitions
lack context and often fail to capture the nuanced connota-
tions conveyed by the normal use of a term in a particular
context.” Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or at 461. “Dictionaries,
after all, do not tell us what words mean, only what words
can mean, depending on their context and the particular
manner in which they are used.” State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68,
96, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (emphasis in original). And where,
as here, a statute uses an ordinary word that has a specific
legal significance, we typically do not rely solely on a dictio-
nary definition. See Kinzua Resources v. DEQ, 366 Or 674,
681, 468 P3d 410 (2020) (“[C]onsulting a dictionary does not
help us to resolve what the legislature intended the term
‘controlling’ to mean.”).
If the dictionary definition of the word “result”
alone provided the clarity to which the majority opinion
aspires, then perhaps it would suffice to adopt that stan-
dard, notwithstanding our implicit suggestion in Meiser II
that simply defining that term does not resolve the issue.
But characterizing that definition as “plain, natural, and
ordinary” does not make its meaning any clearer or more
precise. A factfinder deciding whether a defendant’s lack of
substantial capacity at the time of the charged offense was a
2 The majority opinion indicates we could not have resolved the meaning of
“as a result of” in Meiser II because that would have “prejudged” an issue that
the parties and the Court of Appeals had not yet addressed. ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 26: 8-10). But interpreting the statute is a legal question and we could have
decided that question if we thought that a dictionary definition resolved the issue.
My point is that our decision to remand in Meiser II after citing the dictionary
definition of “result” suggests that we did not consider the dictionary definition of
the statutory term to have provided an adequate and dispositive resolution.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
477
“result,” “consequence,” or “effect” of the defendant’s mental
disease or defect in the context of a co-occurring personality
disorder must still make a difficult assessment of the com-
plex interactions of overlapping disorders that have chal-
lenged mental health experts for decades.3 I do not see why
the majority opinion believes that telling jurors to apply the
dictionary definition of “result” will leave them any more
certain or less confused than telling them to assess whether
the defendant’s mental disease or defect was a “substantial
factor” in causing the requisite lack of capacity.
As I will explain, juries in Oregon and nationwide
have decided cases using substantial factor causation in var-
ious contexts for many decades, demonstrating that substan-
tial factor causation has not caused as much uncertainty or
confusion as the majority opinion suggests. In my view, when
the legislature adopted ORS 161.295(1) in 1971,4 it intended
to place this difficult decision in the hands of juries by apply-
ing an accepted legal test that was preferred by this court at
the time. Additionally, a fair reading of the legislative history
of the statute provides some support for the conclusion that
the prevailing causation principle strikes the balance that
the legislature intended when it enacted the GEI statute.
I summarize this court’s case law applying substan-
tial factor causation before turning to the legislative history
of ORS 161.295.
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR CAUSATION
Our case law analyzing causation in civil and crim-
inal cases has generally addressed two different tests, “but
for” and “substantial factor” causation. In most cases, as we
have recognized, the two tests lead to the same result, and
3 As one commentator explained, “[t]he clinical ability to reliably distin-
guish the functional impact of impairments arising from personality disorders
from those of other co-occurring mental disorders *
*
* is simply not supported in
clinical literature and experience.” Robert Kinscherff, Proposition: A Personality
Disorder May Nullify Responsibility for a Criminal Act, 38 J L Med & Ethics 745,
750 (2010); see also Natalie Abrams, Definitions of Mental Illness and the Insanity
Defense, 7 J Psychiatry & L 441, 448-50, 453 (1979) (describing the difficulty in
“show[ing] a causal connection between a ‘mental illness’ and a criminal act”).
4 We noted in Meiser II that the causation test—”’as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct’
”—was included in the
original statute that was enacted as part of the comprehensive Oregon Criminal
Code of 1971. Meiser II, 369 Or at 356 (quoting Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 36).
478
State v. Meiser
we have often used a but-for test to establish causation under
both criminal and civil law. State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359
Or 364, 470 n 61, 374 P3d 853 (2016) (noting that “[t]he two
tests, in all but rare circumstances, lead to the same conclu-
sion”); Joshi v. Providence Health System, 342 Or 152, 162,
149 P3d 1164 (2006) (pointing out that “the two standards
produce the same result in most cases”). We recently stated,
in Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 751, 525
P3d 451 (2023), that “the substantial factor standard ‘has
not supplanted’ the but-for standard of causation; rather,
‘the two standards apply to different types of negligence
cases.’
” (Quoting Joshi, 342 Or at 162).
But we also recognized that there is “at least one
situation in which a but-for instruction will not work.” Haas,
370 Or at 749. We explained that substantial factor causation
was developed “primarily for that circumstance—the situa-
tion in which the concurrent conduct of two or more causes
combine to create an injury, and either one of those causes,
operating alone, would have been sufficient to produce the
same result.” Id. at 750. We made the same observation in
Turnidge, 359 Or at 470 n 61, and in Joshi, 342 Or at 161.
In Joshi we explained that substantial factor
causation “is an improvement over the ‘but for’ rule for [that]
special class of cases” and for “two other types of situations
which have proved troublesome” for but-for causation. Id.
(quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of
Torts 267-68 (5th ed 1984)). One situation is where “a simi-
lar, but not identical result would have followed without the
defendant’s act.” Id. The other is where “one defendant has
made a clearly proved but quite insignificant contribution to
the result, as where he throws a lighted match into a forest
fire.” Id.
In those situations, we continue to apply substantial
factor causation. In addition, substantial factor causation
was routinely used in Oregon and nationwide during the
1960s and 1970s to establish factual causation in civil negli-
gence cases. See Elk Creek Management Co. v. Gilbert, 353 Or
565, 584, 303 P3d 929 (2013) (noting that, when the Oregon
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act was enacted in 1973,
“this court used the ‘substantial factor’ test to determine the
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
479
‘cause in fact’ of a plaintiff’s injuries”); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 431 (1965) (stating that a person’s conduct causes
harm to another if “his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm”).5
Before 1971, Oregon juries regularly used sub-
stantial factor causation to decide factual causation under
the common law. Dewey v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 233 Or
515, 541, 379 P2d 560 (1963) (O’Connell, J., concurring)
(explaining the causation standard as “a substantial factor
in physically producing the injury”); Babler Bros. v. Pac.
Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 464-65, 415 P2d 735 (1966)
(adopting the views of the concurring opinion in Dewey and
holding that “it is for the trier of fact to say whether (a) the
conduct complained of was a substantial cause of the harm,
and (b) whether the conduct in question was negligent”);
Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 606, 469 P2d
783 (1970) (describing “[t]he scope of the liability of an actor
whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury”);
Furrer v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or 494, 511, 466 P2d
605 (1970) (approving substantial factor jury instruction
but noting that “[t]he term ‘substantial factor’ expresses a
concept of relativity which is difficult to reduce to further
definiteness”).
In Furrer, we made it clear that “[t]he proper use of
the substantial factor test” as adopted in the 1948 revision of
the Restatement “has limited its application very definitely
to the fact of causation alone.” Id. at 510-11 (quoting Prosser
on Torts § 49, 297 (3d ed 1964)). And in Babler Bros., this
court overruled prior precedent to make it clear that using
substantial factor causation to establish factual causation
“will, in most cases, avoid the conceptual debate about
5 Substantial factor causation is a factual question to be decided by juries.
See Restatement (Second) § 434(2)(a). That distinguishes it from the Restatement’s
concepts of “legal” or “proximate” causation. Under the Restatement’s approach,
legal or proximate cause presented a legal question that would be decided by
courts as a matter of law. Restatement (Second) §§ 431, 453 (explaining that “legal
cause” requires a court to decide whether there is any rule of law that relieves a
negligent actor from liability “because of the manner in which his negligence has
resulted in the harm” even if a jury could find that the actor’s negligence was a
substantial factor in causing the harm); see also Hills v. McGillvrey, 240 Or 476,
482, 402 P2d 722 (1965) (noting that the “difficulty” with the 1934 Restatement’s
discussion of proximate cause “is that it assumes that it is the function of the
court rather than of the jury” to determine proximate cause).
480
State v. Meiser
‘proximate’ cause, and will focus upon the proper function of
the jury.” 244 Or at 464-65.6
We have also applied the substantial factor standard
to determine factual causation in two different types of med-
ical malpractice cases. In McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical,
270 Or 375, 528 P2d 522 (1974), the plaintiff alleged that she
was harmed after using oral contraceptives that had been
manufactured by two different pharmaceutical companies.
This court held that “[t]he respective liability of multiple
defendants depends upon whether the negligence of each
was a substantial factor in producing the complained of
harm.” Id. at 418. In that context, we explained, the plaintiff
need not show that each defendant’s negligence was “suffi-
cient to bring about the plaintiff’s harm by itself;” rather, it
was enough that each defendant “substantially contributed
to the injuries eventually suffered by [the plaintiff].” Id.
In the other medical malpractice case, Simpson
v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 284 Or 547, 588 P2d 4
(1978), this court held that the trial court did not err in
instructing the jury on substantial factor causation to deter-
mine whether plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a hospital’s
negligent failure to take adequate x-rays of his spine. We
explained that “[w]e have approved the use of the substan-
tial factor formula in numerous cases” and concluded that,
“
‘as applied to the fact of causation alone, no better test has
been devised.’
” Id. at 560 (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts
240, § 41 (4th ed 1971)).
Although substantial factor causation is no lon-
ger used as widely in civil negligence cases, as we noted in
Haas, Oregon courts still routinely use substantial factor
causation in employment discrimination cases. See Holien
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 90 n 5, 689 P2d 1292
6 The majority opinion states that civil negligence law was “evolving” during
the 1960s, and that substantial factor causation was used in different ways, with
the court at times using the term to include the concepts of legal or proximate
cause. ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 37:6-10). That was true during the 1950s and
1960s. But using “substantial factor” causation to include legal or proximate
cause—which are matters that would be decided by the court—was the reason
that this court in Babler Bros. overruled an earlier case that had misapplied the
causation analysis. 244 Or at 464. And by 1970, when we decided Furrer, we made
it clear that the proper use of substantial factor causation was limited to factual
causation. 258 Or at 510-11.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
481
(1984) (stating that “[a] common law or statutory cause of
action for wrongful discharge emanating from sex discrim-
ination is restricted to cases when sex is for no legitimate
reason a substantial factor in the discrimination”); Seitz
v. State, 100 Or App 665, 675, 788 P2d 1004 (1990) (“We
use the ‘substantial factor’ test to determine whether [the]
plaintiff’s protected activities were the cause of [the] defen-
dant’s adverse [employment] actions.”).7
Substantial factor causation was preferred in the
1960s and 1970s in part because, intuitively, it made sense
in a way that was easy to understand. See Leon Green, The
Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich L Rev 543
(1962) (arguing for widespread use of the substantial factor
test because it avoids the hypothetical thinking required
under the but-for test and directly applies the kind of judg-
ments implicit in causal decision-making, thus yielding a
lower rate of error)8; Restatement (Second) § 431 comment a
(substantial factor test captures the common-sense under-
standing of causation, rather than the “philosophic sense”
of causation represented by the but-for test, which could
include events “so insignificant that no ordinary mind would
think of them as causes”).
In summary, our case law recognizes that a sub-
stantial factor test was widely used in civil negligence
cases to establish factual causation during the 1960s and
1970s—contemporaneous with Oregon’s enactment of ORS
161.295(1).9 Additionally, that test is still used to determine
7 A uniform jury instruction used in employment discrimination cases states
that “[a] substantial factor is one that made a difference in an employment deci-
sion; that is, the decision would not have been made without it. It need not be the
only factor.” UCJI 59A.03.
8 Leon Green’s article was cited favorably by the concurring opinion in
Dewey, 233 Or at 544 (O’Connell, J., concurring) (stating that “the work of Leon
Green most closely relates to the position which I have taken”). As noted above,
this court later adopted the views expressed by Justice O’Connell in his Dewey
concurrence. See Babler Bros., 244 Or at 464-65 (citing concurring opinion in
Dewey and adopting that approach because it avoids “the conceptual debate about
‘proximate’ cause and *
*
* focus[es] upon the proper function of the jury”).
9 The majority opinion states that cases decided after the 1971 enactment of
ORS 161.295(1) are irrelevant to determining the legislature’s intent. I agree, but
those cases are relevant to my point, which is that substantial factor causation
has been applied by juries for decades, and that, as a test of factual causation,
it is not as uncertain or confusing as the majority opinions suggests. In fact,
482
State v. Meiser
factual causation in employment discrimination and some
civil tort cases because we have recognized that, in those
situations, substantial factor causation is an improvement
over but-for causation. As I will explain, analyzing whether
a criminal defendant’s lack of capacity was “a result of” a
mental disease or defect in the context of co-occurring men-
tal conditions presents another situation where substantial
factor is the better test for factual causation.
The more common test, but-for causation, is typi-
cally applied when assessing the effects of discrete, readily
separable links in a causal chain. Turnidge, 359 Or at 471
(conduct occurring “early in the chain of causation *
*
* may
be a ‘but-for’ cause by resulting in a series of forces or events
that follow to cause the injury, each of which is also a link
in the causal chain without which the injury would not have
resulted”). We concluded in Turnidge that, for purposes of
criminal responsibility in general, “[t]he test of causation
for most circumstances is whether, ‘but for’ the defendant’s
conduct, the event would not have occurred.” 359 Or at 481.
Where the specified result follows from such a chain of
events, we explained, the defendant’s role does “not have to
be the last link in the chain, or the only one, for the jury to
make that determination.” Id. at 482.
Similarly, in the civil tort cases that use a but-for
test, a jury is often asked to determine whether a defendant’s
conduct, or something else within a sequence of events,
caused a plaintiff’s injury, as in Haas and Joshi. But where
a jury is called on to assess an individual’s motivation, as in
employment discrimination cases, we have consistently used
substantial factor as the test for causation. See, e.g., Ossanna
v. Nike, Inc., 365 Or 196, 214, 445 P3d 281 (2019) (applying
substantial factor causation). Assessing a criminal defen-
dant’s mental condition to determine whether their lack of
capacity was a result of a mental disease or defect is like
evaluating an employer’s motivation for an employment deci-
sion. Both circumstances require evaluating mental states
that exist concurrently in a person’s mind—which are nei-
ther discrete links in a causal chain, nor readily separable
by 1978, when we decided Simpson, we thought that “no better test has been
devised.” 284 Or at 560.
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
483
events or conditions. Analytically, that context is different
from assessing whether one event in a chain caused a partic-
ular result, as is common in many criminal and civil cases.
That is why, in my view, assessing a criminal defendant’s
co-occurring mental disorders is another situation where
substantial factor causation is the superior standard.
The majority opinion declines to adopt substantial
factor causation, noting that the legislature did not include
a “quantitative descriptor” in the statute and the legislative
history does not mention “substantial factor” causation at
all.10 Those observations are correct, and I do not dispute
that they could mean that the legislature intended to reject
substantial factor causation. But that is not the only inter-
pretation, nor is it necessarily the most natural. Where, as
here, the legislature uses the phrase—”as a result of”—to
describe a causal link without defining the word “result” or
discussing in the legislative history what it was intended to
mean, we search for the intended meaning of the term in
the context of the statute. The absence of any specific men-
tion of “substantial factor” causation in the text or legisla-
tive history of the statute might mean that the legislature
intended to reject it, as the majority opinion suggests. But
it could also mean that the legislature did not consider or
discuss the issue, or that it assumed that courts would apply
the causation standard that was prevailing at the time.
The majority opinion also states that allowing
juries to decide whether a criminal defendant is GEI using
substantial factor causation would import civil tort law
principles into the criminal law, contrary to our caution-
ary note in Turnidge. However, our cautionary note in that
case primarily addressed the “difficulty with extending the
10 The majority opinion notes that no party has advocated for using substan-
tial factor causation for a GEI defense and suggests that defendant argued in
favor of a dictionary definition. ___ Or at ___ n 6 (slip op at 26 n 6). Defendant
argued that the Court of Appeals misapplied the dictionary definition but advo-
cated for a “lesser degree” of causation than the “independent sufficiency” test
adopted by the Court of Appeals. Defendant did not take a position on what that
“lesser degree” should be, concluding that defining the causal link is not neces-
sary because the record in this case shows that defendant’s schizophrenia was
“the predominant driver” of his behaviors. Thus, while it is true that no party
advocated for using substantial factor causation, it is also true that no party
contended that the dictionary definition alone should be used to define the causal
link.
484
State v. Meiser
common-law doctrine of proximate cause in the criminal
law context[.]” 359 Or at 472 n 62. I am not suggesting that
we do that. But with due respect to our own admonition, we
should import a civil tort principle into criminal law if we
conclude that that is what the legislature intended.
The majority opinion further observes that, as we
stated in Haas, instructing a jury on substantial factor
causation can be misleading: “As the Restatement (Third) of
Torts section 26 comment j (2010) points out, a substantial
factor instruction may cause confusion because it can lead
a jury erroneously to believe that it must search for a most
significant causal factor, when that is not required.” Haas,
370 Or at 755. But juries have been applying substantial fac-
tor causation in employment discrimination and certain civil
negligence cases for decades. See, e.g., Lasley v. Combined
Transport, Inc., 351 Or 1, 11, 261 P3d 1215 (2011) (jury deter-
mined whether defendant’s spilling of glass panes onto the
freeway was a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s
death); Crosbie v. Asante, 322 Or App 250, 255-56, 519 P3d
551 (2022) (noting that, to prevail on an employment discrim-
ination or retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that a
protected trait or activity “was a ‘substantial factor’
” in an
adverse employment decision). Other courts have not found
substantial factor causation to be too confusing. See Mitchell
v. Gonzales, 54 Cal 3d 1041, 1052, 819 P2d 872 (1991) (describ-
ing substantial factor causation as “
‘sufficiently intelligible
to any layman to furnish an adequate guide to the jury’
”
(quoting Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 Cal L
Rev 369, 379 (1950))). Any potential confusion in the context
of a GEI defense can be avoided by instructing the jury that
“substantial factor” causation does not mean that the jury
is to compare the relative importance of multiple causes or
search for the most significant causal factor.11
11 Uniform Civil Jury Instruction 23.02 clarifies how juries are to apply the
standard:
“Many factors may operate either independently or together to cause harm.
In such a case, each may be a cause of the harm even though the others by
themselves would have been sufficient to cause the same harm. If you find
that defendant’s act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the harm
to the plaintiff, you may find that the defendant’s conduct caused the harm
even though it was not the only cause. A substantial factor is an important
factor and not one that is insignificant.”
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
485
The majority opinion suggests that substantial
factor causation is unclear because the law does not define
it. But as noted above, one of the reasons the law favored
substantial factor causation at the time was the fact that it
reflected a common-sense understanding that juries could
apply without further definition. As we stated in Simpson,
“as applied to the fact of causation alone, no better test has
been devised.” 284 Or at 560 (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts
§ 41, 240 (4th ed 1971)). The fact that juries have been able
to apply it without difficulty in many civil negligence and
employment discrimination cases sufficiently demonstrates
that no further definition is needed.
Ultimately, the majority opinion’s dictionary defini-
tion of “result” and its misgivings about applying substan-
tial factor causation in this context do not foreclose applying
that standard to give effect to the legislature’s intent when
it enacted ORS 161.295(1) in 1971. And, as I will explain
next, although the legislative history is not clear, its silence
more likely indicates that the legislature intended for juries
to use substantial factor causation in determining whether
a criminal defendant was GEI when the defendant commit-
ted the charged offense.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ORS 161.295
We explained in Meiser II that the “causal link”
included in subsection (1) of ORS 161.295 was enacted in
1971 and was left unchanged by the 1983 amendment to
subsection (2) of the statute. 369 Or at 359. The statute’s
context and legislative history shed some additional light
on what the legislature intended in 1971 when it used “as a
result of” to describe the causal link between a defendant’s
mental disease or defect and the requisite lack of capacity.
We noted in Turnidge that Oregon had adopted the 1971
Criminal Code—including the GEI statute—”against the
backdrop” of developments in the common law, including
specifically Oregon’s rejection of the concept of “proximate
cause.” Turnidge, 359 Or at 480. And, as noted above, that
common law “backdrop” included the routine use of substan-
tial factor causation to determine cause-in-fact.
486
State v. Meiser
It reasonably follows that the legislature would have
intended to use the same causation standard that was widely
used in 1971—substantial factor causation—as the causal
link for the GEI defense. The legislative history of that stat-
ute does not clearly explain what causal link the legislature
intended, as the majority opinion acknowledges. However, in
my view, that history provides some support for concluding
that substantial factor was the intended causal test.
The commentary to the 1971 Criminal Code revi-
sions explains that ORS 161.295(1) was taken from section
4.01 of the Model Penal Code with a few minor changes
in wording.12 See Commentary to Criminal Law Revision
Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft
and Report § 36, 34 (July 1970). That commentary and the
commentary to section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code both
use the phrase “as a result of” repeatedly to describe the
causal connection without clearly explaining what that
phrase was intended to mean.13 However, the commentary
to section 4.01 also suggests that the drafters of the Model
Penal Code were concerned, generally, about adopting a rule
that allowed juries to apply the insanity defense too broadly.
That commentary explains why the drafters of
the Model Penal Code declined to adopt the “Durham
12 Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code provides:
“(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
“(2) As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct.”
13 The commentary to section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code reveals that the
drafters focused on the “substantial capacity” standard, not whether a lack of
substantial capacity was “as a result of” a mental disease or defect. See Model
Penal Code § 4.01 comment 3 at 172 (stating that the adoption of the substantial
capacity standard “may well be the Code’s most significant alteration of the pre-
vailing tests[,]” acknowledging that “substantial” is “an open ended concept[,]”
but concluding that it would be “sufficiently precise for purposes of practical
administration”). The “substantial capacity” standard proposed in the Model
Penal Code was partially adopted in United States v. Currens, 290 F2d 751, 774
(3d Cir 1961) (“The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the
prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked sub-
stantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he
is alleged to have violated.”).
Cite as 372 Or 438 (2024)
487
rule”—based on Durham v. United States, 214 F2d 862
(DC Cir 1954)—even though that rule had been “warmly
supported by psychiatrists at the time.” Model Penal Code
§ 4.01 comment 3 at 173-74 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985). Under the Durham rule, “an accused is
not criminally responsible if [their] conduct was the product
of mental disease or defect.” 214 F2d at 874-75 (emphasis
added).14 As they explain, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code were concerned that using “the product of” to describe
the causal link between a mental disease or defect and ille-
gal conduct could be interpreted to mean “that the crime
would not have been committed but for the presence of the
mental disease or defect.” Model Penal Code § 4.01 comment
3 at 173. In their view, “[that] interpretation [was] too broad”
because it would capture motivations for criminal activity
inspired by delusional beliefs or attitudes, even if the per-
son’s capacity to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness
of their conduct was not substantially impaired. Id.15 Thus,
the drafters of the Model Penal Code wanted to be clear that
a defendant’s lack of substantial capacity—not the illegal
conduct itself—must occur “as a result of” the defendant’s
mental disease or defect.
Unfortunately, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code did not elaborate on what “as a result of” was intended
to mean, and the commentary to Oregon’s revised Criminal
Code does not explain what that phrase was intended to
mean either. That commentary reveals only that Oregon,
like the Model Penal Code, rejected the Durham rule in
part because of the “troublesome causal questions” raised
by its application. See Commentary § 36 at 36 (“Like the
14 The DC Circuit later overruled Durham and adopted a rule based on sec-
tion 4.01 of the Model Penal Code. United States v. Brawner, 471 F2d 969, 994-95
(DC Cir 1972).
15 The Model Penal Code commentary offered an example. If a person mur-
ders a wealthy relative believing, as a result of a mental disease or defect, that
they will inherit a large amount of money upon the relative’s death, the murderer
would be relieved of responsibility under a but-for test. But the murderer should
still be held responsible, the commentary explains, if their capacity for under-
standing and control were not otherwise impaired by mental illness, because
that situation would be morally indistinguishable from someone who does not
have a mental illness and commits a murder to receive an inheritance. Model
Penal Code § 4.01 comment 3 at 173 n 24.
488
State v. Meiser
Model Penal Code § 4.01, the Currens test[16] recognizes
variations in degree and allows wide scope for expert tes-
timony without the troublesome causal questions raised by
Durham.”). Rejecting the Durham rule and its potentially
sweeping application suggests that the drafters of both the
Model Penal Code and the Oregon statute were generally
concerned about adopting a standard that permitted too
broad an interpretation of the causal link between a mental
disease or defect and a defendant’s illegal conduct.
The majority opinion’s dictionary definition would
allow juries to find that a defendant was GEI at the time
of the offense if the defendant’s lack of substantial capacity
was a “result” or “consequence” or “effect” of a mental dis-
ease or defect. In my view, because the legislature was con-
cerned, generally, about an overbroad application of the GEI
defense, it more likely intended that the mental disease or
defect must be a substantial factor in causing a defendant’s
lack of capacity—not just a factor—consistent with the pre-
vailing causation standard at the time.17
Because I agree with the majority opinion’s disposi-
tion of this case, but disagree with some of its reasoning, I
respectfully concur.
Nakamoto, S.J., joins in this concurring opinion.
JAMES, J., concurring.
I join fully in the majority opinion except as to sec-
tion E(3)(c).
Masih, J., joins in this concurring opinion.
16 See Currens, 290 F2d at 774 (stating that “[t]he jury must be satisfied that
at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of men-
tal disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated”). Like the com-
mentary to the Model Penal Code and Oregon’s 1971 revised Criminal Code, the
Currens court did not discuss what it meant when it used the term “as a result of”
to describe the required causal link.
17 The fact that the majority opinion and this concurrence disagree about the
causation analysis that should be used to establish a GEI defense suggests that
further legislation clarifying the intended approach might be warranted. | 615a7b9a68ca510f4932944686ea2fa39ebd5c2b4e0d5e421285478d5c277e3f | 2024-06-13T00:00:00Z |
ad3127e8-db1f-4393-907f-390d5dd2e314 | Sizemore v. Myers | null | S48919 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 28, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48919)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record October 24, 2001.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memorandum for respondent. With her on the
answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11).
PER CURIAM
This ballot title review proceeding under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
has denominated as Initiative Petition 103 (2002). We review the
Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a)
to (d). See ORS 250.085(5) (stating that requirement).
Petitioner challenges all parts of the Attorney
General's certified ballot title. We have considered
petitioner's arguments and determine that they are not well
taken. Accordingly we certify to the Secretary of State the
following ballot title for the proposed measure:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ENTITLES VOTERS TO PREVENT
SALE,
PROTECT PRIVACY OF THEIR PETITION SIGNATURES;
CREATES
IMPLEMENTING, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote entitles
registered voters to prevent sale, protect privacy of
their petition signatures; creates provisions
implementing, enforcing that right, and requiring fines
for violations.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects creation
of constitutional right for registered voters to
prevent the sale, and protect the privacy of their
signatures on initiative, referendum petitions.
SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Entitles
registered voters to prevent their signatures on
initiative or referendum petitions from being sold.
Bars Secretary of State from approving petition for
circulation unless petition clearly gives signers
opportunity to indicate choice not to have signature
sold. If signer so indicates, no one may pay for
obtaining signature or transmitting it to Secretary.
Names, addresses of signers may not be used for
commercial solicitation, other purposes unrelated to
qualifying measure for ballot. Requires minimum $250
fine for each unauthorized sale, knowing use, or
transfer of information to third party. Does not
prohibit payment for signature gathering by hour or on
salary where amount of payment not determined by number
of signers who have indicated choice not to have
signatures sold. Other provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11). | 9b8c2065972e22e9f0a1995588a555dc76fd2bfebc2e009b00820680ed425b4e | 2001-12-28T00:00:00Z |
21bb27a8-b21f-4967-954d-1f014919fadf | State v. Aranda | null | S069641 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 19
May 31, 2024
363
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
STEPHEN ANDREW ARANDA,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 19CR07375) (CA A171800) (SC S069641)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted February 1, 2023.
Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
David L. Sherbo-Huggins, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for respondent on review. Also on the briefs
was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section.
Aliza B. Kaplan, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland,
filed the brief on behalf of amici curiae Coalition for Prior
Conviction Impeachment Reform, Boston University Center
for Antiracist Research, and Criminal Justice Reform Clinic
at Lewis & Clark Law School. Also on the brief was Anna K.
Sortun, Tonkon Torp LLP, Portland.
Rosalind M. Lee, Rosalind Manson Lee LLC, Eugene,
and Monica Milton, Public Defense Counsel, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington, D.C.,
filed the brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association and National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, respectively.
______________
* Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Charles Zennaché, Judge. 319
Or App 178, 509 P3d 152 (2022).
364
State v. Aranda
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, and Masih, Justices, and Walters and Nakamoto,
Senior Judges, Justice pro tempore.**
DEHOOG, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Walters, S.J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Duncan, and Masih, JJ., joined.
______________
** Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the
decision of this case. Bushong and James, JJ., did not participate in the consider-
ation or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
365
DEHOOG, J.
Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 609(1) expressly
requires a trial court to allow the credibility of a witness
to be impeached with evidence that the witness has been
convicted of any felony. That rule applies to all witnesses,
including criminal defendants who testify in their own
behalf. The text of OEC 609 does not allow a trial court to
weigh the probative value of a witness’s conviction history
against its potential for unfair prejudice, nor does it grant
courts discretion to exclude evidence based on the results of
such balancing. Moreover, under our case law, trial courts
may not subject OEC 609 evidence to that assessment under
OEC 403, which, when applicable, provides for such bal-
ancing. See State v. King, 307 Or 332, 336-37, 768 P2d 391
(1989) (OEC 609 does not permit trial courts to conduct OEC
403 balancing).1
Nonetheless, relying on our decisions in State
v. Williams, 357 Or 1, 346 P3d 455 (2015), and State v.
Baughman, 361 Or 386, 393 P3d 1132 (2017), and also on
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, defendant contends—as he
has consistently contended at all stages of this case—that
OEC 403 balancing is required upon a criminal defendant’s
request whenever the state seeks to impeach the defendant’s
testimony with OEC 609(1) evidence. The Court of Appeals
agreed with that argument and, because the trial court had
declined to conduct OEC 403 balancing in his case, reversed
defendant’s conviction and remanded to the trial court to
conduct that balancing. State v. Aranda, 319 Or App 178,
189-90, 509 P3d 152 (2022).
1 When applicable, OEC 403 permits trial courts to exclude evidence upon
determining that its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice[.]” We review the decision whether to exclude evidence on that
basis for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 311, 4 P3d 1261
(2000) (“A decision to exclude evidence under OEC 403 is reserved to the trial
court’s discretion. That is so because application of OEC 403 may allow for more
than one legally correct outcome. For example, in some cases, the record may
support either the admission or exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence under
OEC 403, and neither result legally would be incorrect.”) (internal ellipses and
citations omitted). In this opinion, we refer to the application of OEC 403 in accor-
dance with its terms—that is, balancing the probative value of evidence against
its potential for unfair prejudice and making the discretionary decision whether
to exclude the evidence—as “OEC 403 balancing.”
366
State v. Aranda
On review, the state contends that the Court of
Appeals erred. In the state’s view, the admission of evidence
that satisfies the requirements of a state evidentiary rule—
including OEC 609—does not violate due process. It follows,
the state reasons, that due process did not require the trial
court to conduct OEC 403 balancing to protect defendant’s
due process rights.2 The state further argues that the Court
of Appeals’ conclusion that due process required OEC 403
balancing in defendant’s case reflects a misunderstanding
of our decisions in Williams and Baughman.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, but
we do so on more limited grounds than those advanced by
the state. Before explaining that conclusion, we will briefly
address an argument that defendant raises in his sur-reply
brief, namely, that we should affirm the Court of Appeals’
decision as being “right for the wrong reason.” See, e.g., State
v. Edmonds, 364 Or 410, 415, 435 P3d 752 (2019) (explain-
ing that “the right for the wrong reason doctrine” permits a
lower court’s ruling to be affirmed on grounds the court did
not consider, provided certain conditions are met). We ulti-
mately decline defendant’s “right for the wrong reason” argu-
ment and, instead, adhere to this court’s holding in King, in
which we held that OEC 609 does not permit trial courts
to subject evidence admissible under its terms to OEC 403
balancing. 307 Or at 336-37. Then, turning to defendant’s
contention that OEC 403 balancing is nonetheless required
as a matter of due process, we conclude, after applying the
applicable United States Supreme Court framework, that
defendant’s contention is unfounded. Although we recognize
that the absence of balancing under either OEC 609 or OEC
403 means that some defendants who wish to testify in their
own trials must make a difficult choice—one that effectively
balances the benefits of testifying against the potential con-
sequences of having their testimony impeached by any qual-
ifying conviction history they have—we cannot conclude
that due process requires OEC 403 balancing before such
2 We do not understand the state to argue that, if in fact evidence admissible
under the terms of OEC 609 would violate defendant’s right to due process, the
trial court would nonetheless be required to admit that evidence due to the man-
datory language of OEC 609 (stating that evidence that meets requirements of
rule “shall be admitted”).
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
367
evidence may be admitted. As a result, the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that OEC 403 balancing is a constitutional
requirement, and we, therefore, affirm the judgment of
conviction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. Facts and Trial Court Proceedings
In 2019, defendant was charged with first-degree
rape after the victim reported that he had forcibly subjected
her to sexual intercourse. The charged conduct took place
following a birthday party at which both defendant and the
victim had been guests. Although numerous other guests
from the party testified at trial about the victim and defen-
dant’s interactions, many of the guests had been drinking at
the party, and their testimony varied dramatically regard-
ing those interactions.
Defendant did not dispute that he had engaged
in sexual conduct with the victim; the issue at trial was
whether that conduct had been consensual, and defen-
dant intended to take the stand to testify that it had been.
Defendant anticipated, however, that, when he took the
stand, the state would seek to impeach his credibility by
introducing evidence under OEC 609 that, in 2008, he had
been convicted of multiple felonies in two separate cases. In
one case, defendant had pleaded no contest to two counts
of first-degree sexual abuse for events that had occurred
in 2002, when he was 15. In a second case, defendant had
pleaded no contest to second-degree assault for events aris-
ing out of an alcohol-related car accident.
As discussed in greater detail later in this opinion,
OEC 609(1) permits any witness to be impeached with evi-
dence that the witness has previously been convicted of a
felony3 or a crime involving a false statement or dishonesty:
“(1) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of
3 As in prior decisions, we use the term “felony” as shorthand for convic-
tions rendered admissible by OEC 609(1)(a) (applying to convictions for crimes
“punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted”). See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 367 Or 594, 599 n 4,
482 P3d 52 (2021) (so explaining).
368
State v. Aranda
a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record, but only if the crime:
“(a) Was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness
was convicted; or
“(b) Involved false statement or dishonesty.”
Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine,
seeking to limit the state’s introduction of OEC 609 evi-
dence to impeach his testimony. Relying on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, defendant contended that, unless the trial
court first engaged in OEC 403 balancing regarding his con-
victions for first-degree sexual assault and second-degree
assault, admitting that evidence as impeachment under
OEC 609 would violate his right to due process. When appli-
cable, OEC 403 grants trial courts the discretion to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence as follows:
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless pre-
sentation of cumulative evidence.”
At the motion hearing, defendant acknowledged
that this court had previously held as a matter of statutory
interpretation that evidence admissible under OEC 609(1) is
not subject to OEC 403 balancing. See King, 307 Or at 336-37
(so holding). Defendant contended, however, that OEC 403
balancing was required as a matter of due process. He relied
on this court’s decision in Williams, 357 Or 1, contending
that we held in that case that due process requires courts
to conduct OEC 403 balancing before admitting “other acts”
evidence under OEC 404(4). See OEC 404(4) (providing in
part that, “[i]n criminal actions, evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts by the defendant is admissible if relevant
except as otherwise provided by” various other rules of law,
including, “to the extent required by the United States
Constitution[,]” OEC 403). Defendant argued that, to pre-
vent undue prejudice, even if the trial court did not wholly
exclude his conviction history, it should at least limit the
impeachment evidence to the fact of the felony convictions
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
369
and prohibit any naming of the specific crimes for which he
had been convicted.
In response, the state indicated that it did not
intend to offer defendant’s prior convictions for any purpose
other than impeachment. The state also explained that it
would be asking defendant only whether he had been con-
victed of one count of second-degree assault and two counts
of first-degree sexual abuse; it did not intend to otherwise
mention the specific convictions by name.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to limit
the state’s introduction of OEC 609 evidence to impeach
his testimony. The court explained its understanding that,
if defendant took the stand, OEC 609(1)(a) would allow the
state to impeach him with his prior convictions, which would
be admissible solely for purposes of attacking his credibility.
The court further explained that no other rule of evidence or
provision of the Oregon Constitution required it to balance
the potentially prejudicial effect of that evidence against its
probative value. Moreover, the trial court stated, it was set-
tled law in Oregon that the state could identify defendant’s
convictions by name; it would not be limited to letting the
jury know that defendant had been convicted.
In rejecting defendant’s argument that OEC 403
balancing was required under the federal constitution as a
matter of due process, the trial court explained that, in its
view, there were three reasons not to extend the reasoning of
Williams, 357 Or at 4, to defendant’s case. First, in Williams,
the state had sought to use “other acts” evidence in its case-
in-chief. Here, in contrast, the state would not be permitted
to introduce defendant’s conviction history unless he chose
to take the stand; defendant, therefore, controlled whether
the jury heard that evidence. Second, the court explained,
it would be instructing the jurors that they could consider
defendant’s conviction history for only its bearing, if any, on
his credibility. The court added that jurors were presumed
to know their obligations and to follow instructions, and so
could be expected to follow them here. And third, the court
noted, defendant had been unable to identify any other juris-
diction that had held that due process required balancing in
the impeachment context.
370
State v. Aranda
Before any evidence of defendant’s conviction his-
tory was introduced at trial, the court gave a precaution-
ary instruction telling the jury that it was not to consider
that evidence except for purposes of assessing defendant’s
credibility:
“If you find the defendant has previously been convicted of
a crime, you may consider this conviction only for its bear-
ing, if any, on the credibility of the defendant. Specifically,
you may not use this evidence for the purpose of drawing
the inference that[,] because the defendant was convicted of
a previous crime, the defendant may be guilty of the crime
charged in this case.”
Defense counsel entered a continuing objection to
any identification by name of the felonies for which defen-
dant had been convicted. When defendant took the stand for
direct examination, he acknowledged that he had previously
been convicted of three felonies, but he did not identify any
conviction by name.4 The state, in turn, asked defendant the
following questions on cross-examination:
“Q These *
*
* prior convictions that you have back in
2008, isn’t it correct that one of them is for Assault in the
Second Degree, a felony?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And the other two are for Sexual Abuse in the First
Degree, both felonies?
“A Yes, sir.”
In its closing instructions to the jury, the trial court
again stated that prior convictions were to be used for only
purposes of assessing credibility: “If you find that a witness
has been convicted of a crime, you may consider this con-
viction only for its bearing, if any, on the credibility of the
witness.”
4 The exchange between defense counsel and defendant was as follows:
“Q Okay. And—*
*
* well, sir, have you ever been convicted of any felony
offenses in Linn County Circuit Court, say, I think in *
*
* 2008, like August
of 2008?
“A Yes.
“Q And there were three ** * felony offenses?
“A Yes.”
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
371
The state itself made that point in its closing
argument:
“In your final instructions there—I think it made it
into the preliminary, too—but in your final instructions
there you see this other one about the defendant’s prior
felony convictions. These can only be used by you to deter-
mine whether the defendant is a credible witness; that is,
whether you believe him or not, okay?”
Although the state had previously named defendant’s fel-
ony convictions, it did not remind the jury of the specific
crimes of conviction during closing argument. The state also
focused during closing on how the conviction history bore on
the issue of witness credibility, implicitly contrasting defen-
dant’s conviction history with that of the witnesses against
him, who had no conviction history:
“It’s just not like we have two people come and say this
and we walk out of here. But I just want you to say to your-
selves when you’re sitting there saying, ‘Do I believe [wit-
ness KZ]? Do I believe [witness JM]? Do I believe [witness
DP]? Do I believe [witness RC]? Do I believe [witness MA]?’
Ask yourselves whether they have any of those felony con-
victions when you’re making that determination.”
The jury ultimately convicted defendant of first-
degree rape.
B. Court of Appeals Decision
Defendant appealed his conviction and raised a
number of issues in the Court of Appeals. That court agreed
with defendant’s due process argument and, on that basis,
vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceed-
ings. The court expressly rejected defendant’s remaining
arguments without discussion. 319 Or App at 179.
In considering whether the trial court had violated
defendant’s due process rights by admitting his conviction
history without first conducting OEC 403 balancing, the
Court of Appeals explained that resolving that question
required it to determine how the United States Supreme
Court would itself resolve the issue. Id. at 182. That, accord-
ing to the Court of Appeals, depended primarily on historical
372
State v. Aranda
practice. Id. (so stating); id. at 184 (relevant focus is national
practice).
In reviewing historical practice, the Court of
Appeals first observed that, at common law, any person
who had previously been convicted of an “infamous crime”
was wholly prohibited from testifying—as a result, histor-
ically there had been no practice regarding impeachment
by prior conviction. Id. at 184. Further developments in the
law abolished the rule that such persons were incompetent
to testify, but their conviction history became admissible as
impeachment evidence. Id. at 184-85. The Court of Appeals
observed that, although that development meant that testi-
fying defendants faced a substantial risk of prejudice when
such evidence was admitted, the historical record did “not
provide a definitive answer as to whether the Due Process
Clause requires a trial court” to balance prejudice against
probative value. Id. at 185-86. The court specifically noted
an absence of federal cases since the adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence (FRE) 609, which specifically provides for
balancing, and it observed that Oregon “appears to be an
outlier” when compared to other states, most of which also
had adopted the federal approach. Id. at 187-88.
Because of its conclusion that history failed to pro-
vide a clear answer, the Court of Appeals turned to “
‘the
principles that animate the Due Process Clause,’
” id. at 188
(quoting Williams, 357 Or at 18), including that due process
prohibits the “admission of evidence that is so extremely
unfair that it violates fundamental conceptions of justice,”
id. at 188-89 (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). The court recognized the risk that a jury might misuse
a defendant’s prior conviction to find the defendant guilty
on the ground that the defendant has a propensity to com-
mit crimes, rendering the defendant’s trial fundamentally
unfair. Id. at 189. Allowing trial court discretion to exclude
unfairly prejudicial evidence would, in the Court of Appeals’
opinion, “ensure” that the jury did not misuse the evidence.
Id. at 190. It followed, in that court’s view, that due process
required balancing so as to protect against that possibility.
Id.
The state sought review, which we allowed.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
373
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant’s Challenge to State v. King
As a preliminary matter, we address defendant’s
argument that the Court of Appeals’ decision can be affirmed
as being “right for the wrong reason.” See Edmonds, 364
Or at 415 (explaining “the ‘right for the wrong reason’ doc-
trine”). On review, defendant argues for the first time that
this court’s decision in King, 307 Or 332, was incorrectly
decided and should therefore be overruled. He argues that
OEC 609, properly understood, remains subject to OEC 403
balancing. Therefore, in his view, there is no need for us to
reach the question whether OEC 403 balancing is constitu-
tionally required, as the Court of Appeals held.
The state disputes defendant’s argument on two
grounds. Procedurally, the state objects that such an issue
should not be raised for the first time in a sur-reply brief.
Substantively, the state maintains that King was correctly
decided.
We need not decide the procedural question, because
defendant has not established a basis to overrule King. We
have previously explained that “we begin with the assump-
tion that issues considered in our prior cases are correctly
decided, and the party seeking to change a precedent must
assume responsibility for affirmatively persuading us that
we should abandon that precedent.” Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Mowry, 350 Or 686, 698, 261 P3d 1 (2011) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). Here, defendant has not
meaningfully undertaken that task, much less established
that this court’s decision in King was wrongly decided.
The enactment history of the rules at issue here com-
pels that conclusion. The versions of OEC 609 and OEC 403
adopted in 1981, predating our 1989 decision in King, each con-
tained provisions for balancing an evidentiary item’s potential
for prejudice against its probative value, but the provisions
differed from each other. Compare OEC 403 (1982) (evidence
“may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”), with OEC 609(1)
(1982) (impeachment with prior criminal conviction permit-
ted “only if” “the court determines that the probative value
374
State v. Aranda
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant”). See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence,
Art VI, Rule 609, 251 (1st ed 1982) (“Rule 609 requires that
the probative value outweigh the prejudice before the prior
conviction may be admitted, whereas Rule 403 requires that
the probative value of evidence be substantially outweighed
by prejudice before it will be excluded.”); State v. Pratt, 316
Or 561, 572, 853 P2d 827 (1993) (“OEC 609 provided its own
test for balancing probative value against prejudicial effect,”
separate from that found in OEC 403). By adopting different
balancing tests for prejudice under the two rules, the legis-
lature signaled that it did not intend for the more generally
applicable test under OEC 403 to apply to cases subject to the
specific balancing test contained in OEC 609(1).
In 1986, the voters passed an initiative that
amended OEC 609 to remove that rule’s balancing test. Or
Laws 1987, ch 2, § 9. That amendment thus removed the
only balancing test for prejudice that expressly applied to
evidence offered to impeach the testimony of criminal defen-
dants. Defendant does not contend that the 1986 amend-
ment affirmatively extended the OEC 403 balancing test for
prejudice to fill that gap.5 Nor does defendant explain why,
in his view, this court was mistaken to conclude in King that
the voters did not intend that the impeachment evidence
that they had just rendered admissible without balancing
under OEC 609 would now be subject to balancing under
OEC 403.
In the absence of a focused argument that our deci-
sion in King was the product of a flawed analysis or was
otherwise wrongly decided, we are not persuaded that we
should reconsider that decision. Accordingly, we proceed
with the understanding that evidence admissible under the
5 Defendant does contend that our later decision in Pratt, 316 Or 561, in which
we held that OEC 403 balancing is appropriate when evidence is challenged as
cumulative, is inconsistent with King. Defendant misreads Pratt, however. In
that opinion, this court held that the 1986 amendment to OEC 609 removed
balancing as to prejudice, but not balancing as to the needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. Id. at 573. OEC 403 had merely codified the common-law
discretion to exclude cumulative evidence. Id. The removal of OEC 609 balancing
for prejudice, we concluded, did not affect the court’s authority to balance cumu-
lative evidence under OEC 403. Id. In Pratt, the court acknowledged King, but it
expressly distinguished it on that ground. Id. at 572.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
375
terms of OEC 609(1)—as the impeachment evidence in this
case indisputably was—is not subject to balancing under
OEC 403 unless such balancing is constitutionally required,
the question to which we now turn.
B. Constitutional Question
As noted above, the trial court held that no provi-
sion of the Oregon Evidence Code or the Oregon Constitution
required it to conduct balancing before admitting evidence
of defendant’s conviction history. In adhering to this court’s
decision in King, we have now rejected defendant’s challenge
to that ruling under the evidence code, and defendant has
not advanced an argument under the Oregon Constitution
on appeal. Thus, the remaining issue before us is purely
one of federal constitutional law—specifically, the question
whether due process requires OEC 403 balancing in cases
such as this.
“[W]hen interpreting the federal constitution or
applying [United States] Supreme Court rulings that are
based on its interpretation of the federal constitution, we
must comply with what the Supreme Court has stated.”
Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 386, 84 P3d 133, cert den, 543
US 866 (2004) (citing cases). We cannot interpret the United
States Constitution so as to extend its guarantees beyond
any limits recognized by the Supreme Court. See Arkansas
v. Sullivan, 532 US 769, 772, 121 S Ct 1876, 149 L Ed 2d 994
(2001) (rejecting Arkansas Supreme Court’s holding “that
it may interpret the United States Constitution to provide
greater protection than this Court’s own federal constitu-
tional precedents provide”); Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714,
719, 95 S Ct 1215, 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975) (“[A] State may
not impose such greater restrictions [on police] as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically
refrains from imposing them.”) (Emphasis in original).
Thus, as an initial matter, we must consider
whether the United States Supreme Court has previously
addressed the issue at hand and, if so, whether defendant’s
argument would extend the protections of the Due Process
Clause beyond any limitation recognized by the Court. We
turn to those questions.
376
State v. Aranda
1. Spencer v. Texas
In its briefing, the state relies on Spencer v. Texas,
385 US 554, 87 S Ct 648, 17 L Ed 2d 606 (1967), suggest-
ing that the Supreme Court’s decision in that case controls
the outcome here. We recognize that Spencer can plausibly
be read as deciding the issue raised in this case and doing
so in a manner that would require us to reject defendant’s
position. As we will explain, however, we ultimately con-
clude that, although instructive, the holding of Spencer is
not dispositive.
In Spencer, the Supreme Court addressed the con-
stitutionality of a Texas law that required the same jury to
decide both whether a defendant was guilty of the charged
offense and, if so, whether to impose a recidivist sentence
upon the defendant. Procedurally, a jury would be “fully
inform[ed]” of a defendant’s prior convictions during the
guilt phase of the trial, but the jurors were instructed not to
consider those convictions until after the jury had reached
a decision as to guilt. 385 US at 556-59. The defendants in
Spencer had argued, in essence, that permitting the jury to
hear such evidence—which necessarily included evidence of
convictions for conduct similar to the charged offense—vio-
lated the Due Process Clause because of the risk that jurors
would vote to convict based upon a defendant’s perceived
propensity to commit similar crimes, rather than based
upon the prosecution’s evidence of the charged offense. Id. at
559.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument. The
Due Process Clause, the Court explained, guarantees crimi-
nal defendants a fundamentally fair trial. Id. at 563-64. The
procedure prescribed by Texas law did not fall short of that
guarantee, and therefore the Supreme Court was unwilling
to impose further procedural requirements as a matter of
due process:
“Cases in this Court have long proceeded on the premise
that the Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental
elements of fairness in a criminal trial. *
*
* But it has never
been thought that such cases establish this Court as a rule-
making organ for the promulgation of state rules of crim-
inal procedure. And none of the specific provisions of the
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
377
Constitution ordains this Court with such authority. In the
face of the legitimate state purpose and the long-standing
and widespread use that attend the procedure under attack
here, we find it impossible to say that because of the pos-
sibility of some collateral prejudice the Texas procedure is
rendered unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
as it has been interpreted and applied in our past cases. As
Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to remark, a state rule
of law ‘does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment
because another method may seem to our thinking to be
fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to
the prisoner at bar.’
”
Id. at 563-64 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105, 54 S Ct 330, 78 L Ed 674
(1934)).
Without more, Spencer might be viewed as con-
trolling here. That is, if due process permits a prosecutor
to place a defendant’s prior convictions before the jury any
time that there is a “legitimate state purpose” and a “long-
standing and widespread use” of evidence in that man-
ner, then it might well follow that allowing prosecutors to
freely rely on those convictions for the familiar purpose of
impeaching testifying defendants would raise no due pro-
cess concerns. See Spencer, 385 US at 560-61 (noting case
law permitting testifying defendants to be impeached by
prior convictions); see also id. at 577 (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (distinguishing case at bar
from cases in which testifying defendants are impeached
with prior convictions).
On closer examination, however, Spencer discloses
an ambiguity that might have some bearing here. In refus-
ing to strike down the evidentiary rule at issue in that
case, the Spencer majority expressly noted that Texas law
permitted trial courts to exclude “particularly” prejudicial
evidence:
“The defendants’ [due process] interests are protected by
limiting instructions, *
*
* and by the discretion residing
with the trial judge to limit or forbid the admission of
particularly prejudicial evidence even though admissible
under an accepted rule of evidence.”
378
State v. Aranda
385 US at 561-62 (citing Texas opinion and secondary
sources).
Some courts have concluded that that statement in
Spencer was not important to the holding of that case; those
courts have therefore upheld statutes that gave trial courts
no discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions offered
for purposes of impeachment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Diaz, 383 Mass 73, 78, 417 NE2d 950, 953-54 (1981) (“the
language of Spencer about discretion to exclude has been
taken as merely ‘descriptive’ of the practice in many States,
and not as suggesting any due process infirmity when the
statute or rule allowing impeachment (and the practice
thereunder) gives the trial judge no discretion to exclude
the convictions when offered”); United States v. Belt, 514 F2d
837, 847-50 (DC Cir 1975) (en banc) (stating view that the
majority opinion in Spencer reasoned from analogy regard-
ing the admission of prior-crimes evidence and emphasized
the Court’s obligation to avoid inflexibility in constitutional
interpretation “where local evidentiary rules are involved”;
observing that, in context, it is “unlikely that Justice Harlan
intended, by his generalized reference to judicial discretion,
to declare the invalidity of a statute of the kind now before
us”); Dixon v. United States, 287 A2d 89, 94-95 (DC 1972)
(upholding constitutionality of statute that made the admis-
sion of prior criminal convictions against testifying crimi-
nal defendants mandatory, stating that Spencer’s statement
“does not amount to a declaration that judicial discretion
to exclude prejudicial prior convictions is constitutionally
required” (emphasis in original)).
Two more recent decisions by the Supreme Court
itself, however, suggest that the trial court’s discretion to
exclude unduly prejudicial evidence may have played at least
some role in Spencer’s conclusion that the Texas evidentiary
law at issue there did not violate due process. This court iden-
tified one of those cases in Williams, 357 Or at 12: Dowling
v. United States, 493 US 342, 110 S Ct 668, 107 L Ed 2d 708
(1990). In Dowling, the defendant was prosecuted for bank
robbery, and the trial court admitted testimony regarding
a prior offense that the defendant had allegedly committed,
but for which he had been acquitted before his robbery trial
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
379
began. Id. at 343-46. The Supreme Court held that that tes-
timony did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 352-
54. In so holding, however, the Court expressly noted that a
balancing test would protect a defendant against prejudice:
“Dowling contends that the use of this type of evidence
creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury
will convict the defendant on the basis of inferences drawn
from the acquitted conduct; we believe that the trial court’s
authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence ade-
quately addresses this possibility.”
Id. at 353.
A second case recognizing the potential value of
balancing is Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 US 228, 132 S Ct
716, 181 L Ed 2d 694 (2012), in which the Supreme Court
considered the due process implications of eyewitness testi-
mony where an eyewitness’s out-of-court identification of a
defendant had been made under suggestive circumstances.
See id. at 234-35 (witness had observed defendant in police
custody through kitchen window). The defendant in Perry
argued that the Due Process Clause required the trial court
to make a preliminary inquiry into the reliability of the
identification before allowing the jury to hear the evidence.
Id. at 236 (summarizing issue). The Court held that due pro-
cess did not require such a preliminary inquiry because the
police had not been responsible for the circumstances being
suggestive. Id. at 248. In so holding, however, the Court
“t[ook] account of other safeguards built into our adversary
system that caution juries against placing undue weight on
eyewitness testimony of questionable reliability.” Id. at 245.
One such safeguard specifically identified by the Court was
the authority to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence:
“State and Federal Rules of Evidence, moreover, permit
trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact
or potential for misleading the jury.”
Id. at 247.
The Supreme Court’s repeated reliance on that
rationale—that a trial court’s discretion to exclude preju-
dicial evidence is sufficiently protective of a defendant’s
380
State v. Aranda
due process rights—suggests to us that it remains an open
question for the Court whether such discretion is necessar-
ily required to afford due process. See also Williams, 357
Or at 17 (“[J]ust because due process is served by a partic-
ular evidentiary rule does not mean, at least necessarily,
that due process is violated if that rule is not applicable.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that Spencer is not dispositive
here. We therefore turn to the more general consideration of
what due process requires.
2. The requirements of due process
In determining whether “state procedural rules”
that “are part of the criminal process”—such as OEC
609(1)—meet the requirements of due process, the “appro-
priate [analytical] framework” is set out in Medina v.
California, 505 US 437, 443, 112 S Ct 2572, 120 L Ed 2d 353
(1992). See Nelson v. Colorado, 581 US 128, 134-35, 137 S Ct
1249, 197 L Ed 2d 611 (2017) (so explaining).
In that respect, we first note that defendant does
not contend that his impeachment with prior convictions
violated any specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights. And, as
the Supreme Court has emphasized, when applied outside
those specific guarantees, “due process” has a narrow scope:
“
‘[B]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill
of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.’
Dowling v. United States, 493 US [at] 352 *
*
*; accord, United
States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 790, 97 S Ct 2044, 52 L Ed
2d 752 (1977). The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms
to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion
of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended
rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference
with both considered legislative judgments and the careful
balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order. As we said in Spencer *
*
*, [385 US at 564], ‘it has
never been thought that [decisions under the Due Process
Clause] establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the
promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.’
”
Medina, 505 US at 443-44 (alterations other than first in
original); see Clark v. Arizona, 548 US 735, 748-49, 126 S Ct
2709, 165 L Ed 2d 842 (2006) (to same effect as Medina);
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
381
Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197, 201-02, 97 S Ct 2319, 53
L Ed 2d 281 (1977) (to same effect).
To determine whether a state rule of criminal pro-
cedure violates the Due Process Clause, Medina explains,
the relevant inquiry is whether it “
‘offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.’
” Medina, 505 US
at 446 (quoting Patterson, 432 US at 202). In answering
that question, “[h]istorical practice is probative of whether a
procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental.” Id.;
see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 US 37, 43-44, 116 S Ct 2013,
135 L Ed 2d 361 (1996) (plurality opinion) (describing his-
torical practice as the “primary guide”). Stated in terms
of the parties’ dispute in this case, the question is whether
OEC 609 in its current form denies defendants a procedural
right so established through historical practice that it has
become “fundamental.” Thus, we must determine whether
the OEC 403 balancing of impeachment evidence before its
admission, which OEC 609 no longer allows, is so reflected
in historical practice as to be fundamental in that regard.
Accordingly, we next turn to what historical practice shows.
a. Historical practice
The Supreme Court has articulated a rather
demanding test for one seeking to establish that a given
practice is “historical”:
“[I]n assessing that [historical] practice, we look primar-
ily to eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone, Coke,
Hale, and the like), as well as to early English and American
judicial decisions. The question is whether a rule of crim-
inal responsibility is so old and venerable—so entrenched
in the central values of our legal system—as to prevent a
State from ever choosing another. An affirmative answer,
though not unheard of, is rare.”
Kahler v. Kansas, 589 US 271, 279,140 S Ct 1021, 206 L Ed
2d 312 (2020) (rejecting contention that Due Process Clause
required a state to provide insanity defense (citations omit-
ted)). “Contemporary practice” may also be considered, but it
is “of limited relevance to the due process inquiry.” Medina,
505 US at 447.
382
State v. Aranda
It is defendant’s burden to affirmatively show that
the principle that he seeks to apply is “entrenched in the
central values of our legal system.” That is, it is not suffi-
cient that defendant may be able to show that the state’s
rule is not deeply rooted; he must demonstrate the funda-
mental nature of the rule that he contends is essential to
due process. As the Supreme Court explained in Egelhoff,
“[i]t is not the State which bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that its rule is ‘deeply rooted,’ but rather respondent
who must show that the principle of procedure violated by
the rule (and allegedly required by due process) is ‘so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.’ Thus, even assuming that when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted the rule Montana
now defends was no longer generally applied, this only cuts
off what might be called an a fortiori argument in favor of
the State. The burden remains upon respondent to show
that the ‘new common-law’ rule *
*
* was so deeply rooted
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (or perhaps has
become so deeply rooted since) as to be a fundamental prin-
ciple which that Amendment enshrined.”
518 US at 47-48 (first alteration in original; citations omit-
ted); see Kahler, 589 US at 279 (following Egelhoff). As applied
to this case, then, defendant must show a “deeply rooted”
practice of requiring courts to balance prejudice against
probative value before allowing the state to impeach testify-
ing criminal defendants with their prior felony convictions,
because that, in essence, is the “principle of procedure” that
OEC 609 purportedly violates and that is “allegedly required
by due process.” See Egelhoff, 518 US at 47-48.
In turning to whether history discloses such a prac-
tice, we first observe, as the Court of Appeals noted, that at
common law any person with a felony conviction was deemed
incompetent to testify as a witness. See, e.g., Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 US 504, 511, 109 S Ct 1981, 104 L Ed
2d 557 (1989) (so explaining); Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests—
Current Trends, 89 U Pa L Rev 166, 174 (1940) (same). Thus,
as to such individuals, impeachment was historically not an
issue.
That does not mean, however, that there is no
decisional law from that era relevant to our assessment of
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
383
historical practices. To the contrary—there is a long line
of common-law cases addressing the effect of a pardon on
an individual’s competency to testify. Under those circum-
stances, the pardon restored the witness’s capacity to tes-
tify, but the conviction was admitted for the jury’s consid-
eration in evaluating that person’s credibility. The case of
Rookwood’s Trial, Holt 683, 685, 90 Eng Rep 1277, 1278 (KB
1696), which involved a witness who had been pardoned by
the king, stated the rule as follows: “[T]he conviction indeed
might be objected to his credit, but could not be urged
against his being a witness.”6
Lord Hale expressed the rule similarly:
“[I]f the king pardon *
*
* offenders, they are thereby ren-
dered competent witnesses, tho their credit is to be still
left to the jury, for the king’s pardon takes away poenam &
culpam in foro humano,[7] *
*
* but yet it makes not the man
always an honest man[.]”
Sir Matthew Hale, 2 The History of the Pleas of the Crown
278 (1736) (citations omitted).
That rule was transplanted to the United States
and widely followed until at least the middle of the twenti-
eth century:
“The current of American decision, following the British
cases, is unbroken: an offender, if pardoned, must still face
the fact that his conviction is admissible in evidence as
bearing on his credibility.”
Richards v. United States, 192 F2d 602, 606 (DC Cir 1951),
cert den, 342 US 946, reh’g den, 343 US 921 (1952) (footnotes
omitted); see also Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F2d 753, 754 (9th Cir
1927) (“The pardon in no wise negatived the implications of
the conviction in respect of plaintiff’s character, and the jury
was entitled to knowledge of it as bearing on his credibility
6 See also the more detailed report of the case in Trial of Ambrose Rookwood,
13 Howell’s State Trials 139, 185 (KB 1696), available at https://books.google.
co.uk/books?id=SwQKAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q=pardon&f=false
(reporting Lord Chief Justice’s statement as “the credit of such a [pardoned] wit-
ness is left to the jury, but it is no objection to his being a legal witness”) (accessed
May 29, 2024).
7 The no-longer used Latin phrase can be understood to mean, essentially,
penalty and fault as matters of earthly, as opposed to spiritual, affairs.
384
State v. Aranda
as a witness.”); State v. Grant, 33 Del 195, 198, 133 A 790
(Del Ct Gen Sess 1926) (“[F]or the purpose of affecting the
credit of the defendant, the fact of the conviction may, there-
fore, be brought out either on cross-examination or in rebut-
tal.”); Curtis v. Cochran, 50 NH 242, 244-45 (1870) (“The con-
viction is an impeachment and condemnation of his general
character for truth. *
*
* [A pardon] removes the disability
[to testify], but does not change the common-law principle
that the conviction of an infamous offence is evidence of bad
character for truth.” (Citations omitted.)); Baum v. Clause, 5
Hill 196, 196-97, 1843 N.Y. LEXIS 85, at *1-3 (NY Sup Ct
1843) (although “competency is restored by the pardon, the
crime still goes to the credit of the witness”); United States
v. Jones, 26 F Cas 644, 647-48, 1824 US App LEXIS 265, at
*2-3 (CC D NY 1824) (No. 15,493) (Circuit Justice Thompson)
(charging the jury: “His honor observed, he had no doubt of
the efficacy of the pardon, and that [the state’s witness] was
now a competent witness; his credibility, however, was still
a subject for the consideration of the jury.”). Our review of
the foregoing case law has given us no indication that the
trial courts of the time were required (or even permitted) to
balance the probative value of a witness’s conviction history
against its potential to cause prejudice before admitting that
evidence for impeachment purposes, nor that trial courts
were in fact exercising discretion in that regard.
Meanwhile, over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the general rule of incompetency for persons who had
not been pardoned for their crimes began to change, as
states enacted statutes restoring the competency of previ-
ously convicted persons. See Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the
Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (A)(2)
and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J Crim L & Criminology
1087, 1110 (2000); Ladd, 89 U Pa L Rev at 174-75. The same
statutes, however, typically allowed the use of a witness’s
conviction history to impeach the witness’s credibility. See
Green, 90 J Crim L & Criminology at 1110; Ladd, 89 U Pa
L Rev at 174-75.8 Functionally, then, the states took the
8 Oregon was one of the states that removed incompetency but permitted
the use of prior convictions to attack credibility. As early as 1862, the Oregon
Legislative Assembly began permitting persons previously convicted of crimes to
testify as witnesses, but it also expressly permitted a witness’s credibility to be
questioned “in every case”:
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
385
common-law rule applicable to the impeachment of witnesses
who had been pardoned and applied it more generally to all
persons with prior convictions, without regard to whether a
witness had been pardoned for any earlier offenses.
As the Supreme Court itself has noted, the consen-
sus rule during that period—that is, before the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975—was that trial courts
lacked discretion to bar impeachment by prior conviction:
“The weight of authority before [Federal Rule of Evidence]
609’s adoption *
*
* admitt[ed] all felonies without exer-
cise of judicial discretion in either civil or criminal cases.
Departures from this general rule had occurred overtly by
judicial interpretation, as in Luck v. United States, *
*
* 348
F2d 763 ([DC Cir] 1965), or in evidence codes, such as the
Model Code [of Evidence, 1942] and the Uniform Rules [of
Evidence, 1953].”
Green, 490 US at 521-22.
Moreover, courts of that era specifically authorized
the use of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants
who chose to testify in their own behalf. See Right to cross-
examine accused as to previous prosecution for, or conviction
of, crime, for purpose of affecting his credibility, 161 ALR 233
(1946) (“Even in the absence of a statute to that effect, it has
generally been held proper to cross-examine the accused as
to his previous conviction for the purpose of affecting his
credibility[.]”); see also Goode v. United States, 149 F2d 377,
378 (DC Cir 1945) (no error to “allow[
] the District Attorney
to draw from [the defendant] on cross-examination admis-
sions of his prior convictions on two occasions of grand lar-
ceny”); State v. Ede, 167 Or 640, 644, 117 P2d 235 (1941)
(“[T]he state had a right to show either on the examination
“All persons without exception, except as otherwise provided in this title,
*
*
* may be witnesses. Therefore neither parties, nor other persons who have
an interest in the event of an action, suit or proceeding, are excluded; nor
those who have been convicted of crime; *
*
* although in every case, *
*
* the
credibility of the witness may be drawn in question[.]”
The Code of Civil Procedure and Other General Statutes of Oregon § 700, 174-75
(1863) (emphases added). Furthermore, although witnesses generally could not
be impeached with prior wrongful acts, a witness could be impeached with evi-
dence disclosed “by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of a crime.” Id. at § 830, 203; see also id. at § 837, 205
(“a witness must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction for felony”).
386
State v. Aranda
of the defendant or by the record of a judgment that he had
been convicted of a crime.”); People v. Braun, 14 Cal 2d 1,
6, 92 P2d 402 (1939) (no error for prosecution to ask defen-
dant on cross-examination whether he had previously been
convicted of murder, even though murder conviction was
on appeal at time of trial and subsequently was reversed);
People v. David, 12 Cal 2d 639, 646, 86 P2d 811(1939) (rule
permitting witness to “be impeached by proof that he has
suffered the prior conviction of a felony” “applies to a defen-
dant who testifies in his own behalf in a criminal trial not-
withstanding the fact the such evidence tends to prejudice
him in the eyes of the jury”); State v. Morgan, 192 Wash 425,
431, 73 P2d 745 (1937) (“clearly proper” for prosecution to ask
defendant on cross-examination whether he had previously
been convicted of crime); Mansbach v. United States, 11 F2d
221, 224 (3d Cir 1926) (stating, under New Jersey law, that
“if the defendant offer[s] himself as a witness, his conviction
of another crime may, on cross-examination, be shown for
the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness”).
Some of our own decisions from the period predat-
ing the adoption of the Oregon Evidence Code had rejected
balancing more generally, reasoning that the discretionary
aspect of balancing would mean that the same evidence
could be treated differently by different judges. See State v.
Manrique, 271 Or 201, 210-11, 531 P2d 239 (1975) (rejecting
balancing for prior-crime evidence); see also Smith v. Durant,
271 Or 643, 658-60, 534 P2d 955 (1975) (rejecting balanc-
ing as to impeachment of a nondefendant witness with
prior convictions, noting that “the same evidence admitted
in one court might well be excluded by another,” such that
“the result in a case might well depend upon what court or
judge it is tried before”). Thus, insofar as defendant seeks
to establish a historical practice of mandatory judicial bal-
ancing before a criminal defendant’s conviction history may
be admitted as impeachment, neither this court’s case law,
nor that of the other jurisdictions discussed above, readily
provides support for defendant’s position.
That is not to say that defendant’s concerns are
his concerns alone. Despite—or perhaps due to—the wide-
spread acceptance of impeachment by prior conviction, the
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
387
practice became subject to growing academic criticism in
the last century. See Ladd, 89 U Pa L Rev at 184-91 (1940
law review article discussing chilling effect on a defendant’s
right to testify and potential for prejudice when jurors hear
about prior convictions).
Notably, however, even those
critical of admitting conviction history for impeachment
purposes acknowledged that almost every state allowed the
practice. See id. at 187 (when a defendant testifies, “the right
of the state to prove convictions of a crime is almost uni-
versally admitted as a test of veracity”). And, although the
1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules
of Evidence both would have given trial courts discretion to
exclude impeachment evidence deemed unduly prejudicial,
see Green, 490 US at 513 (discussing both), those specific
provisions were not widely adopted.
Moreover, the concerns expressed in academic cir-
cles initially gained little traction in the courts. However, in
1965, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that judicial balancing for prejudice
was required before criminal defendants could be impeached
with their conviction histories. Luck, 348 F2d at 769-70;
see Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 FRD 315, 393 (1971) (advisory committee’s
note) (discretionary balancing regarding impeachment by
prior convictions “finds its genesis in Luck”; “[p]rior to that
decision, slight latitude was recognized for balancing proba-
tive value against prejudice, though some authority allowed
or required the trial judge to exclude convictions remote in
point of time”); Roger C. Park, Impeachment with Evidence
of Prior Convictions, 36 Sw U L Rev 793, 796 (2008) (identi-
fying Luck as the probable first decision). Significantly, the
Luck opinion was a statutory ruling, based on the text of
a District of Columbia (D.C.) Code provision. As the circuit
court explained, that provision:
“says, in effect, that the conviction ‘may,’ as opposed to
‘shall,’ be admitted; and we think the choice of words in this
instance is significant. The trial court is not required to
allow impeachment by prior conviction every time a defen-
dant takes the stand in his own defense. The statute, in
388
State v. Aranda
our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial
discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in
a particular case. *
*
* There may well be other cases where
the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment
far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction
to the issue of credibility. This last is, of course, a standard
which trial judges apply every day in other contexts; and we
think it has both utility and applicability in this field.”
348 F2d at 768 (footnotes omitted).
The authoring judge in Luck would later express in
a law review article his view that the Luck decision repre-
sented a dramatic change in existing law:
“In the District of Columbia, it was common practice for
the prosecution in a criminal case automatically to enter
in evidence any and all prior convictions, except certain
minor misdemeanors, whenever the defendant elected to
appear on the witness stand in his own defense. This proce-
dure appeared to be the established and accepted mode of
proceeding, not only in the District of Columbia but almost
everywhere in the United States.”
Carl McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by
Prior Convictions, 1970 L & Soc Order 1, 1 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
The Luck holding itself did not endure, because
in 1970 Congress amended the D.C. Code to overrule that
decision’s holding. See Green, 490 US at 514 (citing District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970, Pub L 91-358, § 133(b), 84 Stat 551); Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion
and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 Cardozo L Rev 2295, 2300
(1993) (same). However, the ensuing adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 continued the controversy over
balancing and the Luck decision.
The advisory committee’s9 first proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence expressly rejected the Luck doctrine and
made no provision for discretion or balancing. See Green, 490
9 The advisory committee had been appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. The committee prepared several preliminary
drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence before submitting the final version to the
Supreme Court. The Court, in turn, submitted the draft rules to Congress for
enactment. See Gold, 15 Cardozo L Rev at 2298 n 18 (summarizing process).
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
389
US at 515; Gold, 15 Cardozo L Rev at 2298-99; Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 FRD 161, 295-99 (1969) (proposed Rule 6-09
and advisory committee’s note).
Due to criticism of the first proposal’s rejection of
Luck, the advisory committee reversed course and incor-
porated Luck’s holding in its revised proposal. See Green,
490 US at 515-16; Gold, 15 Cardozo L Rev at 2299-300;
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 FRD 315, 391-93 (1971) (proposed Rule 6-09
and advisory committee’s note). In doing so, however, the
committee failed to note or acknowledge that Congress had
legislatively overruled Luck by amending the D.C. Code.
That perceived affront to the will of Congress led to a legis-
lative attempt to limit the rulemaking power of the Supreme
Court. Gold, 15 Cardozo L Rev at 2300-01. That attempt
ultimately failed. Nonetheless, the advisory committee pre-
pared a final draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
reverted to the original proposal and removed discretionary
balancing. See Green, 490 US at 516-17; Gold, 15 Cardozo L
Rev at 2301; Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 FRD 183, 269-72 (1972) (proposed Rule 6-09
and advisory committee’s note). That was the version sub-
mitted to Congress. Green, 490 US at 517.
FRE 609 was equally controversial in Congress.
Ultimately, the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
Congress adopted in 1975 included a version of FRE 609
that codified much of the balancing test of Luck. That out-
come was the compromise product of a hard-fought political
battle, and the result was quite controversial. See Gold, 15
Cardozo L Rev at 2301-08 (discussing history in detail); id.
at 2303 (“The extent of the floor debate in the House over
Rule 609(a) far exceeded that relating to any other provision
in all the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.”); id. at 2307
(conference committee forced to reconcile essentially contra-
dictory drafts from House and Senate).
390
State v. Aranda
One aspect of that compromise was that it limited
what evidence would be subject to balancing when a defen-
dant took the stand as a witness. Felonies as a general mat-
ter would be subject to some form of balancing. FRE 609(a)
(1). But any prior conviction—whether or not a felony convic-
tion—would be automatically admissible, without balancing,
if the crime involved an act of dishonesty or a false state-
ment. FRE 609(a)(2) (“[F]or any crime regardless of the pun-
ishment, the evidence must be admitted” if “the elements of
the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a
dishonest act or false statement.”) (Emphasis added).10
Thus, the federal rule—along with the many states
that follow that rule or something close to it—requires bal-
ancing as to at least some prior convictions: those for crimes
that did not involve false statements or acts of dishonesty.
See FRE 609. However, the federal rule and analogous state
rules allow a criminal defendant to be impeached by some
prior convictions without any balancing of probative value
against prejudice. And in the context of convictions for dis-
honesty, at least, we are unaware of any case holding that
the absence of balancing violates the federal Due Process
Clause.
With that background in mind, we return to the
question of what historical practice shows. Again, defen-
dant has the burden of showing that trial court balancing
of the probative value of impeachment evidence against its
10 FRE 609 currently provides, in part:
“(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s char-
acter for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
“(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by
death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
“*
*
*
*
*
“(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defen-
dant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
that defendant; and
“(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of
the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or
false statement.”
Although FRE 609 has been amended in various ways since 1975, none of
those amendments affect our assessment of the rule’s enactment history
or the degree, if at all, to which that history reflects historical practices.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
391
potential for prejudice—at least with regard to conviction
history used to impeach criminal defendants—is a histori-
cal practice that is either “entrenched in the central values
of our legal system,” Kahler, 589 US at 279, or “so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental,” Egelhoff, 518 US at 43. Defendant has not
met that burden. To the contrary: The common-law cases
regarding witnesses who had been pardoned for their crimes,
as well as decisional law into the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, show an established practice of allowing wit-
nesses—including criminal defendants—to be impeached
with prior convictions without any balancing. The novelty
of the Luck decision and the battle over FRE 609 confirms
that, as late as the mid-1970s, discretionary balancing of the
sort that OEC 403 permits was far from established practice
with regard to impeachment evidence. And even today, the
federal rules do not permit balancing as to some types of
convictions, even when offered to impeach testifying defen-
dants. That history therefore does not show an “entrenched”
practice of requiring trial courts to balance the probative
value of impeachment evidence against its potential to prej-
udice criminal defendants who choose to testify.
Although that history weighs heavily against defen-
dant’s position, it does not end our analysis. In the absence
of a historical practice, Medina requires us to consider
“whether the [challenged] rule transgresses any recognized
principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.” 505 US at
448. (internal citation omitted). Cf. Williams, 357 Or at 18
(characterizing test as “the principles that animate the Due
Process Clause”). We turn to that question.
b. Fundamental fairness
As a freestanding consideration under the Due
Process Clause, an assessment of “fundamental fairness”—
at least with regard to the introduction of evidence—asks
“whether the introduction of th[e] type of evidence [at issue]
is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamen-
tal conceptions of justice,” Dowling, 493 US at 352, or, stated
another way, would “
‘so infuse[
] the trial with unfairness as
to deny due process of law,’
” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 US 62,
75, 112 S Ct 475, 116 L Ed 2d 385 (1991) (quoting Lisenba
392
State v. Aranda
v. California, 314 US 219, 228, 62 S Ct 280, 86 L Ed 166
(1941)).
Before exploring that question with regard to the
use of impeachment evidence in this case, it bears empha-
sizing that defendant’s position is not that the admission of
felony convictions to impeach a criminal defendant’s cred-
ibility is itself fundamentally unfair.11 Rather, defendant
contends that due process requires the application of a par-
ticular procedural rule—specifically, OEC 403 balancing—
as a safeguard to ensure that evidence so extremely preju-
dicial as to violate due process will not be admitted. Thus,
this case differs from cases such as Williams, where the
court’s focus was on whether the use of other-acts evidence
to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit child sexual
abuse was so “extremely unfair” as to violate “fundamen-
tal conceptions of justice,” 357 Or at 18 (internal quotation
marks omitted), and Baughman, where this court discussed
OEC 404(4)’s potential effect of opening the door for the first
time to evidence that was historically inadmissible due to
its widespread recognition as unfairly prejudicial, 361 Or at
400-01 (concluding that the legislature intended for courts
to apply the specific balancing test set out in OEC 403 when
due process requires that OEC 404(4) evidence be subject to
some form of balancing).
Nonetheless, we find it helpful to consider the spe-
cific purpose for which the trial court admitted the dis-
puted evidence in this case: to impeach, in accordance with
a state evidentiary rule, a criminal defendant’s testimony
with his felony conviction history. As we have noted, to
determine whether due process requires a particular rule
of criminal procedure—or, as relevant here, a particular
rule of evidence—”we must do our best to determine how
the United States Supreme Court would decide that ques-
tion.” Williams, 357 Or at 17. And it stands to reason that, if
it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would ever consider a
particular use of evidence so extremely unfair as to violate
fundamental conceptions of justice, then it is equally or even
11 Neither has defendant ever argued that the specific impeachment evidence
admitted in this case violated his constitutional rights because it was “extremely
unfair,” Dowling, 493 US at 352, or “so infused the trial with unfairness as to
deny due process of law,” Estelle, 502 US at 75.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
393
more unlikely that the Court would require trial courts to
engage in specific procedures—including OEC 403 balanc-
ing—before allowing that use in a given case.
Considering that question, although we need not
endorse the state’s apparent view that the admission of evi-
dence in accordance with a state evidentiary rule will never
violate due process, we see little indication that the Supreme
Court would hold that permitting a defendant’s testimony
to be impeached with the defendant’s felony conviction his-
tory violates the Due Process Clause. As our own case law
suggests, the assessment of whether evidence is “extremely
unfair” appears to depend on not only the character of the
evidence itself, but also on the purpose for which the evi-
dence may be used. To be sure, using defendant’s felony con-
victions to impeach his testimony as OEC 609 contemplates
arguably put “other acts” evidence before the jury, even if it
is not typically characterized that way. And with regard to
“other acts” in general, there are longstanding limits on the
purposes for which that evidence may be used. See Williams,
357 Or at 8-10 (recognizing historical practice of prohibit-
ing use of other-acts evidence to prove propensity in cases
other than child sexual abuse cases); State v. Pinnell, 311
Or 98, 103-04, 806 P2d 110 (1991) (discussing principles);
see also OEC 404(3) (stating general prohibition against use
of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts *
*
* to prove
the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity” with that character). But notably, the
use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes does not
fall within the strict parameters of that prohibition. That is,
the general prohibition against “other acts” evidence applies
only if the sole reason for offering evidence of a person’s prior
acts is to show that the person has a propensity to engage
in such conduct, a distinction that the evidence code itself
reflects:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show that
the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes *
*
*.”
OEC 404(3) (emphasis added); see Williams, 357 Or at 7-10
(discussing history of courts excluding other-acts evidence
394
State v. Aranda
to show propensity); State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 547, 725 P2d
312 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 493, 479 P3d 254 (2021) (OEC 404(3)
is focused on the use of other-acts evidence for the specific
purpose of proving a person’s character “as a basis for the
further inference that he therefore is guilty of the pres-
ent charge” (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted)). Here, the evidence is offered for another purpose—to
impeach defendant’s credibility—to which the presumptive
prohibition does not apply. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, 1
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 1.11, 44-45 (rev ed 2017)
(so noting).
We recognize that impeaching a criminal defendant
with a prior conviction can give rise to concerns similar to
those resulting from the use of “other acts” evidence: There
is at least some risk that the jury will misuse the prior
conviction as evidence that the defendant is a bad person
deserving of punishment and convict the defendant in part
for that reason, rather than solely due to the strength of the
prosecution’s case. See, e.g., Park, 36 Sw U L Rev at 810 (so
noting). Thus, as with “other acts” evidence that is admissi-
ble for some but not other purposes, the challenge with OEC
609 evidence is limiting its use to the purpose for which,
under our system of justice, it may legitimately be consid-
ered. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 US 469, 475-76, 69
S Ct 213, 93 L Ed 168 (1948) (explaining that the reason for
prohibiting character evidence is that “it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to
prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge” (footnote
omitted)).
Despite that similarity, however, we cannot over-
look that there also are significant differences between
using “other acts” evidence to prove propensity and using
prior convictions to impeach a defendant’s credibility as a
witness. For one, unlike propensity evidence, impeachment
evidence in the form of a witness’s criminal record has long
been recognized as probative of credibility and therefore rel-
evant and admissible for that purpose. In contrast, cases
holding that the use of other-acts evidence raises due process
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
395
concerns have emphasized that propensity evidence, at least
historically, has been deemed irrelevant for any legitimate
purpose.
For example, in McKinney v. Rees, 993 F2d 1378,
1380-84, (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1020 (1993), the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the admission of certain
evidence against the defendant, who had been accused of
murdering his mother with a knife, had rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. The disputed evidence included the
fact that the defendant was fascinated with knives, that he
had previously possessed (but no longer possessed at the
time of the murder) “double-edge, dagger-type” knives, and
that “on occasion he strapped a knife to his body while wear-
ing camouflage pants.” Id. at 1382. Noting that it had previ-
ously held that only “if there are no permissible inferences
the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission vio-
late due process,” id. at 1384 (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted), the Ninth Circuit
held that the admission of that character evidence, which
was not only irrelevant to “any fact of consequence,” but
also “emotionally charged” and extensive, had rendered the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair and therefore in vio-
lation of due process, id. at 1383-86 (observing as to certain
other evidence that, even though it may have been inadmis-
sible under California’s version of OEC 403 because it was
more prejudicial than probative, the only relevant inquiry
for purposes of due process was whether the evidence was
relevant); see United States v. Morena, 547 F3d 191, 194-
97 (3rd Cir 2008) (district court plainly erred in admitting
extensive evidence of the defendant’s drug-related activities
in trial on weapons charges, where evidence was probative
of only character and therefore not relevant to any legiti-
mate trial issue); see also Estelle, 502 US 62 (rejecting due
process challenge to admission of “battered child syndrome”
evidence on grounds that evidence was irrelevant due to the
Court’s conclusion that the evidence was in fact relevant).
In addition to that distinction between admitting
potentially prejudicial evidence whose relevance is undis-
puted, on the one hand, and prejudicial evidence that is
not admissible for any legitimate purpose, on the other,
396
State v. Aranda
impeaching a defendant with prior convictions under OEC
609 also involves various procedural mechanisms that the
Supreme Court would likely view as safeguards that help
to ensure that admitting that evidence without OEC 403
balancing will not render a defendant’s trial “fundamen-
tally unfair.” Cf. Perry, 565 US at 245 (“tak[ing] account of
other safeguards built into our adversary system that cau-
tion juries against placing undue weight on eyewitness tes-
timony of questionable reliability” when rejecting argument
that due process required trial court to determine whether
evidence was reliable).
First, under OEC 609, impeachment evidence is
subject to restrictions intended to limit the potential for
abuse by the state or misuse by the jury. The state may pres-
ent “the names and nature of the crimes of which he has
been convicted[.]” State v. Wilson, 182 Or 681, 697-98, 189
P2d 403 (1948). Typically, impeachment with a prior con-
viction involves asking a witness about the conviction; if the
witness denies it, then the state may present the judgment
of conviction. Alternatively, the state may simply introduce
the judgment of conviction without first questioning the wit-
ness about it. In either event, however, nothing further is
permitted. As we have summarized:
“It is proper to ask a witness if he has ever been convicted
of a crime. This may be done with or without a record of
conviction being available. If the witness answers ‘No,’ that
is the end of the interrogation. If an authenticated record
to refute the negative answer is available it may be intro-
duced to show an actual previous conviction of crime by
the witness. Or, the record may be introduced in the first
instance, without a preliminary question to the witness, to
show previous convictions.”
State v. Rollo, 221 Or 428, 437, 351 P2d 422 (1960). “That
*
*
* is the limit permissible by our procedure.” Id.; see also
Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and
Other Matters, 70 Yale L J 763, 776-77 (1961) (discussing
similar restrictions nationally).
Second, the jury must be given an appropriate
limiting instruction. See OEC 105 (“When evidence which
is admissible *
*
* for one purpose but not admissible *
*
*
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
397
for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly.”). As the Supreme Court explained in
Michelson:
“We do not overlook or minimize the consideration that
‘the jury almost surely cannot comprehend the judge’s lim-
iting instruction,’ which disturbed the Court of Appeals.
*
*
* However, limiting instructions on this subject are no
more difficult to comprehend or apply than those upon var-
ious other subjects; for example, instructions that admis-
sions of a co-defendant are to be limited to the question of
his guilt and are not to be considered as evidence against
other defendants, and instructions as to other problems
in the trial of conspiracy charges. A defendant in such a
case is powerless to prevent his cause from being irretriev-
ably obscured and confused; but, in cases such as the one
before us, the law foreclosed this whole confounding line of
inquiry, unless defendant thought the net advantage from
opening it up would be with him. Given this option, we
think defendants in general and this defendant in particu-
lar have no valid complaint at the latitude which existing
law allows to the prosecution to meet by cross-examination
an issue voluntarily tendered by the defense.”
335 US at 484-85 (internal citation omitted); see Spencer,
385 US at 561-63 (defendant’s interests were protected in
part by limiting instruction, the jury is “expected to follow
instructions in limiting this evidence to its proper func-
tion,” and jury instruction at issue was no more difficult for
jury to understand than in Michelson); see also Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 US 422, 438 n 6, 103 S Ct 843, 74 L Ed 2d
646 (1983) (reaffirming Spencer and stating that “the crucial
assumption underlying the system of trial by jury is that
juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Finally, a defendant’s conviction history is wholly
inadmissible under OEC 609 unless the defendant volun-
tarily chooses to testify. That renders such evidence sub-
stantially different from “other acts” evidence, which, when
permitted, may be introduced in the state’s case-in-chief
and is a matter entirely outside the defendant’s control. The
admission of prior convictions, on the other hand, is some-
thing that a defendant has the power to foreclose, albeit at
398
State v. Aranda
the cost of forgoing the right to testify. Although we rec-
ognize the difficult tradeoff between important rights that
such a choice must entail, we are charged with anticipat-
ing how the Supreme Court would rule in a case such as
this, and we are unaware of any decision of the Supreme
Court suggesting that having to make such decisions some-
how renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Indeed, as the
Court stated in Michelson in discussing the state’s right to
introduce evidence of a defendant’s bad character to rebut
the defendant’s own evidence of good character, “[t]he price
a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name
is to throw open the entire subject which the law has kept
closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where
the law otherwise shields him.” 335 US at 479.12
Given those procedural mechanisms, as well as the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements addressing closely related
issues, we conclude that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
conclude that impeaching criminal defendants with prior
felony convictions is “so extremely unfair” as to “violate[
]
fundamental conceptions of justice” or that doing so would
“so infuse the trial with unfairness as to deny due pro-
cess of law.” See Dowling, 493 US at 354 (no due process
violation in admitting evidence of prior crime for which the
defendant had been acquitted); Spencer, 385 US at 564-69
(no violation of due process to permit jury to hear, during
guilt phase, evidence of defendant’s prior convictions rele-
vant only to sentencing); cf. McGautha, 402 US at 183 (rule
allowing impeachment with defendant’s prior convictions
did not unconstitutionally burden defendant’s right to tes-
tify). And even if the Supreme Court might find particular
12 To be clear, defendant does not contend that the threat of impeachment
with his conviction history unconstitutionally burdened his right to testify, and
we do not consider that issue here. Although we have not had occasion to con-
sider that issue under the Oregon Constitution, we note that that argument, as
distinct from defendant’s due process argument, has previously been considered
by the Supreme Court under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Ohler v. United
States, 529 US 753, 759-60, 120 S Ct 1851, 146 L Ed 2d 826 (2000) (possibility of
impeachment with prior convictions may deter defendant from testifying, but it
does not unconstitutionally burden the defendant’s right to testify); McGautha v.
California, 402 US 183, 215, 91 S Ct 1454, 28 L Ed 2d 711 (1971) (stating that,
although “a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached
by proof of prior convictions,” “it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened
administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros
and cons in deciding whether to testify”).
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
399
impeachment evidence “extremely unfair” in a specific
case—a question not raised by defendant’s appeal—we find
no basis to conclude that the Supreme Court would dictate
that trial courts conduct OEC 403 balancing in all cases
in which it is requested so as to ensure against that occur-
rence.13 As a result, we are not persuaded by defendant’s
argument that the Due Process Clause requires trial courts
to conduct OEC 403 balancing before admitting a criminal
defendant’s conviction history as impeachment evidence
under OEC 609.
C. The dissent
The dissent does not challenge our conclusion that
due process does not require a trial court to conduct OEC 403
balancing before admitting OEC 609 impeachment evidence
against a criminal defendant. Instead, without refuting the
reasoning that brought us to that conclusion, the dissent
argues that we should reach a different conclusion, one that
answers—or at least partially answers—a different ques-
tion. See ___ Or at ___ (Walters, S. J., dissenting) (slip op at
20:2-3) (advocating for rule that trial courts “must, among
other things, balance the probative value of the proffered evi-
dence against it prejudicial effect” (emphasis added)). In the
dissent’s view, we have erroneously focused on whether the
Court of Appeals erred in accepting defendant’s argument
that OEC 403 balancing is required, when, the dissent con-
tends, what is at issue is in this case is whether the trial
court erred in accepting the state’s argument and admitting
evidence of defendant’s felony conviction history without
balancing the probative value of that evidence against its
potential for prejudice. Id. at ___ (slip op at 2:4-8).
We respectfully disagree that our opinion—which
considers whether the trial court’s ruling was in error, not
13 We are not suggesting that trial courts have no authority to consider a
defendant’s contention that the use of specific impeachment evidence in a partic-
ular case is so extremely unfair as to violate due process, but defendant has not
made that contention here. And, although the state in this case has argued that
evidence admissible under the terms of OEC 609 does not rise to that level, it
also does not suggest that OEC 609 or any other authority requires a trial court
to admit evidence that does violate due process. But, because defendant has not
presented that argument, our decision in this case should not be viewed as fore-
closing it, nor as determining the precise form of analysis that such an argument
would require.
400
State v. Aranda
whether the trial court or the Court of Appeals accepted the
wrong party’s argument—is misdirected. We instead think
that, by posing the wrong questions and relying on case law
that is largely or even wholly distinguishable, the dissent’s
approach is misguided. We address those various issues in
turn.
1. The dissent poses the wrong questions.
We begin with the question presented in this case.
The dissent expressly acknowledges that, “at trial and on
appeal, defendant has argued that due process requires
‘balancing under OEC 403[.]’
” Id. at ___ (slip op at 9:12-14).
But the dissent does not address the question raised by that
argument. Rather, based on an erroneous assessment that
defendant’s position has never been that the requisite bal-
ancing includes OEC 403’s discretionary component—under
which trial courts have discretion to exclude evidence whose
potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its proba-
tive value14—the dissent seemingly finds room to embark
on a line of inquiry that wholly sidesteps defendant’s actual
argument in favor of questions no one raises in this case:
whether OEC 609 unconstitutionally compels courts to
admit evidence that will deprive defendants of their right
to a fundamentally fair trial, and, if so, what procedure are
trial courts constitutionally required to follow to ensure
that such evidence is not admitted?
The dissent’s root concern is that, in light of OEC
609’s mandatory wording, it might be viewed as somehow
overriding a defendant’s due process rights. See id. at ___
(slip op at 2:10-11) (emphasizing that “due process overrides
OEC 609 and requires trial courts to exclude ‘extremely
unfair’ evidence”). If that were that the only point that the
14 In the trial court, defendant cited this court’s decisions in Williams
and Baughman, and argued that, consistent with those decisions, due process
required the trial court to subject the state’s impeachment evidence to OEC 403
balancing before allowing its admission. And, as we have explained, those deci-
sions collectively established that, when due process requires trial courts to con-
duct balancing, OEC 404(4)(a) requires that they conduct OEC 403 balancing in
accordance with its terms.___ Or ___(slip op at 35:2-10)); see Baughman, 361 Or
at 398 (so stating). Because the terms of OEC 403 expressly grant trial courts
discretion whether to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence, defendant’s argu-
ment for OEC 403 balancing necessarily included an argument that due process
required courts to have that discretion, contrary to the dissent’s understanding.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
401
dissent wished to make, then it would require little response.
It is axiomatic that defendant’s right to due process overrides
any state rule of criminal procedure that would render his
trial fundamentally unfair. But the dissent does not stop at
that simple observation. Rather, it relies on that observation
as jumping-off grounds for a second due process inquiry, one
undertaken without prompting by the parties or the assis-
tance of any briefing: Because OEC 609 cannot constitu-
tionally serve as a gateway for the admission of “extremely
unfair” evidence, what procedure must trial courts follow to
ensure that the admission of OEC 609 evidence will not be
fundamentally unfair, if it is not the procedure dictated by
the terms of OEC 403 as defendant contends?
Notably, the dissent undertakes that inquiry even
though it recognizes that, when evaluating a due process
challenge to the admission of evidence, the focus must be
on the evidence itself and whether its admission would be
so “extremely unfair” as to deprive the defendant of a fun-
damentally fair trial. Dowling, 493 US at 352; see id. at ___
(slip op at 10:21 - 11:1) (agreeing that “due process does not
require trial courts to exclude evidence proffered under OEC
609 unless its admission would deny the defendant a fair
trial” (emphasis added)). Yet, despite that recognition, the
dissent would nonetheless conclude that a particular proce-
dure is required, one at least rooted in OEC 403, if not OEC
403 balancing per se. See id. at ___ (slip op at 19:21 - 20:3)
(calling for procedural overlay to OEC 609). For the reasons
already articulated, we do not conduct that inquiry in this
case, much less draw any conclusion as to what process may
apply.
2. The dissent’s reliance on our own case law is
misplaced.
The dissent purports to find guidance in our own
case law, specifically Williams and Baughman, and federal
decisions construing the Due Process Clause, but the dissent
misunderstands the significance of that case law or places
weight on it that it cannot bear. We begin by discussing our
own case law, after which we will address the dissent’s mis-
placed reliance on federal case law that does not support the
dissent’s reasoning.
402
State v. Aranda
First, the dissent spends considerable time dis-
cussing our decisions in Williams and Baughman before
concluding that, “when the state offers other acts evidence
for character or noncharacter, propensity or nonpropensity
purposes, due process requires that the trial court engage
in balancing to consider whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” Id. at ___ (slip op at 7:12-8:2). As we will explain,
however, that statement greatly overstates the potential sig-
nificance of those decisions here.
In Williams, this court properly applied the Supreme
Court’s framework by first identifying the procedural rule
that the defendant contended was “so fundamental as to be
embodied in the federal constitution,” which in that case
was the rule against using “other acts” evidence to prove the
defendant’s character and related propensity to commit the
charged offense. 357 Or at 17. Here, the procedural rule that
defendant contends is constitutionally required is one that
would compel a trial court to conduct OEC 403 balancing
before admitting evidence of a criminal defendant’s felony
conviction history to impeach his credibility. However, the
dissent never explores the historical underpinnings of any
such rule.
We recognize that, as the dissent correctly notes,
this court in Williams, having not found a historical prac-
tice to support the defendant’s proposed rule in that case—
one that would require OEC 403 balancing before allowing
other-acts evidence in child sexual abuse cases—turned to
other “fundamental conceptions of justice” before conclud-
ing that balancing was constitutionally required in that
context. See Williams, 357 Or at 17-18 (because relevant
historical practice was “not as clear,” turning to “principles
that animate the Due Process Clause”). However, there are
two reasons that our holding in Williams—concluding that
balancing was required before other-acts evidence could be
admitted—cannot sustain the dissent’s view.
The first reason that Williams does not support
the dissent’s view is that, as we have already observed, the
challenged evidence in Williams was specifically offered to
prove the defendant’s character and his propensity to act
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
403
accordingly, i.e., to commit the charged crimes. 357 Or at 7.
Although we ultimately concluded that such evidence would
be admissible (subject to balancing) in child sexual abuse
cases, our analysis was against the backdrop that, in all
other contexts, “other acts” evidence that was probative only
of a defendant’s bad character has historically been rec-
ognized as both irrelevant to any legitimate purpose and
extraordinarily prejudicial. Here the challenged evidence
is defendant’s conviction history, which the state offered to
impeach his testimony. In contrast to the propensity evi-
dence at issue in Williams, (1) conviction history has long
been deemed highly relevant to a person’s credibility; and
(2) defendant’s OEC 403-based objection to that evidence is
that there is a risk that the jury will improperly rely on it as
demonstrating propensity, not that the evidence will be spe-
cifically admitted for that purpose. Thus, although there is
some risk that the jury will use the impeachment evidence
improperly, we do not view that risk to be of the same mag-
nitude as the concerns that informed our ultimate holding
in Williams, nor do we think that the Supreme Court would
equate the two.
The second reason that the dissent’s reliance on
Williams is misplaced is that, as discussed above, the dis-
sent fails to take account of defendant’s argument, which is
that due process requires that OEC 609 evidence be subject
to OEC 403 balancing, not merely that due process requires
the exclusion of evidence that is so extremely unfair that it
violates fundamental conceptions of justice. As we explain
above, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 35:17-21), it is one thing to con-
tend that a specific evidentiary item is “extremely unfair”; it
is another thing altogether to contend that trial courts must
engage in specific procedures to ensure that unfair evidence
is not admitted. And, whatever legal test due process may
require in this context, there is no basis to conclude, as the
dissent contends, that the factors that due process requires
trial courts to consider are, “among other things,” those dic-
tated by OEC 403, much less that courts must be permitted
to exclude relevant evidence whenever “its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice[.]” ___ Or at ___ (Walters, S. J., dissenting) (slip op at
19:21-20:3)
404
State v. Aranda
We recognize that Williams stated, with regard to
propensity evidence admitted under OEC 404(4), that due
process requires OEC 403 balancing. 357 Or at 18. But see
id. at 19 n 17 (declining to reach issue of whether due process
“balancing” may in any way be distinct from that permitted
by OEC 403). But, as the dissent implicitly acknowledges,
that decision has little bearing in regard to impeachment
evidence offered under OEC 609. First, as we have dis-
cussed, other-acts evidence offered to prove propensity has
a long history of being categorically inadmissible, whereas
impeachment evidence has historically been recognized as
relevant and probative. Thus, the dissent’s effort to char-
acterize conviction history as the equivalent of other-acts
character evidence is unpersuasive. Second, as this court’s
subsequent decision in Baughman makes clear, the require-
ment that other-acts evidence be subject to OEC 403 balanc-
ing is a matter of statutory construction—specifically con-
struction of OEC 404(4)—not constitutional interpretation.
361 Or at 399-400 (stating that, where due process requires
balancing before evidence may be admitted under OEC
404(4), the legislature intended that OEC 403 supply the
standard, not due process itself, as the latter understand-
ing would render OEC 404(4)(d) redundant). Thus, neither
Williams nor Baughman supports the view that due process
requires a balancing of the OEC 403 factors before admit-
ting OEC 609 evidence, whether according to the terms of
OEC 403, as defendant contends, or as factors to be con-
sidered “among other” unidentified factors, as the dissent
contends. ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 20:2).15
We agree that the procedural question that the dis-
sent identifies is an important one that should be addressed
15 The dissent’s reliance on federal law fares no better. As we explain above,
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 18:5-17), although the Supreme Court in Dowling men-
tions the availability of FRE 403, it neither holds that balancing under that pro-
vision is a due process requirement nor that evidence that is excludable under
that provision is evidence that would deprive a person of a fair trial. Indeed, the
Supreme Court might be viewed as having affirmatively held that evidence that
must be excluded under FRE 403—which, like OEC 403 weighs the probative
value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice—does not necessarily
violate a person’s right to due process. That is because the Court in Dowling
upheld the Third Circuit’s ruling, applying the harmless-error rule applicable
to subconstitutional violations, that the district court’s erroneous application of
FRE 403 had been harmless.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
405
in an appropriate case, but we disagree that this is such a
case. And, even if this were an appropriate case in which to
decide how courts determine when evidence is “extremely
unfair,” we might hesitate to accept the dissent’s conclu-
sion that due process necessarily requires trial courts to
balance OEC 609 evidence using the factors found in OEC
403, an assessment that even the dissent concedes “may not,
alone, determine whether the admission of the proffered
evidence would deny a defendant a fair trial[.]” Id. at ___
(slip op at 12:7-10) (stating that balancing under OEC 403
“is an essential consideration,” but not identifying any other
considerations).
Ultimately, the dissent disagrees with the conclu-
sion that we reach, but the dissent does not demonstrate
that we either have identified the incorrect principles to
defendant’s case or that we have erroneously applied them.
And, while the legislature may well be interested in fur-
ther exploring the issues raised by the dissent, particu-
larly those attributed to amici, this court is not at liberty to
address them itself, at least not when doing so would require
us to interpret the Due Process Clause more broadly than
we think that the Supreme Court would interpret it. See,
e.g., Sullivan, 532 US at 772 (rejecting Arkansas Supreme
Court’s conclusion that it could construe the federal con-
stitution to provide greater protection than United States
Supreme Court’s own precedents would provide).
III. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether a particular rule of criminal
procedure is required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
we must determine whether either (1) historical practice has
established the rule as a fundamental principle of justice; or
(2) the failure to honor the proposed rule would otherwise
violate a principle entrenched in the central values of our
legal system. Defendant has not met his burden of establish-
ing such a principle, nor has our review of the case law dis-
closed one. And, although we also have considered whether
there are grounds to think that the Supreme Court would
conclude that admitting defendant’s felony conviction his-
tory as impeachment evidence was so extremely unfair that
406
State v. Aranda
it violated fundamental conceptions of justice or infused the
trial with such unfairness as to deny due process of law, it
is ultimately unnecessary to decide that issue, as it is not
an argument that defendant has ever advanced in this case.
Rather, it suffices for us to conclude that due process does not
require OEC 403 balancing to protect against that possibil-
ity. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
OEC 403 balancing was required. Accordingly, we reverse
that court’s decision and affirm the circuit court judgment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
WALTERS, S.J., dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The constitutional issue that this case presents is
whether OEC 609(1) must be applied as written or whether
it is subject to a due process overlay that permits a trial
court to exclude evidence proffered under OEC 609, and, if
so, whether, in determining if exclusion is required, the court
must, as a step in its analysis, balance the probative value
of the proffered evidence against its potential for unfair
prejudice. The state’s position is that, in enacting OEC 609,
“Oregon has made the constitutionally permissible deter-
mination that a witness’s qualifying convictions must be
admitted when offered to challenge the credibility of the
witness.” Defendant’s position, as I understand it, is that, to
comply with due process, OEC 609 must provide room for a
trial court to exclude proffered evidence and, in determining
whether to do so, the court must engage in balancing.
Rather than explicitly rejecting the state’s position
and addressing the implications of doing so, the majority
states defendant’s position more narrowly and rejects it. The
majority does not endorse the state’s view, but it also does
not address it. Instead, the majority characterizes defen-
dant’s argument as an argument that due process requires
application of a particular procedural rule—OEC 403—and
requires that a trial court conduct “balancing under OEC
403” before admitting evidence proffered under OEC 609.
By that, the majority means that a trial court must apply
“OEC 403 in accordance with its terms—that is, balancing
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
407
the probative value of evidence against its potential for
unfair prejudice and making the discretionary decision
whether to exclude the evidence[.]” __ Or at __ n 1 (empha-
sis added) (slip op at 1 n 1). So characterized, the majority
rejects defendant’s argument and concludes that the Court
of Appeals erred in accepting it.
That, at bottom, is the basis for my dissent. The issue
before this court is not whether the Court of Appeals erred,
but, rather, whether the trial court erred when it accepted
the state’s argument that OEC 609 must be applied as writ-
ten and admitted evidence of defendant’s prior convictions
without balancing the probative value of evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice. That, in my view, was error.
I write for three reasons: (1) to explicitly affirm what the
majority apparently assumes but does not articulate—that
is, that due process overrides OEC 609 and requires trial
courts to exclude “extremely unfair” evidence;1 (2) to explain
why, in determining whether proffered evidence rises to that
level, a trial court must, as a step in its analysis, engage
in balancing; and (3) to call on the legislature to explicitly
align the Oregon rules of evidence with those in other state
and federal courts law to ensure defendants’ rights to a fair
trial.
The path to the conclusion that due process over-
rides OEC 609 begins with the Supremacy Clause. OEC
609 is unconstitutional if it “
‘offends some principle of jus-
tice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental.’
” Medina v. California,
505 US 437, 446, 112 S Ct 2572, 120 L Ed 2d 353 (1992)
1 I reach that conclusion, in part, from the following statement of the
majority:
“We are not suggesting that trial courts have no authority to consider
a defendant’s contention that the use of specific impeachment evidence in a
particular case is so extremely unfair as to violate due process, but defendant
has not made that contention here.”
__ Or at __ n 13 (slip op at 43 n 13). Thus, the majority does not take the posi-
tion that admitting prior felony convictions to impeach a defendant is never so
unfair as to violate due process. The majority also states that “it is axiomatic that
defendant’s right to due process overrides any state rule of criminal procedure
that would render his trial fundamentally unfair,” __ Or at __ (slip op at 45:13-
15), but it does not expressly recognize that, by requiring a trial court to admit
evidence proffered under OEC 609, OEC 609 constitutes such a rule.
408
State v. Aranda
(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197, 202, 97 S Ct
2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977)). One fundamental principle of
justice is that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial and to
the exclusion of the type of evidence that “is so extremely
unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions
of justice,” Dowling v. United States, 493 US 342, 352, 110
S Ct 668, 107 L Ed 2d 708 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted), or, stated another way, evidence that would “
‘so
infuse[
] the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of
law,’
” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 US 62, 75, 112 S Ct 475, 116
L Ed 2d 385 (1991) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 US
219, 228, 62 S Ct 280, 86 L Ed 166 (1941)). The concept of
unfair prejudice “
‘speaks to the capacity of some conced-
edly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring
guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.’
” Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172, 180, 117
S Ct 644, 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997). Consequently, although
OEC 609 requires trial courts to admit evidence of qualify-
ing convictions, due process overrides that rule of evidence
and requires trial courts to exclude such evidence when its
admission would deny the defendant a fair trial. See State v.
Moore, 349 Or 371, 389, 245 P3d 101 (2010) (“in all events,
no evidence may be admitted that would violate state and
federal constitutional standards”).
Had the majority explicitly recognized that due pro-
cess and, thereby, the right to a fair trial override OEC 609,
then the majority would better have understood the next
question before it: When a defendant objects to the admis-
sion of evidence proffered under OEC 609 as violating the
defendant’s right to due process, and the trial court must
decide whether to exclude it on that basis, must the trial
court undertake an analysis that requires it to engage in
balancing?
In answering that question, I find it helpful to begin
with this court’s decisions in State v. Williams, 357 Or 1, 346
P3d 455 (2015), and State v. Baughman, 361 Or 386, 393
P3d 1132 (2017), two cases in which this court interpreted
OEC 404(4), and, in doing so, considered the dictates of due
process. OEC 404(4) provides:
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
409
“In criminal actions, evidence of other crimes, wrongs
or acts by the defendant is admissible if relevant except as
otherwise provided by:
“(a) [OEC 406 through 412] and, to the extent
required by the United States Constitution or the Oregon
Constitution, [OEC 403];
“(b) The rules of evidence relating to privilege and
hearsay;
“(c) The Oregon Constitution; and
“(d) The United States Constitution.”
In Williams, the state offered evidence of the defen-
dant’s “other acts” to prove his propensity to commit the
charged act. The defendant argued that the Due Process
Clause required balancing under OEC 403. This court
agreed, holding that “the only way that a court can ensure
that the admission of ‘other acts’ evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial and a violation of ‘fundamental concepts of jus-
tice’ is to conduct OEC 403 balancing.” 357 Or at 18. That
conclusion, the court reasoned, followed from the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling and from other
federal court decisions, including United States v. LeMay,
260 F3d 1018 (9th Cir 2001). Id.
In Dowling, the government had offered other acts
evidence for a noncharacter purpose—to prove identity
under FRE 404(b). The Supreme Court considered whether
admission of that type of evidence “failed the due process
test of ‘fundamental fairness.’
” 493 US at 352. The Court
recognized that the admission of such evidence could pose
a “constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury will con-
vict the defendant on the basis of inferences drawn from the
[other acts evidence],” but it upheld its admission against
the defendant, because it “ believe[d] that the trial court’s
authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence ade-
quately addresse[d] this possibility.” Id. at 353.
In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of FRE 414, a federal rule that, in cases in which
the defendant is accused of child molestation, permits the
admission of other acts of child molestation on any matter to
which it is relevant. The court reasoned that the right to a
410
State v. Aranda
fair trial was safeguarded by the application of FRE 403, a
federal rule that, like OEC 403, permits trial courts to weigh
the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its proba-
tive value. 260 F3d at 1030. The Ninth Circuit explained
that the introduction of “other acts” evidence “can amount
to a constitutional violation only if its prejudicial effect far
outweighs its probative value” and that, “as long as the pro-
tections of Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that poten-
tially devastating evidence of little probative value will not
reach the jury, the right to a fair trial remains adequately
safeguarded.” Id. at 1026-27.
Based on its understanding of those federal cases,
this court held in Williams that due process requires a trial
court to conduct balancing under OEC 403 before admitting
“other acts” evidence to prove a defendant’s character and
propensity to commit the charged act under OEC 404(4). 357
Or at 18-19. The court explicitly left open, however, whether
that balancing was “traditional” or “subconstitutional” bal-
ancing, or a narrower, more exacting “due process” balanc-
ing. Id. at 19 n 17. The trial court had admitted the contested
evidence, and this court said that evidence that was admis-
sible under “traditional” balancing also would be admissible
“under any distinct ‘due process’ balancing test.” Id.
In Baughman, the state had offered other acts evi-
dence for a number of noncharacter, nonpropensity pur-
poses—to establish the defendant’s intent, motive, common
plan or scheme, and the absence of mistake or accident. In
this court, the parties assumed that, before admitting that
evidence, the trial court was required to balance the preju-
dicial effect of the proffered evidence against its probative
value, but they disagreed about the legal standard that
that balancing entailed. The court understood the question
before it to be whether the balancing under OEC 403 is “tra-
ditional” or “subconstitutional” balancing—balancing that
gives the trial court discretion to exclude evidence whose
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudi-
cial effect—or, as the state posited, “due process” balancing
that requires the trial court to exclude propensity evidence
under OEC 404(4) “if its admission would render the trial
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
411
fundamentally unfair as a matter of law.” Baughman, 361
Or at 397.
This court decided that, in enacting OEC 404(4)(a),
the legislature intended the courts to conduct balancing
under OEC 403, “according to its terms,” meaning that, “[u]
nder OEC 404(4)(a) and OEC 403, trial courts may exclude
evidence, in the exercise of their discretion, when they deter-
mine that its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.” Williams, 361 Or at 402. The
court reasoned that OEC 404(4)(a) and OEC 404(d) “provide
two independent bases for excluding other acts evidence” and
two different legal standards for doing so. Id. OEC 404(4)(a)
gives the trial court discretion to exclude otherwise relevant
evidence after conducting balancing, and OEC 404(4)(d)
makes exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence nondiscre-
tionary when, as a matter of law, its admission would render
the trial fundamentally unfair.2 Id.
Thus, under Williams and Baughman, when the
state offers other acts evidence for character or nonchar-
acter, propensity or nonpropensity purposes, due process
requires that the trial court engage in balancing to consider
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court has
discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. But in the
narrow circumstance in which the trial court determines
that the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence so far
outweighs its probative value that its admission would ren-
der the trial fundamentally unfair, then due process requires
its exclusion as a matter of law. See LeMay, 260 F3d at 1026
2 The court noted, however, that it was
“not entirely clear to us that ‘traditional’ balancing and ‘due process’
balancing are as different as the parties assume that they are. *
*
* [B]oth
standards are intended to ensure a trial that is fundamentally fair. If a trial
court were to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, that the probative
value of other acts evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, but, nevertheless, were to admit that evidence, that might
well result in a trial that an appellate court would deem fundamentally
unfair. We think it important to note that *
*
* no court, state or federal, has
distinguished between the balancing required under codified evidentiary
rules and some narrower ‘due process’ balancing.”
361 Or at 402 n 7.
412
State v. Aranda
(where prejudicial effect of evidence “far outweighs” proba-
tive value, constitutional violation occurs). In other words,
under Williams and Baughman, there are two different legal
standards for the admission of other acts evidence—but no
matter which legal standard applies, balancing is the trial
court’s starting point for determining the admissibility of
the proffered evidence.
In this case, defendant does not contend that OEC
404(4) applies to the admission of his past convictions;
rather, he contends that, in interpreting that rule, this court
has decided that due process requires “balancing under
OEC 403” before other acts evidence can be admitted. As
noted, the majority understands defendant’s argument to be
that a trial court must balance the probative value of prof-
fered evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice and
must have discretion to exclude the evidence whenever its
unfair prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its proba-
tive value. Thus, the majority characterizes the question in
this case as whether due process requires both a particular
mode of analysis—a balancing of the probative value of prof-
fered evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice—
and a particular legal standard—discretion to exclude the
evidence whenever its unfair prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value. I disagree with the majority’s
framing. If the majority were to address and explicitly reject
the state’s position that application of OEC 609 is manda-
tory and hold that due process gives a trial court authority
to exclude such evidence when its admission would deny a
defendant a fair trial, then the majority would be entitled to
proceed to the question of whether, in entertaining defen-
dant’s objection to admission of evidence of his prior convic-
tions, the trial court was required to consider the probative
value and unfair prejudicial effect of that evidence, and to
do so without regard to whether that mode of analysis is cor-
rectly described as “balancing under OEC 403.” And even
the majority’s exclusive focus on defendant’s argument does
not obviate the need for that inquiry.
The majority is correct that, at trial and on appeal,
defendant has argued that due process requires “balancing
under OEC 403,” but defendant does not define that term
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
413
and never argues that due process requires that trial courts
have discretion to exclude evidence proffered under OEC 609
when, in their discretion, they deem the prejudicial effect
of that evidence to outweigh its probative value. And, in
this case, the state takes a different position than it took in
Baughman. In Baughman, the state accepted that the mode
of analysis set out in OEC 403—the balancing of probative
value and prejudicial effect—was required before other acts
evidence could be admitted under OEC 404(3) for nonchar-
acter, nonpropensity purposes. Here, however, the state con-
tends that trial courts must admit—and do not have author-
ity to exclude—qualifying evidence proffered under OEC 609.
Thus, because the state contends that admission of evidence
proffered under OEC 609 is mandatory, the state necessar-
ily takes the position that trial courts do not have authority
to engage in balancing to determine whether to exclude such
evidence, and the state does not brief the issue of the nature
of the balancing—or any other mode of analysis—that a
trial court would be permitted or required to conduct should
that authority exist. As this court explained in Williams and
Baughman, “balancing under OEC 403” can be understood
to mean “traditional” or “due process” balancing—that is,
as a mode of analysis that must be conducted both when
a defendant asks a trial court to exercise its discretion to
exclude evidence as well as when a defendant argues that
the proffered evidence must be excluded as a matter of law.
Particularly given the state’s argument at trial and on
appeal—that trial courts must admit qualifying evidence
proffered under OEC 609 without engaging in any balanc-
ing to satisfy any legal standard—I am loath to read defen-
dant’s argument as taking a position that would foreclose
consideration of a pressing constitutional question import-
ant to courts and counsel: When a defendant objects to the
admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions
as violating the defendant’s right to due process, is the trial
court required to balance the probative value of the evidence
against its unfair prejudicial effect? When defendant argues
that due process requires trial courts to “engage in balanc-
ing under OEC 403,” I understand defendant to mean that,
to ensure a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial,
due process requires trial courts to balance the probative
414
State v. Aranda
value of evidence proffered under OEC 609 against its prej-
udicial effect.
To be as clear as I can be, I agree, as I state above,
that due process does not require trial courts to exclude evi-
dence proffered under OEC 609 unless its admission would
deny the defendant a fair trial. But, once this court decides,
as it must, that trial courts have authority to determine
whether that legal standard is met, I see this case as pre-
senting a second question—that is, whether, in deciding how
to rule on an objection to evidence proffered under OEC 609,
trial courts must include, as part of its mode of analysis, a
balancing of the probative value and the prejudicial effect of
the proffered evidence.
Dowling and its progeny provide the constitutional
answer to that question, along with its historical underpin-
nings. As noted, in Dowling, the Supreme Court started from
the premise that it is a fundamental principle of justice that
a defendant is entitled to a fair trial and to the exclusion
of the type of evidence that “is so extremely unfair that its
admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.” 493
US at 352. In Dowling, the government had offered other
acts evidence for a noncharacter purpose—to prove identity
under FRE 404(b). The Court considered whether admission
of that type of evidence “failed the due process test of ‘funda-
mental fairness.’
” Id. The Court recognized that the admis-
sion of such evidence could pose a “constitutionally unac-
ceptable risk that the jury will convict the defendant on the
basis of inferences drawn from the [other acts evidence],” but
it upheld its admission against the defendant it “believe[d]
that the trial court’s authority to exclude potentially preju-
dicial evidence adequately addresses this possibility.” Id. at
353. In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit explained that the intro-
duction of “other acts” evidence “can amount to a constitu-
tional violation only if its prejudicial effect far outweighs its
probative value” and that, “as long as the protections of Rule
403 remain in place to ensure that potentially devastating
evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury, the
right to a fair trial remains adequately safeguarded.” Id.
at 1026-27. In Williams, this court took that reasoning one
step further and held that due process requires balancing
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
415
under OEC 403 to protect against admission of such evi-
dence when offered to prove a defendant’s character and pro-
pensity to commit the charged act. In Baughman, this court
accepted that due process also requires balancing to protect
against the admission of other acts evidence when offered for
a noncharacter, nonpropensity purpose. The outcome of that
balancing may not, alone, determine whether the admission
of the proffered evidence would deny the defendant a fair
trial, but it is an essential consideration in deciding whether
admission would be so “extremely unfair” that it would vio-
late due process.
I do not know why the majority is hesitant to reach
that same conclusion here, and, instead, treats other acts evi-
dence offered under OEC 609 so differently than this court
has treated other acts evidence offered under OEC 404. All
other acts evidence implicates not only the right to fair trial
but also the presumption of innocence, Spencer v. State of
Texas, 385 US 554, 575, 87 S Ct 648, 17 L Ed 2d 606 (1967)
(Warren, J., concurring); the principle that a defendant “be
tried for what he did, not for who he is,” United States v.
Myers, 550 F2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir 1977); and the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397
US 358, 364, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970).3 The
majority recognizes that the admission of evidence of a testi-
fying defendant’s prior convictions under OEC 609 can give
rise to a risk of misuse, but it sees “significant differences
3 Justice Warren recognized the relationship between those principles in his
concurring opinion in Spencer, stating that “[r]ecognition of the prejudicial effect
of prior-convictions evidence has traditionally been related to the requirement of
our criminal law that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission
of a specific criminal act.” 385 US at 575 (Warren, J., concurring). An authority
on the Federal Rules of Evidence did likewise, stating as follows:
“The propensity rule shields the jury from evidence that it would likely
overvalue or otherwise mishandle, while the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement ensures that factual uncertainties are resolved in favor of the
accused. Like the reasonable doubt standard, the propensity rule is an essen-
tial corollary to the presumption of innocence.”
Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 Am
Crim L Rev 57, 81 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
Those principles are in play even when evidence is not expressly offered for
a propensity purpose. As the Supreme Court recognized in Old Chief, whenever
evidence of past convictions is offered for a nonpropensity purpose, there is a dan-
ger that that evidence may be “arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of
bad character reasoning” and therefore be unfairly prejudicial. 519 US at 173.
416
State v. Aranda
between using ‘other acts’ evidence to prove propensity and
using prior convictions to impeach a defendant’s credibility
as a witness.” __ Or at __ (slip op at 38:4-5). The majority
takes the position that evidence of the former may not be
relevant for any legitimate purpose, whereas evidence of the
latter is always relevant to prove credibility, and it says that
there is a difference between “admitting potentially preju-
dicial evidence whose relevance is undisputed, on the one
hand, and prejudicial evidence that is not admissible for any
legitimate purpose, on the other[.]” __ Or at __ (slip op at
39:12-14).
That those differences exist does not mean that,
when other acts evidence is offered for the nonpropensity
purpose of impeachment, a trial court must engage in a dif-
ferent analysis than it would if the evidence were offered
to prove propensity or for another nonpropensity purpose.
As this court explained in Williams, trial courts will be
presented with a spectrum of evidence and its admission
will depend on the differing probative value and prejudicial
effect of that evidence:
“At one end of the spectrum, ‘other acts’ evidence that is
offered for nonpropensity purposes—i.e., to prove motive,
intent, identity, or lack of mistake or accident—generally
will be admissible as long as the particular facts of the
case do not demonstrate a risk of unfair prejudice that out-
weighs the probative value of the evidence. At the other end
of the spectrum, as the state recognizes, when ‘other acts’
evidence goes only to character and there are no permissi-
ble inferences the jury may draw from it, it is more likely
that the evidence will be excluded. Such evidence generally
will have little or no cognizable probative value, and the
risk that the jury may conclude improperly that the defen-
dant had acted in accordance with past acts on the occasion
of the charged crime will be substantial.”
357 Or at 19-20 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether offered to prove char-
acter or offered for impeachment or another noncharacter
purpose, evidence of past convictions may or may not be rel-
evant. And, whether offered to prove character or offered for
impeachment or another noncharacter purpose, due process
may require that relevant evidence of past convictions be
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
417
excluded. The purpose for which the evidence is offered does
not change the nature of the analysis that a trial court must
use to make that determination.
Evidence offered for nonpropensity purposes gen-
erally will have greater legitimate probative value than
evidence offered only to prove propensity, but that does not
mean that there is not a need to consider the extent of the
probative value of the evidence in relation to its prejudicial
effect. For example, in McKinney v. Rees, 993 F2d 1378 (9th
Cir 1993), one of the cases cited by the majority, other acts
evidence was offered to prove that the defendant was lying
(in other words, to impeach his credibility) and that he had
had an opportunity to commit the charged offense. The
Ninth Circuit held that, despite the fact that the prosecution
had offered that evidence for those relevant nonpropensity
purposes, the only inference that the jury could have drawn
from the evidence was that the defendant was the type of
person who would commit the charged offense, and that fact
rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair in vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1382-83, 1386.
In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit explained its decision
in McKinney as follows:
“In McKinney, we granted a writ of habeas corpus and over-
turned a murder conviction where the petitioner’s trial had
been infused with highly inflammatory evidence of almost
no relevance. See McKinney, 993 F2d at 1384-85. LeMay,
of course, emphasizes that McKinney held that the ban on
propensity evidence is of constitutional magnitude. What
he misses, however, is the fact that we held that such evi-
dence will only sometimes violate the constitutional right
to a fair trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential for
prejudice far outweighs what little relevance it might have.
Potentially devastating evidence of little or no relevance
would have to be excluded under [FRE] 403. Indeed, this
is exactly what [FRE] 403 was designed to do. We there-
fore conclude that as long as the protections of [FRE] 403
remain in place so that district judges retain the authority
to exclude potentially devastating evidence, [FRE] 414 is
constitutional.”
Id. at 1026-27 (emphasis in original). In other words, the fact
that evidence of a testifying defendant’s prior convictions
418
State v. Aranda
may have high probative value in one case does not mean
that similar evidence will be equally probative in another
case. For that reason, a trial court must have authority to
determine whether the value of prior conviction evidence to
prove a fact at issue is of such little relevance and is so out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that the admission
of that evidence would deny the defendant a fair trial, and it
must have authority to exclude the evidence on that ground.
Similarly, the majority emphasizes the fact that
“impeachment evidence is subject to restrictions intended to
limit the potential for abuse by the state or misuse by the
jury” may be a factor that a trial court will want to consider in
determining whether admission of such evidence would deny
the defendant a fair trial, __Or at __ (slip op at 39:14 - 40:1).
But the existence of those restrictions does not convince me
that balancing is not also required. The majority discusses
the following restrictions: (1) the fact that only the “names
and nature” of the prior crimes of conviction are admissible;
(2) the fact that the jury must be given a limiting instruction
cautioning against the use of the evidence for an improper
purpose; and (3) the fact that a defendant can avoid admission
of the evidence by voluntarily choosing not to testify. __ Or at
__ (slip op at 40:1 - 42:8). I agree that those restrictions may
have the benefit of limiting potential misuse of the evidence,
but they do not relieve trial courts of their responsibility to
prevent abuse or misuse of evidence by excluding unfairly
prejudicial evidence. Nor are they, even in combination, so
protective of a defendant’s right to a fair trial that they obvi-
ate the need for the trial court to conduct balancing.
As to the first restriction cited by the majority, even
when limited to the “name and nature,” prior conviction evi-
dence may be more or less probative or prejudicial depending
on the prior crime and the elements of the charged crime.
Therefore, the fact that only the name and nature of the
crime may be introduced does not eliminate the potential for
misuse of the evidence. With respect to the second restriction,
I note that the courts in Dowling and LeMay did not view the
availability of a limiting instruction as sufficient to protect
against an unfair trial. Instead, those courts relied on the
rule permitting trial courts to balance the probative value of
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
419
the evidence against its prejudicial effect and to exclude par-
ticularly prejudicial evidence as the basis for their decisions.
Dowling, 493 US at 353; LeMay, 260 F3d at 1031.
Finally, I do not think that the fact that a defendant
can avoid admission of evidence of past convictions by choos-
ing not to testify changes the calculus. Forbearance of a con-
stitutional right is not a price that a defendant should be
required to pay to avoid the risk that the prejudicial effect
of the evidence proffered so far outweighs its probative value
that he would be deprived of a fair trial.
The majority cites Michelson v. United States, 335
US 469, 479, 69 S Ct 213, 93 L Ed 168 (1948), for the propo-
sition that “[t]he price a defendant must pay for attempting
to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject
which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him.”
Perhaps that was a correct statement in that context of that
case. In Michelson, the defendant chose to testify and pro-
duced evidence of his good character. Fair play permitted the
government to answer in kind. But a defendant who testifies
that the charged conduct did not occur does not open that
door. A defendant who denies having committed the charged
offense is exercising a constitutional right to testify.
For me, the conclusion that due process protects the
right to a fair trial by requiring trial courts to exclude evi-
dence that is “extremely unfair” compels the conclusion that,
in analyzing whether exclusion is required, a court must
“balance[e] the probative value of evidence against its poten-
tial for unfair prejudice.” That analysis may not be the end of
the trial court’s analysis, but it is surely the beginning. I see
the United States Supreme Court, our federal courts, and
states throughout this land as in full agreement, and I would
hold that the trial court’s contrary ruling was erroneous.4
4 Federal courts are required to weigh the probative value of prior convic-
tion evidence against its prejudicial effect before deciding whether to admit it.
FRE 609(1)(B) provides that prior conviction evidence “must be admitted in a
criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.” And even before the
adoption of FRE 609, federal courts engaged in balancing. See, e.g., Gordon v.
United States 383 F2d 936, 940-941 (DC Cir 1967) (setting out factors that a court
should consider in exercising discretion as to whether probative value of a prior
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect).
420
State v. Aranda
In criticizing the majority for failing to agree that
the trial court erred, I do not mean to minimize the signif-
icance of its apparent recognition that OEC 609 is subject
to due process and that trial courts must exclude extremely
unfair evidence proffered under that rule if its admission
would deny a defendant a fair trial. In recognizing that due
process overlay, the majority goes a long way toward ensur-
ing that OEC 609 does not violate “fundamental conceptions
of justice.” At the same time, however, it is important to rec-
ognize that, as amici curiae see it, “a long way” is not far
enough. Amici argue that “rules allowing for impeachment
by prior convictions replicate witness competency laws by
systematically silencing witnesses with criminal records—
who are disproportionately people of color—due to racial
bias at each stage of policing and criminal proceedings.”
They also inform us that the premise that prior convictions
provide information about witnesses’ credibility “is unsup-
ported by empirical research.” To the contrary, amici assert,
research shows “that jurors tend to rely on prior convictions
for the improper purpose of assessing a criminal defendant’s
culpability” and that evidence of prior convictions “can also
trigger implicit and explicit biases among factfinders.”
That research certainly provides a reason for the
legislature to reconsider the bright line that it drew when
it enacted and when the voters amended OEC 609. And it
also reminds us that, as a court, we must be mindful that
we cannot uphold rules, even longstanding rules, that are
“offensive to our judicial sense of what is fundamentally fair
in the context of criminal prosecutions.” Watkins v. Ackley,
370 Or 604, 631, 523 P3d 86 (2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted). If there ever were a practice of admitting evidence
of a testifying defendant’s convictions without permitting a
trial court to exclude that evidence if it would deny a defen-
dant a fair trial, that practice has long been replaced, not
The facts in this case demonstrate the importance of that inquiry. Defendant
was charged with first-degree rape. He expressed his desire to testify at his trial,
and he argued that evidence that he had previously been convicted on two counts
of first-degree sexual abuse would be unduly prejudicial and that the trial court
should conduct balancing to determine whether the evidence should be admitted.
In the alternative, defendant offered to make a judicial admission that he had
committed prior felonies if the court would preclude the state from naming them.
The trial court denied defendant’s requests.
Cite as 372 Or 363 (2024)
421
only in select locations, but across this nation. Oregon is an
outlier, and there is more that Oregon can do to fulfill its
obligation to see “that a jury’s decision is based on the evi-
dence and not on racial or other similar biases,” id. at 632,
and to ensure that, whatever important policies OEC 609
promotes, they give way to the right to a fair trial.
As one small step to that end, I would hold that,
when the state proffers evidence under OEC 609 and the
defendant objects to its admission, the trial court must
determine whether admission of that evidence would violate
the defendant’s right to a fair trial and, in doing so, must,
among other things, balance the probative value of the prof-
fered evidence against its prejudicial effect.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Duncan and Masih, JJ., join in this dissenting
opinion. | 82685d2738e5d46e1645f8227024ed651863230305718dea211fb19139d3ecfa | 2024-05-31T00:00:00Z |
841fa157-4053-4e59-887d-531243a689a8 | Dept. of Rev. v. Glass | null | S47572 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: November 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent,
v.
WHELDON E. GLASS,
Appellant.
(OTC 4385; SC S47572)
En Banc
On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.*
Carl N. Byers, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 11, 2001.
Wheldon E. Glass, appellant pro se, argued the cause and
filed the briefs and additional authorities.
Jerry Bronner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent. With him on the brief and additional
authorities was Hardy Myers, Attorney General.
CARSON, C.J.
The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
*15 OTR 117 (2000).
CARSON, C.J.
Taxpayer appeals a decision of the Tax Court, which
denied his claim for a refund of taxes paid for tax years 1992,
1993, and 1994. Dept. of Rev. v. Glass, 15 OTR 117 (2000). At
issue is whether taxpayer was a resident, under ORS 316.027
(1991), for the tax years in question. We review for errors of
law and substantial evidence in the record to support the Tax
Court's decision. ORS 305.445.
The Tax Court found the following facts:
"Taxpayer lived in Oregon from 1963 until 1975
when he graduated from high school and joined the
United States Marine Corps. Taxpayer left the military
in 1989 and returned to Oregon. After working at two
different jobs, he enrolled in truck-driving school in
Eugene. Upon graduation from truck-driving school in
1991, he became employed by KLLM Trucking, a company
headquartered in Mississippi. In 1992, he became a
driver trainer for KLLM Trucking, and in late 1993
obtained a dedicated run between Salinas, California,
and one-of-five other cities, none of which were in
Oregon.
"During the tax years in question, taxpayer lived
in his truck: a four-foot-wide, eight-foot-long, and
nine-foot-high unit attached to the cab of the tractor.
It contained two bunks, a refrigerator, and a small
closet. Taxpayer testified that he used shower and
bathroom facilities of truck stops and ate his meals in
restaurants. He stayed in motels only about 12 to 13
times per year for which his employer reimbursed him.
Taxpayer visited his parents about two weeks every year
in Glide, Oregon. Although taxpayer has two siblings
who also live in Oregon, there was no evidence that he
ever visited them. Taxpayer testified that his life
consisted mainly of driving a truck.
"The department's evidence established that
taxpayer's driver license was issued by Oregon and that
taxpayer registered two personal automobiles in Oregon
during the years in question. Taxpayer used his
parents' mailing address as a permanent mailing address
for important papers. Taxpayer was not registered to
vote anywhere and had no banking or checking account in
Oregon. Taxpayer used a truckers' banking service in
Tennessee that enabled his parents to pay his car
payments and insurance on his behalf."
Glass, 15 OTR at 118-19.
Taxpayer asserts that he was not subject to state
personal income tax during 1992-94 because his source of income
was outside Oregon. Under ORS 316.037(1)(a) (1991), the state
may tax an individual for income earned outside Oregon, if that
individual was a "resident of this state" at the time that the
individual earned the income. ORS 316.027 (1991) provided, in
part:
"(1)'Resident' or 'resident of this state' means:
"(a) An individual who is domiciled in this state
unless the individual:
"(A) Maintains no permanent place of abode in this
state;
"(B) Does maintain a permanent place of abode
elsewhere; and
"(C) Spends in the aggregate not more than 30 days
in the taxable year in this state; * * *."
This court has interpreted that statute to mean that, if an
individual is "domiciled" in Oregon, then he or she is a
"resident" unless he or she can satisfy all three conditions
under subsection (a). dela Rosa v. Dept. of Rev., 313 Or 284,
288-89, 832 P2d 1228 (1992). (1)
The Tax Court concluded that taxpayer was a "resident"
because he was "domiciled" in Oregon from 1992-94 and did not
"maintain a permanent place of abode elsewhere." Taxpayer
challenges both those determinations. We have considered
taxpayer's arguments and, for the reasons explained below, affirm
the Tax Court's decision.
Taxpayer was domiciled in Oregon before 1992. There is
substantial evidence in the record to show that taxpayer did not
intend to change domiciles after 1992. See Elwert v. Elwert, 196
Or 256, 265, 248 P2d 847 (1952) ("To constitute a change three
things are essential: (1) residence in another place, (2) an
intention to abandon the old domicil, and (3) an intention to
acquire a new domicil."). Consequently, taxpayer was domiciled
in Oregon during the relevant tax years. Therefore, under ORS
316.027 (1991), taxpayer was a "resident" during the tax years in
question and was subject to Oregon income tax, unless he meets an
exception.
Taxpayer does not meet an exception. Although taxpayer
did not maintain an abode in Oregon, and spent no more than 30
days in Oregon during each taxable year in question, taxpayer's
truck does not constitute "a permanent place of abode elsewhere."
ORS 316.027(1)(a) (1991) (emphasis added). Therefore, we
conclude that the Tax Court did not err in entering judgment
against taxpayer.
The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
1. We note that dela Rosa interpreted the 1981 version of
ORS 316.027. However, the 1991 version is not substantially
different from the 1981 version. | 04fef86ab66c9610057c1455cd343d51ecc199e905c8f6da9fb40de51250d2e1 | 2001-11-16T00:00:00Z |
b3129c59-94aa-48e8-9c29-4cc7eda7fdca | Marleau v. Truck Insurance Exchange | null | S46406 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 13, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LAWRENCE MARLEAU,
MIKELEEN REED,
and OREGON TRAIL CUSTOM LOG HOMES,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE
and
DAVID FLIPPEN,
Respondents on Review.
(CC CCV 95 08 506; CA A93629; SC S46406)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 7, 2000; reassigned June 20,
2001; resubmitted July 3, 2001.
Christopher A. Rycewicz, of Rycewicz & Chenoweth, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause for petitioners on review. With him
on the briefs was Michael J. Knapp, of Meyers & Knapp, Portland.
William G. Earle, of Abbott Davis Rothwell Mullin & Earle,
PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
respondents on review. With him on the briefs was Alan Gladstone.
J. Michael Alexander, of Burt, Swanson, Lathen, Alexander &
McCann, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Trial Lawyers Association.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and De Muniz, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*On appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Robert J. Morgan, Judge. 155 Or App 147, 963 P2d 715 (1998).
**Van Hoomissen, J. retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate the decision of this case. Kulongoski, J., resigned
June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case. Leeson, Riggs, and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
In this insurance case, we must determine whether Truck
Insurance Exchange (defendant) (1) had a duty to defend its insured,
Marleau, and Marleau's business partner, Reed (plaintiffs), in a
tort action alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, although
the insurance policy covered the conduct alleged, public policy
against insurance coverage for intentionally inflicting injury
upon another precluded coverage. Marleau v. Truck Insurance
Exchange, 155 Or App 147, 154-55, 963 P2d 715 (1998). We allowed
review and now conclude that the insurance policy at issue does
not cover the conduct alleged in the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, we do not address
the public policy argument upon which the Court of Appeals
relied. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the circuit court.
The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs
Marleau and Reed operated "Oregon Trail Custom Log Homes" (Oregon
Trail), a log home construction business. Defendant issued a
commercial general liability policy naming Marleau, doing
business as Oregon Trail, as the insured. In addition to bodily
injury and property damage, the policy covered "personal injury
liability" of the insured:
"COVERAGE B. PERSONAL * * * INJURY LIABILITY
"1. Insuring Agreement.
"a. [Truck Insurance Exchange] will pay those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of 'personal injury' * * * to which
this insurance applies. * * * "
A separate section of the policy defined "personal injury":
"'Personal injury' means injury, other than 'bodily
injury,' arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
"a. False arrest, * * *;
"b. Malicious prosecution;
"c. Wrongful * * * eviction * * *;
"d. Oral or written publication of material that
slanders or libels a person * * * or disparages a
person's * * * goods, products, or services; or
"e. Oral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right to privacy."
The policy excluded "personal injury * * * arising out of oral or
written publication of material, if done by or at the direction
of the insured with knowledge of its falsity." Under the policy,
defendant had the duty to defend any action seeking damages for
"personal injury."
The Parletts were customers of Oregon Trail. After
Oregon Trail built the Parletts' log home, a dispute arose
between plaintiffs and the Parletts. The Parletts brought an
action against plaintiffs and against Oregon Trail, alleging
breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, negligence
per se, conversion, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
As noted above, only the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress remains at issue in this action.
In that claim, the Parletts alleged that:
"Reed and Marleau conspired with each other to harass,
annoy, disgrace, humiliate, discredit and cause severe
emotional distress to [the Parletts] * * * with the
intention of causing [the Parletts] so much emotional
distress that [the Parletts] would sell their log home
and move from the Rhododendron community and abandon
all claims against Reed and Marleau.
"In intentionally committing their outrageous acts
against [the Parletts], * * * Reed and Marleau did so
with the knowledge that * * * Jean Parlett suffered
from a nervous disorder that was aggravated by stress.
* * * Reed and Marleau strategically timed the
commission of their outrageous acts when * * * Charles
Parlett was out of town and when Jean Parlett was home
by herself and without her husband's emotional and
physical support."
The following "intentional acts" gave rise to the claim:
"a. Telling Jean Parlett that her bank loan had
been canceled when it was not;
"b. Informing representatives of [the Parletts']
lender that [the Parletts] were not paying their debts
when such information was false;
"c. Telling members of the Rhododendron community * * * that Jean Parlett was committing adultery;
"d. Telling a local attorney that [the Parletts] were getting a divorce because Jean Parlett was in love with
Defendant Marleau;
"e. Telling members of the local community * * * that [the Parletts] were divorced and that Jean Parlett had
been forced to move to a campground;
"f. Telling local public safety officials that
Jean Parlett was insane and had hired someone to shoot
at Marleau's and Reed's home from a car, and also that
[the Parletts had threatened to] burn down Marleau's
and Reed's home;
"g. Telling members of the Rhododendron community that
Jean Parlett was 'in love' with Defendant Marleau;
"h. Telling members of the Rhododendron community
that Jean Parlett had recently been released from a
mental institution;
"i. Telling * * * Charles Parlett over the
telephone when he was out of town that his wife was
sleeping with * * * Marleau's employees, in love with
Marleau and that she was abusing drugs[.]"
Finally, the claim alleged:
"The foregoing acts were vicious, defamatory,
intentional and constituted extraordinary
transgressions of the bounds of socially tolerable
conduct. As a direct and substantial result, [the
Parletts] were humiliated, disgraced and suffered
severe emotional distress, all to their general damage
of $75,000."
Approximately one year after the Parletts had filed
their complaint, defendant accepted the tendered defense of
plaintiff Marleau under a reservation of the right to deny
coverage. (2) Defendant refused the tender as to plaintiff Reed,
arguing that she was not an insured.
After settling the Parletts' action, plaintiffs brought
this action to recover the costs of defending plaintiffs Reed and
Marleau during the first year of the pendency of the Parletts'
action. Plaintiffs ultimately moved for partial summary
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to a defense because
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
alleged that they had invaded the Parletts' privacy and had
defamed the Parletts, and those offenses were covered under the
"personal injury" coverage of plaintiffs' policy. They also
argued that, if defendant had a duty to defend plaintiff Marleau,
then it also had a duty to defend plaintiff Reed, even if she was
not a named insured, because of Marleau's potential vicarious
liability for Reed's actions. Plaintiffs' theory was that,
because they were partners, Marleau could be held vicariously
liable for Reed's actions and, thus, the defense of Marleau had
to include a defense of Reed.
Defendant also moved for summary judgment, arguing that
it had no duty to defend because the policy did not cover the
Parletts' claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (3) The trial court concluded that both the terms of the
policy and public policy precluded coverage of the Parletts'
claim, and entered summary judgment in defendant's favor.
Plaintiffs appealed. As noted above, the Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding that the insurance policy covered the
allegations in the Parletts' intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, but that such coverage was against public policy.
Marleau, 155 Or App at 154-55. We allowed plaintiffs' petition
for review.
"We review the record on summary judgment in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Miller v.
Water Wonderland, 326 Or 306, 309, 951 P2d 720 (1998). In this
case, such review presents several questions of law. The
ultimate question is whether defendant had a duty to defend its
insured against the Parletts' claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The answer to that question depends on
whether the policy covered the Parletts' claim and, if so,
whether public policy nevertheless precluded such coverage. See
Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 Or 303, 307, 985 P2d
1284 (1999) (insurance policy addressed prior to public policy).
Accordingly, we turn first to the question whether the insurance
policy covered the Parletts' claim.
To answer that question, we must examine two documents:
the insurance policy and Parletts' complaint. Ledford v.
Gutoski, 319 Or 397, 399, 877 P2d 80 (1994). In regard to the
insurance policy, we must determine from its terms and conditions
what the parties intended the policy to cover. Hoffman
Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469, 836 P2d
703 (1992). We then examine the Parletts' complaint to determine
if it, "without amendment, may impose liability for conduct
covered by the policy[.]" Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance
Co., 254 Or 496, 507, 460 P2d 342 (1969).
According to the terms and conditions of the personal
injury provision of the insurance policy (set out ante), the
parties to the insurance contract intended the policy to cover
personal injury arising out of any of the five enumerated
"offenses." Those five "offenses" are essentially five different
torts: false arrest, malicious prosecution, wrongful eviction,
defamation, and invasion of privacy. In this case, the issue is
whether, according to the allegations of the complaint, the
Parletts' injury arose out of any one of those "offenses" or
torts. (4) That question can be answered only by examining the
Parletts' complaint.
Because the parties agree that no other claim in the
Parlett complaint alleges conduct covered by the policy, our
examination of the complaint in this case is limited to the claim
identified as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The parties agree that, as identified in the
complaint, that claim alleges that the Parletts' injury arose out
of the "offense" of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
They also agree that that offense is not covered by the policy.
However, they disagree about whether that claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, without amendment, also may
have imposed liability for either invasion of privacy or
defamation, offenses that the policy covered.
The parties first disagree about how to determine,
under Ferguson, 254 Or at 507, whether a particular claim,
"without amendment, may impose liability" for both an excluded
and a covered offense. Plaintiff argues that, if the allegations
in the claim, without amendment, state facts sufficient to
constitute a claim for conduct that the policy covers, then the
insurer has a duty to defend, even if those facts are not stated
separately from facts that constitute a claim for excluded
conduct. Defendant argues that, if the claims require any
amendment, even an amendment as to form such as one that would be
required if the complaint failed to state the claims separately
as required under ORCP 16 B, (5) then the complaint does not,
"without amendment" (emphasis added) impose liability for a
covered offense, and the insurer does not have a duty to defend.
As discussed below, the rationale for the Ferguson "without
amendment" standard supports plaintiffs' interpretation.
In Ferguson, this court explained that the reason for
the "without amendment" standard is to ensure that an insurer
will not owe a duty to defend unless the complaint provides the
insurer with sufficient notice of the insured's potential
liability for conduct that is covered under the policy. 254 Or
at 507. Thus, the insurer has a duty to defend so long as the
complaint contains one claim that the policy covers. Id. at 506.
This court consistently emphasizes the "notice" rationale when
asked to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend. See,
e.g., Ledford, 319 Or at 400 (insurer should be able to determine
from face of complaint whether to accept tender of defense of
action).
Moreover, this court has recognized that a complaint
need not plead a claim in perfect form to provide notice to the
insurer. Indeed, if the complaint is unclear, but "may be
reasonably interpreted to include an incident within the coverage
of the policy, [then] there is a duty to defend." Blohm et al v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 231 Or 410, 416, 373 P2d 412 (1962). It is
the substance of the complaint, not its form, that is at the
heart of the inquiry. See Ledford, 319 Or at 402 (court should
focus on conduct alleged in complaint in analyzing duty to
defend).
From those principles, it follows that the insured also
has a duty to defend if allegations in a complaint, identified
as a single claim for relief, in fact state more than one claim
for relief, at least one of which is for conduct covered by the
policy. In other words, neither the failure to identify
correctly the claims nor the failure to state them separately
defeats the duty to defend. As this court previously has stated,
"in the absence of any compelling evidence of no coverage, the
insurer owes a duty to defend if the injured claimant can recover
under the allegations of the complaint upon any basis for which
the insurer affords coverage." Casey v. N.W. Security Ins. Co.,
260 Or 485, 489, 491 P2d 208 (1971) (emphasis added). Today, we
so hold: An insurer has a duty to defend if the factual
allegations of the complaint, without amendment, state a claim
for any offense covered by the policy. We now turn to apply that
standard to the complaint in this case.
Plaintiffs contend that the factual allegations of the
Parletts' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
also state claims for invasion of privacy and for defamation,
both of which are covered offenses under the "personal injury"
provision of the insurance policy. The Court of Appeals agreed
that the Parletts' claim stated a claim for defamation, but it
did not explain that aspect of its holding. Marleau, 155 Or App
at 154. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
Parletts' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim did
not state a claim for invasion of privacy or defamation. We
begin by addressing plaintiffs' argument concerning whether the
Parletts' allegations constitute a claim for invasion of privacy.
Plaintiffs assert, without elaborating, that the factual
allegations of the Parletts' complaint state two different
invasion of privacy claims: a "false light" claim and a claim
for public disclosure of private facts. First, we address the
law concerning invasion of privacy by placing another in a "false
light."
This court has referred to the definition of the tort
of invasion of privacy by "false light" offered by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if
"(a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
"(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 625E (1977). See Reesman v.
Highfill, 327 Or 597, 607, 965 P2d 1030 (1998) (discussing
elements of "false light" claim pursuant to Restatement (Second)
of Torts).
It requires little analysis to conclude that the
Parletts' claim fails to state a claim for invasion of privacy by
"false light," under the elements listed above. (6) Invasion of
privacy by "false light" requires that the matter be both false
(or that it create a false impression) and publicized. The only
disclosure in the Parletts' claim that complies with the former
requirement, "informing * * * [the Parletts'] lender that [the
Parletts] were not paying their debts when such information was
false" (allegation "b," ante), does not comply with the latter.
Disclosure to the individual lender does not constitute "giving
publicity." See Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or 398, 402, 430 P2d 990
(1967) ("publicity" element requires communication either to
public generally or to large number of persons).
Plaintiffs' argument that the Parletts' claim states a
claim for public disclosure of private facts also fails. As the
name implies, that tort requires the tortfeasor publicly disclose
private facts about another. Id. In contrast to a "false light"
claim, the facts disclosed may be true. However, not every
disclosure of a private fact will give rise to a claim in tort.
The tortfeasor's conduct must be "wrongful" in some respect apart
from inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiff. As this
court held in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or 452,
469, 712 P2d 803 (1986):
"[I]n Oregon the truthful representation of facts
concerning a person, even facts that a reasonable
person would wish to keep private and that are not
'newsworthy,' does not give rise to common-law tort
liability for damages for mental or emotional distress,
unless the manner or purpose of defendant's conduct is
wrongful in some respect apart from causing the
plaintiff's hurt feelings."
The Parletts included four allegations of disclosures
that arguably were "public": the disclosures made to "members of
the Rhododendron community" (allegations "c," "e," "g," and "h,"
ante). Assuming, arguendo, that those disclosures constituted
disclosures of "private facts," the Parletts' claim does not give
rise to tort liability for public disclosure of those facts
because the Parletts did not allege facts demonstrating that
plaintiffs' conduct in making those disclosures was wrongful.
For example, the Parletts did not allege that plaintiffs obtained
the information in some wrongful way, see Anderson, 300 Or at
469, citing McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or 549, 533 P2d
343 (1975) (unobtrusive filming surveillance during daylight
hours of the plaintiff's activities that could have been observed
by passers-by not invasion of privacy), or that plaintiffs
violated some obligation of secrecy in disclosing the information
about the Parletts, see id. at 469, citing Humphers v. First
Interstate Bank, 298 Or 706, 716-17, 696 P2d 527 (1985) (person
who knows facts without obligation of secrecy does not commit
tort by disclosing them to another). Thus, the Parletts'
allegations fail to state a claim for invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts.
Finally, we turn to plaintiffs' argument that the
factual allegations in the Parletts' complaint constitute a claim
for defamation. When we review the allegations with the elements
of the tort of defamation in mind, we conclude that they fail to
state a claim for that covered offense. Again, we begin by
reviewing the elements of the tort at issue.
To state a claim for defamation, the complaint must
state facts sufficient to establish that the defendant published
to a third person a defamatory statement about plaintiff.
Wallulis v. Dymowski, 323 Or 337, 343, 918 P2d 755 (1996). A
defamatory statement is one that would subject another to "* * *
hatred, contempt or ridicule * * * [or] tend to diminish the
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which [the other] is
held or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or
opinions against [the other]." Reesman, 327 Or at 603 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Unless a statement
constitutes defamation per se, a plaintiff must allege that the
statement was false. See Fowler v. Donnelly, 225 Or 287, 293,
358 P2d 485 (1960) (discussing the necessity of alleging the
falsity of words complained of in libel and slander claims).
The Parletts's complaint does not allege that
plaintiffs made the disparaging statements in writing.
Therefore, the only possible type of defamation at issue in this
case is defamation by spoken words, i.e., slander. An additional
pleading requirement applies to cases of slander: Unless the
statement constitutes slander per se, the plaintiff must allege
special damages. That rule historically applied to all
defamation, see Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co. et al, 122 Or
408, 417, 259 P 307 (1927) (so stating), but, in Hinkle v.
Alexander, 244 Or 267, 279, 417 P2d 586 (1966), this court
abandoned that rule in cases of libel.
When we review the Parletts' complaint with those
requirements in mind, we note that the Parletts did not allege
special damages as a result of plaintiffs' conduct. Therefore,
the complaint does not state a claim for slander unless it states
a claim for slander per se.
Plaintiffs argue that allegation "c" of the Parletts'
claim -- the allegation that plaintiffs told others that Jean
Parlett was committing adultery -- constitutes slander per se.
In support of that argument, plaintiffs rely on Cook v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 266 Or 77, 82, 511 P2d 375 (1973), which this court
referred (in dicta) to an assertion of "unchastity in a woman" as
an example of words that were actionable per se. (7) However,
although that is the rule in many other jurisdictions, it is not
the common-law rule and, as explained below, it is not the rule
in Oregon.
Spoken words are actionable per se in Oregon only if
they are words tending to injure the plaintiff in his or her
profession or business, or if they impute to plaintiff the
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. Davis v.
Sladden, 17 Or 259, 261, 21 P 140 (1889). At common law, an
accusation of unchastity was regarded as a "spiritual" matter and
"actionable only with proof of 'temporal' damage, such as the
loss of a marriage." Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §
112, 792-93 (5th ed 1984). That rule was changed in regard to
women in England in 1891, under the "Slander of Women Act." Id.;
see also Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Or 242, 248, 191 P 502 (1920)
(discussing how "Slander of Women Act" changed common law in
England). However, Oregon continued to follow the common law.
Davis, 17 Or at 261; see also Barnett, 97 Or at 249 (criticizing
Davis, yet noting change in common law should be made by
legislature, not court).
In this jurisdiction at the time of the decision in
Davis, asserting that a woman had committed adultery did
constitute slander per se, but only because adultery was
prosecutable as a crime. Davis, 17 Or at 263. However, adultery
no longer is a crime under Oregon law. See Brown v. Vogt, 272 Or
482, 484, 538 P2d 362 (1975) (noting that legislature
decriminalized adultery in 1971). Thus, asserting that a woman
has committed adultery no longer imputes criminal conduct to her.
Accordingly, the allegations of paragraph "c" of the Parletts'
claim do not state a claim for slander per se.
Plaintiffs do not argue that any other allegation in
the Parlett complaint constitutes slander per se. Accordingly,
the factual allegations of the Parletts' claim do not state a
claim for defamation.
In sum, the factual allegations of the Parletts' claim
do not state a claim for invasion of privacy by "false light,"
for public disclosure of public facts, or for defamation.
Therefore, they do not state a claim for any "offense" covered
under the "personal injury" provision of the insurance policy.
Accordingly, we hold that the insurer did not have a duty to
defend.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Defendant Flippen was dismissed from the case and was
not a party to the appeal. Marleau v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
155 Or App 147, 149 n 1, 963 P2d 715 (1998). Accordingly, we
refer to "Truck Insurance Exchange" as the only defendant
throughout this opinion.
2. The parties disagree concerning when plaintiffs first
tendered defense of the Parletts' action to defendant. Because
we hold that the insurer did not have a duty to defend, infra, we
need not resolve that disagreement.
3. Defendant does not dispute that, if it had a duty to
defend its insured against one claim in the complaint, then it
had a duty to defend against the entire complaint. See Ferguson
v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Co., 254 Or 496, 506, 460 P2d 342
(1969) (when complaint contains two counts, one falling outside
policy coverage and the other within, insurer has duty to
defend).
4. Although "offense" is not always synonymous with
"tort," for purposes of this opinion, the difference in meaning
between the two words is not significant. We will use the word
"offense" in this opinion, because the policy used that word.
5. ORCP 16 B provides, in part:
"Each separate claim or defense shall be separately stated. Within each claim alternative
theories of recovery shall be identified as separate
counts."
If a claim is not separately stated, then a party may move to
strike under ORCP 21 E:
"[T]he court may order stricken * * * any pleading
containing more than one claim * * * not separately
stated. * * *"
6. Although we need not resolve the question here, we note
that we are not certain of the accuracy, by way of dictum, in
Reesman that "[t]his court previously has not recognized the tort
of invasion of privacy by false light." 327 Or at 607.
In Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or 398, 430 P2d 990 (1967),
a decision that pre-dates the Restatement (Second) of Torts by
ten years, this court sustained a pleading that alleged invasion
of privacy by publication of false facts. This court identified
the claim at issue as a claim of invasion of privacy by public
disclosure of private facts. Id. at 401. However, if we apply
the Restatement (Second) definition quoted above to the claim at
issue in Tollefson, it is clear that the pleading at issue also
stated a claim for invasion of privacy by "false light." In that
regard, this court has "recognized" a "false light" claim,
although it had not specifically so stated before Reesman.
7. Cook is not the only opinion in which this court has
referred to an assertion of "unchastity in a woman" as slander
per se. See, e.g., Hinkle, 244 Or at 273 (so referring). | 799d27737fdce215467563991ef9de0b64f810e2be5742fd0b128aa0a9a5146d | 2001-12-13T00:00:00Z |
80933804-040c-4c26-b078-4907ef3df575 | State v. Guzek | 322 Or. 245, 906 P.2d 272 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 906 P.2d 272 (1995)
322 Or. 245
STATE of Oregon, Respondent,
v.
Randy Lee GUZEK, Appellant.
CC 87-CR-0373-TM; SC S38455.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted March 8, 1995.
Decided November 24, 1995.
*273 *274 J. Kevin Hunt, Oregon City, argued the cause on behalf of appellant. With him on the briefs was John P. Daugirda of Roost & Daugirda, Eugene.
Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause on behalf of respondent. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Brenda JP Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
UNIS, Justice.
This case is before this court on automatic and direct review of defendant's sentence of death. ORS 163.150(1)(g). For the reasons that follow, we vacate defendant's sentence of death.
In 1988, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death.[1] On automatic and direct review of that judgment, this court affirmed defendant's convictions, but vacated defendant's sentence on the basis of State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 14-20, 786 P.2d 93, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990) (Wagner II), and remanded the case for a new trial of the penalty phase or, at the election of the district attorney, for a life sentence. State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 305-06, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek I).
In 1991, a new jury was empaneled for the penalty phase pursuant to ORS 163.150(5)(a)(B) (1989). Before the jury was empaneled for that penalty proceeding, defendant moved to exclude the introduction of all "victim impact evidence"[2] by the state, contending, among other things, that it:
*275 "[v]iolates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution[.]"[3]
The trial court granted defendant's motion. At that time, the Supreme Court of the United States had held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution barred the admission of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of capital trials. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 452 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2211, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 883 (1989).
After the new sentencing jury was empaneled, but before opening statements were made, the Supreme Court overruled Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991). In Payne, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. Justice O'Connor explained the significance of that holding:
Thus, whether victim impact evidence should be admitted during the penalty phase of a capital case is an issue of state law.
Believing that Oregon state law permitted the admission of victim impact evidence, the state timely notified the trial court and defendant that it intended to offer such evidence in this case.
Defendant renewed his objection to the admission of such evidence, arguing that victim impact evidence was not admissible as a matter of Oregon statutory and constitutional law. The trial court overruled defendant's objection, ruling that such evidence is admissible.
During the penalty phase on remand, the state called some family members of the two victims in this case, a husband and wife, to testify. The brother of the husband described that victim's personal characteristics and background. The couple's daughter also described the personal characteristics and background of both victims and the impact of their deaths on the family.
After the conclusion of evidence and closing statements, the trial court instructed the jury:
"* * * * *
* * *
The jury deliberated and answered each of the three questions in the affirmative. The trial court scheduled sentencing for five days later and at that time pronounced defendant's death sentence.
Defendant raises numerous assignments of error. Defendant first assigns as error the decision of the trial court to admit the victim impact evidence. Defendant makes both statutory and constitutional arguments that the victim impact evidence was not admissible. We begin with defendant's subconstitutional arguments. See State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 579, 879 P.2d 162 (1994) (Stevens II) (court decides subconstitutional issues before addressing constitutional issues).
Defendant argues that the victim impact evidence was not admissible because it was not relevant to any of the substantive issues submitted by the court to the jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989). We agree.
ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1989), which was the statutory scheme in effect at the time, provided that "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence." The standard of relevance in OEC 401 applies in penalty phase proceedings. Stevens II, 319 Or. at 580, 879 P.2d 162. Under OEC 401, "`[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." OEC 402.
The function of the doctrine of relevancy is to require that there be some rational relationship between the item of evidence offered by a litigant and the substantive issues properly provable in the case. 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5164, at 37 (1978). Relevancy under OEC 401 is a relational concept that carries meaning only in context. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 4.1, at 183 (1995) (stating principle). Stated differently, "[r]elevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case." OEC 401 Commentary, reprinted in Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 104 (2d ed. 1989).
*277 Relevance under OEC 401 merges two traditional conceptsrelevance and materialityinto a single definition, using the term "relevant" to embrace the two. OEC 401 Commentary, reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 105. The traditional concept of relevance concerns the relation between the facts in evidence and the conclusions to be drawn from them, while materiality concerns the relation between the proposition for which evidence is offered and the issues in the case. Id. Under OEC 401, an offered item of evidence may be excluded as irrelevant for either of two quite distinct reasons: (1) because it is not probative (i.e., does not have any tendency to prove or disprove, or to make more probable or less probable) of the fact or proposition at which it is directed, or (2) because that fact or proposition at which the item is directed is not provable in the case, i.e., is not "of consequence [`material'] to the determination of the action." OEC 401. Thus, relevance under OEC 401 is not only a relational concept, it is also a legally substantive or definitional one. Whether a fact or proposition is provable in the case is determined not by the rules of evidence, but by the pleadings, the other evidence introduced in the case, and the applicable substantive law. State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 691-92, 801 P.2d 789 (1990).
Defendant does not dispute that the state's victim impact evidence tends to prove the fact or proposition at which it was directed, namely, the victims' personal characteristics and the impact of the victims' deaths on their families. The question before us, therefore, is whether that evidence was "material," i.e., whether the impact of the crime on the victims' families was a matter properly provable in the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial.
As the trial court's jury instructions in this case indicate, there were three substantive issues which the jury had to consider. To be relevant, the victim impact evidence must tend to prove one of those three substantive issues. The three issues were presented to the jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989), as interpreted by this court in Wagner II, 309 Or. at 19, 786 P.2d 93.
ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989) provided:
The first three statutory factors listed above, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A)-(C) (1989), all require that the jury consider specific aggravating circumstances (i.e., deliberateness, future dangerousness, and unreasonable response to provocation). The existence of an "aggravating circumstance" leads a jury to answer the question "whether the sentence of death [should] be imposed" in the affirmative. The existence of a "mitigating circumstance" weighs against the imposition of the death sentence. The trial court instructed the jury to consider two aggravating circumstances, deliberateness and future dangerousness.[5]*278 The state makes no argument that the victim impact evidence establishes either of those two statutory aggravating circumstances. The state agrees that the victim impact evidence does not tend to prove either defendant's deliberateness in carrying out the crime or defendant's likelihood of future dangerousness.
The state argues that the victim impact evidence tends to prove the existence of an aggravating circumstance under the fourth statutory question,[6] "whether a sentence of death [should] be imposed." ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). Defendant argues that the fourth question under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) only permits the consideration of mitigating evidence. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that only evidence relating to the existence of mitigating circumstances is relevant to the fourth statutory question provided by ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989).
To determine whether victim impact evidence is relevant to the fourth statutory question, we look to the legislature's intent in drafting the fourth question. In doing so, the first level of analysis is to examine the text and context of the statute. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The context of the statute includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.
To review, ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989) provided that the court shall submit to the jury the fourth question as follows:
"* * * * *
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) focuses on mitigation as the purpose of the fourth question. That statute requires the trial court to instruct the jury to consider the extent to which the defendant's character and background and the circumstances of the offense may "reduce the defendant's moral culpability or blameworthiness for the crime."[7] Thus, the text of the statute, and particularly the word "reduce," suggest that the issue before the jury under the "fourth question" is the existence of mitigating circumstances, not aggravating circumstances. The context of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) further indicates that the issue submitted to the jury under the "fourth question" is the existence of mitigating circumstances.
ORS 163.150(1)(d) (1989) provided:
"The state must prove each issue submitted under subparagraphs (A) to (C) of paragraph (b) of this subsection [i.e., deliberateness, future dangerousness, unreasonable response to provocation] beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of `yes' or `no' on each issue considered."
The statute imposed no similar burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the issue submitted to the jury under the "fourth question." See Wagner II, 309 Or. at 18, 786 P.2d 93 (there is no burden of proof on the fourth question). Thus, for each of the first three questions under ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989), which required the jury to consider enumerated aggravating circumstances, the state had the burden to establish the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable *279 doubt. The "fourth question" (whether defendant should receive a death sentence), however, did not refer to aggravating circumstances, and provided no burden of proof.
The statutory requirement that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the issues concerning aggravation submitted under the first three questions indicates that the legislature intended that the death penalty would be imposed only on the basis of the enumerated statutory aggravating factors that the state establishes beyond a reasonable doubt. Interpreting the "fourth question," on which neither party has any burden of proof, to allow proof of non-enumerated aggravating factors would allow the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of non-enumerated aggravating factors that were not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the legislature's intent to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the enumerated aggravating circumstances. Thus, the lack of a burden of proof as to the issue submitted to the jury under the "fourth question" indicates that the legislature did not intend that issue to involve a consideration of aggravating circumstances.
The context of a statute also includes this court's interpretations of the statute. Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or. 247, 252, 864 P.2d 1319 (1994). In Wagner II, this court recognized the lack of grammatical clarity of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) and stated that the following jury instruction was correct for the "fourth question" under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989):
Again, the jury instruction formulated by this court focused solely on whether the evidence of mitigating circumstances justified a sentence of less than death. That statutory interpretation confirmed that the statute referred solely to mitigating circumstances, not to aggravating circumstances.
Following Wagner II, this court held on several occasions that the fourth question was enacted to permit the jury to consider the existence of mitigating circumstances. In State v. Miranda, 309 Or. 121, 131, 786 P.2d 155, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990), this court observed:
In Stevens II, 319 Or. at 585, 879 P.2d 162 (quoting Wagner II, 309 Or. at 13, 786 P.2d 93), we also stated:
The text and context of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) clearly indicate that the fourth question under that statute only permits the jury to consider mitigating evidence. The dissent reaches the opposite conclusion. To support that conclusion, the dissent looks to the text, context, and legislative history to determine the statute's meaning. See 322 Or. at 274-78, 906 P.2d at 289-92 (Graber, J., dissenting).
The dissent argues that legislative history of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) indicates that victim impact evidence is admissible under the fourth question. We disagree. Our review of legislative history supports the opposite conclusion. In order to accurately portray the legislative intent of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989), it is necessary to examine *280 the background surrounding the enactment of that statute.
Oregon's death penalty scheme originally consisted of three statutory questions. ORS 163.150(2) (1985). Those three questions related to the existence of enumerated aggravating circumstances. See id. (future dangerousness, deliberation, and unreasonable response to provocation). Under that initial statutory scheme, only those three enumerated aggravating circumstances justified the imposition of a sentence of death. In 1989, the legislature added the "fourth question." Or.Laws 1989, ch. 790, § 135b. Thus, the question becomes whether, by adding the "fourth question" to Oregon's death penalty scheme, the legislature intended to allow the jury to consider additional non-enumerated aggravating circumstances in deciding whether a defendant should receive a death sentence.
This court recently examined the legislative history of the "fourth question" in Stevens II, 319 Or. at 580-83, 879 P.2d 162. In that case, this court recalled that the "fourth question" was enacted to make Oregon's death penalty scheme comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as those requirements were interpreted in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989). Stevens II, 319 Or. at 581, 879 P.2d 162.
In Penry, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a death sentence imposed under the Texas three-question statutory sentencing scheme, on which Oregon's scheme was based, was unconstitutional, because it did not give the jury a meaningful opportunity to "give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the crime."[8]Penry, 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S. Ct. at 2952. In Penry, the Supreme Court stated:
Thus, under Penry, the Constitution requires that the jury have broad discretion in considering relevant mitigating circumstances, and it imposes "carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death sentence."
*281 In enacting ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989), the legislature was attempting to bring Oregon's death penalty scheme in compliance with Penry. Stevens II, 319 Or. at 581, 879 P.2d 162. When the "fourth question" (whether the defendant should receive a death sentence) was added, the Oregon death penalty scheme already had "carefully defined standards" that narrowed the imposition of the death sentence, in the form of three questions relating to enumerated statutory aggravating circumstances. Thus, in order to comply with Penry, the legislature added the fourth question to allow the jury to "consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background, character, or the circumstances of the crime." Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. at 2951-52.
In Wagner II, this court explained how adding a fourth question to Oregon's original three-question death penalty scheme was required to satisfy the requirements of Penry. This court explained:
When Penry was decided, ORS 163.150 (1987) provided that the jury was to be instructed in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to three issues (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and response to provocation). The statute did not expressly provide for a "fourth question." The court recognized, however, that if the statute did not permit a "fourth question," the statute would be facially unconstitutional. Wagner II, 309 Or. at 8, 786 P.2d 93.
The Wagner II court's discussion of the facial validity of ORS 163.150 (1987) makes clear that the focus of the constitutionally required mechanism of a fourth question was on the consideration of mitigating circumstances. This court held that Oregon's death penalty scheme was not unconstitutional because "ORS 163.150 [ (1987) ] permits a general mitigation question." 309 Or. at 14, 786 P.2d 93. The Wagner II court proceeded to adopt the approach suggested by Justice Gillette's dissenting opinion in Wagner I:
"Justice Gillette's dissent in Wagner [I] states:
"`None of the foregoing [discussion of the federal precedents] necessarily requires holding that the Oregon statutory scheme is unconstitutional on its face. This court could so construe the statute as to permit the admission of all mitigating evidence and to require an instruction to the jury delineating the scope of the jury's authority to reprieve an otherwise death-eligible defendant on the basis of that [mitigating] evidence.
"`I do not here propose any particular solution. One solution perhaps would be to instruct the jury that, even if it concludes that all three statutory questions should be [309 Or. at 14, 786 P.2d 93] answered `yes,' it nonetheless should answer one of them `no' unless it unanimously concludes that the mitigating evidence does not call for a lesser penalty. A second alternative might have the jury answer a fourth, constitutionally-required question after the three statutory ones: After considering all the mitigating evidence, does the jury still unanimously conclude that the prisoner should be put to death, rather than spared?' * * * 305 Or. at 232-33, 752 P.2d 1136 (Gillette, J., dissenting). (Emphasis added.)
"In view of what we have learned from Penry, it is now clear that mitigating evidence beyond the scope of the statutory issues is indeed constitutionally "relevant to sentence" and, accordingly, statutorily admissible. See State v. Wagner, 305 Or. at 156-67, 752 P.2d 1136; ORS 163.150(1)(a) [ (1987) ]. The step from admissibility of such evidence to meaningful consideration by the jury, suggested by *282 Justice Gillette as a possibility of statutory construction in Wagner and required by the Supreme Court in Penry for a constitutionally valid death sentence, is the step we now take." Wagner II, 309 Or. at 13-14, 786 P.2d 93 (emphasis added).
Thus, the fourth question (whether the defendant should receive a death sentence), which this court created in Wagner II, was developed for the sole purpose of giving effect to the constitutional requirement that the jury must consider mitigating evidence. Indeed, the point of the fourth question was to give the jury an opportunity, after considering all mitigating evidence, to decide to spare a defendant's life, notwithstanding affirmative answers to the first three questions which related to the existence of aggravating circumstances.
We now turn to the legislative history that followed this court's decisions discussed above.
The dissent contends that the legislative history of ORS 163.150 (1989) provides support for their position that the fourth question permits the consideration of aggravating evidence. To that end, the dissent argues that the testimony of Dale Penn, a representative of the Oregon District Attorney's Association, sheds significant light on the purpose of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). 322 Or. at 277, 906 P.2d at 291 (Graber, J., dissenting). There are several problems with the dissent's approach. First, the dissent relies almost exclusively on the inconclusive testimony of one person, Penn. Penn is a witness and representative of a district attorney's association; he is not a legislator. As such, his statements say little about the intent of the Oregon Legislative Assembly as a whole.
The majority opinion, on the other hand, attempts to discern the general intent of the Legislative Assembly when it enacted ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). Our opinion does so by analyzing ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) as a legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Penry. The general intent of the Legislative Assembly was to make ORS 163.150 (1989) constitutional in light of Penry by providing a mechanism for the consideration of mitigating evidence. This is the same approach we took when we examined the legislative history of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) in Stevens II, 319 Or. at 581, 879 P.2d 162.
It is curious that the dissent relies so heavily on the testimony of one witness. Recently, the author of the dissenting opinion made a general observation about the use of legislative history. The author stated:
Penn's opinions concerning ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) are merely the views of one witness and do not evidence the general intent of the Legislative Assembly.
Even if we were to find Penn's views persuasive, they do not support the dissent's conclusion that ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) permits the jury to consider victim impact evidence under the fourth question. Penn testified that the fourth question:
First, we point out what Penn did not say. He did not say that the fourth question permits the state to introduce evidence of aggravating circumstances. Rather, he stated that the fourth question would permit both the state and the defense to make arguments "for or against death." Penn's statement simply confirms that the state and defense may make arguments for or against the death penalty under each question. See ORS *283 163.150(1)(a) (1985) ("the state and the defendant * * * shall be permitted to make arguments for or against a sentence of death" "(emphasis added)); ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1989) (same); ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1993) (same). For example, the state may argue that, under the fourth question, any mitigating circumstances offered by defendant should not lead the jury to spare defendant's life. Penn's statement that the state has the right to make arguments for the death penalty is not, as the dissent asserts, the same as saying that the state has the right to introduce aggravating evidence under the fourth question.
If the intent of Penn's testimony was that the state has the right to introduce aggravating evidence under the fourth question, it is curious that he concluded his remarks by stating "that's the intent of the Supreme Court's opinion [in Penry ]." The intent of the Supreme Court's opinion in Penry was not to let in more aggravating evidence. In fact, it was just the opposite; the intent of the opinion was to allow the jury to consider mitigating circumstances that may weigh against the imposition of the death sentence. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-328, 109 S. Ct. at 2951-52.
If the dissent believes that we can glean some legislative intent from the statements of witnesses who testified before the legislative committees, the dissent has overlooked the statements of two important witnesses. Both the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, acting in their official capacities, testified as to the purpose of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). The Attorney General, Dave Frohnmayer, remarked:
The Solicitor General, Virginia Linder, then added:
The comments of the Attorney General and Solicitor General provide additional support to the view that the fourth question was enacted in order to allow the jury to take into account mitigating circumstances that weigh against a sentence of death.
This was the view taken by this court in Wagner II. In Wagner II, we concluded that in order to comply with Penry, Oregon's death penalty scheme must include a mechanism that allows the jury an opportunity to spare a defendant's life in light of any mitigating circumstances. 309 Or. at 14, 786 P.2d 93. Accordingly, the "fourth question" was intended as a mechanism to allow the jury to give full effect to any mitigating circumstances.
Based on the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989), we conclude that the issue submitted to the jury under the "fourth question" is whether any mitigating circumstances exist that would justify a sentence of life rather than death. To conclude otherwise would allow the jury to consider a non-statutory aggravating factor beyond the three aggravating factors specifically enumerated in the statute. We find nothing in the text, context or legislative history of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) to indicate that the legislature intended that the jury could consider aggravating victim impact evidence under the fourth question.
The victim impact evidence presented in this case was not relevant to any of three substantive issues (deliberateness, future *284 dangerousness, and whether defendant should receive a death sentence) that the court instructed the jury to consider in the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial under ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989).
The next issue for this court is whether victim impact evidence is made admissible during the penalty phase of capital cases under ORS 137.013 even though that evidence is not relevant under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989).
ORS 137.013 provides:
In essence, the state argues that ORS 137.013 makes victim impact evidence admissible in the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial, irrespective of its relevance under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). We disagree. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that ORS 137.013 was not intended to render otherwise irrelevant victim impact evidence admissible in the penalty phase of a capital case.
Capital cases require our most vigilant and deliberative review. We agree with the United States Supreme Court statement that "[d]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree" so that "there is a difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976). Similarly, in this case, because "death is a punishment different from all other[ ] [sanctions]," we must be certain that the voters in enacting ORS 137.013 as part of Ballot Measure 10 intended that victim impact statements be admitted as evidence in capital cases. Of course, we are not authorized to rewrite a statute or ignore its plain meaning. Lane County v. Heintz Const. Co., et al, 228 Or. 152, 157, 364 P.2d 627 (1961). We cannot insert into a statute what has been omitted, nor omit what has been inserted. ORS 174.010.
As previously stated, this court considers the subconstitutional arguments before it examines the state or federal constitutional issues, Stevens II, 319 Or. at 579, 879 P.2d 162. We begin our analysis, therefore, by interpreting ORS 137.013. ORS 137.013 was enacted by the people as part of Ballot Measure 10 (the "Crime Victim's Bill of Rights") in the November 1986 general election. Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 10. This court applies the same method of statutory analysis to a statute enacted by the voters as it would to a statute enacted by the Legislative Assembly. PGE, 317 Or. at 612 n. 4, 859 P.2d 1143.
In interpreting a statute enacted by initiative, the court's task is to discern the intent of the voters who passed the initiative. Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. As we said earlier, to determine the intent of the voters, we first look to the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. The text of the statute is the starting point because the text is the best evidence of the voters' intent. Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. Because ORS 137.013 was enacted by the voters as part of Ballot Measure 10, we examine the text of ORS 137.013 in the context of Ballot Measure 10.
The text of ORS 137.013 does not, by its terms declare that victim impact evidence shall be admissible as evidence in the penalty phase of capital trials. By contrast, other provisions of Ballot Measure 10 by their terms declare that certain evidence shall be admissible in criminal homicide trials. For example, ORS 41.415, which was enacted as part of Ballot Measure 10, provides:
The difference in wording regarding admissibility of evidence is significant. When the legislature uses different terms in related statutes, we presume that the legislature intended different meanings. See PGE, 317 *285 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (stating general principle). If the voters intended to require the admission of victim impact evidence in every criminal trialwhether relevant or notthey did not say so explicitly. Indeed, the text of ORS 137.013, in contrast to ORS 41.415 is qualified"[a]t the time of sentencing," a victim has a right "reasonably to express" his or her views. That change does not alter any rule regarding the admissibility of evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial. The textual differences between ORS 137.013 and ORS 41.135 suggest that ORS 137.013 was not intended to provide for the admission of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
The text also contains no indication that the voters in enacting ORS 137.013 intended to amend either expressly or by implication the specific penalty phase procedures that ORS 163.150 (1985)[9] required in capital cases. If the voters intended to alter the penalty phase procedures for capital cases set forth in ORS 163.150 (1985), they could have easily done so by expressly amending that statutory provision. However, the voters did not amend ORS 163.150 (1985). ORS 137.013 was specifically added to chapter 137 of the Oregon Revised Statutes. Ballot Measure 10, section 10, provided that "this section [now ORS 137.013] is added to and made a part of ORS Chapter 137." See Ballot Measure No. 10, State of Oregon, 1986; Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 10. Chapter 137 contains general provisions regarding sentencing, parole, and probation for non-capital cases. Specific procedures for sentencing in capital cases, as noted above, are set forth separately in Chapter 163.
Nothing in the text of ORS 137.013 suggests that it was intended to alter the standards by which the court makes sentencing decisions under ORS 163.150 (1985). As stated previously, when we interpret a statute, we are prohibited from inserting what the lawmakers omitted. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143; ORS 174.010.
The voters also did not amend ORS 163.150 (1985) by implication when they enacted ORS 137.013. As a matter of statutory interpretation, "[w]e generally do not assume that a statute is intended to repeal or amend another by implication." Wilson v. Matthews, 291 Or. 33, 37, 628 P.2d 393 (1981). Amendment by implication is "disfavored by this court" and is only recognized "when the matter is clear." State ex rel. Med. Pear Co. v. Fowler, 207 Or. 182, 195, 295 P.2d 167 (1956).
Construing these two statutes so as to give effect to both, we hold that ORS 137.013 does not amend by implication the penalty phase procedures for capital cases set forth in ORS 163.150 (1985). Wilson, 291 Or. at 37, 628 P.2d 393. Both statutes can be given effect if we interpret ORS 137.013 to apply only to non-capital cases. This construction preserves ORS 137.013 by giving victims the right to make statements in all non-capital cases "at the time of sentencing." Because the voters specifically added ORS 137.013 to the chapter which provides the procedure for sentencing, parole and probation for all non-capital cases, this construction appears consistent with the voters' intent when they enacted ORS 137.013.
This construction also gives effect to ORS 163.150 (1985) by preserving the carefully drafted penalty phase procedures that statute requires in capital cases. If the people intended to amend by implication the penalty phase procedures for capital cases set out in ORS 163.150 (1985), that amendment would have the effect of expanding the scope of aggravating circumstances that could be considered in the sentencing decision by the jury. ORS 163.150 (1985) specifically designates the three aggravating factors that justify a sentence of death. Reading ORS 137.013 to require the admission of aggravating evidence that is unrelated to those three aggravating factors would have the effect of implicitly altering the carefully drafted penalty phase procedures set forth in ORS 163.150 (1985). Nothing in the text of ORS 137.013 indicates that the people intended to alter that carefully drafted penalty scheme.
The context of Ballot Measure 10 also indicates that the drafters of that measure were *286 aware that special procedures applied to capital cases because certain sections of the measure expressly apply to capital cases. See Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 7 (amending ORS 136.230 to make limits on peremptory challenges apply to "capital offense[s]"); id., § 8 (providing for admission of photograph of the victim "in a prosecution for any criminal homicide"). (Emphasis added.) By contrast, the text of ORS 137.013, also enacted as part of Ballot Measure 10, makes no special reference to changing the penalty phase procedures in capital cases or in cases involving criminal homicide. In light of the express changes made to the penalty phase procedures in capital cases by other provisions of Ballot Measure 10, we conclude that ORS 137.013, which makes no special reference to changing the procedures for capital cases, did not alter the penalty phase procedures for capital cases set forth in ORS 163.150 (1985).
Our analysis of the context of the statute also includes consideration of rules of construction because some of those rules "bear directly on the interpretation of the statutory provision in context." PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143; Gaston, 318 Or. at 253, 864 P.2d 1319. One rule of construction which bears directly on the interpretation of ORS 137.013 is set forth in ORS 174.020, which provides:
Thus, when one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with the same subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, while giving effect to a consistent legislative policy. State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229 (1968). However, if the two statutes cannot be harmonized, "the specific statute is considered an exception to the general statute." Id.; Smith v. Multnomah County Board of Commissioners, 318 Or. 302, 309, 865 P.2d 356 (1994) (citing Colby v. Larson, 208 Or. 121, 126-127, 297 P.2d 1073, 299 P.2d 1076 (1956)).
This case involves the interpretation of two statutes, a general and specific statute. ORS 137.013 is a general statute that appears in a chapter containing the sentencing procedures for non-capital cases. ORS 137.013 gives victims or their next of kin the right to make impact statements in person or by counsel at the time of sentencing in criminal cases generally.
ORS 163.150(1) (1989) is a more specific statute. ORS 163.150(1) (1989) sets forth the specific procedures for a jury to follow in the penalty phase prior to the pronouncement of sentence in a capital case. As we previously stated, ORS 163.150(1) (1989) provides four specific questionsthree questions in this casethat a jury must resolve before a trial court sentences a defendant in a capital case.
If we were to adopt the state's interpretation of ORS 137.013, that statute would conflict with ORS 163.150(1) (1989). The state maintains that ORS 137.013 provides that victim impact evidence is admissible during the penalty phase of a capital case. ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1989), however, provides that only relevant evidence may be presented during the penalty phase of a capital case. As we have demonstrated earlier in this opinion, victim impact statements are not "relevant to sentenc[ing]" in capital cases under ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989), because those statements are not relevant to any of the four substantive questions that a jury must answer pursuant to that statute and Wagner II, 309 Or. at 18, 786 P.2d 93.
Under the state's interpretation, therefore, there is an inconsistency between the two statutes. ORS 137.013, according to the state, provides that victim impact evidence is admissible in the penalty phase of a capital case. As we have shown earlier in this opinion, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) bars the admission of such evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case.
Any inconsistency between those two statutes can be resolved, however, if we construe ORS 137.013 to apply only to sentencing in non-capital cases. That construction gives effect to both statutes. As we stated above, *287 that construction preserves the legislative policy of ORS 163.150(1) (1989) by preserving the carefully drafted sentencing scheme evident in that statute. It also ensures that the jury consider only relevant evidence during their deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital case.
That construction also preserves the legislative policy of ORS 137.013. Our interpretation of ORS 137.013 ensures that victims, and their next of kin have the right to make impact statements in person, during sentencing, and before a judge in all non-capital criminal trials. Before the enactment of ORS 137.013, victims did not have the right to make victim impact statements in person. First, the trial court was not required to conduct a sentencing hearing. See ORS 137.080 (1985) (trial judge had discretion as to whether to conduct a sentencing hearing). More significantly, victims only had the right to express their views in writing as part of a presentence report. ORS 137.530(2) (1985) provided in part:
Under ORS 137.090 (1985), the trial court was permitted, but was not required, to consider the presentence report before sentencing the defendant. ORS 137.090 (1985). In the context of non-capital indeterminate sentencing, ORS 137.013 removes a trial court's discretion in deciding whether a victim will be heard personally at the time of sentencing, as opposed to having the victim's views expressed through the presentence report.
Our analysis of the text and context of ORS 137.013 leads us to these conclusions: ORS 137.013 was not intended to render otherwise irrelevant evidence admissible during the penalty phase of capital trials;[10] rather, ORS 137.013 was intended to give victims or their next of kin the right to appear in person or through an attorney at the time of sentencing in all non-capital criminal trials.
In summary, the victim impact evidence presented during the sentencing proceeding in this case was not relevant to any fact or proposition provable under ORS 163.150(1) (1989) and, therefore, was inadmissible under that statute. In addition, an analysis of the text and context of ORS 137.013 indicates that ORS 137.013 did not alter the specific capital sentencing procedures set forth in ORS 163.150(1) (1989). The trial court erred in admitting the victim impact evidence in this case.[11]
The error in this case was not harmless. We cannot say that there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. See State v. Johnson, 313 Or. 189, 201, 832 P.2d 443 (1992) (standard for determining whether evidentiary error is harmless is consistent with the standard for reversible error set forth in Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. Under that standard, error is harmless if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.).
The sentence of death is vacated. This case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*288 GRABER, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, J., joined.
GRABER, Judge, dissenting.
Because evidence of the victims' character and background was admissible, I dissent. The majority distorts the applicable statutes and thereby thwarts the will of the people.
Before the penalty phase of defendant's trial began, defendant moved in limine to prevent the admission of so-called "victim impact" evidence. He relied on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and also asserted that such evidence would "[v]iolate[ ] the right to an impartial jury secured by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution." At the time, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), described the federal constitutional limits on the presentation of such evidence. The trial court granted defendant's motion.
After voir dire, but before opening statements, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled Booth in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991). The next day, the state informed defendant and the court that it intended to introduce evidence from the victims' family about the victims that was consistent with Payne. The state asserted that it intended to present evidence on two issues: (1) "What kind of people were [the victims]," and (2) "how did the manner of their deaths affect the people directly impacted by them." The state also told the court that it did not intend to ask the family members their opinions of the crime or what the sentence ought to be.[1]
The trial court noted that ORS 137.013 appeared to make the evidence that the state proposed to offer admissible as a matter of state law. Defendant argued to the court that ORS 137.013 "does not apply to capital sentencing proceedings" and that, if it does, the statute violates the Oregon Constitution. The court then took the matter under advisement. Three days later, before opening statement, the trial court ruled: "[T]here's no p[er] se prohibition against victim impact evidence, and Oregon has a statute allowing that kind of evidence."
The testimony now challenged fell within the parameters described by the state to the trial court. In addition to testifying about facts of the crime (such as the children's description of discovering their parents' bodies and the family members' identification of the victims' personal property that was found in defendant's possession), the family members described what kind of people the victims were and what they did for a living. Defendant did not ask the court to reconsider its initial ruling in the light of that testimony, nor did he argue that the testimony went beyond what ORS 137.013 would allow. As noted, defendant argued (as the majority now holds) that the statute does not apply in a capital case.
In my view, the statute on which the trial court relied supports the trial court's ruling. In construing a statute, this court first examines its text and context and, if the legislative intent is clear from that examination, the court inquires no further. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The same method of analysis applies to initiated statutes. Id. at 612 n. 4, 859 P.2d 1143. In the present case, the text and context of ORS 137.013 make clear the people's intent when they adopted it as part of Ballot Measure 10 (Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2), also known as the "Crime Victims' Bill of Rights." Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 1. The majority's strained interpretation is, in a word, bizarre. ORS 137.013 provides:
"At the time of sentencing, the victim or the victim's next of kin has the right to appear personally or by counsel, and has the right to reasonably express any views *289 concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim, and the need for restitution and compensatory fine."
By its terms, that statute applies at the time of any sentencing whatsoever, including a sentencing that may (or, of course, may not) lead to imposition of the death penalty.
The phrase "next of kin" suggests strongly that the statute applies in homicide cases. Any doubt in that regard is dispelled by ORS 131.007, which defines the term "victim," as it is used in ORS 137.013, to "include[ ], in the case of a homicide * * *, a member of the immediate family of the decedent." The applicable definition draws no distinction between capital and non-capital homicides.
It is equally clear that the "Crime Victims' Bill of Rights" did not single out for fewer rights the relatives of victims of the most serious of homicidesthose in which the death penalty is sought. Other sections of Ballot Measure 10 demonstrate that the initiative as a whole encompasses capital cases.
For example, Section 7 of Ballot Measure 10 added to ORS 136.230 a provision for additional peremptory challenges for the state in capital cases. Or Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 7. That section indicates that the initiative as a whole was intended to cover capital murder cases.
In addition, Section 8 of Ballot Measure 10 adopted ORS 41.415, which provides that, "[i]n a prosecution for any criminal homicide," a photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible when offered by the state. That section demonstrates that the initiative considered all criminal homicides to be in a single category, covered by the terms of the initiative. Indeed, this court has held that ORS 41.415 applies in capital cases. State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 27-28, 828 P.2d 1006, cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 171, 121 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1992); State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523, 560, 789 P.2d 1326 (1990).
It also is clear that "sentencing" occurs in capital cases. ORS 163.150 uses the term "sentencing" many times, in describing what happens in a capital case. That sentencing occurs at a "time," the time set for the penalty phase of the trial.
Finally, we know from Ballot Measure 10 itself what the people intended to accomplish by its enactment. The preamble to Ballot Measure 10 provided in part that "[t]he purpose of this ballot measure is to declare to our legislature and our courts that victims' rights shall be protected at each stage of the criminal justice system." Or.Laws 1987, ch. 2, § 2.
Even if the text and context of ORS 137.013 were not clear, the legislative history would eliminate any uncertainty. The explanatory statement in the November 1986 Voters' Pamphlet stated that the purpose of Ballot Measure 10 was, in part, to "[e]nsure victim[s], in person * * *, the right to express views in court at sentencing." Official 1986 General Voters' Pamphlet at 52 (emphasis added). Again, there is no hint of a limitation that such rights of victims would be ensured only for less serious crimes, but excluded for the most serious crimes.
In summary, the intent of the people is clear. ORS 137.013 applies uniformly to all criminal cases at the time of sentencing and contains no exception for capital sentencing proceedings. A fair reading of the text and context (even without resort to confirming legislative history) shows that the purpose of ORS 137.013 was to ensure that no sentencing proceeding in Oregon focuses exclusively on the defendant; every such proceeding also is to include consideration of the costs that the defendant's crime imposed on the victim and, in the case of homicides, on the victim's next of kin. The statute, in other words, makes the impact on the victim relevant to every sentencing proceeding. And, it authorizes the admission of such evidence by making the opportunity of the homicide victim's next of kin to speak on the designated topics a "right."
Because ORS 137.013 provides that "victim impact" evidence is to be considered in capital *290 (as well as other criminal) cases, the next question is whether ORS 163.150 (1989) precluded the sentencing jury from hearing such evidence. It did not.
The two statutes are consistent. ORS 137.013 specifies that one type of evidence is relevant to the sentencing jury's decision in capital cases; it reflects the people's determination that the harm caused by a defendant's criminal act is relevant to sentencing and is admissible. ORS 163.150 (1989) set out four questions that the jury must answer. The wording of those questions did not preclude the sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence. The fourth question asked broadly "whether a sentence of death be imposed." ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). As worded, the fourth question was neutral, not one-sided. It permitted the jury to take into account the harm that a defendant caused to the victim or victim's next of kin, among other factors, in deciding the appropriate sentence.
In State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 580-84, 879 P.2d 162 (1994) (Stevens II), this court considered the legislature's intent in adding the fourth question to ORS 163.150. After tracing the history of the fourth question, the court concluded that the sentencing jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 583, 879 P.2d 162. The court then held that the defendant's offer of proof included testimony that could provide circumstantial evidence of some mitigating aspect of the defendant's character or background, making it relevant to the fourth question; therefore, the trial court erred in excluding the proffered evidence. Id. at 584-85, 879 P.2d 162.
Stevens II construed the requirements of ORS 163.150 respecting what kinds of mitigating evidence must be admitted as relevant. The court was not called on, however, to consider the converse: whether the statute makes non-mitigating evidence irrelevant. Neither does its holding answer that question indirectly. To the extent that Stevens II contains any suggestion at all on the point now in issue, it is an implicit assumption that victim impact statements are relevant and admissible and that the defendant's opportunity to introduce evidence of his or her character and background was meant to parallel or balance the opportunity that already existed to do the same respecting the victim:
See also State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 18, 786 P.2d 93 ("[t]here is no burden of proof on the fourth question because it does not present an issue subject to proof in the traditional sense, rather, it frames a discretionary determination for the jury"), cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990).
In short, a reading of the text and context of ORS 163.150 (1989) shows that it was compatible with ORS 137.013. Even if the legislative intent were not clear from the text and context, however, the legislative history likewise shows that the legislature did not intend the 1989 amendment to ORS 163.150 to preclude the kind of evidence that is at issue here. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (if the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context, this court will consider legislative history).
The main messages derived from the legislative history of the 1989 amendment to ORS 163.150 track its text: to add mitigation but not to exclude anything. The Oregon legislature added the fourth question to ORS 163.150 in 1989 in response to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989). Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary, HB 2250, June 29, 1989, at 2 (statements of Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia Linder, Solicitor General). That is the consistent and overarching theme of the legislative history as a whole. See also Stevens II, 319 Or. at 582-83, 879 P.2d 162.
*291 It also is clear from the legislative history as a whole, however, that (1) the legislature did not intend to exclude any category of evidence, (2) the legislature did not intend to do any more to benefit capital defendants than what Penry required, and (3) it was assumed that "aggravating" as well as "mitigating" facts would be introduced during the penalty phase of a capital trial. The following example reflects the foregoing points.
The following version of the fourth question was proposed:
Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, June 29, 1989, Tape 256, Side A at 86. One of the senators objected that the proposed wording was confusing. Id. at 144 (remarks of Sen. Shoemaker). In response, the witness who was then testifying, Dale Penn, explained how the fourth question worked. He told the committee that the proposed wording allowed both the state and the defendant to present arguments for and against the death penalty, even though such arguments were not already relevant to the first three questions.
Id. at 160-75. Immediately after that explanation, Senator Hill moved to substitute "the language just described" for the prior proposal. Id. at 188. With very minor alterations not pertinent to the issue here, "the language just described" became what was the applicable version of ORS 163.150 (1989).
The legislative history shows, as noted, that the fourth question was intended to allow the jury to give effect to a broad range of mitigating evidence that could not be considered in deciding the first three questions. Stevens II, 319 Or. at 582-83, 879 P.2d 162. It does not follow, however, that in adding the fourth question the legislature intended to foreclose the jury from considering non-mitigating evidence that another statute makes relevant to the sentencing decision. To the contrary, in explaining to the Senate Judiciary Committee how the fourth question would work, the witness who described it in essentially the form in which it was adopted said that it would allow "all kinds of arguments by the state * * * for * * * death[,] whether or not" relevant to the other three questions. In other words, the legislative history also shows that the legislature contemplated an open-ended, not one-sided, consideration of the defendant's character, background, and circumstances of the crime. Finally, the legislative history as a whole suggests that the legislature intended to add the minimum protection for defendants that the federal constitution requires.
In conclusion, ORS 163.150 (1989) did not preclude the sentencing jury from considering evidence that ORS 137.013 specifies is relevant. Indeed, even in the terms of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), "victim impact" evidence was independently relevant. "Victim impact" evidence provides the jury with relevant evidence about the circumstances of the crime." It informs the jury of the reasonably foreseeable harm to the victim's family that the defendant's crime caused. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 838, 111 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (Souter, J., concurring) (so stating). Moreover, such evidence makes real the abstract proposition that a murder ends a particular, unique person's life and affects that person's family. Thus, the loss that the crime causes is one of the circumstances of the crime and is relevant to the reasoned moral decision that the fourth question asks the jury to make. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S. Ct. at 2947 (jury must give reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime).
Even if there were some tension between the two statutes, ORS 137.013 is more specific than ORS 163.150 (1989) and, therefore, controls. This court already has held that another provision of Ballot Measure 10 is more specific than the general principles of *292 relevance that otherwise would apply. See Williams, 313 Or. at 28, 828 P.2d 1006 (ORS 41.415, which was enacted as Oregon Laws 1987, chapter 2, section 8, specifically declares photographs of the victim while alive to be relevant and not subject to balancing under OEC 403).
Defendant's subconstitutional arguments are not well taken. Accordingly, I turn to his constitutional arguments.
Defendant preserved only one specific state constitutional argument. He asserted at trial, and asserts in conclusory fashion here, that the introduction of victim impact evidence violated his right to an impartial jury under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.[3]
That clause of Article I, section 11, governs the composition of the jury panel. See State v. Busby, 315 Or. 292, 300 n. 7, 844 P.2d 897 (1993) (this court, in rejecting argument that evidence admitted at trial violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury, stated: "Defendant does not * * * argue that the jury impaneled for his own trial was influenced * * * by the evidence of his prior conviction, because that evidence was never placed before the jury." (emphasis added)). The impartial jury clause of Article I, section 11, does not govern what type of evidence that an impartial jury, once empaneled, may hear or consider.
In this court, defendant asserts that the challenged evidence offends Article I, section 11, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, because it "was fundamentally unfair and seriously compromised his right to a fair trial." But, this court "repeatedly has stated that Oregon's constitution does not contain a due process clause." State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 98, 786 P.2d 111 (1990).
Defendant argues that "[a]llowing evidence of the type challenged her[e] would produce wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty in contravention of the Eighth Amendment."[4] The Supreme Court of the United States held in Payne, however, that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude states from allowing evidence concerning the victim and the effect of the victim's death on his or her immediate family. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
The Supreme Court also has held that a state avoids the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty if it genuinely narrows the class of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983). After that occurs, the Eighth Amendment does not bar the introduction of evidence that is relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. 462 U.S. at 886-87, 103 S. Ct. at 2747-48. The Oregon statute genuinely narrows the class of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed, a determination that the jury makes at the guilt phase of the trial. State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 184-85, 786 P.2d 161, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990). Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment does not bar the introduction of relevant evidence, including the kind of evidence permitted by Payne and specifically authorized by ORS 137.013, during the penalty phase.
Defendant reiterates the conclusory argument made under the Oregon Constitution, that admission of this evidence was fundamentally unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to *293 the United States Constitution.[5] In death penalty cases, the Due Process Clause is coextensive with the Eighth Amendment. Moen, 309 Or. at 98, 786 P.2d 111. Because the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the victim impact evidence in this case, neither does the Due Process Clause.
The victim impact evidence challenged in the present case is relevant under the mandate of ORS 137.013. Its admission is not precluded by ORS 163.150 (1989) or by the constitutional provisions that defendant cited to the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority's contrary conclusion.
CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, J., join in this dissenting opinion.
[1] The facts of this case are set forth in this court's opinion in State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299, 797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek I).
[2] In this opinion, we use the term "victim impact evidence" to mean evidence presented at the penalty phase on remand relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the victim's death on the victim's family.
[3] The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The cruel and unusual punishments clause applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420-21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758, 763 (1962).
[4] In State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 212, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1990) (Wagner II), which we discuss more fully below, this court held that the fourth statutory question, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989), lacked "grammatical clarity" and, therefore, provided a new standard instruction for trial courts to read to juries during the penalty phase of a capital trial.
It is within the context of the fourth statutory question, set out in full following our discussion of Wagner II, that the state argues that victim impact evidence was admissible in this case.
[5] The third statutory question, i.e., the issue of unreasonable response to provocation, was not raised by the evidence in this case and, therefore, was not presented to the jury for its consideration.
[6] We refer to the query "whether a sentence of death should be imposed" as the "fourth question" because it is the fourth question listed in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). In this case, because there were only three substantive questions at issue, the so-called fourth question was actually the third question presented to the jury.
[7] Indeed, the trial court's instructions to the jury focused solely on mitigation. The trial court instructed the jury to consider "any aspect of the defendant's character or background or any circumstances of the offense that you believe would justify a sentence less than death."
[8] Penry followed a long line of Supreme Court cases on the Eighth Amendment which required that the factfinder consider the capital defendant as an individual person.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976), the Court concluded that, in a capital case, the respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment required a trial court to consider the character and record of the individual and the circumstances of the offense. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), the sentencing judge refused to hear evidence of the defendant's troubled youth, beatings by her father and severe emotional disturbance; the Supreme Court remanded, holding that the Eighth Amendment required consideration of the defendant's character and record as well as the circumstances of the offense. This concept was carried further in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986), where the Court held that testimony of two prison officials and a regular visitor of defendant during his incarceration between arrest and trial should have been admitted to show his adaptability to prison life.
[9] We consider the 1985 statute at this point because that was the statute in effect at the time the voters enacted ORS 137.013 in the November 1986 election.
[10] Our decision is based entirely on statutory law. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not create a per se bar to the admissibility of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case. Payne did not hold, however, that victim impact evidence must be admitted in capital cases, or even that it should be admitted. Payne made clear that whether such evidence is relevant is a matter of state law. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
Nothing in our decision prevents the Oregon legislature from amending ORS 163.150 to change the inquiries relevant to sentencing under ORS 163.150 in such a way as to render victim impact evidence relevant in the sentencing phase of capital trials. Indeed, it appears that the 1995 Legislative Assembly may have done so. See Or.Laws 1995, ch. 531, § 3; Or.Laws 1995, ch. 657, § 23 (amending ORS 163.150).
[11] Because of our disposition of this assignment of error, we are not required to consider any of defendant's other assignments of error.
[1] Payne held that, "if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar." 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. Payne did not address the holding in Booth that the Eighth Amendment bars admission of opinions of the victim's family about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate penalty. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n. 2.
[2] In 1995, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) to allow the admission of victim impact evidence of the type at issue in this case at the sentencing phase of a capital case. Or.Laws 1995, ch. 531, § 2 & ch. 657, § 23.
[3] Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury * * *."
[4] The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
[5] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *." | 05b2bf68319e6ccdfd0b17a29d1380870cfc32795b77f1274d6044397c5798ab | 1995-11-24T00:00:00Z |
bd49ff00-a49b-46c1-a93a-3ace0f92099e | Novick v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48765)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted October 4, 2001.
Steven Novick, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petition.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With her on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
GILLETTE, J.
In this ballot title review proceeding, petitioner
challenges all four aspects (i.e., the caption, the "yes" and
"no" vote result statements, and the summary) of the Attorney
General's certified ballot title for a proposed initiative
measure that the Secretary of State has denominated as Initiative
Petition 72 (2002). We review the Attorney General's certified
ballot title to determine whether it substantially complies with
the requirements of ORS 250.035. See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out
standard of review).
The proposed measure would amend the present wording of
Article IV, section 1, subsection (2), paragraph (d), of the
Oregon Constitution, in three respects:
"Article IV, section 1, subsection (2), paragraph
(d) of the Constitution of the State of Oregon is
amended to read:
"(d) An initiative petition shall include the full
text of the proposed law or amendment to the
Constitution. A proposed law or amendment [to the
Constitution] shall embrace one subject only and
matters [properly] reasonably connected therewith. An
initiative shall not be found to contain multiple
subjects or amendments unless the subjects or
amendments contained therein are in no meaningful way
connected or related. A proposed law or amendment that
offers voters a coherent package of choices or
tradeoffs shall not be invalidated on grounds that it
contains more than one subject or amendment." (1)
(Wording that would be removed from the present paragraph (d) is
set off in brackets and is italicized; wording that would be
added is set out in bold.)
The substance of the parties' arguments turns on the
scope and meaning of the two additional sentences that the
proposed measure would add to Article IV, section 1(2)(d).
Article IV, section 1(2)(d), commonly is referred to in its
present wording as the "single-subject" requirement.
Completeness requires us to include reference to another
provision of the Oregon Constitution because, as we shall
explain, its wording appears to be the reason for some of the
content of the last two sentences of the proposed measure.
Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, which
describes the manner in which the Constitution may be amended,
provides, in part:
"When two or more amendments [to the Oregon
Constitution] shall be submitted in the manner
aforesaid[, i.e., either by legislative referral or by
initiative,] to the voters of this state at the same
election, they shall be so submitted that each
amendment shall be voted on separately.* * *"
The quoted part of Article XVII, section 1, commonly is referred
to as the "separate-vote" requirement. An initiated measure
fails the test of Article XVII, section 1, if it submits to the
people for a single vote two or more substantive changes to the
Oregon Constitution that are not "closely related." Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 277, 959 P2d 49 (1998). The "single-subject" and "separate-vote" requirements are related, but they
are not the same. See generally id. at 256-75 (explaining
origins, meaning, and interrelationship of Article IV, section
1(2)(d), and Article XVII, section 1).
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title for the proposed measure:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: INITIATIVE
CONTAINING RELATED PARTS, OFFERING
VOTERS COHERENT PACKAGE OF CHOICES
CONTAINS SINGLE SUBJECT
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote accepts proposal
stating that initiative contains one subject,
amendment, if its parts are related in any 'meaningful
way,' offers coherent package of choices.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects proposal
stating that initiative contains one subject,
amendment, when its parts are related, or it offers
voters coherent package of choices, tradeoffs.
"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Under current law,
an initiative measure is limited to a single subject
and related matters. An initiative complies with the
single-subject requirement if it contains a unifying
principle that logically connects all of its
provisions. The measure provides that an initiative
shall not be found to contain more than one subject or
constitutional amendment unless the subjects or
amendments in the initiative are not connected or
related in any 'meaningful way.' Under the measure, a
proposed law or constitutional amendment can not be
invalidated on the basis that it contains more than one
subject or amendment if the proposed law or
constitutional amendment offers voters a coherent
package of choices or tradeoffs."
As noted, petitioner objects to the ballot title
caption, result statements, and summary. Petitioner's primary
argument (2) is that the true "subject" of the proposed measure is a
change in the criteria that proposed initiatives would have to
meet to be eligible to be placed on the ballot. More
specifically, he asserts that the proposed measure is a directive
to the responsible state officials -- most commonly the Secretary
of State and this court -- not to declare invalid future
initiatives that meet the proposed measure's rewording of both
the "single-subject" and "separate-vote" requirements. It
follows that, if petitioner's argument is correct, then the
Attorney General's caption, result statements, and summary are
insufficient, because none mentions that the proposed measure
alters the constitutional criteria for applying those
requirements.
The Attorney General responds that petitioner's
arguments are speculative and that the Attorney General does not
have the authority to speculate as to the meaning of a proposed
measure in writing a ballot title. See Kane v. Kulongoski, 319
Or 88, 91, 872 P2d 981 (1994) (so holding). We disagree with the
Attorney General that petitioner's arguments are speculative.
Respecting the effect of the proposed measure on the "single-subject" requirement, we agree with the Attorney General
that it may be not possible to state precisely how the proposed
measure would alter the meaning of the present wording of Article
IV, section 1(2)(d). See, e.g., State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley,
326 Or 83, 89-91, 949 P2d 724 (1997) (discussing test; indicating
that enactment does not violate single-subject requirement
"merely by including a wide range of connected matters intended
to accomplish the goal of that single subject"); Armatta, 327 Or
at 273 (citing with approval and relying on Beesley). But it is
inescapable that the proposed measure, by its terms, changes the
wording of the constitutional test, and the voters must be told
at least that much, especially if -- as petitioner contends --
the proposed measure also affects the separate-vote requirement.
We turn to that issue.
The Attorney General argues that, by its wording, the
proposed measure speaks only to Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of
the Oregon Constitution, and does not implicate the "separate-vote" requirement of Article XVII, section 1. We disagree. We
do not see how the wording in two separate sentences of the
proposed measure, viz., "[a]n initiative shall not be found to
contain multiple * * * amendments" and "[an] amendment * * *
shall not be invalidated on grounds that it contains more than
one * * * amendment" (emphasis added), fairly can be read in any
other way than as implicating the standard presently found in
Article XVII, section 1. The Attorney General's argument that
the proposed measure affects only Article IV, section 1(2)(d),
because it mentions only that constitutional provision, cannot
prevail against the wording of the proposed measure, which
implicates Article XVII, section 1, as well as Article IV,
section 1(2)(d).
We also reject the Attorney General's further assertion
that the proposed measure implicates only Article IV, section
1(2)(d), because, as the Attorney General reads it, the wording
that the proposed measure would add to that constitutional
section focuses on the content of future proposed measures,
rather than on the effect of proposed measures on the existing
constitution. The Attorney General points out that this court in
Armatta differentiated between Article IV, section 1(2)(d), and
Article XVII, section 1, on the ground, inter alia, that the
former is concerned with the content of a measure, while the
latter is concerned with the effect of a measure on the existing
constitution. Id. at 270. We are not persuaded by that
argument, however, because of the direct instruction in the
proposed measure that an initiative not be invalidated on the
ground that "it contains more than one * * * amendment." An
initiative never would have been invalidated on that ground under
Article IV, section 1(2)(d); such an action would have been
grounded on Article XVII, section 1. See Armatta, 327 Or at 283-84 (illustrating principle). The caption, the "yes" and "no"
vote result statements, and the summary must be revised to
reflect that the proposed measure creates new criteria respecting
the standards presently found in both Article IV, section
1(2)(d), and Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution.
Petitioner also asserts that the Attorney General's
certified ballot title fails to comply with the requirements of
law in that it
"misleadingly suggests that an initiative must both
have related parts and offer voters a coherent package
of choices in order to be considered to contain a
single subject, when in fact the measure provides * * *
that an initiative must only meet one of the two
alternative standards."
(Emphasis in original.) Petitioner's complaint arises out of the
use of commas in the caption and the "yes" vote result
statement. (3) The commas, he asserts, will leave the voter with
the impression that, to pass constitutional muster, an initiative
both must contain provisions all of which are related in a
"meaningful way" and must offer the voters a "coherent package of
choices or tradeoffs." That is, petitioner asserts that voters
will read the commas used by the Attorney General to mean "and."
In fact, however, petitioner claims that the criteria are
alternatives, either of which would qualify an initiative for the
ballot.
We agree with petitioner that the wording of the
proposed measure indicates that an initiative that meets either
the "related in a meaningful way" or the "coherent package of
choices or tradeoffs" standard would pass constitutional muster.
We note that the Attorney General apparently agrees with that
reading as well, because he used the conjunction "or" in his "no"
vote result statement. (4) We also agree with petitioner that
voters could misread the commas about which he is concerned in
the caption and "yes" vote result statement to mean "and." It
follows that the caption and "yes" vote result statement fail to
conform to the requirements of law in this respect, as well.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
1. We note that the deletion of the repeating phrase, "to
the Constitution," is unexplained and, in any event, immaterial
to our disposition of the present case. Similarly, the meaning
of the substitution of the adverb "reasonably" for the adverb
"properly," although a change of uncertain consequence, does not
lie at the heart of the present controversy.
2. We combine petitioner's first two arguments in his
petition for the purposes of this discussion.
3. As noted, the Attorney General's caption and "yes" vote
result statement provide:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: INITIATIVE CONTAINING
RELATED PARTS, OFFERING VOTERS COHERENT
PACKAGE OF
CHOICES CONTAINS SINGLE SUBJECT."
"'Yes" vote accepts proposal stating that
initiative contains one subject, amendment, if its
parts are related in any 'meaningful way,' offers
coherent package of choices."
4. The Attorney General's "no" vote result statement
provides:
"'No' vote rejects proposal stating that
initiative contains one subject, amendment, when its
parts are related, or it offers voters coherent package
of choices, tradeoffs."
(Emphasis added.) | aed888745ed90f3093b62dcc51868d57071d31605324c4bddcff25f0979370a8 | 2001-12-20T00:00:00Z |
9a458f61-9eba-4d31-b9b3-487656ac64a4 | Mabon v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 26, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LON T. MABON,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
ANN JACKSON,
HANNAH DAVIDSON, JEANA FRAZZINI,
STEPHANIE VAN ZUIDEN,
and JANN CARSON,
Intervenors.
(SC S48518)
En Banc
On modified ballot title filed November 16, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioner or intervenors.
Holly A. Vance, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With her on the
filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
332 Or 633, ___ P3d ___ (2001) (referring ballot title for
modification).
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 34 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Mabon v. Myers, 332 Or
633, ___ P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. The
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title for the
proposed initiative measure, and no party to the ballot title
review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot title and
requiring court to certify modified ballot title if no objection
filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 34
(2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION. PROHIBITS: ABORTION,
PHYSICIAN-AIDED DYING, CERTAIN
PAIN/BIRTH-CONTROL METHODS, 'MORTAL
HARM'
TO 'INNOCENT' PERSONS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits:
abortion; physician aid-in-dying; certain pain-control,
birth-control methods; 'mortal harm' to 'innocent human
life' from fertilization until 'natural death.'
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
laws allowing abortion, physician aid-in-dying, pain-control and birth-control methods; rejects 'protecting'
'person' from fertilization until 'natural death.'
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Under current
law, abortion permitted before fetus becomes viable
outside womb; after viability, abortion allowed if
women's life endangered; woman may use birth-control
methods effective after fertilization, including IUD's,
morning-after pill, some oral contraceptives; pain
control permitted that may hasten death; competent
terminally-ill patient may choose physician-hastened
death under Death with Dignity Act. Measure declares
that 'God Almighty,' not man, establishes 'Human
Personhood' at fertilization. Measure requires
citizens, 'in humility and obedience to Nature's God,'
to 'protect' from 'mortal harm' all 'innocent Human
Life,' 'acknowledging,' 'protecting' 'Human Person'
from fertilization until 'natural death.' Measure does
not define terms quoted above. Measure prohibits
abortion, physician aid-in-dying, birth-control methods
taken after conception, pain control that may hasten
death."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 65cf03099356afd812ab9815b3ac380fd7108acf47faa7859ce4fdd7b27d809f | 2001-11-26T00:00:00Z |
e6385598-7b62-42d9-8eac-b92e84aed1a2 | State v. Baker | null | S47012 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DAVID ALLEN BAKER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 980745983; CA A104522; SC S47012)
On petition for review filed November 23, 1999.*
Garrett A. Richardson, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner on review.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Clay,
332 Or 327, 29 P3d 1101 (2001).
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Marshall L. Amiton, Judge. 164 Or App 271, 991 P2d 65 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case. Justice Thomas A. Balmer did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case. | fd8b3e79eea338d3fe87e52e122b2929f7d394dd42e495d161fb60c8dcc89475 | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
7530cbe3-692e-4a31-b76f-e572ad2c43c2 | Mabon v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LON T. MABON,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
ANN JACKSON,
HANNAH DAVIDSON, JEANA FRAZZINI,
STEPHANIE VAN ZUIDEN, and JANN CARSON,
Intervenors.
(SC S48518)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record July 19, 2001.
Lon T. Mabon, pro se, filed the petition.
Holly A. Vance, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent. With her on the memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
Charles F. Hinkle, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
Portland, filed the memorandum for intervenors Stephanie Van
Zuiden and Jann Carson.
Eli D. Stutsman, Portland, filed the memorandum for
intervenors Ann Jackson, Hannah Davidson, and Jeana Frazzini.
LEESON, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Riggs
and Balmer, JJ., joined.
LEESON, J.
This ballot title review proceeding, brought under ORS
250.085(2), concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for a proposed initiative measure that the Secretary of
State has denominated as Initiative Petition 34 (2002). (1)
Petitioner challenges the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements, and the summary of the Attorney General's certified
ballot title. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the
caption does not comply substantially with statutory
requirements. We refer the ballot title to the Attorney General
for modification. ORS 250.085(8); Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318,
323-24, 30 P3d 408 (2001).
The proposed measure would amend the Oregon
Constitution by adding to Article I, section 1, the following
text:
"(1) God Almighty gives Human Life. In the womb,
He forms a Human Being. At the beginning of that
process, it is God, not man, who establishes Human
Personhood. Therefore, we the People of the state of
Oregon, in humility and obedience to Nature's God, the
Lord of Heaven and earth, shall keep safe from mortal
harm all innocent Human Life, acknowledging and
protecting the Human Person from the moment of
fertilization until natural death, so help us God."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION. PROHIBITS: ABORTION; PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING; CERTAIN PAIN-CONTROL, BIRTH-CONTROL METHODS; OTHER 'MORTAL HARM'
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits
abortion, physician aid-in-dying, certain pain-control
and birth-control methods, other 'mortal harm';
'protects' 'person' from fertilization until 'natural
death.'
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
laws allowing abortion, physician aid-in-dying, pain-control and birth-control methods; rejects 'protecting'
'person' from fertilization until 'natural death.'
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Under current
law, abortion permitted before fetus becomes viable
outside womb; after viability, abortion allowed if
women's life endangered; woman may use birth-control
methods effective after fertilization, including IUD's,
morning-after pill, some oral contraceptives; pain
control permitted that may hasten death; competent
terminally-ill patient may choose physician-hastened
death under Death with Dignity Act. Measure declares
that 'God Almighty,' not man, establishes 'Human
Personhood' at fertilization. Measure requires
citizens, 'in humility and obedience to Nature's God,'
to 'protect' from 'mortal harm' all 'innocent Human
Life,' [']acknowledging,' 'protecting' 'Human Person'
from fertilization until 'natural death.' Measure does
not define terms quoted above. Measure prohibits
abortion, physician aid-in-dying, birth-control methods
taken after conception, pain control that may hasten
death."
ORS 250.035(2)(a) provides that a ballot title for a
proposed state measure shall include "[a] caption of not more
than 15 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of
the state measure." The caption is the "cornerstone for the
other portions of the ballot title." Greene v. Kulongoski, 322
Or 169, 175, 903 P2d 366 (1995). As the "headline" for the
ballot title, the caption "provides the context for the reader's
consideration of the other information in the ballot title." Id.
A caption complies substantially with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(a) if it identifies the subject matter of the proposed
measure in terms that will not confuse or mislead potential
petition signers and voters. Id. at 174-75. A caption that
catalogues the effect of a proposed measure, without identifying
its subject matter, is inadequate. Carson v. Myers, 326 Or 248,
254, 951 P2d 700 (1998).
Petitioner contends that the Attorney General's caption
fails to comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(a) because it
fails to identify reasonably the subject matter of the proposed
measure. Instead, petitioner contends, the Attorney General's
caption is a "mini-summary" that lists conduct that the proposed
measure would prohibit, thereby describing its major effects on
Oregonians' existing legal rights and duties. The Attorney
General defends the caption on the ground that it provides what
the Attorney General believes to be the "critical information"
that voters should receive about conduct that the proposed
measure would prohibit if it were to become the law of Oregon.
In determining whether a caption reasonably identifies
the subject matter of a proposed measure, this court examines the
text of the proposed measure itself. Earls v. Myers, 330 Or 171,
175, 999 P2d 1134 (2000). In this case, the proposed measure
consists of four sentences. The fourth sentence states that the
people of the State of Oregon "shall keep safe from mortal harm
all innocent Human Life, acknowledging and protecting the Human
Person from the moment of fertilization until natural death."
The first three sentences in the proposed measure explain the
rationale for the fourth sentence. The text of the proposed
measure thus makes clear that its subject matter is stated in the
fourth sentence, that is, in the promise that the people of
Oregon will protect some human life from fertilization until
natural death. The Attorney General must identify that subject
matter. (2) Although there is no categorical prohibition against
also listing certain consequences, such as prohibited conduct, in
the caption, any such list may not interfere with reasonably
identifying the subject matter of the proposed measure.
In this case, the Attorney General's catalogue of
conduct that the Attorney General believes the proposed measure
would prohibit has interfered with the Attorney General's task of
reasonably identifying the subject matter of the proposed
measure. To the extent that the Attorney General's caption
identifies the subject matter of the proposed measure at all, the
caption states only that the proposed measure would prohibit
"other 'mortal harm.'" That truncated statement demonstrates the
problem of choosing to describe some of the likely effects of the
proposed measure, rather than identifying its subject matter.
The statement in the caption that the proposed measure would
prohibit "other mortal harm" implies that the subject matter of
the proposed measure includes a promise to prohibit all "mortal
harm" to human life, including abolishing the death penalty. The
text of the proposed measure makes clear that its subject matter
is a promise to protect only some human life from mortal harm.
Because even that part of the Attorney General's caption does not
identify reasonably the subject matter of the proposed measure,
the caption does not comply substantially with the statutory
requirement, and the Attorney General must modify it. We refer
the ballot title to the Attorney General for that purpose.
We turn to petitioner's challenge to the "yes" and "no"
vote result statements. A "yes" vote result statement must
describe in simple and understandable terms of 25 words or fewer
the result if a proposed measure is approved. ORS 250.035(2)(b).
A "yes" vote result statement must describe accurately the result
if the proposed measure is approved, Prozanski v. Myers, 326 Or
391, 395, 952 P2d 531 (1998), and it should be written so that an
affirmative response to the statement corresponds to an
affirmative vote on the proposed measure, ORS 250.035(4). A "no"
vote result statement should be written so that, to the extent
possible, the wording of the "yes" vote result statement and "no"
vote result statement is parallel. ORS 250.035(3).
Petitioner asserts that he objects to the Attorney
General's "yes" and "no" vote result statements, but he advances
no argument about why those statements do not comply
substantially with the statutory requirements. We therefore
decline to require the Attorney General to modify the "yes" and
"no" vote result statements on remand. We note, however, this
court's observation that, when a caption must be modified, it
also may be appropriate to make conforming changes to the result
statements. See Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 227, 936 P2d 964
(1997) (describing court's practice of making conforming changes
to result statements when modifying caption).
We turn to petitioner's contention that the Attorney
General's summary fails to comply with ORS 250.035(2)(d) because
it does not summarize concisely and impartially the proposed
measure and its major effect. This court has explained that the
purpose of a summary is to "help voters understand what will
happen if the measure is approved" and "the breadth of its
impact." Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175, 777 P2d
406 (1989). We have considered petitioner's arguments in light
of that purpose and conclude that his arguments are not well
taken. Nonetheless, in light of the changes that the Attorney
General must make to the caption and may choose to make to the
result statements, he may find it appropriate to reconsider the
wording of the summary as well. Our holding that the summary
complies substantially with the statutory requirement should not
be understood as preventing the Attorney General from modifying
the summary, should he find it appropriate to do so.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
DURHAM, J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority's decision to require the
Attorney General to modify the caption of the ballot title
certified by the Attorney General.
Two errors of law undermine the majority's conclusion.
The first concerns the majority's failure to comply with ORS
250.085(6), which provides:
"When reviewing a title prepared by the Attorney
General, the court shall not consider arguments
concerning the ballot title not presented in writing to
the Secretary of State unless the court determines that
the argument concerns language added to or removed from
the draft title after expiration of the comment period
provided in ORS 250.067."
ORS 250.085(6) forbids this court to consider any
argument about asserted deficiencies in the Attorney General's
ballot title unless the petitioner presented the same argument in
writing to the Secretary of State. ORS 250.067(1)
(describing procedure for submission of written comments to
Secretary of State regarding Attorney General's draft ballot
title). This court has not hesitated to apply the prohibition in
ORS 250.085(6) when other petitioners have attempted to challenge
ballot titles on grounds not raised in written comments to the
Secretary of State. Starrett/Nichols v. Myers, 330 Or 139,
143-44, 998 P2d 671 (2000) (declining to consider arguments not
raised in written comments to Secretary of State); McCoid v.
Kulongoski, 321 Or 452, 454, 900 P2d 1028 (1995) (same). In
other contexts, this court applies differing standards regarding
the preservation of error by a party on appeal. State v.
Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (drawing attention to
distinctions between raising issue at trial, identifying source
for claimed position, and making particular argument; stating
that "[t]he first ordinarily is essential, the second less so,
the third least"). In the ballot title context, ORS 250.085(6)
establishes an unambiguous, bright-line standard that confines
the court's review to the arguments that the petitioner raised in
comments to the Secretary of State. The statute also permits
consideration of arguments regarding wording added to or removed
from the draft ballot title after expiration of the comment
period, but that qualification plays no role in the present
proceeding.
The reasons for the legislative policy embodied in ORS
250.085(6) are both obvious and important. The Attorney General
has the principal statutory responsibility for preparing ballot
titles for certain state measures, ORS 250.065(3), (4)
(describing role of Attorney General in drafting ballot titles);
ORS 250.067(2) (same), and must do so within short time periods.
ORS 250.067(2) requires the Attorney General, in deciding whether
to revise a draft ballot title, to "consider any written comments
submitted" by members of the public under ORS 250.067(1).
Consideration by this court of arguments that a petitioner failed
to submit during the comment phase frustrates the Attorney
General's responsibility to consider written comments under ORS
250.067(1) before certifying a ballot title, wastes the time of
those who perform the ballot title drafting function under
demanding conditions, and effectively substitutes this court for
the Attorney General as the entity that bears principal
responsibility for the preparation of ballot titles.
In the present case, petitioner submitted written
comments regarding the Attorney General's draft ballot title.
Petitioner complained that the beginning phrase, "Bans Abortion,"
was a main effect of the proposal but not its subject matter. He
acknowledged that the proposal also would terminate certain other
practices mentioned in the Attorney General's caption. He
argued, however, that the Attorney General's caption fell short
for one reason: it failed to disclose, in the words of the
proposal, that "God Almighty gives Human Life," and he emphasized
repeatedly that that was the proposal's subject matter and the
very reason for the proposal's emphasis on protecting human life
from fertilization until natural death. In summary, petitioner
complained that the Attorney General's caption was inadequate
because it failed to disclose the reason that the proposed
measure would ban certain practices, such as abortion, i.e.,
"that Almighty God is the Source of that Life and that is why it
should be protected."
ORS 250.085(6) permits the court to address only the
argument that petitioner submitted in writing to the Secretary of
State. However, the majority never addresses that complaint.
Instead, the majority recasts the issue concerning the caption as
a debate over the Attorney General's use of the acknowledged
consequences of the proposal to describe its subject matter,
rather than the proposal's more general wording that it would
protect "innocent human life" from fertilization until natural
death. In addition, the majority goes on to consider another
argument that petitioner never submitted to the Secretary of
State, i.e., whether the Attorney General's phrase, "other mortal
harm," might be misleading, because it might suggest that the
proposal would abolish the death penalty.
At no time, including on review in this court, has
petitioner ever claimed, as the majority now suggests, that the
phrase "other mortal harm" in the Attorney General's caption is
misleading or inaccurate, (3) or conveys a false message about the
proposal's possible impact on the death penalty. In my view, the
majority's decision to require a modification of the caption for
reasons that petitioner never submitted to the Secretary of State
or this court violates the prohibition expressed in ORS
250.085(6).
The second flaw in the majority's analysis is its
failure to conclude that the Attorney General's description of
the principal consequences of the proposal substantially complies
with his obligation to state accurately the proposal's "subject
matter." The parties' legal dispute centers on their differing
constructions of the requirement in ORS 250.035(2)(a) that the
ballot title caption must "reasonably identif[y]" within 15 words
"the subject matter" of the proposed measure. Instead of
addressing the meaning of those key statutory phrases, the
majority lists a series of words or phrases, drawn from this
court's cases, that describe the function of a ballot title
caption, such as "cornerstone," "headline," and "context for the
reader's consideration of the other information in the ballot
title." Mabon v. Myers, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (September
___, 2001) (slip op at 3) (quoting Greene v. Kulongoski, 322 Or
163, 175, 903 P2d 366 (1995)). That approach to statutory
construction fails to answer the legal issue before the court and
departs markedly from this court's precedents regarding statutory
construction.
The majority opinion invites the reader to assume that
the statutory phrase, "subject matter," has an accepted
definition, which the majority never articulates, and asserts
that that unstated definition precludes the Attorney General's
description of the subject matter here. As the following
discussion demonstrates, the correct construction of "subject
matter" in this context supports the Attorney General's approach
to drafting the caption. At a minimum, the Attorney General's
caption substantially complies with the requirement that it
"reasonably identif[y]" the proposed measure's subject matter.
The task of determining the meaning of the phrase,
"subject matter," involves a search for the legislature's
intention in using that phrase in ORS 250.035(2)(a). A plethora
of this court's cases describe how this court ordinarily
approaches that task, including the following recent statement in
Coast Security Mortgage Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or 348,
354-55, 15 P3d 29 (2000):
"To determine the legislature's intent, we first
examine the text and context of the statute. PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859
P2d 1143 (1993). Context includes other provisions of
the same statute and other related statutes. Id. at
611. In analyzing text and context, 'words of common
usage typically should be given their plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning.' Id. If the legislature's
intent is clear from the examination of text and
context, then our inquiry is at an end. Id."
No statute provides a special definition of the
statutory phrase "subject matter." Accordingly, we must construe
that phrase in accordance with its plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 2276 (unabridged
ed 1993), defines "subject matter" in the following pertinent
ways:
"2 : matter presented for consideration: as a : the
essential facts, data, or ideas that constitute the
basis of spoken, written, or artistic expression or
representation; often : substance as distinguished from
the form esp. of an artistic or literary production b :
a subject of thought or study; often : conveyable
material (as information, knowledge, skill) actually
made available by a branch of knowledge or in a course
of study : the available factual content of a branch or
course as distinct from technique or method of
instruction or factors inherent in the individual
learner c : the topic of dispute in a legal matter."
Several features of that definition are noteworthy.
The initiative petition proposes an amendment to the Bill of
Rights of the Oregon Constitution. One reasonable method of
describing accurately the "matter presented for consideration" in
a proposed constitutional amendment is to specify the changes
that the initiative would produce regarding the legal rights that
Oregon citizens enjoy under the current Oregon Bill of Rights or
other laws. The Attorney General has taken that approach, and he
contends that his description of the proposed constitutional
changes is accurate. Neither petitioner nor the majority makes
any attempt to demonstrate that the Attorney General is wrong.
The definition of "subject matter" also refers to
"the essential facts, data, or ideas that constitute
the basis of spoken, written, or artistic expression or
representation; often : substance as distinguished from
the form * * *."
Id. (some emphasis added). That definition permits the Attorney
General to focus the caption, as he did here, on the impact of
the proposed constitutional amendment on the rights of the people
under current law, rather than on the wording that the drafter of
the initiative amendment has chosen.
The majority knows that those who draft proposed
initiatives sometimes seek to achieve significant legal
consequences without identifying those consequences in the
wording of the proposed measure. In preparing a caption, on the
other hand, the Attorney General's touchstones are accuracy and
clarity, which often preclude a slavish devotion to the
particular words or phrases selected by the proponent of the
measure. Indeed, in Earls v. Myers, 330 Or 171, 176, 999 P2d
1134 (2000), this court concluded that the Attorney General had
acted improperly in incorporating the phrase "freedom to choose"
from the text of a proposed measure into the ballot title
caption:
"We agree with petitioner that, in this context,
the phrase 'freedom to choose' is likely to prejudice
voters regarding the measure. Marr v. Thornton,
237 Or 503, 504, 392 P2d 458 (1964) (deleting phrase
'right-to-work' from ballot title caption as slogan
that amounted to argument for measure and that likely
would create prejudice). It is true that the phrase
'freedom to choose' appears in the measure itself.
However the Attorney General and this court are not
constrained to certify a ballot title that is slanted
toward passage or defeat of the measure. Dirks v.
Myers, 329 Or 608, 616, 993 P2d 808 (2000) (court has
resisted attempts to incorporate into ballot title
terms or phrases that 'tend more to promote or defeat
passage of the measure than to describe its substance
accurately'). Proponents of a measure are not entitled
to engineer a favorable ballot title by incorporating
politically inflated terms or phrases in the text of
the measure in order to advance its passage. Cf.
Bernard v. Keisling, 317 Or 591, 596-97, 858 P2d 1309
(1993) (court will not hesitate to look beyond words of
measure if those words obfuscate subject, chief
purpose, summary, or major effect of measure)."
In this case, the Attorney General has done exactly
what this court said that he should have done in Earls. The
proposed initiative addresses legal and moral topics that are
among the most controversial in contemporary life, i.e., the
moment at which human life begins and the extent to which society
should regulate activities that affect the beginning and end of
human existence. The proposal incorporates repeated references
to God as well as various undefined terms and phrases, such as
"keep safe from mortal harm" and "innocent Human Life" that,
according to the Attorney General, fail to disclose the
proposal's substance and simply tend to promote its passage. The
Attorney General has resisted inserting undefined and politically
charged phraseology from the proposal to avoid creating prejudice
or sympathy for the proposed measure. The Attorney General has
chosen, instead, to set out the practical consequences of the
proposed initiative on the existing legal rights of Oregon's
citizens. Earls expressly supports that approach. The majority
faults the Attorney General for doing so, but fails to
demonstrate why the Attorney General's approach is not within the
range of his permissible options under ORS 250.035(2)(a) and
Earls to "reasonably identif[y]" the proposal's "subject matter."
I agree with the majority's decision to decline to
modify the Attorney General's certified "yes" and "no" vote
result statements and the summary, because petitioner raises no
argument about why those segments of the certified ballot title
fall short of statutory requirements. In light of the majority's
decision, the Attorney General may alter the result statements or
the summary if he deems a change necessary, but he has discretion
to decide whether to change those parts of the ballot title. The
Attorney General is not under any compulsion from the court to
change those parts of the certified ballot title in any way. The
only opinion that the court reaches, in its review under ORS
250.085(5) of the Attorney General's result statements and
summary, is the unanimous conclusion that those segments
substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b),
(c), and (d).
For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the
majority's decision to require a modification of the Attorney
General's certified caption.
Riggs and Balmer, JJ., join in this opinion.
1. Intervenors filed a motion to intervene on June 25,
2001. Petitioner filed a document entitled "Petition for
Declaratory Judgment" on July 13 challenging this court's
authority to permit intervenors to respond to petitioner's
challenge to the Attorney General's certified ballot title. We
treat that document as a response to intervenors' motion to
intervene and dismiss it as untimely. ORAP 7.05(3) (setting
14-day limit on time for filing response to motion).
2. The text of the proposed measure uses the phrase
"innocent human life." This court has criticized the Attorney
General for using terminology in a ballot title that mirrors
wording used in the proposed measure itself, if the terminology
"is not neutral and might mislead voters into supporting the
proposal without understanding its true effects." Earls, 330
Or at 176 (declaring phrase "freedom to choose" likely to
prejudice voters). The Attorney General might conclude that the
adjective "innocent" is not neutral and might mislead voters.
Nothing in this opinion prohibits the Attorney General from
exercising his judgment in identifying the subject matter of the
proposed measure using neutral terms.
3. It is worth noting that petitioner himself incorporated
the unqualified phrase "mortal harm" in the caption of the ballot
title that he recommended to the Attorney General. Petitioner's
recommended caption stated: "Amends Constitution: God Gives
Life, All Human Beings Protected from Mortal Harm, From
Fertilization until Natural Death." The Attorney General could
not have divined, from petitioner's proposed caption and the
accompanying argument, that petitioner believed that the
reference to a prohibition on "mortal harm" somehow expanded the
subject of the measure into a ban on the death penalty, as the
majority now claims. | c440ade34794720885bb28013ca0e5d0a8ab4a8503ce5526f8a9b43333bde54e | 2001-11-08T00:00:00Z |
4f688d0b-09be-4f1b-81de-f1197092062f | Knopp v. Griffin-Valade | null | S070456 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 1
February 1, 2024
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Tim KNOPP,
Daniel Bonham,
Suzanne Weber, Dennis Linthicum,
and Lynn Findley,
Petitioners,
v.
Lavonne GRIFFIN-VALADE,
Oregon Secretary of State,
Elections Division,
Respondent.
(CA A182122) (SC S070456)
On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS
19.405.
Argued and submitted December 14, 2023.
John DiLorenzo Jr., Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners. Also on
the briefs were Aaron K. Stuckey and Blake Robinson.
Dustin E. Buehler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. Also on
the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter,
P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae APANO,
Basic Rights Oregon, Oregon AFSCME Council 75, Oregon
Education Association, Oregon League of Conservation
Voters, Accion Politica PCUNnista, Planned Parenthood
Advocates of Oregon, and SEIU Local 503. Also on the brief
was Lydia Anderson-Dana.
Margaret S. Olney, Bennet Hartman, LLP, Portland,
filed the brief for amici curiae Andrea Kennedy-Smith and
Reed Scott-Schwalbach.
Kelly Simon, American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae American Civil
2
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
Liberties Union of Oregon. Also on the brief was Alicia
LeDuc Montgomery.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog,
Bushong and James, Justices, and Walters, Senior Judge,
Justice pro tempore.*
PER CURIAM
The Secretary of State’s Temporary Rules ELECT 12-2023
and ELECT 16-2023 are upheld.
______________
* Masih, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
3
PER CURIAM
In 2022, voters approved Ballot Measure 113, which
amended Article IV, section 15, of the Oregon Constitution.
That amendment provides that any state legislator who
accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative
session shall be disqualified from holding legislative office
“for the term following the election after the member’s cur
rent term is completed.” Or Const, Art IV, § 15.
The parties in this proceeding dispute the timing
of the disqualification imposed by that amendment. In rules
promulgated to implement the amendment, the Secretary of
State has applied the disqualification to a legislator’s next
term of office—that is, the term immediately following the
term in which the legislator accrued 10 or more unexcused
absences. Petitioners are legislators who each accrued 10 or
more unexcused absences during the 2023 legislative ses
sion. They challenge the secretary’s rules, contending that
the disqualification should apply one term later—that is,
that a legislator who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences
during a legislative session should be allowed to serve the
next term of office, but not the term after that.
The resolution of that dispute requires that we apply
our well-established methodology to construe the text of the
amendment, by determining how the voters who adopted
the amendment most likely understood its text, including
considering the information presented to the voters through
the ballot title and in the voters’ pamphlet. That informa
tion expressly and repeatedly described the disqualification
as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current
term. Petitioners concede that that information supports the
secretary’s interpretation and not their own. Nevertheless,
petitioners argue that what they view as the plain meaning
of the amendment’s text must control. They contend that the
text clearly applies the disqualification to the term after the
next term of office and is not capable of supporting the sec
retary’s interpretation.
As we will explain in greater detail, we disagree.
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the text is capable of sup
porting the secretary’s interpretation. And that interpretation
4
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
is uniformly supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pam
phlet, both of which inform voters’ understanding of ballot
measures. Reading the text of the amendment in light of
the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, voters would have
understood the disqualification to apply to the term of office
immediately following the term in which a legislator accrued
10 or more unexcused absences. Thus, for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that voters intended that result and reject
petitioners’ challenge to the secretary’s rules.
I. BACKGROUND
Each chamber of the Oregon Legislative Assembly
may conduct business only if two-thirds of the chamber’s
members are present. Or Const, Art IV, § 12. In some cir
cumstances, therefore, a minority of legislators may prevent
a chamber from conducting business by not being present.
That practice is commonly known as a legislative walk
out. Although legislators have used walkouts throughout
Oregon’s history, the frequency of walkouts has increased in
recent years.
Measure 113 was designed to curtail legislative walk-
outs. To do so, the measure proposed amending Article IV,
section 15. Before the amendment, that constitutional pro
vision authorized either chamber of the legislature to “pun
ish its members for disorderly behavior” and, “with the con
currence of two thirds, [to] expel a member.” Or Const, Art
IV, § 15 (2020). Measure 113 proposed adding the following
words:
“Failure to attend, without permission or excuse, ten or
more legislative floor sessions called to transact business
during a regular or special legislative session shall be
deemed disorderly behavior and shall disqualify the mem
ber from holding office as a Senator or Representative for
the term following the election after the member’s current
term is completed.”
(Emphasis added.)
Measure 113 originated as an initiative petition, for
which the Attorney General must prepare a draft ballot title
and then, following a comment period, a certified ballot title.
ORS 250.065 - 250.067. The ballot title for a state measure
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
5
consists of three parts: (1) a caption of not more than 15
words that reasonably identifies the measure’s subject mat
ter; (2) simple and understandable statements of 25 words
or less that describe the results of a “yes” vote and a “no”
vote; and (3) a concise and impartial statement of not more
than 125 words that summarizes the measure and its major
effect. ORS 250.035(2).
The certified ballot title plays an important role in
the initiative process. The ballot itself—that is, the document
that voters use to cast their votes—is required to include the
caption and the result statements of the certified ballot title.
ORS 254.175(2). Counties also may choose to print the full
ballot title, including the summary. ORS 254.145(7).
For the initiative petition that became Measure 113,
the Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title, which
became the certified ballot title after it was neither revised
(following a comment period) nor challenged in this court.1
Each part of the ballot title addressed the timing of the
proposed disqualification, stating that the measure would
disqualify a legislator from holding legislative office for the
term immediately following the term in which the legislator
accrued 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative
session. The ballot title caption provided:
“Amends Constitution: Legislators with ten unex
cused absences from floor sessions disqualified from hold
ing next term of office.”
(Emphasis added.) The result statements provided:
“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote disqualifies legis
lators with ten unexcused absences from legislative floor
sessions from holding office as legislator for term following
current term of office.
“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains existing law.
Absent legislators may be punished by legislative chamber
(potentially expelled by supermajority); present legislators
have legal authority to compel attendance.”
1 As noted, the Attorney General first prepares a draft ballot title, which is
subject to a public comment period. ORS 250.067(1). Following any revisions by
the Attorney General, any elector who submitted a timely comment on the draft
may challenge the ballot title by petitioning this court. ORS 250.085(2).
6
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
(Emphasis added.) And the summary provided, in relevant
part:
“Measure specifies that ‘disorderly behavior’ includes legis
lator’s failure to attend ten or more legislative floor sessions
during a regular or special legislative session without per
mission or excuse. Under measure, legislator who engages
in ‘disorderly behavior’ through unexcused absences is dis
qualified from serving as a Senator or Representative for
the term following the end of the legislator’s current term.”
(Emphasis added.)2
More information about Measure 113 was provided
to voters in the voters’ pamphlet, which is sent to every
household with a registered voter. OAR 165-022-0060(7).
The voters’ pamphlet contained the full text of Measure 113
and the full ballot title—both set out above—as well as an
explanatory statement and arguments that advocates sub
mitted on the merits of the measure. ORS 251.185(1); Official
Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, Nov 8, 2022, 65-71.3
The explanatory statement is “an impartial, simple
and understandable statement explaining the measure” in
500 words or less. ORS 251.215(1). The explanatory state
ment is approved by a committee of five members: two pro
ponents of the measure, two opponents of the measure, and a
fifth member chosen either by the four other members or by
the Secretary of State. ORS 251.205(2)-(5). In this case, all
five members of the committee voted to approve the explan
atory statement that appeared in the voters’ pamphlet. See
ORS 251.215(4) (requiring statement to show dissenting
votes, if any); Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 66 (showing no
members dissented or were absent). Like the ballot title, the
explanatory statement characterized the measure as dis
qualifying a legislator from holding legislative office for the
term immediately following the term in which the legislator
accrued 10 or more unexcused absences:
2 Two people submitted comments on the Attorney General’s draft ballot title
during the public comment period. Neither comment challenged how the ballot
title characterized the timing of the disqualification that would be created by the
measure.
3 Page cites to the Official Voters’ Pamphlet refer to the pamphlet circulated
to Marion County voters.
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
7
“The measure deems the failure to attend without excuse
to be disorderly behavior and disqualifies the legislator
from holding office after the legislator’s current term ends.”
Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 66 (emphasis added).4
As noted, the voters’ pamphlet also included numer
ous arguments that advocates submitted on the merits of
the measure. By either paying a $1,200 fee or obtaining sig
natures from 500 voters, any person or organization may
submit a written argument—not exceeding 325 words—
supporting or opposing the measure for publication in the
voters’ pamphlet. ORS 251.255(1)-(2); ORS 251.255(4); OAR
165-022-0050(5). The voters’ pamphlet for the 2022 elec
tion contained 19 advocate arguments—each supporting
Measure 113, and none opposing it. While not all the argu
ments addressed the timing of the proposed disqualification,
those that did described it as disqualifying a legislator from
holding legislative office for the term immediately following
the term in which the legislator accrued 10 or more unex
cused absences. Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 67-71.5
Media coverage of Measure 113 was consistent
with the statements in the ballot title and voters’ pamphlet.
The secretary has cited numerous media accounts that
described the measure as disqualifying a legislator with
10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session
from holding office during the next term of office.6 For their
4 The explanatory statement is subject to a public hearing, ORS 251.215(2),
and possible challenge in this court, ORS 251.235(1). No challenge to the explan
atory statement for Measure 113 was filed in this court; the record before us does
not reveal whether a public hearing was held, and if so, what happened at any
such hearing.
5 See, e.g., Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 68 (argument submitted by Tan
Perkins, Vote Yes On 113) (“It would create a consequence for lawmakers who
skip 10 sessions without an excuse, by banning them from holding their seat
the following term.”); Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 70 (argument submitted by
Heather L. Stuart, Fair Shot For All Coalition) (“Under Measure 113, if a politi
cian has 10 or more unexcused absences, they will be barred from holding their
office the following term.”).
6 See, e.g., Claire Withycombe, Midterm ballot measure to decide if Oregon
lawmakers will be punished for absences, Statesman Journal, (Sept 19, 2022),
https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/09/19/2022-ore
gon-midterm-election-ballot-measure-113-walk-outs-republicans/66152421007/
(accessed Jan 25, 2024) (reporting that the measure “would disqualify state law
makers from holding office for the next term” if they accrued enough absences);
Editorial Board, Voters can already remove legislators for unexcused absences,
8
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
part, petitioners have not identified any media accounts sug
gesting that the timing of the disqualification would work
differently.
At the November 2022 General Election, voters
approved Measure 113, thus amending Article IV, section
15, to add the new disqualification. The total vote count was
1,292,127 to 599,204, with 68.3 percent voting in favor and
31.7 percent voting in opposition. The parties report that,
during the 2023 legislative session, which was the first ses
sion after the amendment took effect, 10 senators accrued
10 or more unexcused absences and that petitioners were
among those senators.
In August 2023, the secretary adopted temporary
administrative rule ELECT 12-2023 to, among other things,
implement the amendment for the 2024 General Election.
That rule adopted, and incorporated by reference, the State
Candidate Manual, which applied the amendment’s disqual
ification to the term of office immediately following the term
in which the legislator accrued too many unexcused absences.
Specifically, the rule provided that candidates for state repre
sentative and state senator “must not have 10 or more unex
cused absences from legislative floor sessions during a regular
or special legislative session to be eligible for the term immedi
ately following their current term.” State Candidate Manual 10
(rev Aug 2023) (emphasis added). In September 2023, the
secretary suspended that rule and adopted a revised version
of the State Candidate Manual through temporary adminis
trative rule ELECT 16-2023. No changes were made to the
section of the revised State Candidate Manual implementing
the amendment. State Candidate Manual 10 (rev Sept 2023).
Accordingly, the more recent rule similarly applies the dis
qualification to the immediate next term of office.
Petitioners challenged both rules in the Court of
Appeals under ORS 183.400, arguing that the rules violate
Article IV, section 15, by applying the disqualification to
the next term of office, rather than the term after that. The
Bend Bulletin, (Sept 13, 2022), https://www.bendbulletin.com/opinion/editori
al-voters-can-already-remove-legislators-for-unexcused-absences/article_152d
30ca-3387-11ed-bb34-2f960479e9bd.html (accessed Jan 25, 2024) (reporting that
disqualified legislators would be barred “from holding office in the term following
the current term”).
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
9
Court of Appeals certified the matter to this court under
ORS 19.405, and we accepted the certification.
II. DISCUSSION
As amended by the voters’ approval of Measure 113,
Article IV, section 15, now disqualifies legislators with 10 or
more unexcused absences from holding a future term of office:
“Failure to attend, without permission or excuse, ten or
more legislative floor sessions called to transact business
during a regular or special legislative session shall be
deemed disorderly behavior and shall disqualify the mem
ber from holding office as a Senator or Representative for the
term following the election after the member’s current term
is completed.”
(Emphasis added.) The dispute in this case centers on
whether the disqualification applies to the immediate next
term of office, as the secretary argues, or the term after
that, as petitioners argue.
Resolving that dispute presents a question of inter
pretation. We interpret the Oregon Constitution by “exam
in[ing] the text, in its historical context and in light of rel
evant case law, to determine the meaning of the provision
at issue most likely understood by those who adopted it,
with the ultimate objective of identifying relevant underly
ing principles that may inform our application of the con
stitutional text to modern circumstances.” Couey v. Atkins,
357 Or 460, 490-91, 355 P3d 866 (2015).7 Therefore, when
interpreting a constitutional amendment adopted through
an initiated ballot measure, we consider “the voters’ intent,”
focusing on the text and context as well as “the measure’s
history, should it appear useful to our analysis.” State v.
Algeo, 354 Or 236, 246, 311 P3d 865 (2013). A measure’s
history includes the ballot title, other materials in the vot
ers’ pamphlet, and media reports. AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto
Source v. Dept. of Rev., 363 Or 411, 418, 423 P3d 71 (2018).
We begin with the text. The amendment applies to
members of the legislature and provides that a member’s
7 The amendment at issue in this case does not require identifying underly
ing principles that must be applied to modern circumstances, because the voters
adopted this amendment in November 2022.
10
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
failure to attend 10 or more legislative floor sessions without
excuse “shall disqualify the member from holding office as a
Senator or Representative for the term following the election
after the member’s current term is completed.” Or Const, Art
IV, § 15 (emphasis added). As an initial matter, the parties
agree that “term” refers to a legislator’s term of office. In
Oregon, senators are elected to a four-year term of office,
while representatives are elected to a two-year term of
office. Or Const, Art IV, § 4. The parties also agree that “the
member’s current term” refers to the term of office in which
a legislator accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a
legislative session.
The parties disagree, however, as to the term for
which the legislator would be disqualified from holding
office—whether it is the term immediately following the
legislator’s current term or the term after that. Their dif
fering interpretations depend on the interplay between the
distinct phrases used in the text of the amendment.
Petitioners interpret the amendment to mean that
a legislator who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences
would be allowed to serve the next term of office but would
be disqualified from holding office for the term after that. To
get there, petitioners read the amendment so that the words
“the term” are modified by “following the election,” and then
the words “the election” are modified by “after the mem
ber’s current term is completed.” According to petitioners, to
identify “the term following the election after the member’s
current term is completed,” we should begin by identifying
when the legislator’s current term is completed, then iden
tify the election after that, and then identify the term that
follows that election.
For example, as petitioners posit, if a senator
accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative
session in a four-year term that begins in January 2021,
then the senator’s “current term is completed” in January
2025. See Or Const, Art IV, § 4 (a legislative term shall
commence on the second Monday in January following
the legislator’s election). Petitioners argue that the phrase
“the election after the member’s current term is completed”
should be understood to refer to the first general election
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
11
for the legislator’s office held after the legislator completes
their current term. That election would take place during
the next term of office because general elections are held
in November of the year before a new term begins. So, if a
senator’s current term is completed in January 2025, then
the next general election for that senate office would take
place in November 2028, for the term beginning in January
2029.8 And if “the election after the member’s current term
is completed” refers to the November 2028 General Election,
then “the term following the election after the member’s cur
rent term is completed” must refer to the term that begins
after that election—namely, the term beginning in January
2029. So, according to petitioners, a senator who accrued
10 or more unexcused absences during the 2023 legislative
session and whose term of office would end in January 2025
would be allowed to serve during the next term of office—
beginning in January 2025—but would be disqualified from
holding legislative office for the term after that—beginning
in January 2029.
The secretary interprets the amendment’s text dif
ferently. She interprets the text to mean that a legislator
who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences would not be
allowed to serve the immediate next term of office. In her
view, the words “the term” (for which a legislator is disqual
ified) are modified by both the phrase “following the elec
tion” and the phrase “after the member’s current term is
completed.” As a result, whereas petitioners understand the
phrase “after the member’s current term is completed” to
modify the words “the election,” the secretary understands
the phrase “after the member’s current term is completed”
to modify the words “the term.” She maintains that reading
the amendment that way emphasizes two facts about the
term of disqualification: that it follows an election, and that
it occurs after the disqualified legislator completes their
current term. The secretary thus understands the term
“after the member’s current term is completed” to refer to
the term immediately following the term in which a legisla
tor accrues 10 or more unexcused absences.
8 For a member of the Oregon House of Representatives whose term ends
January 2025, the next general election after that term is completed would be in
November 2026, for a term beginning January 2027. Or Const, Art IV, § 4.
12
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
Applying that interpretation to the same exam
ple from above, if a senator accrues 10 or more unexcused
absences during a legislative session in a four-year term
that begins in January 2021, then the senator’s “current
term is completed” in January 2025. The term immediately
following that term would also begin in January 2025; the
election to decide who would serve in that following term
would be held in November 2024. The senator would be dis
qualified from holding legislative office for the term of office
that both follows the November 2024 election and comple
tion of the senator’s current term of office—that is, the term
beginning in January 2025.
The text of the amendment does not unambiguously
support either interpretation. The text would more clearly
support petitioners’ reading—and weaken the secretary’s
reading—if it referred to “the term following the election
[that occurs] after the member’s current term is completed.”
Without those bracketed words, the intended interplay
among the distinct phrases in the amendment is less imme
diately apparent, and the secretary’s reading gains plausi
bility. Still, petitioners are not wrong to argue that their
proposed reading is supported by certain interpretative
principles. Namely, it conforms with two canons of construc
tion: the rule against surplusage, which provides that we
interpret a provision’s text to give effect to every word and
avoid redundancy, State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 755,
359 P3d 232 (2015); and the doctrine of the last antecedent,
which provides that “
‘[r]eferential and qualifying words and
phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely
to the last antecedent,’
” State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 386, 927
P2d 79 (1996) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 47.33 at 270 (5th ed 1992)); see also
AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 418 (explain
ing that, when examining constitutional text, “we apply
rules of construction that bear directly on the provision’s
interpretation”).
Under the secretary’s interpretation, the amend
ment to Article IV, section 15, would contain a redundancy,
because the amendment would have the same legal effect
even if the words “following the election” were deleted from
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
13
the text—it would disqualify the “Senator or Representative
for the term *
*
* after the member’s current term is com
pleted.” The secretary contends that the redundancy high
lights a fact that might otherwise not be apparent to the
voters—that a legislator’s disqualification takes effect only
after the election to replace them has occurred and not
before the newly elected person can take office.
The secretary’s interpretation also creates tension
with the doctrine of the last antecedent because it does not
treat the modifying phrase “after the member’s current term
is completed” as modifying the words immediately preced
ing it, “the election.” Instead, the secretary reads the phrase
“after the member’s current term is completed” as modify
ing the words “the term.” The secretary acknowledges that
her interpretation would be clearer if a comma separated
the phrases “following the election” and “after the member’s
current term is completed.” Petitioners’ interpretation does
not present a similar difficulty.
Canons of construction, however, are merely guide
lines for interpreting text that, in any given case, may give
way to contrary evidence of intent. See State v. Lane, 357
Or 619, 629, 355 P3d 914 (2015) (describing canons of con
struction as “mere assumptions that always give way to
more direct evidence of legislative intent”); see also State
v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 97, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (“[T]he fact
that a proposed interpretation of a statute creates some
measure of redundancy is not, by itself, necessarily fatal.
Redundancy in communication is a fact of life and of law.”);
Thomas Creek Lumber and Log Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 344 Or
131, 138, 178 P3d 217 (2008) (adopting interpretation of a
tax statute that made “some words *
*
* redundant,” not
ing that “nothing prohibits the legislature from saying the
same thing twice”); Johnson v. Craddock et al, 228 Or 308,
316, 365 P2d 89 (1961) (stating that the “doctrine of the last
antecedent is not inflexible and is never applied when a fur
ther extension is clearly required by the intent and meaning
of the context or when to apply a grammatical rule literally
would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result, defeating
the legislative purpose”).
14
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
For example, both the rule against surplusage and
the doctrine of the last antecedent gave way to ballot mea
sure history in Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or
472, 753 P2d 939 (1988). In that case, we were required to
interpret a referred constitutional amendment that pro
vided the governor with the authority to veto “any provision
in new bills declaring an emergency.” Or Const, Art V, § 15a.
The defendants interpreted the amendment broadly to
mean that, in new bills that contained a provision declaring
an emergency, the governor could veto any provision within
the bill, not only the provision declaring an emergency. The
plaintiffs, by contrast, interpreted the amendment narrowly
to mean that the governor could veto only the provision that
declared an emergency in a new bill. In support of their
interpretation, the plaintiffs argued that the word “provi
sion” was modified by both “in new bills” and “declaring an
emergency.” 305 Or at 485. The defendants countered that
the plaintiffs’ interpretation created a redundancy because
the phrase “in new bills” would have no legal effect—all bills
presented to the governor are new bills. Id. The defendants
further pointed out that their interpretation conformed with
the doctrine of the last antecedent, under which the word
“provision” was modified only by “in new bills,” and the word
“bills” was modified by “declaring an emergency.” Id. The
defendants, therefore, argued that their interpretation rep
resented the unambiguous meaning of the amendment.
We concluded that the amendment was “not as
unambiguous as defendants claim.” Id. Ultimately, we
held that the canons of construction must yield to the voter
understanding demonstrated by the ballot measure his
tory, including material in the voters’ pamphlet, which
supported the plaintiffs’ interpretation. See id. at 486
(“Contemporaneous materials widely available to the voters
in 1921, particularly the explanation by a committee of leg
islators in the official Voters’ Pamphlet, leave no doubt that
the amendment to Article V, section 15a, was intended to
authorize the Governor to veto a declaration of emergency
in a bill so as to protect the opportunity of voters to petition
for a referendum.”).
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
15
In this case, as the court did in Lipscomb, the sec
retary relies on the ballot measure history—in particular,
the ballot title and explanatory statement—to determine
how the voters would have understood the words used in the
amendment to Article IV, section 15. As noted above, the bal
lot title caption and the result statements were printed on
every ballot.9 The ballot title caption expressly stated that a
legislator with too many unexcused absences would be “dis
qualified from holding next term of office.” The “yes” result
statement characterized the amendment as disqualifying a
legislator for the “term following current term of office.” The
voters’ pamphlet contained both those statements as well
as the ballot title summary, which stated that the disqual
ification would apply to “the term following the end of the
legislator’s current term.” Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 65.
Also contained in the voters’ pamphlet was the explanatory
statement, which stated that the disqualification would pro
hibit “the legislator from holding office after the legislator’s
current term ends.” Id. at 66.
Petitioners acknowledge that the ballot measure
history materials uniformly support the secretary’s inter
pretation. No statements that appeared on the ballot or in
the voters’ pamphlet support petitioners’ interpretation. And
the parties have not identified any media accounts prior to
the election suggesting that anyone understood the amend
ment to allow a legislator to serve one more term before the
disqualification would take effect. Nevertheless, petitioners
contend that we must disregard the ballot measure history
materials that contradict their proposed interpretation
because, according to petitioners, the text of the amendment
is capable of only one meaning—as disqualifying a legisla
tor from holding office for the term after the next term.
If petitioners were correct that the text is capable
of supporting only one meaning, then no ballot measure his
tory could justify a different meaning. Cf. State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 173, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (“When the text of
a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no
9 See Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 575,
871 P2d 106 (1994) (Fadeley, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of the
ballot title and results statements because they “are printed on the ballot used by
every person who voted to adopt the initiative amendment”).
16
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or
even confirms—that legislators intended something differ
ent.”). But we disagree with petitioners’ assertion that the
amendment in this case is capable of only one meaning. See
generally Lipscomb, 305 Or at 485 (“[C]ourts rarely see dis
putes over interpretation when the opposing party cannot
show a possible alternative reading of the words, which it
claims to be correct in context.”).
While petitioners’ interpretation of the text may be
the more grammatical reading, the text is capable of sup
porting the secretary’s interpretation. The amendment at
issue is a complex sentence. The parties’ competing inter
pretations depend on how they understand the relation
ship between three phrases within the amendment: (1) “the
term”; (2) “following the election”; and (3) “after the member’s
current term is completed.” Or Const, Art IV, § 15. Those
phrases have no single necessary relationship between
them. As explained above, if the sentence had contained
the additional phrase “that occurs” immediately after “the
election,” petitioners’ reading would be more compelling.
Without that or a similar phrase, the intended meaning of
the sentence is more uncertain. The words “the term” may
be modified by both the phrase “following the election” and
the phrase “after the member’s current term is completed,”
as the secretary argues. That is the same construction that
this court applied in Lipscomb, concluding that one word
was modified separately by the two phrases that followed it.
See 305 Or at 485 (holding that “provision” was modified by
both “in new bills” and “declaring an emergency”). Applying
that construction here treats the two phrases—“following
the election” and “after the member’s current term is com
pleted”—as emphasizing two different facts about the dis
qualification: that voters would retain the right to choose
the person who would serve during the next term of office
and that the disqualified legislator would be allowed to
serve the remainder of the current term of office.
If we were required to choose between petitioners’
and the secretary’s interpretations based on the text alone,
petitioners would have a strong argument that their read
ing is the better one. But we do not review the text in a
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
17
void. We instead seek to understand how voters would have
understood the text in the light of the other materials that
accompanied it. And those other materials expressly and
uniformly informed voters that the amendment would apply
to a legislator’s immediate next terms of office, indicating
that the voters so understood and intended that meaning.
In arguing against that conclusion, petitioners con
tend that the ballot measure history materials are categor
ically insufficient to overcome what they regard as the more
natural way to read the amendment’s text. Petitioners sup
port that argument by relying on statements that this court
made in Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Frank, 293 Or 374,
648 P2d 1284 (1982). There, the court was asked to inter
pret a constitutional amendment that had been referred by
the legislature and adopted by the voters through a ballot
measure. The amendment dedicated the revenue from cer
tain taxes to the Common School Fund. Id. at 378. Applying
that ballot measure as it was drafted, however, would have
disrupted funding for the Department of Energy, which was
evidently not an effect that the legislature had considered
or intended when it drafted the measure. Id. The court was
asked to apply the ballot measure in a manner that would
avoid that unintended consequence compelled by the text of
the measure. In rejecting that argument, the court stated:
“There is no reliable record of what the voters intended
beyond the language of the amendment itself. There are no
official committees, no minutes, no formal debates. Given
the fact that it is the electorate, the ultimate sovereign,
which has adopted the amendment to our Constitution, we
are slow to go beyond the face of the enacted language into
materials not presented to the public at large.”
Id. at 381. Petitioners rely on those statements to argue that
ballot measure history is entitled to little weight in inter
preting constitutional amendments adopted by the voters.
We disagree with petitioners’ reading of Northwest
Natural Gas. As an initial matter, the court’s statements
in that case must be understood in the context of that case.
The court was rejecting a specific argument based on the
specific ballot measure history offered in that case—namely,
that the legislators who had drafted the measure had not
18
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
considered the legal effect of the text that they chose. When
the court referred to “materials not presented to the public
at large,” the court was referring to materials from legisla
tive proceedings demonstrating that legislators never con
sidered how the amendment would affect the Department of
Energy’s funding. Id. at 381.
Further, in Lipscomb, this court expressly rejected
reading Northwest Natural Gas as imposing broad meth
odological constraints on our constitutional interpretation,
noting that Northwest Natural Gas does not confine us “to
historically blind exegesis” of constitutional text and that
questions of constitutional interpretation “cannot be decided
simply by parsing the words of the amendment.” 305 Or at
484-85. Reading Northwest Natural Gas as imposing such
constraints would be inconsistent with the court’s practice,
both before and after that decision, to routinely consider bal
lot measure history, “to the extent that it appears useful to
our analysis.” AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 418;
see, e.g., Couey, 357 Or at 490 (discussing recent case law on
the role of ballot measure history); State ex rel. Chapman v.
Appling, 220 Or 41, 68, 348 P2d 759 (1960) (noting that the
court had “recognized in a number of cases that arguments
in the official Voters’ Pamphlet relative to measures submit
ted to the people may be resorted to as an aid to construc
tion” and collecting cases); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179
Or 548, 562, 173 P2d 475 (1946) (“As the amendment was
adopted by initiative, we turn to the 1912 Voter’s Pamphlet
as an aid to its interpretation.”); Turnidge v. Thompson, 89
Or 637, 175 P 281 (1918) (reviewing the ballot title prepared
by the Attorney General, noting that the ballot title “was
printed upon the ballots submitted to the electorate”).
Instead of making categorical judgments about
the role of ballot measure history in our analysis, we
assign weight based on the substance and probative qual
ity of those materials. See generally Gaines, 346 Or at 172
(“[W]hether the court will conclude that the particular legis
lative history on which a party relies is of assistance in deter
mining legislative intent will depend on the substance and
probative quality of the legislative history itself.” (Emphasis
in original.)). Not all ballot measure history materials serve
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
19
the same role or are owed the same weight. See, e.g., State
v. Sagdal, 356 Or 639, 643, 343 P3d 226 (2015) (expressing
caution in relying too heavily on statements in the section
of voters’ pamphlet containing arguments from advocates).
The ballot measure history materials on which
the secretary relies in this case—namely, the ballot title
(including the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the
summary) and the explanatory statement—directly and
unequivocally address the question at issue, each stating
that the amendment would disqualify a legislator from hold
ing office during the immediate next term of office. Further,
those materials were widely distributed to the voters. As
noted above, the ballot title caption and the result state
ments are required to be printed on the ballots, ensuring
that they were visible to all voters. ORS 254.145(7); ORS
254.175(2). And the complete ballot title and the explana
tory statement are included in the voters’ pamphlet that
is mailed to every household with a registered voter. OAR
165-022-0060(7).
Petitioners do not offer any ballot measure his
tory materials that contradict those materials. Instead,
they argue that those materials do not reflect how the vot
ers would have understood the amendment because those
materials neither were drafted by the voters nor purport
to record the thoughts of voters. But petitioners misunder
stand the role of the ballot title and explanatory statement.
Those materials reflect voter understanding not because
they record that understanding, but because they inform
that understanding. For example, the purpose of the bal
lot title “is to guide and inform the voters.” Richardson v.
Neuner, 183 Or 558, 562, 194 P2d 989 (1948). Similarly, the
explanatory statement is intended to be “an impartial, sim
ple and understandable statement explaining the measure,”
ORS 251.215(1), drafted by a committee composed of mem
bers who both support and oppose the ballot measure, ORS
251.205(3)-(5). Here, the explanatory statement reveals that
the drafting committee unanimously agreed to the construc
tion of the amendment on which the secretary now relies.
Petitioners maintain, however, that we cannot
assume that voters read and understood the ballot title and
20
Knopp v. Griffin-Valade
explanatory statement. We disagree. We assume that vot
ers have familiarized themselves with the issue that is pre
sented on the ballot, just as we assume that legislators have
familiarized themselves with the bills on which they vote.
See Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 498, 220 P2d
493 (1950) (“On the whole, in view of the jealous regard of
the people for the initiative process and of the opportuni
ties which exist for the voters to acquaint themselves with
the background and merits of a proposed initiative measure,
we are of the opinion that, in the construction of such mea
sures, the courts should indulge the same presumption as to
the knowledge of historical facts on the part of the people,
as they indulge with reference to acts passed by the leg
islature.”). The ballot title and explanatory statement are
materials accessible to all voters attempting to familiarize
themselves with a ballot measure.
Because the text is capable of supporting the sec
retary’s interpretation, and considering the clear import of
the ballot title and explanatory statement in this case, we
agree with the secretary that voters would have understood
the amendment to mean that a legislator with 10 or more
unexcused absences during a legislative session would be
disqualified from holding legislative office during the imme
diate next term, rather than the term after that. Petitioners’
contrary interpretation fails to account for the ballot title
and explanatory statement, which expressly and repeatedly
described the disqualification as taking place during the
next term. Voters would have understood the meaning of
the amendment’s text in light of those materials. The uni
formity of those materials, and their availability to voters,
persuades us that the voters would have understood the
amendment to disqualify legislators with too many unex
cused absences from holding office during the next term of
office.
III. CONCLUSION
After considering the text and the ballot measure
history of the amendment to Article IV, section 15, that
voters approved in 2022, we conclude that the phrase “the
term following the election after the member’s current term
is completed” refers to the term immediately following the
Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024)
21
term in which a legislator accrued 10 or more unexcused
absences during a legislative session. That construction is
consistent with the secretary’s interpretation of the amend
ment, as reflected in her temporary rules, ELECT 12-2023
and ELECT 16-2023.
The Secretary of State’s Temporary Rules ELECT
12-2023 and ELECT 16-2023 are upheld. | 6b4fe7d5cda47d1855ccbd511e6ebbcaf22e0428a0b13813b62b1beb984d630a | 2024-02-01T00:00:00Z |
936d7680-df02-4280-a6da-2b0e109eab90 | Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy | null | S070517 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 194
April 18, 2024
No. 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Application for Site Certificate
for the Nolin Hills Wind Power Project.
UMATILLA COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
Energy Facility Siting Council,
and Nolin Hills Wind, LLC,
Respondents.
(SC S070517)
En Banc
On judicial review of a final order of the Energy Facility
Siting Council.*
Argued and submitted January 11, 2024.
Wendie L. Kellington, Kellington Law Group, PC, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner
on review Umatilla County.
Kate E. Morrow, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on
review Oregon Department of Energy and Energy Facility
Siting Council. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General; Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General;
and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General.
Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives, LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review Nolin
Hills Wind, LLC.
Daniel Kearns, Reeve Kearns PC, Portland, filed the
brief for amici curiae Morrow County and The Eastern
Oregon Counties Association.
______________
* Judicial review of a final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council issued
August 31, 2023.
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
195
Daniel Kearns, Reeve Kearns PC, Portland, filed the
brief for amicus curiae Blue Mountain Alliance.
GARRETT, J.
The final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council is
affirmed.
196
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
GARRETT, J.
Umatilla County seeks judicial review of a final
order of the Energy Facility Siting Council (the council) that
granted a site certificate allowing Nolin Hills Wind, LLC,
to construct a wind energy facility in the county. This case
comes to us on direct review of the council’s final order. See
ORS 469.403(3) (providing for direct review by this court
in such cases). The proposed facility includes, among other
things, wind turbines, energy-transmission lines, and other
related or supporting facilities. Umatilla County challenges
the council’s final order on the ground that the council
should have required Nolin Hills to comply with a siting
criterion—a two-mile setback between any turbine and a
rural residence—that the county had recommended to the
council under ORS 469.504(5). For the reasons set out below,
we agree with the council that it has authority under ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) to approve Nolin Hills’s proposed energy
facility notwithstanding the facility’s failure to comply with
that siting criterion. We therefore affirm the council’s final
order.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Overview of the Dispute
As we will explain, state law sets out a complex
framework that governs the council’s approval of a site cer
tificate. That framework makes the council responsible for
the final determination whether a proposed facility complies
with legal requirements and may be approved. However, it
also provides a role for local governments, a role that includes
recommending “applicable substantive criteria” (which we
will explain later in this opinion) that bear on the coun
cil’s determination. Central to this case is precisely what
role those applicable substantive criteria play—specifically
whether, in this case, as the county contends, those applica
ble substantive criteria should have been given dispositive
effect, or whether, as the state respondents1 contend, the
council was authorized to approve Nolin Hills’s application
despite its failure to comply with all of those criteria. Two
1 The council and the Department of Energy jointly filed an answering brief.
They refer to themselves as the state respondents, and we do the same in this
opinion.
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
197
subsidiary questions are presented by the parties’ argu
ments. One is whether—assuming that the proposed facil
ity is required to comply with the “applicable substantive
criteria” recommended by the county—the two-mile setback
requirement qualifies as one of those criteria. The state
respondents argue that it does not. The other is whether
the proposed facility passes through more than three land
use zones. If it does, then it is undisputed that the council
was authorized to approve the site certificate without con
sidering the applicable substantive criteria at all. As we
will explain, we conclude that the council was authorized
to approve Nolin Hills’s site certificate even if the proposed
facility does not pass through more than three land use
zones and even if it does not comply with all of the county’s
recommended substantive criteria. That conclusion obviates
the need for us to resolve those two subsidiary issues.
B. The Council Generally
The council is an independent body composed of
seven volunteers appointed by the Governor and confirmed
by the Senate. ORS 469.450. The council works hand in
hand with the Department of Energy (DOE), which is
charged with implementing the state’s energy goals and
policies. ORS 469.030. Although it is the council that ulti
mately issues the site certificate, each entity plays a role in
the energy facility siting process.
As we recently explained in Friends of Columbia
Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun., 368 Or 123, 125, 486 P3d
787 (2021), “[t]he council oversees the development of large
energy facilities in Oregon, including electric power gener
ating plants, high-voltage transmission lines, gas pipelines,
and radioactive waste disposal sites, among other projects.”
See ORS 469.470 (listing powers and duties of the council);
ORS 469.501 (requiring the council to adopt standards for
siting, construction, operation, and retirement of energy
facilities2); ORS 469.300(11)(a) (defining “energy facility”).
The council carries out that task by issuing site certificates
to developers. See ORS 469.320(1) (“[N]o facility shall be
constructed or expanded unless a site certificate has been
2 Those standards are adopted as DOE regulations. OAR chapter 345, divi
sions 22-26.
198
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
issued for the site.”); ORS 469.503 (setting out requirements
for the council’s issuance of site certificate). To issue a site
certificate, the council must find, among other things, that
the proposed facility “complies with the statewide planning
goals adopted by the Land Conservation and Development
Commission.” ORS 469.503(4).
A site certificate authorizes the holder to construct,
operate, and retire a facility on an approved site, subject to
the conditions that the council includes in the certificate. ORS
469.401(1); see ORS 469.300(26) (defining “site certificate”).
To obtain a site certificate, an applicant first submits to the
council a Notice of Intent to apply for a site certificate. ORS
469.330(1). DOE then issues a project order that identifies all
statutes, administrative regulations, and other requirements
that the applicant must satisfy to obtain the site certificate.
ORS 469.330(3). The applicant submits its evidence of compli
ance with all project order requirements to the council in an
Application for Site Certificate. See ORS 469.350(1) (requir
ing applicants to submit their application to the council).
DOE reviews the application, and, if the agency
determines that an application is complete, it issues a draft
proposed order, which triggers a period for public comment.
See ORS 469.350(4) (requiring DOE to notify applicant
when application is complete); ORS 469.370(1), (2) (requir
ing DOE to prepare a draft proposed order and the coun
cil to hold one or more public hearings as necessary). After
reviewing the public comments, DOE issues a final proposed
order recommending approval or rejection of the applica
tion. ORS 469.370(4). The council then conducts a contested
case hearing on the application before an administrative
law judge (ALJ). ORS 469.370(5). Only issues raised with
sufficient specificity in the public comments may be raised
in the contested case. ORS 469.370(3), (4). The ALJ issues
a proposed contested case order, to which the parties may
take exception. OAR 345-015-0085. The council then issues
a final order approving or denying the application for a site
certificate. ORS 469.370(7); OAR 345-015-0085(7), (8). Any
party to the contested case may seek review in this court of
the council’s decision approving or rejecting the site certifi
cate. ORS 469.403(2), (3).
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
199
C. Historical Facts
In September 2017, Nolin Hills filed a Notice of
Intent to file an application for a site certificate for a pro
posed 350-MW wind energy facility, along with related or
supporting facilities, including a 230-kV transmission line,
to be located on approximately 44,900 acres in Umatilla
County. The proposed wind facility and the transmission
line as described in the Notice of Intent would be entirely on
land that is zoned for exclusive farm use (EFU). The Notice
of Intent stated that the wind energy transmission line
would connect the wind facility to the proposed Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) Stanfield Substation, located
about eight miles north of the “site boundary”—the outer
perimeter of the acreage comprising the proposed facility.3
That proposed transmission line would span 18 miles and is
referred to as the “BPA Stanfield Route.” The BPA Stanfield
Route also would be entirely on EFU land.
After Nolin Hills filed its Notice of Intent, DOE
asked Umatilla County’s Board of Commissioners (county
board) to recommend “applicable substantive criteria”—a
set of local land use rules and regulations to be used by
the council to evaluate Nolin Hills’s eventual application.4
3 The term “site boundary” is defined in OAR 345-001-0010(31) and means
“the perimeter of the site of a proposed energy facility, its related or supporting
facilities, all temporary laydown and staging areas and all corridors and micro-
siting corridors proposed by the applicant.”
4 ORS 469.504(5) provides that, on request by DOE, the “special advisory
group established under ORS 469.480” shall recommend to the council the “appli
cable substantive criteria” that will be used to evaluate a proposed facility. ORS
469.480 does not expressly define the term “special advisory group,” but ORS
469.480(1) requires the council to “designate as a special advisory group the
governing body of any local government within whose jurisdiction the facility
is proposed to be located.” Umatilla County had designated its county board as
the special advisory group. The “applicable substantive criteria” that the special
advisory group must recommend to the council are approval criteria based on
“the affected local government’s acknowledged comprehensive plan and land use
regulations that are required by the statewide planning goals.” ORS 469.504
(1)(b)(A); see also OAR 345-022-0030(3) (providing same definition of “applicable
substantive criteria”). “Acknowledgment” is defined in ORS 197.015(1) to mean
that the Land Conservation and Development Commission [LCDC] has issued
an order certifying that a comprehensive plan and land use regulations complies
with the “goals,” which, in turn, is defined in ORS 197.015(8) to mean “the manda
tory statewide land use planning standards adopted by [LCDC] pursuant to ORS
chapters 195, 196, 197 and 197A.” In addition, OAR 345-015-0180(4)(b)(A) defines
the phrase “applicable substantive criteria” to mean “the criteria and standards
200
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
The county board then timely recommended that the coun
cil apply several Umatilla County land use ordinances as
applicable substantive criteria, including, as relevant here,
Umatilla County Development Code 152.616(HHH)(6)(a)(3),
which requires a two-mile setback between any wind tur
bine and rural residence on EFU-zoned land. The county
had adopted that ordinance pursuant to ORS 215.283(2)(g),
which allows the county to conditionally approve commer
cial utility facilities as non-farm uses on EFU-zoned land.
The county board designated that ordinance as “Criterion 3”
in its list of recommended applicable substantive criteria.
In February 2020, Nolin Hills submitted to DOE
a preliminary application for a site certificate for the pro
posed wind energy facility and related facilities. That pro
posal was identical in all material respects to the proposal
set out in the Notice of Intent. In November 2020, however,
Nolin Hills submitted a revised preliminary application
that increased the size of the facility to about 48,000 acres
and added several additional features, including, as perti
nent here, an alternative energy transmission route (that
is, an alternative to the BPA Stanfield Route).5 The alterna
tive route, referred to as the Umatilla Electric Cooperative
(UEC) Cottonwood Route, would connect the wind facility to
the BPA transmission system via transmission lines to the
UEC Cottonwood Substation. The UEC Cottonwood Route
would span about 25 miles (seven miles longer than the BPA
Stanfield Route). Whereas the BPA Stanfield Route would
be located entirely on EFU land, the UEC Cottonwood Route
would be located mostly on EFU land with small segments
in two other land-use zones: Light Industrial (0.4 mile) and
Rural Tourist Commercial (0.3 mile). In addition, part of the
total acreage within the site boundary associated with the
UEC Cottonwood Route is located within a fourth zone—
Agri-Business (0.35 acre).
The county board provided timely comments on the
preliminary application, asserting that the proposed facil
ity does not comply with all of the applicable substantive
that the local government would apply in making all land use decisions neces
sary to site the proposed facility in the absence of a Council proceeding.”
5 The revised application also included solar energy facilities.
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
201
criteria. Specifically, the county board objected that the
facility would not comply with Criterion 3 because several
of the proposed wind turbine locations would be within two
miles of numerous rural residences. Nolin Hills then sub
mitted a second revised preliminary application; that pro
posal also did not comply with Criterion 3, which the county
board pointed out in its comments.
In January 2022, Nolin Hills submitted its applica
tion. The application did not comply with Criterion 3, as it
continued to include wind turbines that were less than two
miles from rural residences. DOE issued a draft proposed
order recommending that the council find that the proposed
facility complies with all applicable requirements. The draft
proposed order acknowledged that the facility would not
comply with Criterion 3, but it concluded that Criterion 3 is
not an “applicable substantive criterion.” It also stated that,
even if Criterion 3 were an applicable substantive criterion,
the council was authorized to approve the proposed facility
under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B), so long as the council finds that
the project “otherwise compl[ies] with the applicable state
wide planning goals.”
DOE then issued its final Proposed Order, in which
it found that the proposed facility complies with all applica
ble substantive criteria. In so concluding, DOE determined
that Criterion 3 is not an applicable substantive criterion,
because, under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A), applicable substantive
criteria are land use regulations that are “required by the
statewide planning goals,” and no statewide planning goal
requires a two-mile setback between a wind turbine and a
residence.
Alternatively, DOE stated, even if Criterion 3 were
an applicable substantive criterion, noncompliance with
that criterion would not be fatal to the application, because,
under ORS 469.504(5), if a proposed facility passes through
more than three land use zones, the council has the option
to evaluate the proposal against statewide planning goals
instead of the applicable substantive criteria.6 Noting that
Nolin Hills’s application included the possibility that the
facility would use the UEC Cottonwood Route, which, it
6 We set out and discuss the text of ORS 469.504(5) later in this opinion.
202
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
stated, “passes through” more than three land use zones,
DOE concluded that the failure to comply with Criterion 3
was not dispositive.
Finally, DOE stated that, even if Criterion 3 were an
applicable substantive criterion as defined in ORS 469.504
(1)(b)(A), and even if the proposed facility does not pass
through more than three land use zones, the council could
still approve the proposed facility under yet another provision,
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B), because the proposed facility otherwise
complies with the applicable statewide planning goals.7
Umatilla County objected to DOE’s Proposed Order.
The county argued that, contrary to DOE’s reasoning, the
UEC Cottonwood Route does not pass through more than
three land use zones; therefore, the applicable substantive
criteria govern. The county further argued that, contrary
to DOE’s reasoning, Criterion 3 was one of those applicable
substantive criteria. In the ensuing contested case proceed
ing, Umatilla County, DOE, and Nolin Hills each moved for
summary determination. In May 2023, an ALJ issued a con
tested case order denying Umatilla County’s motion, grant
ing DOE’s and Nolin Hills’s motions, and proposing that the
council issue a final order granting Nolin Hills’s application.
In the contested case order, the ALJ determined that the
proposed facility complies with all applicable substantive
criteria. Like DOE, the ALJ concluded that Criterion 3 is
not an “applicable substantive criterion,” because the two-
mile setback required by the Umatilla County ordinance is
not specifically required by the statewide planning goals.
The ALJ further determined that, even if Criterion 3 were
applicable, the proposed facility otherwise complies with
applicable statewide planning goals.
The council issued its final order in August 2023.
The final order incorporated DOE’s Proposed Order and the
ALJ’s Contested Case Order, and it approved Nolin Hills’s
application.
7 ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) allows the council to approve a proposed facility not
withstanding its failure to comply with all applicable substantive criteria if the
council determines that the facility “does otherwise comply with the applicable
statewide planning goals, or that an exception” to the goals applies. We set out
and discuss the text of ORS 469.504(1)(b) later in this opinion.
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
203
II. ANALYSIS
This court reviews final orders of the council for
errors of law, abuses of agency discretion, and lack of sub
stantial evidence in the record to support challenged find
ings of fact. See Friends of Parrett Mountain v. Northwest
Natural, 336 Or 93, 96, 79 P3d 869 (2003) (so stating); Save
Our Rural Oregon v. Energy Facility Siting, 339 Or 353, 356,
121 P3d 1141 (2005) (same); ORS 469.403(6) (Supreme Court
review same as Court of Appeals’ review described in ORS
183.482); ORS 183.482(7), (8) (setting out those standards).
A. Statutory Framework
Before turning to the parties’ contentions on appeal,
we lay out the relevant statutes in detail.
ORS 469.503 sets out the requirements for approval
of energy facility site certificates:
“In order to issue a site certificate, the [council] shall deter
mine that the preponderance of the evidence on the record
supports the following conclusions:
“(1) The facility complies with the applicable standards
[for facility siting, construction, operation, and retirement]
or the overall public benefits of the facility outweigh any
adverse effects on a resource or interest protected by the
applicable standards the facility does not meet.
“(2) *
*
*
*
*
[8]
“(3) Except as provided in ORS 469.504 for land use
compliance and except for those statutes and rules for
which the decision on compliance has been delegated by
the federal government to a state agency other than the
council, the facility complies with all other Oregon statutes
and administrative rules identified in the project order, as
amended, as applicable to the issuance of a site certificate
for the proposed facility. *
*
*
“(4) The facility complies with the statewide planning
goals adopted by the Land Conservation and Development
Commission [LCDC].”
Only ORS 469.503(4) is at issue in this case. That is,
Umatilla County disputes only the council’s determination
8 Subsection (2) applies to fossil-fueled power plants and is not relevant here.
204
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
that the proposed facility complies with statewide planning
goals notwithstanding its failure to comply with Criterion 3,
the county rule requiring a two-mile setback between wind
turbines and rural residences.
A different statute, ORS 469.504, sets out the cir
cumstances under which a proposed facility “shall be found
in compliance” with statewide planning goals under ORS
469.503(4). Of the various subsections in ORS 469.504,
three are most relevant here: subsections (1), (4), and (5).
First, subsection (4) provides that an applicant for a site
certificate “shall elect whether to demonstrate compliance
with the statewide planning goals under [ORS 469.504(1)(a)
or ORS 469.504(1)(b)].” ORS 469.504(4). In other words, the
circumstances in which the proposed facility “shall be found
in compliance” depend initially on the applicant’s choice
between two alternative ways to proceed, which are set out
in subsection (1).
The first of those statutory alternatives, ORS
469.504(1)(a), provides that the council must find the pro
posed facility to be in compliance with statewide planning
goals if “[t]he facility has received local land use approval
under the acknowledged comprehensive plan and land use
regulations of the affected local government.” In other words,
ORS 469.504(1)(a) allows the applicant to elect to demon
strate that the proposed facility complies with local land use
requirements to the satisfaction of the local government, in
which case, if the applicant is successful, the council must
conclude that the facility complies with statewide planning
goals.
In this case, Nolin Hills did not seek local land use
approval under Umatilla County’s acknowledged compre
hensive plan, and it did not elect to demonstrate compliance
under ORS 469.504(1)(a). Rather, it elected to demonstrate
compliance under the second statutory alternative, ORS
469.504(1)(b), which is considerably more complex.
When an applicant elects to demonstrate compli
ance under ORS 469.504(1)(b), then the way in which the
council must proceed depends on the particular circum
stances presented by the application. That statute provides
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
205
that the proposed facility must be found in compliance with
statewide planning goals if the council determines that:
“(A) The facility complies with applicable substantive
criteria from the affected local government’s acknowledged
comprehensive plan and land use regulations that are
required by the statewide planning goals and in effect on
the date the application is submitted, and with any Land
Conservation and Development Commission administra
tive rules and goals and any land use statutes that apply
directly to the facility *
*
*;
“(B) For an energy facility or a related or supporting
facility that must be evaluated against the applicable sub
stantive criteria pursuant to subsection (5) of this section,
that the proposed facility does not comply with one or more
of the applicable substantive criteria but does otherwise
comply with the applicable statewide planning goals, or that
an exception to any applicable statewide planning goal is
justified under subsection (2) of this section; or
“(C) For a facility that the council elects to evaluate
against the statewide planning goals pursuant to subsec
tion (5) of this section, that the proposed facility complies
with the applicable statewide planning goals or that an
exception to any applicable statewide planning goal is jus
tified under subsection (2) of this section.”
ORS 469.504(1)(b) (emphases added). As explained in greater
detail below, the italicized terms are important to the par
ties’ arguments in this case.
The third subsection relevant here is subsection (5),
which is cross-referenced in subparagraph (1)(b)(B), as set
out above. ORS 469.504(5) provides:
“Upon request by the State Department of Energy, the
special advisory group established under ORS 469.480
shall recommend to the council, within the time stated
in the request, the applicable substantive criteria under
subsection (1)(b)(A) of this section. If the special advisory
group does not recommend applicable substantive criteria
within the time established in the department’s request,
the council may either determine and apply the applicable
substantive criteria under subsection (1)(b) of this section
or determine compliance with the statewide planning goals
under subsection (1)(b)(B) or (C) of this section. If the special
206
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
advisory group recommends applicable substantive criteria
for an energy facility *
*
* or a related or supporting facility
that does not pass through more than one local government
jurisdiction or more than three zones in any one jurisdiction,
the council shall apply the criteria recommended by the spe
cial advisory group. If the special advisory group recom
mends applicable substantive criteria for an energy facility
*
*
* or a related or supporting facility that passes through
more than one jurisdiction or more than three zones in any
one jurisdiction, the council shall review the recommended
criteria and determine whether to evaluate the proposed
facility against the applicable substantive criteria recom
mended by the special advisory group, against the state
wide planning goals or against a combination of the appli
cable substantive criteria and statewide planning goals.
*
*
*”
(Emphases added.) Thus, subsection (5) concerns what the
council is required to do with the “applicable substantive
criteria” that may have been recommended by the “spe
cial advisory group,” which, in this case, was the Umatilla
County board.
The county and the state respondents describe sub
section (5) as containing different “tracks,” a term that we
adopt here.9
Track 1, the second sentence in subsection (5),
applies if the special advisory group does not timely recom
mend applicable substantive criteria. In that situation, the
council “either” may determine the applicable substantive
criteria itself and apply those criteria, or it may “determine
compliance with the statewide planning goals under subsec
tion (1)(b)(B) or (C).” Here, the special advisory group—the
Umatilla County board—timely recommended applicable
substantive criteria, so track 1 undisputedly does not apply.
9 We recognize that we are using the shorthand term “tracks” in this opin
ion differently than did this court in Save Our Rural Oregon. In that case, the
court referred to the three subparagraphs in ORS 469.504(1)(b) as “tracks.” 339
Or at 363. However, there was no need to refer to those three subparagraphs
as “tracks” in Save Our Rural Oregon, because they are easily referred to and
identified by their citations. By contrast, the descriptions of the ways the council
is to use the applicable substantive criteria in the three circumstances set out in
ORS 469.504(5) are all part of one section and are not separately identifiable by
citation. For ease of reference, therefore, we refer to those three circumstances as
“tracks.”
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
207
Track 2, the third sentence in subsection (5), applies
if the special advisory group timely recommends applicable
substantive criteria for a facility or a related or supporting
facility that does not pass through more than one jurisdic
tion or more than three land use zones. In that circum
stance, the council “shall apply” the special advisory group’s
recommended applicable substantive criteria.
Finally, track 3, the fourth sentence in subsection (5),
applies if the special advisory group recommends applica
ble substantive criteria for an energy facility or related or
supporting facility that does pass through more than one
jurisdiction or more than three zones in any one jurisdic
tion. In that circumstance, the council must review the rec
ommended criteria and “determine whether” to evaluate the
proposed facility against the recommended criteria, against
the statewide planning goals, or against a combination of
the two.
In this case, the council evaluated Nolin Hills’s
application under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A), concluding that
the proposed facility complies with all “applicable substan
tive criteria from the affected local government’s acknowl
edged comprehensive plan and land use regulations that are
required by the statewide planning goals.” As discussed, it
based that conclusion on its finding that, although the pro
posed facility does not comply with Criterion 3, the two-mile
setback rule, that criterion is not an “applicable substantive
criterion” because it is not “required by the statewide plan
ning goals.”
In addition, the council made “the separate and
alternative findings” that, even if Criterion 3 were an appli
cable substantive criterion, “the facility meets the Land Use
standard under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) and ORS 460.504(5).”
The council went on to state that, as a first alternative basis
for approving the proposed facility, the council found that
track 3 applied because the UEC Cottonwood Route passes
through more than three land use zones, and therefore the
council was entitled to, and did, evaluate the proposed facility
against a combination of the applicable substantive criteria
and the statewide planning goals. In addition, as a second
alternative basis for its ruling, the council stated that it had
208
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
evaluated the proposed facility under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B),
which allows it to approve a proposed facility that does not
comply with all the local government’s applicable substantive
criteria if it “does otherwise comply with the applicable state
wide planning goals.” The council considered all the state
wide planning goals that it considered to be applicable to the
proposed facility, and it concluded that the proposed facility
did comply with them.
B. The Parties’ Arguments on Review
On review, the core of Umatilla County’s argument
is that the council erred in approving Nolin Hills’s appli
cation because the proposed facility includes multiple wind
turbines that are less than two miles from rural residences
and thus does not comply with Criterion 3. That argument
has three main parts.
First, the county argues that the council erred in
concluding that Criterion 3 is not “required by the statewide
planning goals” and therefore is not among the “applicable
substantive criteria” that the council must consider under
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A). The county asserts that Criterion 3
is a conditional land use standard that it adopted in con
formance with Statewide Planning Goal 2, OAR 660-015-
0000(2). Among other things, Statewide Planning Goal 2
requires local governments to adopt a “land use planning
process and policy framework” that would serve as a
“basis for all decision[s] and actions related to use of land.”
According to the county, Criterion 3 is a part of that frame
work and addresses issues relevant to several statewide
planning goals, and, because Criterion 3 was adopted pur
suant to Goal 2, it is “required by” Goal 2.
Second, the county argues that the council erred,
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, in concluding
that the UEC Cottonwood Route “passes through” more
than three land use zones. That is important because, for
facilities that pass through more than three land use zones,
ORS 469.504(5) allows the council to evaluate the proposed
facility against the applicable substantive criteria, against
the statewide planning goals, or against a combination of
the two. As a result, the proposed facility’s failure to comply
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
209
with Criterion 3 would not be a reason to deny the applica
tion.
Third, Umatilla County argues that, because Criterion
3 is an applicable substantive criterion, and because the pro
posed facility does not pass through more than three zones,
the council was required to analyze Nolin Hills’s application
under track 2 in ORS 469.504(5). The county argues that
that is important because track 2 provides that the council
“shall apply” the applicable substantive criteria. In the coun
ty’s view, that wording means that the council was required
to apply Criterion 3 and must deny Nolin Hills’s application
for a site permit because the proposed facility violates the
two-mile setback requirement. Put another way, Umatilla
County contends that the statutory directive in track 2 that
the council “shall apply” the local criteria necessarily means
that, if the proposed facility does not comply with the local
criteria, then the council may not approve the application.
The state respondents argue that, even if track 2 in
ORS 469.504(5) does apply for the reasons that the county
contends—that is, even assuming that Criterion 3 is one of
the applicable substantive criteria, and further assuming
that the proposed facility does not pass through more than
three zones—the council was nevertheless authorized to
approve the application under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B). Again,
that provision applies when a proposed facility “must be
evaluated against” the applicable substantive criteria, and
it allows the council to approve a facility that does not com
ply with all the applicable substantive criteria if the facility
“does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide plan
ning goals.”
In response to that argument by the state respon
dents, the county contends that ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) applies
only to track 1—situations in which the special advisory
group does not recommend applicable substantive criteria to
DOE and the council then exercises its option to determine
applicable substantive criteria itself. Moreover, Umatilla
County argues, nothing in track 2 suggests that the leg
islature intended for ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) to override the
directive in track 2 that the council “shall apply” Umatilla
County’s applicable substantive criteria. On that point, the
210
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
county argues that the state respondents’ interpretation of
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B)—that it gives broad authority to the
council to grant a site certificate for a proposed facility that
falls within track 2, regardless of compliance with local cri
teria—cannot be correct, because that would make it point
less for ORS 469.504(5) to differentiate between proposed
facilities that pass through more than three land use zones
and those that do not: In each case, the council would be free
to disregard the proposed facility’s failure to comply with
all applicable substantive criteria and simply evaluate the
proposed facility against the statewide planning goals.
Although, as is apparent from the foregoing, the par
ties dispute numerous points of law and fact in this appeal,
we conclude that it is unnecessary to resolve most of those
disputes. Specifically, we need not decide whether Criterion 3
is “required by the statewide planning goals” and is there
fore an applicable substantive criterion; nor need we decide
whether the council erred as a matter of fact or of law in
concluding that the proposed facility passes through more
than three land use zones. That is because, even assuming
for purposes of this opinion that Umatilla County is correct
as to both those points—and that the council, therefore, was
required to evaluate the proposed facility under track 2 in
ORS 469.504(5)—we conclude that ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B)
authorized the council to grant Nolin Hills’s application for
a site permit for the proposed wind facility notwithstanding
the failure of the proposed facility to comply with Criterion 3.
C. ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) Applies to Track 2 in ORS
469.504(5).
We review the council’s interpretation of ORS
469.504 for errors of law. In doing so, we attempt to dis
cern the legislature’s intent by employing the framework
for statutory construction set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or
160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009): We examine the text and
context of the relevant statute, and we consider legislative
history to the extent that we find it useful to our analysis.
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) confers broad authority on the
council. It provides that the council may approve a proposed
facility if it determines that the facility “does not comply
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
211
with one or more of the applicable substantive criteria but
does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide plan
ning goals, or that an exception to any applicable statewide
planning goal is justified under subsection (2) of this sec
tion.” Thus, if that provision is applicable, the proposed facil
ity need not comply with all local recommended criteria, and
it need not even comply with all statewide planning goals if
the council determines that an exception to a goal is justi
fied. However, by its terms, that provision’s applicability is
limited to situations when “an energy facility or a related or
supporting facility *
*
* must be evaluated against the appli
cable substantive criteria pursuant to [ORS 469.504(5)].”
(Emphasis added.) The statute thus appears to contemplate
that a situation may arise in which a proposed facility “must
be evaluated against” the applicable substantive criteria,
yet may still be approved even if it does not comply with one
or more of those criteria. According to the state respondents,
the statute means exactly that.
In response, Umatilla County argues that ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) does not apply to this case, because this was
not a circumstance in which a facility “must be evaluated”
against the “applicable substantive criteria” pursuant to
ORS 469.504(5). The county makes several points in support
of that contention, none of which we find persuasive.
According to the county, the only time that the
council “must” evaluate the proposed facility against the
“applicable substantive criteria” is when track 1 applies—
i.e., when the special advisory group has not recommended
applicable substantive criteria and the council decides to
determine them itself. To repeat, track 1 provides:
“If the special advisory group does not recommend appli
cable substantive criteria within the time established in
the department’s request, the council may either determine
and apply the applicable substantive criteria under subsec
tion (1)(b) of this section or determine compliance with the
statewide planning goals under subsection (1)(b)(B) or (C)
of this section.”
ORS 469.504(5).
We agree with the county that, if the special advisory
group has not timely recommended applicable substantive
212
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
criteria for a proposed facility and the council decides to
determine and apply them itself as allowed in track 1, that
is a situation in which the proposed facility “must be eval
uated against the applicable substantive criteria” pursuant
to subparagraph (1)(b)(B). Indeed, this court said as much
in Save Our Rural Oregon. In that case, the special advisory
group did not timely recommend applicable substantive cri
teria, and the council determined the local criteria itself by
looking at the local land use comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinances and directly applicable statutes and rules. 339
Or at 362-63. This court held that, once the council opted
to “determine and apply the applicable substantive criteria”
under track 1, “the facility was one that ‘must’ be evaluated
against the applicable substantive criteria [and therefore]
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) was an appropriate mechanism for
reviewing the proposed facility.” Id. at 368 n 10.
But it does not follow from Save Our Rural Oregon
that track 1 is the only circumstance in which the council
must evaluate a proposed facility against the applicable sub
stantive criteria. The wording of track 2 arguably suggests
even more clearly a legislative intent to make ORS 469.504
(1)(b)(B) an “appropriate mechanism” for review. Again,
track 2 states that, where a proposed facility does not
pass through more than three land use zones, the council
“shall apply the criteria recommended by the special advi
sory group.” ORS 469.504(5) (emphasis added). “Shall,” like
“must,” is a word denoting an obligation or a command. See
Preble v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 320, 324, 14 P3d 613 (2000)
(“
‘Shall’ is a command: it is ‘used in laws, regulations, or
directives to express what is mandatory.’
” (Citation omit
ted.)); Stanley, Adm. v. Mueller, 211 Or 198, 208, 315 P2d 125
(1957) (“Words or phrases which are generally regarded as
making a provision mandatory, include ‘shall,’ and ‘must.’
”).
The phrase “shall apply the [applicable substantive] criteria,”
then, appears to make the proposed facility one that “must
be evaluated” against the applicable substantive criteria.
Umatilla County argues that that is not correct,
because “evaluate” in ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) means some
thing different than “apply” in track 2. That is, Umatilla
County argues that, under track 2, the council is required to
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
213
apply the criteria, but evaluation is not required. The county
does not, however, explain how such a distinction could
make practical sense. Again, ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) is trig
gered when, under ORS 469.504(5), the council must evalu
ate the proposed facility “against the applicable substantive
criteria.” It is difficult to understand how the council, acting
pursuant to track 2, could “apply” the applicable substantive
criteria to a proposed facility without also evaluating the
proposed facility against those criteria, and the county does
not explain how that could be so.
Umatilla County also argues that applying ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) to track 2 would make a nullity of the com
mand in track 2 that the council “shall apply” the applicable
substantive criteria. That is, according to Umatilla County,
it does not make sense to interpret the statutory scheme in a
way that requires the council, acting pursuant to track 2, to
“apply” the substantive criteria, but then allows the council
to use ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) to effectively disregard those
criteria by approving a project that does not comply with
them. That seeming anomaly, according to the county, is a
reason to conclude that ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) does not apply
to track 2.
We disagree. The unspoken premise underlying
the county’s argument is that the requirement in track 2
that the council “shall apply” the recommended substan
tive criteria means that a proposed facility must be rejected
if it does not comply with those criteria. That is a possible
interpretation of “shall apply,” but it is not the only plausi
ble one. “Apply” means “to make use of as suitable, fitting,
or relevant” or “to put to use[,] esp. for some practical pur
pose.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 105 (unabridged
ed 2002). Under that ordinary meaning, one might “apply”
the applicable substantive criteria in evaluating a proposed
facility—meaning, “make use of” them by examining the
degree to which the facility is consistent with those criteria—
even if one may also approve a proposed facility that does
not comply with one or more of them. Contrary to the coun
ty’s argument, such an interpretation does not render the
local criteria irrelevant. Rather, it requires the council to
214
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
consider those criteria in determining whether to ultimately
approve a proposed facility.
Finally, the county points to two other land use stat
utes, ORS 215.283(2)(g) and ORS 215.190, as context for its
interpretation of ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B). ORS 215.283(2)(g)
requires county approval of commercial utility facilities
for the purpose of generating power for public use on high-
value farmland in areas zoned for exclusive farm use.10 ORS
215.190 prohibits, among other things, construction of any
structure in violation of an ordinance or regulation.11 The
county argues that those statutes mean that a facility such
as Nolin Hills proposes can be approved only if it meets local
conditional use standards, and if the facility does not meet
those standards, the application must be denied. According
to Umatilla County, it follows that ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B)
cannot apply to track 2.
Again, we disagree. ORS 469.504(7) alleviates any
tension between ORS 469.504, on the one hand, and ORS
215.283(2)(g) and ORS 215.190, on the other. That subsec
tion specifically contemplates council approval of a facility
that violates local land use rules:
“On or before its next periodic review, each affected local
government shall amend its comprehensive plan and land
use regulations as necessary to reflect the decision of the
council pertaining to a site certificate or amended site
certificate.”
ORS 469.504(7). In other words, if the council issues a site
certificate for a proposed facility that does not comply with
all of a local government’s land use regulations adopted
pursuant to ORS 215.283(2)(g) and ORS 215.190, including
10 ORS 215.283(2)(g) provides:
“(2) The following nonfarm uses may be established, subject to the
approval of the governing body or its designee in any area zoned for exclusive
farm use *
*
*:
“*
*
*
*
*
“(g) Commercial utility facilities for the purpose of generating power for
public use by sale.”
11 ORS 215.190 provides:
“No person shall locate, construct, maintain, repair, alter, or use a build
ing or other structure or use or transfer land in violation of an ordinance or
regulation authorized by [various land use statutes].”
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
215
those recommended as applicable substantive criteria in an
energy facility siting proceeding, the county must amend its
conflicting regulations to conform to the site certificate and
issue any permits necessary for the construction of the facili
ty.12 Notably, nothing in subsection (7) limits its applicability
to proposed facilities approved under tracks 1 and 3.13 Once
the local government amends its regulations to conform to
the site certificate, there is no longer a conflict between a
site certificate and the local conditional use standards.
Our analysis thus far points to the conclusion that
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) applies to track 2 and that it authorizes
the council to issue a site certificate for a proposed facility
notwithstanding that the proposed facility does not comply
with all applicable substantive criteria, so long as it “does
otherwise comply with the applicable statewide planning
goals.” That interpretation of the statute is consistent with
the overarching goal of the energy facility siting process: to
12 As the council’s final order states, “[I]t is the [c]ounty that must amend its
comprehensive plans and regulations to be consistent with the [council’s] deci
sion, not vice versa.”
13 We also observe that, if Umatilla County were correct that ORS 215.283(2)(g)
and ORS 215.190 mean that a proposed facility that does not comply with local
land use regulations must be denied, then it would not matter whether track 2
or track 3 applied, because the council would never be able to approve a proposed
facility that did not comply with all of the local government’s applicable substan
tive criteria. But the legislature has expressly authorized facilities to obtain site
certificates without the local governing body’s approval in ORS 469.504(1)(b), and
both ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) and (C) clearly contemplate approval when a facility
does not comply with all applicable substantive criteria. As we have discussed,
ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) does so expressly, but ORS 469.504(1)(b)(C) also applies
implicitly when a facility does not comply with all applicable substantive criteria.
That subparagraph applies when the council “elects to evaluate [a proposed facil
ity] against the statewide planning goals” and clearly applies to track 3, which
applies to a proposed facility that passes through more than three land use zones,
because only track 3 gives the council that option. Track 3 requires the council
to review the recommended criteria and then determine whether to evaluate the
proposed facility against the recommended criteria, against the statewide plan
ning goals, or against a combination of the two. Obviously, if the council chooses
the first option—if it determines to evaluate the proposed facility against the
applicable substantive criteria—and it further determines that the facility fully
complies with the applicable substantive criteria, then the council can approve
the proposed facility under ORS 469.504(1)(b)(A). But ORS 469.504(1)(b)(C)
would apply both when the council elects to evaluate the proposed facility under
the statewide planning goals alone and when it elects to evaluate the facility
against a combination of the applicable substantive criteria and the statewide
planning goals, having determined that the proposed facility does not comply
with all of the applicable substantive criteria.
216
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
ensure that energy facilities comply with Oregon’s statewide
planning goals. ORS 469.503(4). We disagree with Umatilla
County that that interpretation makes a nullity of the dif
ferent treatment in ORS 469.504(5) for proposed facilities
that pass through more than three land use zones and those
that do not. Rather, our interpretation reflects a legislative
intent to ensure that local government interests are given
robust consideration, while at the same time giving the
council ultimate decision-making authority to approve pro
posed facilities that comply with statewide planning goals.
D. The Legislative History Confirms Our Interpretation of
ORS 469.504.
The legislative history of ORS 469.503 and ORS
469.504 confirms, generally, our understanding that the leg
islature intended, in ORS 469.504(1)(b), to provide a role for
local land use regulations in the energy facility siting pro
cess while making clear that the council, and not the local
government, makes the ultimate determination whether to
issue a site certificate for a proposed facility.14 In particu
lar, it confirms our understanding of the interrelationship
between ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) and track 2, and it reveals
that, although ORS 469.504(5) provides in track 2 that the
council “shall apply” the local criteria, the legislature did
not intend to require compliance with all local criteria as
a prerequisite for issuance of a site certificate for facilities
evaluated under track 2.
The statutes setting requirements for approval of
energy facility site certificates and facility compliance with
statewide planning goals, ORS 469.503 and ORS 469.504,
began to take their present form in 1993. In that year, the
legislature repealed the list of standards, set out in former
ORS 469.500 and former ORS 469.510, that the council was
required to adopt governing the safety, siting, construc
tion, and operation of thermal power plants and nuclear
installations, and it enacted new standards for the siting,
14 As discussed, there is one exception: the council cedes its authority to the
affected local government when the applicant elects to demonstrate compliance
with the statewide planning goals by seeking approval from the local govern
ment under its acknowledged comprehensive plan and land use regulations. ORS
469.504(1)(a), (4).
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
217
construction, operation, and retirement of “energy facili
ties.”15 Or Laws 1993, ch 569, §§ 22-23. The 1993 bill, as
enacted, reflected the legislature’s overarching concern that
proposed facilities comply with statewide planning goals,
and it clarified the ways in which the council could make
that determination.16 Compare former ORS 469.503(1)(c)
(1993), renumbered as ORS 469.503(4) (1997) (to issue a site
certificate, the council shall determine by a preponderance
of the evidence that “[t]he facility complies with the state
wide planning goals adopted by the Land Conservation
and Development Commission”), with former ORS 469.510
(1991), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 569, § 21 (containing no
provision regarding land use or statewide planning goals).
Like ORS 469.504(1)(a) and (b) today, former ORS
469.503 (1993) anticipated two types of circumstances in
which a proposed facility could or must be found in com
pliance with statewide planning goals: where the applicant
had sought and received local land use approval for the pro
posed facility, former ORS 469.503(2)(a) (1993), and where
the applicant had not sought local land use approval and
instead asked the council to make the determination, former
ORS 469.503(2)(b) (1993). Former ORS 469.503(2)(b) (1993),
in turn, set out two circumstances in which the council was
required to find that a proposed facility was in compliance
with the statewide planning goals: (1) when the proposed
facility complied with all the local government’s applicable
substantive criteria, as well as LCDC’s rules and goals and
any applicable land use statutes (former ORS 469.503(2)(b)(A)
and (B) (1993)), and (2) when the proposed facility “[did]
not comply with the applicable local government criteria,”
but the council found that the proposed facility did “other
wise comply with the statewide planning goals,” (former
ORS 469.503(2)(b)(C) (1993)). Further, former 469.503(6)
(1993) provided, “In accordance with subsection (2)(b) of
15 The definition of “energy facility” covered more types of facilities than
merely thermal power plants and nuclear installations; it covered any electric
power generating plant with a generating capacity of 25 megawatts or more.
Former ORS 469.300(10) (1993). That definition is substantially identical to the
definition of “energy facility” set out in ORS 469.300(11)(a).
16 As enacted in 1993, the provisions of the statute that are analogous to
those found today in ORS 469.503 and ORS 469.504 all were found in former ORS
469.503 (1993).
218
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
this section, the council shall apply the substantive crite
ria recommended by the special advisory group.” (Emphasis
added.)
The original wording of former ORS 469.503(6)
(1993) shows that the council was required to “apply” the
local criteria in both circumstances set out in former ORS
469.503(2)(b) (1993)—it “shall apply” them. If the council
applied the local criteria and found that the proposed facil
ity complied with them, then it was required to find that
the proposed facility was in compliance with the statewide
planning goals and approve the site certificate. However, it
also could approve the site certificate if it determined that
the proposed facility did not comply with the local criteria
but that it “does otherwise comply with the statewide plan
ning goals.” Thus, former ORS 469.503 (1993) reflects not
only a legislative intent to allow the council to approve pro
posed facilities that do not comply with the applicable sub
stantive criteria, it also shows that the legislature intended
the phrase “shall apply” to be understood as we interpret
it here: The phrase directs the council to consider the local
criteria, but it does not require the council to reject a pro
posed facility simply because it does not comply with a local
criterion.17
Nothing in the later amendments to that statute
suggests a different legislative intent. In 1995, the leg
islature considered a bill to amend former ORS 469.503
(1993)—SB 951. As introduced, SB 951 would have allowed
the council to consider compliance with the statewide
planning goals without first considering compliance with
the local criteria. See Exhibit D, Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, SB 951,
April 10, 1995 (proposed amendments). Many stakeholders,
including DOE, opposed those amendments on the ground
that they would render local criteria unnecessary to the
council’s determination. See Exhibit H, Senate Committee
17 This interpretation is consistent with the written statement of then-
Senator Joyce Cohen, equating “applying” with “considering.” Senator Cohen
stated that, in the proposed amendments to former ORS 469.503 (1993), “we have
made sure that the local governments[’] comprehensive plans will be considered
by the Siting Council.” Exhibit A, House Committee on Natural Resources, SB
1016, June 29, 1993 (accompanying testimony of Senator Joyce Cohen).
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
219
on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, SB
951, Apr 10, 1995 (accompanying testimony of DOE Acting
Director John Savage) (opposing proposed amendments
because the bill would allow the council “to make a deter
mination of consistency with statewide planning goals with
out considering local government plans”); see also Exhibit F,
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources and
Environment, SB 951, April 10, 1995 (accompanying tes
timony of the council’s Vice Chair Terry Edvalson) (“[The
bill] allows developers to ignore local comprehensive plans
and zoning ordinances, and instead apply the broader state
land use goals to demonstrate land use compliance.”); Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Natural
Resources and Environment, SB 951, Apr 10, 1995, Tape 71,
Side B (statement of Senior Staff Associate for the League of
Oregon Cities Jane Cummins) (the League of Oregon Cities
opposed “language which allow[ed] the local plan criteria to
be ignored”).
Ultimately, the legislature amended former ORS
469.503 (1993) to repeal former ORS 469.503(2)(b)(C) (1993)
and replace it with the following two subparagraphs:
“(C) For an energy facility or a related or supporting
facility that must be evaluated against the applicable sub
stantive criteria pursuant to subsection (6) of this section,
that the proposed facility does not comply with one or more
of the applicable substantive criteria but does otherwise
comply with the applicable statewide planning goals, or
that an exception to any applicable statewide planning goal
is justified under subsection (3) of this section; or
“(D) For a facility that the council elects to evaluate
against the statewide planning goals pursuant to subsec
tion (6) of this section, that the proposed facility complies
with the applicable statewide planning goals or that an
exception to any applicable statewide planning goal is jus
tified under subsection (3) of this section.”
Or Laws 1995, ch 505, § 21. Those provisions are identical
in all material respects to the current statute, ORS 469.504
(1)(b)(B) and (C). In addition, the legislature amended former
ORS 469.503(6) (1993) to include two additional “tracks”
now present in ORS 469.504(5). That is, in addition to track 1,
which applies when the special advisory group does not
220
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
recommend applicable substantive criteria (and which was
already a part of former ORS 469.503(6) (1993)), former ORS
469.503(6) (1995) included the following:
“If the special advisory group recommends applicable sub
stantive criteria for an energy facility *
*
* or a related or
supporting facility that does not pass through more than
one local government jurisdiction or more than three zones
in any one jurisdiction, the council shall apply the criteria
recommended by the special advisory group. If the special
advisory group recommends applicable substantive criteria
for an energy facility *
*
* or a related or supporting facil
ity that passes through more than one jurisdiction or more
than three zones in any one jurisdiction, the council shall
review the recommended criteria and determine whether
to evaluate the proposed facility against the applicable
substantive criteria recommended by the special advisory
group, against the statewide planning goals or against
a combination of the applicable substantive criteria and
statewide planning goals.”
Or Laws 1995, ch 505, § 21. That wording is identical in all
material respects to the second and third tracks that now
appear in ORS 469.504(5). Notably, former ORS 469.503(6)
(1995) continued to provide that the council “shall apply”
the local criteria, although that directive was then limited
to circumstances in which the proposed facility did not pass
through more than one jurisdiction or more than three land
use zones in any one jurisdiction.
There is little explanation in the legislative history
as to why the legislature concluded that those particular
amendments were necessary.18 However, DOE did not object
18 The legislative history suggests that, in differentiating between pro
posed facilities that pass through more than one jurisdiction or more than three
land use zones and those that do not, the legislature was attempting to address
“problems associated with the siting of transmission lines and pipelines that go
through multiple zones and multiple jurisdictions.” Exhibit B, Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, SB 951, Apr 10, 1995
(accompanying testimony of Margaret D. Kirkpatrick). Kirkpatrick explained
that, under current law, it was unclear how “multiple provisions of different zon
ing ordinances and comprehensive plans come into play when you have a large
linear facility” that goes through multiple zones or jurisdictions. Tape Recording,
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, SB 951,
Apr 10, 1995, Tape 70, Side A. Tracks 2 and 3 appear to be a compromise that
requires the council to consider the applicable substantive criteria when the pro
posed facility does not pass through more than one jurisdiction or more than
three land use zones but allows the council to elect to apply only the statewide
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
221
to the proposed amendments and, in a section-by-section
analysis of SB 951, explained that the proposed amendments
“allow the [council] to evaluate the land use impacts of a
facility under the statewide planning goals rather than
local land use criteria if: (i) the relevant local government
fails to provide [the council] with the applicable local cri
teria; (ii) [the council] finds that one or more of the local
criteria are not met; or (iii) the facility passes through more
than one jurisdiction or more than three zoning districts in
one jurisdiction.”
Exhibit E, House Legislative Rules Committee, SB 951,
May 17, 1995 (DOE section-by-section analysis of SB 951).
In addition, in a memorandum submitted with that section-
by-section analysis, a lawyer for DOE stated that “[t]he
existing [land use] system is maintained, except that the
council is authorized—but not required—to apply the state
wide land use goals directly (rather than applying the appli
cable substantive criteria from the local government)” in
the three circumstances set out above. Id. (memorandum of
Assistant Attorney General Meg Reeves).19
The legislative history pertaining to the 1995
amendments, therefore, confirms that the legislature
intended to allow the council to apply the statewide plan
ning goals rather than the local applicable substantive
criteria for a proposed facility that does not comply with
one or more of the applicable substantive criteria. In addi
tion, nothing in the legislative history suggests that the
1995 legislature intended the phrase “shall apply” to have
a different meaning than it had in the 1993 version of the
statute.
planning goals for a facility that does pass through more than one jurisdiction or
more than three land use zones. However, the legislative history does not shed
light on precisely what the legislature intended in using the words “must be eval
uated” in ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B) and “elects to evaluate” in ORS 469.504(1)(b)(C).
19 Subsequent amendments did not change the statute in any material way.
In 1997, the legislature moved the provisions governing the council’s determina
tion of a proposed facility’s compliance with statewide planning goals, without
substantive change, from former ORS 469.503 (1993) to 469.504. See Or Laws
1997, ch 428, § 5; Exhibit F, Senate Livability Committee, HB 3283, May 13,
1997 (section-by-section analysis of HB 3283). ORS 469.504 was subsequently
amended in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 in ways that do not affect our analysis of
this case.
222
Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy
E. Umatilla County Has Not Shown that the Proposed
Facility Fails to Comply with the Applicable Statewide
Planning Goals.
We turn to address Umatilla County’s final argu
ment: that the council erred in concluding that the proposed
facility “otherwise compl[ies] with the applicable state
wide planning goals.” Umatilla County argues that Goal 2
applies to the proposed facility and “requires that all state
agency actions respecting land use comply with the compre
hensive plans of local governments,” and that includes their
implementing ordinances. It follows, according to Umatilla
County, that the facility’s failure to comply with Criterion 3
necessarily means that it does not comply with Goal 2.20
The county’s argument is untenable. It is true
that Goal 2 states that, in general, state agency plans and
actions “shall be consistent with the comprehensive plans of
cities and counties.” OAR 660-015-0000(2). However, a dis
tinct statutory scheme sets out the specific powers and obli
gations of the council. Those powers include the authority
to take an exception to any of the statewide planning goals
when considering approving a proposed energy facility if
the council deems such an exception justified. ORS 469.504
(1)(b)(B), (C); ORS 469.504(2). Moreover, under ORS 469.504(6),
the council is expressly exempted from ORS 197.180(b),
which otherwise provides that state agencies shall “carry
out their planning duties, powers and responsibilities and
take actions that are authorized by law with respect to pro
grams affecting land use *
*
* [i]n a manner compatible with
acknowledged comprehensive plans and land use regula
tions.” Finally, ORS 469.504(7) provides that “each affected
local government shall amend its comprehensive plan and
land use regulations as necessary to reflect the decision of
the council pertaining to a site certificate or amended site
certificate.” Thus, it is the local government’s comprehen
sive plan that must ultimately conform to a council siting
decision—not the other way around. Taken together, those
statutes demonstrate that the legislature has devised a
20 Goal 2 is “[t]o establish a land use planning process and policy framework
as a basis for all decision[s] and actions related to use of land and to assure an
adequate factual base for such decisions and actions.” OAR 660-015-0000(2).
Cite as 372 Or 194 (2024)
223
specific plan for the siting of energy facilities that controls
over the more general requirements of Goal 2. Accordingly,
we reject Umatilla County’s argument that the council
erred in concluding that the proposed facility “does other
wise comply with the applicable statewide planning goals.”
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, based on our analysis of the text,
context, and legislative history of ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B)
and (5), we conclude that the legislature intended ORS
469.504(1)(b)(B) to apply to track 2. In other words, we con
clude that, in enacting ORS 469.504(1)(b)(B), the legislature
intended to allow the council to evaluate a proposed facility
that does not pass through more than three land use zones
against a local government’s applicable substantive criteria
and to approve a site certificate for it even if the facility does
not comply with all of the applicable substantive criteria, if
it determines that the facility does otherwise comply with
applicable statewide planning goals. Thus, we conclude that
compliance with local land use regulations is one way for a
facility to demonstrate compliance with statewide planning
goals, but it is not the only way. If a facility does not com
ply with all applicable local land use criteria, then, under
ORS 469.504(1)(b), compliance with the statewide planning
goals themselves is also a sufficient basis for the council’s
approval of a site certificate.
The final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council
is affirmed. | 0a45b8c40b3c6a5ea1344c282b05305e129c32f2739162e1fa8b789961f1f935 | 2024-04-18T00:00:00Z |
cdcad3d9-2d75-49c3-a494-af0ce46074ab | Brown v. Kotek | null | S071034 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 260
May 8, 2024
No. 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
TERRI LEE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TINA KOTEK,
Governor of the State of Oregon;
Nichole Brown,
Superintendent,
Coffee Creek Correctional Facility; and
Tasha Petersen,
Administrator of Oregon Department of Corrections
Offender Information Sentence Computation Unit,
Defendants.
(SC S071034)
En Banc
Original proceeding in habeas corpus.
Argued and submitted May 2, 2024.
Steven T. Wax, Oregon Justice Resource Center,
Portland, argued the cause for plaintiff. Julia Yoshimoto,
Oregon Justice Resource Center, Portland, filed the petition,
the memorandum in support of the petition, and the reply
for plaintiff. Also on those filings was Malori Maloney.
Kirsten Naito, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for defendants. Paul L. Smith, Deputy
Solicitor General, Salem, filed the memorandum in opposi
tion. Also on the memorandum were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
GARRETT, J.
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be dis
charged from her illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to ORAP
1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP 14.05
(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the appel
late judgment immediately.
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
261
262
Brown v. Kotek
GARRETT, J.
Plaintiff has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
requesting that this court exercise its original jurisdiction
and order her immediate release from prison. Or Const,
Art VII (Amended), § 2 (“[T]he supreme court may, in its own
discretion, take original jurisdiction in *
*
* habeas corpus
proceedings.”).1 Plaintiff is incarcerated as the result of an
order of Governor Tina Kotek that revoked an earlier condi
tional commutation of one of plaintiff’s sentences.2 Plaintiff
had received that earlier commutation in December 2020
from then-Governor Kate Brown and finished serving all
of her sentences in February 2023. Governor Kotek’s order
of revocation issued in December 2023. For the reasons
explained in this opinion, we conclude that, because plaintiff
had finished serving all of her sentences when the Governor
revoked the conditional commutation, the Governor lacked
authority, under the terms of the commutation, to issue the
revocation. We also reject the state’s argument that plaintiff
waived her right to challenge her present imprisonment.
Plaintiff’s imprisonment is unlawful. Accordingly,
we order that she immediately be discharged from custody.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are procedural and uncontested.3
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to two counts of mail theft or receipt
of stolen mail. ORS 164.162. On Count 1, she was sentenced
to 30 months of incarceration and 24 months of post-prison
supervision (PPS). On Count 2, she was sentenced to 30
months of incarceration, consecutive to Count 1, and no
1 See also ORS 34.310 (providing that every person who is “imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty,” with exceptions, “may prosecute a writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint, and if illegal,
to be delivered therefrom”).
2 Defendants are Governor Kotek, the Superintendent of Coffee Creek
Correctional Facility (where plaintiff is currently in custody), and the
Administrator of the Oregon Department of Corrections Offender Information
Sentence Computation Unit. Throughout this opinion, individual defendants are
referred to by name, and defendants collectively are referred to as “the state.”
3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to various dates and time periods regard
ing plaintiff’s convictions and sentences. Those dates and time periods were
likely determined based on a variety of considerations. In all events, because
those dates and periods are undisputed, we need not—and do not—explain how
they were determined.
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
263
PPS. As of December 2020, plaintiff’s term of incarcera
tion was set to be completed in August 2021. That is, she
had approximately eight months of incarceration remaining
before being released to serve 24 months of PPS.
In December 2020, Governor Brown issued com
mutations of sentences in connection with the COVID-19
pandemic. In plaintiff’s case, Governor Brown ordered a
“Conditional and Revocable Commutation of Sentence.” The
commutation order stated that, as to Count 2, plaintiff was
“scheduled to complete her term of incarceration on August
22, 2021.” The Governor then commuted the remaining term
of incarceration “from incarceration to post-prison supervi
sion.” The commutation was subject to a variety of condi
tions, including that (1) “[f]rom the effective date of [the]
order through the end of her [PPS] calculated to August 22,
2021, [plaintiff] shall not violate any state or federal law”; (2)
the commutation order “[did] not relieve [plaintiff] of [PPS]”;
(3) plaintiff shall “agree to, and abide by, the terms speci
fied in the Agreement Accepting Conditional and Revocable
Commutation” (hereinafter, the acceptance agreement);
and (4) if the Governor, in her judgment, should determine
that plaintiff “has violated any of the conditions of this
conditional and revocable commutation,” or that plaintiff’s
“continued release in the community no longer serves the
interests of the State of Oregon,” the “commutation may be
revoked, at which time [plaintiff] shall be returned to prison
to serve out her sentence that was remaining at the time
this commutation was granted according to the terms of the
Judgment of Conviction.”
The acceptance agreement stated that “the Governor
[was] willing to grant a commutation to [plaintiff] only
as provided in this agreement[.]” Among other things, the
agreement provided that (1) “[f]rom the effective date of the
[commutation order] through August 22, 2021, [plaintiff]
shall not violate any state or federal law”; and (2) plain
tiff “shall abide by the terms and conditions of any post-
prison supervision that is imposed in connection with the
conditional and revocable commutation and her Judgment
of Conviction.” The agreement included a waiver provi
sion, stating that plaintiff waived any legal challenges to
264
Brown v. Kotek
future revocation of the commutation and to being returned
to prison, including through a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus:
“If the Governor of the State of Oregon should determine
in his or her sole judgment that [plaintiff] has violated any
of the conditions of this conditional and revocable commu
tation, the Governor may revoke such commutation and
require that [plaintiff] return to prison to serve out her
sentence that was remaining at the time her commutation
was granted according to the terms of the Judgment of
Conviction. [Plaintiff] hereby waives any potential objection
or challenge to having the commutation revoked and being
returned to prison under such a determination, including an
application for a writ of habeas corpus.”
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff signed the acceptance agree
ment, which included an acknowledgement that she had
“carefully reviewed” both the agreement and the commuta
tion order and that she “hereby agree[d] to its terms.”
The Governor’s conditional commutation became
effective on December 23, 2020. Plaintiff was released from
prison and placed under the authority of the Board of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision (BOPPS) to serve her PPS.
In May 2021—approximately four months after her
release from prison—plaintiff pleaded no contest to violat
ing a general condition of her PPS (i.e., that she “[o]bey all
laws, municipal, county, state, and federal”). A hearings
officer found her in violation of her PPS, and a 30-day jail
sanction was imposed. The parties do not dispute that plain
tiff’s conduct constituted a violation of the conditions of her
commutation. Other than the imposition of the sanction, we
are unaware of any other actions being taken at that point.
Almost two years later, in February 2023, BOPPS
issued a “Certificate of Supervision Expiration,” stating that
plaintiff had “completed the period of post-prison supervision
imposed, and *
*
* is expired from supervision.” In other words,
plaintiff had fulfilled her PPS obligations and was no longer
subject to any sentence. The state does not dispute that point.
In February 2024, approximately one year after
BOPPS issued its certificate of supervision expiration,
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
265
plaintiff was arrested and sent to Coffee Creek Correctional
Facility. According to plaintiff, several days after her arrest,
she learned that her commutation had been revoked. The
record reflects that Governor Kotek had issued an order in
December 2023, stating that she had “determined in [her]
sole judgment that [plaintiff had] violated conditions of [the]
Conditional and Revocable Commutation of Sentence.” A
warrant was issued for plaintiff’s arrest, leading to her
present imprisonment.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in this court, contending that she is unlaw
fully incarcerated. Her petition was accompanied by a sup
porting memorandum in which she argues that Governor
Kotek’s revocation of her earlier conditional commutation
violates a variety of state and federal constitutional princi
ples, including that the Governor lacks authority to revoke a
commutation after the expiration of a sentence. In response
to our order requiring the state to show cause why a writ of
habeas corpus should not issue, the state filed memoranda
contending that (1) the Governor had authority to revoke
plaintiff’s commutation after her sentence had expired;
(2) plaintiff, in accepting Governor Brown’s conditional
commutation, had waived her right to seek habeas relief or
otherwise challenge the revocation; and (3) plaintiff’s con
stitutional challenges are meritless. Plaintiff counters that
the purported waiver in the acceptance agreement that she
signed is invalid or otherwise unenforceable.
After considering those filings, the court allowed
plaintiff’s petition and issued a writ of habeas corpus, and
then heard oral argument on May 2. Having now considered
the parties’ filings and their oral arguments, we conclude
that, when the Governor revoked plaintiff’s conditional com
mutation, she lacked the authority to do so under the terms
of the commutation.
ANALYSIS
The Governor has the constitutional authority
to grant clemency, including commutations. Specifically,
Article V, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in
part:
266
Brown v. Kotek
“[The Governor] shall have power to grant reprieves, com
mutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences
[sic] except treason, subject to such regulations as may be
provided by law. Upon conviction for treason [the Governor]
shall have power to suspend the execution of the sentence
until the case shall be reported to the Legislative Assembly,
at its next meeting, when the Legislative Assembly shall
either grant a pardon, commute the sentence, direct the
execution of the sentence, or grant a farther [sic] reprieve.”
The Governor is the “sole repository” of this consti
tutional authority. Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 126,
333 P2d 741 (1958). In exercising her authority, however, “the
Governor is responsible for determining the constitutional
ity of [her] actions in the first instance, and, to the extent
that this court may review those actions, the court does
so with that consideration in mind.” Haugen v. Kitzhaber,
353 Or 715, 720, 306 P3d 592 (2013), cert den, 571 US 1167
(2014) (citing Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or
472, 478-79, 753 P2d 939 (1988)); see Lipscomb, 305 Or at
478-79 (“Governors, legislators, and other public officials are
responsible in the first instance for determining their con
stitutional duties[.]”). However, as we explained in Haugen,
that principle “does not exempt the Governor’s actions from
judicial review.” 353 Or at 720. In so explaining, we relied
on Lipscomb, in which the court had declined to adopt an
argument that the court should defer to a Governor’s under
standing of her constitutional powers if arguably correct. Id.
Thus, although this court does not have a role in reviewing a
governor’s exercise of discretion either to grant or to revoke
a conditional commutation, we can review whether the revo
cation of plaintiff’s commutation exceeded the Governor’s
authority under these circumstances—when plaintiff was
no longer subject to any sentence at all. For reasons that
we will explain, even assuming (without deciding) that the
state and federal constitutions permit a Governor to revoke
a commutation after a commutee’s sentence has expired,
we conclude that the terms of the conditional commutation
in this case—which represents an agreement between the
Governor and plaintiff—preclude that result.
The Governor’s plenary power includes the power
to grant unconditional forms of clemency that require no
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
267
assent by the commutee. Haugen, 353 Or at 739, 743 (con
cluding that an unconditional reprieve was “valid and
effective, regardless of [the recipient’s] acceptance of that
reprieve”). Here, however, Governor Brown exercised her
plenary power through the issuance of a conditional com
mutation order. In exchange for plaintiff having her remain
ing term of incarceration commuted to post-prison supervi
sion, the Governor required plaintiff to agree to be bound
by the acceptance agreement. In other words, the Governor
structured the exercise of her clemency power as something
akin to a contractual arrangement that required plaintiff’s
acceptance.4
As pertinent here, the acceptance agreement
required that plaintiff “abide by the terms and conditions
of any post-prison supervision that is imposed in connection
with the conditional and revocable commutation and her
Judgment of Conviction.” The text of the agreement thus
reflects that the Governor chose to incorporate the statu
tory and regulatory PPS framework. The state acknowl
edges as much in this court, stating that, when plaintiff was
released, “[s]he was placed on community supervision under
the authority of [BOPPS].” See OAR 213-005-0003 (“When
a term of post-prison supervision is imposed as part of a
sentence, the offender shall serve the term of supervision
in the community under the supervision of the Department
of Corrections or a corrections agency designated by the
Department.”). And the record reflects that, when plain
tiff was alleged to have violated the conditions of her PPS
during the term of her supervision, a hearings process was
quickly initiated, plaintiff pleaded no contest and was found
in violation by a hearings officer, and she received a 30-day
jail sanction. See OAR ch 255, div 75 (describing procedures
for addressing alleged violations of PPS).
The acceptance agreement also included a provi
sion, similar to the one in Governor Brown’s conditional
commutation, which provided that the Governor “may”
revoke the commutation if the Governor determined, in her
4 Given the circumstances of this case, where Governor Brown chose to
require plaintiff’s acceptance of the conditions in the commutation, we need
not—and do not—decide whether the Governor’s plenary power includes the
authority to impose conditions without a commutee’s consent.
268
Brown v. Kotek
discretion, that plaintiff had violated one of its conditions,
which would lead to plaintiff being required to “return to
prison to serve out her sentence that was remaining at the
time her commutation was granted according to the terms
of the Judgment of Conviction.” Before this court, the state
takes the broad and categorical position that, even though
plaintiff’s sentence had expired before her commutation was
revoked, the revocation provision allows any Governor—at
any time during plaintiff’s natural life—to revoke the com
mutation and return her to prison upon a determination
that she violated the terms of the commutation while she
had been under supervision. As the state acknowledged at
oral argument, under its interpretation, revocation could
occur 50 years after plaintiff’s sentence had expired, result
ing in her arrest and imprisonment at that time.
However, the state’s argument is inconsistent with
the Governor’s express incorporation of PPS—which is cir
cumscribed by a statutory and regulatory framework—into
the terms of the commutation order and plaintiff’s accep
tance agreement. PPS is a “term of community supervi
sion.” OAR 213-005-0002(1) (emphasis added). That term
is determinate. See ORS 144.103 (providing for duration
of PPS); OAR 213-005-0002(2)(a) (same). Offenders5 are
required to “serve the term of supervision.” OAR 213-005-
0003 (emphasis added). If an offender is alleged to have
violated a condition of PPS, then, during the term of super
vision, the offender may be arrested and a hearing is initi
ated to determine if the offender violated the condition. See
ORS 144.350(1)(a)(A) (providing that a supervisory author
ity “may order the arrest and detention of any person then
under the supervision, custody or control” of the supervisory
authority if there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that
the person has “[v]iolated the conditions of *
*
* post-prison
supervision” (emphasis added)). The initiation of a hear
ing means that a “person under supervision is presented a
Notice of Rights.” OAR 255-075-0001(3) (emphasis added);
see also OAR 255-075-0005(3) (providing that, generally,
5 See OAR 255-005-0005(39) (defining “offender” as “[a]ny person under the
supervision of the Department of Corrections or a local supervisory authority
who is not presently in the custody of a correctional facility, including persons on
*
*
* post-prison supervision”).
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
269
“the Sanction Authority shall impose administrative sanc
tions or shall initiate a hearing within fifteen (15) days of
arrest or detention for the violation of parole or post-prison
supervision conditions”). Once initiated, jurisdiction over
the offender is retained until the proceedings are resolved.
See OAR 255-094-0020(1) (“During the pendency of vio
lation proceedings, *
*
* the Releasing Authority retains
jurisdiction over the offender until the proceedings are
resolved.”). If an offender is found to have violated the con
ditions of PPS after the hearing, or if the offender waives
the right to a hearing, administrative sanctions may be
imposed or PPS may be revoked. See OAR 255-075-0067
(describing authority to impose administrative sanctions or
revoke supervision). Ultimately, a term of PPS ends and the
sentence expires. See OAR 255-094-0020(3) (“After expira
tion of the sentence of an offender on *
*
* post-prison super
vision, the Releasing Authority shall send written notice of
the expiration to the offender and the supervisory author
ity.”); see also ORS 144.085(6) (“The board shall send writ
ten notification to the supervised offender of the expiration
of the sentence.”).
Thus, the PPS framework imposes a temporal limit
on the authority to sanction or revoke an offender’s post-
prison supervision for a violation of a condition: As a general
proposition, violation proceedings must be initiated while
the offender is under supervision (i.e., before the offender’s
sentence has expired) and not after the term of supervi
sion has ended and the offender is no longer subject to any
sentence. See ORS 144.350(1)(a)(A) (providing that, if there
are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the person has
“[v]iolated the conditions of *
*
* post-prison supervision,” a
supervisory authority “may order the arrest and detention
of any person then under the supervision, custody or control”
of the supervisory authority (emphasis added)); OAR 255-
075-0001(3) (providing that a hearing is initiated when a
“person under supervision is presented a Notice of Rights”
(emphasis added)).
By specifying that plaintiff was obligated to serve
PPS, which is governed by a statutory and regulatory scheme,
her conditional commutation—together with the acceptance
270
Brown v. Kotek
agreement to which she was bound—incorporated the gen
eral principle that the authority to sanction an offender for
a PPS violation, or to revoke the offender’s PPS altogether,
is time-limited and must be initiated before the offender’s
PPS term ends and while the offender remains subject to a
sentence. In this case, although the commutation and the
agreement clearly stated that the Governor, in her sole dis
cretion, could revoke the commutation for a violation of its
conditions, there is no indication that the authority to revoke
would survive the expiration of plaintiff’s sentence. Nor is
there any indication that, contrary to the ordinary applica
tion of the statutes and rules governing PPS, plaintiff would
face the prospect of revocation and future imprisonment
for the remainder of her life. Thus, by requiring plaintiff
to serve PPS, and without clearly expressing an intent to
depart from the temporal limitations that otherwise apply
to PPS, the Governor limited her own ability, and the ability
of any future holder of that office, to revoke the commutation
to the period of time before plaintiff’s PPS had ended and
her sentence had expired.
Here, it is undisputed that, in February 2023,
BOPPS issued its certificate stating that plaintiff had “com
pleted the period of post-prison supervision imposed” and
that she was “expired from supervision.” At that point, plain
tiff was no longer subject to any sentence. Accordingly, when
the Governor revoked plaintiff’s commutation in December
2023, she lacked the authority to do so under the terms of
the December 2020 order of conditional commutation.6
We emphasize that the foregoing conclusion is a
function of the way in which we understand Governor Brown
to have structured plaintiff’s conditional commutation. The
parties’ dispute before this court has focused on whether
the state and federal constitutions permit the Governor to
revoke a commutation following the expiration of a sentence.
That is a difficult question of first impression in Oregon,
and one on which other state courts have reached competing
6 Because it is undisputed in this case that plaintiff was not subject to any
sentence when the Governor revoked her conditional commutation, we need not—
and do not—decide the precise point at which the Governor’s authority to revoke
plaintiff’s conditional commutation of sentence ended.
Cite as 372 Or 260 (2024)
271
conclusions.7 But we need not resolve that question today,
because, even assuming that such authority exists, we
conclude that the December 2020 commutation order and
the acceptance agreement are self-limiting. By specifying
that plaintiff was obligated to serve PPS, without expressly
reserving the right of the Governor to revoke the commuta
tion even after plaintiff’s sentence had expired, the commu
tation and acceptance agreement preclude that authority.
That conclusion does not fully resolve this matter.
The state alternatively contends that plaintiff waived her
right to seek habeas relief and to challenge both Governor
Kotek’s revocation and her current imprisonment.
It is true that the acceptance agreement includes a
broadly worded waiver of plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff contests
the validity of that waiver, asserting, among other things,
that the process resulting in her acceptance of the commu
tation was “rushed” and that the implications of the waiver
were never explained to her; thus, she did not knowingly
and voluntarily agree to waive her right to challenge the
Governor’s revocation, or her current imprisonment, or her
right to seek habeas corpus under the circumstances.
In this case, however, we conclude that it is unnec
essary to address those points. That is because, even if we
assume that plaintiff effected a valid waiver of some kind, we
decline to read the text of this waiver as broadly as the state’s
argument requires. The waiver provision can be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the ordinary understanding
of the PPS framework described above—i.e., that plaintiff
was waiving the right to challenge a revocation that was
initiated before the expiration of her sentence. By taking
the position that plaintiff forfeited the ability to challenge a
revocation that was ordered even after the completion of her
sentence, the state would have us conclude that plaintiff, in
7 Compare Rowell v. Dutton, 688 SW2d 474, 477 (Tenn Crim App 1985)
(“Thus we hold that the Governor’s authority to revoke exists only so long as
the commutee’s sentence has not expired. Any other result would mean that the
Governor and his successors in office would retain the power to revoke a commu
tation throughout the balance of a commutee’s life, regardless of the offense, and
could lead to absurd results.”), with Beal v. Mayo, 70 So 2d 367, 368 (Fla 1954)
(“[R]ecommitment for breach of condition is proper notwithstanding the fact
that the period of original sentence has expired when the conditional pardon is
revoked.”).
272
Brown v. Kotek
exchange for being released from prison eight months early,
chose not only to accept the risk of future imprisonment for
a violation of the conditions of the commutation—without
process or the right of judicial review—but to run that risk
for the remainder of her life. Even assuming that a choice of
such gravity by a commutee could be enforceable—a ques
tion we do not decide—we would require it to be expressed
with the utmost clarity. The acceptance agreement in this
case does not meet that standard. See State v. Meyrick, 313
Or 125, 131, 831 P2d 666 (1992) (observing that courts “are
reluctant to find that fundamental constitutional rights
have been waived”).
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case,
we conclude that Governor Kotek lacked authority to revoke
plaintiff’s conditional commutation and that, as a result,
plaintiff’s present imprisonment is unlawful. We order
defendants to discharge plaintiff from custody immediately.
See ORS 34.700(1) (“If it appears that the party detained
is imprisoned or restrained illegally, judgment shall be
given that the party be discharged forthwith[.]”). We further
waive otherwise applicable appellate rules relating to recon
sideration and the issuance of the appellate judgment, and
we direct the State Court Administrator to issue the appel
late judgment immediately. See ORAP 1.20(5) (permitting
the court, for good cause and on its own motion, to waive
any rule of appellate procedure); ORAP 9.25 (providing for
reconsideration); ORAP 14.05(3)(b) (providing for the timing
of the issuance of the appellate judgment).8
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be
discharged from her illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to
ORAP 1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP
14.05(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the
appellate judgment immediately.
8 ORS 34.700(2) provides that a court “shall include in the judgment an order
that the defendant pay the attorney fees incurred by the petition, not to exceed
$100,” if “[t]he court enters a judgment requiring that the plaintiff be discharged”
and “[t]he court finds that the allegations or defenses in the return were frivo
lous.” Under the circumstances, we do not find that the state’s position was frivo
lous. For that reason, plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees under the statute. | 482e1697163d5c07c2594c12aaa8f5bdc0bb5bf0267f739adac8d0dc02de0448 | 2024-05-08T00:00:00Z |
c538e96c-943b-4af3-83e9-4c6ba98c5929 | Sizemore v. Myers | null | S48863 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: NOVEMBER 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
Respondent.
(SC S48863)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record October 10, 2001.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent. With her on the memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11).
In this ballot title review proceeding, petitioner
challenges the "no" vote result statement of the Attorney
General's certified ballot title for a proposed initiative
measure, which the Secretary of State has denominated as
Initiative Petition 95 (2002). We review the Attorney General's
certified ballot title to determine whether it complies
substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (d).
ORS 250.085(5) (setting out standard of review).
We have considered petitioner's argument and conclude
that it is not well taken. Accordingly, we certify to the
Secretary of State the following ballot title for the proposed
measure:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOWS INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM SIGNERS TO PREVENT SALE OF THEIR PETITION SIGNATURES; CREATES IMPLEMENTING, ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS.
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote allows signers to
prevent sale, barter, exchange of their signatures on
initiative, referendum petitions; creates implementing,
enforcement provisions; requires minimum fine for
violation.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects creation of
constitutional right allowing signers to prevent the
sale, barter or exchange of their signatures on
initiative or referendum petitions.
SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Allows signers to
prevent their signatures on initiative, referendum
petitions from being sold, bartered or exchanged for
anything of value. Secretary of State shall not
approve any petition for circulation unless petition
clearly indicates signer's right not to have signature
sold, bartered, exchanged, and gives signers
opportunity to make that choice. If signer refuses
permission, no person or entity may directly or
indirectly pay for obtaining that signature or
transmitting it to Secretary. Requires minimum $250
fine per occurrence; each unlawful sale of signature is
separate occurrence. Does not prohibit payment for
signature gathering by hour or on salary where amount
of payment is not determined directly or indirectly by
number of signers who have chosen not to have
signatures sold, bartered, exchanged.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11). | a629911b66415424b02c41c9c525abd61ee3ae77e8c200aa5749455eaa08ce92 | 2001-11-08T00:00:00Z |
ae42df77-4fc6-4500-b2d7-47d8e8d1cf3f | Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC | null | S070082 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 11
May 2, 2024
225
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM - OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
Thomas BROWN,
Respondent on Review,
and
Maria Del Carmen Espindola GOMEZ,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 15CV23066) (CA A169544) (SC S070082)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 9, 2023.
David
R.
Fine,
K&L
Gates
LLP,
Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, argued the cause and filed the briefs for peti-
tioner on review. Also on the briefs were Elizabeth H. White,
K&L Gates, LLP, Portland, and Robert B. Mitchell, K&L
Gates, LLP, Seattle, Washington.
Travis Eiva, Eiva Law, Eugene, argued the cause and
filed the brief for respondents on review.
Hillary A. Taylor, Keating Jones Hughes, P.C., Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Association of
Hospitals and Health Systems.
Keith J. Bauer, Parks, Bauer, Sime, Winkler & Walker,
LLP, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Salem Health
Hospitals & Clinics. Also on the brief was Michael Walker.
Shayna M. Rogers, Cosgrave Vergeer Kester, LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Oregon Medical
Association and American Medical Association.
______________
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Gregory F. Silver, Judge.
323 Or App 214, 523 P3d 132 (2022).
226
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
David W. Cramer, MB Law Group, LLP, Portland, filed
the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense
Counsel.
Sage R. Vanden Heuvel, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, filed the brief for amici
curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America and The Oregon Liability Reform Coalition.
Kristi Gifford, Callahan Law Office, Milwaukie, filed the
brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Also on the brief was Kirc Emerson, Richardson Wang, LLP,
Portland.
FLYNN, C.J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judg-
ment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
227
FLYNN, C.J.
The Oregon legislature long ago codified a rule of
strict product liability that applies to “[o]ne who sells” an
unreasonably dangerous, defective product, if the seller is
“engaged in the business of selling” such a product. ORS
30.920(1). At issue in this case is whether that statute
applies to a hospital that supplies and administers a drug
that causes harm. The trial court concluded that the stat-
ute was inapplicable under those circumstances and, on
that basis, granted the hospital-defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the
trial court’s construction of the statute and reversed and
remanded. Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 323 Or App
214, 523 P3d 132 (2022). This court allowed review, and we
now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. As we will
explain, we conclude that (1) the legislature did not intend
to exclude hospitals from the scope of ORS 30.920(1); (2) a
hospital that supplies and administers a dangerously defec-
tive drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service
can be a “seller” that is “engaged in the business of sell-
ing” for purposes of liability under ORS 30.920; and, con-
sequently, (3) the trial court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment. Thus, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and
remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
On review of a grant of summary judgment, this
court views “all parts of the record” before the court in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here plain-
tiffs, Brown and Gomez. Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc.,
355 Or 319, 331, 325 P3d 707 (2014); ORCP 47 C. We describe
the pertinent facts consistent with that standard.
Brown and Gomez are the parents of M, who suf-
fered irreparable heart defects as a result of in utero expo-
sure to the drug Zofran, which Providence Health System
- Oregon administered to Gomez. Gomez was seven weeks
pregnant with M when she went to the emergency room of
Providence’s Newberg Medical Center complaining of nau-
sea, vomiting, and other symptoms. A Providence emergency
228
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
department physician evaluated Gomez and prescribed her
four milligrams of injectable Zofran, which a Providence
nurse administered. That prescription was fulfilled by
Providence’s internal pharmacy. Because the parties do not
dispute that the physician, nurse, and pharmacy’s actions
are attributable to Providence, we refer to those individuals
and institutions collectively as Providence.
As part of her emergency department visit, Gomez
signed a “Conditions for Services” form, which stated that
she agreed “to pay for the services or products provided by
Providence.” Providence billed Gomez specifically for the
emergency room visit. Although that bill did not list a spe-
cific charge for Zofran, the parties agree that Gomez was
prescribed and administered Zofran as part of her emer-
gency room visit for which the bill was sent. Gomez later
gave birth to M, who was diagnosed with irreparable heart
defects.
Brown and Gomez brought suit as plaintiffs, on
their own behalf and as guardians ad litem for M, against
Providence, as well as against the manufacturer of Zofran.1
As pertinent to this appeal, plaintiffs asserted a claim for
strict liability under ORS 30.920, alleging that Providence
was a “seller” of Zofran “engaged in the business of selling
Zofran and products of the kind,” that Providence “sold,
distributed, vended, administered and/or supplied Zofran”
to Gomez while she was pregnant with M, that Zofran was
“unreasonably dangerous and defective” in multiple ways,
and that, as a result of the defective condition of Zofran,
M “suffers from permanent and life-threatening congenital
heart defects.”2
Providence moved for summary judgment, con-
tending that, as a matter of law, “[a]s a provider of health
services, [Providence] is neither a seller in the business of
selling Zofran injectable nor is it a distributor of Zofran,”
so it could not be subject to liability under ORS 30.920.
Although Providence did not dispute that it supplied and
1 Plaintiffs’ claims against the manufacturer of Zofran, GlaxoSmithKline,
LLC, are not before this court.
2 Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew an additional claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation that they also had alleged against Providence.
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
229
administered Zofran to Gomez, it emphasized that “[t]he
undisputed evidence in this case establishes plaintiff Gomez
came to [Providence] not to purchase Zofran injectable or
any other medication but for the provision of emergency
medical services.” Providence also emphasized that it sup-
plies drugs like Zofran through its in-house “institutional
drug outlet” (or internal pharmacy), which—unlike a retail
pharmacy—dispenses Zofran and other drugs only for phy-
sicians to administer to a patient in the hospital. Providence
argued that the legislature did not intend ORS 30.920 “to
create a new statutory claim against hospitals for products
used in the course of providing health services to patients.”
The trial court agreed and granted Providence’s motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court concluded
that “one ‘sells’ a product” within the meaning of ORS 30.920
“when one transfers ownership of the product to another in
exchange for valuable consideration; a ‘seller’ is one who car-
ries out such a transfer; and ‘selling’ is the act or process of
such a transfer.” Brown, 323 Or App at 223. That court also
construed “seller engaged in the business of selling” to mean
one who “carries on commercial activity composed in part of
the act of selling the product, viz., transferring ownership
of the product to another in exchange for valuable consid-
eration.” Id. at 223-24. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
concluded that, under the facts alleged, one could determine
that “Providence was a ‘seller *
*
* engaged in the business of
selling’ within the meaning of ORS 30.920” when Providence
provided Zofran to Gomez for valuable consideration, and
when Providence kept a stock of Zofran in its internal phar-
macy for distribution to patients. Id. at 232-33.
Providence then petitioned for review, which we
allowed.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party—
here Providence—is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. ORCP 47. Here, Providence sought summary judgment
on the basis that, as a matter of law, this case fails to sat-
isfy two of the requirements for strict liability under ORS
230
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
30.920. Providence contends that it did not “sell” the Zofran
to Gomez, within the meaning of ORS 30.920, because it did
not transfer “the full panoply of rights attendant to owner-
ship” in the dose of Zofran when it administered the drug to
Gomez. Providence also contends that it is not a “seller *
*
*
engaged in the business of selling” Zofran, either because
the legislature did not intend the statute to apply when the
“essence of the transaction” with a consumer is providing a
service, or because the legislature did not intend the stat-
ute to apply to hospitals. Plaintiffs disagree. They urge this
court to adopt the Court of Appeals’ construction of the stat-
ute and conclude that, under the plain terms of ORS 30.920,
hospitals are sellers of drugs when they dispense drugs
through their internal pharmacy.
The parties’ arguments raise questions of stat-
utory construction that we resolve by employing the ana-
lytical framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in
State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Under that
framework, we examine the text and context of ORS 30.920,
together with legislative history to the extent that it aids
our analysis, all with the “paramount goal” of determining
the legislature’s intent. Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.
As we will explain, our examination of the text, con-
text, and legislative history of ORS 30.920 leads us to the
following conclusions about the legislature’s intent: “Sells”
includes transactions of the type through which Providence
both supplied and administered the Zofran to Gomez, and a
hospital that charges for supplying a dangerously defective
drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service can
be a “seller” that is “engaged in the business of selling” for
purposes of strict liability under ORS 30.920. Accordingly,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred
in granting Providence’s motion for summary judgment.
A. Statutory Construction
1. Text and context
Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim is governed by ORS
30.920. As pertinent, that statute describes the require-
ments for strict products liability in Oregon:
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
231
“(1) One who sells or leases any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to the property of the user or consumer is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm or damage to property caused by
that condition, if:
“(a) The seller or lessor is engaged in the business of
selling or leasing such a product.”
The statute also specifies how questions about those require-
ments should be resolved:
“(3) It is the intent of the Legislative Assembly that the
rule stated in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be
construed in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of
Torts sec. 402A, Comments a to m (1965).”
We turn first to the parties’ dispute over the meaning
of the terms “sells,” and “seller,” neither of which is defined,
before addressing what it means to be “engaged in the busi-
ness of selling.” When determining what the legislature
intended an undefined statutory term to mean, “it is helpful
to understand” how the term was used when the legislature
enacted the statute. Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP, 371 Or 536, 540, 539 P3d 766 (2023). If the term is one
of common usage, we generally presume that the legislature
intended the ordinary meaning of the term, for which we
often consult contemporaneous dictionaries. Id. at 540-41;
see also Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 296, 337
P3d 768 (2014) (observing that “we frequently consult dictio-
nary definitions of the terms, on the assumption that, if the
legislature did not give the term a specialized definition, the
dictionary definition reflects the meaning that the legisla-
ture would naturally have intended”); id. at 296 n 7 (noting
that this court relies on dictionaries “contemporaneous with
the enactment of the statute”).
“But if the context or legislative history of a statute
indicate that the legislature intended a term to have a mean-
ing drawn from a specialized trade or field, so-called terms
of art, we consider the meaning and usage of those terms in
the discipline from which the legislature borrowed them.”
Marshall, 371 Or at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And for terms drawn from the legal field, we often look, “for
starters at least,” to contemporaneous legal dictionaries to
232
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
determine what specialized meaning the legislature may
have intended. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals looked to a dictionary of
common usage to determine the “ordinary meaning” that
the legislature presumably intended for all of the disputed
terms. See 323 Or App at 223 (quoting Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary (unabridged ed 2002)). But, as our discus-
sion in Marshall cautions, some terms of common usage also
are used as terms of art in the context of a specialized field,
such as the legal field. Id. at 542. And when a statute uses
such terms, consulting both ordinary usage and contem-
poraneous legal dictionaries can supply a helpful starting
point to understand how the legislature intended to use the
term. See id. at 542-43 (considering definitions in both ordi-
nary and legal dictionaries to determine the legislature’s
intended meaning for terms “injury” and “property”).
a. “Sells” and “seller”
The term “sell”—the root of both “sells” and
“seller”—is a term of common usage that sometimes is used
as a term of art in the legal field, but both common-usage
dictionaries and legal dictionaries identify a similar range
of meanings, including simply an act of transferring prop-
erty to another for consideration. At the time that the leg-
islature enacted ORS 30.920, common usages of the term
“sell,” included “to give up (property) to another for money or
other valuable consideration,” to “hand over or transfer title
(as goods or real estate) for a price,” “to offer for sale,” and
“to give up in return for something else.” Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary 2061 (unabridged ed 1976);3 Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 786 (7th ed 1970). And as a legal term
of art, “sell” was defined as simply “[t]o dispose of by sale.”
See Black’s Law Dictionary 1220 (5th ed 1979) (defining
“sell”).
3 An advantage in consulting definitions set out in Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary to understand how the legislature would have understood the words
that it uses in statutes—and one reason that this court consults that dictionary
so frequently—is that, unlike other dictionaries, which set out to prescribe the
“
‘correct’ usage” for words, Webster’s “is a dictionary with a ‘descriptive’ focus,
reporting ordinary usage.” Kohring v. Ballard, 355 Or 297, 304 n 2, 325 P3d 717
(2014).
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
233
Definitions of the term “sale,” in turn, referred to
a broad range of transactions. As a term of common usage,
“sale,” referred (somewhat circularly) to “the act of selling”
and also more particularly to “a contract transferring the
absolute or general ownership of property from one person
or corporate body to another for a price.” Webster’s at 2003
(unabridged ed 1976); see also Webster’s Collegiate at 759
(defining “sale” as “the act of selling” and also “the trans-
fer of ownership of and title to property from one person to
another for a price”). The definitions of “sale” as a legal term
of art were extensive, but included both broad references to
the “[t]ransfer of property for consideration either in money
or its equivalent” and “[a]n agreement by which one gives
a thing for a price in current money, and the other gives
the price in order to have the thing itself.” Black’s at 1200.
Those definitions, collectively, suggest that the legislature
enacted ORS 30.920 with the intent that one who “sells” or
is a “seller” of a product could include anyone who transfers
the product to another in exchange for money or other valu-
able consideration.4
Providence, nevertheless, urges this court to pre-
sume that the legislature intended “sell” for purposes of ORS
30.920 to incorporate the legal definition of “ownership”—as
meaning the “[c]ollection of rights to use and enjoy prop-
erty, including the right to transmit it to others,” Black’s
at 997—or the definition of “sale” that appears in Oregon’s
Uniform Commercial Code, which specifies that, “[i]n this
chapter, unless the context otherwise requires *
*
* [a] ‘sale’
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for
a price.” ORS 72.1060(1). From those definitions, Providence
concludes that it did not “sell” the Zofran that it supplied
and administered to Gomez, because a patient in that con-
text does not acquire the right to “use the medication as she
4 Our statement that the term “sells” includes an exchange for valuable con-
sideration accommodates some contextual indications that the legislature may
have intended that liability under ORS 30.920 would not be contingent on a con-
sumer purchasing the product. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment
l (1965) (explaining that, for the rule of strict product liability to apply, “[i]t is not
even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at all”; instead,”[h]
e may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest
at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser”); ORS 30.920(3) (specifying leg-
islative intent that liability under the statute “shall be construed in accordance
with the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A, Comments a to m (1965)”).
234
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
wishes, nor can she transfer it to someone else.” According
to Providence, a “
‘sale’ involves the transfer of title and
ownership in a product, and that means that the transferee
receives the full panoply of rights attendant to ownership.”
But we are not persuaded. Although Providence’s incorpora-
tion of the rights of “ownership” is understandable given the
Court of Appeals’ reliance on “ownership” to define “sell,” see
323 Or App at 223, the reliance is misplaced.
As an initial matter, the words “ownership” or
“title” do not appear in the text of ORS 30.920. The Court
of Appeals included the term “ownership” in its definition of
“sells” through an exercise of linking definitions: Webster’s
defines “sell,” in part, as referring to offering an item “for
sale”; and one of its definitions of “sale” refers to transfer-
ring “ownership of property from one person or corporate
body to another for a price (as a sum of money or any other
consideration)”; therefore “one ‘sells’ a product when one
transfers ownership of the product to another in exchange
for valuable consideration.” 323 Or at 223 (quoting Webster’s
at 2003, 2061-62 (unabridged ed 2002)). And Providence
takes the exercise a step farther by linking to a legal defini-
tion of “ownership” and what it assumes to be a restrictive
concept of “title.”
But the fact that transferring “ownership” or “title”
is included in some definitions of “sale”—which, in turn,
appears in some definitions of “sell”—does not mean that
the legislature intended the term “sells” to convey that strict
liability under ORS 30.920 is limited to transactions in
which a consumer acquires the defective product in a form
that accommodates transfer to a new owner. As a matter
of logic, the fact that a transfer of the “full panoply” of the
rights of ownership is a “sale,” does not mean that every
“sale” transfers what Providence views as the “full panoply”
of the rights of ownership, let alone that “sells” is limited
in that way. And, as a matter of statutory construction,
we reiterate our oft-repeated caution that dictionary defi-
nitions are only a useful starting point for understanding
what the legislature may have intended the terms of a stat-
ute to mean. Marshall, 371 Or at 543. Some of the defini-
tions of “sale” that we quoted above make no reference to
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
235
transferring “title” or ownership rights. But even when dic-
tionary definitions supply clear definitions of the terms used
in a statute, we do not rely “solely on dictionary definitions
to determine the meaning of statutory terms ‘without crit-
ically examining how the definition fits into the context of
the statute itself.’
” Id. (quoting State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela,
358 Or 451, 461, 365 P3d 116 (2015)).
Here, the context of the statute as a whole persuades
us that strict liability for one who “sells” a defective prod-
uct is not limited to those who transfer the “full panoply” of
ownership rights to the product, or “title” to the product in
the formal sense contemplated by Providence. As the text
of ORS 30.920(1) makes clear, the legislature created strict
liability that applies equally to one who “sells or leases” a
defective product if the “seller or lessor is engaged in the
business of selling or leasing such a product.” (Emphasis
added.) The legislature’s decision to create identical liabil-
ity for transactions consisting of a lease, which transfers
fewer than all rights of ownership, suggests that the legisla-
ture was not concerned about limiting liability to those who
transfer all rights of ownership in a product, which makes it
more likely that it did not intend liability for one who “sells”
a defective product to be limited in that way. See, e.g., State
v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340, 351, 537 P3d 503 (2023) (describ-
ing and applying the “oft-invoked principle of statutory con-
struction” under which, “when a word appearing in a list or
grouping is capable of more than one meaning, the meaning
that is more consistent with the other words in the group
may better reflect legislative intent”); Black’s at 800 (defin-
ing “lease” with respect to “tangible personal property” as
meaning “a contract by which one owning such property
grants to another the right to possess, use and enjoy it for
specified period of time”).
Equally significant, ORS 30.920(3) specifies that
the liability provisions of the statute are to “be construed in
accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A,
Comments a to m (1965).” That section of the Restatement
addresses strict products liability, and the comments explain-
ing the scope of that liability are context for what the legis-
lature intended ORS 30.920 to cover. Griffith v. Blatt, 334 Or
236
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
456, 467-68, 51 P3d 1256 (2002). Neither the terms “owner-
ship” or “title,” nor the concept “rights of ownership,” appears
in the comments to section 402A. Moreover, comment l illus-
trates that liability can be based on transactions in which
a product is entirely consumed by being administered to
the consumer. The comment explains that a “customer in
a beauty shop to whose hair a permanent wave solution is
applied by the shop” may recover in strict liability. Id. As with
a drug that is administered intravenously, the application of
a permanent wave solution leaves the consumer no ability to
transfer the solution to anyone else, because the product is
consumed—which is its intended purpose.5 Accordingly, we
are unpersuaded by Providence’s argument that we should
construe ORS 30.920 as if the legislature had intended to
exclude from the meaning of “sells” the transfer of defective
products that the consumer fully consumes.
b. “Engaged in the business of selling”
Next, we consider the parties’ dispute regarding
what the legislature intended by the requirement that strict
liability for a defective product applies to a “seller” that is
“engaged in the business of selling such products.” According
to Providence, the phrase “engaged in the business of sell-
ing” does not include hospitals that supply pharmaceutical
drugs to consumers in conjunction with health care services.
Providence proposes two reasons for that exclusion: First, it
contends that the phrase limits strict liability to businesses
for which the “essence of the transaction” with the public is
selling a product,6 and, second, it contends that the legisla-
5 The concept of transferring the rights of ownership may look different in
the context of a product that is consumed in the process of transfer. For example,
Providence argues that it did not transfer ownership of the Zofran to Gomez, but
it also did not retain ownership of the Zofran, which leaves the question, “Where
did ownership of the Zofran go?” Similarly, the concept of transferring “title” that
is used for Oregon’s Commercial Code is flexible enough to explain what happens
when a cafe serves a glass of wine or plate of scrambled eggs to a customer. See
ORS 72.3140 (under UCC, “sale” includes serving food or drink to be consumed on
the premises); Gardyjan v. Tatone, 270 Or 678, 680, 528 P2d 1332 (1974) (observ-
ing that plaintiff, seeking recovery from restaurant that sold an omelet tainted
with staphylococcal germs, “could have alleged a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability” under the commercial code “or strict liability in tort”).
6 Providence maintains that the “essence” of its transaction with Gomez was
not the “selling” of Zofran. Although the supplying of Zofran to treat Gomez’s nau-
sea arguably was part of the essence of the transaction, we accept Providence’s
characterization for purposes of this opinion.
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
237
ture did not intend strict liability to extend to hospitals that
sell a medication to consumers in the course of providing
medical services.
Neither the common meaning of “engaged in the
business of selling” nor that phrase in the context of the
statute supports Providence’s limiting construction. Looking
first to the contemporaneous meaning of the terms, “seller”
was defined similarly in both ordinary-usage and legal
dictionaries as simply meaning one that “offers for sale,”
Webster’s at 2062 (unabridged ed 1976), or “sells anything,”
Black’s at 1220. Common usages of “engage” were “to begin
and carry on an enterprise, esp[ecially] a business or profes-
sion,” “to employ or involve oneself,” or “to take part : par-
ticipate.” Webster’s at 751 (unabridged ed 1976). “Business,”
as used in this context, commonly means “a usu[ally] com-
mercial or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a
means of livelihood and typically involving some indepen-
dence of judgment and power of decision.” Id. at 302. And
“selling” was used to refer to “the act, process, or art of offer-
ing goods for sale.” Id. at 2062; see Black’s at 1200, 1220
(defining “sell”—the root of “selling”—as “[t]o dispose of by
sale” and the term “sale” as meaning “[t]ransfer of property
for consideration”). Accordingly, we understand the ordi-
nary usage of the phrase “engaged in the business of sell-
ing” products to include those whose business activity reg-
ularly involves transferring products to others in exchange
for consideration.
The context of the statute as a whole further sug-
gests that the legislature intended the phrase “engaged
in the business of selling” to have a meaning consistent
with the ordinary usages of the terms. As described above,
the comments to section 402A of the Restatement provide
important context that informs our understanding of what
the legislature intended by “engaged in the business of sell-
ing.” ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 12:9-11). As we will explain,
those comments point to a construction of “engaged in the
business of selling” that is not compatible with Providence’s
contention that the phrase excludes businesses for which
the “essence of the transaction” between the business and
consumer is providing a service.
238
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
As an initial reference point, the beauty-salon
example in comment l suggests that the legislature did not
intend to limit the scope of strict liability to transactions in
which the “essence of the transaction” with the consumer is
the sale of a product. Although comment l is focused on who
qualifies as a “user or consumer” of a product, it makes clear
that liability can arise even when the only transaction in
which the consumer participates is primarily the purchase
of a service.
The scope of the rule comes through even more
clearly in comment f, which clarifies what engaged in the
“business of selling” a product means:
“It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the
business of selling such products. Thus the rule applies to
the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn
or ice cream, either for consumption on the premises or in
packages to be taken home.”
Restatement § 402A comment f. As that example illustrates,
however, a business can be engaged in the business of sell-
ing a type of product even when selling such products is
ancillary to the service (entertainment) that represents “the
essence” of the business’s interaction with consumers. In
fact, the comment suggests that the primary limitation on
what qualifies as “engaged in the business of selling” is that
it excludes “the ordinary individual who makes the isolated
sale.” Id. As comment f explains:
“The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional
seller of food or other such products who is not engaged
in that activity as a part of his business. Thus it does not
apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her
neighbor a jar of jam or a pound of sugar. Nor does it apply
to the owner of an automobile who, on one occasion, sells it
to his neighbor, or even sells it to a dealer in used cars, and
this even though he is fully aware that the dealer plans to
resell it.”
Id. Relatedly, comment f specifies that, even for merchants
otherwise engaged in the business of selling products, the
rule of liability does not apply to sales made “out of the usual
course of business, such as execution sales, bankruptcy
sales, bulk sales, and the like.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
239
Thus, construing ORS 30.920 in accordance with
the comments to section 402A—as the legislature has
directed—we conclude that the distinction between one who
is “engaged in the business of selling” a product and one who
is not depends on whether the seller sells the product as part
of the usual course of its business, even if selling the prod-
uct is ancillary to providing services to the consumer. That
construction is bolstered by the purpose of imposing strict
liability on one “engaged in the business of selling”:
“The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special
responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one
who enters into the business of supplying human beings
with products which may endanger the safety of their per-
sons and property, and the forced reliance upon that under-
taking on the part of those who purchase such goods.”
Id.
Finally, relevant context for interpreting the text
of ORS 30.920 comes from this court’s prior decisions
addressing strict products liability under the common
law, of which we presume the legislature was aware when
it enacted ORS 39.920. See, e.g., Montara Owners Assn. v.
La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 341, 353 P3d 563
(2015) (“The context for interpreting a statute’s text includes
the preexisting common law, and we presume that the leg-
islature was aware of that existing law.”). Although strict
products liability in Oregon is now governed exclusively by
the statutory framework in ORS 30.920, Griffith, 334 Or at
466, this court had previously adopted and applied section
402A as Oregon’s common-law standard for strict products
liability claims, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or 467, 470,
435 P2d 806 (1967). But concerns that the rules of liability
might continue to evolve if left entirely to the courts, at least
in part, motivated the legislature to “stabilize the rules of
[product] liability” by codifying section 402A, albeit with a
few modifications that expanded liability beyond what 402A
described. Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 28,
706 P2d 929 (1985); see also Allen v. The Heil Company, 285
Or 109, 119 n 5, 589 P2d 1120 (1979) (“It should be remem-
bered that [section] 402A is not a statute and that as an
attempted restatement of common law it is binding upon
240
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
this court only so long and in such particulars as we may
find appropriate.”).
One of the decisions of which the 1979 legisla-
ture presumably was aware when codifying the strict lia-
bility described in section 402A is Hoover v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 270 Or 498, 528 P2d 76 (1974). Significantly,
in the course of examining whether the defendant could be
strictly liable under section 402A for negligently installing
a tire that was not defective, this court in Hoover described
a “series” of “sale-service hybrid” cases from other juris-
dictions, which held that a party that provides a danger-
ously defective product in the course of providing a service
may be subject to strict liability—when it was “clear that
the product, as opposed to the service, was defective.” Id. at
501-02 (citing Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass.
65, 120 NE 407 (1918) (restaurant could be liable for sup-
plying tainted food); State Stove Manufacturing Company v.
Hodges, 189 So 2d 113 (Miss 1966), cert den, 386 US 912
(1967) (contractor could be liable for supplying defective hot
water heater); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev 204, 484 P2d 573
(1971) (carpenter could be liable for supplying defective gas
pipe fittings); and Carpenter v. Best’s Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash
App 439, 481 P2d 924 (1971) (beauty shop could be liable for
supplying defective permanent wave solution)).
Although Hoover ultimately rejected that approach
as “inapposite to the case at hand,” because the plaintiff
alleged only that the service was defective, id., at 501-2, we
presume that the legislature was aware of our discussion of
the cases imposing strict liability on those who sell defective
products as part of “sales-service hybrid” transactions. That
context suggests that, if the legislature had intended to pre-
clude liability for businesses engaged in selling products in
conjunction with providing a service, it would have under-
stood the need to make that limitation explicit. For all of
the reasons described above, we are persuaded that the text
and context of ORS 30.920 point to a legislative intent that
strict liability for those “engaged in the business of selling”
a product reaches those who supply the product in conjunc-
tion with providing a service, regardless of the “essence of
the transaction.”
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
241
Providence nevertheless argues that the legislature
did not intend that a hospital would be considered a seller
“engaged in the business of selling” for purposes of ORS
30.920. Although nothing in the text of the statute suggests
an intent to exclude hospitals from the scope of liability
under ORS 30.920, Providence points to what it contends
are other contextual indications to support that legislative
intent.
First, Providence contends that applying ORS
30.920 to a hospital that supplies a drug in the course of
providing healthcare services would not fit the justification
for strict liability that is described in comment c. The com-
ment explains, in part, that
“the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and con-
sumption, has undertaken and assumed a special respon-
sibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it[.]”
According to Providence, “marketing” a product involves
making “goods available to buyers in a planned way that
encourages people to buy more of them,” and it did noth-
ing to encourage patients to seek Zofran. And Providence
faults the Court of Appeals for describing “market” as sim-
ply a synonym for “sell.” See Brown, 323 Or App at 226. Even
accepting Providence’s premise that “market” in comment
c has a meaning distinct from “sell,” however, Providence’s
reliance on comment c is misplaced. In our view, the por-
tion of comment c that Providence emphasizes simply illus-
trates that a business that markets its products should
be held strictly liable—not that proof of marketing should
be required for liability. In fact, the rest of the comment
explains another justification for strict liability that is fully
applicable to a hospital in Providence’s circumstances: “[T]
he public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely
upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind
their goods.” Restatement § 402A comment c. Pursuant to
ORS 30.920(3), we are directed to construe the liability pro-
visions of ORS 30.920 consistently with all the comments
from a to m, and—as explained above—the comments as a
242
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
whole persuade us that a hospital supplying drugs that it
also administers can be subject to strict liability.
Second, Providence insists that relevant context
can be found in the definitions of “hospital” that are set out
in a different, current statute and in a 1979 administrative
rule, both of which treat a hospital as a service provider, and
not a seller of products. See ORS 442.015(15); OAR 333-23-
114(a) (1979). We are not persuaded.
ORS 442.015(15) defines a “hospital,” for purposes
of chapters governing Public Health and Safety, as:
“(a) A facility with an organized medical staff and a per-
manent building that is capable of providing 24-hour inpa-
tient care to two or more individuals who have an illness
or injury and that provides at least the following health
services:
“(A) Medical;
“(B) Nursing;
“(C) Laboratory;
“(D) Pharmacy; and
“(E) Dietary; or
“(b) A special inpatient care facility *
*
*.”
But ORS 442.015(15) provides no relevant context for
whether the 1979 legislature intended to exempt hospitals
from strict product liability. Beyond the fact the statute does
not purport to prohibit hospitals from selling products, the
definition of “hospital” was not adopted until 2001, and the
statute defines terms for an area of law that is unrelated to
tort liability for a defective product. Or Laws 2001, ch 104,
§ 181; see Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570, 585, 330 P3d 572 (2014)
(explaining that “[a] statute’s context includes other provi-
sions of the same or related statutes”).
Although
the
administrative
rule
to
which
Providence cites may have been in effect when the legisla-
ture enacted ORS 30.920, it also supplies no relevant con-
text for the scope of the statute. OAR 333-23-114(a) (1979)
was a rule promulgated by the Health Division of the for-
mer Oregon Department of Human Resources. Providence
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
243
argues that the rule defined a “hospital”—for purposes of
the Health Division’s regulatory framework—”entirely with
regard to the professionals who work there and the variety
of healthcare services they provide,” with no hint that the
department “regarded them as sellers of anything.”7 Even
accepting that characterization, however, the existence of
an administrative rule from that distinct regulatory context
provides no reason to conclude that the legislature intended
to exclude hospitals from the liability established by ORS
30.920. Nothing in the rule suggested that hospitals were
precluded from selling medical products to their patients.
Moreover, Providence offers no reason that an administra-
tive rule identifying the entities that were regulated by the
health authority in 1979 would supply relevant context for
what the legislature intended when it enacted a statute
addressing tort liability for the seller of a defective product.
Third, Providence cites decisions from courts in
other states that have applied some variation on Providence’s
“essence of the transaction” rule to conclude that hospitals
are not strictly liable for harm caused by the defective prod-
ucts that they supply. For the most part, those cases were
decided after the enactment of ORS 30.920 and, therefore,
cannot inform our understanding of what the legislature
intended. Moreover, they rely on common-law principles
from other states and policy considerations that are not part
of this court’s framework for construing an Oregon statute.
See, e.g., Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal
App 3d 493, 502, 508, 225 Cal Rptr 595, 598, 602 (1986)
(deciding case based on California common law and policy
considerations); Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc., 772 SW 2d
211, 213 (Tex Civ App 1989) (deciding case based on Texas
common law); Cafazzo v. Cent. Medical Health Services, 542
Pa 526, 532, 534-36, 668 A2d 521, 525-26 (1995) (deciding
case based on other jurisdictions’ cases and policy consider-
ations); Royer v. Catholic Medical Center, 144 NH 330, 332-
35, 741 A2d 74, 76-78 (1999) (deciding case based on New
7 OAR 333-23-114(a) (1979) defined a hospital, in relevant part, as “an estab-
lishment with an organized medical staff, with permanent facilities that include
inpatient beds, and with medical services, including physician services and con-
tinuous nursing services under the supervision of registered nurses, to provide
diagnosis with medical or surgical treatment.”
244
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
Hampshire common law and policy considerations). As we
have explained, “this court’s consideration” of limitations
to the liability created under ORS 30.920 “begins and ends
with our construction of the pertinent product liability stat-
utes.” Griffith, 334 Or at 466.
Because two cases were decided before 1979, they
could be relevant to what the 1979 legislature intended. As
we will explain, however, the bare existence of those cases
does not persuade us that the legislature intended to include
a similar limitation on liability for hospitals in Oregon. The
first case is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 NY 100,
107, 123 NE 2d 792, 796 (1954), in which the New York court
decided that a hospital was not liable under the state’s Sales
Act for breaching implied warranties when it transfused
“bad blood” into a patient. The court explained that the
Sales Act, New York’s precursor to the Uniform Commercial
Code, had long been recognized as excluding transactions in
which the transfer of personal property was “an incidental
feature of the transaction,” id. at 104, and the court high-
lighted policy concerns about imposing liability under the
Act “upon the institution or agency actually seeking to save
or otherwise assist the patient.” Id. at 107.
Providence offers no reason to conclude that the
1979 legislature was aware of Perlmutter. Nor is there any
reason to presume that the legislature would have been
influenced by a decision involving principles of New York
sales law when codifying a strict product liability rule that
is based on principles of tort law. See Heaton, 248 Or at
470 (explaining that the liability that the court had recog-
nized for dangerously defective products “was specifically
rationalized as strict liability in tort”); see also Restatement
§ 402A comment l (“The liability stated is one in tort, and
does not require any contractual relation, or privity of con-
tract, between the plaintiff and the defendant.”).
The other case decided prior to 1979 is a decision
by the California Court of Appeal. In that case, the court
declined to extend the state’s common-law doctrine of strict
products liability to a hospital for harm that a patient suf-
fered when a defective surgical needle broke and became
embedded in the patient while the surgeon was suturing a
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
245
wound. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal App 3d
1022, 1025, 1027, 98 Cal Rptr 187, 189, 190-91 (1971). The
court reasoned, in substantial part, that the hospital could
not be a “seller,” because “the hospital itself was a user of the
needle since such needle was supplied to the hospital for its
use in performing medical services incident to the normal
and ordinary business of the hospital.” Id. at 1028 (empha-
sis added). In other words, the California scenario did not
involve a hospital engaging in a transaction that involved
supplying a product to a patient. Thus, even assuming that
the Oregon legislature was aware of decisions from the
California Court of Appeal, we are not persuaded that the
Silverhart opinion would have influenced the legislature to
exclude hospitals from the reach of ORS 30.920 when they
engage in commercial transactions involving a sales-ser-
vice hybrid. In short, the text and relevant context of ORS
30.920 indicate that the legislature intended the liability for
one “engaged in the business of selling” a product to include
those who supply products to their customers in conjunction
with providing a service, and without any exception for a
hospital that engages in such hybrid transactions.
2. Legislative history
The parties have not offered any useful legislative
history to assist in our construction of ORS 30.920, and, as
we will describe, we have found none. The liability provisions
set out at ORS 30.920 have remained essentially unchanged
since their adoption in 1979.8 Or Laws 1979, ch 866, § 2.
The 1979 legislation added the strict liability provisions
now set out at ORS 30.920 as well as a provision governing
the recovery of punitive damages in a product liability civil
action and provisions governing insurers providing “product
liability insurance.” Or Laws 1979, ch 866, § 2. As explained
above, the 1979 legislature was motivated, at least in part,
to “
‘stabilize the rules of [product] liability,’
” which until
then was developing in Oregon entirely through court deci-
sions. ___ Or at ___ (quoting Ewen, 300 Or at 28) (slip op at
17:7-8). In developing the new statute, the legislature heard
8 Oregon Laws 1979 chapter 866, section 2 originally used the phrase “to his
property” instead of “to the property of the user.” Compare Or Laws 1979, ch 866,
§ 2 with ORS 30.920(1).
246
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
from business groups concerned about rising costs for liabil-
ity insurance that “they attributed to the unpredictability
of potential exposure in what was then a rapidly evolving
branch of the law.” Ewen, 300 Or at 28. They also heard com-
peting concerns from other witnesses and legislators “that
legislation not reduce the financial protection under exist-
ing Oregon law for persons injured by dangerous products.”
Id. But we have found no record indicating that the 1979
legislature heard concerns about applying strict liability to
hospitals or other service providers whose transactions with
consumers involve supplying products in conjunction with
providing a service.
Plaintiffs contend that some indication of legisla-
tive intent can be found in later-enacted statutes, which
create exceptions to the strict liability set out in ORS 30.920
for limited circumstances in which a product is supplied in
the context of medical services, echoing reasoning of the
Court of Appeals. 323 Or App at 228-30 (describing ORS
30.902, 30.908(5), and former 97.300 (1991), renumbered as
ORS 97.968 (1995) and renumbered as ORS 97.985 (2007)).
Although recognizing that the later-enacted statutes were
“not indicative of the legislature’s intent” when it enacted
ORS 30.920, the Court of Appeals nevertheless reasoned
that the exceptions—none of which exempt a hospital sup-
plying a drug in conjunction with medical services—would
have been unnecessary if ORS 30.920 already “exclude[d]
those who sell products in the provision of services.” Id. at
228. We acknowledge that this court has occasionally con-
sulted later legislative history in determining the meaning
of a statute. State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 103-04, 261 P3d
1234 (2011). But, as we ultimately reasoned in Cloutier, the
subsequent “legislative history, at best, arguably confirms
what we have determined to be the intended meaning” of
ORS 30.920, so “we need not address the weight, if any, to
which the [later] legislative history is entitled in this case.”
Id. at 104.
In short, the legislative history adds nothing to the
conclusions that we reached, based on our analysis of text
and context, about the intended scope of strict liability under
ORS 30.920. First, the legislature intended that liability
Cite as 372 Or 225 (2024)
247
for one who “sells” a dangerously defective product would
include transactions in which the product is transferred for
consideration even if the product is fully consumed as part
of the transaction. Second, the legislature intended that a
“seller” includes one who engages in such a transaction and
that a “seller” could be “engaged in the business of selling” a
product when the transfer of such products for consideration
is part of the seller’s usual course of business, regardless of
whether the seller transfers such products only in conjunc-
tion with providing a commercial service. And third, the
legislature did not intend to exempt hospitals that other-
wise meet the definition of a “seller or lessor engaged in the
business of selling or leasing such a product.”
B. Application to this Case
As described at the outset, this case reaches us
from a grant of summary judgment to Providence. A party
is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, affidavits, declarations, and admissions on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter
of law.” ORCP 47 C. We explained above that Providence
moved for summary judgment on the basis of its legal argu-
ment that, “[a]s a provider of health services, [Providence]
is neither a seller in the business of selling Zofran inject-
able nor is it a distributor of Zofran,” for purposes of liability
under ORS 30.920, and only supplies drugs to be admin-
istered to patients in the hospital. Our conclusion that the
legislature did not intend ORS 30.920 to be construed in the
limited manner that Providence proposes demonstrates why
the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment.
But Providence’s arguments on appeal add a new
challenge to the premise underlying plaintiffs’ allegation
that Providence “sold” the Zofran that Gomez received at the
emergency room. It notes that although the Court of Appeals
asserted that Providence had specifically charged Gomez for
Zofran, 323 Or App at 232, the record does not support that
assertion. However, to the extent that Providence asserts
that the record does not demonstrate that it sold Zofran
to Gomez—because Gomez’s hospital bill did not include a
248
Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC
specific charge for that drug—we do not reach that argu-
ment because Providence failed to raise that issue in its
motion for summary judgment.
As we emphasized in Two Two, “[p]arties seeking
summary judgment must raise by motion the issues on
which they contend they are entitled to prevail as a mat-
ter of law,” and a party opposing summary judgment has
no burden to produce evidence on an issue that the moving
party has not raised. 355 Or at 326. In other words, had
Providence raised in its motion for summary judgment the
factual issue whether it had charged Gomez for Zofran,
plaintiffs—who bear the burden of persuasion on that issue
at trial—would have been required under ORCP 47 C to pro-
duce evidence on the issue to defeat summary judgment. See
id. at 325 (explaining significance of a defendant raising an
issue in its motion for summary judgment). But Providence’s
failure to raise that factual issue means that plaintiffs had
no burden to produce evidence regarding their allegation
that Providence “sold” the Zofran that it supplied to Gomez,
and it means that “we accept as true” the uncontested alle-
gations in the complaint for purposes of the summary judg-
ment motion. See Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 356 Or 543,
545-46, 340 P3d 27 (2014) (so holding with respect to issues
of negligence, causation, and damages that the defendant
did not raise in its motion for summary judgment).
Providence sought summary judgment on the basis
that, as a matter of statutory construction, a hospital that
supplies and administers a drug to a patient is not a “seller”
of the drug or “engaged in the business of selling” such drug,
as required for liability under ORS 30.920. And we have
explained why we disagree with Providence’s construction
of the statute. Thus, Providence has not established that it
was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ claim
under ORS 30.920.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. | 22f516f6b66fda5954f588ae8f920294a84c17fdd1e3c0942aa8efc98ad234b5 | 2024-05-02T00:00:00Z |
aeee73db-8ea2-4d1c-a090-91283e430c0b | Thompson v. Fhuere | null | S070162 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 5
March 14, 2024
81
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
MATTHEW DWIGHT THOMPSON,
Appellant,
v.
Corey FHUERE,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Respondent.
(CC 20CV29516) (CA A179314) (SC S070162)
En Banc
On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS
19.405.*
Argued and submitted September 19, 2023.
Jeffrey E. Ellis, Law of Office of Alsept & Ellis, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent. Also on
the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
GARRETT, J.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
______________
* Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
82
Thompson v. Fhuere
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
83
GARRETT, J.
Petitioner committed capital crimes in 1994 and
was sentenced to death. Decades later, petitioner filed a
successive petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that
his death sentence and two of the penalty-phase ques
tions that had been posed to the jury at sentencing were
unconstitutional. Because of then-recent changes in the
law, the parties agreed that petitioner’s death sentence
had to be vacated. However, the parties disagreed about
the proper remedy. The superintendent requested that the
post-conviction court modify petitioner’s sentence to life
without the possibility of parole, while petitioner sought to
remand the case for resentencing. The post-conviction court
vacated petitioner’s death sentence, modified his sentence
to life without the possibility of parole, and ruled that his
remaining claims concerning the penalty-phase questions
were procedurally barred.
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court
of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the post-
conviction court had erred by failing to remand the case
for resentencing. While petitioner’s appeal was pending,
then-Governor Kate Brown commuted the death sentences
of 17 individuals—including petitioner—to sentences of life
without the possibility of parole. We accepted certification
from the Court of Appeals to consider, among other issues,
the effect of the Governor’s commutation on this case. See
ORS 19.405 (describing procedures for certification of an
appeal). For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that
petitioner has presented no basis for reversing the post-
conviction court’s judgment. Petitioner’s argument that he
is entitled to a remand for resentencing because the death
sentence that he originally received was unconstitutional
fails because, as a result of the Governor’s commutation,
petitioner is not serving a death sentence. Further, peti
tioner failed to preserve his challenge to the post-conviction
court’s ruling that his constitutional challenges to the two
penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred, and, for
that reason, we do not reach the merits of petitioner’s con
stitutional challenges to those questions. Accordingly, we
affirm.
84
Thompson v. Fhuere
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. History of the Case
The basic procedural facts are undisputed. Petitioner
was convicted of four counts of aggravated murder involving
the murder of two victims in 1994. Two counts were based
on the aggravating circumstance that petitioner had com
mitted multiple murders as part of the same criminal epi
sode. ORS 163.095(1)(d) (1993). The other two counts were
based on the aggravating circumstance that he had “person
ally and intentionally committed” murder in the course of
and in furtherance of committing or attempting to commit
a statutorily enumerated felony (i.e., first-degree burglary in
one count and first-degree robbery in the second count). ORS
163.095(2)(d) (1993); ORS 163.115(1)(b)(C), (G) (1993).
During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed
that there were three possible penalties: death, life impris
onment without the possibility of parole, and life imprison
ment with the possibility of parole. As described in more
detail below, 372 Or at 85-86, 85 n 3, the jury answered cer
tain questions that were legally required at that time for the
imposition of a death sentence, including two pertaining to
whether petitioner posed a “continuing threat” and whether
he “deserved death.” Petitioner was sentenced to death.1
On automatic and direct review, this court affirmed
the judgment of conviction and sentence of death. State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, chal
lenging his convictions and sentence on numerous grounds.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s
judgment denying petitioner relief, and this court denied
review.2 Thompson v. Belleque, 268 Or App 1, 341 P3d 911
(2014), rev den, 357 Or 300 (2015).
1 Petitioner was sentenced to death on each of the four counts of aggravated
murder. State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 253 n 2, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US
1042 (1999). For convenience, however, we refer to those sentences collectively as
either petitioner’s “sentence” or “death sentence.”
2 Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. Thompson v. Premo, No 6:15-cv-01313-SI (D Or 2015). That case is cur
rently stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
85
B. Senate Bill 1013
Several years later, in 2019, the legislature passed
Senate Bill (SB) 1013, which significantly changed Oregon’s
death penalty statutes. Or Laws 2019, ch 635; see State v.
Bartol, 368 Or 598, 496 P3d 1013 (2021) (describing SB 1013,
its legislative history, and its effects). As pertinent here,
SB 1013 “created a new category of murder, ‘murder in the
first degree’; reclassified all the forms of murder that previ
ously had been ‘aggravated murder’ as ‘murder in the first
degree’; and provided a maximum sentence of life impris
onment without the possibility of parole for ‘murder in the
first degree.’
” Bartol, 368 Or at 601 (citing Or Laws 2019,
ch 635, §§ 1, 3(1), (2)). Thus, SB 1013 eliminated the death
penalty for all the forms of murder that previously had been
eligible for it, which included the forms that petitioner had
committed.
“SB 1013 did not eliminate the death penalty
entirely[,]” however. Id. at 601. Instead, SB 1013 “redefined
‘aggravated murder’ to include different forms of murder,
most of which are more serious forms of murder than those
*
*
* previously *
*
* classified as ‘aggravated murder[,]’
” and
provided that those forms of aggravated murder can be pun
ished by death. Id. 601-02; see id. at 602 n 2 (describing con
duct constituting aggravated murder under SB 1013).
In addition, SB 1013 changed the requirements for
imposing a death sentence. “Prior to SB 1013, the jury had to
answer four questions in the affirmative in order for a defen
dant to be sentenced to death.” Bartol, 368 Or at 602 n 3
(citing ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013), amended by Or Laws 2019,
ch 635, § 5).3 Specifically, ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013) provided:
“Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence,
the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
“(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased
or another would result;
3 The penalty-phase questions in ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013) that we discussed
in Bartol were same questions that had applied when petitioner was sentenced
to death.
86
Thompson v. Fhuere
“(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti
tute a continuing threat to society;
“(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and
“(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence.”
Under that statute, if the jury answered any of those four
questions in the negative, a death sentence could not be
imposed. Instead, the trial court was required to sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibil
ity of parole, unless “10 or more members of the jury fur
ther [found] that there [were] sufficient mitigating circum
stances” to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole, in which case the trial court was required to impose
that lesser sentence. ORS 163.150(2)(a) (2013).
SB 1013 eliminated the second of the four questions,
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2013), relating to whether a defendant
constitutes a “continuing threat.” Bartol, 368 Or at 602 n 3.
The bill also added a “
‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’
”
standard to the question of whether a defendant “should
receive a death sentence.” Id.
Significantly, the legislature did not make SB 1013
retroactive as to sentences imposed before the effective date
of the bill. Instead, SB 1013 applied “only to sentencings
that occur after its effective date, regardless of when the
crime was committed.” State v. Rogers, 368 Or 695, 700, 499
P3d 45 (2021) (citing Or Laws 2019, ch 635, § 30). This court
construed that applicability provision in Bartol to demon
strate that “the legislature did not regard conduct commit
ted before the effective date as more culpable than conduct
committed after it.” Bartol, 368 Or at 624. Thus,
“[a]lthough the legislature did not make SB 1013 retroac
tive as to sentences imposed before its effective date, the
enactment of the bill itself reflect[ed] a judgment that con
duct that [had been] previously classified as ‘aggravated
murder’ [did] not fall within the narrow category of conduct
that [could] be punished by death, as opposed to lesser sen
tences, including life imprisonment.”
368 Or at 625.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
87
Bartol held that, so understood, SB 1013 created a
proportionality problem under Article I, section 16, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part, that “all pen
alties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Id.
at 624. That was so, because SB 1013 allowed “the execution
of persons whose conduct the legislature has determined is
not the worst of the worst and whose culpability is no dif
ferent from those who cannot be executed.” Id. (emphases in
original). Put simply, “whether a person who committed con
duct that was previously classified as ‘aggravated murder’
but is now classified as ‘murder in the first degree’ can be
sentenced to death depends on the person’s sentencing date,
not on the relative gravity of the conduct.” Id.
Accordingly, in Bartol—a death penalty case on
automatic and direct review—we explained that carrying
out that defendant’s death sentence
“would allow the execution of a person for conduct that the
legislature has determined no longer justifies that unique
and ultimate punishment, and it would allow the execution
of a person for conduct that the legislature has determined
is no more culpable than conduct that should not result in
death.”
Id. at 625. Having concluded that the defendant’s death
sentence violated Article I, section 16, we vacated the sen
tence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 626; see
Rogers, 368 Or at 701 (same).
C. Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Proceeding
Following the enactment of SB 1013 and the issu
ance of our decisions in Bartol and Rogers, petitioner filed
the successive post-conviction petition that is the subject of
this appeal. He raised the following three claims for relief.4
In his first claim, petitioner asserted that his death
sentence was unconstitutional. He explained that, pursu
ant to SB 1013, the conduct that he had been found guilty
of committing was no longer classified as aggravated mur
der and was no longer punishable by death; thus, under
the holdings in Bartol and Rogers, his death sentence was
unconstitutional.
4 Petitioner alleged two additional claims that were voluntarily dismissed.
88
Thompson v. Fhuere
In his second claim, petitioner contended that the
“continuing threat” question that had been posed to the jury
in his case was unconstitutional (i.e., the second penalty-
phase question, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2013) (“[w]hether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society”)). According to petitioner, that question failed
to serve its constitutionally required function to rationally
“narrow the class of death-eligible criminal defendants.” In
support of that proposition, petitioner referred to empirical
evidence, including research pertaining to jurors’ ability to
predict future dangerousness. He further asserted that the
elimination by SB 1013 of the “continuing threat” question
was an acknowledgment that the question “did not comport
with the current understanding of modern circumstances
and contemporary standards of decency.”
In his third claim, petitioner challenged the consti
tutionality of the version of the “deserves death” question
that was posed to his jury (i.e., the fourth penalty-phase
question, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (2013) (“[w]hether the defen
dant should receive a death sentence”)). As noted above, that
version of the question did not require proof beyond a rea
sonable doubt, which, according to petitioner, made the ques
tion inconsistent both with “[m]odern circumstances and
contemporary standards of decency,” and with the intent of
the voters when they reinstated the death penalty in 1984.
Again, petitioner cited SB 1013 in support of that claim.
As a remedy for each of those three claims, peti
tioner asked the post-conviction court to vacate his death
sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resen
tencing under the provisions of SB 1013.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg
ment. See ORCP 47 C (providing that summary judgment
shall be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any mate
rial fact and *
*
* the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law”). With regard to petitioner’s first claim, they
agreed that petitioner’s death sentence had to be vacated, but
disagreed as to the remedy. Petitioner argued that a remand
for resentencing under the provisions of SB 1013 was required;
the superintendent countered that the post-conviction court
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
89
could modify petitioner’s sentence to life without the possi
bility of parole because that was the only legally permissible
sentence—that is, it was “the next lower sentence that [was]
both statutorily authorized and constitutionally permissible”
based on the jury’s findings. The parties also had differing
views about petitioner’s remaining two claims concerning the
“continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions, which the
post-conviction court would need to address if it declined to
remand for resentencing on petitioner’s first claim. Petitioner
contended that, if the post-conviction court concluded that
either question was unconstitutional, a remand for resentenc
ing was required; the superintendent argued that the claims
were procedurally barred, were moot in light of the parties’
agreement that the death sentence had to be vacated, and, in
all events, lacked merit.
Following a hearing, the post-conviction court granted
petitioner summary judgment, in part, on his first claim
(i.e., the court vacated petitioner’s death sentence). But, as
the superintendent had requested, instead of remanding, the
court modified the judgment of conviction pursuant to ORS
138.520 to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole on each of petitioner’s four aggravated murder convic
tions. See ORS 138.520 (providing that the relief that a post-
conviction court may order “shall include *
*
* modification of
sentence”). As to petitioner’s remaining two claims concern
ing the penalty-phase questions, the post-conviction court
granted summary judgment to the superintendent, conclud
ing that petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred under
ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3). See ORS 138.510(3)
(providing, as pertinent here, that “[a] petition *
*
* must
be filed within two years” of the date of the denial of cer
tiorari “unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition
finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably
have been raised in the original or amended petition”); ORS
138.550(3) (providing, in part, that “[a]ll grounds for relief
*
*
* must be asserted in the original or amended petition,
and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless
the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for
relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been
raised in the original or amended petition”). Specifically,
the court ruled that the constitutionality of those questions
90
Thompson v. Fhuere
previously had been challenged in this court and upheld, and
that petitioner had “had direct appeal, post-conviction *
*
*,
and other options” to challenge them.
D. The Governor’s Commutation
While petitioner’s appeal of the post-conviction
court’s judgment was pending in the Court of Appeals,
then-Governor Brown commuted petitioner’s death sen
tence to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The
Governor’s order stated that it was “limited to reducing
[petitioner’s] death sentence to life in prison without the pos
sibility of parole” and did “not in any way affect the under
lying criminal conviction.” According to the Governor, her
action “remove[d] the possibility” that petitioner would be
“put to death” and brought “all of us a significant step closer
to finality.” However, the order explicitly stated that “[n]oth
ing in [the] Commutation Order [was] intended to preclude
[petitioner] from seeking other or further relief from the
courts that [he] may be entitled to.”5
E. The Parties’ Appellate Contentions
Despite the fact that the Governor had issued her
commutation around the time that the parties were fil
ing their briefs in the Court of Appeals, that briefing paid
relatively little, if any, attention to the legal effect of the
commutation on this case. Petitioner’s briefing focused on
5 In the same commutation order, Governor Brown also commuted the death
sentences of 16 other people. The order provided, in pertinent part:
“[B]y virtue of the authority vested in me under Article V, Section 14, of the
Oregon Constitution, I, Kate Brown, Governor of the State of Oregon, hereby
commute the death sentence of each Commutee, in the respective case refer
enced in Exhibit A, to life in prison without the possibility of parole, effective
as of the 14th day of December, 2022. This Commutation Order is limited
to reducing each Commutee’s death sentence to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, and shall not in any way affect the underlying crimi
nal conviction. Nothing in this Commutation Order is intended to preclude
a Commutee from seeking other or further relief from the courts that they
may be entitled to. Although in many cases commutations are granted in
recognition of extraordinary reform on the part of the individual, that is not
the basis for my actions here. Instead, the sole basis for commuting the death
sentences of each Commutee to life in prison without the possibility of parole
is that the death penalty is dysfunctional and immoral, in all circumstances.
My action today removes the possibility that any of these Commutees will
be put to death by the State and brings all of us a significant step closer to
finality in each of these cases.”
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
91
the post-conviction court’s rulings and raised four assign
ments of error, contending that the post-conviction court
had erred in (1) summarily modifying petitioner’s sentence
to life without parole instead of remanding for resentencing
after it vacated his unconstitutional death sentence; (2) con-
cluding that his claims concerning the penalty-phase ques
tions were “untimely” when the state had “conceded other
wise”; (3) failing to remand for resentencing because the
“continuing threat” question was unconstitutional as mea
sured by evolving standards of decency and events that had
occurred after petitioner’s trial, direct appeal, and prior
post-conviction proceeding; and (4) failing to remand for
resentencing because the “deserves death” question was
unconstitutional for similar reasons. Petitioner’s briefing
did not mention the Governor’s commutation.
The superintendent called the court’s attention to
the commutation in his answering brief, noting that the
Governor’s order made it “unnecessary to address the effect
of the Bartol decision on the validity of the death sentence
imposed in petitioner’s case.” The superintendent also con
tended that the commutation order “effectively moot[ed]”
petitioner’s claims concerning the penalty-phase questions
and that the court should not consider them. In support of
that contention, the superintendent reiterated his argu
ment that the jury’s answers to the penalty-phase questions
necessarily established that life without the possibility of
parole is the proper sentence now that the death sentence
cannot be carried out. The Court of Appeals then certified
the appeal to this court, and we accepted the certification
and received supplemental briefing.
Again, however, the parties’ briefing did not devote
much attention to the legal effect of the Governor’s commuta
tion. Petitioner explained that, although this court’s rulings
in Bartol and Rogers “likely made all then-existing death sen
tences unconstitutional,” the commutation had “ended any
uncertainty when [the Governor] commuted those sentences”
and expressly “preserve[d] all existing rights for every com
mutee.” In other words, petitioner acknowledged that, as a
result of the commutation, he is serving the commuted sen
tence of life without parole, but, nonetheless, contended that
92
Thompson v. Fhuere
the express terms of the Governor’s commutation permitted
him to “seek[
] other or further relief from the courts that
[he] may be entitled to”—including relief that could result in
an even lesser sentence than his commuted one.
The relief to which petitioner claims an entitlement
is a remand for resentencing, based, as we understand his
argument, on four distinct theories. First, because the jury
had found petitioner guilty of aggravated murder based on
conduct that (under SB 1013) can no longer be punished by
death, there is a heightened possibility that his death sen
tence was influenced by the classification of his conduct as
“the worst form of murder” and so created a “bias in favor
of the death penalty,” and, for that reason, he is entitled
to a remand for resentencing. Second, because this court
vacated the defendants’ unconstitutionally disproportion
ate death sentences in Bartol and Rogers and remanded
those cases for resentencing, petitioner is entitled to the
same remedy for the same constitutional violation. Third,
because the post-conviction court had vacated petitioner’s
death sentence (as both parties had agreed was necessary),
he was subject to being resentenced under the provisions
of SB 1013. Fourth, because the “continuing threat” and
“deserves death” penalty-phase questions that were posed to
petitioner’s jury were unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to a remand for resentencing as would be the case with any
other prejudicial penalty-phase error.
In his supplemental brief, the superintendent argued
that the parties’ dispute about the post-conviction court’s
authority to modify petitioner’s sentence had been rendered
moot by the Governor’s commutation, because petitioner “is
no longer subject to a death sentence or the possibility of
one, and he is now serving a true-life sentence instead.” As a
consequence, the superintendent reasoned, “this court need
not consider whether ORS 138.520 authorized the post-
conviction court to modify the judgment *
*
* to impose a
true-life sentence.” The superintendent also contended that
petitioner was not entitled to a resentencing, because the
theories that he had advanced lacked merit.
During oral argument, we sought to further clarify
the parties’ positions about the legal effect of the commutation
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
93
on this case. Both parties agreed that, as a result of the
commutation, petitioner is serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. According to the superintendent,
the commutation rendered moot the parties’ dispute about
the post-conviction court’s authority to modify petitioner’s
sentence, because the Governor did that herself. However,
the superintendent conceded that, if we conclude that there
was a penalty-phase error that requires a remand for resen
tencing, the terms of the commutation order do not preclude
that relief.
As discussed further below, the Governor’s com
mutation order fundamentally changed the circumstances
of this case and the nature of what had been litigated, up
to that point, in the post-conviction court. In this appeal
of the post-conviction court’s judgment resolving petition
er’s claims for post-conviction relief, our task is to address
whether petitioner’s assignments of error present a basis for
reversing that judgment—now that petitioner’s death sen
tence has been commuted.
II. ANALYSIS
To resolve the parties’ contentions in this case, we
must determine the legal effect of the Governor’s commuta
tion order. Accordingly, we begin there.
The Governor has the power to grant clemency,
including commutations, under Article V, section 14, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part:
“[The Governor] shall have power to grant reprieves, com
mutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences
[sic] except treason, subject to such regulations as may be
provided by law. Upon conviction for treason he shall have
power to suspend the execution of the sentence until the
case shall be reported to the Legislative Assembly, at its
next meeting, when the Legislative Assembly shall either
grant a pardon, commute the sentence, direct the execution
of the sentence, or grant a farther [sic] reprieve.”
The Governor is the “sole repository” of this constitutional
clemency power. Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 126, 333
P2d 741 (1958). This court has repeatedly concluded that “
‘it
is not within judicial competency to control, interfere with,
94
Thompson v. Fhuere
or even to advise the Governor when exercising [her] power
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons.’
” Haugen v.
Kitzhaber, 353 Or 715, 720, 306 P3d 592 (2013), cert den, 571
US 1167 (2014) (quoting Eacret, 215 Or at 125-26); see also
Eacret, 215 Or at 127 (“Where the constitution thus confers
unlimited power on the Governor to grant reprieves, com
mutations and pardons, his discretion cannot be controlled
by judicial decision.”).6
A Governor’s grant of clemency is not a “
‘private act
of grace from an individual happening to possess power.’
”
Haugen, 353 Or at 742 (quoting Biddle v. Perovich, 274 US
480, 486, 47 S Ct 664, 71 L Ed 1161 (1927) (emphases in
Haugen)). Instead, it is “an important part of the constitu
tional scheme envisioned by the framers” that “permits the
chief executive to determine that ‘the public welfare will be
better served’ by clemency.” Id. (quoting Biddle, 274 US at
486). Ultimately, “[t]he Governor’s ability to grant clemency is
a direct and complete check on specific actions of the judicial
branch that is entrusted to the chief executive.” Id. at 726.
One form of clemency is a “commutation,” which is
what petitioner received in this case. See State v. Link, 367
Or 625, 663, 482 P3d 28 (2021) (“Commutation *
*
* is an
ad hoc exercise of executive clemency.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). A commutation is “a change of punishment
to which a person has been condemned to one less severe.”
Fehl v. Martin, 155 Or 455, 459, 64 P2d 631 (1937); see Black’s
Law Dictionary 350 (11th ed 2019) (defining “commutation”
6 “[T]o the extent that limits are imposed on the clemency power, those limits
must come from the constitution itself, or from the people.” Haugen, 353 Or at 726.
As we have previously stated, “[t]he most fundamental limit [on the Governor’s
power] is imposed through the actions of the people, if they choose not to reelect
the Governor.” Id. at 742; see Eacret, 215 Or at 128 (noting that, if a Governor
abuses the clemency power, the people have recourse “at the polls”). The “text,
history, and case law surrounding Article V, section 14,” also demonstrate that
“the Governor’s power may be checked by the legislative branch, as in cases of
treason convictions and through the legislature’s authority to establish regula
tions regarding the Governor’s power.” Haugen, 353 Or at 742-43. The legislature
has enacted a few statutory provisions addressing the Governor’s clemency power.
ORS 144.649 - 144.670. “Most of those provisions address procedural issues, such
as the procedure for reporting acts of clemency to the legislature and the proce
dure for applying for clemency.” Haugen, 353 Or at 727 n 7. The one statutory pro
vision that addresses the scope of the Governor’s power, ORS 144.649, “restates
the Governor’s constitutional power, but also expresses the legislature’s intent to
defer to the Governor’s judgment regarding the exercise of that power[.]” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
95
to include “[t]he executive’s substitution in a particular case
of a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has
already been judicially imposed on the defendant”); see
also Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F 305, 307-08 (9th Cir 1915)
(explaining that, in commuting a sentence, “the executive
has superimposed its mind upon the judgment of the court;
but the sentence remains, nevertheless, the judgment of the
court, and not of the executive, and is subject to the regula
tions of law respecting its enforcement”).
In addition, “[a] commuted sentence has the same
legal effect as though the sentence had originally been for the
commuted term.” Pardon and Parole, 67A CJS § 6 (2023); see
also, e.g., Pardon and Parole, 59 Am Jur 2d § 52 (2023) (“In
effect, a commuted sentence replaces the sentence imposed
by the original judgment. Since it is a mere substitution
of a lesser for a greater punishment, it has the same legal
effect, and the status of the prisoner is the same as though
the sentence had originally been for the commuted term.”
(Footnote omitted.)). The Court of Appeals has recognized
that principle—that is, that a commuted sentence has the
same legal effect as though the sentence had originally been
for the commuted term—for almost 50 years. See Marteeny
v. Brown, 321 Or App 250, 288, 517 P3d 343, rev den, 370 Or
303 (2022) (explaining that a “commuted sentence stands as
though it had originally been for the commuted term, and
entitles the offender to benefits of the commuted term—for
example good time” (citing Ferguson v. Cupp, 23 Or App
122, 124-25, 541 P2d 489 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Ferguson, 23 Or App 122 (concluding that,
after the Governor unconditionally commuted the petition
er’s life sentence for murder to a term of 25 years in 1974,
the petitioner was entitled to credits resulting in the reduc
tion of his commuted sentence computed from the date of
his original life sentence in 1957 (citing State ex rel. Murphy
v. Wolfer, 127 Minn 102, 148 NW 896 (1914)); Murphy, 127
Minn at 103, 148 NW at 897 (“A few principles applicable
to the case are, however, well settled. It is well settled that
a commutation of a sentence is a substitution of a less for
a greater punishment. After commutation[,] the commuted
sentence is the only one in existence, and the only one to be
considered. After commutation, the sentence has the same
96
Thompson v. Fhuere
legal effect, and the status of the prisoner is the same, as
though the sentence had originally been for the commuted
term.”)). Thus, the issuance of a commutation significantly
affects the trajectory of a case and the cognizable challenges
to the originally imposed judicial sentence.
Applying those general principles is complicated
because this case comes to us in an unusual posture. At the
time that the Governor commuted petitioner’s death sen
tence to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole,
the following key events already had occurred: (1) SB 1013
had been enacted; (2) this court had issued its decisions in
Bartol and Rogers, vacating the defendants’ death sentences
and remanding their cases so that new sentences could be
imposed; (3) petitioner had sought post-conviction relief,
claiming that his death sentence and two of the penalty-
phase questions were unconstitutional; (4) the parties had
agreed that defendant’s unconstitutional death sentence had
to be vacated but disagreed as to how a new sentence would
be determined (i.e., whether the case should be remanded
for resentencing or whether the post-conviction court should
modify petitioner’s sentence to life without the possibility of
parole); and (5) petitioner had appealed the post-conviction
court’s judgment, challenging several of that court’s rulings.
Nonetheless, while the appeal was pending, the Governor
exercised her constitutional authority to commute petition
er’s death sentence and to substitute, in its place, a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Thus, following the
commutation, petitioner’s sentence of life without the possi
bility of parole has been imposed, not by judicial decree, but
as a function of the Governor’s constitutional authority.
However, the commutation order expressly reserved
to petitioner the right to seek other or further relief from the
courts: “Nothing in this Commutation Order is intended to
preclude a Commutee from seeking other or further relief
from the courts that they may be entitled to.” Therefore, the
timing of the Governor’s commutation gives rise to the ques
tion whether, as petitioner contends in his first assignment
of error, he would be entitled to a remand for resentencing
if we were to conclude on appeal that the post-conviction
court erred in imposing a modified sentence rather than
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
97
remanding for a new sentence to be imposed. For the inter
related reasons that follow, we conclude that, in light of the
commutation, petitioner is not entitled to such relief.
In response to petitioner’s first claim for post-
conviction relief, in which he challenged his death sentence
as unconstitutional, the post-conviction court vacated the
death sentence and modified petitioner’s sentence to life
without the possibility of parole, rather than remanding for
resentencing. On appeal, petitioner contends that the post-
conviction court’s ruling was erroneous and that his case
should have been remanded for a resentencing, where, theo
retically, a different and lesser sentence of life with the pos
sibility of parole could be imposed. The problem with peti
tioner’s theory is that, even if we were to assume that the
post-conviction court erred at the time that it made its rul
ing and should have remanded for resentencing, petitioner
would not be entitled to that relief on appeal. That is so
because the Governor has since exercised her constitutional
authority to impose a sentence of life without the possibil
ity of parole. As previously explained, the legal effect of the
commutation is that the sentence of life without the possi
bility of parole stands as if it had been originally imposed.
Following the Governor’s exercise of her constitutional
clemency power, petitioner’s judicially imposed sentence is
deemed not to have existed, and a new sentence, derived
from a different source, became effective as if it were the
original sentence.
It is plain that, if the Governor had commuted peti
tioner’s sentence before he petitioned for post-conviction
relief, or even during the pendency of the post-conviction
proceeding, his challenge to the constitutionality of his
death sentence would not have been cognizable, because
there would have been no death sentence to challenge. The
post-conviction court would have had no death-sentence
claim to dispose of, and petitioner consequently would have
had no opportunity to assign error to any such disposition
on appeal. As it happened, the Governor’s commutation did
not occur until after petitioner had filed his appeal, but that
does not change the fact that we must now proceed as if peti
tioner had received a sentence of life without the possibility
98
Thompson v. Fhuere
of parole from the beginning. If a post-conviction claim
challenging the constitutionality of a nonexistent death sen
tence is not cognizable, it follows that no assignment of error
to the disposition of such a claim can be cognizable, either.
Essentially, petitioner is asking us to resolve this
appeal as though the Governor had not stepped in and
commuted his sentence to life without the possibility of
parole and to ignore the legal effects of that exercise of con
stitutional authority. We cannot do so. The validity of the
Governor’s action has not been challenged here—or, to our
knowledge, in any other proceeding. The parties agree that
petitioner is serving the Governor’s commuted sentence.
Thus, for present purposes, we must treat the commutation
as a valid exercise of the Governor’s constitutional authority
to impose a new sentence that stands as if it had been the
sentence originally imposed.
To the extent that petitioner argues that, regard
less of the commutation, he nonetheless remains entitled to
a resentencing because that is what SB 1013 required or
because he is entitled to the same remedy that the defen
dants in Bartol and Rogers received, we disagree. “[T]he
legislature did not make SB 1013 retroactive as to [death]
sentences imposed before its effective date[.]” Bartol, 368
Or at 625. Instead, SB 1013 applied only to sentencings
that occurred thereafter. Rogers, 368 Or at 700. Thus, SB
1013 itself did not provide an entitlement to a resentencing.
Instead, that entitlement must be found elsewhere. As to
petitioner’s argument concerning Bartol and Rogers, the cir
cumstances of this case are qualitatively different. In those
cases, the defendants were serving unconstitutional death
sentences, and, on direct appeal, we vacated those sentences
and remanded for resentencing so that a new sentence could
be imposed. Here, unlike the defendants in Bartol and
Rogers, petitioner is not serving a death sentence. Instead,
he is serving the commuted sentence of life without parole.
Petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to the same remedy
as the defendants in Bartol and Rogers ignores the fact that
the Governor commuted his sentence.
In sum, in his first assignment of error on appeal,
petitioner contends that, having vacated his death sentence,
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
99
the post-conviction court erred in declining to remand for
resentencing so that a new sentence could be imposed.
However, the Governor has since exercised her constitu
tional authority to commute petitioner’s death sentence
and impose a new sentence of life without the possibility
of parole. The legal effect of the commutation is that the
commuted sentence is treated as though it had been origi
nally imposed, and it has been substituted for the judicially
imposed death sentence that had been the focus of the post-
conviction court’s inquiry. Petitioner’s first assignment of
error is predicated on a sentence that does not exist and,
for all relevant purposes, is deemed never to have existed.
Accordingly, even if the post-conviction court erred at the
time that it granted relief from the death sentence, petition
er’s first assignment of error does not present a basis for
reversing that court’s ruling.
We emphasize that this resolution of petitioner’s
first assignment of error is a product of how petitioner
pleaded his first claim for post-conviction relief. Unlike his
other claims for relief, which essentially challenge the judi
cial proceeding that led to his death sentence, petitioner’s
first claim for relief challenges the sentence itself. Petitioner
alleges that it violates the constitution for petitioner to be
“under a death sentence,” and, therefore, that his “death sen
tence should be vacated.” As we have explained, the death
sentence that the first claim for relief purports to challenge
does not exist. Because of the commutation, any claim chal
lenging the constitutionality of the death sentence per se
necessarily fails. That is not to say that the commutation in
this case precludes other claims for relief that challenge the
underlying judicial proceeding that ultimately resulted in
petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner’s later claims for relief are
of that nature. As we next explain, petitioner is not entitled
to relief as to those claims, but for reasons unrelated to the
commutation of petitioner’s sentence.
Petitioner’s remaining assignments of error con
cern the post-conviction court’s resolution of his claims that
the “continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions, pre
sented to the jury in his original sentencing proceeding,
were unconstitutional. Unlike petitioner’s first claim for
100
Thompson v. Fhuere
post-conviction relief, which challenged the constitutional
ity of a death sentence that subsequently was commuted,
the gravamen of his other post-conviction claims is that the
jury’s consideration of unconstitutional questions in deter
mining which sentence to impose (i.e., death, life without
parole, or life with the possibility of parole) amounted to
a prejudicial penalty-phase error that entitled him to a
remand for resentencing. We agree with the parties that, if
petitioner is correct that he suffered such a prejudicial error
and was entitled to a remand for resentencing, the express
terms of the Governor’s commutation order do not preclude
that result.7 That is so even though any sentencing proceed
ing would now occur under the provisions of SB 1013 and, at
least in the abstract, could result in an even lesser sentence
of life with the possibility of parole. Accordingly, we turn
to the parties’ contentions concerning the penalty-phase
questions.
At the outset, we reject the superintendent’s argu
ment that we need not consider petitioner’s assignments of
error concerning those questions because, even if petitioner’s
claims concerning the constitutionality of the penalty-phase
questions had merit, he would not be entitled to a remand
for resentencing. Specifically, the superintendent argues
that, if petitioner
“were correct that either of the trial jury’s ‘yes’ verdicts on
the second and fourth questions must be converted into a
‘no’ because the question that was answered was ‘unconsti
tutional,’ that would provide a basis only to invalidate the
death sentence; but it would not undermine the factual and
legal basis for imposition of a true-life sentence instead.
“In other words, once the death sentence is eliminated,
the jurors’ determination of whether to impose either a
true-life sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole depends, under ORS 163.150(2), on
whether ‘10 or more members of the jury further find that
there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant
life imprisonment.’ Because the trial jury unanimously
7 Because the Governor’s commutation order expressly permitted petitioner
to “seek[
] other or further relief from the courts that [he] may be entitled to,” we
need not decide, and express no opinion about, the effects of a commutation that
lacks such wording.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
101
found that those mitigating circumstances did not warrant
a sentence less than death, the jurors’ verdict necessarily
included within it their determination that fewer than ten
of them believed that *
*
* those mitigating circumstances
warranted a sentence less than true life.”
(Emphases in original.)
In short, the superintendent contends that, once
the death sentence was vacated, the only legally permissible
sentence was life without the possibility of parole, because
the jury’s answers to the penalty-phase questions demon
strated that, as between a sentence of life without parole
and life with the possibility of parole, the jury would have
chosen the former. But that argument rests on an internal
contradiction. The superintendent’s position on appeal is
predicated on the assumption that the “continuing threat”
and “deserves death” questions are unconstitutional and, as
a result, the jury’s unanimous “yes” answers to those ques
tions must be disregarded.8 But, if that is so, then one cannot
simultaneously rely on those same answers—as the super
intendent does—to infer that, if the jury had been required
to choose between life with parole and “true life,” the jury
would have chosen the latter. Without those answers, no
other basis exists for assuming that the necessary number
of jurors would have declined to find sufficient mitigating
circumstances to impose a sentence of life with parole.9
Accordingly, we reject the superintendent’s threshold argu
ment and turn to petitioner’s remaining assignments of
error concerning his claims that the “continuing threat” and
“deserves death” questions are unconstitutional.
As we will explain, however, petitioner failed to pre
serve his second assignment of error challenging the post-
conviction court’s ruling that those claims were procedurally
8 See ORS 163.150(1)(e) (providing now, as it did when defendant was con
victed and sentenced, that the court shall instruct the jury that it may not
answer any of the death penalty questions “yes” unless “it agrees unanimously”).
9 See ORS 163.150(2)(a) (providing now, as it did when defendant was con
victed and sentenced, that, if the jury answered any of the death-penalty ques
tions in the negative, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to
“life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole,” unless “10 or more
members of the jury further find that there are sufficient mitigating circum
stances to warrant life imprisonment,” in which case the trial court is required
to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole).
102
Thompson v. Fhuere
barred. Because that failure obviates the need for us to con
sider petitioner’s third and fourth assignments concerning
the merits of those claims (i.e., whether each question was
unconstitutional), we do not address them further and limit
our discussion to petitioner’s second assignment.
In that assignment, petitioner contends that the
post-conviction court erred in ruling that his claims concern
ing the “continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions
were “untimely” when the state had “conceded otherwise.”
Petitioner’s entire argument in support of that assignment
of error in his opening brief is as follows:
“The [superintendent] could have but did not assert that
[petitioner’s] petition was untimely. In fact, it expressly
conceded timeliness. In any event, the issue was waived.
“[‘The state] could have raised the Statute of Limitations
as an affirmative defense in an answer or in a motion to
dismiss. ORCP 19 B; ORCP 21 A(9). [The state] did nei
ther, and thereby waived that defense. ORCP 21 G(2).
“[‘Allowing [the state] to raise the Statute of Limitations
for the first time on appeal would deprive petitioner of
any opportunity to present evidence that would show
why the petition raises grounds for relief that could not
reasonably have been raised in a timely fashion. ORS
138.510(2). [The state] may not do so.[’]”
“Palmer v. State [of Oregon], 121 Or App 377, 380, 854 P2d
955 *
*
* (1993), aff’d [in part on other grounds], 318 Or 352,
867 P2d 1368 (1994).”10
As we will explain, the fundamental problem for petitioner
is that he never raised those bases (i.e., concession and
waiver) in the post-conviction court, and they are therefore
unpreserved.
“The general requirement that an issue, to be raised
and considered on appeal, ordinarily must first be pre
sented to the trial court is well-settled in our jurisprudence.”
Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008).
Among other things, “[p]reservation gives a trial court the
chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly
10 ORCP 21 A(9) is now set out at ORCP 21 A(1)(i), and ORS 138.510(2) is now
set out at ORS 138.510(3).
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
103
avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made,
which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal,” and it
“also ensures fairness to an opposing party, by permitting
the opposing party to respond to a contention and by other
wise not taking the opposing party by surprise.” Id. Here, to
demonstrate that petitioner failed to preserve his appellate
contention that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that
his claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were pro
cedurally barred, we describe the pleadings and proceedings
before the post-conviction court in some detail.
In his successive petition for post-conviction relief,
petitioner conceded that the petition had been “filed more
than two years after finality,” but he contended that,
because it was “premised” on SB 1013, Bartol, and Rogers,
“the grounds for relief *
*
* could not reasonably have been
raised previously or in [his] previous [post-conviction] peti
tion.” Put simply, petitioner alleged that his claims “were
not available previously” and were “timely, not improperly
successive, and meritorious pursuant to ORS 138.530(1)(c),”
which provides, in part, that post-conviction relief shall be
granted when a petitioner establishes the “unconstitution
ality of [his] sentence.” The superintendent admitted, in his
answer, that petitioner’s death sentence could not be main
tained and that “petitioner could not reasonably have raised
the claims based on SB 1013 and [Bartol] in his previous
petition for post-conviction relief and within the time limita
tion set by ORS 138.510(3).” (Emphasis added.) However, the
superintendent “otherwise denie[d]” petitioner’s allegation
that “the grounds for relief *
*
* could not reasonably have
been raised previously or in [his] previous [post-conviction]
petition.” In other words, as the superintendent explained,
he “agreed that petitioner ‘could not reasonably have raised’
in his previous petition the claims that he alleged in this
petition but only to the extent that those actually are ‘based
on SB 1013 and *
*
* Bartol.’
” (Emphasis in original.)
In moving for summary judgment on the claims
concerning the penalty-phase questions, petitioner clari
fied that, although his arguments drew “support from the
legislative changes brought about by SB 1013,” his claims
were “founded on the contention that both questions were
104
Thompson v. Fhuere
unconstitutional at the time of [petitioner’s] trial—before
SB 1013 became law.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner sub
sequently filed a memorandum in support of his motion,
explaining why, in his view, those penalty-phase questions
were unconstitutional.
In his cross-motion, the superintendent asserted
that—“[a]s explained in [his] supporting memorandum,”
which also served as his response to petitioner’s summary
judgment motion—petitioner’s claims concerning the two
penalty-phase questions did not provide “any legal basis
for [the] court to grant petitioner post-conviction relief.”
Specifically, in the supporting memorandum, the superin
tendent argued, among other things, that those two claims
were procedurally barred under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS
138.550(3), and, in all events, lacked legal merit. Petitioner
did not file a response to the superintendent’s cross-motion
or seek to file a reply to the superintendent’s response to
his summary judgment motion, explaining why, in his view,
the superintendent had conceded timeliness (or otherwise
waived that issue).
At the summary judgment hearing, the parties’
arguments focused on whether the post-conviction court
had authority to modify petitioner’s sentence or whether a
remand for resentencing was required. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the post-conviction court ruled that the “con
tinuing threat” and “deserves death” questions were “both
time-barred and procedurally barred,” noting that those
questions had been “on numerous occasions challenged at
the Oregon Supreme Court and upheld as appropriate,”
and that petitioner had had “direct appeal, post-conviction
relief, and other options to challenge that.” Again, petitioner
did not alert the post-conviction court that, in his view,
the superintendent had conceded timeliness (or otherwise
waived that issue).
Following the hearing, the superintendent, as
directed, prepared an order and judgment for the post-
conviction court’s signature; however, the parties disagreed
about the court’s ruling as to the claims concerning the
penalty-phase questions. In a letter to the court, the super
intendent explained, “Petitioner’s counsel has informed me
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)
105
that he believes [the court] ruled that [those claims] have
no merit. My recollection of the ruling is that those claims
are procedurally barred. Because of counsels’ disagreement
as to your ruling, I have prepared two different orders.”
Even at that point, petitioner did not seek to alert the post-
conviction court to the contentions that he now raises on
appeal.
Ultimately, the post-conviction court issued an order
providing that the superintendent was entitled to summary
judgment on petitioner’s second and third claims for relief,
explaining, as it had at the conclusion of the hearing, that
those claims were “procedurally barred by ORS 138.510(3)
and ORS 138.550(3).” See ORS 138.510(3) (generally pre
cluding untimely petitions); ORS 138.550(3) (generally pre
cluding improperly successive petitions).
In sum, petitioner’s successive petition included an
allegation that his claims could not reasonably have been
raised earlier. Thereafter, the superintendent disputed that
assertion, yet petitioner did nothing to alert the post-
conviction court to his view that the superintendent none
theless had somehow “waived” or “conceded” that issue, as
petitioner now asserts. On review, in contending that the
post-conviction court erred, petitioner relies on the superin
tendent’s concession that petitioner’s claims were timely to
the extent that they were based on SB 1013 and Bartol, and
on his related assertion that the claims could not “be subject
to any procedural bar” because SB 1013’s elimination of the
“continuing threat” question and its imposition of a “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard on the “deserves death” ques
tion demonstrate that both questions are unconstitutional
as measured by evolving standards of decency and events
that occurred after petitioner’s trial, direct appeal, and
prior post-conviction proceeding. (Emphasis added.) But
that argument disregards the fact that the superintendent
expressly argued to the post-conviction court that petition
er’s claims could have been raised even before SB 1013 and
Bartol, and that the procedural bars therefore applied. In
light of those arguments, it was incumbent on petitioner
to inform the post-conviction court of his position that the
106
Thompson v. Fhuere
superintendent had conceded timeliness or, in all events,
had waived the issue. He did not do so.
Accordingly, petitioner did not preserve his chal
lenge to the post-conviction court’s ruling that his claims
for relief concerning the penalty-phase questions were pro
cedurally barred under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3).
III. CONCLUSION
After the post-conviction court entered its judgment
resolving petitioner’s first claim for post-conviction relief by
vacating his death sentence and modifying the sentence to
life without the possibility of parole instead of remanding
for resentencing, the Governor stepped in and commuted
petitioner’s death sentence to a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. As we have explained, even if the post-
conviction court erred at the time that it made its ruling,
petitioner is not entitled to the relief that he requests on
appeal (i.e., a reversal of the post-conviction court’s judg
ment and a remand for resentencing). That is so because the
Governor’s commuted sentence became the operative sen
tence, as though it had been the sentence originally imposed,
and, as a result, petitioner is not entitled to relief concerning
the judicially imposed sentence that had been the focus of
the post-conviction court’s inquiry. In addition, petitioner
failed to preserve his challenge to the post-conviction court’s
ruling that his claims concerning two of the penalty-phase
questions were procedurally barred. Accordingly, we affirm.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. | 99131f147d7bd954a2fdfcf500330c817acf9a707925e17e5ce6448938f071b0 | 2024-03-14T00:00:00Z |
3dbcfae2-869b-424b-9c36-89c11cb10109 | Lingel v. Maudlin | 188 Or. 147, 212 P.2d 751 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Reversed and remanded December 20, 1949.
Petition for rehearing denied February 15, 1950.
*148 George T. Cochran, of La Grande, and John R. Ewing, of Caldwell, Idaho, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Cochran & Eberhard, of La Grande, and Smith and Ewing, of Caldwell, Idaho.
Harold Banta, of Baker, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Hallock, Donald, Banta & Silven, of Baker.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, BAILEY, HAY and PAGE, Justices.
*149 BRAND, J.
This is a suit in equity brought by Elizabeth L. Lingel, the divorced wife of defendant Nathan B. Maudlin wherein the plaintiff seeks an order awarding to her the custody of the minor children of the parties and the consequent modification of the order of an Idaho court which gave to the defendant the custody of said children subject only to plaintiff's right of visitation at reasonable times and places. The Oregon court denied plaintiff's prayer for general custody of the children but did enlarge plaintiff's right of visitation and granted to her the custody and control of the minor children for a period of two months during the summer vacation of each year and the custody during the Christmas school vacation in every other year beginning with the year 1950. The decree also contains certain other provisions limiting and defining the above mentioned rights of visitation and custody. From this decree the defendant has appealed.
*150 On 25 November 1944 the plaintiff secured a divorce from the defendant in the state of Idaho and was granted custody of the minor children, the issue of the marriage. On 22 November 1946 the defendant applied to the Idaho court for modification of the divorce decree so as to award to him the custody of the minor children upon the ground that conditions had changed since the entry of the divorce decree. Upon trial of the issue the Idaho court made findings of fact to the effect that the plaintiff had failed properly to care for, support, train and educate the children during the period of her custody, and that since the entry of the divorce decree she had shown herself unfit, neglectful and irresponsible in caring for the children and that the continuance of her custody would do irreparable harm to the personality and character of the children. It also found that the defendant was a fit and proper person to have the custody of the children and that the welfare of the children required that they be given into the custody of the defendant. The Idaho court on 21 February 1947 entered the decree awarding to the defendant the custody of the two minor children. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the state of Idaho which on 2 January 1948 affirmed the lower court. Maudlin v. Maudlin, 68 Ida. 64, 188 P.2d 323. The defendant established residence for himself and the minor children in La Grande, Union County, Oregon.
Relying upon the decision of this court in Bartlett v. Bartlett et al., 175 Or. 215, 152 P.2d 402, the plaintiff brought this equity suit as an expeditious form of procedure instead of instituting proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus, for the purpose of securing custody of the children. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint *151 that there has been a decided change in conditions since the decree of the Idaho court. She alleges that after the Idaho divorce she was compelled to earn her own living and was obliged to leave the children, Beverly Joan Maudlin, now about nine years of age and Bernard Nathan Maudlin, now about five years of age, with her parents; that she has since remarried and is living with her husband on a sixty acre dairy and stock farm near Emmett, Idaho; that there is a comfortable dwelling house on the premises; that her husband is earning a fair livelihood and that she will be able to devote her full time in making a home and caring for the children. She alleges that the defendant has also remarried and that his present wife has a daughter who would now be about five years of age, and in substance that the defendant, her former husband, has no permanent or steady employment and is unable properly to maintain a family of five. She alleges further that the defendant has deliberately and intentionally obstructed and interfered with her reasonable rights of visitation of the children and has never permitted her to be with them except in the presence of the defendant or his wife. The prayer of plaintiff's complaint is for an order awarding the custody of the minor children to her.
The defendant by way of answer alleges that the plaintiff wrongfully interfered with his custody of the children after it had been awarded to him by the Idaho court. He alleges that he is employed as a carpenter, has a comfortable home, that the children are being well taken care of and that the plaintiff is an unfit person to have the custody of the children. In her reply the plaintiff, as further evidence of material change of conditions, alleges that at the time of the *152 Idaho order awarding custody to the defendant, the defendant resided at Huntington, Oregon, and the plaintiff near Weiser, Idaho, a distance of only fifteen or twenty miles, but that the plaintiff now lives near Emmett, Idaho, and the defendant has moved to La Grande, Oregon, so that the parties now reside about 160 miles apart rendering it difficult to exercise her right of visitation at the home of the defendant.
Defendant assigns as error the provisions of the Oregon decree which give to the plaintiff the right of visitation and which authorize "taking them [the children] from the home of the defendant for such visits for a period of not more than three hours of the fourth Saturday or Sunday of each month, or on both of said days, if she so desires; such visits to be during the day time and at such hours as not to interfere with the normal times of rising and retiring for said children, but otherwise to be at the convenience of the plaintiff." He also complains of the order awarding to the plaintiff the care and custody of the children during the summer months of the school vacation and during the Christmas school vacation in every other year. Defendant asserts that there is no substantial change of conditions warranting a change of custody or any change in the order of the Idaho court and that the order of the Oregon court therefore violated the rule of res adjudicate.
1-6. The divorce decree of the Idaho court, in so far as it pertained to the rights of custody and visitation, being subject to modification in that state, was not a final decree. Nor was the Idaho order of modification final. It follows that the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution did not bar the Oregon court from hearing the case on its merits after the *153 defendant and the children had established residence in this state. Bartlett v. Bartlett, supra, and cases cited. Nevertheless it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that conditions had so changed since the order of the Idaho court as to warrant a change in its provisions. No change of legal custody should be made unless the evidence establishes such change of condition relative to the welfare of the children as justifies modification. Leverich v. Leverich, 175 Or. 174, 152 P.2d 303; Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Or. 78, 187 P. 598. It is true, as alleged, that the homes of the plaintiff and defendant are now further apart than was formerly the case, a circumstance which undoubtedly increases the difficulties involved in the exercise of the right of visitation by the plaintiff, but that change of condition is not one which, in our opinion, materially affects the welfare of the children. We have laboriously reviewed 300 pages of transcript and lengthy exhibits, and are of the opinion that the trial court properly denied the request of the plaintiff for change of custody of the children. No contention is made by the plaintiff that the defendant is an unfit person to have the care and custody of the children. The evidence satisfies us that he is able to assume the burden of their support at his home. On the other hand, the evidence raises serious doubts as to the character of the plaintiff and tends to support the finding of the Idaho court to the effect that she was not a suitable person to have the custody of said children. The evidence also indicates that the conditions found by the Idaho court have continued down to the date of trial of this suit. The defendant offered in evidence a certified copy of the complaint in a suit for divorce brought against the plaintiff by her husband, Lester Lingel. While the allegations in that complaint should not be treated *154 as proof of the facts alleged, nevertheless the fact that a divorce suit is pending between the plaintiff and her husband is material, especially in view of her allegation that she is living with her present husband who is earning a comfortable livelihood, making it possible for her to devote her full time to the care of home and children. The trial court rejected the offer in evidence of the divorce complaint upon the apparent ground that it was not filed until after the filing of the complaint in the case at bar and the court refused to permit a supplementary pleading to be filed setting up the fact of the divorce suit. The copy of the complaint was nevertheless received under the equity rule and is before us. We think it was admissible in evidence as bearing upon the probable ability of the plaintiff to care for the children if placed in her custody. The evidence of numerous witnesses and certain admissions by the plaintiff establish that plaintiff had herself intended to divorce her present husband for a considerable period of time and had so declared. Other evidence raises serious doubt as to the character and reputation of the plaintiff. We deem it unnecessary to review the testimony in detail. In the opinion of this court the plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any conditions relative to the welfare of the children have materially changed since the order of the Idaho court, with the exception of the matter of visitation rights now to be discussed.
In plaintiff's brief it is emphatically asserted that "all that is really involved in the present appeal is visitation rights". The great bulk of the voluminous testimony heard by the trial court relates to bitter, unreasonable and unjustified controversies and quarrels *155 between the plaintiff and defendant, involving also plaintiff's parents and the defendant's present wife, concerning the exercise of the rights of visitation. When the plaintiff was in possession of the children during the pendency of the Idaho litigation, the quarrels related to the right of the defendant to visit. In that connection the evidence satisfies us that the plaintiff on several occasions threatened violence, either to the defendant or to the children, if they should be taken from her, although we do not mean to say that she intended to carry out her threats. After the defendant had secured the possession of the children and when the plaintiff attempted to exercise her legal right of visitation, we find that the defendant was as cantankerous and unreasonable as the plaintiff had been. Plaintiff was never permitted to be with the children unless the defendant or his wife was present. We quote the testimony of the defendant Maudlin:
7, 8. This case is typical of many in which bitter enmity arises between the divorced parents of children in connection with the rights of visitation, especially when the divorced mother seeks to exercise her rights in the home and in the presence of her former husband and his present wife. We think the court erred in providing that the plaintiff should have the actual *156 custody and control of the minor children for two months in the summer and during the Christmas holidays in every other year. If the children are not to become a shuttlecock in the bitter game of competition over their custody and affection they must be assured of settled habits of life. It is through no fault of the children or of this court that they cannot enjoy the concurrent affection of both the father and mother. On the other hand, even if no provision were made in the decree, the plaintiff would have the right of reasonable visitation of the children. Of this she has been wrongfully deprived. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree which will protect her in the full enjoyment of that right and for the purpose of avoiding other disputes, her rights should be made specific. We find that she is entitled to visit either or both of the children at her option; to take one or both of them with her from the home of the defendant for the purpose of such visits; that she is entitled to make such visits on the fourth Saturday or Sunday of each month or on both the fourth Saturday and the fourth Sunday of each month, and each such visit may at her option extend from one o'clock p.m. until 6 o'clock p.m. of each such day. During the period of such visits she may at her option have the children either at the home of the defendant or away from the home of the defendant and in the absence of the defendant or of his wife or of any person representing the defendant.
9. To the end that the rights herein granted shall be exercised without excess by the plaintiff and without interference by the defendant and without discourtesy by either party, this case will be remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the provisions of this opinion by the terms of *157 which the plaintiff shall be directed and required to serve notice upon the defendant by mail of any intended visit to the children, such notice to be given at least five days prior to said visit. Plaintiff shall further be required and directed to safely keep said children while in her temporary control for the purpose of visitation, not to remove them at any time to any distance greater than fifty miles from the home of defendant and to safely return them in accordance with the terms of the decree. The said decree shall further enjoin and restrain the defendant from causing or permitting any interference with or interruption of the rights of visitation hereby granted to the plaintiff or until further order of any court having jurisdiction. The said decree shall further provide that the violation of the requirements thereof may be punished as a contempt of court. 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 316, p. 1184. In accordance with the ruling in the recent case of Levell v. Levell, 183 Or. 39, 190 P.2d 527, we hold that any further failure on the part of either party to comply in good faith with the orders of the decree would also constitute ground for a reconsideration by the trial court concerning the extent of visitation rights. The specific provisions which shall be incorporated in the decree of the circuit court shall be without prejudice to the rights of the parties to make specific voluntary agreements for additional visitations at times other than those specified in the decree. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a decree in conformity with the directions contained in this opinion. Neither party will recover costs. | c7ed8dbf3425dd384aa91d1156d0ef24016899944c72103f893c7c92927d6724 | 1949-12-20T00:00:00Z |
06acee1b-76a8-47b1-8e9e-792f79aab3cb | Rose Et Ux. v. Denn Et Ux. | 188 Or. 1, 213 P.2d 810 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Affirmed December 13, 1949.
Petition for rehearing denied January 24, 1950.
*2 Avery W. Thompson and William D. Green, Jr., of Roseburg, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Carl M. Felker, of Roseburg, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Paul E. Geddes, of Roseburg.
*3 Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, ROSSMAN, BAILEY, HAY and PAGE, Justices.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Circuit Court which held that the plaintiffs "are the owners and users of an easement and way of necessity, more particularly described as follows, * * *. The defendants and each of them be and they hereby are perpetually restrained and enjoined from in any manner closing or interfering with the use and travel of said easement and way of necessity by the plaintiffs * * *." The easement and way of necessity sustained by the challenged decree extends across a tract of land which is owned by the defendants-appellants, Henry Denn and Nora Denn, husband and wife. The other defendants-appellants have an interest in the Denns' property, but the interest is immaterial to the issues in this case. Our use of the term "the appellants" will hereafter mean the defendants-appellants, Henry Denn and Nora Denn. All of the lands involved in this suit are situated in Sections 25, 26 and 35, Township 29 South, Range 9 West, Willamette Meridian, and are near Camas Valley in Douglas County. *4 A glance at the following sketch, which makes no pretense at accuracy, will facilitate an understanding of the facts which we shall presently narrate.
*5 The ownership by the respondents, who are husband and wife, of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 35, being the 40-acre tract which our sketch shows, is conceded. The respondents were the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court. Likewise conceded is the fact that the appellants own the tracts attributed to them by our sketch. Their lands are:
From the appellant's brief, we quote the following:
*6 The quoted language mentions a conveyance made by Jacob Denn to Henry J. Denn in 1894. The conveyee, Henry J. Denn, was the son of the conveyor and father of the appellant, Henry Denn. It is the contention of the respondents that since the conveyed tract lay between the public road and other tracts which the conveyor owned, an implication arose that the conveyor reserved an easement or way of necessity across the conveyed lands. The thoroughfare shown on our sketch and marked "public road" is a county road which was opened in 1874. Thus, the easement, recognized by the decree, is not imposed upon the retained land, but upon the conveyed property. The quoted statement speaks of the "present" existence of the road which it mentions, but the appellant, Henry Denn, as a witness, conceded that the road was in use as long ago as 1914. That road is the "easement and way of necessity" claimed by the respondents and mentioned in the part of the decree which we quoted. We made no effort to trace it upon our map. Hereafter when we employ the term, "the road", we will mean the purported "easement and way of necessity"; that is, the road described in the sentence which we just took from the appellants' brief. It will be observed from the statement which we quoted that the road terminates at its western extremity in the respondents' 40-acre tract of land. Its eastern end leads into the county road which shortly, in its southerly course, joins the Coos Bay Highway. The road (easement) is the same one which was the subject matter of Baum v. Denn, decided by us November 15, 1949.
The respondents' tract contains a stand of timber and is unimproved. The appellants' land is improved with a dwelling house and farm structures.
*7 The complaint alleges:
That averment is denied by the answer, but the part concerning deraignment of title from a common source was conceded, as well as established, by evidence at the trial. The complaint alleges that January 10, 1945, the appellants erected a barrier across the road and denied the respondents the privilege of using it any further.
The respondents' brief claims that they obtained their right to the use of the road in the following ways: (1) "By implied right or grant"; (2) "right to travel the same by reason of the way of necessity"; (3) "if, as the appellants contend, there is no implied right, then the respondents and their predecessors have acquired their rights to the same by adverse use, as shown by the testimony of both appellants and respondents as to the many years that the roadway was in use and travel." The appellants present the following contentions: (1) "The record does not show evidence *8 that the respondents acquired the described easement by prescription"; (2) "the doctrine of implied easement does not apply"; and (3) "the doctrine of a way of necessity does not apply."
Although the parties express their contentions in the words just quoted, the issues to which they devoted their major efforts during the trial were these: (1) Does any public road lead to the tract owned by the respondents? and (2) was it necessary for the respondents to travel upon the appellants' land in order to reach a public thoroughfare? During the trial the respondents contended that no public road reached their property and that the appellants' land lay between respondents' and the public thoroughfare. The appellants controverted those propositions. During the trial they contended that a public road known as the Amstein Camas Valley road touched the respondents' tract and that another known as the Southwick road or the Holmes Creek road was available to them. Further, they contended that the predecessors in interest of the respondents, in going to or from the land now owned by the respondents, did so by passing through an area termed by the appellants "the back pasture."
The answer affirmatively alleges:
*9 The affirmative averments of the answer also say:
We shall now take notice of the evidence applicable to those contentions.
Jacob Denn, whom we have mentioned, received a deed in 1893 which conveyed to him a thousand acres lying in Sections 25, 26 and 35, and which included all of the land now owned by the parties to this suit. April 9, 1894, he gave to his son, Henry J. Denn, the father of the appellant, Henry Denn, a deed which conveyed to him the Southeast quarter of Section 26. There was no consideration for the deed; the transfer was a gift. The Southwest corner of that quarter touches the Northeast corner of the 40-acre tract now owned by the respondents. When that conveyance was made, the conveyor owned land to the west of the quarter section which he was giving to his son. Neither the retained land nor the conveyed quarter section bordered upon or in any other way touched a public road.
One Zack Murray, a witness for the respondents, who has lived in Camas Valley for more than seventy years, testified:
By "a road" he meant the road in question. Going on, he said:
*10 By "he" he meant the appellant, Henry Denn. When this witness first saw the road it ran between the house now occupied by the appellants and a barn. Later, its course was altered so that it turned to the left where it came to the barn lot and no longer passed through it. No other material change in the road was mentioned by any witness. Mr. Murray swore that the road "has been used for better than seventy years."
He also testified:
Upon cross-examination, the following occurred:
*11 There was a man by the name of Doney, he had the Southeast of the Southwest quarter and I think Fred Southwick owns that now of Section 35 and this road crossed right in the forty that Mr. Rose owns and went off and came out at the south side of his forty.
Mr. Murray's testimony, if true, warrants a belief that long before Jacob Denn gave his son the quarter section, a road had been established across the quarter and was used as a means of access to and egress from land west of the quarter, including the 40-acre tract now owned by the respondents. The part of that road which lay between the county road and the conveyed quarter afforded access to the latter. That part crossed land owned by Jacob Denn.
Mr. A.F.C. Frear, for twenty-six and one-half years, has been county road master of Douglas County. Prior to that he worked under a former road master and at one time was deputy county surveyor. He testified that no public road touches, crosses or affords access to the respondents' property.
Bert Nealy, a witness for the respondents, who has lived for forty years in Camas Valley, has been familiar with the road across the appellants' land during all of those years. We quote from his testimony the following:
Anna Nealy, another witness for the respondents, began forty-five years ago a course of residence upon the 40-acre tract immediately to the east of the plaintiffs'. While living there she went in and out upon the road in question. Her means of transportation, as described by her, were "horseback and with wagon once in a while." She made it clear that the road over which she traveled as long ago as forty-five years was the road in question, by saying: "The same road they are using now, only change that went through by Mr. Denn's house and barn." As we have explained, in its earlier stages the road went between the house and the barn. In some previous year, unmentioned by any witness, the course of the road was changed so that it went to the rear of the barn. The witness explained that the county road into which the alleged way of necessity empties at its eastern extremity "has been there years longer than my time."
*13 The foregoing is a brief synopsis of the testimony given by some of the respondents' witnesses. The credibility of none of them was challenged. It will be seen that this evidence indicates that seventy years ago a roadway extended across the appellants' property which had its western end in the 40-acre tract now owned by the respondents and its eastern extremity at a county road.
The appellant, Henry Denn, 42 years of age, was born upon the property which he now owns, but he added, "I lived in town most of the time." Evidently his familiarity with the adjacent property is not intimate, for, upon cross-examination, he protested, "I don't know much about them. I don't pretend to know." He recalled the road in question from the time he was a boy, "just playing marbles." Like the other witnesses, he indicated that the present road follows its original course, with the exception of the change around the barnyard.
In 1940 one Jacob Denn, a cousin of the appellant, Henry Denn, owned the 40-acre tract which the respondents now own. That Jacob Denn was a grandson of the Jacob Denn to whom we have frequently referred, and derived his title from him. In February, 1940, Jacob Denn (the cousin) was negotiating a sale of the forty acres to one Oran C. Standley, and in its course showed Standley the property. It was the appellant, Henry Denn, who took his cousin, as prospective vendor, and Standley to the property. In going there, the party traveled over the road in question. The appellant, as a witness, made no claim that he told Mr. Standley or his cousin that they had no right to travel the road or that the latter could be barricaded at any time. In fact, if he mentioned the road during the trip *14 he failed to disclose that matter when testifying. Standley received a deed of conveyance February 8, 1940, and four years later conveyed the property to the respondents.
The appellant, Henry Denn, testified that during the time his grandfather owned the forty acres which the respondents now hold, he cut down and removed from it some timber, but swore that the logs were taken out "through the back pasture and around the other road." We find it impossible to gain any clear impression from this witness' testimony as to the whereabouts of the "other road." Efforts were made to elicit from others testimony concerning a road which lay in the back pasture, but their vague statements give no clear impression as to where it lay or how it connected with any existing public road. One witness, in telling about this elusive "other road", indicated that its course entered into Section 23 and "the Barney Carey place." There is no evidence that Jacob Denn owned any property in that section. It is clear that this "other road" was not a public thoroughfare.
Other testimony presented by the appellants indicates that there were gates upon the road; that is, the alleged way of necessity. Still other evidence that came from the same source endeavored to show that there was a road which led from land to the east of the respondents' and which, pursuing a southeasterly course, connected with the county road. Some of the witnesses referred to that road as the Southwick road and others termed it the Holmes Creek road. The major part of it is owned by a concern engaged in the logging industry. If we have gained the correct conception of it, it is scarcely passable at its northwestern extremity. It is clear that it is not a public road and that the respondents have no right to use it.
*15 The appellants offered much evidence in an effort to show that a public road known as the Amstein Camas Valley road exists and that it affords the respondents access to and egress from their property. According to the record, a petition was filed in February, 1903, for the establishment of that road. Later the county surveyor and the viewers who were appointed performed the functions exacted of them by our laws. But, so far as the record shows, nothing further was done. Section 4785, Bellinger and Cotton's Code, which was then in effect, said:
So far as we know, that action was never taken and the road was never established. Mr. Frear, whom we have already mentioned, testified that the Amstein Camas Valley road is "only a road on paper, a paper road" and that the county never opened it nor spent a cent upon it. The trial judge took the commendable course of visiting the areas we have mentioned in an effort to gain a clearer conception of the facts. While one of the appellants' witnesses was upon the stand giving testimony which indicated that the Amstein Camas Valley road was open and subject to public use, the trial judge addressed him as follows:
The witness replied:
We think that the Amstein Camas Valley road never achieved even the status attributed to it by Mr. Frear's expression, "a paper road." Evidently the efforts to establish it were abandoned before the time occurred for the county court to enter the order authorized by § 4785, Bellinger and Cotton's Code.
In March, 1907, Jacob Denn, father of Henry J. Denn, who still owned large tracts east of the quarter section which he conveyed to his son in 1894, deeded to the latter:
In May, 1921, the heirs of the aforementioned Jacob Denn signed a quitclaim deed which conveyed to appellant Henry Denn's father the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 25,
The respondents argue that the provisions in those deeds for roadways warrant an inference that when Jacob Denn conveyed additional lands to his son he wished the assurance of written words that he would have access to his remaining lands which lay far west of the county road. They make the same argument concerning the deed executed by the heirs. In any event, the reservations indicate that the owners of land in the vicinity of the respondents got in and out by the contested road.
The deed which Jacob Denn and his wife gave to their son, Henry J. Denn in 1894 said:
The above is a review of all the evidence which indicates whether or not the property now owned by the respondents has had at any time access to and egress from a public highway except over the road which leads across the appellants' lands.
*18 We believe that the evidence clearly warrants a finding that for about seventy years before this suit was filed a road extended across the land now owned by the appellants. Evidently the road was in use for fifteen years or more before Jacob Denn, the grandfather of appellant Henry Denn, received the conveyance in 1893 of the thousand acres, which included all of the land now owned by the appellants and the respondents. It is that road which the decree of the Circuit Court holds is a way of necessity available to the respondents. We think that the road was clearly defined and that its purpose was obvious in 1894 when Jacob Denn gave his son a deed to the Southeast quarter of Section 26. It will be observed that the son, Henry J. Denn, father of appellant Henry Denn, upon receiving his father's deed, could not reach the quarter section which was given to him without crossing land owned by his father and which the latter retained. The father's retained land lay between the county road and the conveyed quarter section. Likewise, the father had no practical, if any, way of getting to or from his lands which lay west of the conveyed Southeast quarter of Section 26 without crossing the quarter section. Obviously, the route which both father and son were compelled to employ was the road in question. In short, the father crossed his son's land and the son crossed his father's. No one claims that either of them ever endeavored to deny the other use of the road. According to the evidence, a gate, or possibly more than one, was encountered along the road. We think, however, that the purpose of the gates was not to exclude those who were traveling to properties remote from the county road, but to restrain wandering livestock. The presence of the gates, of course, indicates that they were a part of fences which *19 bordered the road; in fact, some witnesses mentioned the fences. The latter further defined the course of the easement and set it apart from the adjacent fields. Finally, we are satisfied that no effort was made until recently to prevent anyone from using the road who had occasion to go to the respondents' 40-acre tract.
1. From § 474, Restatement of the law, Property, we take the following:
Manifestly, no one probed the mind of Jacob Denn in 1894 when he handed the aforementioned deed to his son, Henry J. Denn, and in that manner discerned his wishes concerning the contested road. But, as we see from the language just quoted, we are justified in analyzing the circumstances of which we have taken notice for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conveyor, by implication, reserved an easement over the conveyed tract.
From § 476, Restatement of the Law, Property, we quote:
It will be recalled that the deed which Jacob Denn gave to his son in 1894 was a general warranty deed. Although the appellants do not claim that the terms of that instrument preclude the existence of the alleged easement, we believe that it is well to take note of the following comment appended to § 476 of the Restatement, at page 2980:
That statement is followed with the following illustration:
At page 2981, the comment says:
The comment following § 476 says, at page 2982:
Going on we find at page 2983:
We resort again to the comment. This time to page 2985:
Finally, we take the following from page 2988:
Most of the above principles governing the implication of an easement by way of necessity have received recognition by this court. Some of our holdings are: Ford v. White, 179 Or. 490, 172 P.2d 822; Penn Mutual *24 Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 170 Or. 248, 132 P.2d 979; Dean v. Colt, 151 Or. 331, 49 P.2d 362; Beck v. Lane County, 141 Or. 580, 18 P.2d 594; Fendall v. Miller, 99 Or. 610, 196 P. 381; Tucker v. Nuding, 92 Or. 319, 180 P. 903; Brown v. Kemp, 46 Or. 517, 81 P. 236.
A well-reasoned decision by the Pennsylvania court, which the respondents called to our attention, is Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Wallace, 219 Penn. State 457. For a good short discussion, see 19 Or. Law Rev. 362. Nothing said in Malsch v. Waggoner, 62 Wash. 470, 114 P. 446, which has been submitted to us, detracts in any way from the rules interpreting the effect of evidence submitted for the establishment of an implied way of necessity. That decision says:
Those appellants were the owners of tract C.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the controlling principles of law any further. They are well set forth in the material we quoted from the Restatement. Most of the language which we took from the Restatement is not law, but common-sense reasoning. It appeals to us as sound and practical. It shows a superior method of determining whether or not an inference is warranted that an easement, of necessity, was impliedly granted or reserved.
*25 2. There remains for expression only our application of those principles to the facts before us. When Jacob Denn, in 1894, made his son, Henry J. Denn, a gift of the Southeast quarter of Section 26, he still owned large tracts of land west and east of the conveyed quarter section. Unless he employed the road in question, he could not reach his lands west of the conveyed quarter section except by pursuing a circuitous course through an undefined area which some of the witnesses termed "the back pasture." That route seemingly involved passage over the property of others. We know of nothing in the record which shows that any appreciable use was ever made of the back pasture route. We are satisfied that Jacob Denn never used it as a means of reaching the county road. The equivocal references to that route made by a couple of witnesses certainly cannot justify a holding that it constituted a practical means of reaching the property now owned by the respondents. The road in question was, we think, indispensable to both conveyor and conveyee. It was of reciprocal value to each. It afforded the father the means of reaching the lands to the west of the conveyed quarter section, and enabled the son to go from his newly-acquired tract eastward across his father's land to the public thoroughfare. When the father, in 1894, gave his son the deed, the road was well defined upon the ground and obvious to both conveyor and conveyee. It would be absurd to believe that the father who gave the deed as a gift, possibly in the nature of a family distribution, intended that the easement, of great value to him, should be blotted out. In view of all the circumstances and the fact that the conveyee paid nothing for the conveyance, we do not believe that the language of the deed, which is quoted in a preceding paragraph, forecloses *26 the alleged implied easement. We think that it is clear that both grantor and grantee intended to reserve, across the conveyed quarter section, a way of necessity, and that a similar easement was reserved in subsequent conveyances. In short, we believe that the alleged way of necessity exists, and that the decree of the Circuit Court is correct. That decree is affirmed.
Avery W. Thompson and William D. Green, Jr., of Roseburg, for appellants.
Geddes & Felker, of Roseburg, for respondents.
PETITION DENIED.
ROSSMAN, J.
3. The appellants' petition for a rehearing says:
Exhibit J was the inventory filed in the estate of Jacob Denn, deceased. It was signed in 1915 and listed the property which the deceased owned at the time of his death in 1915. The list included some land in Section 23, but, of course, does not indicate when it was acquired. As stated in our previous opinion, in language which the petition does not challenge, Jacob Denn received a deed in 1893 which conveyed to him approximately 1,000 acres of land lying in Sections 25, 26 and 35. The deed conveyed nothing situated in Section 23. One year after he received the conveyance *27 just mentioned he gave to his son, Henry J. Denn, the quarter section across which, our previous opinion held, he reserved an easement in the form of a road. The reservation which we recognized was not by express grant, but by implication. So far as the record indicates, Jacob Denn owned nothing in Section 23 when he made the gift. In determining whether or not the parties intended to reserve to Jacob Denn, the conveyor, an easement across the conveyed land, the court is, of course, controlled by the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the gift, that is, in 1894.
We do not know when Jacob Denn came into ownership of the property in Section 23 which the inventory lists. When we wrote our criticized sentence, we assumed that all would understand that we had reference to the crucial year, 1894. The facts mentioned in Exhibit J are immaterial.
The petition for a rehearing also says:
After receipt of the petition for a rehearing, we read the transcript of evidence again and once more examined all of the exhibits. The latter consist in large part of copies of deeds and other records. During the trial the court received in evidence, upon the proffer of appellants, copies of a county court record which was intended to establish as a public road a thoroughfare to be known as the Amstein Camas Valley Road. The record comprised many documents and the exhibit consisted of copies of the latter. The copies, *28 with the exception of one, were photostatic and all of the latter were fastened together. The single exception was a typewritten copy of an order which we will presently quote. It was not attached to the others. Across the top of the first page of the photostatic copies was written in large script this appellation: "Amstein Camas Valley Road." The single unattached typewritten sheet had no appellation.
The brief which the appellants filed when this cause was submitted mentioned no part of any of the records just designated. It did not allude to Exhibit 1 or to any document included within it and nowhere employed the name, Amstein Camas Valley Road. Before quoting the sole reference in the brief to that road, we explain that the word "roadway" and the phrase "another route to the county road through his own `back pasture'" in the quoted passage do not refer to the Amstein Camas Valley road. We now quote from the brief:
Thus, the only allusion in the entire brief to the purported Amstein Camas Valley road was this: "the other routes south and east."
4, 5. Due to the above circumstances, we overlooked *29 the typewritten copy of the part of the County Court's record which the appellants' petition for a rehearing mentions. The material part of that record follows:
We explained the circumstances in order to show how it happened that we overlooked the order and for the purpose of suggesting that whenever an exhibit consists of several papers they should be fastened together and marked in such a manner that they will be a unit. A brief should refer to an exhibit by an identifying name or symbol whenever reliance is placed upon it.
In view of the fact that the appellants' brief did not depend upon the alleged Amstein Camas Valley road, we would have been justified in ignoring the purported road, but since it commanded attention during the trial in the Circuit Court, our opinion gave it consideration.
When the order above quoted was made, § 4785, Bellinger and Cotton's Code, was in effect. The material part of that section is quoted in our original opinion. We do not believe that the order which the County Court entered met the requirements of *30 § 4785. It did not declare that the court was "satisfied that such road will be a public utility" nor did it order that the "report, survey and plat" be recorded. But, even if the order could be deemed adequate, still we do not believe that the order alone helped the appellants' cause.
6. Normally, an easement in the form of a way of necessity terminates when the necessity ceases, as through the construction of a public thoroughfare which serves the dominant estate. Since it was in 1894 that the father gave his son the quarter section over which it is said he reserved a roadway, the easement was created in that year if it was created at all. The order which it is claimed created the Amstein Camas Valley road was not signed until 1903. The appellants claim that it terminated the necessity for using the easement and thereby extinguished the easement. As our previous opinion points out, the Amstein Camas Valley road was never improved. The route which the surveyors selected for it remained in its natural state and was still in that condition on the day of the trial. For one to reach the respondents' land from the county road by means of the route surveyed for the unbuilt Amstein Camas Valley road would have necessitated travel for about a mile and a half through primeval land and, unless we are mistaken, over an unbridged stream. Our previous decision quotes from the testimony of Mr. A.F.C. Frear, who for 26 1/2 years has been the roadmaster of Douglas County, that the county never spent a cent upon the purported Amstein Camas Valley road. He referred to the latter as "a paper road." The trial judge who, as our opinion says, visited the area in which the properties in controversy are situated, could find no *31 trace of the Amstein Camas Valley road. Although diligent efforts were made by the appellants to show that this or that person had traveled upon some part of the so-called Amstein Camas Valley road, no one testified that he had done so. Even the name was a stranger in the ears of some of the witnesses. Plainly the route was never used or traveled.
7. In 1903, when the order which the petition cites was entered, the road upon which the respondents depend was twenty or so years old and had served Jacob Denn for nine years. We do not think that the mere adoption of the order of the County Court above quoted ended the necessity to use the road. The necessity was unaffected by the adoption of the order. The latter, if valid, and we do not think that it was, was immaterial to the issues of this case. Had the contemplated road been rendered usable, that fact would have been material.
The fact that the appellants' petition for a rehearing mentions the above details indicates that they misconstrued our opinion. In inferring that the father reserved, and that the son granted to the father, an easement over the conveyed land, we did not draw our inference from necessity alone. The necessity for a passageway was only one of the circumstances which we deemed significant. It may be that our use of the term "way of necessity" misled the appellants. That type is only one form of an implied easement. We will attempt to make matters clearer by going over some phases of the case again.
We did not interpret the evidence as indicating that when Jacob Denn, in 1894, gave to his son the quarter section over which the respondents claim he reserved an easement, the property which the father *32 retained west and southwest of the conveyed quarter section was landlocked. We thought that we made it clear that the father owned land to the north and east of the quarter section. That land extended all of the way to the county road which is indicated upon the plat which accompanies our previous decision. Possibly the father could have made his way to the county road by going over that land. The distance was about two miles. As nearly as we can glean from the record, the land north and east of the conveyed quarter section was partially covered with timber and crossed by a stream. It is through that area that the father would have been compelled to wend his way in going from the land which the respondents now own to the county road. No witness testified that anyone ever took that course, but, in theory at least, it was possible. Witnesses spoke of the "back pasture" route, but, as our previous decision indicates, that route went through Section 23, and it does not appear that the father owned any land there in 1894. Our opinion reviewed the testimony of witnesses who swore positively that the only means of getting from the land which the respondents now own to the county road was by means of the lane which our decision recognized as an easement. Very likely those witnesses, who were farmers and settlers, were concerned with practical matters and not with a theoretical way of going through the untamed land. We think that their testimony reflects the truth. We know of nothing in the record which shows that anyone drove a wagon from the property now owned by the respondents to the county road by any route except over the lane which we held is an easement. We reviewed these phases of the evidence again for the purpose of making it clear that (1) when *33 the father gave to his son a deed to the quarter section, the land which the respondents now own was not landlocked; and (2) the only practical method of going from the land now owned by the respondents to the county road was over the alleged easement.
As we have said, Jacob Denn in 1893 purchased a piece of land comprising one thousand acres which included the tracts now owned by the appellants and the respondents. It embraced all of the land over which the road extends. The thousand-acre tract was, roughly speaking, rectangular in shape and the road somewhat paralleled the longer sides of the rectangle. The road was nothing more than a wagon road in 1893, but its contours were plainly visible. Witnesses, in mentioning it, spoke of fences, gates and a cattle guard. Hence, it seems permissible to infer that the course of the road was defined, not only by the clearings through which it ran and the wagon tracks left behind by vehicles which had passed over it, but also by stretches of fence. The road was used by those who had occasion to leave the county road and visit the land which lay west of it comprising that which Jacob Denn acquired in 1893 and other land beyond his. The western extremity of the road was in the 40-acre tract which the respondents now own. Its eastern end was in the county road to which we have made frequent reference. Thus, the entire length of the road, about two miles, was upon property of which Jacob Denn was the owner.
Frequently when the owner of real property so employs it that one part of it receives a service which another part renders through the medium, for example, of a drain or a road, we term the road or drain a quasi easement in order to express more readily the *34 manner in which the favored part has become dominant and the other servient. When, in such instances, we use the term quasi easement, we realize the inaccuracy and recognize that normally no one can possess an easement over land which he himself owns. Yet the term quasi easement, when used in such situations, facilitates understanding.
In 1893, as we have seen, the western extremity of the road in question was in the 40-acre tract which the respondents now own, but which Jacob Denn had purchased in that year. When the road left that tract it shortly entered and then crossed the quarter section which the appellants now own, but which Jacob Denn then owned. Had Denn been familiar with legal terms and principles, he would have deemed the 40-acre tract as the dominant tenement, the quarter section as the servient tenement and the road as a quasi easement. The terms would have been inaccurate, but they would have served their purpose.
One year after the father made his purchase and the property had assumed the features which we just described, he gave to his son, Henry J. Denn, the quarter section which the appellants now own. We have just deemed it as the servient tenement. The conveyance severed the ownership and made possible a technical easement with its accompaniment of dominant and servient estates. The question which this appeal propounds is this: When the father made that gift, did he then intend to forego the road, surrender up his right to use it and authorize his son to erect a barrier where the road leading from the dominant tenement entered the servient one? Or did father and son intend to preserve the relationship of the two tenements to each other and reserve to the father an *35 easement across the conveyed property so that he could get in and out of his retained land without constructing a new road about two miles long?
We shall mention another fact. It received attention in our previous opinion. When the son received the conveyance of the quarter section, he had no way of getting to his property without using the very road with which we are concerned. The quarter section was completely landlocked. On three sides of it lay land owned by the father and on its fourth side was an area held by strangers. The road in question, after originating upon the 40-acre tract now owned by the respondents and crossing the quarter section, extended a mile easterly over lands held by the father, and in that manner reached the county road. Thus, the son himself needed a way of necessity, and the road in question was the very right of way which he required. It appears that he and his successors, the appellants, have constantly used it. It can, therefore, be inferred that when the father gave his son the quarter section he also gave him, as an appurtenance to the quarter section, an easement across the father's large tract to the east. That easement, in the form of a way of necessity, was a one-mile stretch of the road with which we are concerned.
When the dispute about the road arose about four years ago, both father and son were dead and, hence, no help could come from their lips. When the transaction between them took place nothing was written except the deed and, as our previous opinion states, it included a warranty. The latter is adverse to the respondents' contentions, but not fatal to them.
The evidence which indicates whether or not the father reserved, and the son granted, the alleged easement must be found in the circumstances which attended *36 the making of the gratuitous conveyance. There is nothing novel about the fact that we must look to circumstantial evidence, for the courts frequently resort to evidence of that kind.
The circumstances which show whether or not father and son intended that the road should remain open to the former are these: (1) The father after giving his son the quarter section still owned property west and southwest of the conveyed quarter section. (2) The conveyance to the son was unaccompanied by any consideration and was a gift. (3) The father had no practical means of access to or egress from his land west and southwest of the conveyed quarter section except by the road. (4) The son, after receiving the quarter section, had no means of going to or from it except over the part of the road which lay upon property owned by the father east of the quarter section; in other words, he had need of a way of necessity over the father's land. (5) The road had been in use for many years; its contours were well defined and plainly visible; its purposes were self-evident. (6) The land which the father retained west and southwest of the conveyed land lay almost two miles from the county road, and although no witness estimated the cost of building a road from the retained land to the county road, it is obvious that the cost would have been large. (7) The land over which the easement is claimed is the conveyed land. (8) Since the son had need for the part of the road which lay upon his father's land east of the quarter section, the easement in its entirety extended over land owned by both the father and the son.
The authorities devote much space to a delineation of the circumstances under which an implication may *37 be drawn that a quasi easement became a technical one upon severance of ownership. It is apparent that discord exists in the decisions and that many of them employ rules difficult of application.
In 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 34, page 694, it is said:
Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., § 502, says:
Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., § 781, states:
From 17 Am. Jur., Easements, § 34, page 948, we take the following:
8. It is seen from the passages which we quoted from the above authorities that the courts have employed various conflicting tests in determining whether upon severance of ownership a quasi easement became a technical one. One of the tests, it will be noticed, was whether or not the servitude was continuous or discontinuous. German Savings & Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 Or. 147, 102 P. 736, bestowed considerable analysis upon the distinction between a continuous and a discontinuous servitude, and then held:
To that extent at least that decision simplified the test for determination whether or not the parties intend, when severance of ownership occurs, that an existing servitude should become an easement. "Continuous or discontinuous" is no longer the test in this *41 state. "Conspicuity" was substituted by that decision for that phase of the text. Restatement of the Law, Property, § 476, expresses that feature of the test thus:
The German Savings & Loan Society decision was concerned with still another detail of the test. The case involved lots 1, 2, 7 and 8 of a subdivision of Portland. Lots 1 and 2 fronted upon Hood Street; lots 7 and 8, immediately to the rear of those lots, fronted upon Corbett Street. Upon lots 1 and 2 stood a dwelling house facing Hood Street. It was occupied by one Mrs. Leaner Gray, owner of the lots. In 1891 she conveyed lot 7, with the exception of a strip 5.125 feet wide off its north side, to the defendant who presently improved the part conveyed to him with dwelling house. Mrs. Gray converted the narrow strip she reserved into a passageway leading from Corbett Street to the rear of her house. Thus, her house, fronting as it did upon Hood Street, had access by means of the passageway to Corbett Street. The passageway was 5.125 feet wide and about 90 feet long. Later, Mrs. Gray mortgaged lots 1, 2 and 8 to the plaintiff, and still later defaulted in meeting the mortgage indebtedness. Through foreclosure sale the plaintiff became the owner of lots 1, 2 and 8. After the foreclosure sale and after a deed had been delivered to the plaintiff, Mrs. Gray conveyed to the defendant the fractional strip we have mentioned. The defendant then closed the passageway. This court affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court which held that the servitude to which Mrs. Gray subjected the strip when she was owner of the entire estate became an easement upon severance *42 of ownership. In so doing and in affirming the award of an injunction, the decision said:
That language renders it clear that reasonable necessity suffices. It should be observed that notwithstanding Mrs. Gray's home fronted for the width of two city lots upon Hood Street, access to Corbett Street by means of the contested passageway was sustained. That decision is by no means a novelty. Several others to like effect from other jurisdictions could be cited. Each depended, in part, upon the element of necessity although, in defining the latter, terms like "necessary for convenience and comfortable enjoyment" were used. Therefore, in the present instance, even though Jacob Denn might have been able to reach the county road through the back pasture, that circumstance would not in itself be fatal to the alleged easement.
By reverting to our original decision, it will be seen that it quoted in large part the test written by Restatement of the Law, Property, § 476. We believe that that test is in harmony with our prior opinions, although its phraseology is an improvement over the language which they employed. That test permits courts which are confronted with an alleged implied grant or reservation of an easement to give proper weight to all the evidence which bears upon the intention of conveyor and conveyee. It will be recalled *43 from the passage we quoted from Tiffany on Real Property that that writer deemed it "unfortunate that the courts, in determining whether in a particular case, an easement corresponding to a pre-existing quasi easement has passed with the land, have usually failed to recognize that the question is primarily one of construction." The rule offered by the Restatement deems the question one of construction and permits the courts to weigh all of the circumstances attendant upon the conveyance for the purpose of determining whether conveyor and conveyee intended that an easement should be created. So-called necessity is only one of the items to which attention should be given. In some instances, like those in which (1) an adequate consideration was paid, (2) the claimant is the conveyor and executed a warranty deed, (3) no reciprocal benefits resulted, and (4) the servitude was not clearly defined, necessity must be more pressing than in instances where other elements speak up in behalf of the alleged easement. The test suggested by the Restatement is merely a method of determining from the available circumstantial evidence whether or not conveyor and conveyee intended when the conveyance took place that a servitude, then in existence, should be preserved as an easement. If the parties had no thoughts at all upon the subject, then, since no easement was intended, none can be awarded by the court's decree. If they intended that the servitude should become an easement, the court's decree should give effect to their wishes.
9. As stated in our previous decision, we think that the circumstances clearly indicate that father and son intended that the existing servitude should remain as an easement, affording the father access to the county *44 road from the land which he retained west and southwest of the tract he gave to his son.
The above suffices for a consideration of everything submitted by the petition for a rehearing. The petition is denied.
Page, J., did not participate in this decision.
Bailey, J., dissents.
LUSK, C.J.
I think that the evidence establishes the easement in question, and therefore concur in the denial of the petition for rehearing. | 62b1a92106630f7ad57727d2eb5f40134c6345f1a58932b86fe0bba1fc7de1fd | 1949-12-13T00:00:00Z |
2c2d5534-2638-4cd5-907f-53e56ebc932b | Bosak v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48536)
En Banc
Submitted on the record July 31, 2001.
Margaret S. Olney, Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
filed the petition for petitioners.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the answering
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
PER CURIAM
Petitioners challenge the Attorney General's certified
ballot title for a proposed initiative denominated by the
Secretary of State as Initiative Petition 40 (2002). ORS
250.085(2). The proposed initiative, if approved, would
incorporate into the Oregon Constitution several new provisions
concerning the negotiation of wages and working conditions in
public sector workplaces in Oregon. The Attorney General's
certified ballot title is insufficient for the reasons described
by this court with respect to a similar ballot title for a
similar proposed measure in Novick/Bosak v. Myers, ____ Or ____,
____ P3d ____ (2001) (decided this date). For the same reasons,
we refer the ballot title in this proceeding to the Attorney
General for modification. ORS 250.085(8).
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification. | 25102a20f132a0958a187564700201028ce92cf149bdf7be94658084694d7e2a | 2001-11-30T00:00:00Z |
57a24bb4-15dd-4d1b-b2b4-f08d5b85cf0e | Con. Freightways v. West Coast Freight | 188 Or. 117, 214 P.2d 475 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Affirmed December 20, 1949.
Petition for rehearing denied February 7, 1950.
*118 James P. Cronan, Jr., of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Schafer & Holbrook and James A. Nelson, of Portland.
Earl F. Bernard, of Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Merwin Rankin and Collier & Bernard, of Portland.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, ROSSMAN, BAILEY and HAY, Justices.
*123 LUSK, C.J.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the Circuit Court in an action tried to the court without jury.
The action arose out of a collision on a public highway in the state of Washington between trucks owned and operated by the respective parties. The plaintiff, charging negligence against the defendant, sought to recover for the damages to its truck; the defendant denied negligence on its part, and, in a counterclaim which alleged that the accident was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff, asked judgment for the damages to its truck. After a trial the court entered detailed findings of fact, the effect of which is that the accident was proximately caused by the negligence of the plaintiff and that the defendant was free from negligence. As a conclusion of law the court found that the defendant was entitled to recover a judgment in the sum of $1,332.82 and judgment was entered accordingly.
No objection to the findings or request for other different or additional findings was made by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's brief contains two assignments of error, to the effect that the court erred in finding that the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence, *120 if any, was the proximate cause of the accident, both assignments being based on the claim that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. Counsel for the defendant urge that these assignments present no question for the consideration of this court, for the reason that the plaintiff made no objections to the findings entered and failed to request other, additional or different findings.
1. The procedure to be followed in cases of this sort is outlined in § 5-502, O.C.L.A., which is printed in the margin.[*] As originally enacted in 1862 this statute, while requiring the court to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law, contained no express provision for objections to, or requests for, findings. § 216, General Laws of Oregon 1845-1864 (Deady). Such provisions were added by amendments, first by Ch. 211, General Laws of Oregon 1925, and later by Ch. 165, General Laws of Oregon 1927. But whether under the statute in its original, or in its present form, it has uniformly been held that, in order to raise in the Supreme Court the question of the failure to make findings in accordance with a party's theory, the failure to find on an issue claimed to be material, or the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, the question *121 must first be brought to the attention of the trial court by objections to proposed findings or requests for other, different or additional findings. The most recent decision is McPherson v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 169 Or. 190, 196, 127 P. (2d) 344 (1942). Among many others applying the rule are School Dist. No. 106 v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 132 Or. 673, 676, 288 P. 196; Maddox v. McHattan, 111 Or. 324, 326, 327, 224 P. 833, 226 P. 427; Stroberg v. Merrill, 67 Or. 409, 410, 135 P. 335; Taffe v. Smyth, 62 Or. 227, 229, 125 P. 308; Harris v. Harsch, 29 Or. 562, 568, 46 P. 141; Tatum v. Massie, 29 Or. 140, 147, 44 P. 494; Noland v. Bull, 24 Or. 479, 481, 33 P. 983; Umatilla Irrigation Co. v. Barnhart, 22 Or. 389, 390, 30 P. 37; In re Fenstermacher, 19 Or. 504, 507, 508, 25 P. 142; Hicklin v. McClear, 18 Or. 126, 138, 22 P. 1057.
2, 3. Three of our decisions are cited by the plaintiff to the proposition that "It is error to make a finding of fact with no satisfactory evidence to support it." Northwest Oil Co. v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 168 Or. 570, 123 P. (2d) 985; Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper & Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P. (2d) 1391; Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber Co., 149 Or. 126, 184, 40 P. (2d) 703. With the substitution of the word "substantial" for "satisfactory", there can be no doubt of the correctness of the rule stated. But the question here, is how the error shall be made to appear, and, as has been frequently said, it is not error alone, but error legally excepted to, which constitutes ground for reversal. While formal exceptions are no longer required, except in the specific instances mentioned in Ch. 257, Oregon Laws 1941, it is still required that the appellant must first, in some fashion, have made his objection or request for a ruling to the trial court *122 (Williams v. Ragan, 174 Or. 328, 337, 143 P. (2d) 209); in this instance in the manner already pointed out. As to the cases above cited, on which the plaintiff relies, it appears that in each of them the appellant made his record by objections to the findings and requests for findings.
The plaintiff also cites Burke Machinery Co. v. Copenhagen, 138 Or. 314, 6 P. (2d) 886, in which this court considered the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is true, as counsel for the plaintiff say, that the printed abstract does not show that objections to the findings were made in that case. The original record, however, which is on file here, discloses that the appellant filed with the trial court both objections to the challenged findings and a request for a finding that there was no evidence to support certain allegations of the complaint. The case is not authority for the plaintiff's position.
There is no contention that the findings do not support the judgment, and, as there is no other question properly before us, the judgment is affirmed.
PETITION FOR REHEARING DENIED.
Schafer, Holbrook & Cronan, James P. Cronan, Jr., and James A. Nelson, of Portland, for the petition.
Collier & Bernard and Merwin Rankin, of Portland, contra.
Before LUSK, Chief Justice, and BRAND, ROSSMAN, BAILEY and HAY, Justices.
LUSK, C.J.
The argument of the appellant in support of the petition for rehearing is to the following effect: The statute in effect when many of the decisions cited in our former opinion were rendered, and which stand for the necessity of objections to, or requests for, findings, in order to raise in this court the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, did not mention such objections or requests. That statute (§ 216, General Laws of Oregon 1845-1864 (Deady)) read:
5. Specific provisions as to objections to, and requests for, findings did not come into the statute until its amendment by Ch. 165, General Laws of Oregon 1927, now § 5-502, O.C.L.A., which is set out in full in our former opinion. It is conceded that the decisions of this court, prior to 1927, support the view that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be *124 raised on appeal unless it has first been raised in the trial court in the manner heretofore stated. It is argued, however, that the 1927 amendment changed all this because its provisions are purely permissive and do not require a party either to object to findings or to request findings. It is sought to fortify the argument by reference to the principle that, where the legislature has permitted to stand undisturbed over a period of years an interpretation of a statute by this court, an assumption of legislative approval of such interpretation may be indulged. Ryan v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 154 Or. 563, 567, 568, 61 P. (2d) 426. From these considerations the conclusion is drawn that the legislature, by the 1927 amendment, intended to provide a different practice on appeal than that which had formerly prevailed.
6. We think the conclusion is a non sequitur. Since the original statute said nothing of objections to findings or requests for findings, the decisions prior to 1927 were not an interpretation of that statute. They were simply the application to a particular situation, and against the background of the statute, of a settled general rule of practice in this state, to wit: that in actions at law, whether tried to a jury or by the court without a jury, error of law, such as is assigned here, will not be considered on appeal unless it is made to appear by a bill of exceptions. This is the basis of the decisions in Stroberg v. Merrill, 67 Or. 409, 135 P. 335; Taffe v. Smyth, 62 Or. 227, 229, 125 P. 308, and in the other cases cited in our former opinion.
7. Consequently, we think that there is no merit in the suggestion that the legislature intended by the 1927 enactment to deal in any way with appellate procedure. That amendment was an implementation *125 of the prevailing practice. Its purpose was to prescribe rules for that practice: to fix the time within which requested findings, either special or general, must be served on the opposing party, the time for presenting objections to such requested findings, and to allow time for objections to findings prepared by the court. In one sense there has never been any requirement of statute, or otherwise, that the defeated party in the Circuit Court must follow the practice of objecting to findings or requesting findings. He could always do as he liked about it. But, in another sense, if he wished to appeal and invoke this court's consideration of certain types of error, including the error assigned on this appeal, the practice is today, and always has been, compulsory: the objection must be made or the finding requested, and the adverse ruling thereon brought to this court, with the evidence, in a bill of exceptions. The 1927 amendment discloses no intention to change that practice.
The petition for rehearing will, therefore, be denied.
[*] "Upon the trial of an issue of fact by the court, its decision shall be given in writing, and filed with the clerk during the term or within twenty days thereafter. The decision shall consist of either general or special findings without argument or reason therefor. All parties appearing in the case shall have the right to request either special or general findings, and if any findings are requested by any party litigant such requested findings shall be served upon all the other parties who have appeared in the case and such adverse parties may, within ten days after such service, present to the trial judge objections to such proposed findings or any part thereof and request other, different, or additional findings. When the findings are prepared by the court or judge thereof, a copy of such findings shall be served upon, or mailed to, all parties appearing in the case or their attorneys ten days before the same are filed, and any party litigant may, within such ten days, object thereto and request other, different, or additional findings. Nothing herein contained shall prevent the court from shortening the time in which to file objections or request other, different, or additional findings or prevent the parties to the case stipulating or agreeing to the findings to be entered." | 2179f8a75d5b59201b069b379ef2befca3ceca2a25e2c303071e67b76daf6cc0 | 1949-12-20T00:00:00Z |
ac54bf05-888b-4679-9a03-c0c0a8f6d5ae | Bacote v. Johnson | null | S47861 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DENNIS BACOTE,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DAN JOHNSON,
Superintendent,
Snake River Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 98-06-29826M; CA A105109; SC S47861)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 7, 2001.
Bob Pangburn, Caldwell, Idaho, argued the cause and filed
the brief for petitioner on review. With him on the brief was
Rebecca Neal-Richardson, Caldwell, Idaho.
Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and Balmer Justices.**
LEESON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals regarding assessment of
costs is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court regarding
assessment of costs is reversed. The case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court, J. Burdette Pratt, Judge. 169 Or App 44, 7 P3d 729 (2000).
**De Muniz, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
LEESON, J.
In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner alleged
that he had received inadequate assistance of counsel at trial
and that his sentences were illegal. The circuit court denied
relief and assessed costs against petitioner in the amount of
$975. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Bacote v. Johnson, 169 Or
App 44, 46, 7 P3d 729 (2000). That court declined to address
petitioner's argument regarding costs of appointed counsel,
because it believed that petitioner had not preserved that
argument. Id. This court allowed review of only two issues:
whether petitioner preserved his argument and whether the circuit
court erred in assessing $975 in costs of appointed counsel
without first determining petitioner's ability to pay those
costs. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals regarding costs, reverse the circuit court's
assessment of costs, and remand the case to the circuit court.
The following facts are not in dispute. In June 1998,
petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
that the sentences he had received after pleading guilty to
charges of attempted assault and delivery of a controlled
substance were illegal and that he had received inadequate
assistance of counsel. Petitioner also filed an affidavit of
indigence and requested appointed counsel to represent him in the
post-conviction proceeding. The circuit court appointed counsel
to represent petitioner. After the court denied relief on the
merits of petitioner's claim, the court stated that it intended
to order petitioner to repay the costs of his appointed counsel.
The parties agree that the court was relying on ORS 151.505 (1)
as
authority for ordering petitioner to repay the costs of court-appointed counsel. Petitioner objected to the assessment of
costs as follows:
"[COUNSEL]: * * * On behalf of [petitioner] I
object to the imposition of the $975.00 in attorney
reimbursement fees. The basis for my objection is that
there's been no showing that [petitioner] has the
ability to pay. There has not even been an inquiry as
to whether he has the ability to pay that he -- without
undue hardship. He is indigent, he has been declared
indigent by this Court. He [is] scheduled to be in the
institution for still some period of time and he is --
and those rare occasions when he is employed he is
making maybe less than one twentieth of minimum wage.
Consequently -- and that money still has to go to pay
for shaving supplies, health care products * * *,
tennis shoes, things of that nature. Consequently, we
believe that he is unable to pay and that it should not
be imposed."
"THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll have -- indicate copies of the order and judgment need to be
sent to the parties. Anything else we need to
address?"
(Emphasis added.) The court included in its judgment an order
requiring petitioner to repay $975, the amount that petitioner's
court-appointed counsel had charged the state to represent him in
the post-conviction proceeding.
On appeal, petitioner assigned error to the circuit
court's failure to make a determination that petitioner is or may
be able to pay costs. As noted, a panel of the Court of Appeals,
with one judge dissenting, declined to address that claim on the
ground that petitioner had not preserved it. Bacote, 169 Or App
at 46. We begin with the preservation issue.
Petitioner contends that his objection challenged the
circuit court's authority to impose the costs of appointed
counsel under ORS 151.505 because there had been no determination
that petitioner is or may be able to pay costs. Petitioner's
objection at the post-conviction hearing stated, in part, that
"[t]here has not even been an inquiry as to whether [petitioner]
has the ability to pay." That objection was sufficient to alert
the court and defendant to petitioner's claim that the court
erred in assessing costs under ORS 151.505 without first
determining his ability to pay those costs. See State v. Wyatt,
331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (holding party must provide
trial court with explanation of objection specific enough to
ensure that court can identify alleged error and correct it
immediately if correction warranted). The Court of Appeals erred
in holding that petitioner had failed to preserve that issue. We
turn to the merits, namely, whether the circuit court erred in
assessing $975 in costs of appointed counsel without first
determining petitioner's ability to pay those costs.
Petitioner contends that ORS 151.505(4) requires the
court to determine that a person is or may be able to pay the
costs of appointed counsel before the court may impose costs. He
argues that nothing in the record indicates that the court made
that kind of determination in his case. Defendant responds that
petitioner's objection to the assessment of costs demonstrated
that he had the ability to pay costs, because his objection
established that he earns at least some money when he works in
prison. Moreover, defendant contends, a reviewing court should
presume that the circuit court complied with the requirements of
ORS 151.505(4) so long as there is evidence in the record to
support its order.
To resolve the parties' dispute over what a court must
do in determining a person's ability to pay costs under ORS
151.505, we must construe the statute. Our task is to discern
the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020; (2) see PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(summarizing methodology for construing statutes).
By its terms, ORS 151.505(1) authorizes a trial court,
at the conclusion of a case or matter filed after January 1,
1998, to include in its judgment an order requiring a person who
has received appointed counsel to repay in full or in part the
costs of the legal and other services related to the provision of
appointed counsel. ORS 151.505(2) identifies the costs that are
repayable under ORS 151.505, which include a reasonable attorney
fee and a reasonable amount of expenses authorized under ORS
135.055. ORS 151.505(3) provides that costs under the statute do
not include costs imposed and paid under a previous order under
ORS 151.487. However, costs under the statute may include costs
imposed under ORS 151.487 that are unpaid at the time when the
judgment is filed.
ORS 151.505(4) is the source of the interpretive
dispute in this proceeding regarding a person's ability to pay
costs. That subsection contains a limitation on the authority
that is granted in ORS 151.505(1). A court may not order a
person to pay costs unless the person "is or may be able to pay"
the costs. The words "is" and "may be able to" refer to the
person's present or future ability to pay costs. Only a person
who presently is able, or who may be able in the future, to pay
costs may be ordered to do so. Subsection (4) further provides
that the determination of the person's ability to pay costs and
the amount of costs to be repaid "shall be subject to the
guidelines and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator
under ORS 151.487." The term "shall" is a command expressing
what is mandatory. See Preble v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 320, 324,
14 P3d 613 (2000) (so stating). Finally, subsection (4) directs
the court to determine the amount and the method of payment of
costs. The statute provides that the court, in making that
determination, "shall take account of" the person's financial
resources and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will
impose.
ORS 151.505(4) thus contemplates a two-step process.
First, the court must determine if the person is or, in the
future, may be able to pay costs and the amount of costs to be
repaid. The determination of the person's ability to pay costs
and the amount of costs to be repaid is subject to the guidelines
and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator. Next,
assuming that the person has the ability to pay costs, the court
must determine the amount and the method of payment of costs. In
making that determination, ORS 151.505(4) directs the court to
"take account of" the person's financial resources and the nature
of the burden that payment of costs will impose.
As noted, this case involves only the first step of
that two-step process. Under that step, the statute provides
that the determination of a person's ability to pay and the
amount of costs to be repaid is subject to the guidelines and
procedures issued by the State Court Administrator. Because the
legislature has declared in mandatory terms how the court is to
determine the person's ability to pay costs and the amount of
costs to be repaid, the record must indicate that the court made
that determination subject to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the State Court Administrator.
In this case, after petitioner objected to the
imposition of costs on the ground that there had been no inquiry
about his ability to pay, the circuit court merely noted the
objection and then imposed costs equal to the amount that
petitioner's court-appointed counsel had charged the state to
represent petitioner. We find no indication in the record that
the court made the determination of petitioner's ability to pay
costs and the amount of costs to be repaid in the manner
prescribed by ORS 151.505(4), namely, subject to the guidelines
and procedures issued by the State Court Administrator.
The decision of the Court of Appeals regarding
assessment of costs is reversed. The judgment of the circuit
court regarding assessment of costs is reversed. The case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. ORS 151.505 provides, in part:
"(1) At the conclusion of a case or matter in
which the first accusatory instrument or petition in
the trial court was filed after January 1, 1998, and in
which the court appointed counsel to represent a
person, a trial * * * court may include in its judgment
an order that the person repay in full or in part * * *
the costs of the legal and other services that are
related to the provision of appointed counsel.
"(2) Costs repayable under this section include a
reasonable attorney fee for counsel appointed to
represent the person and a reasonable amount for
expenses authorized under ORS 135.055. * * *
"(3) Costs repayable under this section do not
include costs imposed and paid under a previous order
under ORS 151.487, but may include costs imposed under
an order under ORS 151.487 that are unpaid at the time
the judgment is filed.
"(4) The court may not order a person to pay costs
under this section unless the person is or may be able
to pay the costs. In determining the amount and method
of payment of costs, the court shall take account of
the financial resources of the person and the nature of
the burden that payment of costs will impose. The
determination of the ability of a person to pay costs
and the amount of costs to be paid shall be subject to
the guidelines and procedures issued by the State Court
Administrator under ORS 151.487."
2. The legislature amended ORS 174.020 in 2001. Or Laws
2001, ch 438. Those amendments relate, in part, to a court's use
of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes. Those
amendments apply only to actions commenced on or after June 18,
2001. Or Laws 2001, ch 438, §§ 2 & 3. Petitioner filed his
petition for post-conviction relief on June 24, 1998. Therefore,
the amendments to ORS 174.020 do not apply in this case. | ef116887de750488b17b8700b0f8b9a07b1f3b95758263599db511e1ea753b75 | 2001-11-30T00:00:00Z |
8222f85c-8457-4f7e-ac39-13adc6baae68 | Bosak v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 19, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48563)
On modified ballot title filed October 11, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioners.
David F. Coursen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With him on
the filing were hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*332 Or 552, ___ P3d ___ (2001) (referring ballot title for
modification).
**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 45 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Bosak v. Myers, 332 Or
552, ___ P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. The
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title for the
proposed initiative measure, and no party to the ballot title
review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot title and
requiring court to certify modified ballot title if no objection
filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 45
(2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOWS WORKPLACE
EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY RECOGNIZED
UNION TO REFUSE TO PAY FOR UNION
REPRESENTATION 'SERVICES'
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allows
individual employee in workplace represented by union
to refuse payment for undesired union 'services'
without modifying union's obligation to represent each
employee.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
law, rejects allowing union workplace employee to
refuse payment for undesired union 'services' without
modifying union's obligation to represent each
employee.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Under current
law, when majority of workplace employees select union
as collective bargaining representative, that union
must fairly represent all employees, may negotiate
agreement requiring all employees to contribute to
representation costs. Measure allows an individual
employee to refuse to pay for representation 'services'
by identifying unwanted 'services' in writing. Measure
does not change union's existing obligation to bargain
for and represent all covered employees. Measure does
not define 'service' or provide formula for valuing
specific 'services.' Measure affects existing contract
provisions that require payment for representation;
expressly prohibits future contracts from requiring
such payment. Measure requires union to notify
employees of right to withhold payment to union and
prohibits discrimination or harassment of employee for
exercising that right. Imposes penalties. Other
provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | cd931f53497ea26633240952622acd2767fd0c63fa2d86630e2c50b3844ba338 | 2001-10-19T00:00:00Z |
675dddeb-6b5f-4ed7-81b7-36931bd3a1ba | State v. Riley | null | S46399 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
WENDY LOUISE RILEY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 97-CR-0081-AB; CA A98342; SC S46399)
On petition for review filed April 29, 1999.*
Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for petitioner on review. With him on the petition was
David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001).
*On appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Alta J. Brady, Judge. 158 Or App 649, 976 P2d 79 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case. Justice Thomas A. Balmer did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case. | 0b305b338853fc7d9bbca4e15414e96083e0190c52135e31e91aabccb056e20b | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
ac05d9f8-fd60-475d-a3df-2750107ce7c0 | Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly | null | S070879 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 292
May 16, 2024
No. 15
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
James SASINOWSKI,
Petitioner,
v.
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
OREGON,
Respondent.
(SC S070879)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title filed February 27, 2024;
considered and under advisement on April 23, 2024.*
James Sasinowski, Eugene, filed the petition and reply
memorandum pro se.
Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
Also on the memorandum were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
PC, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Oregon Ranked
Choice Voting Advocates and Blair Bobier.
GARRETT, J.
The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
______________
* Ballot title for Legislative Referral 403 (2024), prepared by the Joint
Legislative Committee for LR 403 on February 16, 2024.
Cite as 372 Or 292 (2024)
293
GARRETT, J.
Petitioner seeks review of the ballot title prepared
for Legislative Referral 403 (2024) (LR 403), which the 2023
Legislative Assembly referred for the voters’ consideration
at the upcoming November 2024 General Election. Or Laws
2023, ch 220. Petitioner challenges all parts of the ballot
title, asserting lack of compliance with requirements set out
in ORS 250.035(2). Or Laws 2023, ch 366, §§ 1, 4(1).1 We
review the ballot title to determine whether it substantially
complies with those requirements. See id. § 4(4) (setting out
that standard). For the reasons explained below, we agree
with petitioner in part, and we refer the ballot title to the
Attorney General for modification of the caption and the
“yes” result statement. See id. § 4(6) (explaining modifica-
tion process).
We begin by providing a summary of LR 403. The
referral would amend ORS chapter 254 to require “ranked
choice voting” for the primary and general elections for
President of the United States, United States Senators and
Representatives, Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer,
Attorney General, and Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor
and Industries; it also would permit local governments to
adopt ranked-choice voting in their elections (unless prohib-
ited by home-rule charter). Or Laws 2023, ch 220, §§ 2, 3.
As defined in LR 403, ranked-choice voting would permit—
but not require—a voter to rank on their ballot multiple
candidates and write-in candidates, in order of the voter’s
preference. Each cast ballot would be counted as one vote
for each voter’s “highest-ranked active candidate.”2 Ballots
then would be tallied in rounds; if an active candidate were
1 In addition to permitting a challenge asserting lack of compliance with
ORS 250.035(2), section 4(1) of Oregon Laws 2023, chapter 366, permits a peti-
tioner to contend that the ballot title did not substantially comply with a different
section of that Oregon Laws chapter. Petitioner’s challenge is limited to ORS
250.035(2).
As noted later below, the ordinary word-count limits set out in ORS 250.035(2)
do not apply to the ballot title for LR 403; all other provisions of ORS 250.035(2)
apply, however.
2 An “[a]ctive candidate” means a candidate who has not withdrawn, been
defeated, or been nominated or elected. Or Laws 2023, ch 220, § 4(6)(a). A “[h]
ighest-ranked active candidate” means the active candidate “assigned to a higher
ranking on a ballot than any other active candidate.” Id. § 4(6)(b).
294
Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly
to receive a majority of votes cast in the first round, then
that candidate would be elected (or nominated, as applica-
ble). Id. § 4(2)(a), (b)(A). But, if no active candidate were to
amass a majority of votes, then (1) the candidate with the
fewest votes would be defeated (and so no longer would be
an active candidate); (2) the votes that had been counted
for that defeated candidate would be “transferred to each
ballot’s next highest-ranked active candidate”; and (3) a new
round of tallying would begin. Id. § 4(2)(b)(B). That same
process would continue until an active candidate amassed a
majority of votes in a final round of tallying. Id.
LR 403 contains several other provisions, including
a series of definitions. Id. at § 4(6). It also would direct the
Secretary of State to (1) adopt implementing rules, includ-
ing as to the number of candidates and write-in candidates
that could be ranked on a ballot, as well as to educate voters
about ranked-choice voting; and (2) analyze current election
laws and make a report to the legislature about any incon-
sistency with LR 403 and its cost of implementation. Id.
§§ 5, 16. As to local governments, LR 403 expressly would
not limit, restrict, or preempt the authority of any home-
rule jurisdiction that adopted ranked-choice voting between
November 8, 2016, and the effective date of LR 403. Id. § 3(4)
(b). If approved by the voters at the November 2024 General
Election, all the provisions of LR 403 described above
(except the provision about the Secretary of State’s analysis
of election laws and report to the legislature) would become
operative on January 1, 2028, and would apply to elections
conducted after that date. Id. §§ 18(1), 19.3
After the 2023 session, a joint legislative commit-
tee prepared a ballot title for LR 403 and filed it with the
Secretary of State. See Or Laws 2023, ch 366, § 1 (setting
out that process for any legislative referral approved during
the 2023 session). The ordinary word limits for ballot titles
do not apply to LR 403; however, the content requirements
3 LR 403 would enact other statutory changes that are not summarized in
the joint legislative committee’s ballot title, all of which would become operative
on January 1, 2028. Or Laws 2023, ch 220, § 18. The provision directing the
Secretary of State to analyze the election laws and make a report to the legis-
lature, id. § 16, would be effective 30 days after the 2024 General Election and
would be repealed on January 2, 2027. Id. § 17; see also Or Const, Art IV, § 4(d)
(specifying effective date for initiative or referendum measures generally).
Cite as 372 Or 292 (2024)
295
for each element of a ballot title for a state measure to be ini-
tiated or referred—set out in ORS 250.035(2) and discussed
further below—do apply. Id. §§ 1(1), 4(1). We review the bal-
lot title for substantial compliance with those requirements.
Id. § 4(4). If we determine that modification is required,
then we may refer the ballot title to the Attorney General
for modification. Id. § 4(6).
The joint legislative committee prepared the follow-
ing ballot title for LR 403:
“GIVES VOTERS OPTION TO RANK CANDIDATES IN
ORDER OF PREFERENCE; CANDIDATE RECEIVING
MAJORITY OF VOTES WINS.
“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote gives voters the option to
rank candidates in order of preference for specified federal
and statewide offices. Establishes process for tallying votes
in rounds, with the candidate receiving the fewest votes
in each round being defeated and votes for the defeated
candidate going to the voter’s next-highest ranked active
candidate. Requires that candidate must receive majority
of votes to win election.
“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote maintains current voting
system. Voter selects one candidate for federal and state-
wide offices. Candidate with most votes wins. Majority of
votes not required for candidate to win election.
“Summary: Current state law requires voters to select
only one candidate for each office on the ballot. The candi-
date with the most votes after a single vote tally wins, even
if not a majority. This measure gives voters the option to
rank candidates in order of preference using ‘ranked choice
voting.’ Under the measure, voters may choose to rank only
one candidate or multiple candidates for each office, as well
as write in candidate(s). Votes are counted toward each vot-
er’s highest-ranked candidate. If no candidate receives a
majority of votes, votes are tallied automatically in rounds.
The candidate receiving the fewest votes in each round is
defeated. A defeated candidate’s votes go to the voter’s next
highest-ranked candidate. The process continues until one
candidate has a majority of votes. The measure applies to
the nomination and election of President, United States
Senator, Representative in Congress, Governor, Secretary of
State, State Treasurer and Attorney General, and election
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.
296
Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly
The measure requires the Secretary of State to establish a
program to educate voters about how ranked choice voting
elections will be conducted. Authorizes local governments
to adopt ranked choice voting for elections for local offices.
Local governments that adopted ranked choice voting before
2025 may continue to use current method or modify it. The
measure applies to elections beginning in 2028.”
Petitioner challenges all parts of the ballot title. See
Or Laws 2023, ch 366, § 4 (describing process to file a peti-
tion in this court, seeking a different title). We agree with
one of petitioner’s arguments—as applied to the caption and
the “yes” result statement—as explained next.4
Petitioner contends that, throughout the ballot title
for LR 403, the word “majority” is used inaccurately and
without proper context. He specifically argues that “majority
of votes” suggests that a candidate has received the major-
ity of total votes cast, but, in operation, ranked-choice vot-
ing—as LR 403 would establish—can produce a winner who
does not receive that type of “majority” vote. That is most
notably so, petitioner explains, because rounds of tallying
after the first round do not count all votes cast; instead, they
count only votes cast for active candidates, while other votes
may be discarded. He argues that, without that important
context, the words “majority of votes” inaccurately describe
ranked-choice voting and thus render the ballot title non-
compliant with applicable statutory requirements.5
For its part, the Legislative Assembly agrees
that receiving a “majority of votes” under ranked-choice
4 Petitioner raises an additional challenge to the ballot title for LR 403, con-
cerning a purported transition to centralized tabulation, which we reject without
discussion.
Petitioner also raises arguments that appear to challenge LR 403 itself—
namely, that ranked-choice voting violates various constitutional provisions. We
do not address those arguments, which do not fall within the scope of this ballot
title proceeding. See Nearman v. Rosenblum, 358 Or 818, 825-26, 371 P3d 1186
(2016) (explaining and citing cases for the proposition that determinations as to
the constitutionality of a proposed measure are not within the scope of the ballot
title certification process).
5 Petitioner characterizes votes counted for active candidates in ensuing
rounds of tallying as “active votes,” but LR 403 does not use that wording. By con-
trast, as noted earlier, it defines an “[a]ctive candidate” as a candidate who, “for
the election at which ballots are being tallied,” has not withdrawn, been defeated,
or been elected (or nominated).
Cite as 372 Or 292 (2024)
297
voting—as set out in LR 403—means the majority of votes
counted for active candidates in the final round of tallying,
as opposed to the majority of total votes cast. The Legislative
Assembly argues, though, that the word “majority” through-
out the ballot title is unlikely to meaningfully mislead vot-
ers. For example, both the “yes” result statement and the
summary add clarifying detail, explaining that the tally-
ing of votes proceeds in rounds, such that a candidate who
receives a “majority of votes”—meaning in the final round of
tallying (which necessarily would include active candidates
only)—wins. Alternatively, in the event that we agree with
petitioner that the word “majority” is so inaccurate as to ren-
der the ballot title noncompliant with ORS 250.035(2), the
Legislative Assembly suggests that we could refer the ballot
title to the Attorney General for modification of the caption
and the “yes” result statement, to state that the “candidate
receiving majority of votes in the final round wins.”
We agree with petitioner that the caption must be
modified. The caption of a ballot title for a referred state
measure must “reasonably identif[y] the subject matter” of
the measure. ORS 250.035(2)(a). As set out in the caption of
the ballot title for LR 403, the words “Candidate Receiving
Majority of Votes Wins” would most readily be understood by
voters to mean the majority of votes cast, but that does not
accurately describe the measure. (Emphasis added.) As the
parties agree, the word “majority” in the caption does not
mean the majority of votes cast; instead, under the ranked-
choice voting process set out in LR 403, it means the majority
of votes counted for active candidates in a final round of tal-
lying. And, importantly, no accompanying contextual word-
ing appears in the caption to help voters understand that
intended meaning. It follows that the caption does not rea-
sonably identify the subject matter of LR 403 and therefore
requires modification. See Hurst v. Rosenblum, 366 Or 260,
263, 461 P3d 978 (2020) (caption should “state or describe
the proposed measure’s subject matter accurately and in
terms that will not confuse or mislead *
*
* voters” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Towers v. Rosenblum, 354 Or
125, 129, 310 P3d 1136 (2013) (caption is the “headline” of
the ballot title, “provid[ing] the context for the reader’s con-
sideration of the other information in the ballot title[,] and
298
Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly
must describe the proposed measure’s subject matter accu-
rately” (internal quotation marks omitted)).6
Similarly, we agree with petitioner that the “yes”
result statement also must be modified. A “yes” result state-
ment must set out a “simple and understandable statement
*
*
* that describes the result” if a referral for a state measure
is approved. ORS 250.035(2)(b). The “yes” result statement in
the ballot title for LR 403 describes the ranked-choice voting
process of counting votes in rounds of tallying, including the
elimination of some candidates, with only “active” candidates
remaining; it then states, in its final sentence, that a candidate
“must receive majority of votes”—again meaning the majority
of votes counted for active candidates in the final round—to
win election. On one hand, unlike the caption, the first part
of the “yes” result statement provides some preceding context
to help suggest that, in the final sentence, “majority of votes”
means the majority of votes counted in a final round, for only
active candidates. However, a voter just as easily could under-
stand the final sentence as standing apart from the sentence
that precedes it; that is, regardless of the preceding context,
a reader might erroneously understand the words “[r]equires
that candidate must receive majority of votes to win election”
to mean that a candidate must receive the majority of votes
cast. In light of those competing readings, we conclude that
the “yes” result statement does not substantially comply with
ORS 250.035(2)(b) and therefore requires modification. See
Hurst, 366 Or at 268 (“yes” result statement required modifi-
cation because it was “ambiguous and therefore open to mis-
interpretation by a reasonable voter”).
We disagree with petitioner, however, that the “no”
result statement and the summary in the ballot title for LR
403 require modification.
The “no” result statement must set out a “simple and
understandable statement *
*
* that describes the result” if
6 Petitioner further contends that, in addition to adding context about count-
ing votes for only active candidates in a round of tallying, the ballot title for LR
403 must add contextual information about counting only “active votes.” We dis-
agree. As noted earlier, LR 403 does not use the wording “active votes”; moreover,
with the inclusion of contextual information about counting votes for only active
candidates, the ballot title will necessarily convey that some votes—for defeated
candidates—ultimately may not be counted.
Cite as 372 Or 292 (2024)
299
the referral or measure “is rejected.” ORS 250.035(2)(c). To
explain current law, the second sentence of the “no” result
statement in the ballot title for LR 403 first states that a voter
selects only one candidate. Then, the third sentence states
that the candidate with the “most votes wins.” (Emphasis
added.) Together, those sentences accurately describe the
result if LR 403 is rejected. Although the final sentence of
the “no” result statement—which in effect describes LR 403
as a contrast to current law—uses the phrase “[m]ajority
of votes” without providing additional contextual informa-
tion about how ranked-choice voting works, that sentence
does not detract from the import of the second and third
sentences. The “no” result statement therefore substantially
complies with statutory requirements.
The summary must set out a “concise and impar-
tial statement *
*
* summarizing the *
*
* measure and its
major effect.” ORS 250.035(2)(d). The summary in the ballot
title for LR 403 thoroughly describes the ranked-choice vot-
ing process, including the elimination of one or more candi-
dates through rounds of tallying. That description provides
sufficient context for voters to understand that the words
“majority of votes” in the summary means the majority of
votes counted for active candidates in a final round of tally-
ing. Stated differently, the word “majority” is not inaccurate,
ambiguous, or likely to mislead the voters. The summary
therefore substantially complies with statutory require-
ments. See McCann v. Rosenblum, 354 Or 701, 710, 320 P3d
548 (2014) (rejecting arguments that a ballot title summary
was misleading, in light of additional wording in the sum-
mary that provided sufficient context to adequately describe
a key component of the measure).7
In sum, we conclude that the caption and “yes”
result statement in the joint legislative committee’s ballot
title for LR 403 require modification, to more accurately con-
vey that a “majority” of votes means a majority of the votes
counted for active candidates in a final round of tallying. We
7 As already explained, we reject petitioner’s argument that the ballot title—
including the “no” result statement and the summary—fails to substantially
comply with statutory requirements because it omits information about counting
only “active votes” in ensuing rounds of tallying.
300
Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly
therefore refer the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification.
The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General
for modification. | 47bb4d36b17b9b332f5588d6928aaadd3127b35e878cd11046496a1775a06484 | 2024-05-16T00:00:00Z |
68c256df-d20e-4863-ad83-2d10a21b6092 | Hotchalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod | null | S069765 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 12
May 2, 2024
249
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
HOTCHALK, INC.,
both individually and derivatively on
behalf of Concordia University,
aka Concordia University—Portland,
Plaintiff-Relator,
v.
LUTHERAN CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD;
Lutheran Church Extension Fund—Missouri Synod,
Concordia University System;
Concordia University, St. Paul; Concordia University,
aka Concordia University—Portland;
Charles E. Gerken; Kathleen Hone; Terry Wilson;
Jerry Baltzell; David O. Berger; Michael Borg;
Charles E. Brondos; Gerald Koll; Paul Linnemann;
Jeff Oltmann; Kurt Onken; Timothy Pauls; Bev Peloquin;
Rod Wegener; Sam Wiseman; Brian T. Yamabe;
Thomas John Zelt; Thomas Ries; Richard Doughty;
Concordia Foundation; Chris Dunnaville;
George Thurston; Lutheran Church Extension Fund;
John Andrea,
Defendants-Adverse Parties.
(CC 20CV15620) (SC S069765)
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted June 22, 2023.**
James T. McDermott, McDermott Weaver Connelly
Clifford LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for plaintiff-relator. Also on the briefs was Gabriel M.
Weaver.
______________
* On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Eric L. Dahlin, Judge.
** Bushong, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case. Nakamoto, J., Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral
argument, but did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
250
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
Timothy R. Volpert, Tim Volpert. P.C., Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. Also on the brief
were Thomas L. Hutchinson and Laura C. Caldera Loera,
Bullivant House Bailey PC, Portland.
In a combined brief, Rian Peck, Visible Law LLC,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyers Association; Peter Janci, Crew Janci LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae CHILD USA, Zero
Abuse Project, and Oregon Abuse Advocates & Survivors
in Service, with Shiwanni Johnson, Crew Janci LLP, also
on the brief; Meg Garvin, The National Crime Victim Law
Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School, filed the brief for
amicus curiae The National Crime Victim Law Institute;
and Kristian Roggendorf, The Zalkin Law Firm, San Diego,
California, filed the brief for amicus curiae The National
Center for Victims of Crime.
Colton L. Stanberry, The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Washington, D.C., filed the brief for amicus curiae
The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty. Also on the brief
were Eric C. Rassbach and Nicholas R. Reaves.
Herbert G. Grey, Portland, filed the brief for amici cur-
iae Religious Organizations the General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, Queens Federation of Churches,
and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Also
on the brief were Gene C. Schaerr and James C. Phillips,
Schaerr | Jaffe LLP, Washington, D.C.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, James and Masih, Justices, and Walters, J., Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
JAMES, J.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as improvi-
dently allowed.
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)
251
252
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
JAMES, J.
HotChalk, LLC1 filed suit against the Lutheran
Church—Missouri Synod (Synod) and 22 other defendants,
alleging breach of contract and fraud, among other claims,
in the closure of Concordia University - Portland (the uni-
versity). HotChalk alleges that the Synod orchestrated the
university’s closure to financially enrich itself and its affili-
ates while freezing out the university’s creditors. During the
course of discovery, the Synod sought a protective order under
ORCP 36 C to shield from disclosure a subset of documents
related to internal religious matters. The trial court con-
ducted in camera review, then issued the protective order—
in essence, denying a motion to compel discovery of those
documents. HotChalk filed a petition for mandamus, and we
issued an alternative writ. As we now explain, our statu-
tory authority to issue a writ of mandamus is limited: “[A]
writ shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.”2 ORS 34.110. Because we conclude that HotChalk has
not established that the normal appellate process would not
constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case,
we dismiss the alternative writ as improvidently allowed.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the facts from the record in the underlying
trial court proceedings. Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
361 Or 115, 117 n 1, 390 P3d 1031 (2017). In 2018, HotChalk
and the university entered into a 20-year contract—the
Administrative Services Agreement (ASA)—under which
the parties agreed to share costs and tuition revenue to sup-
port and grow the university’s educational programs. The
ASA required the university to make weekly revenue share
payments to HotChalk. In return, HotChalk was responsi-
ble for a proportional amount of operational expenses and
for providing services to support the university’s marketing,
1 HotChalk was originally registered as a corporation but has since changed
corporate form to a limited liability company.
2 We are not called upon to decide, and do not decide, whether this court’s
constitutional mandamus authority is so limited, see Oregon Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 2 (“[T]he supreme court may, in its own discretion, take original
jurisdiction in mandamus[.]”).
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)
253
recruiting, enrollment, student support services, and infor-
mation technology.
After that contract was executed, the Synod—which
is a synodical union of certain Lutheran congregations—
closed the university. HotChalk filed this civil action against
the Synod raising claims that focused on the alleged role
that the Synod played in the university’s closure. HotChalk
sent the Synod its first request for production, requesting
that the Synod produce all Synod board meeting minutes,
all communications between the defendants, all documents
and communications related to the university’s closure, and
any documents and communications concerning HotChalk.
After the parties agreed on search terms, the Synod pro-
duced more than 33,000 documents, including handbooks,
bylaws, other governing documents for the Synod and its reli-
gious affiliates, and final minutes of its Board of Directors
meetings since 2016.3
The Synod moved under ORCP 36 C for a protec-
tive order limiting the scope of permissible discovery by
prohibiting HotChalk “from discovering (1) internal church
communications related to religious doctrine; (2) internal
church communications regarding church governance; and
(3) internal church communications regarding employment
decisions, including who, if anyone, should be approved as
the president of [the university].”4 The Synod argued that
the production of those “private religious communications”
would violate the Synod’s First Amendment right to freely
exercise its religious beliefs, including church governance
and selection of ministers and other employees. The Synod
argued that the framework articulated by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F3d 1147
(9th Cir 2010), applied to this case. Under that framework,
the party opposing discovery must make a “prima facie
3 By the time of this mandamus proceeding, the Synod had produced “about
180,000 documents” in response to HotChalk’s requests for production. The total
ultimately withheld pursuant to the trial court’s protective order was roughly
1500, approximately 0.83% of the total discovery in the case.
4 Another defendant, Concordia University System (CUS), joined the Synod
in the motion for a protective order. CUS advanced the same arguments as the
Synod and was ultimately subject to the trial court’s protective order before the
trial court granted CUS’s motion to dismiss. HotChalk is currently pursuing an
appeal of that dismissal order in the Court of Appeals (A179825).
254
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
showing of arguable First Amendment infringement.” Id. at
1160.5 After that showing has been made, the burden then
shifts to the party requesting discovery to show, among
other things, that the information being sought is “highly
relevant” to the requesting party’s claims and that discov-
ery would not unduly infringe on protected activity. Id. at
1161.
In response, HotChalk argued that the trial court
should deny the motion for a protective order because there
was no First Amendment privilege for the documents that
the Synod sought to protect. Instead, HotChalk argued that
the trial court should apply the regular discovery standard
provided in ORCP 36 B(1), which allows parties to “inquire
into any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim
or defense of the party seeking discovery.”6 Under that rule,
discovery is not limited to information that would be admis-
sible at trial “if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
During a hearing on the Synod’s motion for a pro-
tective order the trial court equated the Synod’s motion to
a motion under ORCP 36 C to restrict discovery “to protect
a party or person from *
*
* embarrassment.”7 Rather than
issuing any substantive rulings, the trial court deferred
5 In Perry, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning relied solely on case law dealing
with associational rights protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 1160-61.
Because we decide this case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether
Perry can be appropriately applied to other First Amendment rights, including
those at issue in this case.
6 ORCP 36 B(1) provides:
“For all forms of discovery, parties may inquire regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seek-
ing discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not a ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the informa-
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence.”
7 ORCP 36 C provides, in part:
“On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make
any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including *
*
* that
the discovery not be had.”
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)
255
full argument and decision until it could perform in camera
review of the withheld documents. The trial court ordered
the Synod to compile a numbered list of those documents so
that it could randomly select a subset of them for review.8
After completing its final in camera review, the trial
court granted the Synod’s motion for a protective order. After
some further hearings clarifying the order, HotChalk ulti-
mately filed a timely petition for mandamus in this court.
This court issued an alternative writ of mandamus direct-
ing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause
why the trial court should not do so. The trial court declined
to vacate its order. As a result, the parties proceeded to
argument in this court. Among other issues addressed in
the briefing, the Synod argued that the writ should be dis-
missed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
II. ANALYSIS
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and serves
a limited function.” Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or 338, 347, 297
P3d 1266 (2013). ORS 34.110 governs the issuance of a writ
and provides, in part:
“A writ of mandamus may be issued to any inferior court
*
*
* to compel the performance of an act which the law spe-
cially enjoins *
*
*; but though the writ may require such
court *
*
* to exercise judgment, or proceed to the discharge
of any functions, it shall not control judicial discretion. The
writ shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.”
To determine whether mandamus will lie, we
engage in a two-pronged inquiry. First, we assess whether
the trial court had a legal duty to act in a certain way. State
ex rel. Maizels v. Juba, 254 Or 323, 327, 460 P2d 850 (1969)
8 Initially, the Synod had withheld approximately 2,017 documents. While
compiling the numbered list for the trial court, the Synod removed several doc-
uments from its asserted privilege because they were (1) third-party documents
or (2) publicly available. The Synod also discovered and produced two documents
that mentioned the university’s finances. Ultimately, the Synod provided the trial
court with a list of 1,534 documents that it sought to withhold from production.
256
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
(“Generally, the court has said that when the facts are not in
dispute and there is a clear rule of law requiring the matter to
be decided in a certain way, mandamus will lie.”). Accordingly,
mandamus is appropriate to review only obligatory—not dis-
cretionary—action. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or
413, 421-22, 255 P2d 1055 (1953), overruled on other grounds
by Maizels, 254 Or 323 (“It has become hornbook law in this
state that the writ of mandamus cannot be used as a means
of controlling judicial discretion, nor as a substitute for appel-
late review. The statute restricts its use to instances involv-
ing the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.
Mandamus will never lie to compel a court to decide a matter
within its discretion in any particular way.”).
The second preliminary question that we consider
is whether the party seeking the writ has other means of
recourse and, if so, whether the relief provided thereby is
“plain, speedy, and adequate[.]” ORS 34.110; see also Durham
v. Monumental S. M. Co., 9 Or 41, 44 (1880) (“The existence,
or non-existence, of an adequate and specific remedy at law
under the ordinary forms of legal procedure, is *
*
* one of
the first questions to be determined in all applications for
the writ of mandamus[.]”).
The fact that this court issued an alternative writ
at the outset of a mandamus proceeding does not resolve
whether those preliminary requirements are met. See, e.g.,
Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp., 363 Or 810, 813, 429 P3d 727
(2018) (dismissing writ after briefing and argument); State
ex rel. Portland Habilitation Center, Inc. v. PSU., 353 Or
42, 51 n 4, 292 P3d 537 (2012) (considering a circuit court’s
issuance of an alternative writ and explaining that the cir-
cuit court was required to dismiss that writ if it later deter-
mined that the preliminary requirements were not met);
State ex rel. Le Vasseur v. Merten, 297 Or 577, 582, 686 P2d
366 (1984) (dismissing alternative writ after concluding that
relators had an adequate remedy at law); State ex rel. Boe v.
Straub, 282 Or 387, 389-90, 578 P2d 1247 (1978) (same).
Before us, the Synod argues that HotChalk is not
entitled to mandamus relief because the issues that it raises
can be resolved on direct appeal and that HotChalk has not
established that direct appeal is not an adequate remedy
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)
257
in this instance. The Synod cites State ex rel. Anderson v.
Miller, 320 Or 316, 324, 882 P2d 1109 (1994), and State ex.
rel. Automotive Emporium, Inc. v. Murchison, 289 Or 265,
611 P2d 1169 (1980), for the proposition that, generally,
relief from a discovery ruling must be pursued through an
ordinary appeal and that “[d]irect appeal is an adequate
remedy unless the relator would suffer a special loss beyond
the burden of litigation by being forced to trial.” Murchison,
289 Or at 269; see also Fredrickson, 363 Or at 813-14 (to
same effect).
The Synod is correct that we have previously cau-
tioned that the availability of mandamus to resolve a discov-
ery dispute is limited: “[N]ot every pretrial discovery order
is subject to mandamus,” because “[m]any pretrial discovery
errors do not have systemic implications and can be reme-
died on appeal.” Anderson, 320 Or at 324; Murchison, 289
Or at 268 (stating that mandamus in the discovery context
is generally inappropriate because “direct appeal is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy”). In Murchison, this court rea-
soned that “the prospect of suffering the burden of litigation”
was insufficient in itself to justify mandamus. 289 Or at 269.
The court concluded that appeal was a “plain, speedy and
adequate” remedy so long as the relators did not “suffer[
]
an irretrievable loss of information and tactical advantage
[that] could not be restored to them on direct appeal.” Id.
That rule is not absolute, and, on occasion, we have
issued writs of mandamus to resolve issues of pretrial dis-
covery. For example, in Anderson, this court concluded that
appeal was not a sufficient remedy where the trial court had
denied the relator’s request to record a deposition via vid-
eotape. 320 Or at 323. In that case, the trial court issued a
“protective order requiring that the deposition be recorded
stenographically only and that videotape not be used.” Id.
at 318. This court concluded that appeal would not remedy
that error because the method used to record and present
deposition testimony at trial could have a subtle yet signifi-
cant impact at trial:
“Use of tape recorders, video tape, and similar devices may
facilitate less expensive procedures. They have a further
advantage in that the finder of fact at trial often will gain
258
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
greater insight from the manner in which an answer is
delivered and recorded by audio-visual devices. Moreover,
a recording, video tape, or a motion picture of a deposition
will avoid the tedium that is produced when counsel read
lengthy depositions into evidence at trial.”
Id. at 323 (quoting 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure 426, § 2115 (1970) (footnotes omitted)).
As another example, in Gwin v. Lynn, 344 Or 65,
70-71, 176 P3d 1249 (2008), the relator had sought to depose
a witness who, although designated as an expert, was also
involved in the cases in a direct and personal way. When the
relator sought to depose the witness because of her direct
involvement in the actions giving rise to that case, the
opposing party objected on the grounds that they planned
to call her as an expert witness at trial, and the trial court
sustained that objection. Id. at 69.9 Before this court, the
relator argued that he had a right to depose the witness on
matters not covered by the bar on expert discovery. Id. at
70-71. We issued the writ, concluding that a witness may
be both an expert and a fact witness and, therefore, may
be deposed concerning only those facts pertinent to the wit-
ness’s direct involvement in or observation of the relevant
events. Id. at 67.
In this case, in its petition for a writ of manda-
mus, HotChalk claimed that mandamus was appropriate
“because the trial court’s order proscribes discovery into
key aspects of HotChalk’s complaint” and “direct appeal is
not *
*
* adequate [to] remedy” that purported error. At the
petition stage, HotChalk asserted that, “without knowing
the content of the communications improperly withheld as
privileged, [it] will be prejudiced in prosecuting its validly
pleaded tort and contract claims.” However, in its briefing
in this court, HotChalk does not reply to the Synod’s argu-
ment in its brief on the merits or to the cases that it cites.
HotChalk asserts only that relief on appeal would “come too
late.” But, HotChalk does not give us more.
9 As this court has previously stated, while ORCP 36 B authorizes discovery
of any relevant nonprivileged matter, it does not authorize trial courts to order
pretrial disclosure of the identity and intended testimony of expert witnesses.
Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 84 P3d 140 (2004).
Cite as 372 Or 249 (2024)
259
HotChalk has not addressed Murchison at all, let
alone persuaded us that the general rule of Murchison—that
“[a]ny claim of prejudice arising from a denial of discovery
is reviewable on direct appeal”—is not applicable. 289 Or at
268. HotChalk has not persuaded us that whatever harm it
may have suffered as a result of the trial court court’s rul-
ing equates to the type of irretrievable loss of information
and loss of tactical advantage discussed in Murchison. In
particular, we note that the trial court ordered the Synod
to produce a detailed privilege log with entries for each of
the withheld documents. Given that log, the nature of the
dispute and parties’ arguments, and the records in the pro-
ceeding below, HotChalk does not explain how direct appeal
would be inadequate, and, on this record, we perceive no
impediment to meaningful appellate review sufficient to
make traditional appeal an inadequate remedy so as to jus-
tify the extraordinary relief of mandamus.
Accordingly, we now conclude, as we did in
Fredrickson, that “the questions raised in the mandamus
petition are better resolved in the ordinary trial and appel-
late process.” 363 Or at 813. We therefore exercise our discre-
tion to decline to resolve those questions on mandamus, and
we dismiss the alternative writ as improvidently allowed.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as
improvidently allowed. | e8b7357c2b69da0f370514064a79ff0c5e1dfc57e65e02c4007fd234fdcfd800 | 2024-05-02T00:00:00Z |
65c09d63-2fec-4749-8444-a06db3e472cc | State v. Villeda | null | S070188 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 108
March 21, 2024
No. 6
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JULIO CESAR VILLEDA,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 19CR08759; 20CR10192)
(CA A175679 (Control); A175680) (SC S070188)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 9, 2023.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender, Criminal Appellate Section.
James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Gary Walter Higgs.
Rosalind M. Lee, Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae
Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Also on the
brief were Stacy M. Du Clos, Nora E. Coon, and Daniel C.
Silberman.
BUSHONG, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
* Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Oscar Garcia, Judge. 324
Or App 502, 526 P3d 1213 (2023).
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
109
110
State v. Villeda
BUSHONG, J.
A jury convicted defendant of two domestic violence
offenses, acquitting him on more serious charges, including
rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his domestic partner. Before
trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror stated that she
did not think that she could be fair and impartial because
she had several close friends who had been sexually assaulted
and that would influence her if she sat on the jury. The trial
court denied defendant’s request to excuse that prospective
juror for actual bias after hearing her responses to additional
questions posed by the court and the prosecutor. The prospec
tive juror did not sit on the jury that decided the case because
defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse
her. In appealing his convictions, defendant contended that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s
for-cause challenge to that juror. The Court of Appeals agreed
and further concluded that the error was prejudicial because it
resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. State v. Villeda,
324 Or App 502, 526 P3d 1213 (2023).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge
for cause, but we conclude that the error did not prejudice
the defendant “in respect to a substantial right” as required
for reversal under ORS 131.035. As explained below, the
error did not interfere with defendant’s right to a fair trial
before impartial jurors, and whatever impact the error may
have had on how defendant used his peremptory challenges
did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to
a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Fanus, 336
Or 63, 83, 79 P3d 847 (2003), cert den, 541 US 1075 (2004).
Because the trial court has the advantage of observing the
juror’s demeanor, a trial court’s decision on a challenge for
cause “is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed
absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. The trial court’s
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
111
discretion, however, is limited by the law that governs chal
lenges for cause for actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(g) (defin
ing actual bias);1 ORS 136.210(1) (adopting ORCP 57 D(1)(g)
standards for jury selection in criminal cases); State v.
Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998) (describing
abuse of discretion standard). The fact that a juror “has
preconceived ideas about a matter relevant to the case is
not determinative.” Barone, 328 Or at 74. Rather, the test
“is whether the prospective juror’s ideas or opinions would
impair substantially [their] performance of the duties of a
juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evi
dence presented in court.” Id.
B. The Jury Selection Process in This Case
The relevant facts—involving the steps taken by
the trial court during the jury selection process, also known
as voir dire—are procedural and undisputed.
At the start of the jury selection process, the court
read the charges in the indictment and asked if any of the
prospective jurors had personal views about this type of
case—involving allegations of domestic violence, including
charges of rape, sodomy, and physical assault—that might
affect their ability to be fair and impartial jurors. Juror 155
raised her hand. When defense counsel asked juror 155 why
she might not be able to be fair and impartial, she stated, “I
have several close friends who have been sexually assaulted
or raped” and “that would influence how I would participate
in this.” When asked to explain further, juror 155 stated,
“Well, I think generally when I hear about cases of sexual
1 ORCP 57 D(1)(g) provides that challenges for cause may be taken for actual
bias. The rule defines actual bias as
“the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that satisfies the court,
in the exercise of sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the issue impar
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging
the juror. Actual bias may be in reference to the action; either party to the
action; the sex of the party, the party’s attorney, a victim, or a witness; or a
racial or ethnic group of which the party, the party’s attorney, a victim, or a
witness is a member, or is perceived to be a member. A challenge for actual
bias may be taken for the cause mentioned in this paragraph, but on the trial
of such challenge, although it should appear that the juror challenged has
formed or expressed opinion upon the merits of the cause from what the juror
may have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain
the challenge, but the court must be satisfied, from all the circumstances, that
the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try the issue impartially.”
112
State v. Villeda
abuse or rape, I tend to give credibility to the survivor. And,
so, while I can still presume that [defendant] is innocent, I
think my natural inclination is [to] stand with the survivor.”
When defense counsel asked the juror if she could
put that view aside, she stated, “I’m not sure if I could put
it aside.” Defense counsel then asked the juror if she had “a
reasonable doubt about [her] ability to be fair to [defendant]
in this case,” and she replied, “Yes.” Defense counsel then
asked the court to excuse juror 155 for cause.
The court did not immediately rule on that request.
Instead, the court spoke to the pool of prospective jurors
about the role of the jury, explaining that, although the cir
cumstances of the case might remind a person of their own
life experiences, that does not necessarily mean that the
person cannot be a fair and impartial juror. The court then
asked juror 155 the following question:
“Do you think you could put those feelings aside *
*
*
and be neutral, fair when you hear the evidence here *
*
*
and then if it’s creeping back, wait, I know I have these
feelings, but I can’t let them—no, no, I got to listen. I got to
be fair to both sides *
*
*.
“And then hear the evidence and then follow the law
as I give it to you and just in essence, you know, to be fair.
I mean, do you think you could do that *
*
* if you were a
juror in this case?”
Juror 155 replied:
“Yes, I think so. I think, again, that my natural inclina
tion would be to lend more support to the victim survivor,
but I think I could check my biases and my past under
standing of these issues.”
At that point, the court permitted questioning of the pro
spective jurors to continue.
Later, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors
if anyone believed that a woman would not lie about being
raped. Juror 155 raised her hand and confirmed that her con
cern was the same as what she previously explained. Juror
155 also indicated that she agreed with defense counsel’s
statements that a woman would not lie about being raped
by someone that she was in a relationship with, and that a
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
113
woman would not lie “in court” about being raped. Defense
counsel then asked juror 155 if she thought she would be a
good juror for this case, and she replied that she thought she
would be “biased” or “really emotional.”
The court and prosecutor then inquired further:
“THE COURT: Ma’am, *
*
*we gave you a chance to hear
other folks*
*
*? And again, you know, you heard my defini
tion of what we’re looking for, everybody here *
*
* to be fair
and * *
* kind of keep *
*
* those emotions aside if you can* *
*.
So, do you think, ma’am, that you can do it in this case?
“[JUROR 155]: I don’t think I could keep my emotions
to the side. Even just being in the room is just difficult.
“THE COURT: And would those emotions not allow
you to be fair to one side.
“[JUROR 155]: Yeah. I don’t think they would allow
me to be fair.”
The court then allowed the state to inquire further:
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. [Juror 155], I can
see you’re getting a little upset, and I totally understand.
The good news is that we’re not here to decide whether or
not rape is a crime. There are certainly—it’s a crime within
the books, and there are other heinous crimes that defi
nitely happen in the courthouse that *
*
*would be hard to
listen to. There’s child abuse. There’s murder. And nobody
is asking you not to be a human when you’re hearing that.
The question is when the judge tells you that, you know,
you’re to follow the law and to weigh the evidence as it’s
presented, do you think that’s something you could do?
“[JUROR 155]: To weigh the evidence as it’s presented?
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Mm-hmm. The evidence and
the law as its presented.
“[JUROR 155]: Yes.”
Defense counsel again challenged juror 155 for
cause, and the court denied the challenge. The court also
denied defense counsel’s request for additional peremptory
challenges. At the end of the jury selection process, defense
counsel used one of defendant’s six peremptory challenges
to excuse juror 155 and used the other five peremptory
114
State v. Villeda
challenges to excuse other prospective jurors. Defense coun
sel did not challenge for cause any of the jurors who were
eventually seated on the jury, although counsel did state
that the defense would have used peremptory challenges to
excuse jurors 128 and 305 if two more peremptory challenges
had been available.2 Defense counsel did not challenge those
jurors for cause, contend that they did not qualify as fair and
impartial jurors, or explain why he would have excused those
jurors peremptorily if he had more peremptory challenges.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defen
dant guilty of endangering a person protected by an order
under the Family Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 163.192, and
assault in the fourth degree constituting domestic violence,
ORS 163.160(2). The jury found defendant not guilty on the
other charged offenses, including rape, sodomy, and sexual
abuse of his domestic partner.
Defendant appealed his convictions, and the Court
of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court abused
its discretion in rejecting defendant’s for-cause challenge to
juror 155, Villeda, 324 Or App at 512, and that the conse
quence of that error “was to force defendant to use a peremp
tory challenge, effectively reducing the number of peremp
tory challenges available for other prospective jurors.” Id.
at 514. That amounted to prejudice within the meaning of
Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution,
the court reasoned, in part based on this court’s description
of “prejudice” in State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 577, 789 P2d
1352 (1990). Thus, the court concluded that “prejudice arises
from the erroneous rejection of a for-cause juror challenge if,
as here, the defendant makes a record that a lost peremp
tory challenge would otherwise have been used against a
juror who sat.” Villeda, 324 Or App at 514.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant’s Challenge for Cause Based on Actual Bias
In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant has the
right to a trial “by an impartial jury.” Or Const, Art I, § 11.
That right “is a matter which is and should be guarded
2 Juror 305 sat on the jury that decided the case. Juror 128 was empaneled to sit
on the jury but was later released due to illness and replaced by an alternate juror.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
115
zealously by the courts, and the courts should guarantee
that juries consist of impartial persons.” Lambert v. Srs. of
St. Joseph, 277 Or 223, 230, 560 P2d 262 (1977). “The test
of a juror’s disqualification [for actual bias] is the probabil
ity of bias or prejudice” as determined by the trial court.
Montez, 309 Or at 575; see also State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455,
474, 17 P3d 1045 (2000) (stating that the trial court deter
mines excusal for actual bias “by looking at the totality of
the potential juror’s voir dire testimony to discern whether it
suggests the probability of bias”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In considering the totality of the circumstances,
we have explained that a court must give more weight to
a juror’s unprompted statements of bias, and less weight to
any statements made in response to statements or leading
questions by counsel or the court designed to “rehabilitate”
a juror who had disclosed a preexisting bias. For example,
in Lambert, at the beginning of the jury selection process in
a medical malpractice case, one prospective juror indicated
that he knew one of the defendant doctors and stated that
he would be biased in favor of that doctor. 277 Or at 226.
Because the plaintiffs had exhausted their peremptory chal
lenges, that juror was seated on the jury, which returned a
verdict for the defendants.
On appeal, we reversed, concluding that the trial
court should have excused that juror for cause because his
“substantial probability of bias” deprived the plaintiffs “of
the right to have their issues determined by an impartial
juror.” Id. at 231. We explained that the trial court’s fail
ure to excuse the juror for cause amounted to “a manifest
abuse of the discretion vested in the court,” because a juror’s
“[i]nitial reactions or answers given in voir dire without
undue debate and confinement of issues should be afforded
much greater weight in determining [the juror’s] true frame
of mind.” Id. That is because “[e]arly answers or reactions
more truly indicate the juror’s frame of mind as opposed to
later generalized statements that the juror would be fair.”
Id. Thus, we concluded that answers given by a juror early
in the jury selection process—before any efforts at reha
bilitating the juror—must be given “[s]pecial emphasis” or
116
State v. Villeda
“particular significance” in assessing a prospective juror’s
actual bias. Id.
We apply the same principles in criminal cases. For
example, in State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 531, 789 P2d 1326
(1990), a capital case, we held that a trial court did not err in
excusing one prospective juror for actual bias where, “[w]ith
out equivocation, [the juror] explained his views and the effect
that they would have on his ability to be an impartial juror
at the beginning of his voir dire testimony.” The defendant
in Nefstad argued that the trial court had erred in excusing
the prospective juror for cause because the defendant had not
been “given a chance to rehabilitate [the juror] on issues the
trial court felt provided a legal basis for exclusion” in violation
of his statutory and constitutional rights. Id. We disagreed,
noting that ORS 136.210(1) gave the defendant a statutory
right to examine prospective jurors as to their qualifications,
and the defendant’s counsel had been given two opportunities
to question the juror. Id. at 531-32. Moreover, we explained,
examining a juror is different from rehabilitating the juror,
because “the purpose of the voir dire examination was inves
tigation, not persuasion.” Id. at 533. We therefore concluded,
“
‘[w]hen it satisfactorily appears from the examination of a
person called as a juror that [they possess] such a state of
mind that [they] cannot try the issues impartially, the intro
duction of further testimony would be superfluous.’
” Id. (quot
ing State v. Miller, 46 Or 485, 487, 81 P 363 (1905)).3
Thus, we recognized in both Lambert and Nefstad
that (1) a party does not have a right to rehabilitate a biased
juror; (2) a juror’s unprompted statements of bias should be
given special weight; and (3) attempting to persuade a juror
that they could be fair despite their expressed biases inter
feres with the court’s effort to assess whether the prospective
3 We also noted that the statements of another prospective juror in Nefstad
“were equivocal” and that that juror had “given admittedly contradictory
responses” regarding his personal views about the death penalty. Id. at 536, 538.
We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing that
juror for actual bias because the juror’s voir dire testimony, taken as a whole,
“established that his views on the death penalty would have interfered substan
tially with and impaired his performance as a juror in accordance with his oath
and the court’s instructions.” Id. at 538. We explained that a prospective juror in
a capital case “may be excused on [those] grounds without violating the defen
dant’s right to an impartial jury.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
117
juror’s “probability of bias” is sufficient to excuse the juror
for cause.
Legal scholars and empirical studies support those
conclusions. One commentator observed that juror reha
bilitation “gets little support from social science research
as a method to ensure impartial juries.” Kathleen Wright,
Friends and Foes in the Jury Box: Walls v. Kim and the
Mission to Stop Improper Juror Rehabilitation, 53 Mercer
L Rev 929, 941 (2002) (examining the practice of juror reha
bilitation in Georgia in the context of a specific case).4 Other
research has confirmed what we recognized in Lambert:
Juror “rehabilitation” is ineffective at best and likely detri
mental to the court’s goal of ensuring that all jurors are fair
and impartial.5 See Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of
the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 Ga L Rev 1471, 1487
(2003) (noting that judicial rehabilitation of jurors is a com
mon tool that is used to increase the efficiency of trials and
advocating for “close scrutiny” of the practice of juror reha
bilitation); Barbara O’Brien & Catherine Grosso, Judges,
Lawyers, and Willing Jurors: A Tale of Two Jury Selections,
98 Chi Kent L Rev 107, 112 (2023) (noting that, “[w]hen
jurors say something to suggest a bias of any sort, judges
often attempt to rehabilitate that juror” but concluding that
that effort is ineffective in addressing juror bias); Jessica M.
4 In the case addressed by the Wright article, Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga App
259, 259, 549 SE2d 797, 799 (2001), aff’d, 275 Ga 177, 563 SE2d 847 (2002), the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that some trial judges attempt to “rehabilitate”
jurors by asking them if they can set aside their biases and decide the case solely
on the evidence and the law, and then retain “these purportedly rehabilitated
jurors.” The court explained that “the better practice is for judges *
*
* to remove
such partial jurors, even when the question of a particular juror’s impartiality is
a very close call.” Id. 250 Ga at 260, 549 SE2d at 799.
5 Several commentators have noted that juror rehabilitation is especially inef
fective when it is done by a judge. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian
Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire,
the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv L & Pol’y Rev 149, 160
(2010) (stating that “empirical research suggests that potential jurors respond more
candidly and are less likely to give socially desirable answers to questions from law
yers than from judges” (citing Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 Law & Hum Behav 131
(1987))); Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative
Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 Law & Hum Behav 212, 213 (2010)
(describing an empirical study that revealed that, “not only do venirepersons pro
vide less candid information to judges than to attorneys, but also judges elicit inac
curate information from venirepersons due to their choice of questions”).
118
State v. Villeda
Salerno, John C. Campbell, Hannah J. Phalen, Samantha
R. Bean, Valerie P. Hans, Daphna Spivack & Lee Ross, The
Impact of Minimal Versus Extended Voir Dire and Judicial
Rehabilitation on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in Civil Cases, 45
Law & Hum Behav 336, 336 (2021) (noting that “[j]udicial
rehabilitation did not reduce the biasing impact of their pre
existing attitudes on case judgments but did result in mock
jurors reporting that they were less biased, despite evidence
that judicial rehabilitation did not actually reduce their
bias” (emphasis in original)).6
As one study explained, “[i]n a typical juror reha
bilitation, the judge asks jurors individually, in front of
the remaining panel, whether they can set aside bias they
have already confessed and be fair. Social science evi
dence strongly [suggests] *
*
* that jurors confronted with
this question from the bench almost invariably say, yes.”
Wright at 941-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those
results support this court’s conclusion in Lambert that a
juror’s unprompted statements regarding bias must be
given “much greater weight” than statements made after
the court or counsel attempt to “rehabilitate” the juror by
asking whether the juror can set aside her bias and be fair.
277 Or at 231. Posing close-ended questions to “rehabilitate”
a juror is an ineffective way to discern a juror’s actual biases
and achieve the goal of selecting a fair and impartial jury.
In this case, the trial judge gave greater weight to
juror 155’s responses to the judge’s questions, and, to some
extent, the prosecutor’s follow-up question asking the juror
if she could set aside her expressed bias and be fair, than
to her initial, unprompted statements of bias. The trial
court’s reliance on the juror’s responses to those questions
and its failure to give “much greater weight” to the juror’s
unprompted statements about her bias at the start of the
jury selection process exceeded the range of discretion
6 Although this case involves a juror’s express, rather than implicit, bias,
commentators have noted that juror rehabilitation is especially ineffective to
address a juror’s implicit bias. See Bennett at 160 (stating that the question
often asked by judges to rehabilitate a juror—Can you be fair and impartial in
this case?—“does not begin to address implicit bias, which by its nature is not
consciously known to the prospective juror”); id. (noting that “the trial judge is
probably the person in the courtroom least able to discover implicit bias by ques
tioning jurors”).
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
119
afforded under Lambert. Accordingly, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155.
B. Whether the Error Is Grounds for Reversal
In criminal cases, an error is grounds for rever
sal only if it “has prejudiced the defendant in respect to a
substantial right.” ORS 131.035; see also State v. Davis, 336
Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (stating that, under Article
VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, this
court “must affirm a judgment, despite any error commit
ted at trial, if, after considering all the matters submit
ted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment ‘was such
as should have been rendered in the case’
”). In Davis, we
explained that assessing whether there is little likelihood
that an error affected the outcome is the “constitutional test
for affirmance despite error.” 336 Or at 32.
Although ORS 131.035—whether the error “has
prejudiced the defendant in respect to a substantial right”—
is worded differently, we noted in Davis that the constitu
tional analysis “is similar to” the analysis required by stat
utes that “preclude reversal of a judgment for trial error in
the absence of a demonstration that the error affected the
substantial right of a party.” 336 Or at 29 n 7. In another
case, we cited both provisions without identifying any
meaningful difference between them, and no party in this
case contends that there is any difference between the stat
utory and constitutional standards. See State v. Dulfu, 363
Or 647, 676, 426 P3d 641 (2018) (citing Or Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 3, and ORS 131.035 in determining whether
an error was harmless). Accordingly, in this case, our con
clusion that the erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause
challenge did not prejudice defendant in respect to a sub
stantial right as required for reversal under ORS 131.035
also means that there was little likelihood that the error
affected the outcome, consistent with the constitutional test
for affirmance despite error described in Davis.
The state contends that the erroneous denial of
defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155 was not prejudi
cial under State v. Megorden, 49 Or 259, 88 P 306 (1907), and
120
State v. Villeda
Barone. We stated in Megorden that the erroneous denial of
a challenge for cause to a juror excused peremptorily is not
prejudicial unless “the challenger was compelled to accept
an objectionable juror.” 49 Or at 263-64. We concluded in
Barone that peremptory challenges “have no constitutional
significance in and of themselves, and the fact that a defen
dant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury does
not offend the right to a fair trial.” 328 Or at 72-73. The
state contends that an “objectionable juror” for purposes
of Megorden is a juror who should have been excluded for
cause, and that any “loss” of a peremptory challenge in this
context cannot be prejudicial under Barone unless the error
deprived a defendant of his right to a fair trial.
Defendant counters that the erroneous denial of his
for-cause challenge was prejudicial because it caused him to
use a peremptory challenge on juror 155 that he otherwise
could have used on one of two other jurors that he identi
fied at the time, and one of those jurors served on the jury.
Defendant argues that this “loss” of a peremptory challenge
is prejudicial automatically under Highway Commission
v. Walker et ux, 232 Or 478, 485, 376 P2d 96 (1962), and
that we confirmed that presumption of prejudice in Montez.
Alternatively, defendant contends that our prior cases have
treated any juror that a party would have excused peremp
torily as an “objectionable juror” for purposes of Megorden,
making the erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause chal
lenge in this case prejudicial because it forced him to accept
an “objectionable juror” that he would have been able to
excuse peremptorily if the court had not denied his for-cause
challenge.7
The state disagrees with defendant’s understanding
of Megorden and suggests that we should overrule Walker if
we conclude that it conflicts with this court’s decisions in
Megorden and Barone. As we shall explain, we conclude that
the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s challenge
to juror 155 for cause did not “prejudice the defendant in
respect to a substantial right” as required for reversal under
7 Defendant assigned error solely to the trial court’s decision not to excuse
juror 155 for cause. Defendant did not separately assign error to the trial court’s
“rehabilitation” statements during voir dire. Accordingly, we are not called upon
to decided how prejudice is to be evaluated in that circumstance.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
121
ORS 131.035. To reach that conclusion, we need not overrule
Walker because the error in that case is different than the
error in this case.
We begin with defendant’s argument that his “loss”
of a peremptory challenge is presumed to be prejudicial
under Walker. In that condemnation action, both parties
had a statutory allotment of three peremptory challenges.
After each party had exercised two peremptory challenges,
the plaintiff—the State Highway Commission—declined to
use its final challenge on any of the 12 jurors that had been
seated on the panel. Defendants then exercised their third
peremptory challenge, and a new juror was seated. The state
then attempted to exercise its third peremptory challenge
on the new juror, but the trial court ruled that the state had
waived its third peremptory challenge by declining to exer
cise it on any of the jurors on the previous panel. The only
issue on appeal was whether “the trial [court] erred when
[it] refused to permit the state to exercise its third peremp
tory challenge.” Walker, 232 Or at 481.
To resolve that question, we cited the general rule
that applies when the parties “exercise their peremptory
challenges alternately, beginning with the plaintiff and con
tinuing until one of them is satisfied with the jury as it is
then constituted and waives his next challenge.” Id. at 484.
When that occurs, we explained, a peremptory challenge
“waived by either party upon its becoming satisfied with
the jury as then constituted may later be exercised upon
a juror who is called to the box subsequent to the time the
challenge was waived.” Id. We concluded that the trial court
had erred because it did not allow the state to exercise its
third peremptory challenge “upon a juror who [was] called
to the box” after the state had passed on the 12 jurors who
had been seated on the previous panel. Id. We said that the
error “should be deemed prejudicial automatically” because,
otherwise, the statutory right to three peremptory chal
lenges “is an empty one.” Id. at 485.
Thus, the error that was presumed prejudicial in
Walker was the trial court’s determination that the state
had “waived” one of the three peremptory challenges allot
ted to it by statute. The error in this case is different. Here,
122
State v. Villeda
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to juror 155. But
the trial court did not find that defendant had “waived” any
of the six peremptory challenges allotted to him by stat
ute, as in Walker. Because defendant was able to use all six
peremptory challenges allotted to him by statute, the error
in this case is different from the error that we presumed to
be prejudicial in Walker.
In addition, we determined in Baker v. English, 324
Or 585, 932 P2d 57 (1997), that Walker’s presumptive preju
dice rule should be limited to the circumstances presented
in that case. In Baker, we noted that Walker had identified
“a narrow exception to the general principle that a party’s
rights ordinarily are not substantially affected by an error
that likely did not affect the outcome of the case,” but we
indicated that Walker’s “per se rule specifically for the pur
pose of analyzing error pertaining to peremptory challenges
*
*
* should not be interpreted to reach beyond that context.”
Id. at 592 n 6. Accordingly, we decline to extend Walker’s
per se rule beyond the context of that case. Thus, the only
error pertaining to peremptory challenges that will be
“deemed prejudicial automatically” under Walker is errone
ously denying a party the number of peremptory challenges
allotted by statute. See also State v. Durham, 177 Or 574,
164 P2d 448 (1945) (holding that the trial court commit
ted reversible error “in denying [the] defendant the right of
peremptory challenge” when the court refused to allow the
defendant any peremptory challenges in selecting a jury for
sentencing under Oregon’s Habitual Criminal Act).8
There is no such error here. Defendant used all six
of the peremptory challenges allotted to him by statute,
and he does not contend in this court that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow him more than six peremptory
8 The Habitual Criminal Act applied in Durham was a 1927 statute that pro
vided for an enhanced sentence of up to life imprisonment for a felony conviction
if the defendant had three prior felony convictions. The trial court in Durham
empaneled a jury at the time of sentencing to consider whether defendant had
been convicted of the requisite four felonies (including the current charge), but
the trial court determined in that special proceeding that defendant “was not
entitled to any peremptory challenge[s].” 177 Or at 579. This court reversed, con
cluding that the legislature did not intend to deny defendant the right of peremp
tory challenge when it enacted the Habitual Criminal Act. Id. at 581.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
123
challenges. Defendant contends, however, that he was effec
tively denied the use of six peremptory challenges because
he was “forced” to use a peremptory challenge on juror 155,
leaving him with only five peremptory challenges to use on
other jurors. Defendant argues that we confirmed in Montez
that such a “loss” of a peremptory challenge is grounds for
reversal. We disagree with both contentions.
The erroneous denial of defendant’s for-cause chal
lenge did not “force” him to use a peremptory challenge on
juror 155. Peremptory challenges are granted by statute “as
[a] matter of favor” or as a “privilege” to litigants. State v.
White, 48 Or 416, 425, 87 P 137 (1906). A peremptory chal
lenge is something that a party may “use at [the party’s]
own discretion.” State v. Humphrey, 63 Or 540, 544, 128 P
824 (1912). Denying a for-cause challenge does not “force” a
party to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror it had
challenged for cause because a party might choose not to use
a peremptory challenge to excuse that juror. For example, in
Humphrey, the defendants chose to leave on the jury a juror
that they had previously challenged for cause, even though
they still had peremptory challenges available at the end of
jury selection. Id. at 544-45 (noting that the defendants had
challenged six jurors for cause, used peremptory challenges
to excuse five of those jurors, and did not use “any of the
remaining seven peremptory challenges allowed them by
statute” to excuse the other juror that they had challenged
for cause).
If we assume that defendant’s objective was to
accomplish what he would have accomplished if the trial
court had dismissed juror 155 for cause—removing that
juror from the jury—then the only way he could accomplish
that result was to use one of his peremptory challenges to
remove that juror. As explained below, we have described
that use of a peremptory challenge as “curing” the error,
but we have never described it as a prejudicial denial of a
substantial right. Defendant argues that we “confirmed” in
Montez, a capital case, that an erroneous denial of a chal
lenge for cause is prejudicial error where a party uses one
of the allotted peremptory challenges to excuse the juror
in question, leaving it with one less peremptory challenge
124
State v. Villeda
to exercise on other jurors. That argument relies on our
“exhaustive discussion of the merits” of a for-cause chal
lenge to a prospective juror in Montez, suggesting that we
undertook that discussion because we were “apparently sat
isfied that the prejudice issue did not present an easy way
out.” But defendant reads too much into the fact that we
reviewed the merits of the for-cause challenges in Montez.
There, the defendant contended that the trial court
erred in excluding two prospective jurors who had expressed
opposition to the death penalty, and in denying the defen
dant’s for-cause challenges with respect to two other pro
spective jurors who had expressed support for the death
penalty. The defendant argued that those decisions “denied
him his right to an impartial jury” in violation of the Oregon
and United States Constitutions. Montez, 309 Or at 573. We
began our discussion on the merits of the defendant’s chal
lenge to one of those prospective jurors with the observation
that, “[b]ecause [that juror] did not serve on the jury, the
only ‘prejudice’ to [the] defendant was that [the] defendant
had no remaining peremptory challenge to later excuse
[another prospective juror], who did serve on the jury.” Id. at
577.
Stating that “the only ‘prejudice’
” to the defendant
was the fact that he had no remaining peremptory chal
lenge to excuse a different juror does not mean that we had
decided that the error was prejudicial. Ultimately, we found
no basis in the record “to conclude that the trial court’s
decision not to excuse [that prospective juror] for cause was
reversible error.” Id. at 593. We further concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion “in refusing to excuse
[the other juror] for cause.” Id. at 594. Because we found
no error in the trial court’s denial of any of the defendant’s
for-cause challenges in Montez, it was not necessary for us
to decide whether any error was prejudicial. See Parks v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 347 Or 374, 384, 227 P3d 1127 (2009) (the
fact that the court previously mentioned without deciding
an issue “simply reflects” that we “had no reason to consider
the issue”).
Defendant alternatively contends that, because the
error in this case resulted in seating a juror that he would
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
125
have excused peremptorily, it was prejudicial under Megorden,
because he was “compelled to accept an objectionable juror.”
49 Or at 263-64. Defendant asserts that our case law has
recognized that any juror whom a party would have excused
peremptorily is an “objectionable” juror for purposes of estab
lishing prejudice under Megorden. But, as explained below,
none of the cases cited by defendant held that an “objection
able juror” for purposes of Megorden is a juror whom a party
would have excused peremptorily if another challenge had
been available. We begin our discussion of those cases with
Ford v. Umatilla County, 15 Or 313, 16 P 33, reh’g den, 15
Or 323, 16 P 38 (1887), which does provide some support for
defendant’s argument.
The plaintiff in Ford sued Umatilla County for
damages after a bridge collapsed while plaintiff was driving
his team of horses and a wagon across it, killing two horses,
and badly damaging his personal property. During jury
selection, plaintiff’s counsel argued that jurors who were
taxpayers in Umatilla County should be excused for implied
bias. The trial court generally agreed and excused several
prospective jurors on that basis.9 The county then sought
to excuse a juror for cause on the same grounds; plaintiff
objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, deny
ing the county’s for-cause challenge. The county then used
a peremptory challenge to remove that juror and contended
on appeal that the trial court had committed reversible error
in denying its challenge for cause. This court disagreed,
concluding that the county, “having afterwards challenged
the juror peremptorily, thereby waived [its] challenge for
cause.” 15 Or at 322. The county moved for rehearing, but
the court adhered to its ruling, noting that the only reason
given for excusing the juror for cause was that he was a tax
payer in Umatilla County. The court explained that “being
a tax-payer of the county interested him in deciding in [the
county’s] favor” so the county “must have had other reasons
for objecting to his sitting.” Ford v. Umatilla County, 15 Or
9 Unlike actual bias, a challenge for cause for “implied basis” is based solely
on a prospective juror’s relationship to the parties involved, prior involvement in
the case, or interest in the outcome of the case. See ORCP 57 D(1)(c) - (f) (listing
reasons). The Ford court did not explain why it thought that being a taxpayer of a
county that had been sued for damages gave rise to implied bias; taxpayer status
would not be a basis for a challenge for cause for implied bias under current law.
126
State v. Villeda
323, 325-26, 16 P 38 (1887) (on petition for rehearing). Under
those circumstances, the court continued, the county “was
not compelled to resort to a peremptory challenge in order
to exclude the juror for grounds for which he had been chal
lenged for cause.” Id. at 325. Rather, the court concluded, if
a party chooses to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a
juror for reasons other than the reasons given for challeng
ing the juror for cause, the party “should be deemed to have
waived his right to insist upon the former objection.” Id. at
326.
The court then stated:
“If the grounds of the challenge for cause had been of such
a nature as would have been likely to prejudice the juror
against [the county], and [the county] had been put to its
peremptory challenge in order to exclude him, there would
be more reason for claiming that the error was prejudicial.”
Id. (emphasis added). But the court went on to explain that,
“under the circumstances, as they exist, no such presumption
can be drawn.” Id. Given that context, the statement that
there would be “more reason” to find prejudicial error under
circumstances not presented in that case is clearly dicta and,
as our subsequent cases (discussed next) demonstrate, we
have never adopted that dicta in determining whether using
a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror who should have
been excused for cause makes the error prejudicial.
In some cases, we have indicated that using a
peremptory challenge to excuse a juror who should have
been excused for cause “cures” the error. See, e.g., Humphrey,
63 Or at 544 (“It is well settled that, although the court sit
ting in the trial of the cause may have erred in overruling
a challenge for cause, yet the error is cured by the exercise
of a peremptory challenge against the juror in question.”);
Twitchell v. Thompson, 78 Or 285, 289, 153 P 45 (1915)
(where plaintiff used peremptory challenges to excuse jurors
that plaintiff had challenged for cause, any claim that the
court erred in denying the for-cause challenges was “dis
posed of” by the decision in Humphrey); State v. Layton, 174
Or 217, 234, 148 P2d 522 (1944) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause
challenges to two jurors because defendant removed those
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
127
jurors peremptorily, so “[i]f any error was committed, it was
cured by the exercise of the peremptory challenges”).
Other cases have framed the issue in terms of waiver
or lack of prejudice, but none followed the dicta in Ford. For
example, in State v. Rathie, 101 Or 339, 349, 199 P 169 (1921),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brewton, 238
Or 590, 395 P2d 874 (1964), we stated that “[i]t is the rule in
this state that error of the court in refusing to allow a chal
lenge to a juror for cause is waived if the party objecting,
after exhausting his peremptory challenges, accepts with
out objection other jurors to complete the panel.” In State v.
Douglas, 310 Or 438, 441-42, 800 P2d 288 (1990), we con
cluded that, where the defendant exhausted his peremptory
challenges to remove a juror whom he had challenged for
cause, there was a “lack of demonstrated prejudice” because
the defendant had failed to show “that the final jury panel
was inappropriate in any way.”10
Two other cases cited by defendant merely apply the
principle established in Humphrey that an erroneous denial
of a challenge for cause is not prejudicial error if the defen
dant does not exhaust the allotted peremptory challenges.
See Mount v. Welsh et al, 118 Or 568, 579, 247 P 815 (1926)
(stating that “[t]he rule in this jurisdiction” is that “until
a defendant’s peremptory challenges are exhausted, [they
are] not in a position to complain of the overruling of [their]
challenge for cause to any particular juror who afterwards
serves on the panel”); State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 158, 800
P2d 288 (1990) (holding that, where a defendant “did not
exhaust his statutory allocation” of peremptory challenges
and did not establish “that any member of the jury panel
that actually decided his guilt should have been excused for
cause[,]” defendant has failed “to identify any prejudice that
may have resulted from the ruling [on a challenge for cause]
even if it were error”).
Thus, none of the cases that defendant cites held that
an “objectionable juror” for purposes of determining prejudicial
10 Rathie’s characterization of a party’s failure to object to any remaining
jurors for cause after exhausting all peremptory challenges as a “waiver” was
discarded in Douglas, where we stated that Megorden “more accurately described
the reason for the rule, which is a lack of demonstrated prejudice.” 310 Or at 441.
128
State v. Villeda
error under Megorden is a juror whom a party would have
excused peremptorily. Although dicta in Ford suggests other
wise, no other case has adopted that position. To the contrary,
our recent cases have suggested—also without expressly hold
ing—that an “objectionable” juror for purposes of determining
prejudicial error under Megorden is a juror who would have
been excused for cause. For example, in Douglas, after quot
ing the “objectionable juror” rule in Megorden, we concluded
that there was no prejudicial error absent a showing that “the
final jury panel was inappropriate in any way.” 310 Or at 442.
Although we did not explain in Douglas what we meant by
“inappropriate,” we had earlier stated in Farrar that any error
in denying a for-cause challenge was not prejudicial, in part,
because defendant did not show “that any member of the jury
panel that actually decided his guilt should have been excused
for cause.” 309 Or at 158 (emphasis added).
That statement suggests that an “objectionable” or
“inappropriate” juror for purposes of determining prejudice
is a juror who should have been excused for cause. That is
what happened in Lambert. There, as noted above, we con
cluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiffs’ challenge for cause to a juror based on his
actual bias. That juror sat on the jury that decided the case
because the plaintiffs had exhausted their peremptory chal
lenges. We concluded that the trial court’s error was preju
dicial, because, by allowing a juror who should have been
excused for cause to sit on the jury, the court “deprived [the
plaintiffs] of the right to have their issues determined by an
impartial juror.” 277 Or at 231.
Our observation in Farrar and our conclusion in
Lambert are supported by other cases that describe peremp
tory challenges as a tool that can be used to help avoid
infringing upon a party’s right to a fair trial with impartial
jurors. None of those cases suggests that, when a party uses
one of its allotted peremptory challenges to excuse a juror
when the party might have preferred to use the challenge
to excuse a different qualified juror amounts to prejudice
to a substantial right. For example, we stated in Barone
that peremptory challenges “have no constitutional signif
icance in and of themselves.” 328 Or at 72. We explained
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
129
that peremptory challenges help “guarantee the impartial
ity of the jury that sits on the case,” but “the fact that a
defendant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury
does not offend the right to a fair trial.” Id. at 72-73. And,
as we stated in Humphrey, “the law has provided not only
challenges for cause, but also those peremptory to enable the
defendant to protect his right to a fair and impartial jury.” 63
Or at 545 (emphasis added). That suggests that, although a
defendant certainly has a “substantial right” to a fair trial
with impartial jurors, denying a defendant the opportunity
to seat a juror that the defendant would prefer over another
qualified juror is not prejudicial to any substantial right.11
That suggestion is supported by our description of
the nature of peremptory challenges in Megorden, where we
framed the issue as follows: “The simple question, after the
peremptory challenges are exhausted, is: Is the jury which
finally tries the case impartial?” 49 Or at 264 (internal quo
tation marks omitted). If so, we explained, there is no prej
udicial error because “[a]ll that the [c]onstitution, all that
the law, requires and demands is a trial by an impartial
jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We further
explained that “[t]he right to challenge is the right to reject,
not to select, a juror. If from those who remain, an impartial
jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is
maintained.” Id. (quoting Hays v. Missouri, 120 US 68, 71,
7 S Ct 352, 30 L Ed 578 (1887)).12
11 The conclusion that a party does not have a protected “right” to seat
one qualified juror over another is supported by the well-documented abuse of
peremptory challenges for racially discriminatory purposes, which led Arizona to
abolish them entirely. See Arizona Supreme Court Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug 30,
2021) (amending rules of criminal and civil procedure to eliminate peremp
tory challenges); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79, 102-03, 106 S Ct 1712,
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not
end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory chal
lenges entirely.”). Other states have limited the use of peremptory challenges
for the same reason. See Willamette University College of Law Racial Justice
Task Force, Remedying Batson’s Failure to Address Unconscious Juror Bias in
Oregon, 57 Willamette L Rev 85 (2021) (calling for reform and describing court
rules adopted in Washington and California that specify presumptively invalid
reasons for exercising peremptory challenges).
12 The Megorden court cited with approval its then-recent decision in State
v. White, 48 Or 416. In White, we held that the trial court did not abuse its dis
cretion in excusing two jurors for cause—and seating two new jurors—after the
defendant had used all his peremptory challenges. We explained that the fact
130
State v. Villeda
That position is also supported by our more recent
decision in Barone, a capital case, where we rejected the
defendant’s argument that the erroneous denial of his chal
lenges for cause was prejudicial. Although the denial of
those challenges resulted in the defendant using peremp
tory challenges “that he could have used to exclude other
jurors who were objectionable to him, who did remain on
the jury,” he was not required to accept a juror who should
have been excused for cause. 328 Or at 72. We acknowledged
that, if the trial court had excused the challenged prospec
tive jurors for cause, the defendant “would have used his
peremptory challenges differently and, as a result, would
have been tried by a jury with a different membership.” Id.
But, we explained, the state and federal constitutions do
not give a defendant “a right to exclusive control over the
composition of the trial jury.” Id. Rather, peremptory chal
lenges help “guarantee the impartiality of the jury that sits
on the case.” Id. Thus, although those challenges play a role
in ensuring an impartial jury, they “have no constitutional
significance in and of themselves, and the fact that a defen
dant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury does
not offend the right to a fair trial.” Id. at 72-73.
In summary, as explained above, an error is
grounds for reversal only if the error prejudiced the appel
lant in respect to a substantial right.13 Even if we pre
sume that defendant effectively “lost” a peremptory chal
lenge when the trial court denied his for-cause challenge
to juror 155, peremptory challenges “have no constitutional
that a party had exhausted his peremptory challenges before a juror was excused
for cause “invaded no right” of that party, because a peremptory challenge “is
not aimed at disqualification, but is exercised upon qualified jurors as a matter
of favor to the challenger.” Id. at 425 (quoting O’Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 67
Mich 560, 562, 35 NW 162, 163 (1887) (emphasis added)). Thus, we held that, if a
party “has exercised the privilege [of peremptory challenges] to the extent given
by the statute, it cannot be alleged as error that qualified jurors are afterwards
drawn or placed in the panel.” Id. The reason, we explained, is that the party’s
“right to have his case tried before a fair, impartial and qualified jury remains
unimpaired[.]” Id.
13 In light of our conclusion that the trial court’s error in denying defendant’s
for-cause challenge was not prejudicial in respect to a substantial right, we do
not think it is necessary to remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether
the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant defendant an additional
peremptory challenge, as he asserted in his second assignment of error in the
Court of Appeals.
Cite as 372 Or 108 (2024)
131
significance in and of themselves.” Barone, 328 Or at 72.
Peremptory challenges also have no statutory significance
in and of themselves other than the right to use the number
of peremptory challenges allotted by statute.14 Defendant’s
statutory right to use six peremptory challenges is a right
“to reject, not to select, a juror.” Megorden, 49 Or at 264.
Thus, any error in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge
to juror 155 meant, at most, that defendant lost the ability to
reject another qualified juror that he would have preferred
to excuse from the jury. That “loss” was not prejudicial to
defendant in respect to a substantial right, as required for
reversal under ORS 131.035.15
That conclusion is consistent with our cases holding
that an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is reversible
error only if a juror who decided the case was not fair and
impartial. It is also consistent with the nature and purpose
of peremptory challenges as a tool to help protect the funda
mental right to a trial to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant
does not contend that any of the jurors who decided this case
were not fair and impartial. Accordingly, the trial court’s
error in denying defendant’s challenge for cause to juror 155
was not prejudicial to defendant in respect to a substantial
right.
III. CONCLUSION
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s chal
lenge for cause to juror 155 on the grounds of actual bias
but conclude that that error is not grounds for reversal
14 Defendant does not contend that peremptory challenges have any stat
utory significance in and of themselves other than as recognized in our prior
cases. But as we have explained, the only statutory significance of peremptory
challenges that we have recognized is the right to use the number of peremptory
challenges allotted by statute.
15 To be clear, we are not saying that the only right that would be considered
a “substantial right” under ORS 131.035 is a right that affects a party’s right to
a fair trial or is otherwise constitutionally significant. Statutory rights may also
be “substantial” for purposes of ORS 131.035. For example, as explained above,
we held in Walker and in Durham that erroneously refusing to allow a party
to exercise the number of peremptory challenges allotted by statute would be
deemed prejudicial error. But an erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge is not
prejudicial under ORS 131.035 where the challenged juror is excused perempto
rily unless the error affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial before impartial
jurors.
132
State v. Villeda
under ORS 131.035 because it did not prejudice defendant
in respect to a substantial right.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. | b3e3a4c9954e80e845304a87783bc466c10a4a42c54fcbc2df1fc375bc7095a0 | 2024-03-21T00:00:00Z |
60c32565-e3ca-400f-96eb-ed902a8cb78b | Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority | null | S069004 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 18
May 23, 2024
331
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
William B. WALTON,
an individual;
James Jefferson WALTON, JR.,
an individual; and
Victoria K. WALTON,
an individual,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
NESKOWIN REGIONAL SANITARY AUTHORITY,
Respondent on Review,
and
Evelyn A. HARRIS,
Trustee of the Harris Living Trust et al.,
Defendants.
(CC 17CV10996) (CA A168358) (SC S069004)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 29, 2022.
Paul J. Sundermier, Saalfeld Griggs PC, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioners on review. Jennifer C. Paul filed the
brief. Also on the brief was Paul J. Sundermier.
Christopher T. Griffith, Haglund Kelley LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Also on the brief was Joshua J. Stellmon.
Kathryn D. Valois, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach
Gardens, Florida, argued the cause for amicus curiae Pacific
Legal Foundation. Christina M. Martin filed the brief.
______________
* Appeal from Tillamook County Circuit Court, Jonathan R. Hill, Judge. 314
Or App 124, 498 P3d 325 (2021).
332
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
Nicole M. Swift, Cable Huston LLP, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for amici curiae League of
Oregon Cities, Association of Oregon Counties, and Special
Districts Association of Oregon. Also on the brief were Clark
I. Balfour and Nicole A.W. Abercrombie.
Before, Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, Bushong, James, and Masih, Justices.**
DUNCAN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
______________
** Balmer, J., retired December 31, 2022, and did not participate in the
decision of this case. Walters, J., retired December 31, 2022, participated at oral
argument, but did not participate in the decision of this case. Nelson, J., resigned
February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
333
DUNCAN, J.
In 2017, petitioners on review (plaintiffs) filed a
complaint asserting an inverse condemnation claim against
respondent on review (defendant), a local sewer authority.
An inverse condemnation claim is a claim that a property
owner can bring for “just compensation” under the state and
federal constitutions when a governmental entity or its del-
egate has taken the owner’s property for public use without
instituting condemnation proceedings.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant had installed sewer
lines on their property and that the installation constituted a
“taking” for which they were entitled to “just compensation”
under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that
plaintiffs’ claim was time barred because it was not brought
within the six-year limitations period established by ORS
12.080(3), which applies to claims “for interference with or
injury to any interest of another in real property.” According
to defendant, plaintiffs’ claim accrued when the sewer lines
were installed, which was no later than 1995, and, there-
fore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen
years before plaintiffs filed their complaint.
In response, plaintiffs made three arguments. First,
they argued that, because their takings claim was based on
the takings clauses of the state and federal constitutions, it
could not be subject to a statute of limitations. Second, they
argued that, even if some types of takings claims—specifi-
cally, “regulatory” takings claims—can be subject to stat-
utes of limitations, claims like theirs—which are “physical
occupation” takings claims—cannot be. Third, they argued
1 Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particular services of any man
be demanded, without just compensation; nor except in the case of the state, with-
out such compensation first assessed and tendered[.]” The Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall *
*
* be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Dept.
of Transportation v. Hewett Professional Group, 321 Or 118, 131 n 7, 895 P2d 755
(1995) (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 US 825, 827, 107 S Ct
3141, 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987)).
334
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
that, even if “physical occupation” takings claims can be sub-
ject to statutes of limitations and ORS 12.080(3) applies, the
point at which their claim accrued was not when defendant
installed the sewer lines, but instead when defendant affir-
matively denied plaintiffs “just compensation,” which, they
alleged, occurred in 2014. Therefore, according to plaintiffs,
the six-year limitations period did not expire until 2020,
three years after they filed their complaint.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion and
entered a judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Walton v.
Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority, 314 Or App 124,
126, 498 P3d 325 (2021). On plaintiffs’ petition, we allowed
review. For the reasons we explain below, we hold that (1)
plaintiffs’ claim is subject to the six-year limitations period
established by ORS 12.080(3); (2) given the facts of this case,
plaintiffs’ claim accrued when defendant installed the sewer
lines; and (3) because plaintiffs did not initiate their claim
within the six-year limitations period, it is time barred.
Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and the
trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Facts
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, we view the summary judgment
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
in this case, plaintiffs. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or 329, 332, 83 P3d 322 (2004). Viewed
in that light, the relevant historical facts are as follows.
Sometime before or during 1995, defendant, the
Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority, installed two sewer
lines on property that belonged to plaintiffs’ predecessor
in interest, their father. According to plaintiffs, defendant
“dug a trench in [the] front yard and installed and buried a
main sewer line and a feeder line.” Defendant did not have
plaintiffs’ father’s permission to install the sewer lines, and
it did not make any payments to plaintiffs’ father when it
installed the lines.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
335
Three years after the sewer lines were installed,
plaintiffs’ father made an agreement with defendant about
them. According to plaintiffs’ complaint, “[o]n or around
November of 1998,” defendant told their father that it needed
an easement for the sewer lines and their father granted
defendant an easement “on the condition that” defendant
provide “a free hook-up to the [sewer system] when required.”
But defendant “never prepared an easement document” and
“never recorded an easement.”
In 2014, defendant informed plaintiffs—who, by
that time, had acquired the property from their father—
that the property’s septic system had failed and they needed
to connect to the sewer system. Plaintiffs invoked the 1998
agreement and requested a free connection to the sewer sys-
tem. In an April 2014 letter, defendant informed plaintiffs
that it was denying their request.
B. Procedural Facts
In 2017, plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case,
asserting an inverse condemnation claim against defen-
dant. As explained further below, an inverse condemnation
claim is a claim that a property owner can bring to obtain
“just compensation” when a governmental entity or its del-
egate has taken the owner’s property for public use without
first initiating condemnation proceedings. Dunn v. City of
Milwaukie, 355 Or 339, 347, 328 P3d 1261 (2014) (so holding
with respect to “just compensation” under Article I, section
18, guarantees); United States v. Clarke, 445 US 253, 257,
100 S Ct 1127, 63 L Ed 2d 373 (1980) (so holding with respect
to “just compensation” under Fifth Amendment guarantees).
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendant
had installed the sewer lines on their property “without the
legal acquisition of a part of the fee or an easement” over
the property and that the installation of the sewer lines
constituted a “taking.” Plaintiffs further alleged that defen-
dant is a “public sewer authority” with “statutorily dele-
gated authority to use the state’s power of eminent domain
to acquire real property interests *
*
* pursuant to ORS
450.815(4)” and that defendant had installed the sewer lines
“for the public purpose of providing [defendant’s] utility
336
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
services.”2 Plaintiffs asserted that, under Article I, section
18, and the Fifth Amendment, they were entitled to “just
compensation,” which “is, at a minimum, the value of the
*
*
* hook-up” to the sewer system.
Regarding the timing of their complaint, plaintiffs
asserted that, because they were making “a direct claim for
compensation under both constitutions as a per se ‘physical
invasion or occupation’ *
*
* no state statute or court rule can
limit the time within which to bring an action for the remedy
mandated by each constitutional provision.” In other words,
plaintiffs asserted that their claim could not be subject to a
statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim was their
only claim. Although plaintiffs alleged that defendant had
made an agreement with their father for a free connection
to the sewer system and that defendant had breached that
agreement, plaintiffs did not assert a contract or quasi-
contract claim.
In its answer, defendant admitted that it is a public
sewer authority with the powers set out in ORS 450.815, that
it had installed the sewer lines “on and under property near
or on Plaintiffs’ property” no later than 1995, and that, in
2014, it had informed plaintiffs that they needed to connect
to the sewer system because the property’s septic tank had
failed. Defendant denied all the other allegations in plain-
tiffs’ complaint, including the allegation that it had entered
into an agreement with plaintiffs’ father regarding the
sewer lines. Defendant raised several affirmative defenses
and counterclaims. As one affirmative defense, defendant
asserted that, to the extent that plaintiffs were relying on
an oral agreement between defendant and their father, the
agreement was unenforceable due to the statute of frauds,
ORS 41.580, which provides, in part, that an agreement for
the sale of an interest in real property is void unless writ-
ten and signed. As another affirmative defense, defendant
asserted that plaintiffs had failed to file their claim within
the applicable statutory limitations period.
2 ORS 450.815(4) authorizes sanitary authorities to “[a]cquire by purchase,
gift, devise, condemnation proceedings, or otherwise” real property necessary for
the exercise of its powers.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
337
Thereafter, defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation
claim was untimely. Defendant asserted that plaintiffs’
inverse condemnation claim was subject to ORS 12.080(3),
which establishes a six-year limitations period for actions
“for interference with or injury to any interest of another in
real property.” For support, defendant relied on two cases in
which courts applied ORS 12.080(3) to takings claims. The
first case was Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or
254, 268, 256, 656 P2d 306 (1982), where this court applied
ORS 12.080(3) to a “regulatory” takings claim in which
the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had “tempo-
rarily deprived them of the rental value of [their] property
and caused a permanent depression of its market value by
designating the major part of the property as a future park
site in the city’s comprehensive land use plan.” The second
case was The Foster Group, Inc. v. City of Elgin, Oregon, 264
Or App 424, 441, 332 P3d 354 (2014), where the Court of
Appeals applied ORS 12.080(3) to a “physical occupation”
takings claim in which the plaintiffs had alleged that the
defendant had constructed a road that encroached on their
property.
Defendant asserted that there was no dispute about
the facts relevant to its summary judgment motion, specif-
ically, that plaintiffs had alleged an inverse condemnation
claim based on the installation of the sewer lines, that the
lines were installed no later than 1995, and that plaintiffs
did not file their complaint until 2017. Defendant contended
that the six-year limitations period began to run no later
than 1995 and, therefore, expired in 2001, sixteen years
before plaintiffs filed their complaint.
Plaintiffs filed a response to defendant’s summary
judgment motion. They did not dispute the facts that defen-
dant had identified as relevant to its motion, but they made
three alternative arguments against the motion.
First, plaintiffs argued that, because takings
claims are based on constitutional provisions, they cannot
be subject to any statutory limits, including statutory time
limits. They contended that “the legislature cannot pass
338
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
statutes that contravene the constitution, nor should the
courts enforce [such] statutes[.]”
Second, plaintiffs argued that, even if some types of
inverse condemnation claims, like the “regulatory” takings
claim in Suess Builders, are subject to ORS 12.080(3), “phys-
ical occupation” takings claims are not. Thus, plaintiffs
contended, Suess Builders was not controlling. They also
argued that, although Foster involved a “physical occupa-
tion” taking, the parties in that case did not dispute whether
the six-year limitations period under ORS 12.080(3) applied.
Third, plaintiffs argued that, even if “physical occu-
pation” takings claims are subject to ORS 12.080(3), the stat-
ute’s six-year limitations period does not begin to run until
“the putative condemner refuses to pay just compensation
after taking private property for a public use.” Therefore,
according to plaintiffs, the limitations period for their claim
did not begin to run until defendant affirmatively denied
plaintiffs “just compensation” in the April 2014 letter.
After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s
summary judgment motion. The trial court held that plain-
tiffs’ claim was subject to the six-year limitations period
established by ORS 12.080(3) and that it accrued when the
sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995.
Therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001,
sixteen years before plaintiffs filed their complaint in 2017.
The trial court entered a limited judgment dismissing plain-
tiffs’ inverse condemnation claim.3 It later entered a supple-
mental judgment with a money award in defendant’s favor.
Plaintiffs appealed both judgments. On appeal, the
parties renewed the arguments they had made in the trial
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that,
3 Although plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim was their only claim,
defendant raised counterclaims. The trial court’s limited judgment dismissing
plaintiffs’ claim was authorized by ORCP 67B, which provides, “When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, *
*
* the court may render a limited
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims[.]” The limited judg-
ment resolved plaintiffs’ claim and made it possible for plaintiffs to appeal the
trial court’s summary judgment ruling while the parties continued to litigate
defendant’s counterclaims, which they did for a time before agreeing to stay the
proceedings pending resolution of plaintiffs’ appeal.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
339
as the trial court had concluded, plaintiffs’ inverse condem-
nation claim was time barred. Walton, 314 Or App at 126.
Plaintiffs petitioned for review, which we allowed.
II. DISCUSSION
We begin our discussion, in Section A, with an over-
view of the relevant law: the law regarding a government’s
power of eminent domain; the state and federal constitu-
tional limits on that power, specifically, Article I, section 18,
and the Fifth Amendment, which require a government to
pay “just compensation” for property that it takes through
an exercise of the power of eminent domain; and the pro-
cesses through which a property owner can obtain “just com-
pensation.” Then, in Section B, we apply that law to address
plaintiffs’ three alternative arguments for why their inverse
condemnation claim is timely. For the reasons that we will
explain, those arguments are unavailing. Inverse condem-
nation claims, including those based on “physical occupa-
tion” takings, can be subject to statutes of limitations, and
plaintiffs’ claim is subject to ORS 12.080(3), which estab-
lishes a six-year limitations period. That period began to
run for plaintiffs’ claim when the sewer lines were installed
in 1995 and expired in 2001. Therefore, plaintiffs’ 2017 com-
plaint was untimely.
A. Relevant Law
The state and federal governments have the power
of eminent domain, which is the power to take private prop-
erty for public use without the property owner’s consent.
Dunn, 355 Or at 346; PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey,
594 US 482, 487, 141 S Ct 2244, 210 L Ed 2d 624 (2021)
(“Eminent domain is the power of the government to take
property for public use without the consent of the owner.”).
“The power of eminent domain requires no grant of author-
ity for its exercise, but instead is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty.” Dunn, 355 Or at 346; Georgia v. Chattanooga,
264 US 472, 480, 44 S Ct 369, 68 L Ed 796 (1924) (“The
power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and
inheres in every independent State.”).
The power of eminent domain is limited by the state
and federal constitutions. Article I, section 18, and the Fifth
340
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
Amendment each provide that private property shall not be
taken for public use without “just compensation.” Dunn, 355
Or at 347; United States v. Carmack, 329 US 230, 241-42, 67
S Ct 252, 91 L Ed 209 (1946).
This case involves the physical occupation of
property. A government can exercise its power of eminent
domain to physically take property in two ways. Dunn, 355
Or at 347; United States v. Dow, 357 US 17, 21, 78 S Ct 1039,
2 L Ed 1109 (1958). It can initiate condemnation proceed-
ings, through which the amount of compensation due to the
owner is determined and a court order awarding the prop-
erty to the government can be obtained, or it can physically
occupy the property without a court order. Dunn, 355 Or at
347; Dow, 357 US at 21.
Usually, a government exercises its eminent domain
power by initiating condemnation proceedings before tak-
ing property. Dunn, 355 Or at 347; Cereghino et al v. State
Highway Com., 230 Or 439, 443-44, 370 P2d 694 (1962)
(“Ordinarily, when the state takes private property for a
public use and it cannot agree with the owner on the value
of the property, it institutes a condemnation proceeding in
which the amount of just compensation is determined and a
judgment therefor entered in favor of the property owner.”);
First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 US 304,
316, 107 S Ct 2378, 96 L Ed 2d 250 (1987) (observing that “the
typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain”).
Such proceedings are sometimes referred to as “direct” con-
demnation proceedings. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 US
180, 186, 139 S Ct 2162, 204 L Ed 2d 558 (2019).
In some circumstances, a government exercises its
power of eminent domain by taking property without initiat-
ing condemnation proceedings. Dunn, 355 Or at 347 (explain-
ing that the power of eminent domain can be exercised
de jure or de facto). Those circumstances include, for exam-
ple, circumstances where the government physically occupies
property that it mistakenly believes that it owns and circum-
stances where the government’s actions on its own property
result in the “destruction, restriction, or interruption of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment” of a neighboring
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
341
property. Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Or 564, 568, 18
P2d 814 (1933); see, e.g., Cereghino, 230 Or at 443 (collection
of surface water and dirt on the plaintiff’s property caused
by the state highway commission’s relocation of a highway
constituted a taking); Morrison, 141 Or at 569 (the plaintiff’s
complaint, alleging that the county’s construction of a jetty
diverted river flow onto the plaintiff’s property, causing the
property’s “destruction,” stated a cause of action for a taking).
When a government takes property without initi-
ating a condemnation proceeding, the property owner can
bring an inverse condemnation claim. “An ‘inverse condem-
nation’ claim is any claim against a governmental agency to
recover the value of property taken by the agency although
no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
completed by the taking agency.” West Linn Corporate Park
v. City of West Linn, 349 Or 58, 64, 240 P3d 29 (2010) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); Knick, 588 US at 186 (an
inverse condemnation claim is a claim “
‘against a govern-
mental defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant’
” (quoting
Clarke, 445 US at 257)).
The term “inverse condemnation” is not a constitu-
tional or statutory term. Suess Builders, 294 Or at 258 n 3;
Clarke, 445 US at 257. Instead, it is a “popular” or “short-
hand” description of a claim to recover the value of property
that has been taken through an exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain outside of a direct condemnation proceeding.
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or 178, 180 n 1, 376 P2d
100 (1963) (“Inverse condemnation is the popular descrip-
tion of a cause of action against a governmental defendant to
recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by
the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise
of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency.”); Clarke, 445 US at 257 (The term “
‘inverse
condemnation’ appears to be one that was coined simply as a
shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner
recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.”).
“[I]nverse condemnation” simply describes a pro-
ceeding that “is the ‘inverse’ or ‘reverse’ of a condemnation
342
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
proceeding.” Clarke, 445 US at 257; see also City of Keizer v.
Lake Labish Water Control Dist., 185 Or App 425, 429, 60
P3d 557 (2002). An inverse condemnation claim is denomi-
nated as “inverse” because “the taking occurs before the ini-
tiation of condemnation proceedings, which is the inverse of
the ordinary sequence of events when a governmental entity
exercises its power of eminent domain.” City of Keizer, 185
Or App at 429. Thus, condemnation proceedings are brought
by governmental entities before taking property, whereas
inverse condemnation proceedings are brought by property
owners after a governmental entity has taken property. The
two types of proceedings differ both in who initiates them
and when they are initiated.
“Actions to recover compensation for such a gov-
ernmental taking long preceded the [‘inverse condemna-
tion’] label.” Suess Builders, 294 Or at 258 n 3 (citing, e.g.,
Morrison, 141 Or 564); Morrison, 141 Or at 575 (holding that,
where county’s construction of a jetty diverted river water
onto the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff’s complaint seek-
ing “just compensation” under Article I, section 18, stated a
cause of action).
A property owner can bring an inverse condemna-
tion claim even if the legislature has not provided for such a
claim. Morrison, 141 Or at 574. As this court has observed,
“[i]t is the general rule, except where an exclusive remedy
has been provided by statute, [that] the owner of property,
appropriated or injured for a public use without just com-
pensation having been made, may maintain an action at law
for the damages sustained thereby.” Id. Such an action is
distinct from a tort action, from which a government may
be immune. Id. (“We recognize the rule, *
*
* that a county
of the state of Oregon is not liable for ordinary torts or for
the wrongful acts or omissions of its officers, servants, or
employees unless made so by statute or some constitutional
provision. But the present case [alleging flooding of the plain-
tiff’s land], we think, plainly comes within the provisions of
the constitution ordaining that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation and, there-
fore, the county is made liable.” (Citations omitted.)).
An inverse condemnation claim may be brought
against “the state itself” or “one of its lawfully constituted
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
343
agencies, such as a county, a school district, the State Fish
and Game Commission, or the State Highway Department.”
Tomasek v. Oregon Highway Com’n, 196 Or 120, 147, 248 P2d
703 (1952); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 US 419, 432 n 9, 102 S Ct 3164, 73 L Ed 2d 868 (1982)
(“A permanent physical occupation authorized by state law
is a taking without regard to whether the State, or instead
a party authorized by the State, is the occupant.”).
“
‘Successful litigation [of an ‘inverse condemna-
tion’ claim] against the governmental agency is a factual
determination that there has been a ‘taking’ and in effect
forces the governmental agency to purchase the interest
taken.’
” Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or 57, 67, 843
P2d 400 (1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property
§ 8.1 comment d (1997)). “The dispositive issue, then, in an
inverse condemnation claim is whether property was taken,
in fact, by the government even though no formal eminent
domain proceedings were initiated.” Dept. of Transportation
v. Hewett Professional Group, 321 Or 118, 131, 895 P2d 755
(1995) (italics omitted).
There is no unitary test for what constitutes a “tak-
ing” of property under either Article I, section 18, or the
Fifth Amendment. Dunn, 355 Or at 348-49. Because of the
“nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions
or regulations can affect property interests,” there is “no
magic formula” that “enables a court to judge, in every case,
whether a given government interference with property is a
taking.” Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States,
568 US 23, 31, 133 S Ct 511, 184 L Ed 2d 417 (2012). But all
takings of property involve the appropriation of the prop-
erty without the consent of the owner. Dunn, 355 Or at 346;
PennEast Pipeline Co., 594 US at 487.
Although there is no unitary test for what con-
stitutes a taking, both this court and the United States
Supreme Court have drawn some bright lines. This court has
“consistently found a taking when government has inten-
tionally authorized a physical occupation of private property
that substantially has interfered with the owner’s rights of
exclusive possession and use.” Dunn, 355 Or at 348 (so stat-
ing regarding Article I, section 18). Similarly, the Supreme
344
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
Court has ruled that “a permanent physical occupation of
property authorized by the government is a taking.” Arkansas
Game and Fish Comm’n, 568 US at 31 (so ruling regarding
the Fifth Amendment). Thus, “[i]f the nature of the govern-
mental intrusion amounts to a ‘permanent physical occupa-
tion of property,’ the inquiry ends, regardless of ‘whether the
action achieves an important public benefit or has only min-
imal economic impact on the owner.’
” GTE Northwest, Inc.
v. Public Utility Commission, 321 Or 458, 469, 900 P2d 495
(1995) (quoting Loretto, 458 US at 434-35 (so ruling under
the Fifth Amendment)); see, e.g., Loretto, 458 US at 438 (hold-
ing that television company’s installation of cable lines on
the plaintiff’s apartment building constituted a taking).4
A government can acquire private property for pub-
lic use without “taking” the property, that is, without appro-
priating the property without the consent of the owner. For
example, a government can negotiate with a property owner
to purchase property, in which case the government has not
“taken” the property because it has acquired the property
with the owner’s consent. Woodward Lbr. Co. v. Un. Comp.
Com., 173 Or 333, 338, 145 P2d 477 (1944) (holding that
where property owner and federal government agreed upon
purchase price and sale of property after the government
threatened to exercise its power of eminent domain, the
property was acquired by “purchase” and not by “eminent
domain”); see also In re Estate of Moore, 190 Or 63, 67, 223
P2d 393 (1950) (rejecting argument that Article I, section 18,
precludes the government’s receipt of property by will or gift
because Article I, section 18, applies only “to a ‘taking’ under
the power of eminent domain, and has nothing whatever to
do with taking of title to real property by devise”); Janowsky
v. U.S., 23 Cl Ct 706, 712-13 (1991), rev’d and vac’d in part on
other grounds, 989 F2d 1203 (Fed Cir 1993) (collecting cases
and observing that “when a citizen delivers property to the
4 As explained, a permanent physical occupation of private property is a
taking. The Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to apply that rule to the
installation of sewer lines. See Courter v. City of Portland, 286 Or App 39, 48, 398
P3d 936 (2017) (stating that “if the city’s pipes are occupying plaintiffs’ property”
outside the scope of the city’s easement, “there has been a taking” for the purposes
of Article I, section 18); Ferguson v. City of Mill City, 120 Or App 210, 214-15,
852 P2d 205 (1993) (holding that ordinance that required city property owners to
grant city an easement for sewer lines and tanks was a taking for the purposes of
Article I, section 18).
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
345
government pursuant to an agreement, an inverse condem-
nation claim does not arise simply because the government
does not pay; the property owner’s consent to the arrange-
ment vitiates a claim that the government took the property
for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment”);
see, e.g., id. at 711-12 (property owners’ allegations that FBI
breached an implied-in-fact contract to compensate owners
for use of their property during an undercover investigation
failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation because own-
ers had freely agreed to allow the FBI to use their property;
property owners’ claim was contractual in nature). Thus, not
all government acquisitions of property for a public use result
from an exercise of the government’s eminent domain power.
Consequently, not all government acquisitions of property
for a public use are subject to Article I, section 18, and the
Fifth Amendment. To prevail on a takings claim, a plaintiff
must show that their property was “taken,” that is, that their
property was appropriated for a public purpose through the
exercise of eminent domain authority.
B. Responses to Plaintiffs’ Arguments
In this case, plaintiffs brought an inverse condem-
nation claim, and the issue on review is whether their claim
is time barred. As mentioned, plaintiffs have made three
alternative arguments regarding that issue: (1) inverse
condemnation claims cannot be subject to statutes of lim-
itations; (2) even if some types of inverse condemnation
claims, like the “regulatory” takings claim at issue in Suess
Builders, can be subject to statutes of limitations, “physical
occupation” takings claims cannot; and (3) even if “physi-
cal occupation” takings claims can be subject to statutes of
limitations and the six-year limitations period established
by ORS 12.080(3) applies to them, the period does not begin
until “the putative condemner refuses to pay just compen-
sation after taking private property for a public use.” We
address those arguments in turn.5
5 As recounted, in the trial court and Court of Appeals, plaintiffs made three
arguments. We allowed review to address plaintiffs’ third argument, relating to
when an inverse condemnation claim accrues. However, because plaintiffs’ three
arguments are related and were fully litigated below, we address all three of
them. See ORAP 9.20(2) (providing that the Oregon Supreme Court may consider
issues that were before the Court of Appeals).
346
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
1. Whether inverse condemnation claims can be subject
to statutes of limitations
Plaintiffs’ first argument is that inverse condem-
nation claims cannot be subject to statutes of limitations
because they are constitutional claims. That argument is
unavailing for three reasons: (1) both this court and the
Supreme Court have already subjected takings claims to
statutes of limitations; (2) Article I, section 18, is based on
the Indiana Constitution’s Takings Clause and, prior to the
adoption of the Oregon Constitution, the Indiana Supreme
Court had held that that clause could be subject to statutory
requirements; and (3) this court has long held that Article I,
section 18, claims can be subject to statutory limits.
First, plaintiffs’ argument that, because state and
federal takings claims are based on constitutional provi-
sions, they cannot be subject to statutes of limitations, is at
odds with decisions by this court and the Supreme Court.
As mentioned, in Suess Builders, this court held that the
six-year limitations period established by ORS 12.080(3)
applied to a takings claim. Suess Builders, 294 Or at 268.
Similarly, in United States v. Dickinson, 331 US 745, 747, 67
S Ct 1382, 91 L Ed 1789 (1947), the Supreme Court applied a
six-year limitations period to the plaintiff’s federal takings
claim. See 28 USC § 1491(a)(1) (Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution” or any
federal law, or for contract damages “in cases not sounding
in tort”); Knick, 588 US at 189 (observing that 28 USC sec-
tion 1491(a)(1) “provides the standard procedure” for bring-
ing Fifth Amendment takings claims against the federal
government); 28 USC § 2501 (claims brought under 28 USC
section 1491(a)(1) are “barred unless the petition thereon is
filed within six years after such claim first accrues”).6
6 We note that Congress has imposed statutes of limitations on other consti-
tutional rights. See 28 USC § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply
to an application for writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court.”); 28 USC § 2255(f) (“A 1-year period of limitation
shall apply” to a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence by a
person in federal custody.). The Oregon State Legislature has done the same. See
ORS 147.515(1) (“A victim who wishes to allege a violation of a right granted to
the victim in a criminal proceeding by Article I, section 42 or 43, of the Oregon
Constitution, shall inform the court within 30 days of the date the victim knew
or reasonably should have known of the facts supporting the allegation.”).
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
347
Second, as to Article I, section 18, plaintiffs’ argu-
ment is contradicted by a case decided by the Indiana
Supreme Court, which construed the Takings Clause of
the Indiana Constitution of 1851, on which Article I, sec-
tion 18, was based: New Albany & S.R. Co. v. Connelly, 7
Ind 32 (1855), overruled in part on other grounds by Graham
v. Columbus & I.C. Ry. Co., 27 Ind 260 (1866). Because
New Albany was decided before the adoption of the Oregon
Constitution, it informs our construction of Article I, section
18. Putnam v. Douglas Co., 6 Or 328, 331 (1877), overruled in
part on other grounds by State Highway Com. v. Bailey et al,
212 Or 261, 319 P2d 906 (1957) (“The provisions contained in
our constitution and statute in relation to the taking of pri-
vate property for public use appear to have been taken from
the Indiana Constitution and statute; and, having adopted
them after they had been judicially construed by the courts
of that state, it must be presumed that we adopted along
with them the construction of those courts.”).7
In New Albany, the Indiana Supreme Court held that
a statute that prescribed procedures for bringing a claim
for “just compensation” under the Indiana Constitution was
enforceable, stating that “where the statute pointed out a
special constitutional mode for the assessment of dam-
ages, in cases like the present, none but that mode could
7 Indiana decisions that predate the adoption of Oregon’s constitutional
Takings Clause are relevant to our analysis because Article I, section 18—for-
merly Article I, section 19, under the Oregon Constitution of 1857—was derived
from Article I, section 21, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851. Claudia Burton &
Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857—Part I
(Articles I & II), 37 Willamette L Rev 469, 486 (2001). Compare Or Const, Art I,
§ 19 (1857) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particu-
lar services of any man be demanded, without just compensation; nor except in
case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.”), with
Ind Const, Art I, § 21 (1851) (“No man’s particular services shall be demanded
without just compensation. No man’s property shall be taken by law without just
compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first
assessed and tendered.”).
Article I, section 21, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 was, in turn, an
amended version of the takings provision contained in the Indiana Constitution
of 1816. See Ind Const, Art I, § 7 (1816) (“[N]o man’s particular services shall
be demanded, or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent
of his representatives or without just compensation being made therefor.”); see
also State v. Cookman, 324 Or 19, 28, 920 P2d 1086 (1996) (relying on an Indiana
Supreme Court decision construing the meaning of a clause in the Indiana
Constitution of 1816 to inform the meaning of the parallel clause in the Oregon
Constitution of 1857).
348
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
be adopted to recover them.” 7 Ind at 35. In doing so, the
Indiana Supreme Court relied on Null v. White Water Valley
Canal Co., 4 Ind 431 (1853), in which it had held that a
property owner’s claim for compensation under the Indiana
Constitution of 1816 was time barred because it was not
brought within a statutorily prescribed two-year limitations
period. New Albany, 7 Ind at 35 (citing Null, 4 Ind 431).
In Null, the court held that the legislature “had
power to enact” the statute of limitations and commented
that “two years is a reasonable time for asserting a claim
for damages [and] a party is not necessarily entitled to any
more.” 4 Ind at 435. Applying that conclusion, the court held
that, if a claim “is not asserted in that time, it shall be dis-
regarded.” Id. at 435.
Thus, New Albany contradicts plaintiffs’ argument
that the legislature cannot impose statutory requirements—
like limitations periods—on constitutional claims for “just
compensation” under Article I, section 18. It shows that,
prior to the adoption of the Oregon Constitution, the Indiana
Supreme Court had held that the Indiana Constitution’s
Takings Clause on which the Oregon Constitution’s Taking
Clause was based could be subject to statutory require-
ments. New Albany, 7 Ind at 35; see also Null, 4 Ind at 435
(so holding under the Indiana Constitution of 1816); Nelson
v. Fleming, 56 Ind 310, 321 (1877) (“[W]here a party whose
land had been appropriated to the [state] failed to file his
application for damages within the time thus limited, he
must be regarded as having waived any claim for damages,
and that upon the lapse of the time limited, no such claim
for damages having been filed, the title to the land appropri-
ated vested in the State as thoroughly and completely as if
damages had been assessed and paid.”).8
Third, also as to Article I, section 18, plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the legislature may not impose statutory require-
ments on constitutional takings claims is contrary to our
cases holding that property owners seeking compensation
8 Because Nelson was decided after the adoption of the Oregon Constitution,
it is not evidence of the Oregon drafters’ intent regarding Article I, section 18, but
it confirms our understanding of New Albany and Null, which are relevant to the
Oregon drafters’ intent.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
349
under Article I, section 18, must comply with statutes that
prescribe the processes for obtaining such compensation.
Kendall v. Post, 8 Or 141 (1879), is illustrative. In Kendall,
a property owner sought compensation for rocks and stone
that a county road supervisor had taken from the owner’s
land. Id. at 143-44. The road supervisor was authorized by
statute to take private property for road building and repair.
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch L, § 28, p 728 (Deady
& Lane 1843-1872). If the road supervisor took a person’s
property, the person could seek compensation through a pro-
cess prescribed by a statute, specifically, by making a writ-
ten complaint “to the county court, at any regular meeting
within six months after the cause of such complaint shall
exist.” Kendall, 8 Or at 145 (quoting General Laws of Oregon,
Crim Code, ch L, § 29, p 729 (Deady & Lane 1843-1872)).
The property owner argued that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it did not provide for a jury trial regarding the
amount of compensation. Id. at 146. This court rejected that
argument, distinguishing between claims for compensation
under Article I, section 18, and civil claims, to which the
Article I, section 17, right to a jury trial applies. Id. at 146.
Regarding claims for compensation under Article I, section
18, this court held that, “in the absence of special provision
in the organic law, giving the right to have a jury assess
the damages, it is competent for the legislature to provide
for assessments by any other just mode,” and that, if the
property owner “felt aggrieved by the acts of the supervisor,
he should have applied to the county court, composed of the
county judge and the county commissioners, while transact-
ing the county business.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Branson v. Gee, 25 Or 462, 466-68, 36 P 527
(1894) (holding that, under Article I, section 18, the state
could appropriate private property for public use “without
compensation first assessed and tendered, but it must make
provision by which the party whose property has been seized
can obtain just compensation for it” and that property owner
had to comply with statutory procedures for seeking compen-
sation); id. at 467 (holding that statutory procedures did not
violate federal Due Process Clause, even though the property
owner bore the burden of initiating them); Cherry v. Lane
County, 25 Or 487, 489, 36 P 531 (1894) (following Branson
350
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
and holding that property owner aggrieved by exercise of
eminent domain had to submit their claim to the circuit
court as required by statute). Thus, this court has long held
that claims for compensation under Article I, section 18, may
be subject to statutory requirements.9
2. Whether “physical occupation” takings claims
can be subject to statutes of limitations
Plaintiffs’ second argument is that, even if some
types of takings claims—like the “regulatory” takings claim
in Suess Builders—can be subject to a statute of limitations,
“physical occupation” takings claims cannot. Plaintiffs are
correct that Suess Builders addressed a “regulatory” tak-
ings claim; the issue was whether the defendants had taken
the plaintiffs’ property by designating part of it as the site of
a future park. Plaintiffs are also correct that, under the law,
“physical occupation” takings and “regulatory” takings are
treated differently in some ways. For example, what a plain-
tiff must show to establish a “physical occupation” taking
differs from what must be shown in a “regulatory” takings
case. See Hall v. Dept. of Transportation, 355 Or 503, 511-12,
326 P3d 1165 (2014) (observing that, under Article I, section
18, a “physical occupation” taking results “when a govern-
mental actor physically occupies private property or invades
a private property right in a way that substantially inter-
feres with the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property,
thereby reducing its value,” and that a “regulatory” taking
can result when (1) a government regulation “restricts a
property owner’s right of possession, enjoyment, and use,”
and that, as a result, “the property retains no economically
viable or substantial beneficial use”; or (2) a government
zoning or planning action reduces the property’s value, and
the property owner “
‘is precluded from all economically fea-
sible private uses pending eventual taking for public use,’
”
9 In arguing otherwise, plaintiffs rely on Morrison and Tomasek, but those
cases are not on point. They did not involve whether the state may impose proce-
dural requirements on takings claims. In Morrison, this court held that, although
a county may be immune from tort liability, Article I, section 18, requires it to
pay “just compensation” for property taken in an exercise of eminent domain. 141
Or at 574. In Tomasek, this court held that a property owner’s constitutional right
to “just compensation” does not depend on whether the state has failed or refused
to institute direct condemnation proceedings; a property owner may bring an
inverse condemnation claim. 196 Or at 147.
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
351
or “
‘the designation results in such governmental intrusion
as to inflict virtually irreversible damage.’
” (quoting Fifth
Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 614, 581 P2d
50 (1978))); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 322-23, 122 S Ct
1465, 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002) (observing that, under the
Fifth Amendment, whether the government’s physical occu-
pation constitutes a taking “involves the straightforward
application of per se rules,” but whether the government’s
regulation constitutes a taking “
‘necessarily entails complex
factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects’
”
(quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 US 519, 523, 112 S Ct 1522,
118 L Ed 2d 153 (1992)). But plaintiffs are incorrect that
“physical occupation” takings claims cannot be subject to
statutes of limitations.
As noted, the Supreme Court has applied stat-
utes of limitations to “physical occupation” takings claims.
Dickinson, 331 US as 747.
As for Article I, section 18, as just discussed, prior
to the adoption of the Oregon Constitution, the Indiana
Supreme Court held that claims for “just compensation”
could be subject to statutory requirements, including stat-
utes of limitations. Those cases involved physical occupation
and appropriation of private property for public use. In New
Albany, the alleged taking was the construction of a railroad
on the claimant’s property, and, in Null, the alleged tak-
ing involved the construction of a canal through the plain-
tiffs’ property and the diversion of the plaintiffs’ water. New
Albany, 7 Ind at 33; Null, 4 Ind at 432. Thus, prior to the
adoption of the Oregon Constitution, the Indiana Supreme
Court applied statutory requirements to “physical occupa-
tion” takings claims.
Similarly, the Oregon cases in which this court held
that the plaintiffs had to comply with statutory require-
ments when seeking “just compensation” under Article I,
section 18, include cases involving the physical appropria-
tion of property. Kendall involved the removal of gravel and
dirt from the plaintiff’s property for road construction and
repair, as did Branson and Cherry. Kendall, 8 Or at 143;
Branson, 25 Or at 462; Cherry, 25 Or at 488. In those cases,
352
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
property was literally taken by the government, and this
court held that the property owners had to comply with the
statutory procedures for seeking compensation.
In light of Dickinson, and the Indiana and Oregon
cases upholding the application of statutory requirements
on takings claims involving the physical occupation and
appropriation of property, we reject plaintiffs’ argument
that such claims cannot be subject to statutes of limitations.
Consequently, we conclude that ORS 12.080(3) applies to
“physical occupation” takings claims.
3. Whether the limitations period on a takings claim
does not begin to run until a government entity
refuses or ignores a request for compensation
Plaintiffs’ third argument is that, even if takings
claims based on the physical occupation of property can be
subject to a statute of limitations, the limitations period does
not begin to run “until the entity with the power of eminent
domain refuses to pay or ignores a demand for compensation
for what it took.”
A limitations period begins to run when a claim
accrues. ORS 12.010 (requiring actions to be commenced
within limitations periods “after the cause of action shall
have accrued”). Under Oregon law, the general rule is that
a claim accrues when a plaintiff “has a right to sue on it.”
Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or 151, 161,
742 P2d 1176 (1987). That is, a claim accrues when all the
facts necessary to prove the claim exist. U.S. Nat’l Bank v.
Davies, 274 Or 663, 666-67, 548 P2d 966 (quoting Michael
Franks, Limitation of Actions 11 (1959)). Similarly, under
federal law, a claim accrues when a plaintiff has “a complete
and present cause of action,” meaning that “the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief.” Bay Area Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522
US 192, 201, 118 S Ct 542, 139 L Ed 2d 553 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).10 As we will explain, under both
the state and federal constitutions, a property owner may
10 In addition to the general rule, there is a discovery accrual rule, which
applies to some claims. As discussed later in this opinion, we need not decide
whether plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim is subject to a discovery accrual
rule. See ___ Or at ___ n 11 (slip op at 29 n 11).
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
353
bring a “physical occupation” takings claim when the phys-
ical occupation occurs. However, the reasons why an owner
may bring such a claim at that point differ under state and
federal law.
Under the Oregon Constitution, a property owner
has a right to “just compensation,” but not necessarily at the
time that their property is taken. Again, Article I, section 18,
provides, “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use,
nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without
just compensation; nor except in the case of the state, with-
out such compensation first assessed and tendered[.]” Thus,
Article I, section 18, does not require the state to pay for prop-
erty before taking it for a public use. Instead, as this court
has explained, the state may appropriate property “without
compensation being first assessed and tendered, but it must
make provision by which the party whose property has been
seized can obtain just compensation for it.” Branson, 25 Or at
466; see also Tomasek, 196 Or at 147 (“[T]he assessment and
tender of just compensation is not a condition precedent to a
taking. The taking may occur and the amount of compensa-
tion be determined and paid later.”); Branson, 25 Or at 467
(holding that statutes that established procedure for com-
pensation after taking did not violate Article I, section 18,
because the state “is not bound to make or tender compensa-
tion before [the] actual appropriation [of private property],”
and the provisions of the statutes “afford[
] an opportunity
for the party aggrieved, whose property has been taken by
the [state], to propound his claim for compensation”).
The state can delegate its eminent domain author-
ity to other governmental entities, and when it does, its
delegates are also allowed to take property for public use
without first paying “just compensation.” Baker County v.
Benson, 40 Or 207, 215, 66 P 815 (1901) (“When the property
is taken directly by the state, or by any municipal corpora-
tion by state authority, it has been repeatedly held not to be
essential to the validity of a law for the exercise of the right
of eminent domain that it should provide for making com-
pensation before the actual appropriation.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)).
354
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
An Article I, section 18, claim for “just compensa-
tion” from the state or other governmental entity is best
understood as an assertion of a constitutional entitlement.
An owner can bring such a claim as soon as their property
is taken. As discussed above, the physical occupation of an
owner’s property constitutes a taking. The physical occupa-
tion triggers the entitlement to “just compensation” and pro-
vides the basis for a takings claim.
Plaintiffs argue that, before a property owner can
bring a takings claim, the owner must request compensa-
tion and be denied. We find no legal support for that argu-
ment. The Indiana and Oregon cases that we have discussed
indicate that, when an owner’s property is taken, the owner
can seek compensation. We see no reason why, as plain-
tiffs would have it, a property owner should be required to
request compensation and be denied before being able to
bring a takings claim to obtain that same compensation.
Plaintiffs appear to suggest that, because Article I,
section 18, allows the state and other governmental entities
to take property before paying “just compensation,” a taking
is not adverse to a property owner’s interests until the owner
requests and is denied compensation. That is incorrect. A
“physical occupation” taking, like the one alleged here, is a
substantial interference with an owner’s “rights of exclusive
possession and use.” Dunn, 355 Or at 348; Hall, 355 Or at 511
(explaining that “a de facto taking results when a govern-
mental actor physically occupies private property or invades
a private property right in a way that substantially inter-
feres with the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property,
thereby reducing its value”); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 322-
23 (explaining that a “categorical taking” results “[w]hen
the government physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose”). It is necessarily adverse.
Therefore, we conclude that a property owner can bring a
takings claim as soon as the state or other governmental
entity physically occupies the owner’s property.11
11 It is possible that accrual of a “physical occupation” takings claim could
be subject to a “discovery rule.” Generally speaking, under a “discovery rule,”
a cause of action does not accrue “until the claim has been discovered or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered.” FDIC v. Smith, 328
Or 420, 428, 980 P2d 141 (1999). But we need not determine whether a “physical
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
355
We reach the same conclusion regarding takings
claims under the Fifth Amendment, but for a different rea-
son. Unlike Article I, section 18, the Fifth Amendment does
not expressly provide that a government may take prop-
erty before paying for it. And, in Knick, the Supreme Court
recently held that, “because a taking without compensation
violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time
of the taking, the property owner can bring a federal suit
at that time.” 588 US at 194 (emphasis added). Therefore,
a property owner can bring a takings claim alleging a vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment “as soon as the government
takes [the property owner’s] property without paying for it.”
Id. at 190.
Plaintiffs make two arguments against that con-
clusion. The first is based on a sentence in Knick, and the
second is based on a subsequent Supreme Court case: Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 549 US 139, 141 S Ct 2063, 210
L Ed 369 (2021). We address each of those arguments in
turn.
First, plaintiffs point to a sentence in Knick in
which the Court stated that its holding did not “as a practi-
cal matter mean that government action or regulation may
not proceed in the absence of contemporaneous compensa-
tion.” 588 US at 202. The Court made that statement in
response to a concern that its interpretation of the federal
Takings Clause would prevent governments from taking
necessary actions because property owners would be able
to enjoin those actions. Id. at 201-02. In that context, the
Court opined that, because “just compensation” remedies
are generally available to property owners, there is, in most
cases, “no basis to enjoin the government’s action effecting a
occupation” takings claim is subject to a discovery rule because, in this case,
there is no dispute that plaintiffs’ father was aware of, or had reason to be aware
of, the installation of the sewer lines by 1995.
Moreover, even if there was a dispute about whether plaintiffs’ father was
aware of, or had reason to be aware of, the installation of the sewer lines in 1995,
plaintiffs themselves allege that their father entered into an agreement with
defendants in 1998, and that allegation shows that their father knew about the
lines by 1998. So, even assuming a discovery rule applies and that plaintiffs’
father did not know, or have reason to know, of the sewer lines in 1995, plaintiffs’
claim would have accrued in 1998, and the statute of limitations would have run
by 2004, thirteen years before plaintiffs filed their claim.
356
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
taking.” Id. at 201. Therefore, the Court continued, as long
as post-taking compensation is available, prospectively pre-
venting the government from committing the violation in
the first place is unwarranted. Id. at 202.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the Court did
not suggest that the reason the government may proceed
with an uncompensated taking is because the availabil-
ity of post-taking compensation prevents the taking from
being unconstitutional; that is, it did not suggest that an
uncompensated taking is not a constitutional violation
unless and until post-taking compensation is denied. To the
contrary, the Court explained that, “[g]iven the availabil-
ity of post-taking compensation, barring the government
from acting will ordinarily not be appropriate.” Id. at 202.
“But that is because *
*
* such a procedure is a remedy for a
taking that violated the Constitution, not because the avail-
ability of the procedure somehow prevented the violation from
occurring in the first place.” Id. at 201 (emphasis added). To
be clear, the Court stated, irrespective of the remedies avail-
able, “the violation is complete at the time of the taking,”
and “a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim
*
*
* at that time.” Id. at 202. Thus, Knick does not support
plaintiffs’ position that a federal takings claim includes as
an element a denial of requested compensation.
Plaintiffs’ second argument is based on Cedar Point
Nursery, which was decided two years after Knick. But, as
we will explain, Cedar Point Nursery did not involve a ques-
tion of when a property owner can bring a federal takings
claim, and it did not cite Knick, much less address Knick’s
holding regarding when a property owner may bring a such
a claim. Moreover, unlike plaintiffs here, the petitioners in
Cedar Point Nursery were not seeking compensation, they
were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from future
entries onto their property.
In Cedar Point Nursery, a California regulation that
took effect in 1975 required agricultural employers to per-
mit union organizers onto their property “for up to three
hours per day, 120 days per year.” 594 US at 143; see id.
at 166 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the access reg-
ulation was enacted in 1975). In 2015, union organizers
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
357
entered one petitioner’s property under that regulation.
Cedar Point Nursery, 594 US at 144-45. The union organiz-
ers also attempted to enter the other petitioner’s property,
but that petitioner blocked them from entering. Id. at 145.
Believing that the union organizers would attempt to enter
their properties again, the petitioners filed a claim against
the California Agricultural Labor Board for declaratory and
injunctive relief to prohibit the enforcement of the regulation
against them, arguing that the access regulation effected a
per se physical taking that violated the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Id. On review, the Court held
that the access regulation effected a per se physical taking,
reasoning that “[w]henever a regulation results in a physical
appropriation of property, a per se taking has occurred.” Id.
at 149.
Plaintiffs point out that the access regulation that
effected the taking in Cedar Point Nursery was enacted
in 1975, but that the petitioners did not initiate their tak-
ings claim until 2015 upon the union workers’ actual and
attempted invasions pursuant to that regulation. That gap,
plaintiffs reason, demonstrates that the petitioners’ takings
claim in that case could not have accrued at the time of the
“taking” in 1975, because by 2015, a claim that accrued in
1975 would have been time barred. Thus, they maintain,
Cedar Point Nursery demonstrates that “it was not the taking
of the right to exclude that violated the Fifth Amendment—
it was the non-payment of just compensation” that violated
the Fifth Amendment and gave rise to an actionable tak-
ings claim in that case. (Emphasis in original.)
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, Cedar Point
Nursery does not indicate that Knick is no longer good law.
Cedar Point Nursery did not involve the issue whether the
petitioners’ claim in that case was time barred. As men-
tioned, the Cedar Point Nursery Court did not cite Knick
or address Knick’s holding about when a takings claim is
actionable. Moreover, Cedar Point Nursery did not involve
a claim for “just compensation” based on past interference
with the petitioners’ property rights; instead, it involved
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seek
a rule that a claim for “just compensation” does not accrue
358
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
unless and until the government refuses compensation.
Nothing in Cedar Point Nursery indicates that the Court
considered such a rule. Indeed, it does not appear that the
petitioners in Cedar Point Nursery themselves complied
with such a rule because there is no indication that the peti-
tioners were denied any requested relief before they brought
their takings claim in federal court. For all those reasons,
we conclude that Cedar Point Nursery did not alter the Knick
Court’s holding regarding when a federal takings claim is
actionable.12
C. Application of the Statute of Limitations to Plaintiffs’
Claim
Having concluded that takings claims under
Article I, section 18, and the Fifth Amendment can be sub-
ject to statutes of limitations and that “physical occupation”
takings claims can accrue when the physical occupation
occurs, we apply those conclusions to the facts of this case. As
recounted above, the summary judgment record, viewed in
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, establishes that defen-
dant installed the sewer lines by 1995 and that it did so for a
public purpose and without the consent of plaintiffs’ father,
who owned the property at the time. Based on those facts,
plaintiffs’ father could have brought an inverse condemna-
tion claim by 1995. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim accrued, and
the six-year statute of limitations began running, in 1995.
Because that period expired in 2001, plaintiffs’ 2017 claim
is time barred.
In arguing against that conclusion, plaintiffs
rely on the 1998 agreement. They appear to contend that
they had no basis for bringing their claim until defendant
breached that agreement. There are two problems with that
argument.
12 That conclusion is supported by numerous federal court decisions issued
since Cedar Point Nursery that have continued to apply Knick as good law. See,
e.g., St. Maron Properties, L.L.C. v. City of Houston, 78 F4th 754, 762 (5th Cir
2023); Fox v. Saginaw County, Michigan, 67 F4th 284, 290 (6th Cir 2023); Beaver
Street Investments v. Summit County, Ohio, 65 F4th 822, 826-27 (6th Cir 2023);
Kreuziger v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, 60 F4th 391, 394 (7th Cir 2023);
Bruce v. Ogden City Corp., 640 F Supp 3d 1150, 1161 (D Utah 2022), aff’d, No.
22-4114, 2023 WL 8300363 (10th Cir Dec 1, 2023); Knight v. Richardson Bay
Regional Agency, 637 F Supp 3d 789, 798-99 (ND Cal 2022); Vargo v. Barca, No.
20-CV-1109-JDP, 2023 WL 6065599, * 4 (WD Wis Sept 18, 2023).
Cite as 372 Or 331 (2024)
359
First, as just discussed, any takings claim based
on the installation of the sewer lines accrued when defen-
dant installed the lines, which was by 1995. At that point,
plaintiffs’ father could have initiated a takings claim. So,
the 1998 agreement would matter only if it somehow tolled
the running of the limitations period. But plaintiffs have
not made a tolling argument. That is, they have not argued
that, if their claim accrued in 1995, it was somehow tolled
in 1998. They have argued only that their claim did not even
accrue until 2014.
The second problem with plaintiffs’ reliance on the
1998 agreement is that, if, as they have alleged, their father
gave defendant an easement over the property in exchange
for a free hook-up to the sewer system, then their father
voluntarily transferred a property interest to defendant in
exchange for a payment. And, if he did that, defendant’s occu-
pation of the property from the point of the agreement forward
was not an exercise of defendant’s eminent domain authority.
Consequently, that occupation is not subject to Article I, sec-
tion 18, or the Fifth Amendment. That is because, if a govern-
ment acquires property as a result of an agreement, then it
has acquired the property with the owner’s consent. It has not
exercised its eminent domain authority. See Woodward Lbr.
Co., 173 Or at 338 (transfer of property interest for agreed
upon price was a purchase, not an exercise of eminent domain
authority); Janowsky, 23 Cl Ct at 712 (property owner’s claim
that government breached contract to compensate owners for
use of property sounded in contract, not the Takings Clause).
Therefore, if defendant acquired plaintiffs’ property pursuant
to an agreement, its acquisition of the property is not subject
to the constitutional limits on the exercise of eminent domain
power, and it cannot be the basis for a takings claim under
Article I, section 18, or the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiffs are understandably concerned by what
they believe to be defendant’s breach of the 1998 agreement.
The Court of Appeals addressed a similar concern in City of
Ashland v. Hoffarth, 84 Or App 265, 733 P2d 925 (1987). In
that case, the defendant brought a counterclaim for inverse
condemnation against a city, alleging that he had dedicated
a 20-foot strip of land to the city in exchange for a promise of
360
Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority
payment and that the city had failed to make the payment.
Id. at 269. The defendant
“alleged that he would not have dedicated the strip to the
city had he known that he would not be reimbursed for it
and that, as a result of the city’s representation, the city
obtained possession of the 20-foot-strip without providing
just compensation.”
Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant failed
to state a claim for inverse condemnation because the city’s
actions did not constitute a taking. Id. at 270. The court
explained that, at best, the
“counterclaim alleges a promise by the city to pay for the strip
in the future and his reliance on that promise. The mere fact
that as a result of the promise the city now owns the strip
and defendant has not been paid does not show that there
was a ‘taking.’ Defendant’s remedy, if any, was contractual.”
Id. (citation omitted). We agree with the Court of Appeals’
reasoning in Hoffarth. The defendant’s concern related to
the breach of an agreement; it was not a claim that his prop-
erty had been taken without his consent. Consequently, he
needed to bring a contract or quasi-contract claim, not an
inverse condemnation claim.
The same is true here. Plaintiffs’ concern is that, as a
result of the 1998 agreement, they are entitled to a free sewer
connection and that defendant has refused to provide them
with that connection. That concern relates to the breach of
an agreement. But, again, plaintiffs have not raised a breach
of contract claim or a quasi-contract claim, which would have
different accrual dates than their takings claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that
plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim is subject to the
six-year limitations period set out in ORS 12.080(3), that
the limitations period began to run when defendant had
installed the sewer lines, and that, because plaintiffs’ claim
was not filed within the limitations period, it is time barred.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the circuit court are affirmed. | 74bd28ea1e8d6701e2ef76907965974a5f755ec9c2724f6216421ee0561a03d1 | 2024-05-23T00:00:00Z |
fe46b01c-f516-4062-8dd4-e89e7e59792a | Bosak v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 19, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48606)
On modified ballot title filed October 11, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioners.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With her on
the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*332 Or 537, ____ P3d ____ (2001) (referring ballot title
for modification).
**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 49 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Bosak v. Myers, 332 Or
537, ___ P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. The
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title for the
proposed initiative measure, and no party to the ballot title
review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot title and
requiring court to certify modified ballot title if no objection
filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 49 (2002)
states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: LIMITS ANNUAL
INCOME-TAX REVENUE SPENDING GROWTH
TO FOUR PERCENT; RETURNS REVENUE
EXCEEDING LIMIT
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote limits the
annual growth in spending of state income-tax revenue
to four percent; state must return all revenue
exceeding limit to taxpayers.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects four-percent limit on annual growth in spending of state
income-tax revenue; rejects requiring state to return
revenue exceeding that limit.
"SUMMARY: Amends Oregon Constitution. Oregon
statutes currently limit biennial growth of state
appropriations for general governmental purposes to
previous biennium's growth rate for personal income in
Oregon. Under Oregon Constitution, the state currently
must return excess income- and excise-tax revenue to
taxpayers when it collects at least two percent more
than it estimated it would collect. This measure adds
constitutional provision limiting annual rate of growth
in spending of 'state income tax revenue' (personal and
corporate income taxes, corporate excise taxes) to four
percent; growth limit not adjusted for population
change or inflation. Measure requires state to return
to taxpayers all 'state income tax revenue' collected
in excess of growth limit. Measure limits state
spending of income-tax revenues without providing
replacement revenues. Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 6266803ec78f44ccfa9415943c5810122fee3c0f973a1c76e7445d17da32b162 | 2001-10-19T00:00:00Z |
c8c0d9cb-2f46-47bc-9ba4-3434daa68413 | State v. Ray | null | S48637 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
TRAVIS JOHN RAY,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC C96-2920CR; CA A98561; SC S48637)
En Banc
On petition for review filed July 9, 2001.*
Louis R. Miles, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for petitioner on review.
No appearance contra.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802, (2001).
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Timothy P. Alexander, Judge. 164 Or App 145, 990 P2d 365 (1999). | 321efa87c966604ff947947704969f6ca39e2f8395534823785b79ad7b0231aa | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
fd18e612-14f5-4c8d-bfc5-f3c3e3ae766c | Oregon v. Haugen | null | S059519 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: November 21, 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
GARY HAUGEN,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 04C46224; SC S059519)
En Banc
Joseph Guimond, Judge.
On Request for Court and/or the Chief Justice to Act on its Own Motion and Issue
an Order Enforcing the Alternative Writ of Mandamus, Issued June 29, 2011, filed
October 17, 2011; considered and under advisement on November 2, 2011.
Jeffrey E. Ellis, Oregon Capital Resource Center, Portland, filed the request and
reply on behalf of Oregon Capital Resource Center.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the response for
Adverse Party State of Oregon. With him on the response were John R. Kroger, Attorney
General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
Greg Scholl, of Metropolitan Public Defender, Hillsboro, filed the response for
Relator Gary Haugen.
BALMER, J.
The request submitted by Oregon Capital Resources Center to enforce the June 29,
2011, writ is denied.
Walters, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which De Muniz, C. J., and Durham,
J., joined.
De Muniz, C. J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Durham and Walters, JJ.,
joined.
1
BALMER, J.
1
This matter comes to this court on a "request" that it enforce, on its own
2
motion, an alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued in connection with Gary
3
Haugen's death-warrant proceeding. After that writ issued, this court determined that it
4
had been complied with, and then sua sponte dismissed it. The request to now enforce
5
the dismissed writ is premised on an assertion that the trial court did not comply with the
6
writ. The request is filed by Oregon Capital Resource Center (OCRC), an organization
7
that, when it attempted to participate in the earlier mandamus proceeding, failed to
8
establish any right or authority to do so.1 As we will explain, we deny OCRC's request,
9
without deciding whether OCRC properly may make it, because we conclude that the
10
judge to whom the writ was addressed has taken the actions that the writ required.
11
We begin by describing the procedural posture in which OCRC's request
12
arises. We then turn to the contrary arguments advanced by OCRC and the contrary legal
13
analysis urged by the dissenting members of the court.
14
I. BACKGROUND
15
This court affirmed Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and death
16
1
Specifically, this court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary
showing of legal authority to bring the action under ORS 34.105 to ORS 34.320. In
particular, under ORS 34.105(4), a relator in a mandamus proceeding must be "the
beneficially interested party on whose relation" the proceeding is brought. OCRC
brought the petition alleging Haugen to be the relator, while also acknowledging that it
did not represent Haugen. The court decided that OCRC had not made the necessary
showing of legal authority to bring the proceeding on Haugen's behalf.
2
sentence. State v. Haugen, 349 Or 174, 243 P3d 31 (2010). Judge Guimond, who had
1
been the trial judge, then held a hearing on whether to issue the death warrant. Haugen
2
was represented at the hearing by two lawyers, Simrin and Goody. Before the hearing,
3
Haugen had made clear his desire to waive all further challenges to his conviction and
4
sentence. Simrin and Goody, however, believed that Haugen was not competent to be
5
executed. They filed a motion to declare Haugen incompetent, supported by Goody's
6
declaration that Haugen had been interviewed and evaluated by a neuropsychologist, Dr.
7
Lezak, who had had concluded that Haugen was not competent to be put to death.
8
At the hearing, before considering Simrin and Goody's motion, Judge
9
Guimond received a letter from Haugen, asking him to remove Simrin and Goody as his
10
lawyers and to permit him to proceed pro se. Simrin and Goody objected to being
11
removed as Haugen's lawyers, arguing that Judge Guimond had to hold a so-called
12
"Faretta" hearing before accepting Haugen's waiver of counsel and permitting him to go
13
forward without representation; Simrin and Goody urged that Lezak's evaluation was
14
relevant and necessary to that issue.2 Judge Guimond disagreed on the necessity of an
15
2
A "Faretta" hearing refers to a hearing comporting with Faretta v.
California, 422 US 806, 95 S Ct 2525, 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), in which the United States
Supreme Court articulated the test for a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See generally State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 831 P2d 666 (1992) (discussing
requirements of inquiry into a defendant's exercise of the right to waive counsel under
both state and federal constitution). This court has explained that a colloquy on the
record between the court and a defendant in which the court, "in some fashion, explains
the risks of self-representation" is generally the preferred means of assuring that the
defendant understands those risks. Meyrick, 313 Or at 133-34. Simrin and Goody did
not cite or otherwise refer to the procedures under ORS 137.464, which, as we later
3
evidentiary hearing, and instead conducted a colloquy with Haugen. After doing so, and
1
after advising Haugen of the risks of proceeding without counsel, Judge Guimond found
2
Haugen to be competent, concluded that he was knowingly choosing to proceed pro se,
3
and discharged Simrin and Goody. Judge Guimond, however, simultaneously appointed
4
Simrin and Goody as "stand by" counsel to provide legal advice to Haugen at any point at
5
which he might want that advice. Judge Guimond then asked Haugen a series of
6
questions. Based on Haugen's responses to those questions, Judge Guimond concluded
7
that Haugen was validly waiving his rights to further challenge his conviction and
8
sentence. Judge Guimond issued a death warrant setting a date for Haugen's execution.
9
After the death warrant issued, OCRC filed a petition for a writ of
10
mandamus contending that the trial court had discharged Haugen's lawyers and issued the
11
death warrant without a sufficient inquiry into Haugen's competence. In support of that
12
petition, OCRC filed an affidavit by Lezak attesting that, in her opinion, Haugen was not
13
competent to be executed. Simrin and Goody, Haugen's discharged lawyers, submitted a
14
letter supporting the petition. The state opposed the petition, arguing that OCRC lacked
15
standing to file it. Haugen, appearing pro se, also opposed the petition, arguing
16
principally that neither OCRC nor Simrin and Goody had authority to represent him or to
17
seek relief on his behalf. Haugen also claimed that Simrin and Goody had divulged
18
explain, apply at a death warrant hearing in which the defendant wants to waive counsel
and there is a substantial question about the defendant's mental capacity to represent
himself or herself adequately.
4
privileged and confidential attorney-client communications in their letter to the court,
1
without his authorization.
2
This court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary showing that
3
it had any legal authority to bring the proceeding on Haugen's behalf. The court further
4
concluded, however, that Simrin and Goody, as Haugen's former lawyers, had authority
5
to challenge Haugen's competency to discharge them. We therefore construed Simrin
6
and Goody's letter as a petition for an alternative writ challenging certain findings,
7
rulings, and orders that Judge Guimond had entered, including the order discharging
8
Simrin and Goody without adequate procedures to determine Haugen's competence to
9
waive counsel and proceed pro se. Having so construed Simrin and Goody's letter, this
10
court issued an alternative writ of mandamus directed to Judge Guimond.
11
In the order issuing the writ, the court described the state of the record at
12
that point -- Simrin and Goody had obtained Lezak's evaluation, Lezak had concluded
13
Haugen was not competent to be executed, and Simrin and Goody had sought an
14
evidentiary hearing on the issue of Haugen's competency, which Judge Guimond had
15
denied. Given those facts, this court concluded that Judge Guimond had been obligated
16
to follow certain statutory procedures -- ones that he had not followed -- before
17
discharging Simrin and Goody and allowing Haugen to proceed pro se. In particular, the
18
court noted, ORS 137.464 provides that, at a death warrant hearing, if a defendant wishes
19
to waive his or her right to counsel and the trial court has "substantial reason to believe
20
that, due to mental incapacity, the defendant cannot engage in reasoned choices of legal
21
strategy and options," then the trial court "shall order" that the Oregon Health Authority
22
5
or its designee assess the defendant's mental capacity. The writ therefore directed Judge
1
Guimond to vacate his related findings, rulings, and orders, including "[t]he finding that
2
defendant Haugen is competent to waive his right to counsel" and "[t]he order removing
3
Simrin and Goody as counsel for defendant Haugen[.]" Judge Guimond was ordered to
4
then take the following further actions or to show cause for not doing so:
5
"1. Pursuant to ORS 137.464, order that the Oregon Health
6
Authority or its designee perform an assessment of the defendant's mental
7
capacity to engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and options;
8
"2. Pursuant to ORS 137.463(3) and (4), after completion of the
9
assessment by the Oregon Health Authority or its designee and any other
10
inquiry you deem appropriate, and before issuing a death warrant, hold an
11
evidentiary hearing and
12
"a. permit Simrin and Goody to offer evidence pertinent to
13
defendant Haugen's mental capacity to make a competent, knowing, and
14
voluntary waiver of his rights and to the question of whether defendant is
15
competent for the purposes of being executed;
16
"b. advise defendant Haugen that he is entitled to counsel in any
17
post-conviction proceeding and that counsel will be appointed if the
18
defendant is financially eligible for appointed counsel at state expense;
19
"c. determine whether defendant [Haugen] wishes to waive counsel,
20
and whether that waiver is competent, knowing, and voluntary;
21
"d. make findings on the record whether defendant Haugen suffers
22
from a mental condition that prevents Haugen from comprehending the
23
reasons for the death sentence and its implication; and
24
"e. determine whether defendant Haugen intends to pursue any
25
challenges to the sentence or conviction and, if not, advise defendant
26
Haugen of the consequences and make a finding on the record whether the
27
defendant competently, knowingly, and voluntarily waives the right to
28
pursue available challenges to his death sentence."
29
The alternative writ issued on June 29, 2011. Immediately after it issued,
30
Haugen wrote letters to this court vigorously objecting to its issuance. Among other
31
6
points, he objected to having Simrin and Goody reinstated as his attorneys, asserting that
1
they had a conflict of interest in representing him. Haugen also objected to any use or
2
disclosure of Lezak's evaluation or her opinion of his competency without his written
3
consent. Haugen asserted that his interview with Lezak was confidential and subject to a
4
privilege that he had not waived; that Simrin and Goody had not adequately advised him
5
in connection with Lezak's evaluation; and that Simrin and Goody's actions in disclosing
6
Lezak's opinion without his consent were both unethical and illegal. Haugen asked this
7
court, if it determined that Haugen did not have a right to object to the release of
8
information about Lezak's examination, to appoint independent counsel to represent him
9
on that issue.
10
This court responded to Haugen by letter, advising him that the case had
11
been returned to the circuit court, where further proceedings were to be conducted. The
12
court informed Haugen that copies of his letters raising his objections would be provided
13
to Judge Guimond. The court's letter also acknowledged Haugen's request to have
14
separate counsel appointed to represent him on "medical records and other issues." The
15
letter advised Haugen that copies of his letters would be forwarded to the Office of Public
16
Defense Services for "their consideration and further action as warranted." The court's
17
letter so advising Haugen was copied to, among others, Judge Guimond and all counsel
18
involved, including Simrin and Goody.
19
Meanwhile, Judge Guimond opted to comply with the writ rather than show
20
cause for not doing so. Judge Guimond promptly reinstated Simrin and Goody as
21
Haugen's counsel. He also directed the Oregon Health Authority to assess Haugen's
22
7
competence. Finally, he scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine Haugen's
1
competence, to be held after that evaluation was completed.
2
On July 14, 2011, Haugen notified Judge Guimond that he wanted Simrin
3
and Goody to be removed as his counsel. Haugen did not, however, ask to proceed pro
4
se. Instead, Haugen requested substitute counsel. In making that request, Haugen raised
5
substantially the same issues that he had raised with this court immediately after the writ
6
issued -- including that Simrin and Goody had violated the confidentiality of his
7
examination by Lezak by disclosing the results without his consent and that they had
8
acted unethically and illegally. Judge Rhoades, rather than Judge Guimond, presided at
9
the hearing on Haugen's motion for substitution. She determined that a conflict of
10
interest existed between Haugen and his counsel, based on an irremediable breakdown in
11
their attorney-client relationship. Judge Rhoades accordingly removed Simrin and
12
Goody as Haugen's counsel and ordered a substitution of counsel. Within a few days,
13
different lawyers -- Scholl and Gorham -- were appointed to represent Haugen.
14
On July 15, 2011, Simrin and Goody filed a second petition for a writ for
15
mandamus, challenging Judge Rhoades's decision to remove them as Haugen's counsel
16
and to substitute different counsel in their place. This court denied that petition three
17
days later.
18
On August 5, 2011, this court on its own motion dismissed the alternative
19
writ that had issued on June 29, 2011, directing Judge Guimond to take particular actions
20
in connection with the death warrant proceedings. The court did so, reciting that Judge
21
Guimond had notified the court that he would comply with the alternative writ and that,
22
8
"[f]rom our review of [the] OJIN [register] entries, it appears that Judge Guimond has
1
taken the actions necessary to comply with that writ." As noted, Judge Guimond had
2
vacated his earlier orders and had taken certain other actions directed by the writ. The
3
evidentiary hearing that the writ contemplated, although scheduled, had not yet occurred
4
when that dismissal order issued. Neither the parties to the writ proceeding nor OCRC
5
objected to the writ's dismissal, however.
6
After substitute counsel were appointed to represent Haugen, Dr. Hulteng
7
was selected to perform the evaluation of Haugen on behalf of the Oregon Health
8
Authority. Hulteng performed that evaluation and submitted his assessment that Haugen
9
is competent. Judge Guimond then held a hearing at which the lawyers for the parties
10
were permitted to offer further evidence on Haugen's competency.3 At that hearing,
11
Scholl, Haugen's lead counsel, did not offer Lezak's affidavit or other evidence of Lezak's
12
opinion of Haugen's competency. Rather, the only expert evidence presented at that
13
hearing was Hulteng's evaluation. Hulteng's written report was placed in evidence, and
14
Hulteng testified at the hearing. Counsel for both sides questioned Hulteng about his
15
assessment of Haugen's mental competence. At the conclusion of the hearing, based on
16
Hulteng's written report and in-court testimony, Judge Guimond concluded that Haugen
17
was competent to waive any further challenges to his conviction and sentence and that he
18
3
What we describe as a single hearing was held on September 27, 2011, and
October 7, 2011, and encompassed proceedings relevant to both the evidentiary hearing
on competency, as well as other proceedings required as part of the death warrant
hearing.
9
is competent to be executed.4
1
II. COMPLIANCE WITH THE WRIT
2
A.
OCRC's Request and Status
3
On October 17, 2011, OCRC filed the "request" that brings this matter
4
before the court. OCRC's specific request is for "this court and/or the Chief Justice to act
5
on its own motion and issue an order enforcing [the] alternative writ of mandamus."
6
The threshold problem with OCRC's request is that it is made by OCRC,
7
rather than by a party with a demonstrated interest in the proceeding. In the order issuing
8
the alternative writ of mandamus, we stated that "OCRC has not made the necessary
9
showing of legal authority to bring this proceeding on behalf of Haugen under ORS
10
34.105(4)." We concluded that Simrin and Goody had authority to seek mandamus,
11
because the trial court had permitted Haugen to discharge them and proceed pro se
12
without first holding a hearing to determine his competence to do so. In its request to
13
now enforce the writ of mandamus, OCRC has not offered any additional reason why it
14
was entitled in that original petition to seek mandamus on Haugen's behalf. If OCRC
15
lacked authority to seek a writ of mandamus in the first place, it necessarily follows that
16
it lacks authority to seek to enforce the writ that we issued.
17
4
When OCRC filed the request for this court to enforce the writ, Judge
Guimond had not signed a death warrant setting the date of Haugen's execution. Judge
Guimond, on November 18, 2011, did so. Haugen's execution is now scheduled for
December 6, 2011.
10
For present purposes, however, we assume that this court, having dismissed
1
the writ on its own motion, could reinstate the writ on its own motion, if the dismissal
2
had been issued by mistake or in error. And we assume further that, although OCRC has
3
not established any authority to make the request that it makes, we are not precluded from
4
considering its arguments in determining whether to act on our own motion. We look
5
past those potential issues because the trial court fully complied with the writ.
6
B.
Judge Guimond's Actions after the Writ Issued
7
We have already quoted the writ, at length and verbatim. The operative
8
directives were straightforward in what they required. As pertinent here, the terms of the
9
June 29, 2011, alternative writ stated four directives to Judge Guimond: to vacate certain
10
findings and orders; to order the Oregon Health Authority or its designee to conduct an
11
assessment of defendant Haugen's competence; to hold a hearing to determine Haugen's
12
competence after receiving that assessment; and to permit Haugen's counsel at that
13
hearing to offer evidence bearing on Haugen's competence.
14
Judge Guimond has complied with those directives. In particular, he
15
vacated his earlier orders and, in doing so, reinstated Simrin and Goody as
16
Haugen's counsel;
17
ordered the Oregon Health Authority to perform an assessment of Haugen's
18
mental capacity pursuant to ORS 137.464, which Hulteng then performed;
19
held an evidentiary hearing to determine Haugen's mental capacity before
20
issuing a death warrant; and
21
permitted Haugen's counsel at that hearing to offer further evidence pertinent
22
to Haugen's mental capacity.
23
Those were the actions that the writ contemplated. When this court
24
11
dismissed the writ on August 5 after concluding that it had been complied with, the
1
evidentiary hearing had not yet occurred. But it was scheduled to occur. That was
2
sufficient for this court to determine that Judge Guimond had complied with the writ.
3
Compliance did not require that the court know what evidence would be offered or
4
admitted at the hearing; compliance did not require the court to know the outcome of the
5
hearing.
6
Our dismissal of the writ was correct when it issued on August 5. It
7
remains correct now. The writ required Judge Guimond to take the steps outlined above,
8
which he had committed to doing when the dismissal occurred, and which he has since
9
done. Judge Guimond followed through on all procedural actions that our writ required.
10
No further enforcement of the writ is necessary or appropriate.5
11
III. THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY
12
We turn to the arguments to the contrary advanced by OCRC and the two
13
dissenting opinions. Those arguments center on three issues: (1) whether our writ
14
commanded that Simrin and Goody have a role in the death warrant proceedings
15
5
The fact that a writ of mandamus has been complied with does not mean
that this court has no authority to direct further or different actions on the official's part
based on circumstances that may arise after a writ issues. But for the court to have that
authority requires a further petition for a writ of mandamus, one addressed to any further
or different actions to be ordered and to the official's legal duty to perform them. And
that petition must be brought by someone who makes the necessary showing of interest to
bring it. No one has come before the court seeking a new or further writ of mandamus.
OCRC's request is limited to a claim that the trial court did not comply with the writ that
the court issued on June 29. Our disposition is limited to a denial of that request.
12
regardless of their status as Haugen's lawyers; (2) whether our writ commanded that
1
Lezak's opinion on Haugen's competency be considered by Judge Guimond regardless of
2
whether any party to the proceeding offered it in evidence; and (3) whether the
3
evidentiary hearing held by Judge Guimond comported with due process requirements.
4
We address those issues in turn. Although we ultimately disagree with the conclusions
5
reached in the dissenting opinions, we do so with respect for the legal analyses that are
6
offered in those opinions and for the views of the members of the court who have
7
authored and have joined them.
8
A.
The Role of Simrin and Goody
9
Both dissenting opinions argue that Judge Guimond failed to comply with
10
this court's writ because he did not have Simrin and Goody present evidence regarding
11
Haugen's competency at the evidentiary hearing conducted after issuance of the writ. The
12
dissents rely on the fact that the writ referred to Simrin and Goody by name. Their
13
position in that regard, however, fails to take into account (a) the context in which the
14
writ issued; (b) the text of the writ itself; (c) the proceedings in the trial court and this
15
court following the June 29, 2011, writ; and (d) the events that did and did not transpire
16
at the post-writ evidentiary hearing held by Judge Guimond.
17
First, the court issued the writ because it concluded that Simrin and
18
Goody's status as Haugen's "stand by" counsel after the trial court had allowed Haugen to
19
discharge them permitted them to take -- or at least did not prohibit them from taking --
20
"any legal action to challenge Haugen's competency to discharge them." Accordingly,
21
we construed Simrin and Goody's letter to the court as a petition for an alternative writ of
22
13
mandamus and, on that basis, issued the writ. Simrin and Goody thus were not lawyers
1
who were strangers to the case petitioning to participate in the proceedings; rather, as our
2
order explained, they were Haugen's recently discharged counsel -- now serving as "stand
3
by" counsel for him in the death warrant proceeding at issue. Moreover, Haugen had just
4
been found by the trial court to be competent (without the trial court having the benefit of
5
expert testimony), had waived his rights to further challenges to his sentence, and had
6
been given an execution date -- all at a hearing in which he was not represented by
7
counsel. For those reasons (among others), we issued the June 29 writ directing Judge
8
Guimond to vacate his earlier rulings, to order an examination by the Oregon Health
9
Authority, and to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the procedures prescribed by
10
ORS 137.463 and ORS 137.464.
11
It was in that context that we directed Judge Guimond to "permit Simrin
12
and Goody to offer evidence pertinent to defendant Haugen's [competence]." Nothing in
13
the court's order issuing the writ conferred any special "ombudsman," "next friend," or
14
similar status on Simrin and Goody. Rather, it identified them by name because they
15
were Haugen's recently discharged lawyers and had filed the petition that resulted in the
16
issuance of the writ.
17
Second, the text of the writ itself stated that the trial court should "permit"
18
Simrin and Goody to offer evidence pertaining to Haugen's mental state. The writ
19
conferred no right on them to appear in any capacity other than as Haugen's counsel. It
20
did not require Judge Guimond to permit them, as opposed to other counsel for Haugen,
21
to appear at the hearing. The writ did not require Simrin and Goody to offer any
22
14
evidence. It did not require Simrin and Goody to offer, or the trial court to admit, any
1
particular evidence, including the Lezak affidavit.
2
If there were any question about Simrin and Goody's role as contemplated
3
by the June 29 writ, that question is answered by events that occurred following the
4
issuance of the writ. As we have noted, Haugen wrote this court asserting that Simrin
5
and Goody had a conflict of interest with him, had not advised him adequately in
6
connection with Lezak's evaluation, and had disclosed Lezak's opinion in violation of his
7
claims of privilege and confidentiality. Haugen requested independent counsel on the
8
"medical and other issues" if this court concluded he could not object to disclosure of
9
Lezak's opinion. This court did not treat those issues as resolved by the writ. Instead,
10
this court referred Haugen's objections to the circuit court, and forwarded his request for
11
independent counsel on those issues to the appropriate appointing entity. Haugen then
12
moved for a substitution of counsel at the circuit court level. Judge Rhoades held a
13
hearing on Haugen's motion, determined that Simrin and Goody had a conflict of interest,
14
and removed Simrin and Goody. Judge Rhoades also appointed Scholl and Gorham to
15
represent Haugen. Simrin and Goody filed a mandamus petition seeking reversal of the
16
order, and this court -- unanimously -- denied that petition on July 18, 2011.
17
This court was aware that those events had taken place on August 5, when
18
it determined on its own motion that Judge Guimond had complied with the writ and
19
dismissed it. If this court had viewed the June 29 writ as requiring Simrin and Goody
20
specifically -- as opposed to other duly appointed counsel -- to participate at the death
21
warrant hearing, it would have granted their mandamus petition challenging their
22
15
removal. Likewise, if this court had viewed the writ as requiring Simrin and Goody
1
specifically -- as opposed to other duly appointed counsel -- to participate in the death
2
warrant hearing, this court would not have concluded that Judge Guimond had complied
3
with the June 29 writ and would not have dismissed it on its own motion. Simply put,
4
those actions by this court cannot be reconciled with the dissents' views that the June 29
5
writ required that Simrin and Goody personally participate in the death warrant hearing
6
and present evidence despite their status as lawyers who no longer represented Haugen
7
and who have a conflict of interest with him.6
8
Finally, what occurred at the post-writ evidentiary hearing itself
9
demonstrates that no one, including Simrin and Goody, interpreted the writ as mandating
10
that they appear personally and present evidence on Haugen's competency, regardless of
11
their status. At that hearing, Haugen was represented by counsel; he did not appear pro
12
se, as he had in the initial death warrant hearing that led to issuance of our writ. Judge
13
Guimond did not find Haugen to be competent based solely on his own colloquy with
14
Haugen, as happened in the initial death warrant hearing. Instead, Judge Guimond also
15
relied on the evidence presented by the parties at the evidentiary hearing, as our writ
16
6
Justice Walters suggests that this court denied the mandamus petition that
Simrin and Goody filed to challenge their removal as counsel and the substitution of
Scholl and Gorham, assuming that Scholl and Gorham would take the same positions in
representing Haugen (including introducing evidence that he was not competent) as
Simrin and Goody had. Nothing in the record supports that assertion, and the court took
no official action consistent with it. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, this court
does not and should not purport to control the choices made by counsel in representing
their clients. We did not do so here.
16
required. The evidence both parties chose to present was Hulteng's evaluation -- which
1
was the expert evaluation contemplated by the statutory procedure that our writ ordered
2
Judge Guimond to invoke. Simrin and Goody did not appear at the hearing, did not seek
3
to participate, and did not offer evidence. Their inaction at least suggests that they, too,
4
understood the writ to be directed to them only insofar as they remained Haugen's
5
lawyers.7
6
B.
The Lezak Affidavit
7
In urging that the writ must be enforced because Judge Guimond has not
8
complied with it, OCRC's arguments rest principally on the assertion that the writ
9
required Judge Guimond to consider Lezak's evaluation in making the competency
10
determination. The dissenting opinions agree. Our writ, however, did not order Judge
11
Guimond to do so.
12
To state the obvious first: the text of the June 29 writ does not direct Judge
13
Guimond to consider the Lezak affidavit. Had this court concluded that a reliable
14
determination of Haugen's competence could not be made without evidence of Lezak's
15
expert opinion, it would have directed Judge Guimond specifically to consider the Lezak
16
affidavit, in terms that expressed that obligation. The writ, however, contained no such
17
7
Worth noting is that OCRC does not dispute the propriety of removing
Simrin and Goody based on their conflict of interest with Haugen. Nor does OCRC,
unlike the dissenting members of this court, assert that Simrin and Goody, once they were
removed as Haugen's lawyers and different counsel were appointed to represent Haugen,
had any proper role to play at the evidentiary hearing held pursuant to our writ.
17
directive. Insofar as Lezak's opinion of Haugen's mental competency in particular was
1
concerned, the writ did not refer to it at all in the directives issued to Judge Guimond.8
2
Rather, the writ was open-ended: Haugen's lawyers could "offer evidence pertinent to
3
defendant Haugen's mental capacity to make a competent, knowing, and voluntary waiver
4
of his rights and to the question of whether defendant is competent for the purposes of
5
being executed." The writ did not order Judge Guimond to consider evidence regardless
6
of whether it was offered by any party and was determined to be admissible. Nothing in
7
the writ prejudged what evidence Haugen's lawyers might offer or preempted any
8
disputes that might arise over evidence offered by either side. Instead, the writ
9
commanded Judge Guimond to hold an evidentiary hearing, which he has done. It also
10
commanded Judge Guimond to permit Haugen's lawyers to offer evidence pertinent to
11
Haugen's competency, which he has also done. The writ ordered nothing more, and
12
nothing less.
13
As events transpired, Simrin and Goody were replaced by Scholl and
14
8
The order issuing the June 29 writ, as opposed to the writ itself, discussed
Lezak's opinion and relied, in part, on Simrin and Goody's attempt to present that
evidence to Judge Guimond. The significance of Lezak's opinion to the issuance of the
writ was that Simrin and Goody's attempt to offer evidence of her opinion at the initial
death warrant hearing triggered Judge Guimond's obligation under ORS 137.464 to order
an evaluation by the Oregon Health Authority and to hold an evidentiary hearing
afterwards. Our writ concerned only what procedures Judge Guimond was required to
follow. The dissenters view this court as having decided what evidence should be offered
and considered by Judge Guimond in following the required procedures, but that was not
an issue before us or one that we could have or should have resolved, given the
limitations of our record and the procedural posture of the case. We did not address or
resolve that issue when we issued the writ.
18
Gorham because Simrin and Goody had a conflict of interest with Haugen. Scholl, as
1
Haugen's lead counsel, independently assessed the evidence on Haugen's competency, the
2
legal issues involved, and his own ethical obligations to his client. Scholl properly did
3
not consider himself bound to pursue whatever legal strategies and positions Simrin and
4
Goody had pursued, as opposed to assessing those matters anew. Scholl decided to rely
5
on Hulteng's evaluation, which was the expert evaluation contemplated by the statutory
6
procedure that our writ ordered Judge Guimond to follow. Scholl specifically decided
7
not to submit the Lezak affidavit at the evidentiary hearing.9 By directing Judge
8
9
In response to OCRC's request to enforce our writ, Scholl, as Haugen's lead
counsel, has submitted an affidavit explaining his decision. Scholl knows Hulteng's work
well, having worked with and against him on many different cases. Scholl was present
during Hulteng's evaluation interviews of Haugen, and Hulteng allowed Scholl to
question him and Haugen during the evaluation. In addition, Hulteng allowed Scholl to
record the interviews by filming them. Based on his knowledge of Hulteng's work,
Scholl considers Hulteng "a fair evaluator and a knowledgeable * * * expert." With
regard to Hulteng's assessment of Haugen's mental competence specifically, Hulteng "is
credible and unbiased in [Scholl's] opinion." Scholl states that, "[i]n the end, Dr.
Hulteng's opinion about defendant's competency was very similar to my own view and
that of defendant himself."
In his affidavit, Scholl explains that, in contrast to Hulteng's expert
evaluation and opinion, Lezak's affidavit "does not offer a diagnosis, or present any
detailed client history. It does not establish defendant's incompetence. As an attorney
with experience in this area, I would not try to establish anyone's incompetency in court
or otherwise with the information in that document." Scholl emphasizes that he "could
have offered [Lezak's affidavit]" during the death warrant hearing if that affidavit was
"thought credible and if it furthered the objectives of the representation." For Scholl,
however, Lezak's affidavit seemed neither thorough nor complete. He declined to offer it
at the evidentiary hearing on Haugen's competency.
Scholl, of course, is not a medical professional. However, he explained
that, in the course of his work as the Director of the Washington County Section of
19
Guimond to permit Haugen's lawyers to offer evidence pertinent to Haugen's
1
competency, the writ deferred to the judgment of Haugen's lawyers to decide what
2
evidence to offer. That deference is consistent with how this court approaches virtually
3
all significant legal proceedings, including those in death penalty proceedings.
4
The dissenting opinions question how a majority of this court can now
5
conclude that Judge Guimond complied with this court's writ, when Simrin and Goody
6
did not participate in the hearing and the Lezak affidavit was not considered. The reasons
7
we have set forth above answer their question: Simrin and Goody presumably (and
8
correctly) understood that, once they had been replaced as counsel by Judge Rhoades
9
(with this court unanimously declining to vacate that action), they had no role to play in
10
the hearing; they did not seek to appear at or participate in the hearing or to introduce the
11
Lezak affidavit; and nothing in the order required Judge Guimond to sua sponte consider
12
the Lezak affidavit.
13
C.
The Evidentiary Hearing on Haugen's Competency
14
As noted, after Hulteng performed his evaluation of Haugen as the designee
15
for the Oregon Health Authority, Judge Guimond held an evidentiary hearing to
16
determine Haugen's competency. At that hearing, Haugen was represented by Scholl and
17
Gorham, rather than by Simrin and Goody. As required by our June 29 writ, Judge
18
Metropolitan Public Defender, he has "litigated competency issues in my own cases, and
assessed competency questions in the cases of other attorneys in the office. My work has
required regular client competency analysis, and in more areas than just a client's ability
to aid and assist in their own defense."
20
Guimond permitted Scholl and Gorham, as Haugen's counsel, "to offer evidence pertinent
1
to defendant Haugen's [competence]," and they did so. As already described, Scholl, as
2
Haugen's lead counsel, decided not to offer the Lezak affidavit; he relied on Hulteng's
3
expert evaluation instead. Judge Guimond was presented with both Hulteng's written
4
report and his testimony. Both parties examined Hulteng about his conclusions. No one
5
has come to this court -- including OCRC -- challenging Hulteng's credentials, the
6
thoroughness of his evaluation, or even his expert opinion. Judge Guimond made
7
findings of fact based on the evidence so presented and concluded that Haugen was
8
competent.
9
Justice Walters argues in dissent that Judge Guimond failed to comply with
10
the writ because he did not hold a hearing at which "one side contends that Haugen is
11
competent" and the "other side takes the contrary position * * *." However, our writ did
12
not direct "one side" to present evidence of Haugen's competence and the "other side" to
13
present evidence to the contrary. Rather, the writ simply ordered that a hearing be held at
14
which the parties could "offer evidence pertinent to defendant Haugen's mental capacity
15
to make a competent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his rights and to the question of
16
whether defendant is competent for the purposes of being executed[.]" The two "sides" at
17
the hearing were the state and Haugen. Consistent with Oregon statutes and our
18
adversarial legal system, the parties to the proceeding were permitted to present what
19
counsel for each side determined to be appropriate evidence -- and they did so. Judge
20
Guimond conducted the hearing required by the writ, and he permitted full participation
21
by the parties as contemplated by the writ.
22
21
To the extent that OCRC and the dissents argue that the United States
1
Supreme Court's decisions in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 US 930, 127 S Ct 2842, 168 L
2
Ed 2d 662 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US 399, 106 S Ct 2595, 91 L Ed 2d 335
3
(1986), require a different result, they read those cases for more than they hold. Those
4
cases stand for the principle that, when a prisoner seeks a stay of execution and makes a
5
"substantial threshold showing of insanity," due process requires that the state provide the
6
prisoner with a hearing at which both the prisoner and the state are free to put on
7
evidence. Panetti, 551 US at 949-50 (summarizing Justice Powell's opinion concurring
8
in part and concurring in the judgment in Ford).10 Neither the controlling opinion in
9
Ford nor the majority opinion in Panetti suggests that the procedure that the trial court
10
followed in this case violates the Due Process Clause.
11
IV. CONCLUSION
12
This court's June 29 writ commanded Judge Guimond to take four actions
13
pertinent here. He was to vacate certain findings and orders; to order the Oregon Health
14
Authority or its designee to conduct an assessment of defendant Gary Haugen's
15
competence; to hold a hearing to determine Haugen's competence after receiving that
16
10
As the Court explained in Panetti, Justice Powell's opinion concurring in
the judgment in Ford was narrower than Justice Marshall's plurality opinion regarding
the procedures for determining competence. Panetti, 551 US at 949. Accordingly,
because Justice Powell's opinion was necessary to form a majority position, it controls.
Id. We note that OCRC relies on Justice Marshall's plurality opinion, even though it is
not the controlling precedent on the process that the constitution requires to determine a
prisoner's competency to be executed.
22
assessment; and to permit Haugen's counsel at that hearing to offer evidence bearing on
1
Haugen's competence. Four members of this court so understood the writ in voting to
2
issue it; four members of this court so understand it still. A fortiori, those are the writ's
3
terms. Judge Guimond has complied with those directives.
4
The writ set out the directives described above. It did not require that
5
particular evidence be provided to or considered by Judge Guimond, and it did not direct
6
Judge Guimond to consider the Lezak affidavit regardless of whether Haugen's lawyers
7
offered it in evidence. The writ did not give Simrin and Goody a personal right or legal
8
role entitling them to present evidence on Haugen's competence -- their status was, and
9
is, that of former lawyers for Haugen who have been discharged due to a conflict of
10
interest and replaced by other duly appointed counsel. The writ did not preempt
11
Haugen's counsel from choosing what evidence to offer at the evidentiary hearing based
12
on their assessment of the evidence, the law, and their ethical responsibilities to their
13
client. The adversarial process would be ill-served were we to prevent Haugen's lawyers
14
from making those choices, or were we to take action to override or circumvent those
15
choices. We did not do so in issuing the writ, and we decline to do so now, on our own
16
motion, by enforcing the writ on revised terms.
17
Our conclusion that Judge Guimond has complied with the writ, of course,
18
does not make this case any less fraught or sobering. We agree with the dissenting
19
opinions that, as this court and the United States Supreme Court have said, "death is
20
different." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US 280, 305, 96 S Ct 2978, 49 L Ed 2d 944
21
(1976); State v. Haugen, 349 Or 174, 203, 243 P3d 31 (2010). And we agree that the
22
23
procedures established by the legislature that can lead to an execution must be followed
1
scrupulously. We share the dissenters' premise that every death penalty case raises the
2
most profound issues of morality and social justice. The record before us, however,
3
demonstrates no legal error in Judge Guimond's conduct of the proceedings to determine
4
Haugen's competence, nor any failure on his part to comply with the terms of our writ.
5
The request submitted by Oregon Capital Resources Center to enforce the
6
June 29, 2011, writ is denied.
7
1
WALTERS, J., dissenting.
1
Because the law requires Judge Guimond to decide whether Haugen is
2
mentally competent to be executed and because Judge Guimond has not yet considered
3
expert testimony relevant to that issue, this court should not conclude that Judge
4
Guimond "has complied" with this court's alternative writ of mandamus. That writ
5
permitted counsel to present a challenge to Haugen's mental competence and evidence of
6
Haugen's incompetence. Until Judge Guimond hears and considers that challenge and
7
evidence, no death warrant should issue.
8
Before the death warrant hearing that Judge Guimond conducted on May
9
18, 2011, Haugen's lawyers, Simrin and Goody, filed a motion pursuant to ORS
10
137.463(4)(a), asking Judge Guimond to find that Haugen was not mentally competent to
11
be executed or to set a hearing to consider evidence on that issue. Simrin and Goody
12
explained that a neuropsychologist, Dr. Muriel Lezak, had conducted a
13
neuropsychological assessment of Haugen's mental capacity and had informed them that
14
she was prepared to testify to her opinion that Haugen was not mentally competent to be
15
executed.1 Judge Guimond declined to entertain Simrin's and Goody's motion or the
16
1
With their motion, Simrin and Goody filed a declaration summarizing the
conclusion that Dr. Lezak had reached and to which they expected Dr. Lezak would
testify. OCRC later attached a sworn affidavit from Dr. Lezak to the petition for writ of
mandamus that it filed with this court. In that affidavit, Dr. Lezak states that Haugen
suffers from a delusional disorder that "prevents him from comprehending the reasons for
his death sentence or its implication[,]" rendering him incompetent to be executed under
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 US 930, 127 S Ct 2842, 168 L Ed 2d 662 (2007), Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 US 399, 106 S Ct 2595, 91 L Ed 2d 335 (1986), and ORS
2
evidence that they proffered. Instead, after discharging Simrin and Goody at Haugen's
1
request, Judge Guimond permitted Haugen to withdraw the motion. Judge Guimond then
2
conducted a colloquy with Haugen and issued a death warrant.
3
This court issued its alternative writ of mandamus on June 29, 2011. This
4
court explicitly ordered Judge Guimond to conduct a new "evidentiary hearing" and, at
5
that hearing, to permit "Simrin and Goody" to "offer evidence pertinent to * * * the
6
question of whether defendant Haugen is competent for the purposes of being executed."
7
(Emphases added.) The terms and context of that order required Judge Guimond to
8
conduct the evidentiary hearing that Simrin and Goody had sought and to hear the
9
evidence that they had proffered. This court's direction to Judge Guimond was not
10
limited to ensuring that Haugen was represented by competent counsel or was mentally
11
competent to waive his right to counsel. This court ordered Judge Guimond to reinstate
12
Simrin and Goody -- lawyers who intended to challenge Haugen's competence to be
13
executed -- and to permit them to present evidence pertaining to that challenge -- the
14
testimony of Dr. Lezak.
15
This court anticipated that, at the evidentiary hearing that it ordered, the
16
state and Haugen would take the position that Haugen is mentally competent to be
17
executed. This court anticipated that Simrin and Goody would take the contrary position
18
that Haugen is not mentally competent to be executed and to offer Dr. Lezak's testimony
19
137.463(6)(a).
3
to prove that fact. This court adhered to the view that "truth * * * is best discovered by
1
powerful statements on both sides of the question[,]" United States v. Cronic, 466 US
2
648, 655, 104 S Ct 2039, 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984) (internal citations omitted), and issued
3
its writ to ensure that the issue of Haugen's mental competence to be executed would be
4
tested, as our system tests all questions of fact, by subjecting it to the crucible of the
5
adversary process.
6
This court now knows that Simrin and Goody no longer represent Haugen
7
and that no lawyer has filled the role that it anticipated that Simrin and Goody would fill.
8
No lawyer has challenged Haugen's mental competence to be executed or presented
9
Lezak's opinion that he is incompetent. Because Judge Guimond has not heard or
10
considered that challenge or that evidence, this court cannot conclude that Judge
11
Guimond "has complied" with this court's order.
12
When this court entered its order dismissing the alternative writ of
13
mandamus, it acted prematurely. ORS 34.250(6) provides that if the judge or court
14
whose action is being challenged by a petition for a writ of mandamus "performs the act
15
* * * required by the alternative writ," the relator shall notify, and the judge, court, or any
16
party may notify, the Supreme Court that the judge or court "has complied." (Emphases
17
added.) In this case, after this court entered its writ, Judge Guimond notified this court
18
that he "would comply," and this court dismissed its writ on that basis. In fact, however,
19
neither the relator, the judge, nor any party has notified us that Judge Guimond "has
20
complied" with this court's order as ORS 34.250(6) requires. At the time that the court
21
entered its order of dismissal, Judge Guimond had not held an evidentiary hearing as to
22
4
Haugen's mental competence to be executed, and this court did not know what evidence
1
he would consider on that issue. This court should recall its order of dismissal and enter
2
further orders enforcing and, if necessary, clarifying its writ.
3
This court should order Judge Guimond to vacate the findings and
4
conclusions that he entered on October 7, 2011, stay Haugen's execution, and hold an
5
evidentiary hearing on the issue of Haugen's mental competence to be executed. This
6
court should order Judge Guimond to grant Simrin and Goody the status necessary to
7
permit them to challenge Haugen's mental competence, or appoint alternate counsel to
8
serve in that role. See Wright v. Thompson, 324 Or 153, 157, 922 P2d 1224 (1996)
9
(assuming, arguendo, that Oregon law may provide third-party standing to seek relief for
10
an incompetent convicted defendant); Ford v. Haley, 179 F3d 1342 (11th Cir 1999)
11
(capital defendant's former lawyer retained standing to file appeal challenging district
12
court's finding that capital defendant is mentally competent to discharge former counsel
13
and its dismissal of habeas action); Mason by and through Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F3d
14
1220, 1223 (9th Cir 1993) (for purpose of competency hearing, court permitted
15
participation of lawyer that defendant had discharged); and Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F2d 91,
16
92-93 (9th Cir 1979) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of habeas corpus filed by capital
17
defendant's former lawyers for lack of standing, but suggesting that result would have
18
been different if there had been evidence that defendant was incompetent). This court
19
should require Simrin and Goody, or alternate counsel, to present relevant evidence of
20
Haugen's incompetence, including Dr. Lezak's assessment, opinion, and testimony.
21
Finally, this court should grant Judge Guimond the alternative of contesting this court's
22
5
order and proceeding with briefing and oral argument.
1
Clearly, those are actions that this court has the jurisdiction and authority to
2
order. Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon Constitution expressly confers on
3
this court authority to, "in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in mandamus * * *
4
proceedings." If this court chooses to exercise that discretion (as it did in this case when
5
it originally issued its June 29 order allowing the requested alternative writ of
6
mandamus), it has at its disposal "all the means to carry [that jurisdiction] into effect[,]"
7
ORS 1.160,2 including, particularly, the authority to recall its own erroneous dismissal of
8
a writ so that it may enforce or clarify that writ or determine whether the acts required
9
have been performed.3
10
2
ORS 1.160 provides:
"When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or by statute, conferred on
a court or judicial officer, all the means to carry it into effect are also given;
and in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not
specifically pointed out by the procedural statutes, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable
to the spirit of the procedural statutes."
3
The authority of this court and, indeed, of any court of record in this state,
to act to recall its previous orders cannot be denied. See, e.g., Bailey v. Steele, 263 Or
399, 401, 502 P2d 586 (1972) ("the authority of a court to vacate or set aside its own
judgments is an inherent power of all courts of record or of general jurisdiction and may
be exercised without any special statutory authority"). This court has exercised that
power previously, in the context of orders disposing of petitions for review. See, e.g.,
State v. Saner, 342 Or 254, 149 P3d 1213 (2006) (on own motion, vacating order denying
review); Zimmerlee v. Baldwin, 330 Or 281, 6 P3d 1100 (2000) (vacating on own motion
denial of petition for review 14 months later); Ponder v. Baldwin, 330 Or 281, 6 P3d
1100 (2000) (on own motion, granting reconsideration and withdrawing order denying
review); Cooper v. Maass, 329 Or 10, 994 P2d 119 (1999) (on own motion, reconsidering
6
In this case, Judge Guimond's failure to hear and consider Dr. Lezak's
1
opinion that Haugen is incompetent to be executed presents serious constitutional
2
implications. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the
3
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a state from carrying out a sentence
4
of death when a prisoner is not competent to be executed. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
5
US 930, 127 S Ct 2842, 168 L Ed 2d 662 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US 399, 106 S
6
Ct 2595, 91 L Ed 2d 335 (1986). If a prisoner makes "'a substantial threshold showing of
7
insanity,' the protection afforded by procedural due process includes a 'fair hearing' in
8
accord with fundamental fairness." Panetti, 551 US at 949 (quoting Ford, 477 US at 426
9
(Powell, J., concurring)). Such a hearing must include the opportunity to submit
10
"'evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric
11
evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination.'" Id. at 950
12
(quoting Ford, 477 US at 427 (Powell, J., concurring)). To ensure that Oregon acts
13
consistently with those constitutional mandates, Oregon law requires that a trial judge
14
conduct a death warrant hearing in every case in which a defendant is sentenced to death,
15
make an "appropriate inquiry" as to the defendant's mental capacity, and make findings
16
petition for review previously denied and withdrawing order denying review). Although,
as indicated, the power to correct may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, there also are statutes that explicitly address that authority. See, e.g., ORCP
71A, C (providing that certain errors may be corrected by trial court at any time on its
own motion and that "[t]his rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a
judgment within a reasonable time"); ORS 19.270(6)(a) (appellate court, which normally
loses jurisdiction over cause when appellate judgment issues, retains jurisdiction to
"[r]ecall the appellate judgment as justice may require").
7
on the record on that issue. ORS 137.463(2), (4)(a).
1
When this court reviewed the letter from Simrin and Goody that it
2
construed as a petition for a writ of mandamus, it was not convinced that the death
3
warrant hearing that Judge Guimond had conducted on May 18, 2011, satisfied those
4
constitutional and statutory requirements. This court knew that a man's life hung in the
5
balance, and it was not willing to tolerate the risk that, because Judge Guimond had failed
6
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Haugen's mental competence and to
7
consider the expert evidence of Haugen's mental incompetence that his lawyers had
8
proffered, Judge Guimond had wrongly issued a death warrant. See Beck v. Alabama,
9
447 US 625, 637-38, 100 S Ct 2382, 65 L Ed 2d 392 (1980) (Supreme Court decided that
10
it could not tolerate a risk created by the lack of a different procedural safeguard -- the
11
opportunity for a jury to consider convicting the defendant of a lesser-included offense).
12
Death is different in kind from all other sentences and requires heightened
13
judicial scrutiny:
14
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
15
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
16
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year
17
or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
18
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
19
appropriate punishment in a specific case."
20
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US 280, 305, 96 S Ct 2978, 49 L Ed 2d 944 (1976). See
21
also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US 586, 605, 98 S Ct 2954, 57 L Ed 2d 973 (1978) (when
22
choice is between life and death, risk of improper sentence is "unacceptable and
23
incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"). "Oregon
24
8
law also has long imposed stricter safeguards on potential capital cases than on other
1
criminal proceedings." State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 189, 752 P2d 1136 (1988) (Linde,
2
J., dissenting), vac'd and rem'd sub nom, Wagner v. Oregon, 492 US 914, 109 S Ct 3235,
3
106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989).
4
The majority agrees that death is, indeed, different, see State v. Haugen,
5
349 Or 174, 203, 243 P3d 31 (2010) ("To state the obvious, the penalty of death is
6
different in kind from incarceration"), and apparently assessed OCRC's request that we
7
enforce our writ of mandamus in that light. However, in declining to take action in
8
response to the information that OCRC provided, the majority does not meet this court's
9
obligation to see that Judge Guimond follows the constitutional and statutory procedures
10
necessary to ensure the reliability of his decision.
11
The majority concludes that Judge Guimond "has complied" with this
12
court's order because it does not interpret the writ to require Judge Guimond to consider
13
Dr. Lezak's opinion. In the majority's view, it is enough, under the express terms of the
14
writ, that Haugen had counsel -- Scholl -- and that Scholl chose not to present Dr. Lezak's
15
opinion. The problem with that view is that Scholl's representation does not meet the
16
terms or the purpose of the writ. The terms and purpose of the writ require that Judge
17
Guimond hear from lawyers who take a position contrary to Haugen's and consider expert
18
evidence that Haugen is mentally incompetent to be executed. In the affidavit that Scholl
19
filed with this court, Scholl acknowledges that he did not advocate for that position or
20
present that evidence. Scholl explains his belief that he is ethically required to abide by
21
Haugen's decisions and to advance Haugen's personal position as Haugen directs.
22
9
The stark problem that this court faces is that two sets of lawyers have
1
reached two contrary conclusions as to Haugen's mental competence to be executed. If
2
Haugen is mentally competent, then he is entitled to determine his legal strategy and ask
3
to be executed. Scholl represents that position. If Haugen is not mentally competent, the
4
court must appoint lawyers to represent his best interests and advance legal positions in
5
accordance with those interests. Simrin and Goody represent that position.4 No neutral
6
judge has decided which of those two sets of lawyers is correct. To this date, Judge
7
Guimond has not conducted an evidentiary hearing at which one side contends that
8
Haugen is competent, and the other side takes the contrary position, and presents Dr.
9
Lezak's testimony and other evidence in support of that position, as Simrin and Goody
10
were prepared to do. Haugen may be correct that he is mentally competent to be
11
executed, and he certainly is entitled to the assistance of counsel in pressing that point.
12
However, Oregon law requires a neutral judge, and not Haugen or lawyers acting at his
13
direction, to decide that question of fact. ORS 137.463(4)(a). And a neutral judge cannot
14
make that decision until the judge conducts a "fair hearing" in accordance with the
15
Constitution of the United States and makes an "appropriate inquiry" as required by
16
4
That fact that Simrin and Goody questioned Haugen's mental competence is
an important factor in assessing Haugen's contentions that Simrin and Goody had a
conflict of interest and should not have had him examined by Dr. Lezak or disclosed her
opinion to the court. The ethical rules anticipate that a lawyer may need to take action
against a client's personal wishes when the client suffers from diminished capacity. See
Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.14(b) (lawyer may take necessary action
to protect client with diminished capacity even if action against client's wishes).
10
Oregon law, considering not only the evidence that Haugen, or lawyers acting at his
1
direction, wish to offer, but also the evidence of Haugen's incompetence. See Panetti,
2
551 US at 949 (requiring "fair hearing"); ORS 137.463(4)(a) (requiring "appropriate
3
inquiry").
4
The majority decides otherwise and finds significance in this court's denial
5
of Simrin and Goody's petition for a writ of mandamus, in which they objected to the
6
substitution of Scholl as counsel for Haugen. At the time that this court denied that
7
petition, however, this court did not know that Scholl would not proceed as Simrin and
8
Goody had and would not challenge Haugen's mental competence or offer relevant
9
evidence of Haugen's incompetence, including Dr. Lezak's testimony. Had Scholl done
10
so, there would have been no question that the terms and purpose of the writ had been
11
met. And, in any event, denial of a petition for writ of mandamus does not constitute a
12
ruling on the merits of the issues raised. See North Pacific v. Guarisco, 293 Or 341, 346
13
n 3, 647 P2d 920 (1982) (because mandamus is extraordinary and discretionary remedy,
14
denial of petition is not binding on determination of issue); State ex rel Venn v. Reid, 207
15
Or 617, 633, 298 P2d 990 (1956) (nothing said in denying writ "is res judicata as to the
16
merits of the controversy").
17
The majority also suggests that Scholl's decision not to present Dr. Lezak's
18
opinion was manifestly correct and this court should defer to Scholl's expertise. The
19
majority notes that Scholl stated that he could have offered Dr. Lezak's affidavit if he had
20
thought that it would be useful, but that he had decided not to do so because the affidavit
21
"did not seem thorough or complete," and he "would not try to establish anyone's
22
11
incompetency in court or otherwise with the information in that document." However,
1
when OCRC filed Dr. Lezak's affidavit in this court, it did not intend that that affidavit
2
would substitute for Dr. Lezak's testimony. 5 It is therefore not surprising that Dr. Lezak's
3
affidavit summarized her conclusions and itself was not thorough or complete. If Simrin
4
and Goody, or alternate counsel, had been permitted to offer Dr. Lezak's opinion, they
5
certainly would have offered more than Dr. Lezak's affidavit.
6
In the affidavit that he filed with this court, Scholl does not aver that he had
7
actually interviewed Dr. Lezak to learn the basis for her conclusions or that he had asked
8
her for a more complete report. Nevertheless, Scholl decided that Haugen was mentally
9
competent and that he must abide by Haugen's directions. Whether Scholl was correct in
10
that decision is not, however, the question before us. The question before us is, instead,
11
whether Judge Guimond himself should hear, consider, and evaluate all of the relevant
12
evidence.
13
It is true that Judge Guimond held an evidentiary hearing on September 27,
14
5
As Simrin and Goody explained to this court in the letter that we construed
as a petition for a writ of mandamus, the death warrant hearing that was held on May 18,
2011, was originally scheduled for May 13, 2011. Before that date, Simrin and Goody
had been operating under the assumption that the hearing would be continued to give Dr.
Lezak time to write a complete report and testify in person. However, on May 13, Judge
Guimond agreed with the state that the applicable statute required the hearing to be
conducted within 30 days of the issuance of the appellate judgment and, therefore,
declined to continue it. Because Dr. Lezak was then out of the country, Simrin and
Goody filed their own declaration summarizing Dr. Lezak's opinion. Later, as noted, Dr.
Lezak also signed a sworn affidavit summarizing her conclusions, which OCRC attached
to the petition for writ of mandamus that it filed with this court.
12
2011, and that Haugen had legal counsel at that hearing.6 But at that September hearing,
1
as at the May hearing, Judge Guimond again heard only the evidence that Haugen chose
2
to present. That Haugen was represented by counsel in September does not change the
3
fact that, on both occasions, Haugen controlled the evidence of his own competence that
4
Judge Guimond heard and considered. It is wrong for this court to refuse to acknowledge
5
that that circumstance resulted in a flawed procedure -- one in which Judge Guimond
6
failed to consider relevant expert evidence of Haugen’s incompetence. And it is wrong
7
for this court to refuse to correct that error.
8
I firmly believe that the writ that this court issued required Judge Guimond
9
to permit Simrin and Goody, or if necessary, other alternate lawyers, to present a
10
challenge to Haugen's mental competence to be executed and the opinion of Dr. Lezak
11
that Haugen is incompetent. If, however, because this court failed to anticipate Simrin
12
and Goody's discharge as counsel for Haugen, the writ was not sufficiently clear, then
13
this court should accept responsibility and issue a more specific order now. But either
14
way, this court should act.7
15
In a death warrant proceeding, it is the trial judge who decides whether, as a
16
matter of fact, a defendant who is sentenced to death is mentally competent to be
17
6
That hearing was continued on October 7, at which time Judge Guimond
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
7
We also should not consider ourselves bound by the arguments of OCRC.
We can determine the procedure that the constitution and statutes require and mandate
that it be followed.
13
executed. ORS 137.463(4)(a). This court must ensure that the procedure that the trial
1
judge uses to make that factual decision accords with constitutional and statutory
2
mandates. If the required procedure is followed, then, like the rest of society, this court
3
trusts that whatever factual decision the trial judge makes will be the correct one. The
4
correct procedure helps ensure the reliability of the result. In a death warrant hearing, the
5
result affects not only the defendant, who has committed unthinkable crimes warranting a
6
death sentence, but also the people of this state who impose that penalty. For society,
7
what is at stake is "'our collective right as a civilized people not to have cruel and unusual
8
punishment inflicted in our name.'" Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 149, 172,110 S Ct
9
1717, 109 L Ed 2d 135 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Franz v. Lockhart, 700
10
F Supp 1005, 1024 (ED Ark 1988)). The majority errs in concluding that the procedure
11
that has been followed in this case is sufficient to that end.
12
Every day I trust that truth will be the victor if the facts are subjected to a
13
fair adversary process. When I am assured that a fair process has been followed, I trust
14
the decision of the judge or jury to such an extent that I can join my colleagues in
15
affirming the sentence that results -- even a death sentence that will be carried out, at
16
least in part, in my name. But here, I have no such assurance, and I can neither trust nor
17
join.
18
I can only, respectfully, dissent.
19
De Muniz, C. J., and Durham, J., join in this dissenting opinion.
20
1
DE MUNIZ, C. J., dissenting.
1
I join with Justice Walters's dissent, but write separately in an effort to
2
clarify the issues, at least as they appear to me.
3
The alternative writ of mandamus that this court issued was clear on its
4
face. It expressly required the trial court to take certain actions or show cause for not
5
doing so. Those actions were: (1) order the Oregon Health Authority to assess Haugen's
6
mental capacity; (2) hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, as a matter of law,
7
he was competent to be executed; and (3) permit lawyers Simrin and Goody -- identified
8
by name in the writ -- to submit evidence regarding Haugen's capacity to make a
9
competent, knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, as well as evidence
10
pertaining to his mental competency. The trial court, for its part, agreed to follow the
11
requirements set out in the writ.
12
With regard to the competency hearing that was to follow, it is a certainty
13
that Simrin and Goody would have offered into evidence the opinion and testimony of
14
Dr. Muriel Lezak, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist licensed to practice psychology in Oregon
15
and a Professor Emerita, Neurology, at Oregon Health Sciences University -- that is, had
16
they been given the opportunity to do so. Dr. Lezak is an acknowledged authority in the
17
field of neuropsychology and her book, Neuropsychological Assessment, is recognized as
18
an authoritative text on the subject.1 At the behest of Simrin and Goody, Dr. Lezak
19
1
In U.S. v. Hammer, 404 F Supp 2d 676, 706 (2005) a United States District
Court made the following findings regarding Dr. Lezak's professional credentials:
2
conducted a five-hour neuropsychological assessment of Haugen and executed a sworn
1
affidavit that was subsequently tendered to this court setting out her ultimate conclusions
2
in writing. In it, Dr. Lezak stated that, in her professional opinion, Haugen
3
"does not have a 'rational understanding' of the connection between the
4
crime and the punishment in this case. Instead, in my opinion he suffers
5
from a delusional disorder that makes him incompetent to be executed."2
6
She also stated that she was willing to testify regarding that opinion and the reasons
7
underlying it at a hearing.
8
The trial court, however, never afforded Dr. Lezak the opportunity to so
9
testify. Before her opinion could be received as evidence at Haugen's competency
10
hearing, the trial court granted Haugen's pro se motion to discharge Simrin and Goody,
11
and appointed new counsel to represent him. The trial court then granted a second pro se
12
request made by Haugen and excluded Dr. Lezak's opinion from consideration during the
13
"221. Muriel Lezak is an authority in the field of neuropsychology
and she wrote the text, Neuropsychological Assessment. (U) [undisputed]."
"222. Neuropsychological Assessment is an authoritative text in the
field of neuropsychology."
2
As the Supreme Court held in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 US 930, 960,
127 S Ct 2842, 168 L Ed 2d 662 (2007):
"Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an
awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose. It is
therefore error to derive from Ford and the substantive standard for
incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that
treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State
has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be
inflicted."
3
death warrant hearing.3 As a result, this court's express requirement in the writ that
1
Simrin and Goody be permitted to submit evidence regarding Haugen's mental
2
competence was not followed. As the court of last resort in this state, we should not
3
allow a mistake of that magnitude to go uncorrected.
4
If I appear jealously protective of the Oregon Supreme Court's authority in
5
this matter, it is because I am. The legislature has assigned this court an extraordinary
6
responsibility when a man or woman in this state has been sentenced to die for crimes
7
that they have committed. ORS 138.012(1) charges this court with "direct and automatic
8
review" of a death sentence, an appellate procedure that takes place whether or not a
9
defendant asks for it. See ORAP 12.10 (1) (automatic review of death sentence occurs
10
without defendant filing notice of appeal). The purpose of our automatic review is to
11
ensure to a legal certainty that the trial courts have fully and fairly carried out the
12
processes leading to the execution of a human being, including the careful consideration
13
of all relevant evidence.
14
In this case, we determined that lawyers Simrin and Goody must be
15
permitted to submit evidence from Dr. Lezak regarding Haugen's competency to the trial
16
3
The fact that the trial court apparently sealed Dr. Lezak's written
assessment of Haugen's competence in September 2011 is of no moment here. This court
received Dr. Lezak's affidavit stating her ultimate conclusions in June 2011 as part of the
documents originally submitted by the OCRC in this matter and it has freely considered
those documents during its deliberations ever since.
4
court with the expectation that that evidence -- like all the evidence that preceded it --
1
would be given due consideration. The trial court was entitled to give Dr. Lezak's
2
testimony and her opinions as much or as little weight as they deserved, and it was
3
certainly within the trial court's authority to allow Haugen to discharge his lawyers after
4
that evidence was taken. The trial court, however, was not authorized to simply ignore
5
evidence relevant to Haugen's competence to be executed, whether that was Haugen's
6
wish or not.
7
This court has the authority to "make and enforce all rules necessary for the
8
prompt and orderly dispatch of the business of the court[.]" ORS 2.120 (emphasis
9
added). It should do so here. The legislature has mandated that, after a death warrant
10
hearing has taken place, there shall be no appeal from a trial court's decision to issue the
11
resulting death warrant and set an execution date. ORS 137.463(8). As part of that
12
hearing, however, the legislature has also required Oregon trial courts to conduct an
13
"appropriate inquiry" into the defendant's mental condition and to "make findings on the
14
record whether the defendant suffers from a mental condition that prevents the defendant
15
from comprehending the reasons for the death sentence or its implication." ORS
16
137.463(4)(a). This court's purpose in issuing a writ of mandamus here was to ensure
17
absolute compliance with those procedures before a nonappealable death warrant was
18
issued and Haugen's execution date was set. A death warrant proceeding in which
19
relevant evidence goes unconsidered by a trial court, in direct contravention of a
20
determination made by this court, is not the "appropriate inquiry" statutorily mandated by
21
the legislature, and is not consistent with state and federal constitutional requirements.
22
5
Haugen has repeatedly expressed his desire to be executed, and he may well
1
be legally competent to receive that penalty for his horrible crimes. His desire to be put
2
to death, however, does not excuse this court's failure to require strict adherence to the
3
legislature's mandated procedures in this, and every other, death penalty proceeding.
4
I respectfully dissent.
5
Durham and Walters, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.
6
7 | 1348dd7f0902bd279f51fea3444b8a1688251e85805cdab84ebfaa9467675e71 | 2011-11-21T00:00:00Z |
7fa52147-b3f8-4485-88c1-a7c7044fbc01 | Kain v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KRIS KAIN
and TRICIA BOSAK,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
BILL SIZEMORE,
Intervenor.
(SC S48796)
En Banc
On modified ballot title filed December 20, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioners.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With her on
the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*333 Or 75, ___ P3d ___ (December 13, 2001) (referring
ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 91 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Kain v. Myers, 333 Or
75, ___ P3d ___ (December 13, 2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001,
chapter 802, section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the
court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification. The Attorney General has filed a modified ballot
title for the proposed initiative measure, and no party to the
ballot title review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9)
(setting out period within which party may object to modified
ballot title and requiring court to certify modified ballot title
if no objection filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 91
(2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
IN UNIONIZED WORKPLACE CANNOT SIGN
CERTAIN LABOR CONTRACTS, UNIONS
NOT REPRESENT NONMEMBERS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits
public employers in unionized workplace from signing
contracts requiring union nonmembers to pay money to
union; union may refuse to represent nonpayers.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects amendment
prohibiting public employers from signing contracts
requiring union nonmembers to pay money to union;
retains laws requiring unions to represent nonpayers.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently, public
employers in workplace where majority of employees have
voted to be represented by union may sign labor
contracts requiring employees who are not union members
to make payments in lieu of dues to union for
representation in collective bargaining. Unions must
represent all employees in bargaining unit, including
nonmembers. Measure prohibits public employers in
unionized workplaces from signing contracts requiring
nonmember employees to pay money to union for any
purpose and from deducting money from paycheck of any
nonmember for transfer to union without employee's
authorization. Unions not required to represent public
employees who are not union members or who do not pay
for union services. Prohibits discrimination against
public employees for not joining or being represented
by union. Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 1f7378dc380e0d24401c155ff40a445c0b4e77bf8684ddd7833b7e5aff23eaa9 | 2001-12-31T00:00:00Z |
10b81e9a-a06c-44c4-84e8-51ce9ceac9f7 | Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
SHILO INN
Appellant,
v.
MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
CITY OF PORTLAND,
and PORTLAND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION,
Respondents,
and
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Intervenor Below.
(OTC 4370; SC S46816)
On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.*
Carl N. Byers, Judge.
Argued and submitted May 15, 2000.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellant.
Jeannette N. Launer, Pacific City, argued the cause for
respondent Portland Development Commission. With her on the
brief were Sandra Duffy, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
Portland, for respondent Multnomah County; Linda Meng, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Portland, for respondent City of Portland;
Karen Williams, Portland, for respondent Portland Development
Commission; Douglas M. Adair, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
and Hardy Myers, Attorney General, for intervenor Department of
Revenue.
Glenn Klein, of Harrang, Long, Gary, Rudnick, P.C., Eugene,
filed the brief for amici curiae League of Oregon Cities and
Association of Oregon Development Agencies.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Tax Court is reversed and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
*15 OTR 36 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of the case; Kulongoski, J., resigned
June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this ad valorem property tax case, the issue is
whether all taxes assessed on property located within an urban
renewal area and used to pay urban renewal indebtedness must be
characterized as taxes "raised to fund government operations
other than the public school system," as that phrase is used in
Article XI, section 11b(1), of the Oregon Constitution. The
Oregon Tax Court held that they need not be so characterized.
Shilo Inn Portland/205, LLC v. Multnomah County, 15 OTR 36
(1999). That court concluded that a part of the taxes in
question that was disbursed to urban renewal agencies properly is
characterized as taxes "raised specifically to fund the public
school system," as that phrase is used in the same constitutional
provision. Id. at 44-45. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the decision of the Tax Court.
This case comes to us on review of the Tax Court's
grant of summary judgment to the Portland Development Commission
(PDC), which was one of the respondents in the Tax Court
proceeding. No material facts are in dispute. Taxpayer owns two
parcels of real property within the City of Portland. Each is
located in an urban renewal area that was established by the city
and PDC, which is an urban renewal agency, in 1986. The real
market value of taxpayer's property for the 1998-99 tax year was
$15,297,600, and the assessed value was $11,155,970.
For the 1998-99 tax year, taxpayer paid $234,005.06 in
ad valorem property taxes. Those taxes were distributed among
the various taxing districts in which taxpayer's property is
located, principally to the Parkrose School District, the City of
Portland, Multnomah County, and to PDC. (1) Taxpayer contends, and
respondents concede, that part of the taxes reflected on
taxpayer's property tax bill as taxes for "schools" actually was
disbursed to PDC. As taxpayer reads the constitution, however,
Article XI, section 11b(1) (hereafter called "Measure 5"), (2)
requires that all taxes ultimately disbursed by the tax collector
to the urban renewal agency for payment of urban renewal
indebtedness be treated as having been raised for a nonschool
purpose and be added to the "government operations other than
schools" amount shown on the tax statement. By a series of
calculations, taxpayer arrives at the part of its property tax
that was characterized as for "schools" that taxpayer contends
instead was paid over to the urban renewal agency for the tax
year in question. According to taxpayer, when that amount is
subtracted from the amount on taxpayer's tax bill that is
designated for schools, and is added to the amount on taxpayer's
tax bill that is designated for government operations other than
schools, the total amount of taxpayer's tax bill attributable to
taxes for government operations other than schools becomes
$159,099. (3)
Taxpayer points out that, under Measure 5, the taxes
that constitutionally could be imposed on its property for the
1998-99 tax year for government operations other than the public
school system could not exceed $10 per $1,000 of the property's
real market value -- in this case, $152,976. Because the
$159,099 that taxpayer claims is attributable to government
operations other than schools is $6,123 more than the amount that
Measure 5 permits, taxpayer claims to have been overcharged by
the taxing authority by that amount. (4) As noted, the Tax Court
denied relief.
To place the present dispute in context, some
background is necessary. In 1990, the voters approved Measure 5,
which added Article XI, section 11b, to the Oregon Constitution.
Subsection (1) of that measure provides:
"[T]axes imposed upon any property shall be separated
into two categories: One which dedicates revenues
raised specifically to fund the public school system
and one which dedicates revenues raised to fund
government operations other than the public school
system. The taxes in each category shall be limited as
set forth in the table which follows and these limits
shall apply whether the taxes imposed on property are
calculated on the basis of the value of that property
or on some other basis:
"MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TAXES
"Property tax revenues are deemed to be dedicated
to funding the public school system if the revenues are
to be used exclusively for educational services,
including support services, provided by some unit of
government, at any level from pre-kindergarten through
post-graduate training."
Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(1) (emphasis added). In addition,
Measure 5 created a third category of property taxes for, among
other things, "bonded indebtedness authorized by a specific
provision of this Constitution." Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(3)(a).
That last category was not subject to the foregoing limitations.
Id.
To address the situation in which taxes imposed by the
various taxing districts exceed the limits for the school or
nonschool categories, or for both, Measure 5 included a procedure
for "compression" of taxes within each category. Subsection (4)
of Article XI, section 11b, provides:
"In the event that taxes authorized by any
provision of this Constitution to be imposed on any
property should exceed the limitation imposed on either
category of taxing units defined in subsection (1) of
this section, then, notwithstanding any other provision
of this Constitution, the taxes imposed upon such
property by the taxing units in that category shall be
reduced evenly by the percentage necessary to meet the
limitation for that category." (5)
In 1997, the legislature proposed and the people
adopted Measure 50, which repealed, among other things, the then-existing Article XI, section 11, and replaced it with an entirely
new section 11. (6) Measure 50 transformed the ad valorem property
tax scheme from a "levy-based" system to a "rate-based" system.
Among its other effects, the measure reduced the assessed value
of property to 10 percent below 1995 levels, Or Const, Art XI, §
11(1)(a), limited the amount of any increase in assessed value to
three percent per year, Or Const, Art XI, § 11(1)(b), and
required each "local taxing district" (7) to certify a "permanent
limit on the rate of ad valorem property taxes imposed by the
district for tax years beginning after July 1, 1997" (the
"permanent rate"), Or Const, Art XI, § 11(3), to be applied to
each property in that district. Simply stated, that permanent
rate is calculated, first, by determining the taxes that could
have been imposed for tax year 1997-98 under Measure 5, had
Measure 50 not been adopted (and not taking into account Measure
47), then reducing that amount by 17 percent, and, finally,
dividing those taxes by the assessed value of property in the
district. Or Const, Art XI, §§ 11(3)(a)(A) and 11(3)(b).
Measure 50 also includes a detailed compression formula to ensure
that no district exceeds the "$5 (public school system) and $10
(other government)" limits. (8) Or Const, Art XI, § 11(11)(b) and
(c).
The foregoing constitutional provisions were
superimposed on a tax scheme that already authorized the division
of taxes to pay urban renewal indebtedness. Since 1960, property
within an urban renewal area has been subject to "tax increment"
financing, or division, under Article IX, section 1c, of the
Oregon Constitution. (9)
Under that constitutional provision and
the statutory system that implemented it, urban renewal agencies,
have had no authority to levy taxes themselves. Instead, the
taxing districts in which an urban renewal area is located, such
as cities, counties, and school districts, levy the taxes that
ultimately are used to repay the indebtedness for urban renewal
projects. The county assessor certifies the value of property
located within an urban renewal area on the effective date of the
adoption of the urban renewal plan (the "frozen value" or "frozen
base") and segregates that amount from the (presumably higher)
assessed value of the property for the later tax year in
question. Then, taxes derived by imposing the district's tax
rate on the frozen base are disbursed to the taxing districts
that levied the tax, while taxes derived by applying that rate to
the increase in property value over the frozen base are disbursed
to the urban renewal agency to pay indebtedness incurred for the
urban renewal project.
Over the last decade, with the adoption of Measures 5
and 50, the procedures for allocating funds to pay urban renewal
indebtedness have changed. Under the former, "levy-based"
system, and before the adoption of Measure 5 in 1990, each taxing
district notified the assessor of the amount of revenue to be
raised for that district. In an urban renewal area, the assessor
then calculated the levy rate for each taxing district by
dividing the amount to be raised by the frozen value of the
property in that district and then "extended" that rate to the
entire assessed value of the property. Because the increase in
property value over the frozen base, or increment, was excluded
in setting the tax rate, applying the rate to the higher value
generated funds beyond the budgeted needs of the taxing
districts. The taxes generated on the frozen base were allocated
to the budgeted requirements of the taxing districts, while the
additional, often called "excess," taxes were allocated to the
urban renewal agency. See Dennehy v. Dept. of Rev., 305 Or 595,
598-99, 756 P2d 13 (1988) (explaining that process).
Measure 5, which, as noted, retained the levy-based
system, did not mention urban renewal or redevelopment funding or
otherwise provide a specific method for categorizing or dividing
taxes that were to be applied for an urban renewal purpose.
After the adoption of Measure 5 in 1990, the legislature amended
the urban renewal statutes to reconcile the division of taxes for
urban renewal purposes with the Measure 5 limits. See ORS
457.420 to ORS 457.450 (1991) (so providing). Under those
statutes, urban renewal taxes were calculated in a manner similar
to the pre-Measure 5 calculation method, that is, the taxing
districts notified the assessor of the amount of taxes needed,
the assessor then calculated a levy rate based on the frozen
value and extended that rate to the increment to raise "excess"
funds, which in turn were to be used to pay for urban renewal.
However, the assessor's statutory duty to collect taxes that
would be divided for urban renewal purposes expressly was made
"subject to section 11b, Article XI of the Oregon Constitution
[Measure 5]." ORS 457.440(6) (1991). (10)
In 1996, the voters approved Measure 47, which, as we
have explained, also was a constitutional amendment aimed at
reducing and limiting property taxes. Like Measure 5, Measure 47
contained no references to urban renewal. Then, in 1997, the
voters approved Measure 50, which replaced Measure 47. As noted,
Measure 50 transformed the tax scheme from a levy-based system to
a rate-based system and imposed new limits on the growth of
property taxes. Unlike Measure 5 or Measure 47, Measure 50 does
contain several provisions directly dealing with urban renewal
taxes.
The first references in Measure 50 to urban renewal
taxes pertain to the calculation of the permanent rate.
Subsection (3) of Article X1, section 11, specifically excepts
from the mandatory 17 percent reduction in taxes, inter alia,
taxes to pay bonded indebtedness and "taxes described in section
1c, Article IX of this Constitution," which authorizes taxes
levied against the increase in value of directly affected
properties to fund redevelopment or urban renewal programs. Or
Const, Art XI, § 11(3)(a)(B). Only those reduced taxes, that is,
those taxes that would have been imposed other than for bond
repayment and urban renewal, are used to calculate the permanent
rate. Or Const, Art XI, § 11(3)(b). The permanent rate,
therefore, raises only the taxing districts' operating taxes; it
is not intended to generate taxes that pay the cost of urban
renewal. That conclusion is confirmed in subsection (3)(g) of
Article 11, section 11, which provides:
"Urban renewal levies described in this subsection
shall be imposed as provided in subsections (15) and
(16) of this section and may not be imposed under this
subsection."
(Emphasis added.)
A necessary result of that scheme, however, is that the
permanent rate does not generate sufficient taxes to pay both the
various taxing districts' operating taxes and the taxes needed to
pay existing urban renewal indebtedness. That is so because,
under Measure 50, in existing urban renewal areas, the district's
operating taxes themselves must be divided to fund urban renewal
programs. Article XI, section 11(15), mandates in those
circumstances that taxes on the increment be used "exclusively"
for urban renewal. Or Const, Art XI, § 11(15). (11) At the same
time, however, the new Measure 50 system does not contemplate the
existence of "excess" taxes, as were generated under the old
levy-based system, because the permanent rate is based on the
entire assessed value of the property, not just the frozen base.
Or Const, Art XI, § 11(3)(b).
The remaining references in Measure 50 to urban renewal
are located in subsections (15) and (16). Those provisions
address the funding of existing and future urban renewal
indebtedness. We turn first to subsection (15).
In addition to its other effects, subsection (15)
provides the mechanism for funding urban renewal programs
instituted after the adoption of Measure 50. That section
provides:
"If ad valorem property taxes are divided as provided
in section 1c, Article IX of this Constitution, in
order to fund a redevelopment or urban renewal project,
then notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section,
the ad valorem property taxes levied against the
increase shall be used exclusively to pay any
indebtedness incurred for the redevelopment or urban
renewal project." (12)
As described above, a taxing district's permanent rate raises its
operating taxes. If an urban renewal plan eventually is
instituted in a district in which there was no urban renewal area
when Measure 50 was adopted, then the assessed value of each
property in the district on the date that the permanent rate was
set necessarily would be equal to its frozen base. The increment
would begin to accrue thereafter, as the urban renewal plan took
effect. The urban renewal program, therefore, would be funded by
the familiar process of extending the permanent rate against the
increment and, under subsection (15) of Article XI, section 11,
the taxes raised thereby would be used "exclusively to pay any
indebtedness incurred for the redevelopment or urban renewal
project."
Subsection (16) of Article XI, section 11, by contrast,
provides the mechanism for funding existing urban renewal
programs. It directs the legislature to enact laws ensuring that
indebtedness incurred to carry out existing urban renewal
projects is repaid, with the caveat that urban renewal taxes
still must not exceed the "dollar limits" set out elsewhere in
Measure 50. That subsection provides:
"The Legislative Assembly shall enact laws that
allow collection of ad valorem property taxes
sufficient to pay, when due, indebtedness incurred to
carry out urban renewal plans existing on December 5,
1996. These collections shall cease when the
indebtedness is paid. Unless excepted from limitation
under section 11b of this Article, as modified by
subsection (11) of this section, nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to remove ad valorem
property taxes levied against the increase from the
dollar limits in paragraph (b) of subsection (11) of
this section." (13)
Or Const, Art XI, § 11(16).
Paragraph (b) of subsection (11) of Article XI, section
11, provides, in turn, as follows:
"The $5 (public school system) and $10 (other
government) limits on property taxes per $1000 of real
market value described in subsection (1) of section 11b
of this Article shall be determined on the basis of
property taxes imposed in each geographic area taxed by
the same local taxing districts."
Pursuant to the foregoing delegation of authority, the
legislature that referred Measure 50 to the voters enacted
legislation that, among other things, effectively grants urban
renewal agencies limited taxing authority. Those agencies are
permitted to impose a "special levy" to fund urban renewal
programs existing before December 6, 1996. ORS 457.010(5)(a)
(defining "existing urban renewal plan" as one that existed on
December 6, 1996, the effective date of Measure 47); ORS
457.435(1) (authorizing special levies to pay indebtedness
incurred for existing urban renewal plans). The special levy
authority allows an urban renewal agency to make up for the
shortfall caused by the Measure 50 reductions in assessed value
and taxes. For purposes of Measure 5 and applicable statutes,
special levies are treated as taxes for "government operations
other than the public school system." OAR 150-457.440(9)(4)(d)(D); OAR 150-457.440(9)(5)(c)(F); OAR 150-457.440(9)(6)(e)(D).
Second, the statutory scheme provides taxing districts
in which existing urban renewal areas are located with an
alternative to the permanent rate provided for in Article XI,
section 11(3)(b). As discussed above, a district's
constitutional permanent rate does not generate sufficient funds
to pay existing urban renewal indebtedness. The legislature
therefore created a substitute, "statutory rate limit" for tax
years after 1997-98, for taxing districts in which urban renewal
areas exist. ORS 310.236(4)(a)-(b). Simply stated, that
statutory rate is calculated in a manner similar to the
constitutional permanent rate, but taxes are divided by the
frozen base, rather than by the entire assessed value of the
property, as required by Article XI, section 11(3)(b). ORS
310.236(4)(b); ORS 310.232. As in the pre-Measure 50 scheme,
excluding the increment in calculating the statutory tax rate and
then imposing that rate on the assessed value of property in the
district again results in the generation of "excess" funds (that
is, funds in excess of the district's operating taxes), which are
used to pay existing urban renewal indebtedness.
In addition to the foregoing, the 1997 Legislature
amended the procedures for assessing compliance with applicable
constitutional limits and for collecting taxes to pay urban
renewal indebtedness. The procedure that was in place during the
tax year at issue in this case, and that remains in place today,
generally is as follows: Each taxing district files a written
notice with the assessor certifying, among other things, its ad
valorem property tax rate to be imposed on properties within the
district, which must be within either the constitutional or
statutory permanent rate limit. ORS 310.060(2)(a). That notice
must be accompanied by a validly adopted ordinance or
resolution (14) designating the taxes as either subject to or not
subject to the Measure 5 limits and "identified by the categories
set forth in ORS 310.150." ORS 310.060(1). In addition, the
notice itself must list which rates are subject to the Measure 5
limits, identified by the categories of taxes set out in ORS
310.150. ORS 310.060(3)(a).
ORS 310.150, in turn, generally restates the Measure 5
categories of taxes, viz., school, other government, and exempt
bonded indebtedness. ORS 310.150(1)(a) to (c). Notably,
however, ORS 310.150(7) expressly directs each taxing district to
characterize its tax rates without regard to the fact that part
of the taxes raised as a result of application of that rate to
the entire assessed value, including the increment, will be used
to fund urban renewal:
"The determination of the appropriate category for an
item of tax is based on the tax as certified by the
taxing district under ORS 310.060 and not based on the
tax imposed on the urban renewal increment as described
in ORS chapter 457."
In addition, if a taxing district incorrectly categorizes the
taxes as subject to or not subject to the Measure 5 limits, ORS
310.070 directs the Department of Revenue to so notify the taxing
district and the assessor, and then requires the assessor to
extend the taxes on the rolls in a manner that is consistent with
the constitution. ORS 310.070(1). That statute provides,
further, that taxes are categorized incorrectly only if the
taxing district does not have statutory authority to impose a tax
in a particular category or if the Oregon Tax Court or this court
has determined that the correct manner for categorizing the tax
is different. ORS 310.070(2).
The assessor synthesizes the notices filed by all the
taxing districts in the county into "code areas," which represent
"all of the various combinations of taxing districts * * * in
which a piece of property was located in the county * * *." ORS
310.147(1). For each code area, the assessor computes a
tentative consolidated ad valorem property tax rate, which is the
sum of all the rates identified on the notices as being within
each category set out in ORS 310.150. ORS 310.090; ORS
310.147(2). The assessor then determines if the amount of tax
that will be imposed on the properties in each category under the
tentative consolidated ad valorem property tax rate is within the
applicable constitutional limits and, if the amount in either or
both of the categories is not within the limits, then the
assessor compresses all the rates in the affected category
proportionately to ensure compliance with those limits. ORS
310.150(3) to (6). The assessor thereby arrives at a
consolidated tax billing rate, which ultimately serves as the
basis for the tax statement sent out to each property owner. ORS
310.153; ORS 311.105 to 311.115.
Meanwhile, the urban renewal agency notifies the
assessor of the amount of money that needs to be raised to pay
urban renewal indebtedness through the division of taxes and any
special levy. ORS 457.440(2). To ensure that the amount
requested through the division of taxes will be available for
distribution to the urban renewal agency, the assessor also
determines the maximum amount available for urban renewal by
extending the consolidated tax billing rate for each code area in
which an urban renewal area is located against the increment in
that code area. (15) ORS 457.440(5). The assessor certifies that
amount to the tax collector. ORS 457.440(6)(a). Once the taxes
have been collected, the county treasurer distributes the taxes
derived from the increment to the urban renewal agency and
distributes the remaining funds to the taxing units that levied
the taxes. Id.; ORS 310.390; ORS 310.395(5) to .395(6).
Under the foregoing statutory procedures, for the tax
year in question, the "school" taxing districts in taxpayer's tax
code area notified the assessor of their rates. The assessor
then used the total amount of taxes generated by imposing those
rates on the assessed value of the properties in the area to
evaluate compliance with the Measure 5 limits for "school" taxes,
and compressed, if necessary. Later, that total amount of
collected taxes was divided, and the part of those taxes
attributable to the urban renewal increment was disbursed to PDC.
Thus, a part of the taxes that were levied by extending the
school taxing districts' rates to the assessed value of
taxpayer's property for the 1998-99 tax year ultimately was not
used "to fund the public school system," at least as Measure 5
defines that phrase. However, that part was not placed in the
"other than schools" category on taxpayer's property tax
statement or treated as falling in that category for purposes of
assessing compliance with the Measure 5 ad valorem property tax
limits. The issue in this case is whether Measure 5, Measure 50,
or both, required the assessor to treat that part as "revenue
[dedicated] to fund government operations other than the public
school system."
Measure 5 was an initiative measure, while Measure 50
was referred to the voters by the legislature. When we interpret
either initiated or referred constitutional provisions, we
attempt to discern the intent of the voters. Stranahan v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 56-57, 11 P3d 228 (2000). That is so
because, "with respect to [such] provisions, it is the people's
understanding and intended meaning of the provision in question * * * that are critical to [this court's] analysis." Id. at 57.
The best evidence of the voters' intent is the text of the
provision itself. Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery
Comm., 318 Or 551, 559, 871 P2d 106 (1994); Roseburg School Dist.
v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378, 851 P2d 595 (1993). If the
voters' intent is clear after consideration of text and context,
then the court's inquiry is over. Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or
at 559. The court, however, will not lightly conclude that the
text is so clear that further inquiry in unnecessary. If any
doubt remains, the court will consider the history of an
initiated or referred constitutional provision in an effort to
resolve the matter. Id.
As noted, taxpayer's principal argument focuses on the
wording of Article XI, section 11b(1). We, too, start with that
section. The first sentence of section 11b(1) requires the
"separat[ion]" of "taxes" into categories. It provides:
"[T]axes imposed upon any property shall be separated
into two categories: One which dedicates revenues
raised specifically to fund the public school system
and one which dedicates revenues raised to fund
government operations other than the public school
system."
Taxpayer contends that that wording unambiguously requires the
assessor to evaluate compliance with the Measure 5 limits by
considering the ultimate use to which the tax revenues will be
put, regardless of the character of the taxing district whose
rate was extended to generate those revenues.
We agree with taxpayer that the plain wording of the
first sentence of subsection (1) indicates that it is the taxes
imposed, and not particular taxing districts, that are to be
separated into categories and, accordingly, that it is the rates
derived by reference to those taxes, and not the rates of
particular taxing districts generally, that are to be limited.
The last sentence of subsection (1) confirms that interpretation
by setting out, effectively, a definition of property tax
revenues "raised specifically to fund the public school system."
That sentence provides:
"Property tax revenues are deemed to be dedicated
to funding the public school system if the revenues are
to be used exclusively for educational services,
including support services, provided by some unit of
government, at any level from pre-kindergarten through
graduate training."
(Emphasis added.)
The emphasis in the first and last sentences is on the
taxes themselves, the purpose to which those taxes are dedicated,
and the use to which those taxes are to be put. It also is
noteworthy that subsection (1) does not refer to the taxing
districts that impose those taxes, except to the extent that it
refers indirectly to those districts that use the taxes dedicated
to educational services.
In spite of the foregoing, the Tax Court concluded,
essentially, that other text in Article XI, section 11b, dictates
a different conclusion. That court pointed to subsection (4) of
Article XI, section 11b, which provides that, in the event that
property taxes "exceed the limitation imposed on either category
of taxing units defined in subsection (1) * * * the taxes
imposed upon such property by the taxing units in that category
shall be reduced evenly by the percentage necessary to meet the
limitation for that category." (Emphasis added.) Relying in
part on its earlier opinion in Glenn v. Morrow Cty. Unified
Recreation Dist., 14 OTR 344 (1998), the Tax Court concluded that
the foregoing provision demonstrates that "the constitution's
emphasis is on the governmental unit categorizing the tax and not
on the use of the tax." Shilo Inn, 15 OTR at 42. In a similar
vein, the court concluded that, "'[a]s enacted by the people,
section 11b evidences an intent to limit the taxes imposed by
each category based upon the function of the unit of government
imposing the tax.'" Id. (quoting Glenn, 14 OTR at 352).
The Tax Court had attempted to reconcile the different
wording (i.e., "taxes," "revenues," and "taxing units") in
subsections (1) and (4) in its earlier case, Glenn. In that
case, the court stated that the wording of subsection (4)
suggests that every taxing district falls into one of the two
("school" and "other") Measure 5 categories and the limitation,
therefore, is on the category of taxing unit. 14 OTR at 351.
The Tax Court in Glenn acknowledged that that interpretation was
"somewhat at variance with the language in subsection (1)" but
reasoned that, in light of the fact that Measure 5 provides no
mechanism for tracking actual expenditures of tax dollars, the
limitations on taxes in Measure 5 must be based on their intended
use. Id. It follows, according to the Tax Court, that the
voters must have presumed an identity between the category or
function of a taxing district and the purpose for which the taxes
are raised by that taxing district. (16)
Id. at 352.
As a starting point, we agree with the Tax Court that,
in employing different phraseology in subsections (1) and (4),
the voters well may have assumed an identity between the function
of the taxing district imposing a tax and the use to which that
tax will be put. However, in the case of taxes raised for urban
renewal by extending a school taxing district's rate to the
increment, there is no such identity in fact.
In light of the statutory scheme that was in effect
when Measure 5 was adopted, and in light of the present
constitutional and statutory scheme, we cannot conclude that
taxes levied on the increment to fund urban renewal were, or are,
"dedicated to funding the public school system" or "used
exclusively for educational services," regardless of the function
of the taxing district whose rate was used to generate the tax.
The tax rates of school taxing districts, together with the rates
of all the other taxing districts in an urban renewal area, have
always been used to calculate the amount of taxes to be paid for
urban renewal purposes. Former ORS 457.440(4) (1989), in place
when Measure 5 was adopted, directed that the taxes so generated
"shall be used to pay the principal and interest or indebtedness
incurred by the [urban renewal] agency to finance or refinance
the carrying out of the urban renewal plan." Moreover, Measure
50 placed a similar mandate in the constitution. Under Article
XI, section 11(15), taxes on the increment expressly are
dedicated "exclusively to pay any indebtedness incurred for the
redevelopment or urban renewal project." Put differently, those
directives affirmatively establish that taxes on the increment
that are based on the extension of a school taxing district's
rate have not been, and are not, "dedicated to funding the public
school system," as Measure 5 defines that latter phrase.
Measure 5 itself contains no reference to urban
renewal. It may be that, in adopting that measure, the voters
did not anticipate a situation in which, as we have shown, there
is a lack of identity between the function of the taxing district
and the use to which at least part of the tax derived from
extending that taxing district's rate is put. Indeed, we may
assume that the disparate wording of subsections (1) and (4)
arose out of an expectation that the principal function of a
taxing district always would be identical to the use made of a
tax generated by extending that district's rate. But it does not
follow that, in a case in which there is no such identity, the
voters intended the function of the taxing district imposing the
tax, rather than the intended use of the tax, to determine the
appropriate category for evaluating compliance with the Measure 5
limits.
This court has stated that the "basic directive" of
Measure 5 is to "limit[] the taxes that may be imposed on any
property by limiting the tax rates." Coalition for Equit. School
Fund. v. State of Oregon, 311 Or 300, 310, 811 P2d 116 (1991).
Thus, the limits themselves are featured prominently -- they are
set out at the beginning of the measure, in subsection (1) of
Article XI, section 11b, and provide its foundation. Essential
to the implementation of those limits are the categories to which
they apply. In keeping with that position of prominence,
subsection (1) is drafted in specific terms, even to the point
that it contains an explanation of the categories and a
definition of one of them, viz., property tax revenues "dedicated
to funding the public school system."
Subsection (4), by contrast, merely provides a
procedural mechanism -- compression -- for ensuring that the
limits on rates of taxation set out in subsection (1) are not
exceeded. The subsection refers to and is dependent on "the
limitation imposed on either category of taxing units defined in
subsection (1)." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (1) does not
"define" categories of taxing units. Thus, in spite of its use
of the words "taxing units" rather than "taxes," that reference
to "either category * * * in subsection (1)" only can be read to
refer to the two categories that actually are labeled as such in
subsection (1), viz., the category of taxes dedicated to funding
the public school system, and the category of taxes dedicated to
funding the rest of government. The cross-reference in
subsection (4) shows that we must turn to subsection (1) for
insight concerning the parameters of the pertinent categories,
and not vice versa. As we have explained, when the inquiry is
made in that way, it is clear that taxes devoted to urban renewal
do not fall within the description of use for the public school
system found in subsection (1).
We recognize that the description of the compression
scheme in subsection (4) is not a perfect analytical fit.
Specifically, that subsection requires the even reduction of "the
taxes imposed upon * * * property [on which the taxes exceed the
Measure 5 limits] by the taxing units in that category * * * by
the percentage necessary to meet the limitation for that
category." Further, it provides that the "percentage used to
reduce the taxes imposed shall be calculated separately for each
category and may vary from property to property within the same
taxing unit." That wording appears to assume that the taxing
district's rate would be reduced as a whole and then applied to
the entire assessed value. The wording does not address
different reduction percentages for the frozen base and for the
increment, or the reduction of one but not the other, either of
which might become necessary in the event that the school and
other-government limits within an urban renewal area are exceeded
to varying degrees, or in the event that one limit is exceeded
but the other is not.
Having noted that seeming anomaly in subsection (4),
however, we nevertheless conclude that the wording of that
subsection provides no basis for overriding the clear import of
the wording of subsection (1), nor does it otherwise justify a
contrary interpretation of Measure 5's categories.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, in a case in
which there is an arguable inconsistency between the purpose for
which a tax is raised and the function of the taxing district
whose rate is the source of the tax, subsection (1), which
describes the categories in terms of the purpose of the tax,
controls. That is, in adopting section 11b, the voters limited
taxes according to their intended use, not according to the
principal function of the taxing district whose rate generated
those taxes. (17)
Having concluded that Measure 5, standing alone,
requires the categorization of urban renewal taxes according to
their intended use, we examine whether any provision in Measure
50 signals the voters' intent to alter that scheme.
Measure 50 contains three references to categories of
taxing districts, all of which are found in subsection (11)(c)(B)
of Article XI, section 11. That subsection provides:
"If property taxes exceed the limitations imposed
under either category of local taxing district under
paragraph (b) of this subsection:
"(i) Any local option ad valorem property taxes
imposed under this subsection shall be proportionally
reduced by those local taxing districts within the
category that is imposing the local option ad valorem
property taxes; and
"(ii) After local option ad valorem property taxes
have been eliminated, all other ad valorem property
taxes shall be proportionally reduced by those taxing
districts within the category, until the limits are no
longer exceeded."
(Emphasis added.) As is evident from the foregoing, all three
references in Measure 50 to categories of taxing districts are
contained in the part of that constitutional amendment dealing
with compression of property taxes in the event that those taxes
exceed the Measure 5 limits. The Measure 50 compression
provisions do not modify the compression procedure set out in
Measure 5, except to the extent that they ensure that local
option taxes that are authorized separately by Measure 50 also
are included in the procedure. Under the circumstances, we
conclude that the fact that subsection (11) of Measure 50 is
consistent with subsection (4) of Measure 5 is no evidence of the
voters' intent to change the directive in subsection (1) of
Measure 5 to limit taxes according to their intended purpose.
The Tax Court found support for its contrary conclusion
in another paragraph of Article XI, section 11(11), as well as in
Article XI, section 11(15), and Article XI, section 11(16). For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that, in each case, the Tax
Court's reliance was misplaced.
Article XI, section 11(11)(b), provides:
"The $5 (public school system) and $10 (other
government) limits on property taxes per $1,000 of real
market value described in subsection (1) of section 11b
of this Article shall be determined on the basis of
property taxes imposed in each geographic area taxed by
the same local taxing districts."
With regard to that provision, the Tax Court stated:
"[Section 11(11)(b)] uses terms indicating that the
limits of 11b are based on the taxes imposed, not the
taxes expended. Specifically, section 11(11)(b) states
that the limits 'shall be determined on the basis of
property tax imposed in each geographic area taxed by
the same local taxing districts.' * * * Although
section 11b obviously contemplated that taxes would be
used for the purposes as categorized, it contains no
mechanism for ascertaining or verifying the actual
expenditure of taxes. It provides only for the
categorization at the time of imposition.
Consequently, if taxes are properly categorized and the
rate imposed in each category is within the limits of
section 11b, that is the end of the 11b inquiry."
Shilo Inn, 15 OTR at 44 (emphasis added by Tax Court).
We find the Tax Court's reliance on the fact that
neither Measure 5 nor Measure 50 provides a "mechanism for
ascertaining or verifying the actual expenditure of taxes" to be
something of a non-sequitur. Both measures are tax limitation
provisions. Certainly, one need not trace every dollar spent by
a taxing district to see that taxes on the increment (no matter
which taxing district's tax rate was extended to raise them) that
are distributed to an urban renewal agency to pay for urban
renewal projects are not "raised specifically to fund the public
school system."
Turning to the essence of the Tax Court's analysis of
subsection (11)(b), we observe that, in the material quoted
above, the court focused on the reference in subsection (11)(b)
to "taxes imposed" when describing how compliance with the
Measure 5 limits should be evaluated. Based on that wording, the
court determined that each taxing district must categorize its
tax rate as either "school" or "other government" at the time
that it is imposed. In the Tax Court's view, the inquiry is over
at that point: A statutory scheme that allows some urban renewal
taxes to be treated as "dedicated to funding the public school
system" does not violate the constitution. The unspoken premise
on which that ultimate conclusion is based is that a taxing
district cannot "impose" taxes for more than one purpose.
Therefore, the Tax Court seems to have reasoned, taxes "imposed"
on a property by application of a school taxing district's tax
rate to a property must be categorized as being dedicated to the
public school system, even if the part that is imposed on the
increment is dedicated to urban renewal.
The problem with the foregoing reasoning is that it
lacks a textual predicate. Nothing in the text of subsection
(11)(b) suggests that taxes that are imposed by a local taxing
district for two different purposes cannot be categorized
separately. That paragraph merely provides that the applicable
limits are to be "determined on the basis of property taxes
imposed in each geographic area taxed by the same local taxing
districts." Consistent with that approach, in a geographic area
that includes an urban renewal district, compliance with the "$5
(public school system)" limit is to be determined on the basis of
taxes imposed on the frozen base by the same school taxing
districts. Similarly, compliance with the "$10 (other
government)" limit is to be determined on the basis of taxes
imposed on the increment by the same local taxing districts, some
of which also are schools.
We also observe that the wording of subsection (11)(b)
of Measure 50 is virtually identical to that used in subsection
(1) of Measure 5. Measure 5 requires that "taxes imposed upon
any property shall be separated into two categories * * *"
according to the purpose for which they are raised. Or Const,
Art XI, § 11b(1). Under Measure 50, it still is the taxes
themselves, and not the rates of particular taxing districts,
that are subject to the school and other government limits: The
"limits * * * shall be determined on the basis of property taxes
imposed * * *." Or Const, Art XI, § 11(11)(b) (emphasis added).
In addition, Measure 50 does not purport to redefine the Measure
5 categories; instead, it refers to the "limits * * * described
in subsection (1) of section 11b of this Article," i.e., the
Measure 5 limits. Id. Because subsection (11)(b) of Measure 50
is not inconsistent with subsection (1) of Measure 5, it follows
that the reference in subsection (11)(b) to "taxes imposed" does
not reflect the voters' intent to change the way in which urban
renewal taxes are categorized for purposes of assessing
compliance with the Measure 5 limits.
The Tax Court also concluded that Article XI, section
11(15), of the Oregon Constitution, suggests that property taxes
are to be categorized according to the function of the taxing
district. That subsection provides:
"If ad valorem property taxes are divided as provided in
section 1c, Article IX of this Constitution, in order to
fund a redevelopment or urban renewal project, then
notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the ad
valorem property taxes levied against the increase shall be
used exclusively to pay any indebtedness incurred for the
redevelopment or urban renewal project."
With regard to that provision, the Tax Court stated:
"When read in light of the issue before the court, this
provision clearly affirms that taxes will continue to
be divided as permitted by section 1c, Article IX of
the Oregon Constitution to fund urban renewal projects.
To avoid this result, section 11b or section 11 would
have to indicate that a school's tax rate is only to be
applied to the frozen value. There is no such language
anywhere in the constitution.2
____________
"2 It is important to note that because urban renewal
agencies do not levy taxes, such a result would leave
urban renewal districts without funds to meet their
obligations."
Shilo Inn, 15 OTR at 43.
It is, of course, beyond dispute that subsection (15)
affirms that property taxes may continue to be divided as
provided in Article IX, section 1c. As we understand taxpayer's
arguments, however, taxpayer never has contended that either
Measure 5 or Measure 50 changed the way that taxes are to be
divided for urban renewal. Moreover, the Tax Court's statement
concerning the failure of either Measure 5 or Measure 50 to
specify that schools' tax rates apply only to the frozen base is
another non-sequitur. The categorization of property taxes for
Measure 5 purposes is a process entirely separate from the
division of taxes for urban renewal funding. In sum, Article XI,
section 11(15), does not support the Tax Court's analysis.
Finally, the Tax Court turned to subsection (16) of
Article XI, section 11, which expressly authorizes the
legislature to enact laws ensuring that existing urban renewal
obligations are paid. That section concludes:
"Unless excepted from limitation under section 11b of
the Article, as modified by subsection (11) of this
section, nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to remove ad valorem property taxes levied against the
increase from the dollar limits in paragraph(b) of
subsection (11) of this section."
The Tax Court stated that the foregoing
"indicates that any * * * taxes imposed [to pay urban
renewal debts], 'unless excepted from limitation under
section 11b,' remain subject to the limits of section
11b. Hence, taxes imposed 'against the increase' are
not exempted from 'the dollar limits' of section 11b.
Section 11b does not refer to just the limit on taxes
for government operations other than schools. Use of
the plural 'limits' refers both to the $5 per $1,000
limit for public schools and to the $10 per $1,000
limit for governmental operations other than schools.
This evidences an intent that such limits are applied
to the categories as made by the taxing districts when
the taxes are imposed."
Shilo Inn, 15 OTR at 44.
Respondents make the same point. They contend that the
reference to the plural "limits" in subsection (16), rather than
the singular "limit," clearly means that the voters intended that
urban renewal taxes could be subject both to the school and to
the "other government" limits. According to respondents, had the
voters intended urban renewal taxes to be treated exclusively as
"other government" for purposes of the Measure 5 limits (as
modified by Measure 50), Measure 50 would have referred only to
the single other-government limit, either specifically or by
using the singular word "limit."
Amici elaborate on the foregoing argument by contending
that the history of the House Joint Resolution that eventually
was referred to the voters as Measure 50 shows that the
legislature made a deliberate choice to include the plural word
"limits," rather than the singular "limit," in subsection (16)
and that that choice reflects the legislature's intent to subject
urban renewal taxes to both the school and other government
limits.
Along the same lines as the foregoing arguments of the
parties, there is one other aspect of the "dollar limits" phrase
in subsection (16) that warrants closer inspection. The last
sentence of that subsection provides that, unless excepted from
limitation under "section 11b of this Article, as modified by
subsection 11 of this section" (that is, under Measure 5, as
modified), urban renewal taxes remain subject to "the dollar
limits in paragraph (b) of subsection (11) of this section," that
is, Measure 50. As discussed above, "paragraph (b) of subsection
(11)" includes a shorthand reference to the Measure 5 limits:
"The $5 (public school system) and $10 (other government) limits
* * *."
Under ordinary rules of construction, the use of two
different phrases in the same subsection to refer to the limits
is presumed to be intentional and suggests that the phrases refer
to different kinds of limits. One plausible interpretation of
the reference at the end of subsection (16) to "paragraph (b) of
subsection (11) of this section" is that the Measure 50 limits
are combined dollar limits, as respondents and amici contend and
the Tax Court held, and the parenthetical notation of categories
is included in subsection (11)(b) only for the purpose of
identifying the source of each dollar cap.
To determine whether, in subjecting urban renewal taxes
to the "dollar limits of paragraph (b) of subsection 11 of this
section" rather than to the "other government" limit alone or to
the Measure 5 limits, the voters intended to alter the way in
which urban renewal taxes were treated under Measure 5, we turn
to the methodology that this court set out in Ecumenical
Ministries, 318 Or at 559. That is, we first consider the text
of the initiated or referred constitutional provision and its
context. Id. If the voters' intent remains unclear after
consideration of the text and context of the provision, then the
court turns to its history. Id.
We first observe that neither subsection (11) nor any
other provision of Measure 50 directly refers to a combined $15
limit. Instead, paragraph (b) of subsection (11) continues to
refer to the dollar limits according to their categories: "The
$5 (public school system) and $10 (other government) limits on
property taxes per $1000 of real market value described in
subsection (1) of section 11b of this Article * * *." Or Const,
Art XI, § 11(11)(b). Moreover, that paragraph provides that
those limits are "described in subsection (1) of section 11b of
this Article." That suggests that Measure 50 imports the Measure
5 limits in their entirety and that the category references in
subsection (11)(b) are not merely parenthetical explanations
intended only to identify the source of each dollar cap but,
rather, are a shorthand reaffirmance of the Measure 5 limits.
Context also provides an indication that the use of the
phrase "dollar limits" in subsection (16) does not represent a
manifestation of the voters' intent to change the way urban
renewal taxes are treated. Subsection (6) of Article XI, section
11, is similar to subsection (16), inasmuch as it uses the plural
word "limitations" when limiting taxes covered by that
subsection. Subsection (6) specifies that "[a]d valorem property
taxes described in this subsection shall be subject to the
limitations imposed under section 11b of this Article, as
modified by subsection (11) of this section." Or Const, Art XI,
§ 11(6)(b) (emphasis added). The phrase "taxes described in this
subsection" in subsection (6) refers to the "ad valorem property
tax of a local taxing district, other than a * * * school
district, that is used to support a hospital facility." Or
Const, Art XI, § (6)(a) (emphasis added).
It is incontrovertible, under any reading of the
pertinent provisions of Measure 5 and Measure 50, that a tax
imposed by a taxing district other than a school district, used
to support a hospital facility (clearly a nonschool purpose), is
a tax "raised to fund government operations other than the public
school system." It cannot be seen as a tax "raised specifically
to fund the public school system." Under that circumstance, it
is apparent that the provision in Article XI, section 11(6)(b),
subjecting that tax to the "limitations" (plural) of Measure 5,
as modified, merely reflects a general intent not to exclude that
tax from the Measure 5 limits, and does not reflect a conscious
decision on the part of the voters to broaden those categories
beyond their defined parameters.
Similarly, nothing in subsection (16) of Article XI,
section 11, suggests that the last sentence of that subsection is
anything more than a limitation on the legislature's authority to
enact laws protecting existing urban renewal programs. That is
to say, it is more likely that the voters intended, by that
sentence, to preclude the legislature from exempting urban
renewal taxes from the Measure 5 limits as a means to ensure that
existing urban renewal indebtedness is paid.
As is clear from the foregoing, our analysis of the
text and context of the last section of subsection (16) suggests
that the reference to the "dollar limits" does not manifest the
voters' intent to subject urban renewal taxes generated by
extending the school taxing districts' tax rate to the increment
to the five dollar "school system" limit on property taxes.
Nonetheless, as we have stated in the past, "caution is required
in ending the analysis before considering the history of an
initiated [or referred] constitutional provision." Ecumenical
Ministries, 318 Or at 559 n 7; see also Stranahan, 331 Or at 57
(stating principle). We therefore choose to exercise our
discretion by examining the history of Measure 50.
Contrary to amici's suggestion, however, the history
that we consider does not include early drafts of the legislative
bill that later was referred to the people, nor does it include
statements made by legislators in hearings on that matter. Those
materials may be indicative of the legislature's intent in
crafting Measure 50 but, as we stated most recently in Stranahan,
331 Or at 57, "it is the people's understanding and intended
meaning of the provision in question -- as to which the text and
context are the most important clue -- that is critical to our
analysis." (Emphasis added.) It follows that only those
materials that were presented to the public at large help to
elucidate the public's understanding of the measure and assist in
our interpretation of the disputed provision. Id. at 64-65.
Those materials include, inter alia, materials that are included
in the Voters' Pamphlet, such as the ballot title, the
explanatory statement, and the legislative argument in support.
See Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559 n 8 (so stating). We
turn to a review of those materials.
First, neither the ballot title summary of Measure 50,
the explanatory statement, nor the Legislative Argument in
Support mention urban renewal. Moreover, the ballot title
summary and the explanatory statement imply that, under Measure
50, the Measure 5 limits remain unchanged. For example, the
ballot title summary states that:
"The measure retains the existing total property tax
rate for all property taxes, including local option
taxes but excluding taxes for bonds, at $5 per $1000 of
value for schools and $10 per $1000 of value for
nonschool government."
Official Voters' Pamphlet, Special Election, May 20, 1997, 5
(emphasis added). The Explanatory Statement contains a similar
statement but includes a direct reference to Measure 5:
"Retains existing property tax rate limitation of $5
per $1000 of value for schools and $10 per $1000 of
value for nonschool government (1990 Measure 5)."
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Second, those materials prominently inform the voters
that Measure 50 was intended to repeal and replace Measure 47,
which, according to the Legislative Argument in Support, had
"unintended consequences." Id. Measure 47, however, did not
address urban renewal in any respect. Thus, the voters would not
have had a reason even to suspect that Measure 50 would change
the way in which urban renewal taxes would be treated. In short,
nothing in the history establishes that, in adopting Measure 50
and, in subsection (16) of that measure, subjecting urban renewal
taxes to the "dollar limits of paragraph (b) of subsection (11),"
the voters intended to change the way that urban renewal taxes
are to be categorized for purposes of assessing compliance with
the Measure 5 limits.
In summary, the text of subsection (1) of Measure 5
provides that the limits set out in that subsection apply to
taxes that are to be separated into categories according to the
uses to which those taxes are dedicated. Nothing in the context
of other provisions of Measure 5 alters that conclusion.
Moreover, nothing in the later-enacted Measure 50 changes that
method of categorization to a system in which the function of the
taxing district imposing the tax, rather than the use to which
the tax is dedicated, is the determinative factor in evaluating
compliance with the Measure 5 limits.
As noted, the problem in this case arises because
certain parts of the statutory scheme that the legislature
enacted to implement Measure 50 expressly direct the
categorization of urban renewal taxes according to the function
of the taxing district whose rate is used to generate the tax.
Specifically, ORS 310.150(7) provides:
"The determination of the appropriate category for an
item of tax is based on the tax as certified by the
taxing district under ORS 310.060 and not based on the
tax imposed on the urban renewal increment as described
in ORS chapter 457."
Thus, under that statute, the assessor treats all taxes generated
by extending a school taxing district's tax rate to the assessed
value of a property within an urban renewal area as being subject
to the school system limit for purposes of assessing compliance
with Measure 5. The Tax Court, based on its construction of the
various provisions of Measure 5 and Measure 50, concluded that
ORS 310.150(7) is consistent with the Oregon Constitution.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, however,
that conclusion was incorrect. The Oregon Constitution requires
that the assignment of an item of tax to the "school" or "other
government" category be based on the purpose to which that item
of tax is dedicated. In an urban renewal area, only taxes on the
frozen base specifically are dedicated to funding the public
school system. Taxes on the increment, by contrast, regardless
of which taxing district's ad valorem property tax rate is used
to calculate their amount, are dedicated to pay indebtedness
incurred for the redevelopment or urban renewal project. Thus,
for purposes of assessing compliance with the Measure 5 property
tax limits, taxes on the increment, including those that are
generated by extending a school taxing district's tax rate to the
increment, are taxes that belong in the category that "dedicates
revenues raised to fund government operations other than the
public school system." Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(1). To the
extent that ORS 310.150(7) is in conflict with that requirement,
it is unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding any conflict with Article XI, section
11b(1), amici suggest that the legislature was within its
authority to enact ORS 310.150(7). They contend, first, that the
legislature's actions should be given deference because, in
subsection (16), Measure 50 specifically calls for the
legislature to adopt implementing legislation. Article XI,
section 11(16), provides that:
"The Legislative Assembly shall enact laws that allow
collection of ad valorem property taxes sufficient to
pay, when due, indebtedness incurred to carry out urban
renewal plans existing on December 5, 1996."
Amici suggest that, under that grant of authority, the
legislature "made a number of deliberate choices to ensure that
urban renewal agencies would continue to receive the tax revenues
necessary to carry out the [existing] urban renewal plans * * *
includ[ing] making certain that the taxes were spread, for
purposes of property tax limits, between both the $10 and the $5
limits." Amici also contend that the statutory scheme allowing
urban renewal taxes to be treated in some cases as subject to the
school system limit should be construed as constitutional because
the same legislature that crafted Measure 50 also adopted its
implementing legislation, which includes the provisions
subjecting urban renewal taxes to the $5 school system tax limit
if they are raised by extending a school taxing district's rate
to the increment. For the reasons that follow, neither of those
positions is persuasive.
It is true that the directive to the legislature in
subsection (16) to "enact laws" to ensure the payment of urban
renewal obligations purports to be a broad grant of authority to
protect existing urban renewal funding in any way that the
legislature sees fit. Nevertheless, that authority expressly is
made subject to the Measure 5 limits. The last sentence of
subsection (16) provides:
"[N]othing in this subsection shall be construed to
remove ad valorem property taxes levied against the
increase from the dollar limits in paragraph (b) of
subsection (11) of this section."
Moreover, nothing elsewhere in the text of Measure 50 suggests
that that amendment to the constitution was intended to change
the way that the categories to which the Measure 5 limits apply
are construed. As we already have discussed at length, the
Measure 5 limits apply to categories of taxes according to the
purpose to which those taxes are dedicated. Measure 50 neither
directs the legislature, nor grants it the power, to enact laws
that change that constitutional structure.
We also reject amici's argument that ORS 310.150(7) is
entitled, in effect, to a presumption of constitutionality,
simply because it was drafted by the same legislature that
crafted Measure 50 itself. This court considered a contention
similar to amici's in State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or 478, 266 P2d
698, on reh'g 201 Or 478, 272 P2d 225 (1954). In that case, the
court was asked to consider whether a statute adopted pursuant to
constitutional authority "defined" the relevant constitutional
provision, such that compliance with the statute became
equivalent to compliance with the constitutional provision. The
court stated
"[s]o long as the doctrine of separation of powers
remains basic in our system, the ultimate power and
duty of the courts to construe the constitution must
rest with the courts alone. That power should not be
lightly whittled away by any rule which recognizes the
power of the legislature to authoritatively construe
the constitution. * * *
"It has been suggested that there is an exception
to the general rule in the case of a contemporaneous
legislative construction of the constitution. * * *
Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the
legislature had power to bind this court as to the
construction of the constitution, it would necessarily
follow that the only constitutional provision which the
legislature could 'construe and define' would be the
constitution which was in force at the time that the
statute was enacted."
Kuhnhausen, 201 Or at 517-18.
The same reasoning applies in the present case. Even
if the legislature had the power to construe and define Measure
50 through the statute at issue in this case, it had no such
power with respect to Measure 5. Therefore, even if the
legislature believed when it referred Measure 50 to the voters
that that measure, if adopted, would permit the categorization of
taxes according to the principal function of the taxing district
whose rate was used to generate the tax, this court is not bound
by that interpretation. We already have concluded that Measure 5
requires the categorization of taxes according to their dedicated
purpose and that no provision of Measure 50 changes that method
of categorization. The fact that the legislature that proposed
Measure 50 to the people and enacted its implementing legislation
might have held a different view does not inform our analysis of
Measure 5 and, therefore, cannot dictate derivatively how we
interpret Measure 50.
In summary, under Measure 5, for purposes of assessing
compliance with the ad valorem property tax limits, taxes must be
separated into two categories, "school system" and "other than
schools," according to the use to which those taxes are
dedicated. Taxes on the increment to fund urban renewal projects
belong in the Measure 5 category that "dedicates revenues raised
to fund government operations other than the public school
system."
The decision of the Tax Court is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
1. Ad valorem property taxes are assessed in a combined
statement by each county, which then allocates the taxes to the
various entities, such as cities, school districts, and other
governmental units within the county to which the taxes actually
are owed. PDC is not specifically identified on petitioner's tax
statements as a recipient of taxes.
2. Article XI, section 11b(1), of the Oregon Constitution,
is the first section of an amendment to the Oregon Constitution
that the voters adopted in 1990 and was (and still is) known as
"Measure 5." As adopted, Measure 5 included Article XI, section
11b-11f, of the Oregon Constitution. The voters repealed section
11f on May 20, 1997, as part of Measure 50, which is discussed at
length elsewhere in this opinion. Throughout this opinion, we
refer at times to the constitutional provisions at issue by their
measure numbers, rather than referring to them exclusively by the
pertinent citations to the constitution, because the measure
numbers continue to be used in common parlance by the bench, bar,
and public.
3. Although respondents assert that the process that
taxpayer used to arrive at that figure is flawed, they did not
contend either to the Tax Court or to this court that the figures
set out in the text are incorrect.
4. Taxpayer also claimed in its complaint to the Tax Court
that it was bringing the present action for the benefit of all
similarly situated taxpayers who, it contended, collectively were
overcharged over $7.5 million for the 1998-99 tax year.
Accordingly, taxpayer also moved for class action status and
claimed entitlement to attorney fees under ORS 305.587, which
authorizes the Tax Court to order such relief as it considers
appropriate. Because the Tax Court granted summary judgment
against taxpayer on the merits, that court did not consider
whether to certify the class.
5. Part of the basis for the present dispute stems from
the fact that subsection (4) of Article XI, section 11b, refers
to categories of taxing units, rather than to categories of
taxes, and suggests that categories of taxing units were
"defined" in subsection (1). Subsection (1), however, does not
provide such a definition. For the moment, we need note only
that the contrasting wording in the two sections is inartful, at
the least.
6. The new section 11 did not repeal section 11b, which,
as we have explained, is the official label for Measure 5.
Former section (11), which Measure 50 repealed, provided for tax
base limitations. Importantly, Measure 50 also repealed another
property-tax-limiting initiative measure, Measure 47, which the
voters had approved a year earlier, in 1996. Measure 47 was a
short-lived constitutional amendment aimed at closing what its
supporters considered to be a significant loophole in the
property tax limitation goal of Measure 5. Former Or Const, Art
XI, 11g, 11h, 11i and 11j. Certain practical and technical
difficulties in the application of Measure 47 led the legislature
to propose, and the people to adopt, Measure 50 as its effective
replacement.
7. We note that Measure 50 employs the phrase "local
taxing district," while Measure 5 and Article IX, section 1(c),
use the phrases "taxing units" and "governmental units." In
addition, the statutes implementing Measures 5 and 50 employ
still different phraseology in various sections. Neither party
has suggested that we ascribe a difference in meaning based on
the difference in phraseology, and we perceive no reason to do
so. Accordingly, we assume for purposes of this opinion that the
foregoing terms, viz., "local taxing district," "taxing units,"
and "governmental units," are interchangeable. For the sake of
consistency, we use the phrase "taxing district" throughout this
opinion.
8. That formula, similar to the one contained in Measure 5
(Or Const, Art XI, § 11b(4)), refers numerous times to
"categories" of "local taxing districts" that are subject to the
Measure 5 limits. See, e.g., Or Const, Art XI, § 11(c)(B) ("If
property taxes exceed the limitations imposed under either
category of local taxing district * * *"); Or Const, Art XI, §
11(c)(B)(i) ("[a]ny local option * * * taxes * * * shall be
proportionally reduced by those local taxing districts within the
category * * *); Or Const, Art XI, § 11(c)(B)(ii) ("* * * all
other ad valorem property taxes shall be proportionally reduced
by those taxing districts within the category * * *").
9. That section, as amended in 1997 by Measure 50,
provides as follows:
"The Legislative Assembly may provide that the ad
valorem taxes levied by any taxing unit, in which is
located all or part of an area included in a
redevelopment or urban renewal project, may be divided
so that the taxes levied against any increase in the
assessed value, as defined by law, of property in such
area obtaining after the effective date of the
ordinance or resolution approving the redevelopment or
urban renewal plan for such area, shall be used to pay
any indebtedness incurred for the redevelopment or
urban renewal project."
10. Although the statutes implementing Measure 5 themselves
did not specify how taxes used to pay urban renewal indebtedness
were to be treated, the Attorney General had issued an opinion in
1990, before the election at which the people adopted Measure 5,
concluding that,
"[e]xcept for revenue used to pay bonded indebtedness,
revenue generated by tax increment financing that funds
the activities of an urban renewal agency, is subject
to the 'other than schools' limit under the proposed
measure."
46 Op Atty Gen 388, 429 (1990). In addition, the Attorney
General specifically addressed urban renewal revenues derived
from school district levies:
"All urban renewal tax increment revenues are subject
to the nonschool limit, whether or not the amount of
those revenues is determined in part by the rate
applicable to a school district levy, because those
revenues are not dedicated to be used 'exclusively for
educational purposes.'"
Id. at 431-32. The Department of Revenue also promulgated a
regulation codifying that conclusion. Former OAR 150-457.440(7)(h) (1990, amended 1991).
11. Subsection (15) is quoted at page 13.
12. We observe in passing that the reference in the above-quoted passage to "subsection (1) of this section" makes no sense
in context. Subsection (1) of section 11 sets new maximum
assessed values of properties for ad valorem tax purposes.
13. Subsection (16)) effectively adopts this court's
holding in City of Portland v. Smith, 314 Or 178, 192, 838 P2d
568 (1992). In Smith, the City of Portland brought an action,
soon after the adoption of Measure 5, challenging the application
of the Measure 5 limits to urban renewal taxes. The city
contended that taxes imposed under Article IX, section 1c, to pay
urban renewal indebtedness were, in the words of Measure 5, Or
Const, Art XI, § 11B(3)(a), "taxes imposed to pay the principal
and interest on bonded indebtedness authorized by a specific
provision of this Constitution" and, therefore, exempt from the
Measure 5 limits. This court held to the contrary, on the ground
that Article IX, section 1c, does not specifically authorize
urban renewal agencies to incur bonded indebtedness.
14. ORS 310.145 authorizes units of local government to
adopt such ordinances and resolutions.
15. As noted, at the time when an urban renewal plan is
approved, the county assessor for the area in which the urban
renewal area is located prepares a certified statement of the
total assessed value of all the taxable real property contained
in the urban renewal area in the county. ORS 457.430(1). That
certified statement, as adjusted to account for changes in
assessed value under Measure 50, ORS 457.430(6)(b), then provides
the base from which the increment is calculated. ORS 457.440(4).
16. On that basis, the court upheld the constitutionality
of ORS 310.355, which permits the categorization of a particular,
voter-approved levy as either dedicated to funding the public
school system or not, depending on the principal function of the
governmental unit imposing the tax, unless the sole purpose of
the levy is for a use in the other category. Glenn, 14 OTR at
352.
17. As noted above, at n 10, the Attorney General
effectively came to the same conclusion at the time that Measure
5 was adopted, as did the Department of Revenue in thereafter
adopting implementing regulations, when designating that urban
renewal taxes were to be treated as "other government" for
purposes of the Measure 5 limits. | 9682675a1dc6e14213232779f6578c680396a920e609ad40f259642da0a9fe1d | 2001-12-20T00:00:00Z |
16a8378a-7ba8-4227-8474-f88b58e7ac47 | In re Eadie | null | S47751 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: December 6, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
L. BRITTON EADIE,
Accused.
(OSB 96-80, 97-105, 97-109, 97-114; SC S47751)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 10, 2001.
L. Britton Eadie, West Linn, argued the cause and filed the
brief in propria persona.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
De Muniz, and Balmer.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended for three years, effective 60 days
from the date of the filing of this decision.
*Riggs, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with statutory violations and
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
connection with his representation of several clients:
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3) (dishonesty and
misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice); DR 6-101(A) (incompetence); DR 6-101(B) (neglect of client matter); DR 7-102(A)(5) (false
statement during representation); DR 7-106(C)(1) (alluding to
inadmissible evidence); DR 7-106(C)(7) (intentionally or
habitually violating rules of procedure or evidence); DR 7-110(B)
(ex parte communications); ORS 9.460(2) (misleading statements);
and ORS 9.527(4) (willful deceit or misconduct). A trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated
DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR
7-106(C)(7), and ORS 9.460(2), and recommended that the accused
be disbarred. Our review is automatic. BR 10.1. On de novo
review, BR 10.6, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(C)(1), and DR 7-106(C)(7). We conclude that a three-year
suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction.
I. FACTS AND TRIAL PANEL FINDINGS
The Bar has the burden of establishing misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence. BR 5.2. "Clear and convincing
evidence" means evidence establishing that the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable. In re Johnson, 300 Or 52, 55, 707
P2d 573 (1985). We find proof of the following facts by clear
and convincing evidence.
A. Burke Matter
The accused represented Shon in a dispute with her
neighbor, Burke, regarding an easement. On January 31, 1995, the
accused filed a complaint seeking to terminate Burke's easement
over Shon's property. The complaint also sought costs and
disbursements. Burke did not retain a lawyer to represent her,
and the parties thereafter negotiated a settlement agreement.
The agreement provided that Shon would dismiss the complaint in
return for Burke's promises to execute and return a quitclaim
deed, and to remove structures and debris from the property.
Burke did not file an answer to the complaint.
On March 8, 1995, in response to a letter that Burke
had written to the accused about the settlement, the accused wrote a letter to Burke summarizing the terms of the settlement
and concluding:
"The easement is terminated as indicated in your
letter. The complaint will be dismissed when the
properly executed quit-claim deed is returned and
recorded, as indicated above."
(Emphasis added.)
Burke executed and returned the quitclaim deed, and
fulfilled her other duties under the settlement agreement. The
accused thereafter submitted a proposed form of judgment to the
trial court, with a copy to Burke, that included an award of
costs to Shon. In his cover letter, the accused informed the
court that he was seeking a prevailing-party fee. The trial
court returned the proposed judgment to the accused, explaining
that, unless stipulated, Shon was not a prevailing party and that
she therefore was not eligible to recover costs. Burke also
wrote a letter to the accused stating that she "d[id] not agree
to pay [Shon's] costs and disbursements.
The accused thereafter attempted to recover costs by
applying to the trial court for a default judgment against Burke,
alleging that Burke had "failed to answer or appear" and not
mentioning the settlement agreement. The accused did not serve a
copy of the application on Burke. The court entered the default
judgment, which included an award of costs. Burke became aware
of the entry of the default judgment only after the accused
demanded payment under the judgment.
Burke moved to set aside the default judgment on the
basis of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct." ORCP
71 B(1)(c). The trial court denied the motion.
In its cause of complaint relating to the Burke matter,
the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-104(A)(4), and DR 7-110(B), in the Burke matter. The Bar
maintained that the accused made a misrepresentation and engaged
in prejudicial conduct when he reached an agreement with Burke
that did not mention costs, then later attempted to improve on
the settlement by filing a judgment of dismissal that included an
award of costs. The Bar also alleged that the accused engaged in
a written communication with the court on the merits of an
adversary proceeding without delivering a copy to the opposing
party when he submitted the proposed default judgment to the
court without serving a copy on Burke.
The trial panel concluded, apparently on grounds of
issue preclusion, that the trial court's denial of Burke's motion
to set aside the default judgment under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) precluded
the trial panel from finding a disciplinary violation. The trial
panel also found that, because Burke had not filed an answer to
Shon's complaint, she "had not filed an appearance in the
litigation that would have entitled her to notice" from the
accused regarding the accused's application for a default
judgment. Accordingly, the trial panel concluded that the
accused had not violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), or 7-110(B) as charged.
B. Collins Matter
In 1996, the accused represented Collins in a personal
injury action against Harbertson, the driver of a car that
allegedly had struck Collins. Safeco, Harbertson's insurer,
retained lawyers Brisbee, Mead, and Johnston to represent
Harbertson.
After the accused had filed a complaint against
Harbertson, the trial judge set pretrial conference and trial
dates. Harbertson's lawyers thereafter moved to strike portions
of the complaint. After successfully arguing the motion to
strike, Mead gave the accused a proposed order for submission to
the judge. The accused objected to the proposed order and added:
"* * * My notes indicate that [the judge] specifically
stated that this matter would be put back on the trial
docket, I think he intended that it would be scheduled
for trial earlier than May 1996? [Question mark in original.] An order to that effect would be appropriate."
The accused then submitted a proposed order to the judge,
rescheduling the pretrial conference and trial dates. In a
letter accompanying the proposed order, the accused stated:
"I believe that this proposed form of order
accurately reflects your findings and rulings on
defendants' motion and your intent as to rescheduling
the pre-trial and trial dates in this case."
(Emphasis added.) After the judge signed the accused's proposed
order, Brisbee reminded the judge that he had not discussed
changing the pretrial conference and trial dates, and questioned
whether the judge had contemplated doing so. The judge agreed
with Brisbee and modified the order to delete the date changes
that the accused had submitted to the judge.
In April 1996, Brisbee scheduled a hearing before a
different judge on a motion to compel production. The day before
the hearing, the accused, without serving Harbertson's lawyers,
filed a written motion to disqualify that judge. Harbertson's
lawyers did not learn about the accused's motion until they
appeared before the judge, who sent them to a courtroom where a
different judge was presiding. When they arrived at that
courtroom, however, the accused announced that he planned to file
an affidavit of prejudice against that judge as well. After a
period of delay, a third judge heard the defense motion to compel
production.
Several months later, on October 6, 1996, a judge in
the Collins litigation imposed a sanction on the accused for
filing a meritless discovery motion. Ten days later, on October
16, 1996, the accused served a subpoena duces tecum on a Safeco
employee to produce Safeco's file on the Collins/Harbertson
accident by October 24, 1996. Brisbee told Johnston to file a
motion to quash the subpoena. Because the accused's subpoena
required production in only eight days, Johnston acted quickly.
On October 16, the day that the accused served the subpoena,
Johnston called the accused and left a telephone voice message,
stating that she wanted to discuss her intent to file a motion to
quash and that, if she did not hear from him, she would appear in
court ex parte on October 18, 1996, to request an expedited
hearing on the motion. Johnston's secretary also telephoned the
accused and told him of Johnston's plan. In response to that
information, the accused told the secretary, among other things,
"I object," and hung up. Later, Johnston's secretary attempted
to send the accused a facsimile copy of the motion to quash, but
the facsimile would not go through, and no one answered the
telephone at the accused's office. Johnston then told her law
clerk, Morrow, to deliver a copy of the motion to the accused's
office. Morrow went to the accused's office on the evening of
October 17, 1996. Morrow saw the accused through a glass door
and told him that he had documents to deliver. The accused would
not open the door, so Morrow told the accused that he was leaving
the documents and placed them in the door jamb while the accused
watched. (1)
On October 18, 1996, Johnston appeared in court and
received a date for the hearing on the motion to quash. The
accused did not appear. Johnston then sent the accused a
facsimile letter stating the date and time for the hearing. The
accused responded by writing a letter that accused Brisbee and
Johnston of "judge shopping," and stated that the accused neither
had been served with the motion to quash nor had been advised
that Johnston planned to appear in court to request a hearing
date on the motion. The accused sent copies of that letter to
two Washington County judges. At a hearing on October 22, 1996,
the accused told the judge: "[T]hey didn't even attempt to
confer with me. There was no one that made any effort to
communicate with me in my office in any way whatsoever."
The case of Collins v. Harbertson eventually was tried
to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. The court
thereafter imposed sanctions on the accused for failing to obey
discovery orders.
In its causes of complaint relating to the Collins
matter, the Bar alleged that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS 9.460(2), and ORS
9.527(4) by seeking to have the judge change the pretrial
conference and trial dates. The Bar alleged that the accused had
violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS
9.460(2), and ORS 9.527(4) by telling several judges that
opposing counsel had made no effort to notify him of Johnston's
ex parte court appearance. Finally, the Bar alleged that the
accused had violated DR 7-106(C)(7) and DR 7-110(B) by failing to
serve the written motion to disqualify the trial judge on
Harbertson's lawyers. According to the Bar, an established rule
of procedure required him to do so.
The trial panel found that the accused had violated DR
1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), and ORS 9.460 by misrepresenting to
the court its intentions regarding scheduling in Collins v.
Harbertson. However, the trial panel held that the accused did
not violate ORS 9.527(4) or DR 7-110(B). (2)
The trial panel also found that it could not determine
whether the accused had received the telephone messages from
Johnston or her secretary, or Johnston's facsimile about the
hearing on scheduling the defense motion to quash. However, the
trial panel accepted Morrow's testimony that Morrow had delivered
the papers, and it specifically refused to credit the accused's
testimony on that point. The trial panel found that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4). (3)
C. Cassady Matter
The accused represented Cassady against Huber in a
personal injury action in which the sole issue was damages.
During jury selection in the case, the accused improperly
mentioned Huber's insurance coverage. See OEC 411 (limiting
admissibility of evidence concerning liability insurance);
Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or 1, 4, 389 P2d 330 (1964) (unnecessary
injection of insurance information prejudicial). Although the
jury selection proceedings were not transcribed, the judge who
presided over the trial testified at the disciplinary hearing
that, when a potential juror raised the issue of insurance, the
accused responded that there was plenty of insurance to go around
and that the jury should not worry about it. During trial, the
accused again raised the issue of Huber's insurance coverage,
contrary to the judge's repeated admonitions not to do so.
During the course of the trial in Cassady v. Huber, the
accused did not appear to be prepared for trial and was either
unfamiliar with or unwilling to comply with the rules of
evidence. For example, during his direct examination of a
physician that the accused had called as an expert on Cassady's
behalf, he handed the witness a stack of medical bills that the
witness had not seen previously and asked him whether the bills
were reasonable and necessary. It also became evident during the
trial that the accused had failed to order a copy of the
transcript of Cassady's deposition. Accordingly, he was
unprepared when defense counsel used that deposition transcript
at trial to impeach Cassady.
The accused also ignored the trial court's evidentiary
rulings. For example, the accused repeatedly attempted to
introduce hearsay, despite the trial court's repeated rulings
that those reports and opinions were inadmissible. Moreover,
during his direct examination of Cassady's treating physician,
the accused asked the physician questions about which the
physician had no personal knowledge and then ignored the court's
rulings about those questions.
The jury began its deliberations in Cassady v. Huber
late on the second day of trial. According to the trial judge,
the case could have been tried more quickly if the accused had
been prepared and competent. The jury awarded Cassady
compensatory damages.
Huber promptly paid the amount that she owed under the
judgment, and the accused accepted satisfaction of the judgment
on Cassady's behalf. Thereafter, the accused filed a motion for
a new trial. Huber opposed the motion, arguing that there was no
legal basis for the motion and requesting sanctions against the
accused for having filed it. See Nickerson and Nickerson, 296 Or
516, 520, 678 P2d 730 (1984) (party cannot accept benefits of
judgment and also pursue course that might overthrow right to
benefits). The court set a hearing date on the motion for a new
trial and notified the accused of that date. The accused failed
to appear despite the court's efforts to contact him. The court
held the accused in contempt and, in its contempt order, noted
that the accused's affidavit accompanying his motion for a new
trial was "full of inaccuracies." (4) The court also denied
Cassady's motion for a new trial. Following a subsequent hearing
on the defense motion for sanctions against the accused for
having filed the motion for a new trial, the trial court imposed
sanctions on the accused for filing the baseless motion for a new
trial and for making false statements in the affidavit that
accompanied the motion. (5)
In its cause of complaint relating to the Cassady
matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 6-101(A),
DR 6-101(B), DR 7-106(C)(1), and DR 7-106(C)(7). (6)
The trial panel concluded that the accused had failed
to represent Cassady competently, in violation of DR 6-101(A),
and that he intentionally or habitually had violated procedural
and evidentiary rules, in violation of DR 7-106(C)(7). However,
the trial panel concluded that the Bar had not shown that the
accused had neglected a legal matter in representing Cassady, in
violation of DR 6-101(B), or that he had alluded to inadmissible
evidence, in violation of DR 7-106(C)(1). (7)
D. Martin Matter
The accused represented Martin in a personal injury
case for injuries that she received when a kitchen cabinet in her
apartment fell on her. The complaint that the accused filed on
Martin's behalf named many defendants, including various
subcontractors and others, some of whom later provided evidence
that they should not have been named as defendants.
Several of the defendants named in the complaint filed
motions for summary judgment, and the accused delegated
responsibility for opposing those motions to a new associate in
his office, Gresham. Gresham had minimal legal experience and
never before had opposed a motion for summary judgment. The
accused was aware of Gresham's inexperience, but he assigned the
matter to Gresham nonetheless.
To respond to each defendant's motion for summary
judgment, Gresham needed to submit documents or affidavits on
Martin's behalf that would show the court that there was a
genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. ORCP 47 C.
Rather than doing so, Gresham opposed the motions orally, relying
solely on legal arguments. The trial court granted the defense
motions, then stated:
"I will be fairly blunt. I suspect that at least
half the motions I just granted could have been
overcome by appropriate documents had they been filed.
Without their being filed, I can't do the right thing.
I have to do the legally required thing * * *."
Thereafter, the trial court imposed sanctions on the
accused for failing to investigate information suggesting that
claims against several of the defendants whom he had named in the
complaint should have been dismissed. See ORCP 17 C (authorizing
imposition of sanctions against lawyers who file pleadings not
based on lawyer's "reasonable knowledge, information and belief,
formed after the making of such inquiry as is reasonable under
the circumstances"). According to the court, the accused's
conduct was "the most egregious set of circumstances I have ever
seen."
In its cause of complaint relating to the Martin
matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 6-101(A)
and DR 6-101(B). The trial panel concluded that the accused did
not represent Martin competently, in violation of DR 6-101(A).
However, the trial panel concluded that the Bar had not shown
that the accused had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him,
and it therefore dismissed the charge under DR 6-101(B).
E. Trial Panel Sanction Determination
The trial panel concluded that, in view of the prior
disciplinary record and the ethical violations found by the trial
panel arising out of four separate cases, and involving numerous
and factually separate circumstances, "disbarment is the only way
to protect the public and the integrity of the profession."
II. ISSUES ON REVIEW
A. Burke Matter
1. DR 1-102(A)(3)
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." DR 1-102(A)(3). To violate the rule, an
accused's misrepresentations, whether direct or by omission, must
be knowing, false, and material in the sense that the
misrepresentations would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process. See In re Kluge, 332 Or 251,
255, 19 P3d 938 (2001) (so stating).
As a threshold matter, we address whether the trial
court's denial of Burke's motion to set aside the default
judgment under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) precluded the trial panel from
holding that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(3). Although
there may be circumstances in which the doctrine of issue
preclusion would prevent consideration of a claim that a lawyer
had violated a disciplinary rule, issue preclusion plays no role
here. Issue preclusion requires, among other things, that the
party sought to be precluded was a party (or was in privity with
a party) to the prior proceeding and that the party sought to be
precluded had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that
issue. See Nelson v. Emerald People's Utility Dist., 318 Or 99,
104, 862 P2d 1293 (1993) (setting out elements of issue
preclusion). The Bar neither was a party nor was in privity with
a party in Shon v. Burke. Even assuming that the terms "fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct" under ORCP 71 B(1)(c)
mean the same as "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation" under DR 1-102(A)(3), the Bar did not have a
full and fair opportunity to be heard in the hearing on Burke's
motion under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) to set aside the default judgment.
The trial panel was not constrained by principles of issue
preclusion from finding that the accused intentionally had
misrepresented the question of payment of court costs in his
settlement letter to Burke and that Burke had relied on the
omission to her detriment.
We turn to the merits on this issue. The Bar contends
that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(4) by
making a misrepresentation by omission to Burke in the settlement
agreement and by applying for a default judgment that included
costs after he had told Burke that he would dismiss the complaint
once she had complied with the terms of the settlement agreement.
The accused contends that his conduct was not unethical.
We find that the accused intentionally omitted from the
settlement agreement his intent to seek costs. The complaint
that the accused filed in Shon v. Burke made clear that the
accused sought costs. However, Burke objected to paying costs.
Burke's objection indicates that, to her, the matter of costs was
an important element of the settlement. The settlement agreement
that the accused sent to Burke made no mention of costs, leading
Burke to believe that the settlement did not include them. The
accused intentionally failed to disclose a material fact --
namely, that he intended to seek costs -- to obtain Burke's
acquiescence to settle her dispute with Shon. The accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
We turn to the accused's submission of a default
judgment to the court that contained an award of costs to Shon
after the parties had settled the case. As we have explained,
the accused concealed his intent to recover costs against Burke
by not including them in the settlement agreement. After Burke
had agreed to the settlement and had complied with its terms, she
was entitled to believe that the matter was resolved and that the
accused would dismiss the action. The accused did not inform
Burke that he intended to seek a default judgment notwithstanding
the settlement. The accused's failure to correct a false
impression created by nondisclosure of a material fact -- that
the settlement agreement did not resolve completely the case of
Shon v. Burke -- was a misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3).
2. DR 1-102(A)(4)
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
DR 1-102(A)(4). To establish a violation of that rule, the Bar
must show: (1) that the accused lawyer engaged in "conduct" by
doing something that the lawyer should not have done or by
failing to do something that the lawyer was supposed to do; (2)
that the conduct occurred during the course of a judicial
proceeding or another proceeding that has the trappings of a
judicial proceeding; and (3) that the conduct was prejudicial
because it involved several acts that caused some harm to the
administration of justice or because it involved a single act
that caused substantial harm to the administration of justice.
In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 643, 968 P2d 367 (1998).
The Bar argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4)
by applying for a default judgment for costs against Burke,
contrary to the settlement agreement that called for dismissal of
Shon's action against Burke, and by failing to give Burke notice,
under ORCP 69 A(1), of his intent to apply for a default
judgment. The Bar contends that Burke's "substantive interests
were substantially and adversely affected by the Accused's
conduct."
As we have explained above, to establish a violation of
DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar must satisfy all three prongs of the test
summarized in Gustafson. Here, the Bar has not demonstrated that
the accused's conduct in applying for the default judgment was an
act that caused substantial harm to the administration of
justice. To the extent that the Bar makes an argument regarding
the "prejudice" prong of that test in this matter, it focuses
solely on prejudice to Burke, not on prejudice to the
administration of justice. The Bar has not met its burden of
proving that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
3. DR 7-110(B)
Unless otherwise authorized by law, it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to communicate in writing on the merits
with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding is pending
unless the lawyer "promptly delivers a copy of the writing to
opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the adverse party is
not represented by a lawyer." DR 7-110(B)(2). This court has
construed the term "on the merits" in that rule to include
procedural as well as substantive matters. In re Schenck, 320 Or
94, 103, 879 P2d 863 (1994).
The Bar contends that the accused violated DR 7-110(B)
by failing to notify Burke of his intent to apply for a default
judgment. The accused responds that he was not required to
provide Burke with notice because he was "authorized by law"
under ORCP 69 A(1) not to do so.
ORCP 69 A(1) requires a party seeking a default
judgment to provide the opposing party with written notice at
least ten days prior to the entry of the order of default
"[i]f the party against whom an order of default is
sought has filed an appearance in the action, or has
provided written notice of intent to file an appearance
to the party seeking an order of default[.]"
(Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that Burke did not file an
answer to Shon's complaint and sought instead to settle the case.
The Bar contends that, by informing the accused before the
settlement that she objected to paying his costs, Burke triggered
the ten-day notice requirement in ORCP 69 A(1). The Bar relies
on Morrow Co. Sch. Dist. v. Oreg. Land and Water Co., 78 Or App
296, 300 n 4, 716 P2d 766 (1986), for the proposition that
"almost anything that indicates that a party is interested in the
case will suffice" to trigger the ten-day notice requirement in
ORCP 69 A(1).
The Bar reads too much into that statement in Morrow.
By its terms, ORCP 69 A(1) requires notice to an opposing party
only if the party has filed an appearance or provided written
notice of an intent to file an appearance. The legal meaning of
the word "appearance" is "[a] coming into court as a party" or
"[a] formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court." Black's Law Dictionary, 97 (6th
ed 1990). Burke's letter to the accused stating that she was
opposed to paying costs was not an "appearance" as that term is
used in ORCP 69 A(1). The accused was not required to serve
Burke with notice that he intended to apply for a default
judgment. See ORCP 9 A (no service required on parties in
default for failure to appear). Because an exception to the
general rule requiring notice was "authorized by law," the
accused did not violate DR 7-110(B).
B. Collins Matter
1. DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5)
As we have discussed above, a lawyer commits
professional misconduct by knowingly engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. DR 1-102(A)(3). The misrepresentation must be material. Moreover, in
representing a client or the lawyer's own interests, the lawyer
shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact."
DR 7-102(A)(5).
The Bar contends that the accused knowingly caused the
trial judge in the Collins matter to sign an order containing a
provision that the judge had not considered regarding the
pretrial and trial dates in Collins v. Harbertson. The accused
does not respond.
At the trial panel hearing, the accused testified that
he recalled hearing the judge mention that he wished to change
the pretrial conference and trial dates in Collins v. Harbertson.
Harberton's lawyers testified that the judge had made no such
statement. Assessing the witnesses' testimony, which was the
only evidence regarding those charges, we agree with the trial
panel that the accused knowingly misrepresented the judge's
intent regarding the scheduling of Collins v. Harbertson. The
misrepresentation was material in that it affected the judge's
decision-making process about the scheduling of the trial. The
accused violated DR-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).
We agree with the trial panel's finding that the
accused made a knowing misrepresentation to two Washington County
judges when he stated that Johnston and Brisbee had made no
effort to notify him before filing the motion to quash the
accused's subpoena. Even assuming that the accused did not
receive either Johnston's voice mail message or the facsimile,
the record nonetheless establishes that Johnston and Brisbee
attempted to consult with the accused through Morrow, and that
the accused's contrary assertion was a knowing misrepresentation
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).
2. DR 1-102(A)(4)
Our finding that the accused made misrepresentations in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) establishes that the accused did
something that he was not supposed to do, thus satisfying the
first prong of the three-pronged test for finding a violation of
DR 1-102(A)(4), described earlier in this opinion. See
Gustafson, 327 Or at 643 (summarizing three-pronged test). The
accused's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial
proceeding in the case of Collins v. Harbertson, thereby
satisfying the second prong. The proposed order that the accused
submitted to the judge changing the pretrial and trial dates
contained a misrepresentation that was calculated to induce the
judge to acquiesce to a trial date that the accused preferred.
Changing the trial date substantially harmed the administration
of justice, satisfying the third -- or prejudice -- prong. The
accused's misrepresentation made it necessary for the judge to
resolve the dispute that arose as a result of the accused's
misrepresentation and to redraft his order. See In re Meyer (I),
328 Or 211, 214, 970 P2d 652 (1999) (harm under DR 1-102(A)(4)
can occur when procedural functioning of a case or hearing is
impaired; harm may be actual or potential). The accused violated
DR 1-102(A)(4).
3. DR 7-110(B)
As previously noted, DR 7-110(B) provides that, unless
otherwise authorized by law, it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to communicate in writing on the merits with a judge or an
official before whom the proceeding is pending unless the lawyer
"promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or
to the adverse party if the adverse party is not represented by a
lawyer."
The Bar contends that the accused violated that rule by
failing to serve opposing counsel with his written motion to
disqualify the trial judge. The motion was "on the merits" in
Collins v. Harbertson. The accused does not dispute that he
filed a written motion on the merits. However, he contends that
he filed his motion to disqualify under ORS 14.270 (8) and that
nothing in that statute requires service "upon anyone or any
entity other than the court."
The accused's reliance on ORS 14.270 is misplaced.
That statute provides that, under certain circumstances, notice
to the court may be oral. The statute creates no exception to
the general rule regarding service of a written motion on
opposing counsel. See ORCP 9 A (unless excepted by rule, "every
written motion * * * shall be served upon each of the parties").
The accused violated DR 7-110(B) by failing to serve notice of
the written motion to disqualify on opposing counsel. (9)
C. The Cassady Matter
1. DR 6-101(A)
A lawyer must provide "competent representation to a
client," which requires "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." DR
6-101(A). This court has held that determining whether a lawyer
acted incompetently, in violation of that rule, is a fact-specific inquiry:
"The question whether a lawyer has competently
represented a client is, of course, a fact-specific
inquiry. A review of this court's cases shows that
incompetence often is found where there is a lack of
basic knowledge or preparation, or a combination of
those factors.
"In contrast, lawyers have been found not guilty
of providing incompetent representation where the
lawyers showed experience and professional ability to
perform work, or where the Bar failed to prove that a
position taken by the lawyer was 'advanced in pretense
or bad faith, or in culpable ignorance.' In sum,
competence or incompetence can best be measured on a
case-by-case basis using the standard stated in DR
6-101(A) itself."
In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 553-54, 857 P2d 136 (1993) (footnote
and citations omitted).
In its cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that the
accused failed to represent Cassady competently at trial. The
Bar identifies many deficiencies in the accused's performance,
ranging from repeatedly asking witnesses questions about which
they had no knowledge and asking witnesses to give opinions about
reports that were not in evidence, to his inability to
authenticate or establish proper foundations for evidence. The
accused responds that Greene "did not offer any specific basis *
* * as to whether the accused had performed his duties in a
competent manner in the Cassady trial."
Our review of the record substantiates the Bar's
contention that the accused did not represent Cassady competently
at trial. Several examples demonstrate the accused's lack of
legal knowledge, skill, or preparation. First, the accused
repeatedly attempted to inject the issue of Huber's insurance at
the trial. The trial judge admonished the accused many times not
to mention insurance. Nonetheless, the accused continued to do
so. The accused persists in his belief that the jury was
entitled to hear evidence about Huber's insurance coverage and
that the evidence would have been admissible had it not been for
the judge's bias against the accused.
Second, the accused was not prepared for trial. Greene
testified that it is "absolutely essential" for a lawyer to have
a copy of the client's deposition transcript at trial so that the
client does not mistakenly make statements inconsistent with the
client's prior testimony. The accused did not order a copy of
Cassady's deposition transcript for use at trial. In addition,
the accused failed to show Cassady's medical bills to his own
medical expert before trial, causing the expert to be unprepared
to testify at trial.
Third, during the trial, the accused attempted to show
the jury through the testimony of Cassady's treating physician
that Cassady had a good work ethic, even though the physician had
no knowledge of her work ethic. The accused appeared to be
oblivious to that problem.
Fourth, the accused repeatedly posed questions to
witnesses seeking hearsay or other incompetent evidence, a
practice that he continued even after the trial judge had ruled
the evidence inadmissible. Fifth, the accused made multiple
unfounded objections during the trial. Finally, the accused
moved for a new trial after accepting satisfaction of judgment on
Cassady's behalf, despite the long-established rule that a party
cannot move for a new trial after accepting the benefits of a
judgment in its favor. See Snipes v. Beezley, 5 Or 420, 422
(1875) (too late to move for new trial after receiving payment on
judgment). The accused's conduct at Cassady's trial reveals a
lack of understanding of basic legal concepts concerning the
conduct of a trial and the consequences of accepting satisfaction
of a judgment.
Both the trial judge in the Cassady trial and Greene
testified that the accused had performed incompetently in the
Cassady trial. According to the judge, "in 14 years, it was the
worst presentation by an attorney I've ever seen." On de novo
review, we find that the accused performed incompetently in his
representation of Cassady at trial. The accused violated DR 6-101(A).
2. DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7)
In appearing in the lawyer's professional capacity
before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not "[s]tate or allude to any
matter that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence," DR 7-106(C)(1), or "[i]ntentionally or habitually
violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence," DR 7-106(C)(7).
The Bar contends that, in the Cassady matter, the
accused violated both those rules by referring to Huber's
insurance coverage during voir dire and during the trial itself
after the judge had admonished him not to do so. The accused
acknowledges that he made several references to insurance but
apparently believes that he was entitled to do so.
The Bar's expert witness, Greene, testified that the
rules do not allow a lawyer to discuss insurance during voir dire
in a personal injury case and that the accused's repeated
references to Huber's insurance could have caused a mistrial.
Even without instruction from the court, the accused should have
known that evidence of Huber's insurance was not admissible.
However, in light of the judge's repeated warnings that the
accused was not to mention insurance coverage, the accused had no
reasonable basis for believing that he was entitled to do so.
The accused's reference to insurance was intentional.
The accused had filed a motion in limine to prevent Huber's
witnesses from mentioning any collateral sources of payment that
Cassady might have received. That motion established that the
accused understood that insurance could be a sensitive subject at
trial. Although he had sought the trial court's aid in
preventing Huber's witnesses from referring to insurance payments
that Cassady might have received, the accused nonetheless
repeatedly attempted to inform the jury that Huber had insurance
coverage. The accused violated DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7).
D. Martin Matter
1. DR 6-101(A)
As discussed above, DR 6-101(A) requires a lawyer to
represent clients competently. The Bar alleged that the accused
had violated that rule by delegating Martin's response to the
defense motions for summary judgment to Gresham and then failing
to supervise Gresham adequately. The accused responds that he
provided what he believed to be reasonable supervision of
Gresham, but he faults Gresham for failing to confer with the
accused on important matters. The accused also contends that
Gresham's testimony that the accused did not give him any
guidance in preparing to oppose the summary judgment motions was
biased, that Gresham obviously had been coached by the Bar
regarding his testimony, and that time records should clearly
demonstrate Gresham's failure to confer with the accused on
important matters.
Before the trial panel, Gresham testified that, when
the accused assigned him to oppose the defense motions for
summary judgment in the Martin case, Gresham had had no
experience in handling such matters and that he had received no
guidance from the accused. In his deposition, the accused stated
that he had not conferred with Gresham about how to oppose the
motions for summary judgment and that, when the accused learned
that Gresham had not filed the documents required to create
material issues of fact, the accused, like everyone else in his
office with whom he spoke about the matter, was appalled. Before
the trial panel, by contrast, the accused testified that he
thought he had supervised Gresham adequately. As noted, the
accused contends before this court that he provided Gresham what
the accused believed to be reasonable supervision in the Martin
case.
The accused does not dispute that he had supervisory
responsibility for Gresham or that he was Martin's attorney of
record. We find it highly probable that, consistent with the
accused's deposition testimony, the accused did not supervise
Gresham's opposition to the defense motions for summary judgment
in the Martin matter. The accused violated DR 6-101(A). See In
re Spies, 316 Or 530, 538, 852 P2d 831 (1993) (lawyer failed to
act competently, in part, by failing to prepare certified law
student to handle hearing).
2. DR 6-101(B)
DR 6-101(B) provides that a lawyer "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to the lawyer." The Bar also alleged
that, by entrusting opposition of the summary judgment motions to
Gresham, the accused violated that rule. The accused responds
that Gresham had the requisite qualifications to be an effective
advocate for clients in litigation.
To prove a violation of DR 6-101(B), the Bar must show
a "course" of negligent conduct. In re Meyer (II), 328 Or 220,
225, 970 P2d 647 (1999). The Bar has failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused has engaged in a
"course" of negligent conduct in violation of DR 6-101(B).
E. Summary
In sum, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in both the Burke and Collins matters; DR 1-102(A)(4),
DR 7-102(A)(5), and DR 7-110(B) in the Collins matter; DR 6-101(A), DR 7-106(C)(1) and DR 7-106(C)(7) in the Cassady matter;
and DR 6-101(A) in the Martin matter. Those violations fall into
four categories: misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice; incompetence; ex parte contact;
and misconduct at trial. We turn to the appropriate sanction.
In that regard, the Bar argues that this court should affirm the
trial panel sanction and disbar the accused. The accused
responds that the complaint should be dismissed.
III. SANCTION
In arriving at the appropriate sanction for lawyer
misconduct, this court makes a preliminary determination by
consulting the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).
Gustafson, 327 Or at 652. The ABA Standards direct us to analyze
the accused's misconduct in light of the following factors: the
duty violated, the accused's mental state at the time of the
misconduct, the actual or potential injury that the accused's
misconduct caused, and the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. ABA Standard 3.0. Finally, we analyze
this court's case law to determine the sanction that should be
imposed in the particular situation. In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
241, 974 P2d 191 (1999).
We analyze the factors described above with respect to
each of the categories of misconduct identified in this case:
misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice; incompetence; ex parte contact; and misconduct at
trial.
A. Preliminary Determination
1. Misrepresentation and Conduct Prejudicial to
Administration of Justice
The accused's misrepresentations in the Burke and
Collins matters violated his duty to the public to maintain
personal integrity. ABA Standard 5.1. The accused violated his
duty to the legal system to refrain from making false statements
and misrepresentations. ABA Standard 6.1.
We find that the accused's misrepresentations were
intentional. That is, the accused acted with a conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA
Standards at 7. In the Burke matter, the accused intentionally
submitted a default judgment for the purpose of being awarded
costs after leading Burke to believe that he would dismiss Shon's
action if Burke agreed to the settlement. The accused's
dishonesty caused Burke actual injury, because a default judgment
was entered against her.
In the Collins matter, the accused wanted the pretrial
and trial dates changed, and he intentionally misrepresented to
the trial judge that the judge had intended to change those
dates. The accused also intentionally told several judges in the
Collins matter that opposing counsel had made no effort to notify
the accused of the hearing to quash the subpoena that the accused
had issued to the Safeco employee, apparently with the motive to
impugn the integrity of opposing counsel. The accused's
intentional misrepresentations created the potential for
significant injury. As noted, the accused's misrepresentations
to the trial judge regarding the "changed" pretrial conference
and trial dates caused substantial harm to the administration of
justice. The accused's misrepresentations in the Burke and
Collins matters seriously adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law.
ABA Standard 5.11(b) makes disbarment the appropriate
sanction when a lawyer engages in intentional, albeit
noncriminal, misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects upon the
lawyer's fitness to practice law. ABA Standard 6.11 generally
makes disbarment the appropriate sanction when a lawyer, with the
intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a party or causes a
significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the
legal proceeding. The ABA Standards call for such a harsh
sanction because, as explained in the introduction to ABA
Standard 5.0, "[t]he most fundamental duty which a lawyer owes
the public is the duty to maintain the standards of personal
integrity upon which the community relies." The ABA Standards
suggest that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misrepresentations.
2. Incompetence
Having agreed to represent a client, a lawyer must be
competent to perform the services requested. ABA Standard 4.0.
It is evident from the record that the accused tenaciously
represented Cassady and believes that he did so competently.
However, tenacity is not the same as competence, and, as our
review of the record has shown, the accused did not represent
either Cassady or Martin competently. In the Cassady litigation,
the accused's incompetent trial techniques harmed the legal
system and the parties. In the Martin matter, the accused's
incompetence harmed his client. Disbarment generally is
appropriate when a lawyer demonstrates a lack of understanding of
the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and the client
is actually or potentially injured. ABA Standard 4.51. However,
disbarment as a sanction should be imposed only on lawyers "whose
course of conduct demonstrates that they cannot or will not
master the knowledge and skills necessary for minimally competent
practice." Commentary to ABA Standard 4.51. Suspension
generally is appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of
practice in which the lawyer knows that he or she is not
competent and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
ABA Standard 4.52. Reprimand generally is appropriate when a
lawyer: (1) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal
doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to
a client; or (2) is negligent in determining whether he or she is
competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential
injury to a client. ABA Standard 4.53.
Our review of the record in this case leads to the
conclusion that disbarment would not be an appropriate sanction
for the accuse's incompetence in the Cassady and Martin matters,
because we are not persuaded that the accused is incapable of
mastering the knowledge and skills necessary for minimally
competent practice. Neither is it clear to us that the accused
engaged in practice in an area of the law in which he knew he was
not competent. However, the records of the Cassady and Martin
matters reveal that the accused failed to understand relevant
legal doctrines or procedures, and caused actual injury. In
light of the significant sanction we impose for all the accused's
misconduct, discussed below, we need not address what sanction
would be appropriate if this proceeding involved only the
accused's incompetence.
3. Ex parte contact
The accused violated his duties as a lawyer by engaging
in ex parte communications with a judge in the Cassady matter.
ABA Standard 6.3. We find the accused's mental state in filing
the written disqualification motion without serving opposing
counsel to be negligent, as he misunderstood his legal obligation
to do so. In failing to serve opposing counsel with the
disqualification motion, the accused caused actual injury.
Opposing counsel arrived to argue the motion to compel, only to
discover that the accused had succeeded in disqualifying the
judge who was assigned to hear the motion and delaying the
hearing.
ABA Standard 6.33 provides that reprimand generally is
appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether it
is proper to engage in communication with an individual in the
legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party.
Standing alone, the accused's misconduct regarding his ex parte
contact would merit a reprimand.
4. Trial misconduct
The accused abused the legal process by repeatedly
raising the issue of Huber's insurance to the jury during the
Cassady trial. ABA Standard 6.2. As we have explained, we find
that the accused acted intentionally. Injecting the existence of
Huber's insurance at trial caused potential injury, because the
threat of a mistrial hung over the proceedings after the accused
mentioned insurance. The trial judge testified that he would
have granted a mistrial if the defense had moved for one.
ABA Standard 6.21 provides that disbarment generally is
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a rule with the
intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes
serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes
serious or potentially serious interference with a legal
proceeding.
It appears that, in raising the issue of Huber's
insurance in the Cassady trial, the accused intended to obtain a
benefit for Cassady, namely, assuring the jury that it could
award Cassady damages without harming Huber. The ABA Standards
indicate that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misconduct in intentionally and persistently attempting
to interject the fact of Huber's insurance at trial.
In summary, the ABA Standards point to disbarment as
the appropriate sanction for the accused's intentional
misrepresentations and his trial misconduct. The ABA Standards
point to a sanction short of disbarment for the accused's
incompetence and his ex parte contact. We turn to aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
"[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations, or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed." ABA Standard 9.21. The first aggravating factor
in this proceeding is that the accused has a prior disciplinary
offense. ABA Standard 9.22(a). In 1994, the accused stipulated
to discipline for contacting a represented party without the
permission or presence of that party's counsel, in violation of
DR 7-104(A)(1). The accused received a public reprimand for that
violation. (10)
In weighing the prior offense as an aggravating
circumstance, we consider its relative seriousness and the
resulting sanction; the similarity of the prior offense to the
offense in the present case; the number of prior offenses; the
relative recency of the prior offense; and the timing of the
current offenses in relation to the prior offense and resulting
sanction. We also consider whether the accused lawyer had been
sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
misconduct at issue in the present case. In re Jones, 326 Or
195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997). Applying those considerations, we
conclude that the accused's prior offense deserves little weight
as an aggravating factor in this proceeding. His record of
discipline is limited to one instance of misconduct for which he
received only a public reprimand. That sanction regarded a
matter that is not similar to the misconduct at issue here, and
the misconduct occurred several years ago. We turn to other
aggravating circumstances.
The accused has engaged in misconduct involving four
different client matters. In three of those matters, the accused
committed multiple ethical violations. ABA Standard 9.22(d).
The accused has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of any
of his misconduct. ABA Standard 9.22(g). The accused has
substantial experience in the practice of law, having been
admitted to the bar in 1987. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
Mitigating circumstances are "any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
to be imposed." ABA Standard 9.31. The only mitigating factor
here is that the accused cooperated with the Bar during its
initial investigation. ABA Standard 9.32(e).
C. Oregon Cases
In past cases, when this court has found
misrepresentation in addition to other misconduct, the court has
imposed lengthy suspensions or disbarment. See In re Gallagher,
332 Or 173, 190, 26 P3d 131 (2001) (two-year suspension for two
misrepresentations plus other misconduct); In re Wyllie, 327 Or
175, 184, 957 P2d 1222 (1998) (two-year suspension for submitting
false MCLE forms and failing to cooperate with investigation); In
re Recker, 309 Or 633, 641, 789 P2d 663 (1990) (two-year
suspension for misrepresentation to court plus other disciplinary
rule violations). However, multiple misrepresentations to
courts, the Bar, or clients, combined with other serious ethical
violations, has led to disbarment. For example, this court
disbarred a lawyer who notarized false documents and made
misrepresentations to clients in an unlawful living trust scheme.
In re Morin, 319 Or 547, 566, 878 P2d 393 (1994). The accused in
that proceeding also failed to respond truthfully to the Bar's
inquiries during its investigation. Id. at 564. This court also
disbarred a lawyer who filed a false affidavit with a probate
court, committed a misdemeanor, and violated several other
disciplinary rules. In re Hawkins, 305 Or 319, 326, 751 P2d 780
(1988). Further, this court disbarred a lawyer who, among other
things, made multiple misrepresentations to clients and court
staff, represented a client incompetently, and neglected a legal
matter. Spies, 316 Or at 541. However, the lawyer's conduct in
that proceeding was part of a downward personal spiral of
"increasingly irresponsible" conduct. Id. at 540. Other
situations in which this court has disbarred a lawyer have
involved serious misconduct on the heels of an already lengthy
record of disciplinary violations. See, e.g., In re Miller, 310
Or 731, 739, 801 P2d 814 (1990) (multiple misrepresentations,
excessive fee, lengthy disciplinary record).
In this proceeding, the accused not only made
misrepresentations in the Burke and Collins matters, he provided
incompetent representation in the Cassady and Martin matters. We
note that, in Spies, misrepresentation and incompetence played a
significant role in the decision to disbar the lawyer. Spies,
316 Or at 540. However, in the case that is most similar
factually to this case, this court imposed a lengthy suspension
rather than disbarring the lawyer. In In re Chambers, 292 Or
670, 642 P2d 286 (1982), the lawyer negligently failed to prepare
and return a proper summons and failed to communicate with his
client. In a criminal matter, the lawyer was incompetent in
conducting his investigation of exculpatory evidence on behalf of
his client and subsequently trying the case "by the seat of his
pants." Id. at 678. In a third matter, the lawyer knowingly
made a false statement of fact when he represented to an accident
victim that he was an insurance agent. Id. at 680-81. When
Chambers was decided, the maximum suspension possible short of
disbarment was three years. See BR 6.1(a)(iii) (three-year
suspension maximum length for proceedings commenced before
January 1, 1996). (11) This court held that a two-year suspension
was the appropriate sanction. Chambers, 292 Or at 682.
In this proceeding, the Bar, like the trial panel,
asserts that disbarment is required to protect the public and the
integrity of the profession. However, this court's case law does
not support disbarment for the accused's misconduct, although it
does support a lengthy suspension.
The accused's conduct is more egregious than the
conduct in Chambers. The accused acted dishonestly in submitting
a default judgment after settling the dispute with Burke. The
accused intentionally misrepresented to the trial judge that the
judge had ordered a change in the pretrial conference and trial
dates in the Collins matter. The accused intentionally sought to
impugn the integrity of opposing counsel in the Collins matter
when he claimed that opposing counsel had made no effort to
notify him of a hearing to quash the subpoena that he had served
on a Safeco employee. The accused deliberately and repeatedly
injected the issue of insurance into a trial to prejudice the
jury in favor of his client, Cassady. The trial judge found the
accused's representation of Cassady to have been the worst
performance he had seen as a trial judge, resulting in prejudice
to Cassady's interests. The accused's failure to assure that
evidence was presented to defeat the motions for summary judgment
in the Martin matter also damaged his client.
The foregoing examples, taken together, reveal a
disturbing pattern of a lawyer who disrupts the functioning of
the legal system and the interests of parties in that system
through a combination of intentional and negligent misconduct.
Considering together the ABA Standards, the aggravating factors,
and this court's case law, we conclude that a three-year
suspension from the practice of law is the appropriate sanction.
Requiring the accused to show the requisite character and fitness
to practice law for readmission under BR 8.1(a)(iv) following
that suspension will protect the public and the integrity of the
profession.
The accused is suspended for three years, effective 60
days from the date of the filing of this decision.
1. The accused admitted that he had heard pounding on his
office door that evening and had seen someone outside, but he
denied that he had seen Morrow deliver anything or that he had
found documents left in the door jamb.
2. The trial panel stated that the accused had not
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) when he failed to serve opposing counsel
with the motion to disqualify the trial judge. However, it is
clear from the trial panel's opinion that it meant to state that
the accused had not violated DR 7-110(B).
The trial panel did not address the Bar's allegation
that the accused also had violated DR 7-102(A)(5) by knowingly
making a false statement of law or fact in the Collins matter.
3. The trial panel did not address the Bar's allegation
that the accused had violated DR 7-106(C)(7) by intentionally or
habitually violating rules of procedure or evidence in his
handling of the Collins matter, and the Bar has abandoned that
issue on review.
4. The court eventually vacated the contempt order so that
the matter could be heard by another judge. The record does not
reveal the outcome.
5. The court thereafter vacated that order for lack of
jurisdiction, because the accused already had filed an appeal
from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
6. Although the Bar's cause of complaint alleged that the
accused had made misleading statements to the court and in
affidavits in connection with a discovery dispute over a
photograph of Cassady's damaged car that fell out of the
accused's file during the trial, the Bar did not charge the
accused with violating DR 7-102(A)(5) or ORS 9.460. Nonetheless,
as we note below, the trial panel concluded that the accused
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) and ORS 9.460 by making misleading
statements regarding the photograph. The Bar does not ask this
court to hold that the accused violated any disciplinary rules in
connection with the photograph incident at Cassady's trial.
7. The trial panel also concluded that the accused had
violated DR 7-102(A)(5) and ORS 9.460 in the Cassady matter, even
though the Bar did not charge those violations in its complaint.
The Bar does not argue those violations on review. In addition,
on review, the Bar has abandoned its charge of neglect under DR
6-101(B) in the Cassady matter.
8. ORS 14.270 provides:
"An affidavit and motion for change of judge to
hear the motions and demurrers or to try the case shall
be made at the time of the assignment of the case to a
judge for trial or for hearing upon a motion or
demurrer. Oral notice of the intention to file the
motion and affidavit shall be sufficient compliance
with this section providing that the motion and
affidavit are filed not later than the close of the
next judicial day. No motion to disqualify a judge to
whom a case has been assigned for trial shall be made
after the judge has ruled upon any petition, demurrer
or motion other than a motion to extend time in the
cause, matter or proceeding; except that when a
presiding judge assigns to the presiding judge any
cause, matter or proceeding in which the presiding
judge has previously ruled upon any such petition,
motion or demurrer, any party or attorney appearing in
the cause, matter or proceeding may move to disqualify
the judge after assignment of the case and prior to any
ruling on any such petition, motion or demurrer heard
after such assignment. No party or attorney shall be
permitted to make more than two applications in any
action or proceeding under this section."
(Emphasis added.)
9. We decline to address the Bar's charges under ORS
9.460(2) and ORS 9.527(4), because they are redundant of its
charges under DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5), and the Bar does
not argue that a finding that the accused had violated those
statutes would enhance or otherwise affect the sanction. See In
re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 487, 31 P3d 414 (2001) (illustrating
point); In re Lawrence, 332 Or 502, 511, 31 P3d 1078 (2001)
(same).
10. The Bar had charged the accused with violating several
disciplinary rules, but the stipulation for discipline involved
only DR 7-104(A)(1).
11. Under BR 6.1(a)(iv), the maximum period of suspension
short of disbarment in proceedings commenced after December 31,
1995, is five years. | 38f45833fd710364104401c68745d8d6147aa01a16181235fab9c2a8a290528f | 2001-12-06T00:00:00Z |
ada9aa3d-588e-469a-9f43-653809ee83ed | Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC | null | S069417 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 3
February 15, 2024
27
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Robert TREBELHORN,
Petitioner on Review,
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Judgment Creditor,
v.
PRIME WIMBLEDON SPE, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company;
and Prime Administration, LLC,
a Delaware Limited liability company,
dba Prime Group,
dba Wimbledon Square,
dba Wimbledon Square Apartments,
Respondents on Review,
and
Andrea SWENSON,
Defendant.
(CC 16CV40959) (CA A170010) (SC S069417)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 29, 2022.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for peti
tioner on review. Mark McDougal, Kafoury & McDougal,
Portland, filed the brief for petitioner on review. Also on the
brief was Gregory Kafoury.
Raffi Melkonian, Wright Close & Barger, LLP, Houston,
Texas, argued the cause for respondents on review. Matthew
C. Casey, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, filed the
brief for respondents on review. Also on the brief were
Jessica Z. Barger, Raffi Melkonian, and Brian J. Cathey,
Wright Close & Barger, LLP, Houston, Texas.
______________
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Karin J. Immergut, Judge.
316 Or App 577, 500 P3d 675 (2021).
28
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
Kristian Roggendorf, The Zalkin Law Firm P.C., San
Diego, California, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon
Trial Lawyers Association.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, James,
and Masih, Justices, and Kistler and Balmer, Senior Judges,
Justices pro tempore.**
FLYNN, C.J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the circuit court are affirmed.
______________
** Walters, J., retired December 31, 2022, and did not participate in the deci
sion of this case. Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate
in the decision of this case. DeHoog and Bushong, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
29
FLYNN, C.J.
This case requires us to determine whether the jury
assessed a “grossly excessive” amount of punitive damages,
contrary to the prohibition of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary deprivations of
liberty or property. Plaintiff suffered a serious knee injury
at his apartment complex when his leg punched through
a section of elevated walkway that had been weakened
by dry rot. Defendants Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, and
Prime Administration, LLC, who owned and managed the
apartment complex, were aware that the walkway and other
structures at the complex had deteriorated to the point that
they required “life safety” repairs, but they had chosen not to
repair the walkway on which plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff
sued defendants for negligence and violation of Oregon’s
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and prevailed. In addi
tion to awarding plaintiff just under $300,000 in economic
and noneconomic damages, the jury found that defendants’
conduct justified imposing punitive damages of $10 million
against each defendant.
On post-verdict review of the punitive damages
verdict, the trial court concluded that the evidence permit
ted the jury to find defendants liable for some amount of
punitive damages but that imposing $10 million in puni
tive damages would violate defendants’ due process rights.
The trial court also determined that the maximum amount
of punitive damages that due process will permit on this
record is nine times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded by the jury and, accordingly, entered judgment for
the reduced amount of just under $2.7 million in punitive
damages against each defendant. On cross-appeals from
the parties, the Court of Appeals agreed with all of the
trial court’s decisions and affirmed, and this court allowed
review.
In briefing to this court, plaintiff argues that the
jury’s full amount of punitive damages must be reinstated,
and defendants urge us to simply affirm the trial court’s
judgment for the reduced amount of $2.7 million in punitive
damages against each defendant. Those arguments frame
and narrow the scope of our inquiry. As we will explain,
30
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
the sole question that we answer is whether the trial court
correctly concluded that the Due Process Clause precluded
the court from entering judgment for the full amount of
punitive damages found by the jury. We agree with the trial
court that, on this record, $10 million in punitive damages
would violate defendants’ due process rights. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
We state the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiff because he was the prevailing party before the jury.
Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber Mills, Inc., 349 Or 526, 528, 246
P3d 1121 (2011). At the time of his injury, in February 2016,
plaintiff was 47 years old. He lived an active lifestyle, work
ing as a high school baseball coach and running an after-
school sports program for children. He was living in an
apartment complex owned and managed by defendants in
Portland, Oregon. One night, plaintiff was walking across
a second-story concrete walkway, connecting his apartment
building to a parking structure, when a portion of the con
crete gave way under his right foot, creating a hole in the
walkway of approximately nine by 18 inches. Plaintiff’s
right leg dropped into the hole up to his thigh, and he landed
in a sitting position on the walkway. His right knee was in
pain, but he was able to lift himself out of the hole and noti
fied apartment staff of the hazard.
The next day, plaintiff’s knee remained in pain and
was swollen. He went to the hospital and was instructed to
return if the swelling did not go down. In the weeks that
followed, the swelling did not go down, and the pain and
weakness in plaintiff’s knee prevented him from partici
pating in his normal activities. After five weeks without
improvement, plaintiff returned to the hospital. The doctor
diagnosed plaintiff with an acute meniscus tear in his right
knee, resulting from his fall at the apartment complex.
Plaintiff tried to improve his knee through phys
ical therapy and activity modification. But nearly a year
after the fall, his activities were still significantly limited
by knee weakness and instability. He was not able to coach
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
31
as he previously had, by demonstrating to the kids how to
perform certain actions, and he was no longer able to par
ticipate in many of the sports programs that he was tasked
with running.
Plaintiff then underwent surgery to repair the
injury to his knee, participated in physical therapy, and
exercised his knee to improve strength and stability. By the
time of trial, in May 2018, plaintiff had largely been able
to return to his normal activities, but he still experienced
lingering pain and weakness in his knee when engaging in
more strenuous physical activities. His coaching career path
had been disrupted. And, according to plaintiff’s doctor, the
surgery left plaintiff with an increased chance of developing
arthritis in his knee.
Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence and vio
lation of Oregon’s residential landlord-tenant laws, and he
sought economic damages of just over $45,000 plus noneco
nomic damages of $350,000. Plaintiff also obtained leave to
amend his complaint to add a claim for punitive damages
against each defendant in the amount of $10 million. See
ORS 31.725 (describing process for pleading a request for
punitive damages).
At trial, both defendants admitted that they had
negligently maintained the walkway through which plaintiff
fell and that they had violated the obligations of a landlord
under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act. Specifically,
defendants admitted that they were negligent in failing to
properly repair or replace cracked concrete on the walkway,
in patching the walkway in a manner that was insufficient
to withstand the weight of a pedestrian, and in failing to
warn plaintiff of the defect in the walkway. Defendants,
however, disputed the extent of damages that plaintiff suf
fered as a result of the incident and specifically denied the
claim for punitive damages.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, defendants
moved for dismissal of the claim for punitive damages, argu
ing that the evidence was insufficient to support a punitive
damage award. By statute, punitive damages are unavail
able “unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
32
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
that the party against whom punitive damages are sought
has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outra
geous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm
and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health,
safety and welfare of others.” ORS 31.730(1). The trial court
rejected defendants’ arguments and denied their motion.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury was instructed
on the proof required for it to award punitive damages and
on how to determine the amount for each defendant, if it
decided to award punitive damages. Those instructions
included that the jury should consider “separately for each
[d]efendant”:
“(a) How reprehensible was that defendant’s conduct, con
sidering the nature of that conduct and the defendant’s
motive?
“(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the amount
of punitive damages and plaintiff’s harm? [and]
“(c) In view of that defendant’s financial condition, what
amount is necessary to punish them and discourage future
wrongful conduct?”
The jury also was instructed that it “may not punish a defen
dant merely because a defendant has substantial financial
resources” and that it could “not award punitive damages to
punish the defendant for harm caused to persons other than
the plaintiff,” but that evidence “of harm suffered by persons
other than the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s con
duct” could “be considered in evaluating the reprehensibility
of defendant’s conduct.”
After deliberating, the jury found that defendants’
conduct caused plaintiff to suffer $45,597.06 in economic
damages for medical expenses (the full amount sought) and
$250,000.00 in noneconomic damages for pain and emo
tional distress. The jury also found that plaintiff had proved
that both defendants had engaged in conduct that met the
statutory standard for punitive damages and awarded $10
million in punitive damages against each defendant.
Following the jury’s verdict, defendants asked the
trial court to reduce the jury’s punitive damages award, argu
ing that the amount set by the jury was “grossly excessive”
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
33
and would violate defendants’ rights under the Due Process
Clause. The trial court agreed. The trial court concluded
that, under the case law of this court and the United States
Supreme Court, a punitive damages award that exceeds
compensatory damages by a double-digit ratio will violate
due process except in exceptional circumstances. Here, the
amount of punitive damages that the jury assessed against
each defendant was 33 times more than the amount that the
jury found to be plaintiff’s damages for the harm that he
suffered, and the trial court concluded that the facts did not
present the type of exceptional circumstances that would
justify such a disparity. The trial court concluded that the
maximum constitutionally permissible amount of punitive
damages for each defendant on this record was nine times
the actual damages awarded by the jury—$2,660,373.54—
and, accordingly reduced the punitive damages against each
defendant to that amount.
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order reducing
the punitive damages award, and defendants cross-appealed,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support any
amount of punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s judgment without opinion. Trebelhorn
v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, 316 Or App 577, 500 P3d
675 (2021). Plaintiff filed a petition for review in this court,
which we allowed.
II. ANALYSIS
As indicated above, plaintiff urges this court to
conclude that the Due Process Clause requires no reduction
of the punitive damages in this case. Pointing primarily
to what he contends was extremely reprehensible conduct,
plaintiff asks that we reinstate the $10 million in punitive
damages that the jury assessed against each defendant.
Plaintiff does not separately argue that, if due process
requires a reduction of the punitive damages verdict, the
trial court nevertheless reduced the award more than due
process requires. And defendants simply urge us to affirm
the reduced amount of punitive damages imposed by the
trial court; in this court, they do not dispute that the evi
dence permitted the jury to award punitive damages, and
they do not contend that the reduced amount imposed by
34
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
the trial court is constitutionally excessive given the record
in this case. Thus, the single question before us is whether
the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
$10 million in punitive damages exceeds the amount that
the Due Process Clause permits in this case.1
The question of whether a jury’s punitive damages
award is constitutionally excessive is entirely governed by
federal law because there is “no state law excessiveness chal
lenge under the Oregon Constitution.”2 Goddard v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 344 Or 232, 256, 179 P3d 645 (2008) (internal quo
tation marks omitted). Indeed, under Oregon law, the jury’s
assessment of punitive damages is a determination of fact
subject to the prohibition in Article VII (Amended), section 3
of the Oregon Constitution that “no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state.”
DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or 425, 447, 51 P3d 1232 (2002).
That uniquely Oregon prohibition must yield, however, to
the prohibition of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against arbitrary deprivations of liberty or
property. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 US 415, 434-35, 114
S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336 (1994). The Due Process Clause
prohibits states from imposing “grossly excessive” punitive
damages awards.3 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
1 In the course of responding to plaintiff’s arguments, defendants suggest
that the appropriate punitive damages amount for purposes of our due process
analysis inquiry might be $20 million in punitive damages (combining the $10
million that the jury assessed against each defendant). But defendants do not
develop a due process argument for that approach and, in any event, do not ask
us to correct any aspect of the trial court’s due process analysis. Thus, we assume
that the trial court correctly framed the due process inquiry as whether $10 mil
lion in punitive damages against either defendant is constitutionally excessive
given the record of harm that plaintiff suffered.
2 Oregon statutes impose limits on the imposition of punitive damages that
are not in dispute in this case. Specifically, ORS 31.730(1) provides that “[p]uni
tive damages are not recoverable in a civil action unless it is proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages are sought
has acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a
highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference
to the health, safety and welfare of others.” And ORS 31.735(1) provides that
70 percent of any assessment of punitive damages is payable to the Attorney
General—60 percent “for deposit in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account
of the Department of Justice Crime Victims’ Assistance Section” and 10 percent
“for deposit in the State Court Facilities and Security Account.”
3 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in rel
evant part, that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
35
Campbell, 538 US 408, 416, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L Ed 2d 585
(2003).4
A. Framework and Standard of Review
We have previously emphasized that “
‘[s]tates nec
essarily have considerable flexibility in determining the
level of punitive damages that they will allow,’
” and the Due
Process Clause permits states to impose punitive damages
in amounts that are “
‘reasonably necessary to vindicate the
State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.’
”
Hamlin, 349 Or at 533 (quoting BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 568, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d
809 (1996)). Thus, “[o]nly when an award can fairly be cat
egorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to these interests
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hamlin, 349
Or at 533 (quoting Gore, 517 US at 568).
There is no easy answer to whether a particular
award of punitive damages is “grossly excessive.” Indeed,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused “to set any
‘rigid benchmark’ beyond which a punitive damages award
becomes unconstitutional.” Hamlin, 349 Or at 533 (cit
ing Campbell, 538 US at 424-25 and Gore, 517 US at 582).
Instead, the Supreme Court has required courts to consider
three “guideposts” when reviewing whether a punitive dam
ages award is “grossly excessive”: “
‘(1) the degree of repre
hensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity
[or ratio] between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in compa
rable cases.’
” Id. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 US at 575). And the
Court has required appellate courts to consider those guide
posts without any deference to the determinations of the
trial court, in order to “ensure[
] that an award of punitive
damages is based upon an application of law, rather than a
4 Campbell is the most recent Supreme Court decision to consider whether a
punitive damages award was “grossly excessive” in violation of the Due Process
Clause, but this court has subsequently examined that question on multiple
occasions. Thus, we rely significantly on those more recent Oregon decisions to
explain the governing law.
36
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
decisionmaker’s caprice.” Campbell, 538 US at 418 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In determining the factual predicate for the award
of punitive damages, we view “the evidence in the record
that is relevant to [the] award in the light most favorable
to the party who won the award.” Goddard, 344 Or at 261;
see also Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or 537, 556, 17
P3d 473 (2001) (court views the historical facts “in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict if there is evidence in the
record to support them”). But whether a particular punitive
damages award is grossly excessive is a question that we
resolve by employing “the applicable legal criteria (including
the three Gore guideposts) to determine if, as a matter of
law, the jury’s punitive damages award is grossly excessive.”
Goddard, 344 Or at 263; see also Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 US 424, 437, 121 S Ct
1678, 149 L Ed 2d 674 (2001) (emphasizing that, under fed
eral due process principles, “the level of punitive damages
is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, in determining whether a particular
punitive damages award is grossly excessive, we “must in
some sense reexamine the evidence in the record—not to
redecide the historical facts as decided by the jury, but to
decide where, for purposes of the [three] guideposts, the con
duct at issue falls on the scale of conduct that does or might
warrant imposition of punitive damages.” Goddard, 344 Or
at 262.
B. Guidepost Analysis
Our analysis, therefore, is framed around the three
guideposts that the Supreme Court has identified: repre
hensibility, ratio, and civil penalties. We begin by assess
ing each guidepost separately, based on “the historical facts
that a rational juror could find, based on the evidence in the
record,” and then consider the guideposts together in deter
mining whether the punitive damages imposed by the jury
was “grossly excessive.” See Goddard, 344 Or at 262.
1. Reprehensibility guidepost
The degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s con
duct is “[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
37
of a punitive damages award.” Campbell, 538 US at 419
(quoting Gore, 517 US at 575). The Supreme Court has spe
cifically identified five factors to consider in assessing the
degree of reprehensibility: whether “the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic; [whether] the tortious con
duct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; [whether] the target of the conduct
had financial vulnerability; [whether] the conduct involved
repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and [whether]
the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit, or mere accident.” Id. Before analyzing those repre
hensibility factors, we describe the historical facts related
to reprehensibility that a rational jury could find and the
reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from that
evidence.
a. Historical facts related to reprehensibility
The hole that formed in the elevated walkway as
plaintiff walked across it occurred because defendants had
ignored the safety risks posed by the failing staircases and
walkways at their property. The property consists of two
adjacent apartment complexes known as Wimbledon Square
and Wimbledon Gardens. The two complexes were built in
the 1970s and, between them, consist of nearly 600 apart
ment units in 72 buildings that are two- to three-stories
high.
The apartments above the first floor are accessed
through exterior staircases and elevated walkways con
necting the buildings. Those staircases and walkways were
originally constructed by pouring concrete over untreated
wooden posts and beams. Over the years, the concrete would
settle and wear, leading to cracks that allowed water to enter
those structures. The water rotted the untreated wooden
posts and beams, compromising the structural integrity of
the staircases and walkways, as well as the railings that
are intended to prevent people from falling over the sides of
the staircases and walkways.
Defendant Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, purchased
Wimbledon Square in the early 2000s and, soon after,
acquired Wimbledon Gardens. Prime Wimbledon SPE,
38
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
LLC, as the owner of the properties, contracted with defen
dant Prime Administration, which provides management
services, to run the day-to-day operations at the properties,
including maintenance. The maintenance staff had a yearly
maintenance budget, but expenses of more than $5,000
required management approval. And larger maintenance
projects would be budgeted annually by ownership and
management.
The record contains no evidence prior to 2011 of
whether defendants knew of potential risks posed by struc
turally compromised staircases, walkways, and handrails,
or whether they took steps to address the structurally com
promised conditions. In 2011, defendants brought in a con
tractor to submit bids to repair some of the staircases and
walkways. That contractor later testified that many stair
cases and walkways needed immediate repair due to dry rot
and that he had never seen dilapidation at that scale before.
Although the contractor submitted bids, defendants did not
hire him to repair the rotted structures.
Instead, defendants hired another contractor,
Larsen, to replace a few landings in 2012 and 2013. Those
projects revealed some rotted structures in the staircases,
raising concerns among Prime Administration, employees
that there was severe dry rot in similar structures through
out the property. Employees were concerned that, if the prob
lems were not fixed, then someone could fall from a walkway
or balcony and get seriously injured or die. Employees tes
tified that Prime Administration’s management was aware
of the risks but did not take them seriously. For example,
the onsite regional manager avoided a certain route to her
office because it required crossing an uneven walkway that
she joked might collapse. Prime Administration’s chief oper
ating officer joked that the property was so dilapidated that
they should just burn it down.
Larsen assessed the entire property to identify
needed repairs in 2014 and 2015, often accompanied by
onsite maintenance staff and members of the upper man
agement who were involved in developing the maintenance
budget—namely, Prime Administration’s vice president of
capital and regional maintenance supervisor. According to
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
39
Larsen, “[t]here were a lot of areas that needed to be fixed,
more than about any other property that I can recall looking
at.” He put together a spreadsheet consisting of hundreds
of items that needed repairs, including about $750,000 in
repairs to address “life safety” issues. According to Larsen,
“life safety” issues referred to staircases, balconies, land
ings, railings, and elevated walkways that were structur
ally compromised because a collapse of those structures
“would cause life-or-death injury.” The items covered by
the $750,000 proposal addressed only those structures that
could be identified as compromised before beginning the
repairs. Larsen was certain that they would discover more
rotted areas by opening up the concrete.
One of the areas that Larsen specifically identi
fied as needing repairs was the elevated walkway where
plaintiff was later injured. Concrete on the walkway was
visibly cracked, and there was an area of one- to two-inch
depression—like a puddle in the concrete—that was covered
with a skim-coat of patching material. Those changes to the
concrete indicated that the structural components of the
walkway had been compromised. Indeed, when the concrete
was removed from that walkway after plaintiff’s injury, it
showed that the wood joists underneath were “very rotten”
and had been “for quite some time.” The joists were covered
by plywood with the concrete on top, and the weight of the
concrete pushing down had caused compression of the “soft,
wet wood” below.
Identifying and restoring all the compromised
staircases and walkways would require expenditures well
beyond the normal maintenance budget, necessitating
approval from both management and ownership. Larsen’s
proposal was sent to management and ownership as part
of the 2015 budgeting process. But defendants rejected
most of Larsen’s proposed “life safety” repairs. Rather than
spending the approximately $750,000 that Larsen recom
mended for repairs to resolve the “life safety” issues, defen
dants spent about $225,000 on “life safety” issues and spent
another $225,000 on non-”life safety” issues, such as replac
ing trim and siding. The only reason defendants gave for
40
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
rejecting the proposal to address all “life safety” repairs was
that the $750,000 cost “was too much.”
Although Larsen was directed to replace some of
the rotted structures, for others, he was directed to perform
superficial repairs that he did not think were adequate to
make the structures safe, such as fabricating brackets for
the top of rotted posts that supported some walkways. That
direction came from Prime Administration’s vice president
of capital. According to Larsen, those repairs were simply
a “Band-Aid” that would provide support for “a year or two,
maybe five. You never know.” But, because the rot remained,
it would continue to grow and eventually compromise the
bracketed posts.
Other items identified as posing “life safety” risks
did not even receive those superficial fixes. Prime
Administration management instead directed staff to paint
over rotted wood and rusted metal brackets supporting the
staircases, walkways, and handrails. Although painting
over rotted wood makes the wood appear to be in sound con
dition, it accelerates the rate of deterioration by trapping
moisture inside the wood. The walkway where plaintiff was
later injured was among the proposed “life safety” repairs
that defendants did not make. The regional maintenance
supervisor instructed onsite maintenance staff to put a
skim coat of concrete over the crack in that walkway. That
made the walkway look better, but it did nothing to address
the structural deterioration that was causing the walkway
to sag.
Maintenance staff stated that management con
sistently preferred putting cheap “Band-Aids” on a prob
lem rather than fixing it, including after plaintiff’s injury.
Maintenance staff indicated that management did not
provide them with the resources to properly fix problems.
Instead of addressing the underlying safety risks, the
regional manager directed leasing agents to take prospec
tive tenants along certain pathways to avoid dilapidated
areas. The onsite maintenance manager left shortly after
plaintiff’s injury because he was tired of “constantly having
to fight to try to get things fixed between upper manage
ment.” The next onsite maintenance manager encountered
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
41
the same resistance. He sent an email to management in
March 2017 raising what he considered to be urgent safety
concerns at the property—namely, a sagging elevated walk
way that was pulling away from the building. He was rep
rimanded by the regional supervisor for making an email
record of the safety problems. Later that year, the mainte
nance manager was a second victim of deteriorating condi
tions at the complex. Approximately a year after plaintiff’s
injury, the manager injured his back when a deteriorated
concrete stair tread broke when he stepped on it.
In 2017, plaintiff described his injury to an acquain
tance who worked as a fire code inspector. Concerned about
potential fire code violations, the inspector examined the 58
buildings at Wimbledon Square. The inspector identified
cracked concrete stairs, sagging elevated walkways, loose
railings, and risers on staircases that were rusted or affixed
to rotted wood. A maintenance staff member showed the fire
inspector a rotted wooden beam that was supporting two
stories of elevated walkways. The beam was so rotted that
the staff person could push a pin through it. Each of those
problems posed risks to tenants attempting to exit the prop
erty in an emergency. The fire inspector testified that he had
never seen an occupied building in worse or more dangerous
condition. The inspector cited defendants for code violations
at each of the 58 buildings, requiring defendants to “repair
loose or broken walkways, staircases, stairs, and railings in
the exit path.”
In preparation for trial, plaintiff hired a building
code expert with 35 years’ experience, who examined the
property in 2018. When asked about the structural integ
rity of the staircases, railings, and elevated walkways, he
testified:
“This is probably the worst multifamily or occupancy build
ing I have ever seen, as far as the means of egress go in
regards to the stairs, the balconies. I just have not seen any
worse. I have seen one small area as bad as many of the
areas are in this case, but never a totality of dilapidation
and rot that I’ve seen at this building’s property.”
He pointed to numerous examples of unsafe stair
cases and walkways, including unsafe conditions that resulted
42
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
from the cheap fixes that defendants had carried out. He
cited many places where staff had painted over dry rot and
rusted metal fasteners and said that it would take many
years of neglect to accumulate the amount of dry rot and
corrosion that he saw at the property. He testified that there
was “imminent danger” in many places at the property, it
was one of the “most dangerous” residential properties he
had seen in commercial use, and he did not believe that it
was “safe for occupancy.”
b. The degree of reprehensibility
According to plaintiff, we should conclude that
defendants’ conduct falls “at the extreme end” of each of
the factors that the Supreme Court has instructed us to
consider in assessing the reprehensibility of a defendants’
conduct. We agree that the evidence permitted the jury to
draw factual inferences favorable to plaintiff with respect
to at least four of the factors: “the harm caused was phys
ical as opposed to economic”; defendants’ “conduct evinced
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others” and “involved repeated actions”; and the
harm that plaintiff suffered “was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit.”5 Moreover, viewing the historical
facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a rational juror
could draw reasonable inferences with respect to those fac
tors that place the conduct of both defendants at the high
end of reprehensible conduct that a state may punish. But,
as we will explain, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s asser
tion that defendants’ conduct falls at the “extreme end” of
the range of reprehensible conduct that justifies punitive
damages of the magnitude found by the jury.
There is no dispute that defendants caused plain
tiff to suffer physical harm. And, given the jury instructions
and verdict form, we know that the jury found that each
defendant at least had “shown a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and ha[d]
5 Plaintiff contends that defendants’ tenants were financially vulnerable
“because all were in low-income housing” and at risk of becoming homeless.
Although defendants insist that no evidence supports those assertions, and we
are inclined to agree, our assessment of reprehensibility does not ultimately turn
on plaintiff’s failure to identify the evidence that would permit a reasonable
inference that defendants’ tenants were financially vulnerable.
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
43
acted with a conscious indifference to the health, safety and
welfare of others.” See ORS 31.730 (describing statutory
standard for recovery of punitive damages in a civil action).
That statutory threshold for awarding any punitive damages
describes conduct that is well onto the scale of reprehensible
conduct that a state may punish. See Campbell, 538 US at
419 (explaining that whether conduct “evinced an indiffer
ence to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of oth
ers” informs the degree of reprehensibility of that conduct
(emphasis added)). And, viewing the historical facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, a rational juror would have
no difficulty finding that the conduct of both defendants rose
to that level—as the trial court concluded.
Moreover, the jury could find that defendants were
aware, for at least five years prior to plaintiff’s injury, that
structurally compromised stairs, balconies, and elevated
walkways pervaded the complex and posed a risk of serious
physical injury if not death to the tenants and others using
the complex. The jury could find that defendants consciously
rejected needed repairs to many of the deteriorated struc
tures, including the walkway on which plaintiff was injured.
And the jury could find that defendants’ tortious conduct put
at risk many hundreds of people who lived in the apartment
complex over the years, in addition to those who visited, and
caused actual injury to a second person after plaintiff was
injured. In fact, the jury could find that defendants contin
ued to reject performing other needed repairs for more than
a year after plaintiff’s injury, leading to a second injury. That
actual and threatened harm to others is expressly relevant
to our assessment of the degree to which defendants’ conduct
was reprehensible. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
US 346, 357, 127 S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed 2d 940 (2007) (empha
sizing that, although “the Due Process Clause prohibits a
State’s inflicting punishment for harm caused strangers to
the litigation, *
*
* conduct that risks harm to many is likely
more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a
few” and that “a jury consequently may take this fact into
account in determining reprehensibility”); see also Williams
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 340 Or 35, 55, 127 P3d 1165 (2006),
vac’d on other grounds, 549 US 346, 127 S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed
2d 940 (2007), on remand, 344 Or 45, 176 P3d 1255 (2008)
44
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
(explaining that the jury, “in assessing the reprehensibility
of [the defendant’s] actions, could consider evidence of simi
lar harm to other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the
same conduct”). And the jury could further infer from that
evidence that defendants’ decision not to address the dete
rioration of the walkway on which plaintiff was injured was
part of a repeated pattern.
A rational jury also could reasonably infer that the
harm that plaintiff suffered “was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit.” From the evidence described
above, the jury could find that defendants covered up defects
to make the structures appear safe to current and prospec
tive tenants even though they knew that the defects actually
posed an unreasonable “life safety” risk. Indeed, according
to one of defendants’ maintenance supervisors, “fresh paint
over rotting wood” was “the Wimbledon Way.”
And a rational jury could find that defendants were
motivated to disguise, rather than repair, the deteriora
tion, because they put their profits ahead of the safety of
the residents, believing that the misconduct would not be
discovered. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[a]ction
taken or omitted in order to augment profit represents an
enhanced degree of punishable culpability.” Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 554 US 471, 494, 128 S Ct 2605, 171 L Ed 2d
570 (2008).
Finally, we highlight defendants’ admission that
the condition of its walkway violated the Oregon Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act. See ORS 90.730(6)(a) (specifying that
a “common area is considered unhabitable if it substan
tially lacks,” among other things, “[b]uildings, grounds and
appurtenances that are kept in every part safe for normal
and reasonably foreseeable uses”). As we have previously
concluded, “the Oregon legislature’s affirmative action to
protect qualitatively similar state interests permits us to
consider defendant’s statutory violation in our reprehensi
bility analysis.” Hamlin, 349 Or at 541; see also Gore, 517 US
at 576-77 (explaining that “evidence that a defendant has
repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing
or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
45
support for an argument that strong medicine is required to
cure the defendant’s disrespect for the law”).
In sum, the evidence permitted the jury to draw
reasonable inferences about defendants’ conduct that sug
gest a high degree of reprehensibility. That conclusion “does
not generate numerical answers at all, because the [repre
hensibility] guidepost itself, and the ‘subfactors’ that go into
it, are all qualitative, not quantitative.” Goddard, 344 Or
at 257. But we have emphasized that it can be helpful to
“compare the level of reprehensibility exhibited in various
cases, and that comparison may lead us to a conclusion that
the constitutionally permissible limit in a particular case is
‘high’ or ‘low,’ relative to the limit in another case.” Id. Thus,
although the scale of reprehensible conduct is not exclusively
defined by a comparison to past cases, those cases nonethe
less provide useful guidance.
At the most extreme end of the range of reprehen
sible conduct exhibited by defendants in our punitive dam
ages cases is the conduct of the cigarette manufacturer
Philip Morris, which the jury in Williams found liable for
the wrongful death of a smoker. In that case, the jury found
$821,485.50 in economic and noneconomic damages, and
this court affirmed a $79.5 million punitive damages award
as constitutionally permissible based largely on the repre
hensibility of the defendant’s conduct. Williams, 340 Or at
44, 63-64. In upholding the amount as within constitutional
limits, we emphasized that “there can be no dispute that [the
defendant’s] conduct was extraordinarily reprehensible.” Id.
at 55. As we described, the defendant “knew that smoking
caused serious and sometimes fatal disease, but it never
theless spread false or misleading information to suggest to
the public that doubts remained about that issue.” Id. The
defendant had “engaged in a massive, continuous, near-half-
century scheme to defraud the plaintiff and many others,”
even though it “always had reason to suspect—and for two or
more decades absolutely knew—that the scheme was dam
aging the health of a very large group of Oregonians—the
smoking public—and was killing a number of that group.”
340 Or at 63; see also id. at 55 (noting that the defendant’s
46
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
“deceit thus would, naturally and inevitably, lead to signifi
cant injury or death”).6
For cases involving harm to a person, however,
the exercise of comparing to other cases is of limited value,
because Williams provides the only relevant reference point
on the scale. Every other case from this court and every
case from the Supreme Court has addressed reprehensi
bility in the context of conduct that caused only economic
harm. Given the significance that the Court has placed on
the distinction between reprehensible conduct that causes
“physical as opposed to economic” harm, a comparison to
those cases tells us that defendants’ conduct was signifi
cantly more reprehensible and could justify a more signif
icant amount of punitive damages. See, e.g., Goddard, 344
Or at 260 (emphasizing that “reprehensibility depends, to a
large degree, on whether the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
On the other hand, a comparison to Williams tells
us that this case does not fall at the extreme end of repre
hensible conduct for which the state may impose punitive
damages. Two significant differences between the evidence
here and the evidence in Williams require a conclusion that
defendants’ conduct is less reprehensible than the “extraor
dinarily reprehensible” conduct that allowed us to justify
the award in Williams. First, although defendant’s repre
hensible conduct was more than an isolated occurrence, the
earliest indication that defendants were aware of the need
for “life safety” repairs was 2011—five years prior to plain
tiff’s injury. Second, although defendants acted with indif
ference to the risk of life-threatening harm to their tenants,
there is no evidence that defendants’ conduct had caused
6 The Supreme Court later vacated our first Williams decision based on its
concern that the jury may have punished the defendant for harm that its mis
conduct had caused to strangers to the litigation. Philip Morris, 549 US at 357.
The Court explained that, although the jury may consider the risk of harm to
others when determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, it may
not punish the defendant for harm caused to others. Id. But the Court declined to
consider whether the award in Williams was “grossly excessive.” Id. at 358. And
this court on remand adhered to its original decision. Williams v. Philip Morris
Inc., 344 Or 45, 61, 176 P3d 1255 (2008), cert dismissed 556 US 178 (2009). We
therefore treat our reasoning and conclusions in our original Williams decision as
approved of in the remand decision.
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
47
actual harm prior to plaintiff’s injury and no evidence that
it caused life-threatening harm at any point. Thus, the
degree of reprehensibility in this case is not comparable to
the “extraordinarily reprehensible” conduct of the defendant
in Williams. See 340 Or at 63 (explaining that, “for two or
more decades [the defendant] absolutely knew” that its rep
rehensible conduct “was damaging the health of a very large
group of Oregonians—the smoking public—and was killing
a number of that group”). As indicated above, however, the
degree of reprehensibility is high and, accordingly, the con
stitutionally permissible amount of punitive damages also
is high. Goddard, 344 Or at 259.
2. Ratio guidepost
The next guidepost that the Supreme Court has
directed us to consider is the “disparity between the actual
or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award.” Campbell, 538 US at 418. Although the
Supreme Court has “consistently rejected the notion that
the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical
formula,” Gore, 517 US at 582, the so-called “disparity,” or
“ratio,” guidepost “comes closest to providing numerical lim
its.” Goddard, 344 Or at 257. That is because the Supreme
Court has, “at various times, alluded to specific numerical
ratios” that provide a place to start. Id. at 257-58. For exam
ple, in one early case involving purely economic harm, the
court concluded that a four-to-one ratio might be “
‘close to
the line,’ [but that] it did not ‘cross the line into the area
of constitutional impropriety.’
” Gore, 517 US at 581 (quot
ing Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1,
23-24, 111 S Ct 1032, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991)). In another early
case, the Court upheld an award of punitive damages where
the “relevant ratio” between punitive damages and poten
tial economic harm from the defendant’s conduct “was not
more than 10 to 1.” Id. (describing TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443, 462, 113 S Ct 2711,
125 L Ed 2d 366 (1993)). But the Court in Gore readily con
cluded that due process precluded the jury’s finding of puni
tive damages that was “a breathtaking” 500 times greater
than the fraudulently caused economic harm that the
defendant caused by selling the plaintiff a new car without
48
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
disclosing that the car had been repainted. Id. at 583, 585-
86. Goddard drew from those cases “a very general rule of
thumb” that “the federal constitution prohibits any punitive
damages award that significantly exceeds four times the
amount of the injured party’s compensatory damages, as
long as the injuries caused by the defendant were economic,
not physical.” 344 Or at 260.
As indicated above, the Court has yet to consider
a due process challenge to punitive damages in the context
of reprehensible conduct that causes physical harm, but
the Court has said that, “in practice, few awards exceed
ing a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”
Campbell, 538 US at 425. The Court later characterized that
holding of Campbell as meaning that “a single-digit maxi
mum is appropriate in all but the most exceptional of cases,”
albeit in the context of deciding a case that did not turn on
the due process limitation on an award of punitive damages.
Exxon Shipping, 554 US at 514-15; see Goddard, 344 Or at
275 (“Campbell suggests that, except in extraordinary cir
cumstances, a punitive damages award that is more than
nine times the amount awarded in compensatory damages
violates due process, no matter what the tort.”).
That is the guidance that the trial court followed in
this case. As noted above, the trial court concluded that $10
million in punitive damages was grossly excessive. The trial
court arrived at that conclusion by comparing the amount of
punitive damages that the jury imposed against each defen
dant to the actual damages that the jury awarded—a ratio
of 33 to one—and determining that the facts did not present
the type of exceptional circumstances to justify that dispar
ity. The court concluded that, on this record, due process
required the court to limit punitive damages to an amount
nine times more than the damages that the jury awarded
for plaintiff’s actual harm.
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in calculat
ing the ratio under the second guidepost because it failed to
account for the potential harm to plaintiff. In argument to
the trial court, plaintiff cited the testimony of Larsen—the
contractor that defendants hired to make repairs in 2012
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
49
and 2013—as permitting an inference that the walkway on
which plaintiff was injured, like the other walkways through
out the complex, had deteriorated to a condition that pre
sented “life safety issues.” He also insisted that there was no
need for evidence of how he potentially could have suffered
greater harm because “that’s nothing for the jury to decide.”
Instead, he contended that “the Court is invited, in its wis
dom, to take a look at how dangerous this thing was” and
conclude that the potential harm could have included death
or paralysis. In briefing to this court, plaintiff repeats his
argument that the relevant ratio should reflect the poten
tial “that plaintiff could easily have sustained catastrophic
injuries from a fall through a second-story walkway.” Citing
appellate cases involving jury awards of “many millions of
dollars” for catastrophic injuries, plaintiff urges this court
to conclude that his “potential harm” falls in that range.
And he emphasizes that a ratio that takes into account mil
lions of dollars in potential harm would be “vastly reduced”
compared to the ratio that the trial court calculated.
Defendants insist, however, that the trial court cor
rectly compared the punitive damages only to the amount
of compensatory damages that the jury actually awarded in
this case. They contend that plaintiff “misconceives” the law
of “potential harm” in seeking to compare punitive damages
to harm from injuries that plaintiff “did not suffer at all (but
could have).” Defendants also insist that, even if potential
harm can be based on injuries that plaintiff did not actu
ally suffer, potential harm must be based on the record,
not merely what a reviewing court can conceive of. And the
record here, they contend, requires us to reject plaintiff’s
potential harm argument because there was no jury finding
or instruction on potential harm and no evidentiary basis
for plaintiff’s “catastrophic injury” theory of potential harm.
As we will explain, we agree with plaintiff that it
generally is appropriate to compare the amount of punitive
damages to the actual and potential harm to the plain
tiff, even if that produces a number that is substantially
greater than the amount of damages that the jury actually
awarded. But we agree with defendant that the extent of
potential harm to a plaintiff is a fact that must be based
50
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
on permissible inferences from the evidence. And poten
tial harm must be closely related to the harm that actually
occurred, rather than an alternative injury scenario that is
merely conceivable. Ultimately, we also agree with defen
dants that, on this record, there is no basis to infer that the
possibility of plaintiff suffering a catastrophic injury was
more than merely a conceivable alternative scenario. For
that reason, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
using the jury’s determination of actual damages to evalu
ate the ratio guidepost.
a. Potential harm in the ratio in general
Although short-hand descriptions of the ratio guide-
post sometimes describe a comparison between the puni
tive damages and the “compensatory damages,” which rep
resent the actual harm to a plaintiff, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the relevant constitutional
comparison focuses on “the disparity between the actual
or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the puni
tive damages award.” Campbell, 538 US at 418 (emphasis
added); see also TXO, 509 US at 460 (explaining that the
Court had “eschewed an approach that concentrates entirely
on the relationship between actual and punitive damages”
and that “[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude of
the potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have
caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had suc
ceeded” (emphasis added)); Hamlin, 349 Or at 534 (“[T]he
Supreme Court has suggested that reviewing courts may
consider not only the compensatory damages awarded
by the jury, but also the potential harm that could have
resulted from the defendant’s acts.”). We emphasized in
Goddard that, “[b]y permitting a punitive damages award
to be a multiple of ‘potential harm,’ the Court [in Campbell
and Gore] demonstrated that the punitive damages award is
not limited to some multiple of the compensatory damages
actually awarded by the trial court.” 344 Or at 269.
Defendants, nevertheless, cite this court’s decision
in Goddard for the proposition that “the correct amount to
use in calculating the maximum constitutionally permis
sible punitive damages award under Oregon law” is the
amount of compensatory damages that the jury awarded
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
51
plaintiff. But our decision in Williams makes clear that,
under Oregon law as well as under federal law, the amount of
punitive damages can be compared to a plaintiff’s “potential
harm,” not just the amount of compensatory damages actu
ally awarded by the jury. There, we described Gore’s ratio
guidepost as requiring the court to compare a “numerator”
that “is fixed by the punitive damages award” to a “denomi
nator” that includes “not only the harm actually suffered by
[the] plaintiff, but also the potential harm to [the] plaintiff.”7
340 Or at 60. And in considering the size of the ratio, we
observed that the plaintiff’s decedent had died “shortly after
being diagnosed with cancer” and that, had he lived longer,
his “economic damages could easily have been 10 or more
times the amount awarded.” Id.
Goddard, on which defendants rely, did not change
that principle, although we recognize the potential confu
sion. In Goddard, the jury awarded $20 million in punitive
damages against an insurance company that had failed
to settle a wrongful death action against its insured. The
plaintiff argued that the punitive damages were not “grossly
excessive” if compared to what the plaintiff understood to be
“potential harm”—the amount of damages that the complaint
in the underlying wrongful death action had alleged against
the insured driver. This court rejected that view of “potential
harm” and announced, without elaboration, that the concept
of potential harm “has nothing to do with the amount that a
jury could conceivably have awarded to plaintiff.” 344 Or at
268 (emphasis in original). “Rather,” this court emphasized,
“the actual and potential harm suffered by a plaintiff is a
fact to be decided by the jury.” Id. at 268-69.
Defendants rely on Goddard’s reference to what a
jury “could conceivably have awarded” as meaning that the
ratio must compare the amount of punitive damages found
by the jury to the amount of compensatory damages that
the same jury actually awarded for the plaintiff’s actual
harm. But in context, our reference in Goddard to what “a
jury could conceivably have awarded” was a reference to the
7 As a mathematical concept, “numerator” and “denominator” generally refer
to the terms of a fraction. Although a ratio is sometimes expressed as a fraction,
we will refer to the relevant components as the “first term” (punitive damages)
and the “second term” (actual or potential harm) of the ratio.
52
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
jury in the underlying wrongful death action, which was
the source of the harm for which the plaintiff sought dam
ages against the insurer. And, although unexplained, our
statement that the amount alleged in the wrongful death
case was simply the amount that the jury in that case “could
conceivably have awarded” reflects the long-established
rule that the relevance of the amount alleged as damages
in a complaint is to provide notice to the defendant of the
maximum amount that could conceivably be awarded. See
ORCP 67 C (“A judgment for relief different in kind from or
exceeding the amount prayed for in the pleadings may not
be rendered unless reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard are given to any party against whom the judgment
is to be entered.”). Because “the actual and potential harm
suffered by a plaintiff is a fact to be decided by the jury,” like
all facts, “potential harm” must be based on more than the
mere assertions of counsel in a pleading. Thus, we disagree
with defendants here that the jury’s actual award of com
pensatory damages is “the correct amount to use in calcu
lating the maximum constitutionally permissible punitive
damages award under Oregon law.”
b. Potential harm as a fact
Goddard, however, presents a problem for plaintiff
for a different reason. As we emphasized, “the actual and
potential harm suffered by a plaintiff is a fact to be decided
by the jury.” 344 Or at 268-69. Identifying potential harm
as a fact to be decided by the jury means that the review
ing court is limited to considering the potential harm “that
a rational juror could find, based on the evidence in the
record.” Id. at 262; see also id. at 263 (describing the appli
cable standard of review for predicate facts relevant to the
three constitutionally prescribed guideposts). Consistent
with that principle, in the two cases in which this court or
the Supreme Court has upheld a punitive damages award
based on “potential harm,” the evidence of what actually
occurred as a result of the wrongful conduct permitted a
reasonable inference that the harm to the plaintiff could
have been much worse.
The Supreme Court applied the concept of “poten
tial harm” in affirming the award of punitive damages
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
53
in TXO. There, the litigation involved allegations that
TXO was attempting to interfere with Alliance Resources
Corporation’s (Alliance) oil and gas development rights.
Alliance brought a slander of title claim to prevent the
interference from succeeding, and the jury found in favor of
Alliance, awarding $19,000 in compensatory damages and
$10 million in punitive damages. 509 US at 450-51. Although
the punitive damages award was 526 times greater than the
actual compensatory damages award, the Court neverthe
less rejected TXO’s constitutional challenge to the punitive
damages award. Id. at 459, 462.
A plurality of the Court specifically relied on the
potential harm that might have resulted had TXO succeeded
in its effort to deprive the plaintiff of development rights.
Id. at 462. After considering the parties’ arguments about
evidence in the record, including the full value of the rights
with which TXO attempted to interfere, a plurality of the
court reasoned that “the jury could well have believed” that
the amount potentially at stake was multiple millions of dol
lars. Id. at 461. As the plurality opinion explains, “[w]hile
petitioner stresses the shocking disparity between the
punitive award and the compensatory award, that shock
dissipates when one considers the potential loss to respon
dents, in terms of reduced or eliminated royalties payments,
had petitioner succeeded in its illicit scheme.” Id. at 462.8
Considering that potential harm, the plurality concluded
that “the disparity between the punitive award and the
potential harm” did not “jar one’s constitutional sensibili
ties.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
This court’s decision in Williams offers another
example of a record that provided a basis for including poten
tial harm in the ratio that we consider under the second
guidepost. 340 Or at 60. In Williams, after emphasizing that
Campbell’s ratio takes into account “not only the harm actu
ally suffered by [the] plaintiff, but also the potential harm
8 At trial, Alliance had introduced evidence that “the anticipated gross rev
enues from oil and gas development—and therefore the amount of royalties that
TXO sought to renegotiate—were substantial.” 509 US at 450; see also id. at 450
n 10 (describing the detailed evidentiary record that Alliance created to support
its calculation of the size of the income stream for TXO if it succeeded in its effort
to acquire Alliance’s development rights).
54
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
to [the] plaintiff,” we reasoned that the “economic damages
could easily have been 10 or more times” the amount of eco
nomic damages that the plaintiff actually suffered had the
decedent “lived long enough to incur substantial medical
bills.” Id. In explaining that statement, we pointed to evi
dence that the decedent had “died shortly after being diag
nosed with cancer”—the disease caused by the defendant’s
wrongful conduct—and evidence of the amount of economic
damages incurred during the six months that the decedent
had lived. Id.
Thus, both TXO and Williams illustrate ways in
which evidence of the actual wrongful conduct and the
actual resulting harm support using a ratio that takes into
account potentially greater harm that the defendant’s con
duct could have caused to the plaintiff. In other words, both
cases illustrate applications of our holding in Goddard that
“the actual and potential harm suffered by a plaintiff is a
fact to be decided by the jury.” See 344 Or at 268-69. And we
do not question that holding. But neither TXO nor Williams
supports defendant’s suggestion that there must be an
express jury finding on “potential harm,” because neither
TXO nor Williams relied on an express jury finding regard
ing potential harm.9
c. Conceptual limits on what counts as “potential
harm”
The evidence of potentially greater harm to which
plaintiff has pointed is the testimony from the contrac
tor who repaired other walkways that had deteriorated to
the point that they were at risk of collapsing and causing
life-threatening injuries. We agree with plaintiff that the
evidence permits an inference that the walkway on which
plaintiff was injured also was deteriorated to the point that
9 The jury in this case was instructed that, in determining the amount of
punitive damages, it was to consider whether there was “a reasonable relation
ship between the amount of punitive damages and the plaintiff’s harm.” Although
defendants insist that plaintiff’s “potential harm” argument must fail because
the jury was not specifically instructed to consider “potential harm,” the concept
arguably was included within the unqualified reference to “plaintiff’s harm” in
the given instruction. Because we ultimately conclude that plaintiff’s argument
fails for other reasons, we leave for another day questions about the extent to
which either party must request a jury instruction on “potential harm.”
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
55
it was capable of collapsing and causing catastrophic injury.
But defendants insist that plaintiff’s theory of catastrophic
harm relies on an alternative injury scenario that is too dif
ferent from what actually occurred to constitute “potential
harm” for purposes of the ratio guidepost. We are persuaded
by defendants’ argument.
Although neither TXO nor Williams defines “poten
tial harm” or articulates a limitation on what the concept
includes, those and other cases make clear that there are
limitations. The first is that the ratio takes into account
only the potential harm to the plaintiff. Although harm (or
threatened harm) to others is relevant in assessing the rep
rehensibility of a defendant’s wrongful conduct, we empha
sized in Williams “that harm to others should not be con
sidered as part of the ratio guidepost.” 340 Or at 61 (citing
Campbell, 538 US at 426-27). Considering potential harm in
the context of what actually occurred keeps the focus on how
the defendant’s wrongful conduct has affected the plaintiff.
Another important limitation is described by our
emphasis in Goddard that the concept of potential harm
“has nothing to do with” harm that the plaintiff “conceivably”
could have incurred. We recognize that the line between
“potential harm” and harm that is merely conceivable could
be more clear. But both TXO and Williams illustrate poten
tial harm that was more than merely conceivable. Those
cases, thus, offer some guidance regarding what the concep
tual limit means. In both cases, the wrongful conduct set in
motion a chain of events that resulted in the actual harm to
the plaintiff—in TXO, conduct to cause the plaintiff to lose
development rights and, in Williams, conduct that caused
the decedent to smoke and develop lung cancer. And in both
cases, those actual events could have ended in far greater
harm to the plaintiff. As this court reasoned in Williams,
the decedent’s early death meant that “[o]nly chance saved
[the defendant] from” being liable for a much greater amount
of economic damages. 340 Or at 60.
In later describing TXO, the Supreme Court assigned
a label to the relationship between the actual events and the
potential harm, which informs our understanding of what
we may consider to be “potential harm.” According to the
56
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
Court in Gore, TXO endorses a ratio standard that consid
ers the “relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as
well as the harm that actually has occurred.” 517 US at 581
(emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
We do not understand the Court, in describing
potential harm as harm likely to result from the defendant’s
conduct, to mean that the potential harm must have been
more likely than not to result. Nothing in TXO’s discussion
of the potential harm to the plaintiff, if the defendant’s
attempted plan had succeeded, can be understood to sug
gest that the defendant’s success was more likely than the
actual result. But Gore directs us to understand “potential
harm” as “likely” under the circumstances.
The nature of the ratio guidepost suggests a related
conceptual limitation on harm that was “likely to result from
the defendant’s conduct.” As we discussed above, the ratio
of punitive damages to actual and potential harm is a sig
nificant indicator of whether the jury has found an amount
of punitive damages that is a constitutionally permissible
punishment. 372 Or at 46-47. The ratio “comes closest to
providing numerical limits,” Goddard, 344 Or at 257, and as
a practical matter, the ratio can easily be dispositive of the
due process inquiry. See Campbell, 538 US at 425. But that
significance is easily lost if the size of the ratio can be too
easily modified, such as by substituting alternative injury
scenarios that are too remote from what actually occurred to
the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.
To some extent, every consideration of “potential
harm” involves the proposition “if _____ had happened,
then plaintiff’s harm could have been greater.” Contrasting
Williams and TXO with Goddard tells us that, if the vari
ables that must be inserted to complete the proposition are
too attenuated from the evidence of what actually happened,
then the alternative harm is merely conceivable.
d. Application
That guidance persuades us that the possibility of
catastrophic injury that plaintiff identifies does not qualify
as “potential harm.” The evidence of what actually occurred
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
57
is that a portion of a second-story walkway gave way under
plaintiff’s right foot. Plaintiff describes the incident as his
foot “puncturing through” the walkway. And the record doc
uments a hole of approximately nine by 18 inches that was
open to the ground below and into which plaintiff’s leg slid
up to his thigh. The extent to which plaintiff suffered actual
harm as a result of that incident is established by the jury’s
findings regarding compensatory damages. And defendants
contend that the record permits no inference that cata
strophic injury, and much greater potential harm, was a
likely result. We agree with defendants that the evidence of
what actually occurred does not permit a reasonable infer
ence that plaintiff could have, instead, suffered catastrophic
injury.
It is possible to add variables to the “if _____ had
happened” proposition to create a scenario under which
plaintiff could have suffered a catastrophic injury. For
example, if the hole had been big enough for his body to fall
through, if—instead of punching through a hole—plaintiff’s
weight had triggered collapse of one of the cross-beams sup
porting a large section of the walkway, or if plaintiff had
fallen sideways toward the railing and the railing collapsed
under his weight, then plaintiff could have suffered a cata
strophic injury. But those scenarios are not what actually
happened to cause plaintiff’s injury. Larsen’s testimony, to
which plaintiff pointed, may have permitted an inference
that the wooden structures supporting the concrete had
deteriorated to such a degree that the walkway posed a risk
of collapsing under the weight of a person walking across
it, and causing catastrophic injury. There is no evidence,
however, that the catastrophic injury scenario that Larsen
described was any more likely to occur to plaintiff on the
night that his foot punched through the concrete than to
any other person walking across at any other time. And that
generic risk of catastrophic injury, if the walkway had failed
in an entirely different way than it failed on the night that
plaintiff was injured, depends on the kind of reasoning that
we rejected in Goddard. It depends on an alternative sce
nario that is conceivable but too remote from the evidence
of what actually happened for us to count it as “potential
harm” under the ratio guidepost.
58
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
We in no way discount the risk of catastrophic harm
that defendants’ conduct presented or the actual physical
and emotional harm that plaintiff experienced when his foot
punched through the walkway. But those are considerations
that the jury addresses in awarding actual damages and
in assessing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.
Thus, we understand that something different is meant by
the “potential harm” that we may use in calculating the
ratio. On this record, the trial court did not err in conclud
ing that there was no basis for adding catastrophic “poten
tial harm” to the ratio.
3. Comparable sanctions guidepost
The final guidepost instructs courts to consider “the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in compa
rable cases.” Campbell, 538 US at 418. As this court has pre
viously noted, “comparable sanctions suggest a legislative
determination about what constitutes an appropriate sanc
tion for the conduct” and “may give a defendant fair notice
of the penalties that the conduct may carry.” Williams, 340
Or at 57. In assessing comparable sanctions, we look at the
“relative severity of the comparable sanctions” to determine
the seriousness of the misconduct. Id. at 58. “The guidepost
may militate against a significant punitive damage award
if the state’s comparable sanctions are mild, trivial, or non
existent. However, the guidepost will support a more signif
icant punitive damage award when the state’s comparable
sanctions are severe.” Id.
Plaintiff primarily relies on evidence from the fire
inspector, who testified that he had the ability to “shut down”
an apartment complex if he determined that the condition
was “imminently dangerous” but that he generally does not
exercise that authority because doing so at a complex like
Wimbledon Square “would immediately displace hundreds
of families.” Given the 600 rental units at the complex, with
an average rent of $1,250, plaintiff argues that the “shut-
down sanction would presumably result in many millions of
dollars of lost rents.” Defendants do not dispute that a fire
inspector has the authority to “shut down” an “imminently
dangerous” apartment complex, and we agree with plaintiff
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
59
that the record permits factual inferences from which to
conclude that regulatory action to address the dangerous
condition could have cost defendants many millions of dol
lars of lost rents.
Although that consequence is not technically a
penalty for wrongful conduct, defendant also acknowledges
that the City of Portland could impose monthly enforcement
fees, totaling $643 per unit, for violating Portland’s property
maintenance regulations. Although defendant argues that
such a penalty militates against a significant punitive dam
ages award, we disagree. A fee of $643 per unit multiplied by
600 units easily could add up to multiple millions of dollars.
We therefore conclude that the “comparable sanctions are
severe” and support a significant punitive damages award.
See Williams, 340 Or at 58.
C. Final Considerations
Our final task is to determine, in light of the three
guideposts and other applicable legal criteria, whether the
$10 million in punitive damages that the jury assessed
against each defendant is grossly excessive in this case as
a matter of law. See Goddard, 344 Or at 262-63 (describing
that inquiry). We have concluded that two of the guideposts
that govern our due process review of the punitive dam
ages in this case—reprehensibility and comparable civil
sanctions—support a significant punitive damages award.
But the amount of punitive damages that the jury assessed
against each defendant exceeds the approximately $300,000
in actual compensatory damages by a ratio of 33:1. And we
have concluded that there is no evidentiary basis for increas
ing the second term of the ratio by inferring significantly
greater “potential harm” to plaintiff, so the relevant ratio
of punitive damages to the harm to plaintiff remains 33:1.
That disparity is dramatically greater than the “single-digit
ratio” that the Supreme Court has suggested is—“except
in extraordinary circumstances”—the limit of what due
process will permit, “no matter what the tort.” Id. at 275
(describing Campbell, 538 US at 425). Despite our obser
vation above that the Supreme Court’s general pronounce
ments about proportionality limits has never been tested
by a case involving wrongful harm to a person, the caution
60
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
best reflects that Court’s view of the due process limits on
a state’s interest in punishing and deterring reprehensible
conduct. Thus, as we acknowledged in Goddard, the second
guidepost “suggests that due process normally will not per
mit a punitive damages award in excess of a single-digit
ratio.” 344 Or at 259.
The qualifier regarding the ratio that due process
“normally will not permit,” of course, allows that there are
limited exceptions. See id. at 260-61 (allowing that, higher
ratios “might be appropriate in unusual circumstances”).
Goddard catalogs the “few narrow circumstances” in which
the Supreme Court or this court has held that due process
does not preclude a greater disparity in the magnitude of
punitive damage to harm: “(1) when a particularly egre
gious act causes only a small amount of economic injury; (2)
when the injury is hard to detect; (3) when it is difficult to
place a monetary value on noneconomic harms; and (4) when
‘extraordinarily reprehensible’ conduct—roughly comparable
to the defendant’s conduct in Williams—is involved.” Id. at
270. The four examples described in Goddard share a com
mon theme that, in those circumstances, limiting punitive
damages to a single-digit ratio would “risk interfering with
legitimate state interests by striking down awards that are
reasonably calculated to deter and punish illegal conduct
and that are, therefore, constitutionally permitted.” Hamlin,
349 Or at 537.
The purpose of such examples is “to caution against
the categorical use of ratios,” not “to set forth an exclusive
list of exceptions to a ratio requirement.” Id. at 535. But
plaintiff’s justification for imposing $10 million in punitive
damages against each defendant falls within the fourth cat
egory that we identified in Goddard. Plaintiff insists that
due process permits the unusually great disparity in this
case between the amount of punitive damages and the harm
to plaintiff, because it serves the state’s legitimate interest
in deterring and punishing wrongful conduct that easily
could have gone undiscovered or unpunished. According to
plaintiff, defendants engaged in the “egregious” misconduct
of choosing not to pay for “life safety” repairs having “every
reason to believe that their conduct would never be subject
Cite as 372 Or 27 (2024)
61
to any significant sanctions whatsoever”—because the wit
nesses who came forward had “nothing to gain and every
thing to lose from” bringing defendants misconduct to light.
Plaintiff is correct that deterring such misconduct
is part of the state’s legitimate interest in imposing punitive
damages in civil cases. See Hamlin, 349 Or at 533. And, as
described above, an inference that defendants were moti
vated to disguise, rather than repair, the deterioration in
part because they believed that the misconduct would not be
discovered and punished “represents an enhanced degree of
punishable culpability.” See Exxon, 554 US at 494. Indeed,
we pointed to that inference in concluding that defendants’
wrongful conduct demonstrates a high degree of reprehen
sibility. 372 Or at 43-44. But we have also concluded that
defendants highly reprehensible conduct was, nevertheless,
not comparable to the “
‘extraordinarily reprehensible’ con
duct on the part of the defendant” in Williams. Thus, we
are not persuaded that the evidence in this case permits
the kind of inferences that “may provide a basis for over
riding” our due process concerns that arise from the jury’s
assessment of punitive damages that exceed the damages
for harm to plaintiff by a ratio of 33:1. See Goddard, 344 Or
at 258.
Although we do not rule out the possibility that
some amount greater than (or less than) a nine-to-one ratio
might be the maximum constitutionally permitted award
in a case like this, neither party has challenged the trial
court’s determination that $2.7 million in punitive dam
ages against each defendant is the correct reduced amount.
Their arguments presented the single question of whether
$10 million in punitive damages exceeds the amount that
the Due Process Clause permits in this case, and we have
answered that question.10 Accordingly, we affirm.
10 We recognize that, in Goddard, we described the methodology for perform
ing a due process review in a way that arguably suggests a court must always
determine the maximum constitutionally permitted amount of punitive damages.
See 344 Or at 261-62 (explaining that, “[i]f the court determines that the award
is grossly excessive, it then uses the same guideposts to determine the highest
lawful amount of punitive damages that a rational juror could award, consis
tent with the Due Process Clause”). And we reiterate, to the extent that a court
determines that due process requires any reduction to a jury’s punitive dam
ages verdict—an act that is otherwise prohibited by the Oregon Constitution—
the court must give effect to both constitutional provisions by entering judgment
62
Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.
for a reduced amount that is not lower than the reduction that due process
requires. See Parrott, 331 Or at 556 (explaining that “the federal requirement of
judicial review for excessiveness directly conflicts with the re-examination clause
of Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution”). But, as Goddard
describes, that is a separate determination the court must make. We reviewed
that determination in Goddard, because we were presented with arguments that
challenged both to the trial court’s determination that the jury’s punitive dam
ages verdict was grossly excessive (by the plaintiff) and the trial court’s deter
mination of the reduced amount that was the maximum amount permitted by
due process (by defendant). Id. at 251. Here, neither party has argued that, if
the court correctly determined that the jury’s punitive damages were grossly
excessive, the court nevertheless incorrectly determined that $2.7 million is the
maximum, reduced amount of punitive damages that due process permits, and
we decline to take up that question unilaterally. | 966f225567af2eb9722b78b4bc6cdf411561649ebffa92d675fb17f243c0b2ae | 2024-02-15T00:00:00Z |
c14b5048-88ca-48c2-bdbb-4beffc039375 | State v. Cruz-Aguirre | null | S46254 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
FROYLAN CRUZ-AGUIRRE,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 95CR3094FE; CA A97471; SC S46254)
On petition for review filed March 17, 1999.*
Andy Simrin, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for petitioner on review.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802, (2001).
*Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, Joan G. Seitz, Judge. 158 Or App 15, 972 P2d 1206 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case. Balmer, J. did not participate in the decision of
this case. | df67bd0f3c075640b00ef90b2509b4873608866c43c4491cb1737549d0a2e9da | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
a5f97b5c-f55d-4fa3-8635-12d24c4d9818 | Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing | null | S070083 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 64
March 7, 2024
No. 4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON REPRESENTED BY XL CATLIN
SYNDICATES 2003 AND 1209,
Liberty Syndicate 4472, and
Novae Syndicate 2007,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
TNA NA MANUFACTURING, INC.,
dba FOODesign Machinery & Systems, and
Food Design, Inc., an Oregon corporation,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 18CV15868) (CA A175864) (SC S070083)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 9, 2023.
Sara Kobak, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petition-
ers on review. Also on the briefs were William J. Ohle, and
Aukjen T. Ingraham.
Dayna J. Christian, Immix Law Group PC, Portland, filed
the brief for respondent on review TNA NA Manufacturing,
Inc. Also on the briefs was Nicole McMillan.
Ashley L. Vulin, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland,
argued the case and filed the brief for respondent on review
Food Design, Inc. Also on the brief was P. Andrew McStay,
Jr., and Meagan A. Himes.
JAMES, J.
______________
* Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Henry Breithaupt, Judge.
323 Or App 447, 523 P3d 690 ( 2022).
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
65
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
66
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
JAMES, J.
The issue in this case is the specificity of contract
language required to disclaim tort liability under Oregon
law. SunOpta, Inc. (SunOpta), purchased food process-
ing equipment from Food Design, Inc. (FDI), for use in its
sunflower seed production.1 Following a listeria outbreak
that resulted in a recall costing SunOpta’s insurer, Lloyd’s
London (Lloyd’s), nearly 20 million dollars, Lloyd’s brought
claims for negligence and product liability against FDI and
TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. (TNA), FDI’s successor in
interest. On summary judgment, the trial court held that
SunOpta had waived any action in tort through its purchase
contract with FDI, and specifically looked to four provisions
of that contract—sections 5, 7, 11, and 12—reasoning that,
when read together, those provisions reflected a waiver of
tort liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
on narrower grounds, concluding that one provision, section
11, when viewed in the context of the contract as a whole,
constituted a waiver of tort liability because the provision,
“implicates liability beyond that arising under the contract.”
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing, 323 Or App
447, 454, 523 P3d 690 (2022). Lloyd’s petitioned for review,
which we allowed.
We conclude that both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals erred. Oregon law establishes that “a presump-
tion will be indulged against an intention to contract for
immunity from the consequence of one’s own negligence.”
Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 242 Or 1, 19, 406 P2d 556
(1965). In considering whether that presumption has been
overcome, “a contract will not be construed to provide immu-
nity from the consequences of a party’s own negligence unless
that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed.” Estey
v. MacKenzie Engineering Inc., 324 Or 372, 376, 927 P2d 86
(1996) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. U.S. Nat’l Bank,
276 Or 945, 951, 558 P2d 328 (1976)). As we will explain,
to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and
explicit; waiver will not simply be deduced from inference or
implication. The text of the contract must show, clearly and
1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the parties by name and use the term
“defendants” to refer collectively to FDI and TNA.
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
67
unambiguously, that the parties intended to disclaim actions
outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort. Generic text that
purports to waive all liability, or any loss, will typically be
insufficiently specific to overcome the presumption against
the waiver of tort liability. Accordingly, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.2
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Before reciting the underlying facts, for ease of ref-
erence, we set forth the pertinent provisions of the contract
between FDI (the seller) and SunOpta (the purchaser) on
which the parties and the lower courts relied.
Section 5, entitled “WARRANTIES,” states:
“Seller’s warranties are limited as follows:
“There are no warranties which extend beyond the descrip-
tion on the face hereof.
“Seller warrants to the original Customer that the equip-
ment is free from manufacturing defects. Seller agrees to
repair or replace, F.O.B. any part of standard commercial
manufactured items which are, within the warranty period
of the manufacturer’s item in question, found defective or
otherwise unsatisfactory owing to faulty material or work-
manship. The warranty shall not apply to any product which
has been damaged by improper usage, accident, neglect,
alteration or abuse. The liability of the manufacturer is
limited solely to replacing the defective product. In no event
shall the manufacturer be liable for special or consequen-
tial damages to any Purchaser, user or other person.”
Section
7,
entitled
“MATERIALS
AND
WORKMANSHIP,” provides, in relevant part:
“Purchaser agrees to defend and indemnify Seller against
any loss, cost, damage or expense (including reasonable
attorney’s fees) resulting from any claims by Purchasers
or by third parties (including Purchaser’s employees) of
2 At the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs raised an additional assignment of error,
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered plaintiffs to pay
FDI attorney fees as a discovery sanction under ORCP 46 A(4). Certain Underwriters,
323 Or App at 449. The Court of Appeals affirmed the attorney fee award, id. at 457,
and plaintiffs do not challenge that part of the decision before this court.
68
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
damage to property or injury to persons resulting from
faulty installation or negligent operation of the equipment.”
Section 11, entitled “DISCLAIMERS,” states:
“There are no warranties, express or implied, including the
warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose extending beyond those set forth
in [s]ection 5. Seller’s liability shall be limited to the repair
or replacement of any defective equipment and the parties
agree that this shall be Purchaser’s sole and exclusive rem-
edy. Seller shall not be liable, in any event, for loss of prof-
its, incidental or consequential damages or failure of the
equipment to comply with any federal, state or local laws.
Seller shall under no circumstances be liable for the cost of
labor, raw materials used or lost in testing or experimen-
tal or production operations of any equipment sold, whether
such testing, production or experimentation is done under
the supervision of a representative of the Seller or of any
employee or other representative of the Purchaser.”
Section 12, entitled “DEFAULT, DAMAGES, AND
REMEDIES,” provides, in relevant part:
“In the event of default by either party, all rights and reme-
dies shall be governed by the law of the State of Oregon and
venue for any litigation shall be laid in the Circuit Court of
Oregon for the County of Clackamas.
“Seller shall further not be liable for any consequential
damages.”
BACKGROUND
Because the trial court granted defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, we recount the facts in the light
most favorable to Lloyd’s, the nonmoving party. ORCP 47 C.
SunOpta is a plant-based food company that expe-
rienced $20 million in damages after it issued a voluntary
product recall in 2016 due to the discovery of the bacterium
Listeria monocytogenes (listeria) in its processed sunflower
seeds. The recalled sunflower seeds had been processed
using equipment that SunOpta had purchased from FDI
in 2012. Following the recall, Lloyd’s paid SunOpta the
insurance policy limit of $20 million to cover the company’s
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
69
property losses, and SunOpta subrogated its claims related
to FDI’s potential tort liability to Lloyd’s.
Lloyd’s then sued defendants, FDI and its succes-
sor in interest, TNA, alleging tort claims for negligence and
strict products liability under ORS 30.920. Lloyd’s alleged
that “the food contamination was caused by unreasonably
dangerous design and manufacturing defects in FDI’s cool-
ing conveyor system that wrongly impeded access to fully
inspect and sanitize all areas of the equipment.” Lloyd’s also
alleged that the equipment had serious design and manu-
facturing flaws that improperly allowed water intrusion into
hidden parts of the equipment that dangerously concealed
product buildup and other conditions promoting the growth
of listeria.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that the purchase contract for the cooling equipment
barred Lloyd’s tort action. That contract, a five-page doc-
ument containing FDI’s standard terms and conditions,
had been included as part of FDI’s sales proposal for the
custom cooling conveyor system.3 SunOpta executed that
proposal without objecting to FDI’s terms and conditions,
and FDI then manufactured and delivered the equipment
to SunOpta for approximately $32,000. Defendants argued
that four provisions of that purchase contract—sections 5, 7,
11, and 12—reflected an “unmistakable mutual agreement
for SunOpta, as an equipment buyer, to exculpate FDI from
any tort liability for damages caused by FDI’s own negli-
gence or product defects.”4 In response, Lloyd’s argued that
those provisions of the sales contract did not satisfy the
requirement that provisions limiting tort liability must be
“clear and unequivocal.”
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of defendants. Relying on American Wholesale Products v.
3 There was no evidence offered at summary judgment that FDI engaged in
any kind of explanation or discussion with SunOpta about any of FDI’s standard
terms and conditions. There was also no evidence that FDI ever offered any kind
of price concession, or otherwise bargained with SunOpta for a release of tort
liability as a condition for the sale of FDI’s food-processing equipment.
4 Initially FDI did not claim that its standard terms and conditions included
a waiver of tort liability. Rather, FDI asserted that the contractual terms at issue
were intended to “disclaim[
], in whole or in part, warranties” in the equipment.
70
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
Allstate Ins. Co., 288 Or App 418, 406 P3d 163 (2017), the
trial court read the relevant contract provisions together to
“determine whether the liability allocation in the contract,
including liability for defendants’ own negligence or tort
exposure, [was] clear and unequivocal.” After noting that
none of the provisions contradicted each other, the trial
court stated that “nothing in the documents suggests that
defendants’ liability extends beyond repair or replacement.”
The court found that, “most importantly, no language in the
agreement suggests that defendants have any responsibil-
ity for damage to person or property—that is[,] tort[-]type
damages.” The trial court then entered a general judgment,
dismissing Lloyd’s claims with prejudice.
Lloyd’s appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
although on different grounds than the trial court. The
Court of Appeals “disagree[d] with the trial court’s rea-
soning suggesting that sections 5, 7, and 12 shielded FDI
from tort liability, because they all could be plausibly read
as limitations to contract damages.” Certain Underwriters,
323 Or App at 455. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
concluded that section 11 “[could not] be read in a way that
restricts it to damages related to contract liability” and
therefore “agree[d] with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion
that the text of the sales contract unambiguously limited
FDI’s tort liability.” Id.
The court invoked Estey for the proposition that “[a]
limitation of liability clause need not use the word ‘negli-
gence’ in order to be effective against a negligence claim.” Id.
at 450 (quoting Estey, 324 Or at 378). Although the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial court that sections 5, 7, and
12 immunized defendants from tort liability, it affirmed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that
section 11 of the sales contract “unambiguously disclaimed
any liability in tort when viewed in the context of the con-
tract as a whole.” Id. at 453. The court stated that section 11,
“[b]y disclaiming liability of the seller ‘in any event,’ in a sec-
tion separate from the one titled ‘[WARRANTIES]’ and with
broad language as to the types of damages disclaimed, *
*
*
the contract unambiguously expressed the parties’ intent to
immunize FDI from tort liability.” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
71
The Court of Appeals based that decision on one
of its own cases where it had held that “[a] contract that
contains a broad reference to ‘any liability’ suggests that
the parties intended for the provision to limit ‘any liability’
regardless of whether that liability arose in tort or contract.”
Id. at 453-54 (quoting Kaste v. Land O’Lakes Purina Feed,
LLC, 284 Or App 233, 246, 392 P3d 805, rev den, 361 Or 671
(2017)). The court concluded that “[s]ection 11’s statement
that FDI ‘shall not be liable, in any event’ is substantially
similar to a disclaimer of any liability.” Id. at 454. The court
further noted that the fact that the terms at issue were not
included in the “WARRANTIES” provision but instead in
the “DISCLAIMERS” provision indicated an intention for
those disclaimers to apply beyond contract liability. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
that the “disclaimer of any liability related to a violation
of law necessarily implicates claims for negligence per se,
which is a concept in tort.” Id.
After concluding that the contract clearly and
unambiguously immunized defendants from tort liability,
the Court of Appeals proceeded to assess “the possibility of
a harsh or inequitable result that would fall on one party if
the other party was immunized from the consequences of
its own negligence.” Id. at 455 (quoting American Wholesale
Products, 288 Or App at 423). The court concluded that
“[t]he language of the contract indicates that the parties
expected that issues involving the use of FDI’s equipment
would be remedied by either repairing or replacing the
equipment. Nothing in the nature of the parties’ relation-
ship or bargaining power suggests that the parties reason-
ably held different expectations and, thus, it would not be
harsh or inequitable to limit FDI’s liability.”
Id. at 456.
Lloyd’s petitioned for review, which we allowed.
ANALYSIS
Oregon law recognizes a “policy favoring the free-
dom to contract as one pleases *
*
* unless there is some
contravening policy which outweighs it.” Irish & Swartz
Stores v. First Nat’l Bk., 220 Or 362, 378, 349 P2d 814
72
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
(1960). Accordingly, absent a public policy impediment,5 so
long as the parties have “expressed their intent with rea-
sonable clarity, contractual immunity from a party’s own
negligence” can be “a matter for negotiation.” Commerce &
Industry Ins. v. Orth, 254 Or 226, 232, 458 P2d 926 (1969).
However, because “public policy favors the deter-
rence of negligent conduct,” Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 356
Or 543, 572, 340 P3d 27 (2014), the allocation of liability in
tort is one area where public policy may outweigh the gen-
eral freedom to contract. In light of the strong public interest
in promoting the exercise of reasonable care, it has been the
established rule in Oregon for over sixty years that “a pre-
sumption will be indulged against an intention to contract
for immunity from the consequence of one’s own negligence
and that a contract will not be given that meaning unless so
expressed in unequivocal language.” Waterway Terminals,
242 Or at 19 (citing So. Pac. Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
216 Or 398, 410, 338 P2d 665 (1959); Glens Falls Indem. Co.
v. Reimers, 176 Or 47, 53, 155 P2d 923 (1945); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Layman, 173 Or 275, 280, 145 P2d 295 (1944); and U.
S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomlinson Co., 172 Or 307, 324-25,
141 P2d 817 (1943)) (emphasis added).
In determining when a contract will overcome the
presumption against the waiver of tort liability, exculpatory
contracts are strictly construed to ensure that the releas-
ing party did, in fact, knowingly bargain for the release of
tort liability. Commerce & Industry Ins., 254 Or at 231. “A
contract will not be construed to provide immunity from
consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that inten-
tion is clearly and unequivocally expressed[.]” Estey, 324
Or at 376 (internal quotation marks and additional brack-
ets omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 2 comment d (1997) (“Courts normally construe
exculpatory contracts strictly, finding that the plaintiff has
5 For example, this court has held that “a clause in a contract for insurance
purporting to indemnify the insured for damages recovered against him as a
consequence of his intentional conduct in inflicting injury upon another is unen-
forceable by the insured on the ground that to permit recovery would be against
public policy.” Isenhart v. General Casualty Co., 233 Or 49, 53, 377 P2d 26 (1962).
As another example, ORS 30.140 voids, on public policy grounds, any provision in
a construction agreement for indemnification against liability for personal-injury
or property damage due to the indemnitee’s sole negligence.
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
73
assumed a risk only if the terms of the agreement are clear
and unequivocal.”).
In considering whether a contract “clearly and
unequivocally” waives tort liability, Oregon courts “consider
both the language of the contract and the possibility of a
harsh or inequitable result that would fall on [the releas-
ing] party by immunizing the other party from the con-
sequences of [their] own negligence.” Estey, 342 Or at 376.
The “heavy burden” to satisfy the “clear and unequivocal”
standard means that the exculpatory contract must “put[
] it
beyond doubt,” and the contract must make it crystal clear
that the releasing party has absolved the other party from
the consequences of the party’s own negligence and prod-
uct defects. Layman, 173 Or at 281 (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the con-
tract at issue here. We readily conclude that sections 5, 7,
and 12 fail to effect a waiver of tort liability.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, with
respect to section 5, “warranties” are “typically a contract
concept.” Certain Underwriters, 323 Or App at 451. The types
of damages limited under section 5—special or consequen-
tial damages—are ordinarily types of damages under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and they are naturally
associated with contract disputes, not tort claims. See ORS
72.7150(2) (defining “consequential damages” as damages
“resulting from the seller’s breach”); Parker v. Harris Pine
Mills, Inc., 206 Or 187, 208, 291 P2d 709 (1955) (explaining
that “
‘special damages’ [are] those naturally but not nec-
essarily resulting from the breach” of a contract (emphasis
omitted)).
Defendants argue that, “[e]ven if the limitation of
liability in [s]ection 5 relates only to breaches of warranty
*
*
*, [that provision] uses *
*
* language showing the intent
to limit liability even for harm to third parties.” Even if that
language shows an intent to limit liability for harm to third
parties, that does not compel the conclusion that the par-
ties were intending to cover third-party tort liability. Third-
party liability can arise under contract as well. Sisters of
74
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
St. Joseph v. Russell, 318 Or 370, 374, 867 P2d 1377 (1994)
(recognizing third party liability under contract; explain-
ing that, “[a]s a general proposition, a third party’s right
to enforce a contractual promise in its favor depends on the
intention of the parties to the contract”).
For much the same reason, section 12 is insufficient
to limit FDI’s tort liability. Section 12—which covers default
and limitations on liability for consequential damages—
addresses contract requirements and remedies. Nothing in
the text of section 12 reflects the clear and unambiguous
language required to disclaim tort liability.
Nor does section 7 immunize FDI from all tort lia-
bility. That provision indemnifies FDI from some tort liabil-
ity, but critically, only some. By its terms, section 7 shifted
tort liability to SunOpta only for tort claims “resulting from
faulty installation or negligent operation of the equipment.”
A reader could reasonably infer that only the referenced sub-
set of tort claims is being addressed by that provision, and
that, by negative implication, the contract does not waive
other liability in tort.
We turn now to section 11, which formed the basis
for the Court of Appeals’ holding that tort liability had been
contractually disclaimed in this case. For convenience, we
set out the terms of section 11 again:
“DISCLAIMERS:
“There are no warranties, express or implied, including the
warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose extending beyond those set forth
in [s]ection 5. Seller’s liability shall be limited to the repair
or replacement of any defective equipment and the parties
agree that this shall be Purchaser’s sole and exclusive rem-
edy. Seller shall not be liable, in any event, for loss of prof-
its, incidental or consequential damages or failure of the
equipment to comply with any federal, state or local laws.
Seller shall under no circumstances be liable for the cost of
labor, raw materials used or lost in testing or experimen-
tal or production operations of any equipment sold, whether
such testing, production or experimentation is done under
the supervision of a representative of the Seller or of any
employee or other representative of the Purchaser.”
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
75
The Court of Appeals did not identify any specific
language of tort disclaimer in section 11 but reasoned that
the inclusion of the wording “
‘’in any event,’ in a section sep-
arate from the one titled ‘[WARRANTIES]’ and with broad
language as to the types of damages disclaimed” was suf-
ficient. Certain Underwriters, 323 Or App at 453. In short,
the Court of Appeals found the intent to waive tort liabil-
ity through inference or implication, and through the use of
broad language. We disagree with both of those approaches.
First, and most critically, nothing in section 11
plainly, directly, and unequivocally speaks to liability out-
side of that arising under contract. The words “in any event”
do not clearly waive tort liability because the types of dam-
ages that are “disclaimed” in any event—loss of profits, inci-
dental or consequential damages, or failure of the equipment
to comply with federal, state, or local laws—can reasonably
be understood to refer to damages other than those arising
from the seller’s own negligence. Because there is no clear,
unequivocal waiver of that liability, any waiver can only be
found by inference from the broad words used in section 11.
The problem with finding a waiver of tort liability
by inference is that, at least in this case, there is not a single
permissible inference. Section 11 could reasonably be read
as a disclaimer of implied warranties other than section
5’s express warranty. Much like section 5’s remedy limita-
tions for any breach of the express warranty, section 11 pre-
scribes the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement of the
equipment, and then it follows with an alternative remedy
limitation in the event that the exclusive remedy does not
apply—that is, it sets out the alternative remedy limitation
providing that FDI is not liable “in any event” for “loss of
profits, incidental or consequential damages or failure of the
equipment to comply with any federal, state or local laws.”
Additionally, it is not the case that the only per-
missible inference to be drawn from the location of the dis-
claimer, in a provision separate from one under the heading
“WARRANTIES,” is that the parties intended to disclaim
tort liability. The requirements of the UCC provide a rea-
son for commercial contracts for the sale of goods to have
separate headings in contracts for warranties and warranty
76
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
disclaimers. The UCC requires that disclaimers of implied
warranties of merchantability or fitness be “conspicuous.” See
ORS 72.3160 (“to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability” or “implied warranty of fitness,” exclusion
must be “conspicuous”). Under the UCC, a “printed head-
ing in capitals” is conspicuous, ORS 71.2010(10), and Oregon
courts have previously held that warranty disclaimers are
not sufficiently conspicuous if placed under a heading titled
“warranty.” See Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Or App
387, 391, 641 P2d 668 (1981) (declining to give effect to war-
ranty disclaimers because “[o]nly the paragraph headings,
e.g., ‘WARRANTY,’ stand out, but such a heading suggests
the making of warranties, not their exclusion”).
Nor does the reference to “federal, state or local laws”
require the inference that the parties intended to waive tort
liability. Commercial contracts—especially in highly reg-
ulated industries such as food processing—often impose
requirements for parties to comply with governing laws and
regulatory standards, and compliance with such standards
may be part of the basis of an implied warranty of fitness
for a specific purpose. See, e.g., Millenkamp v. Davisco Foods
Int’l, Inc., 562 F3d 971, 977 (9th Cir 2009) (analyzing how
compliance with government regulations can be relevant to
claims asserting breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose); Durrett v. Baxter Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 198 Neb 392, 395-96, 253 NW2d 37, 39 (1977) (explain-
ing how compliance with government standards and reg-
ulations can be used to defend in cases involving implied
or express warranties); Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wash 2d 70,
73-75, 515 P2d 982, 984-85 (1973) (assessing a breach of
warranty claim where a contract for the sale of securities
in a nursing home warranted that sellers’ operations were
“maintained in accordance with all applicable government
rules”). Contract damages—including consequential dam-
ages from regulatory penalties, manufacturing shutdowns,
or other “down time” when equipment is out of service—also
may result from failures to fulfill a contractual duty to com-
ply with governing laws. See, e.g., NextSun Energy Littleton,
LLC v. Acadia Ins. Co., 494 F Supp 3d 1, 4 (2020) (uphold-
ing breach-of-contract claim to recover lost income during
mandatory shutdown of operations from governmental
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
77
red-tag orders requiring the testing, inspection, and repair
of equipment).
We reiterate that, to affect a waiver of liability in
tort, a contract must be clear, explicit, unequivocal, and
place the waiver beyond doubt. Arguments that seek to infer
such an express waiver through inference or implication are
unlikely to succeed. Our decision in Estey, 324 Or at 372,
is illustrative. In that case, the plaintiff brought negligence
and breach-of-contract claims against the defendant engi-
neering firm after it provided a faulty inspection report. The
contract between those parties set out an estimated contract
sum of $200 and provided that “[t]he liability of [defendant]
and the liability of its employees are limited to the Contract
Sum.” Id. at 374. On review, we found that the term lacked
sufficient clarity to absolve the defendant of tort liability
because the “plaintiff reasonably might have interpreted
‘liability’ to refer only to liability arising from breach of
contract” and not to liability for negligence. Id. at 378-79.
Because of the ambiguity in the limitation of liability, we
could not “conclude that the parties ‘clearly and unequiv-
ocally’ intended a broader interpretation that would have
required plaintiff to bear the risk of defendant’s negligence.”
Id. at 379.
In reaching our conclusion in Estey, “we declin[ed]
to hold that the word ‘negligence’ must expressly appear in
order for an exculpatory or limitation of liability clause to be
effective against a negligence claim.” Id. at 378. That state-
ment in Estey should not be read to obscure its core holding:
The text of the contract must clearly and unambiguously
show that the parties intended to disclaim liability outside
of contract. Our decision in K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co.,
273 Or 242, 541 P2d 1378 (1975), illustrates effective contract
language. In that case, the defendant manufacturer sought
to avoid tort liability to a commercial purchaser based on a
term in the sales contract providing that the manufacturer’s
liability was limited to repair or replacement of the prod-
uct as the purchaser’s “sole and exclusive remedy whether
in contract, tort or otherwise, and [the defendant manufac-
turer] shall not be liable for injuries to persons or property.”
Id. at 245. In upholding the enforceability of that explicit
78
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
limitation on tort liability, we held that the provision was
“not ambiguous or confusing” as a matter of law. Id. at 254.
We adhere to our statement in Estey that no magic
words are, per se, required. However, to overcome the strong
presumption against waiver of tort liability, the contract
must make explicit that the liability being waived is out-
side of liability arising under contract. Perhaps it is possible
to accomplish that goal without the use of the word “negli-
gence,” or “tort,” and we do not entirely foreclose the possi-
bility that an effective waiver could be constructed without
those terms. But use of the terms negligence or tort may
certainly prove helpful, and prudent and cautious contract
drafters in Oregon might consider their use.
Finally, the Court of Appeals relied on its holding
in Kaste for the proposition that “[a] contract that contains
a broad reference to ‘any liability’ suggests that the parties
intended for the provision to limit ‘any liability’ regardless
of whether that liability arose in tort or contract.” Certain
Underwriters, 323 Or App at 453-54 (quoting Kaste, 284
Or App at 246). We disagree with that proposition. As we said
in Estey, because the issue arose in the context of a contract,
the “plaintiff reasonably might have interpreted ‘liability’ to
refer only to liability from breach of contract” and not to lia-
bility for negligence. 324 Or at 378-79. Broad language may
encompass tort liability in theory, but as a practical matter,
in a contract, where the parties are naturally interpreting
terms in the context of contractual obligations, broad lan-
guage may obscure as much as it clarifies. Accordingly, we
have rejected similar broad language disclaiming “any loss.”
In Layman, we considered a contractual waiver
written in very broad terms:
“The agreement is on a printed form prepared by the rail-
way company. The plaintiff is termed the ‘Licensor’ and the
defendant the ‘Licensee’. The clause thereof which plaintiff
seeks to enforce reads: ‘Licensee shall and hereby expressly
agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Licensor and its
lessor from and against any and all loss, damage, injury,
cost and expense of every kind and nature, from any cause
whatsoever, resulting directly or indirectly from the main-
tenance, presence or use of said crossing.”
Cite as 372 Or 64 (2024)
79
173 Or at 276-77.
Despite the terms specifying “any and all loss *
*
*
from any cause whatsoever,” we reasoned that such broad
language was insufficient to meet the “clear and unequiv-
ocal” language requirements for contractual waiver of tort
liability. In so reasoning, we began by noting that “[i]t is a
firmly established rule that contracts of indemnity will not
be construed to cover losses to the indemnitee caused by his
own negligence unless such intention is expressed in clear
and unequivocal terms.” Id. We reiterated the strong policy
rationale behind that strict rule:
“
‘The liability on such indemnity is so hazardous, and the
character of the indemnity so unusual and extraordinary,
that there can be no presumption that the indemnitor
intended to assume the responsibility unless the contract
puts it beyond doubt by express stipulation. No inference
from words of general import can establish it.’
”
Id. (quoting Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa 252, 255, 66 A 553, 554
(1907)).
We then considered the specific language of the
indemnity clause at issue, noting that it was “undoubtedly
broad and general enough to include loss caused solely by
the plaintiff’s negligence.” Id. at 281. However, we surveyed
the treatment of similar language by a range of courts and
concluded that such “language has not deterred the courts
from finding that no such meaning was intended by the par-
ties.” Id. (citing Mynard v. Syracuse, B & NYR Co., 71 NY
180, 183 (1877) (“General words from whatever cause arising
may well be satisfied by limiting them to such extraordi-
nary liabilities as carriers are under without fault or negli-
gence on their part. When general words may operate with-
out including the negligence of the carrier or his servants,
it will not be presumed that it was intended to include it.”
(Emphasis in original.)); Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Cornell, 7
NYS 557, 558 (Gen Term 1889), aff’d, 130 NY 637, 29 NE
151 (1891) (“For while the language of this part of the con-
tract is very general, it cannot reasonably be so construed as
to impose upon the contractors the obligation to protect the
plaintiff against the carelessness or negligence of persons in
its own employment.”).
80
Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing
The treatment we observed in our survey of other
jurisdictions in Layman, in 1944, continues to find support
in other jurisdictions today. See, e.g., Wycoff v. Grace Cmty.
Church of Assemblies of God, 251 P3d 1260, 1265 (Colo App
2010) (reviewing appellate case law; holding that “any liabil-
ity” language did not waive personal injury claim as no excul-
patory provisions had previously been upheld in the absence
of “some reference to waiving personal injury claims”); Hyson
v. White Water Mountain Resorts Of Connecticut, Inc., 265
Conn 636, 829 A2d 827 (2003) (concluding that a party can-
not be released from liability for injuries resulting from its
future negligence in the absence of language that expressly
invokes negligence); Wright v. Loon Mountain Recreation
Corp., 140 NH 166, 169, 663 A2d 1340, 1342 (1995) (provid-
ing that the validity of a release turns on whether a rea-
sonable person would have known of an exculpatory provi-
sion and stating that a reasonable person would understand
the provision only if the language “
‘clearly and specifically
indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability
for personal injury caused by the defendant’s negligence’
”
(quoting Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass’n, Inc., 128
NH 102, 107, 509 A2d 151, 154 (1986))); Sivaslian v. Rawlins,
88 AD2d 703, 704, 451 NYS2d 307, 309 (1982) (concluding
that provision that covered “any and all manner of actions”
was insufficient to disclaim tort liability).
Accordingly, we continue to adhere to our analysis
in Layman. Disclaimers written in generic broad language,
such as “any liability” or “any loss” may be insufficiently
specific to meet the standard of “clear and unequivocal” lan-
guage sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against
the waiver of tort liability.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings. | f2a663a2bc80e45dd0055c98aeeba8a4165d42d2821db48dd7bf51ac3928c629 | 2024-03-07T00:00:00Z |
256c2aaa-d901-488b-96b7-eef43d031ea0 | Gorham v. Thompson | null | S46642 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
A. KENT GORHAM,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
S. FRANK THOMPSON,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 96C-12929; CA A100889; SC S46642)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 3, 2000.
Marc D. Blackman, Ransom Blackman, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. With him on
the briefs was Kendra M. Matthews.
Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
LEESON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Rodney M. Miller, Judge. 159 Or App 570, 978 P2d 443 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case. Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case. De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner contends
that his convictions for sex abuse and rape must be set aside
because he received inadequate assistance of trial counsel in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (1) The post-conviction court held that, by not
investigating experts regarding impeachment and credibility
issues for petitioner's third trial before deciding not to use
them, petitioner's trial counsel had not exercised reasonable
professional skill and judgment. Nonetheless, that court denied
relief on the ground that petitioner had not shown prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Gorham v. Thompson, 159 Or App
570, 978 P2d 443 (1999). We allowed petitioner's petition for
review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the judgment of the post-conviction court on a different ground.
The relevant events giving rise to petitioner's post-conviction challenge in this proceeding are as follows. In 1991,
a grand jury indicted petitioner on three counts of first-degree
rape and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against his
daughter L, (2) in 1989 and 1991, when she was five and seven years
old. Petitioner was tried three times. The first trial, in July
1992, ended in a mistrial. Thereafter, petitioner retained
Morrow, the lawyer whose conduct is at issue in this proceeding,
to represent him at the second trial.
Petitioner's second trial began in October 1992. At
that trial, Morrow cross-examined prosecution witnesses and
presented defense witnesses to undermine the reliability of L's
reports of petitioner's sexual acts. Morrow also offered the
testimony of two expert witnesses, a physician, Dr. Moore, and a
child psychiatrist, Dr. Boverman. The purpose of Moore's
testimony was to challenge the physical examination methodology
that a pediatrician, Dr. Young, had used when she had examined
L's genitalia in 1990 and 1991, and had reported "nonspecific"
findings of sexual abuse, based in part on "bumps" and "dips" in
L's hymen. The purpose of Boverman's testimony was to establish
that children of L's age are susceptible to suggestion, that
inappropriate questioning can lead children to make false
disclosures of sexual abuse, that the inconsistencies in L's
accounts of what had occurred were the result of improper
questioning and "contamination" through play therapy with a
psychologist, Gregory-Mull, and that Gregory-Mull inappropriately
had used anatomically correct dolls with L before L had made a
clear disclosure of sexual abuse.
During its deliberations in the second trial, the jury
informed the trial court that it had seen an exhibit that it did
not believe had been introduced as evidence. The court had the
exhibit removed, instructed the jury to disregard it, and told
the jury to continue its deliberations. The jury convicted
petitioner on all counts.
After the verdict, Morrow talked to one of the jurors.
He learned that, before seeing the exhibit, five of the twelve
jurors had voted to acquit petitioner. However, after seeing the
exhibit, at least three of the five jurors who had voted to
acquit changed their votes. Morrow also learned that, in the
jury's view, the prosecution's cross-examination had discredited
both Moore's and Boverman's testimony. Morrow then wrote a
letter to petitioner explaining that the information that he had
obtained from the juror meant that the trial court probably would
grant a motion for mistrial, that petitioner had a chance of
prevailing in a third trial, and that "[t]here are things we can
do better next time." The trial court subsequently granted
petitioner's motion for a mistrial.
Petitioner's third trial began in May 1993,
approximately seven months after the second trial had begun.
Before trial, Morrow learned that the prosecution's case at the
third trial would be a replay of the second trial and that the
prosecution would call the same witnesses. According to Morrow's
affidavit in this proceeding, he decided that it would be "a
better tactic at the third trial not to call expert witnesses,
subjecting them to cross-examination by the prosecutor." The
accused testified on his own behalf at the third trial, as he had
previously. He denied having had any sexual contact with L.
After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts
on all counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
State v. Gorham, 131 Or App 267, 884 P2d 1230, rev den 320 Or 493
(1994).
As noted, petitioner brought this post-conviction
proceeding, alleging that he had received inadequate assistance
of counsel at his third trial. See ORS 138.530(1)(a) (post-conviction relief available for substantial denial of rights
under state and federal constitutions). (3) To prevail on his claim
of inadequate assistance of counsel, petitioner had to make two
showings. First, petitioner had to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that Morrow had failed to exercise
reasonable professional skill and judgment. See Trujillo v.
Maass, 312 Or 431, 435, 822 P2d 703 (1991) (identifying two-pronged test for post-conviction relief). Second, even if Morrow
had failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment, petitioner had to demonstrate that that failure would
have had a tendency to affect the result. Id.
As relevant to the issue on review in this proceeding,
petitioner alleged that Morrow had failed to exercise reasonable
professional skill and judgment in failing to present expert
opinion evidence on credibility and impeachment matters.
Petitioner submitted an affidavit from Dr. Bruck, a developmental
psychologist, stating that, in Bruck's opinion, L's trial
testimony
"* * * is characterized by so many poor investigative
techniques as to render the reports unreliable. Their
reports appear to be products of coercive and
pressurized interview techniques conducted over a
period of 18 months. As well there are a number of
milder suggestive influences that could interact with
these more coercive techniques to produce her
testimony."
The petition also averred that a "behavior pediatrician," Dr.
Sabin, would testify that the manner in which Young had conducted
her examination and obtained L's medical history did not meet
minimum professional standards, and that Young's interpretation
of her findings conflicted with medically accepted standards.
At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner submitted
Bruck's affidavit as well as the testimony of a defense lawyer,
Matasar. Matasar expressed the opinion that, to provide adequate
assistance of counsel, Morrow had to present expert testimony to
the jury at petitioner's third trial, that it was unreasonable
not to present such testimony, that there was no tactical reason
not to present expert testimony if it were available, and that
he, Matasar, had found no evidence that Morrow had investigated
the use of expert witnesses at petitioner's third trial. Matasar
expressed no opinion about Morrow's investigation and use of
experts at petitioner's second trial.
Following the hearing, the post-conviction court found
that Morrow had presented expert testimony from Moore and
Boverman at petitioner's second trial; that Boverman had
testified about circumstances that could create a risk that
children would make false accusations of sexual abuse; that the
prosecution had discredited both Moore and Boverman on cross-
examination; that Morrow had chosen not to use expert witnesses
in the third trial; and that Morrow instead had "extensively
cross-examined the complaining witness and the prosecution's
witnesses, including experts." Those findings are not contested.
The post-conviction court then held:
"1. Trial counsel, in failing to investigate
experts on the impeachment and credibility issues,
failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment in defending petitioner.
"2. Petitioner did not establish that the trial
counsel's decision to rely on extensive cross-examination of the complaining witness and the
prosecution witnesses had a tendency to affect the
result of the prosecution.
"3. Trial counsel's omissions cannot be regarded
as of a constitutional magnitude.
"4. In the underlying criminal proceedings
resulting in petitioner's conviction, petitioner was
not denied assistance of trial counsel as guaranteed by
either the United States Constitution or the
Constitution of the State of Oregon."
(Emphasis added.)
In a letter to counsel that clarified its findings and
conclusions about Morrow's failure to investigate experts before
deciding not to use them at petitioner's third trial, the post-conviction court explained:
"The credibility and the impeachment of the
complaining witness issue was a major focus of defense
counsel. * * * A decision not to pursue expert
witnesses for possible impeachment of the child and to
preclude cross examination by the District Attorney
should logically be made after investigating what
experts had to say on the subject. It does not seem
that 'a tactic' could be determined to be the 'better'
until the experts' input was known. The same rationale
carries to defense counsel's decision to focus solely
on cross examination of the child witness.
"Trial counsel, in failing to investigate experts
on the impeachment and credibility issues, failed to
exercise reasonable professional skills and judgment in
defending petitioner.
"* * * Petitioner must make a showing that the
omission of trial counsel prejudiced the defense."
(Emphasis added.)
On appeal, petitioner assigned error to the post-
conviction court's holding that petitioner had failed to
establish prejudice. The state cross-assigned error to the post-conviction court's holding that Morrow had failed to exercise
reasonable skill and judgment in deciding not to use experts at
the third trial without first investigating what they would say.
The state argued that, having been through the second trial -- at
which he had both investigated and presented expert testimony --
Morrow already knew what experts would say. Under those
circumstances, the state contended, Morrow's decision not to use
experts at the third trial was an informed tactical choice that
did not require additional investigation. Petitioner asserted
that the post-conviction court had found that Morrow had provided
inadequate assistance of counsel by not presenting expert
testimony at the third trial.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without discussion, that
"[Morrow's] decision not to call experts in the third trial after
his experts had been discredited in the second trial was not a
reasonable tactical decision." Gorham, 159 Or App at 575.
Nonetheless, that court affirmed the post-conviction court on the
ground that petitioner had failed to establish that Morrow's
decision to rely on extensive cross-examination of L and the
other prosecution witnesses at the third trial had a tendency to
affect the result of the prosecution. Id.
On review, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals misapplied the second, or "prejudice," prong of the post-
conviction relief test. The state defends that court's analysis
of the prejudice prong. However, the state contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in not addressing the first prong of the
post-conviction analysis. It argues that Morrow was not required
to treat preparation for the third trial as though he were
writing on a "clean slate." Rather, Morrow was entitled to rely
on his investigation and use of experts at petitioner's second
trial to inform his decision not to call such experts at
petitioner's third trial. If the state's argument on that point
is well taken, then it is dispositive. Accordingly, we turn to
the state's argument.
It is well established that a reviewing court will not
second-guess a lawyer's tactical decisions in the name of the
constitution unless those decisions reflect an absence or
suspension of professional skill and judgment. Krummacher, 290
Or at 875-76. However, tactical decisions must be grounded on a
reasonable investigation. Id. at 875; Stevens v. State of
Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108, 902 P2d 1137 (1995). The question in
each case is whether trial counsel's investigation was legally
and factually appropriate to the case. Stevens, 322 Or at 108.
In this case, by the time that Morrow began preparing
for petitioner's third trial, he had both investigated and used
expert witnesses only a few months earlier at petitioner's second
trial. Nothing changed during the time between the two trials
that would have compelled Morrow to investigate anew expert
testimony; the facts, law, and theories that the experts had
relied on remained the same. Morrow also had learned after the
second trial that the state intended to present the same case at
the third trial that it had presented at the second trial and
that it would call the same witnesses in its effort to prove
petitioner's guilt. Based on his investigation and use of
experts on credibility and impeachment issues at the second
trial, Morrow believed that it would be a better strategy at the
third trial not to subject defense experts to the prosecution's
cross-examination. Accordingly, he decided not to call experts
on those issues at petitioner's third trial. (4) On those facts,
the post-conviction court erred in holding that Morrow failed to
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment by not
investigating experts regarding impeachment and credibility
issues for petitioner's third trial before deciding whether to
present such experts.
The facts of this case differ from the situation in
which a lawyer makes a tactical decision about how to conduct a
trial without ever having undertaken any investigation on which
to ground that decision. In Stevens, for example, in preparing
for the petitioner's trial on charges of sexual abuse, trial
counsel did not interview potential witnesses whose testimony
might have had a bearing on the complaining witness's
credibility, and trial counsel did not investigate at all whether
any medical evidence supported the petitioner's claim that he was
sexually impotent. 322 Or at 105-06. This court held that trial
counsel's investigation was not legally and factually appropriate
to the case, id. at 108-09, and that trial counsel had not
exercised reasonable professional skill and judgment, id. at 110.
In this case, by contrast, Morrow recently had both investigated
and used experts on credibility and impeachment issues at
petitioner's second trial. The second trial turned out to be a
"dry run" for the third trial a relatively short time later.
Morrow's decision not to present expert testimony at the third
trial was grounded on his investigation and use of experts at
petitioner's second trial.
As we have explained, the post-conviction court and the
Court of Appeals denied relief in this proceeding on the ground
that petitioner had not satisfied the second -- or prejudice --
prong of the test for post-conviction relief. Because we hold
that petitioner has not demonstrated that Morrow failed to
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment under the
first prong of the post-conviction test, we do not address
petitioner's arguments under the prejudice prong of the post-conviction test. (5)
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Article I, section 11, provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 342-45,
83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).
2. We refer to the minor child by her initial.
3. In this case, the inquiry under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is the
same as the inquiry under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution. See Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 871, 627
P2d 458 (1981) (determining that "[i]t is sufficient for the
purposes of this case to examine the right to counsel as if the
rights assured under each constitution are identical").
4. Petitioner does not challenge Morrow's preparation for
and conduct at the third trial in any other respect.
5. Petitioner also contends that the evidence that the
state presented against him at his third trial was so unreliable
that due-process principles precluded his conviction. Petitioner
did not challenge the reliability of the state's evidence at
trial or on direct appeal. See Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or
352, 867 P2d 1368 (1994) (failure to raise issue at trial that
reasonably could have been raised at trial generally precludes
post-conviction relief on that ground). We decline to address
petitioner's due-process argument on review. | 6d5c2756ff8b828a2a4ad89d49ff654bc024dbe0f03818ba3ffbf078586fe61c | 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z |
854f2933-f840-4e8a-a6d3-802f4a9492e0 | Nesbitt v. Myers | null | S48783 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: November 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TIM NESBITT,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48783)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted October 4, 2001.
Lynn-Marie Crider, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
petition for petitioner.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With him on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11).
PER CURIAM
In this ballot title review proceeding, petitioner
challenges an aspect of the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for a proposed initiative measure that the Secretary of
State has denominated as Initiative Petition 83 (2002). We
review the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(a) to (d). See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out standard
of review).
Petitioner challenges the "no" vote result statement in
the Attorney General's certified ballot title. We have
considered petitioner's arguments and determine that they are not
well taken. Accordingly, we certify to the Secretary of State
the following ballot title for the proposed measure:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: PROHIBITS
ESTABLISHING, EXPANDING INMATE WORK
PROGRAMS DISPLACING, SIGNIFICANTLY
REDUCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES, NON-INMATE WORKERS
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote prohibits
establishing, expanding inmate work programs
displacing, significantly reducing: opportunities for
pre-existing private enterprises or non-inmate workers;
government, nonprofit programs employing
developmentally-disabled.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote retains laws
granting corrections director discretion to establish,
expand inmate work programs displacing, significantly
reducing: pre-existing private enterprises'
opportunities; programs employing developmentally-disabled.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Constitution
currently requires inmate work programs for state
corrections institutions. Constitution currently
instructs the corrections director to avoid, but grants
director discretion to establish or expand, inmate work
programs that would: provide goods or services to the
private sector and displace or significantly reduce
opportunities for pre-existing private enterprises; or
displace or significantly reduce government or
nonprofit programs that employ developmentally-disabled
persons. Measure prohibits director, cities, and
counties from establishing or expanding inmate work
programs that would: provide goods or services to the
private sector and displace or significantly reduce
opportunities for preexisting private enterprises; or
displace or significantly reduce either non-inmate
workers' work opportunities or government or nonprofit
programs that employ developmentally-disabled persons.
Others provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(11). | 478ecb35f50a2e4c905056215dad86cdc9ee42c2f0dd2a423a84594e92c1dfc1 | 2001-11-30T00:00:00Z |
26006f09-c75b-416a-b3f6-30b2cdbc4afc | Rivera v. Dept. of Rev. | null | S48386 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: September 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
VICTORIO C. RIVERA,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent.
(OTC 4487; SC S48386)
On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.
William C. Richardson, Judge pro tempore.
Argued and submitted September 7, 2001.
Victorio C. Rivera, appellant pro se, argued the cause and
filed the brief.
Melisse S. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. With her on
the brief was Hardy Myers, Attorney General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
PER CURIAM
The judgment of the Oregon Tax Court is affirmed.
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Oregon Tax
Court that dismissed taxpayer's complaint (1), denied taxpayer's
motion for summary judgment, and denied taxpayer's motion for
change of judge.
We have considered each of taxpayer's various
submissions in support of his appeal and conclude that none is
well taken.
The judgment of the Oregon Tax Court is affirmed.
1. The complaint sought various forms of relief, the
precise natures of which are not pertinent to our disposition of
this case. | 62e0439d8efecfe600a6d13a0e53cb7a874a509745d0b69aeb5136c18dea625a | 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z |
7cc3e70f-2835-46be-afbf-dc6d01796721 | State v. Jaehnig | null | S48941 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 13, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JEFFREY J. JAEHNIG,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 97NB0467; CA A99180; SC S48941)
En Banc
On motion to reverse and remand filed October 8, 2001.*
Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed
the motion for petitioner on review.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the response for respondent on review.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The motion to reverse and remand is construed as a petition
for review. The petition for review is allowed. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v.
Fugate, 332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001).
*Appeal from Coos County District Court, Paula M. Bechtold, Judge.
158 Or App 348, 978 P2d 1011 (1999). | e28d04d612c105b4ea67e18233981ba3fa4103060852092a64fefc1c5532a67a | 2001-12-13T00:00:00Z |
5b2e2e65-a4b5-4b1d-8c4a-ea80704c7425 | Marcus v. Myers | null | S48720 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LEWIS MARCUS,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
JAMES SAGER,
TRICIA BOSAK,
and OREGON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Intervenors.
(SC S48720)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record August 24, 2001.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner.
Jas. Jeffrey Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the
answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney,
Portland, filed the intervenors' memorandum in support of
Attorney General's certified ballot title.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
In this ballot title review proceeding, petitioner
challenges each aspect of the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of
State denominated as Initiative Petition 66 (2002). We review
the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(a) to (d). See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out standard
of review).
We considered each of petitioner's arguments and find
none to be well taken. Accordingly, we certify to the Secretary
of State the following ballot title for the proposed measure:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REQUIRES INITIATIVE
PROPONENTS, BEFORE OBTAINING UNBIASED
BALLOT TITLE, TO SUBMIT 50% OF
NECESSARY VOTER SIGNATURES
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote requires
proponents of initiative measures, before obtaining
unbiased ballot title, to submit 50% of voter
signatures necessary to get measure on ballot.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects
constitutional requirement that, before obtaining
unbiased ballot title, initiative proponents must
submit 50% of voter signatures necessary for placement
on ballot.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current statutes
require proponents of statewide initiative measures to
obtain a ballot title, before circulating petition to
gather voter signatures necessary to get the measure on
the ballot. Currently, process to obtain impartial
ballot title, including drafting and revision by
Attorney General and potential Supreme Court review,
commences when initiative proponent submits to
Secretary of State document signed by 25 persons
qualified to vote. Measure requires that before ballot
title process can begin, proponents of initiative
measures must submit to Secretary of State for
verification 50% of the voter signatures necessary to
get measure on ballot. Measure places in constitution
requirement that ballot title be unbiased. Provides
that legislature shall prescribe form for ballot titles
and procedures for drafting and appealing them.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10). | e63dc213dac08532d9688409bb4862275729be85406b9675d42b25da34971821 | 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z |
795e975c-7adf-47c7-926d-400f60925f60 | State v. Terry | null | S42818 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 28, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
KARL ANTHONY TERRY,
Appellant.
(CC 94-1337; SC S42818)
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentences of death imposed by the Clackamas County Circuit
Court.
Raymond Bagley, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 6, 2001.
Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were David. E.
Groom, State Public Defender, and Ingrid MacFarlane, Deputy
Public Defender.
Robert E. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General,
and Kathleen Cegla and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorneys
General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.*
DE MUNIZ, J.
The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.
*Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
This case is before us on automatic review of
defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated murder and
sentences of death. See State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 457 n 1,
17 P3d 1045 (2000) (explaining that judgment of conviction and
sentence of death now subject to automatic and direct review in
this court under ORS 138.012(1)). Defendant challenges the pre-trial, guilt, and penalty phases of his trial in 22 assignments
of error. For the reasons set out below, we reject each of
defendant's assignments of error and affirm the convictions for
aggravated murder and sentences of death
I. FACTS
Because the jury found defendant guilty of the crimes
charged, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light
most favorable to the state. State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250,
971 P2d 879 (1999).
On August 6, 1994, Jeffrey Brown (Jeff) invited
defendant to celebrate the birthday of Jeff's brother Dale Brown
(Dale). Defendant and Jeff had spent a lot of time together.
According to defendant's writings, they belonged to an
organization that defendant called the "Order of the Black Dove."
The creed of the Order of the Black Dove, as reflected in
defendant's journals, celebrated violence and other anti-social
behavior.
Defendant accepted the invitation and met Jeff and Dale
at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. that day. The three of them
drank beer together and, eventually, decided to go camping on the
Willamette River. The brothers collected their gear, and Jeff
brought a samurai or ninja knife that he owned. The group
obtained cash from an ATM machine and purchased a six-pack of
beer. At the river, they drank more beer and argued about where
to camp. Witnesses recalled seeing defendant with Jeff and Dale
at the river before 9:00 p.m., and also recalled that defendant
was wearing a black leather jacket. Defendant was seen alone at
the river at about 9:15 p.m.
The next day, Bennie Garry and his two sons went
fishing at the Jefferson Milwaukee boat landing. The younger son
tired of fishing and decided to play elsewhere. A few minutes
later, he returned and reported that there was a dead man nearby.
The older son investigated and returned to tell his father that
the man had a hole in his neck. Garry then found two bodies, one
that appeared to be sleeping on the ground and one that was in a
sleeping bag. He notified police. The police concluded that the
victims had been killed where they were found. Although the
police surveyed the area, they did not find a weapon. The
victims were identified as Jeff and Dale.
Jeff had lived in an apartment above a restaurant where
he worked. The owner of the restaurant let the police into the
apartment, where they made a brief, preliminary search. The
owner noticed that Jeff's keys were on the counter and that the
deadbolt, usually locked, was unlocked. After notifying the
parents and obtaining permission, the police searched Jeff's
apartment more thoroughly and discovered defendant's black
motorcycle jacket inside a backpack. A witness had seen
defendant leaving Jeff's apartment on the night of the murders at
about 9:30 p.m. Defendant was not wearing a jacket at that time.
On August 8, 1994, the police again went to Jeff's
apartment. While searching the apartment, Detective Corson
noticed that the telephone had a redial function. He pressed the
button. The person who answered the call identified himself as
"Karl," i.e., defendant. Defendant acknowledged that he was a
friend of Jeff's. Corson asked if he could speak with defendant
in person at his apartment in Portland. Defendant agreed.
When Corson arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant
gave him a paper sack containing a knife, saying that he was
aware that the police were looking for knives. According to
defendant, the knife had belonged to Jeff. Defendant also handed
Corson a written statement, and agreed to go to a Portland police
station to give an interview. At the interview, Corson advised
defendant of his Miranda rights and recorded defendant's oral
statement. In that statement, defendant indicated that he had
left Dale and Jeff at the river at about 8:00 p.m. He denied
that he had fought with them. Corson and Detective Kidd then
took defendant home but, on the way, stopped for some cigarettes.
At his apartment, defendant invited the police inside and
permitted them to look around. The officers explained to
defendant that they had no right to look inside his apartment
without a warrant and that anything incriminating that they might
find could be used against him. Defendant was cooperative and
signed a consent-to-search form. The police searched the
apartment but did not seize anything.
On August 9, 1994, Kidd telephoned defendant and
obtained defendant's consent to take a polygraph examination.
The next day, when Kidd arrived at defendant's apartment,
defendant refused to submit to the polygraph examination and
walked away, stating that he had given the police all the
information that he had.
On August 19, 1994, the police obtained a search
warrant for defendant's apartment. Four officers -- Corson,
Kidd, Trooper Nguyen, and Sergeant McCrum -- went to defendant's
apartment to execute the warrant. The officers talked to
defendant through the front door. When that discussion was
unavailing, the police forced the door open. Once the police
were inside, defendant sat calmly at a table and watched the
officers. Corson informed defendant that he was not under arrest
and that he was free to leave while the officers conducted the
search. Despite that invitation, defendant remained in the
apartment and even assisted the officers in their search.
The police seized various items from the apartment and
obtained defendant's consent to take a polygraph test and to have
his blood drawn. The police took defendant to the hospital to
obtain a blood sample and then returned him to his apartment.
On August 22, 1994, Corson and Nguyen transported
defendant to the location of the polygraph examination. Before
the examination, the examiner, Detective Bryant, advised
defendant of his Miranda rights. After the examination, Bryant
informed defendant that his answers were deceptive. Defendant
indicated that he wanted to talk to Corson and the others about
his test. During the ensuing conversation with the officers,
McCrum referred to inconsistencies in defendant's statements.
Defendant became agitated and responded, "How about if I let you
talk to my attorney? I want to go home." McCrum responded,
"That's fine." Defendant then sat down and asked McCrum
questions about the investigation, and stated, "How do you expect
me to remember everybody that was outside there that day? I was
drunk." McCrum answered defendant's questions, and defendant
calmed down.
Defendant then went outside with the officers to smoke
a cigarette. Once outside, he discussed with the officers
whether he would have interfered in a fight between Dale and
Jeff. He then began to ramble about having blackouts. He also
asked about what the DNA analysis of the blood on his jacket
might reveal. He was told that, according to preliminary tests,
the blood might be Dale's, but that further testing would be
undertaken. Defendant responded, "I just want to go home. Maybe
you guys should talk to my attorney." McCrum replied, "Okay.
Fine." They began to walk toward the police vehicle. On the way
to the vehicle, defendant asked more questions of the officers
and speculated about why a person might black out. Defendant
asked more questions about the blood on the jacket. After the
officers answered his questions, defendant declared, "I want to
go home." About 7:00 p.m., the officers drove him home.
When they arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant
stated, "I'm fucked either way. No matter what I tell you, the
D.A. is going [to] put me in prison, that's for sure." Corson
told defendant that the district attorney would review the
information that the police provided to him. Defendant inquired
whether the police would appoint him an attorney. Corson said he
could not appoint an attorney for defendant, and explained that,
if defendant wanted an attorney, he should say so, and then asked
whether defendant wanted the officer not to ask any further
questions without an attorney present. Corson elaborated that,
"If you want to have an attorney, you need to tell me and I will
not have any contact or conversation with you." Defendant
replied that he knew his rights and asked for Corson's business
card. Defendant took the card and said that he might call Corson
later that night. He then said that he definitely would call
Corson the next day. The officers left.
About a half-hour later, Corson suggested that Nguyen
call defendant at his apartment. Nguyen called defendant and
asked how he was doing. Nguyen intimated that he knew that
defendant wanted to talk to them, but was having difficulty doing
so. Defendant indicated that he was worried about going to jail
and no longer receiving his social security checks. Nguyen
explained that the police gather information and give that
information to the district attorney to make a charging decision.
Defendant agreed to speak with the police again that evening.
Corson and Nguyen arrived at defendant's residence and
defendant spoke to them in an unmarked patrol car. After being
advised of his rights, and after acknowledging that he was
speaking voluntarily, he told the police his version of the
events that led to the killings. According to defendant, Dale
and Jeff started fighting, Dale killed Jeff, and defendant
killed Dale in Jeff's defense. Defendant agreed to help the
police search for the murder weapon at the scene. Corson wanted
to advise defendant of his constitutional rights again, but
defendant refused, stating that he did not want a lawyer and that
he knew what his rights were. Defendant recited his rights to
the officers. He described to them how and where he had disposed
of a sword. They then drove to the crime scene and engaged in a
fruitless search for the sword. Defendant identified the area in
which the sword should be located. It was getting late in the
evening, and defendant indicated that he would help the police
again the next day. Defendant said that he was hungry, so an
officer took him to buy some food and then took him home.
The next day, Corson and Nguyen arrived at the front
door of defendant's apartment and found a note fixed to the door
stating that defendant did not wish to cooperate further. Later
that day, the police arrested defendant. The police also found a
samurai sword near the location that defendant had identified.
DNA testing of blood on the sword indicated that the blood
belonged to Dale and Jeff. Defendant's black leather jacket also
had Dale's and Jeff's blood on it.
In October 1994, while in detention in the Clackamas
County Jail, defendant told a fellow prisoner that Jeff had
wanted out of the Order of the Black Dove. Defendant also told
the prisoner that the only way out was death, and that he had
killed Jeff with a "big knife."
Defendant was tried and convicted of the murders of
Dale and Jeff, and sentenced to death. This automatic review
followed. ORS 138.012(1).
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENTS TO POLICE
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
permitting defendant's statements to be admitted into evidence.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the
police, in which he claimed that he had killed Dale in Jeff's
defense, citing Article I, sections 9, (1) 11, (2) and 12, (3) of the
Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth, (4) Fifth, (5) Sixth, (6) and
Fourteenth Amendments (7) to the United States Constitution.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
concluding
"that in each of the interviews defendant was not in
custody. To the extent his comments regarding an
attorney could be construed to be an exercise of his
right to counsel, it was waived by his continuing the
conversations with police."
On appeal, defendant argues that his statements were
involuntary and that the trial court should have suppressed them
because his mental health had been fragile, the police had made
an express or implied promise of leniency, and police questioning
had been persistent and involved the "false friend" investigation
technique. In addition, defendant argues that the trial court
should have suppressed his statements because he "equivocally
invoked" his right to counsel, and the police had not clarified
his intent. Although defendant identifies a number of statements
that he made, he challenges only the substance of the interview
that took place on August 22, 1994, during which he confessed to
killing Dale in Jeff's defense.
A. Alleged Involuntariness of Statements
In reviewing the voluntariness of defendant's
statements, this court is bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact if the evidence supports them. Ball v. Gladden,
250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). We are not bound by the
trial court's ultimate holding as to voluntariness, however, and
we assess anew whether the facts are sufficient to meet
constitutional standards. State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 135, 806
P2d 92 (1991).
Defendant has failed to identify any evidence in the
record that provides a basis for a conclusion that the police
made an offer of leniency to defendant or employed some other
fraudulent tactic to obtain defendant's statement. He offers
instances of contact with the police that do not indicate any
misconduct on their part or anything that would have encompassed
some form of deception. He argues that the police obtained a
statement from him "by leading [him] to believe that they cared
about him and were interested in his well-being," and that his
statement "was derived through the implied representation of
leniency that one would expect of a friend." Defendant thus
attempts to construe courtesy and civility as some form of
deceit. The police did not mislead defendant and, indeed,
defendant understood that the police had thought that he was the
prime suspect. He acknowledged that fact, for example, when he
told the police that "the D.A. is going to put me in prison,
that's for sure." Similarly, defendant's reference in his
argument to his "mental health" is not sufficiently developed to
conclude that his state of mind made his statement involuntary.
B. Right to Counsel
Although a trial court's findings of historical fact
are binding on this court if the evidence supports them, we
review legal conclusions regarding the invocation of the right to
counsel for legal error. State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572-73,
789 P2d 1352 (1990). Defendant's references to his right to
counsel during questioning are not a basis for reversal for two
reasons.
First, defendant was not in custody when he mused that
the police perhaps should talk to his attorney. The invocation
of the right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution, requires police questioning to cease only
when a defendant is in custody, i.e., not free to leave.
However, when a person gives an interview, even at a police
station, of his own free will, and is "free to answer questions,
or not to answer, or simply to end the meeting," that person is
not in custody. State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 8, 791 P2d 836 (1990).
Similarly, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a person is in custody only if his or her freedom
has been "significantly restrained"; voluntary participation in a
police interview at the police station generally does not
constitute a significant restraint. Id. (citing Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 US 298, 309, 105 S Ct 1285, 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985) and
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495, 97 S Ct 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714
(1977). Here, defendant referred to an attorney on four
occasions. However, in each instance, which we set out below, he
was free to leave, and he chose not to.
1. After the polygraph examination, when defendant had
indicated that he wanted to talk to the officers about the test,
defendant made an ambiguous statement about "How about if I let
you talk to my attorney" and expressed a desire to "go home." An
officer responded, "That's fine." At that point, defendant sat
back down in his chair.
2. Defendant went outside to smoke a cigarette. He
talked to the officers about the testing of the blood on his
jacket. Defendant stated, "I just want to go home. Maybe you
guys should talk to my attorney," to which an officer responded,
"Okay," and began walking toward the police vehicle to leave.
Defendant then persisted in asking more questions of the
officers. After the officers responded to his questions,
defendant stated again that he wanted to go home, and the
officers took him home.
3. When they arrived at his residence, defendant asked
whether the police would provide him with an attorney. Corson
told defendant that, if he wanted an attorney, he should say so.
Corson asked defendant whether he wanted an attorney. Defendant
replied that he knew his rights; he then accepted a business card
from Corson and discussed when they would speak again.
4. Defendant agreed to speak with the officers again.
When Corson attempted to advise defendant of his rights,
defendant stated that "he didn't want a lawyer and he knew what
his rights were." He acknowledged that his statement that he had
killed Dale was voluntary.
In each of those four instances, defendant was free to
leave, yet he remained. We conclude that defendant was not in
custody when he mentioned the subject of counsel.
Second, each time that defendant mentioned counsel, he
rejected the idea in favor of cooperating with the police and
engaging in further conversation about the investigation, thereby
waiving any protection from interrogation. See State v. Meade,
327 Or 335, 341, 963 P3d 656 (1998) (suspect who has made
equivocal request for counsel thereafter may waive right to have
counsel present during that or later interrogation). In each
instance noted above, defendant appeared to have weighed his
options of remaining silent versus cooperating with the police
and decided that he wanted to cooperate, or at least engage in
dialogue. At times, defendant refused to cooperate, thereby
demonstrating that he was aware of his rights. In fact, he was
so aware of his rights that he could recite them.
We conclude that defendant's constitutional right to
counsel under the Oregon Constitution and the United States
Constitution was not violated, and that his statements properly
were admitted at trial.
III. REFERENCE TO POLYGRAPH AT TRIAL
Defendant maintains that the court erred in denying his
motions to dismiss and for a mistrial because a witness made a
passing reference to the fact that defendant had taken a
polygraph test. Trooper Nguyen testified at trial that he had
been present when defendant was interviewed at the police station
on August 22, 1994, and that he had accompanied Corson when they
drove defendant home. Specifically, Nguyen testified on direct
examination:
"Q: [Prosecutor] And after you got back to the
police station at about 7:40, did you place a telephone
call to the defendant?
"A: [Nguyen] That's correct, I did.
"Q: Before doing that, did you discuss that with
Detective Corson?
"A: Yes, I did.
"Q: What did you -- what was the conversation you
had with [defendant] on that occasion?
"* * * * *
"A: On that day what I did was I placed a
telephone call to [defendant] and spoke to him in
general conversation at first. And then [defendant]
initiated conversation with me further.
"Q: What did you tell him about why you called
when you first called him?
"A: Oh. I stated to [defendant] that I called
because I wanted to see how he was doing because I knew
that the polygraph examination that he took and the
interviews --"
Defense counsel cut off the witness, stating that he had a matter
for the court. Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel
stated that, "[i]t was our understanding, Your Honor, that all
witnesses had been cautioned not to get into the issue of
polygraphs taken, polygraphs not taken." The prosecutor
apologized that he had forgotten to caution Nguyen about
referring to any polygraph and did not know that Nguyen was going
to mention one. Defendant moved for a mistrial or,
alternatively, for a curative instruction. The trial court
observed that Nguyen's answer was not responsive to the question
asked and that no one in the room had expected the answer that
followed. The court adjourned for the day before making a
decision.
The next day, defendant moved to dismiss the case or,
alternatively, for a mistrial, and argued that a curative
instruction was insufficient because implicit in Nguyen's
statement was an inference that defendant had failed the
polygraph examination. The trial court denied those motions and
opined that a curative instruction would be adequate:
"[W]hen words are said in a courtroom, they ring
in our ears and I don't know what they ring to the
juror's ears. I think it was stated in a context that
didn't indicate a result. That, at best, an
instruction that is neutral along the line prepared by
the State that 'disregard the last response' won't
bring that response back to their attention. And I
assume the jurors follow the instructions that judges
give them, that they disregard that evidence."
Consistent with the foregoing observations, the trial court
instructed the jury as follows:
"Yesterday there was an answer given by the
witness on the stand, Mr. Nguyen, that wasn't
responsive to the question asked. That testimony is
stricken. You will disregard it."
This court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a
mistrial motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Larson, 325 Or
15, 22, 933 2d 958 (1997). We recognize that "[t]he trial judge
is in the best position to assess the impact of the complained-of
incident and to select the means (if any) necessary to correct
any problem resulting from it." State v. Wright, 323 Or 8, 12,
913 P2d 321 (1996). With respect to the polygraph, this court
has held that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination
is inherently prejudicial. See State v. Lyon, 304 Or 221,
233-34, 744 P2d 231 (1987) (polygraph evidence not admissible by
stipulation); State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 445, 687 P2d 751 (1984)
(polygraph evidence inadmissible over proper objection); State v.
Middleton, 295 Or 485, 492, 668 P2d 371 (1983) (polygraph
evidence "inherently prejudicial").
Despite the general inadmissibility of polygraph
evidence, law enforcement agencies often use polygraph tests in
the course of investigation and, despite vigilant efforts,
reference to them occasionally finds its way into courtroom
testimony. This court has held that it is not an abuse of
discretion to refuse a motion for a mistrial based on a passing
reference to a polygraph examination when that reference did not
disclose the results of that examination. For example, in State
v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 786 P2d 161 (1990), defense counsel asked
a state witness whether he had reviewed his statement with the
police or a prosecutor, to which he replied, "[w]e went over
roughly the same questions that were asked during the lie
detector test and during tapings they took at [the] police
station." Id. at 162. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which
the trial court rejected. This court affirmed, reasoning that
"[t]he reference did not warrant a mistrial because it was
isolated and made only in passing, the results of the test were
not disclosed, and the state never argued that the test had any
significance to the witness's credibility or to any other issue
in the case." Id. at 164. Likewise, in State v. Eby, 296 Or 63,
673 P2d 522 (1983), this court affirmed a lower court's decision
to deny a mistrial motion based on a witness's brief reference to
a polygraph examination, because "reference to the word
'polygraph,' without more, was so indefinite as to render any
prejudicial effect speculative at best." Id. at 77-78.
In this instance, the trial court found that the
witness's testimony referring to the polygraph examination was
inadvertent and did not imply the results of the examination.
The court was uncertain whether the jury might have understood
the reference to it at all. Although Nguyen's telephone call to
defendant possibly could have indicated a sign of concern on
Nguyen's part that defendant had failed the test, the call also
could have suggested that defendant's performance in the test had
been favorable, because defendant had been released and Nguyen
was calling him at home. Hence, Nguyen's testimony was ambiguous
as to whether defendant's polygraph results were favorable or
unfavorable to defendant.
In such circumstances, a curative instruction is
sufficient to neutralize the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant. "Jurors are assumed to have followed their
instructions, absent an overwhelming probability that they would
be unable to do so." Smith, 310 Or at 26. The instruction did
not mention the critical testimony and informed the jurors to
disregard as unresponsive what Nguyen had mentioned.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motions to dismiss and for a mistrial, in light of
the curative instruction given.
IV. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A. Admissibility of Victim-Impact Evidence
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting victim-impact evidence in the form of a statement that
the victims' mother had read to the jury during the penalty
phase. At the outset of the proceedings, the law did not provide
specifically for the admission of victim-impact evidence during
the penalty phase of an aggravated murder trial. See ORS 163.150
(1993) (outlining penalty-phase procedures prior to allowance of
victim-impact evidence consideration by Oregon juries). Thus,
the trial court granted defendant's motion to limit victim-impact
evidence and ordered the state to notify defendant of any victim-impact evidence that it intended to present. Defendant's motion
did not raise any federal or state issues regarding prohibitions
on ex post facto laws.
Effective July 7, 1995, the legislature amended ORS
163.150(1)(a) to permit a jury to consider, during the penalty
phase, "victim impact evidence relating to the personal
characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the
victim's family[.]" State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 412, 963 P2d
667 (1998). As a result of the legislature's enactment of the
new statute, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and
decided to permit the state to offer victim impact evidence.
In accordance with that ruling, the state offered a
written statement from the victims' mother that the defense had
reviewed. The victims' mother read the following statement to
the jury:
"Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale
Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being
their mother.
"Jeffrey was my first born, my obedient child.
After all, he was told to get off the table before he
fell and broke something in our nursery, so he did fall
off the table and [break] his arm.
"Dale was my baby. My loving child. He would be
outside playing, suddenly stop, come running inside to
say, 'Mommy, I love you,' and run back outside to
continue to play.
"They will never marry, have children, grow old.
They will walk with God forever. They made that choice
as young children. I will miss seeing them grow, but
this I know, I will be with them in God's good time.
"Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale
Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being
their mother.
"This past year at family gatherings as I listened
to my sister-in-law talking about their daughters-in-law, grandchildren, and even a great grandchild, I
delighted in hearing the stories and I hope they will
always continue. And yet at the same time I was
greatly saddened as I will never enjoy the pleasure of
a daughter-in-law. I will never enjoy the pleasure of
a grandchild and I will never enjoy the pleasure of a
great grandchild. Mr. Terry, you took those
opportunities from me when you murdered my sons,
Jeffrey and Dale.
"During this past year, as my brothers and I
rallied around my mother to lend her emotional and
physical support in dealing with her first year as a
widow, I was pleased and proud of our willing ability
to do so, and yet at the same time I was greatly
saddened as I realized that when either my husband or I
reached that stage in life, we will be truly alone, no
children to lift us up as my brothers and I lifted my
mother. Mr. Terry you have taken that from us when you
murdered our sons, Jeffrey and Dale."
Afterwards, defendant renewed his objection to the
victim impact testimony:
"I believe that earlier in the case that there was
a motion regarding victim impact. I am certainly aware
of the recent statute. We'll stand on our previous
objections over the impact."
The trial court then overruled the objection in light of the
amended statute.
On appeal, defendant maintains that the victim impact
evidence at trial violated the ex post facto prohibitions set out
in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, (8) and
Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. (9) The
ex post facto clause of the Oregon Constitution, for example,
forbids the retroactive application of certain types of criminal
statutes. See generally State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 211, 26 P3d
802 (2001) (discussing doctrine).
In this instance, however, defendant failed to preserve
the issue for review, because he made no objection in the trial
court that referred to either the federal or state ex post facto
doctrine. (10) Ordinarily, this court will not consider any matter
assigned as error unless it was preserved in the lower court.
ORAP 5.45(4)(a); see State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 356, 927 P2d 64
(1996) (claim of error not preserved when defendant failed to
object to testimony on grounds asserted on appeal). Indeed,
defendant admits that "[i]t does not appear on the record * * *
that defendant specifically asserted that application of the 1995
version of ORS 163.150 violated the ex post facto provisions of
the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions." Defendant suggests, without
citing a basis in the record, that the issue may have been raised
"off the record." This court, however, will not look outside the
record to find objections.
We also reject defendant's alternative argument that
his more generalized objections preserved the issue for review,
when those objections did not include a citation or other
reference either to Article I, section 21, of the Oregon
Constitution, or to Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, or otherwise suggest that applying the new statute
somehow was constitutionally impermissible. Defendant failed to
preserve the ex post facto issue. See State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183,
188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (stressing justifications for raising
issues before trial court).
Defendant next requests that this court review his ex
post facto arguments as error apparent on the face of the record.
"Even if a party fails to preserve a claim of error, appellate
courts nonetheless possess discretion to consider it if it is
plain error, also known as error 'apparent on the face of the
record.'" State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435-36, 7 P3d 522
(2000). The elements of "error apparent on the face of the
record" are that: "(1) the error is one of law; (2) the point of
law is obvious, i.e., is not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the
error is not one respecting which the court must go outside the
record or select among competing inferences." Lotches, 331 Or at
472. (11) The first and third elements are present here, because
the issue is whether the mother's testimony should have been
admitted into evidence. Thus, the only issue is whether the
error was "obvious," assuming that admitting the evidence in
question was error at all. At the time of trial in this matter,
and even now, the purported error is not obvious. Ex post facto
claims frequently require an intricate constitutional analysis.
See, e.g., Fugate, 332 Or at 211, (engaging in ex post facto
analysis).
When the victims' mother testified in October 1995, no
case from this court or the Court of Appeals had determined
whether the retroactive application of a statute permitting
victim-impact evidence at trial would violate either Article I,
section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, or Article I, section 10,
of the United States Constitution. The first such case was not
decided until four years later. See State v. Metz, 162 Or App
448, 461, 986 P2d 714 (1999) (1995 revision to ORS 163.150
fundamentally changed what evidence may be relevant to the issue
before the jury and thus violated the ex post facto provision of
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution). Deciding
whether an error even occurred would require this court to engage
in the same kind of extensive analysis that the Court of Appeals
undertook in Metz. As a result, we conclude that the alleged
error is not obvious.
Defendant failed to preserve his ex post facto argument
for purposes of appeal, and we decline to address that argument
as error apparent on the face of the record.
B. Alleged Error in Jury Instructions
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it could consider any aspect of
defendant's life in answering the penalty-phase questions.
Quoting the pertinent jury instruction in full illustrates the
alleged error:
"The first question asked by the law as to Count I
is, was the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of Jeffrey Brown committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the death of Jeffrey
Brown would result.
"The first question asked by the law as to Count
II is, was the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of Dale Archie Brown committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that the death of Dale
Archie Brown would result.
"The word deliberately means that state of mind
that examines and considers whether a contemplated act
should or should not be done. Deliberation is present
if the thinking is being done in such a cool mental
state under such circumstances and for such a period of
time as to permit a careful weighing of the proposed
decision. The law, however, does not prescribe a
particular period of time as necessary to constitute
deliberation.
"The second question asked by the law in each
count is, is there a probability, meaning is it more
likely than not, that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
"The third question asked by the law in each count
is, shall a death sentence be imposed.
"The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not apply to the third question. As to this
question, neither side bears any burden of proof. You
must answer this question no if there is any aspect of
the defendant's character or background or any
circumstance of the events that one or more of the
jurors believes justifies a sentence less than death.
"You may consider any aspect of the defendant's
life in your determination of the answers to these
questions. And in answering these questions, you are
to consider any mitigating circumstances received in
evidence including but not limited to the defendant's
age and the extent and severity of the defendant's
prior criminal conduct.
"Mitigating circumstances include those
circumstances that do not justify or excuse the events,
but that in your sole [judgment] may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the degree of culpability and
the appropriate punishment. The defendant need not
establish the existence of a mitigating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt. If you reasonably believe
that a mitigating circumstance exists, then you may
consider it as established.
"If you unanimously answer all three of the
[preceding] questions yes, the law requires that the
penalty should be death. You may answer any of the
first three questions in any order. * * *."
(Emphasis added.) The questions presented to the jury followed
those set out in the then-current version of ORS 163.150(1)(b)
(1995). (12)
Defendant admits that he failed to object at trial to
the sentence in the jury instructions that he now challenges.
Accordingly, defendant requests that this court review the
alleged error as an error of law apparent on the face of the
record. As noted above, this court, in its discretion, may
review such alleged errors if the error is a legal error
discernable in the record, and the point of law is not reasonably
in dispute.
Defendant makes no argument that the purported error is
an obvious one. Indeed, the error is not obvious because Oregon
appellate courts have not ruled on the inclusion of that
particular sentence in penalty-phase jury instructions. In fact,
in conjunction with a slightly different suggested formulation of
the four questions set out in ORS 163.150(b) (1993), this court
previously had approved in substance an instruction that stated:
"You may consider any aspect of defendant's life
in your determination on the fourth question [here, the
third question] and any aspect of defendant's life that
may be relevant in your determination of the first
three questions."
Farrar, 309 Or at 177. (13) There is little, if any, substantive
difference between the two instructions. Defendant has not
demonstrated that the error, if it existed at all, is obvious.
Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the jury
was improperly instructed, and we decline to address the argument
as error apparent on the face of the record.
C. Allegedly Defective Indictment
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to death. He maintains that, because the penalty
phase instruction must include an element of "deliberation" to
make him death eligible, the indictment that charged him had to
specify that he had acted deliberately. He bases that argument
on this court's decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 623 P2d
630 (1981), and on a relatively recent United States Supreme
Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348,
147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000).
The indictment in this case stated:
"The above-named defendant is accused by the Grand
Jury of the County of Clackamas, State of Oregon, by
this indictment of the crimes of AGGRAVATED MURDER (TWO
COUNTS) committed as follows:
"COUNT I (ORS 163.095)
"The said defendant on or about the 7th day of
August 1994, in the County of Clackamas, State of
Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally cause the
death of another human being, to-wit: Jeffrey Ray Brown
by stabbing him, the said defendant having unlawfully
and intentionally, in the course of the same criminal
episode caused the death of an additional human being,
to-wit: Dale Archie Brown by stabbing him * * *.
"COUNT II (ORS 163.095)
"The said defendant on or about the 7th day of
August 1994, in the County of Clackamas, State of
Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally cause the
death of another human being, to-wit: Dale Archie Brown
by stabbing him, the said defendant having unlawfully
and intentionally, in the course of the same criminal
episode caused the death of an additional human being,
to-wit: Jeffrey Ray Brown by stabbing him * * *."
Defendant thus was charged with aggravated murder under
ORS 163.095(d) (1993), which required that the murder be
committed intentionally and that there be more than one murder
victim during the same criminal episode. See ORS 131.505(4)
(1993) (defining "criminal episode").
During the penalty phase, the jury was asked to
determine "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another
would result." See ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) (1993) (setting out
first question that must be asked in penalty phase). As noted,
defendant contends that, under Quinn and Apprendi,
"deliberateness" is an element that had to be set out in the
indictment.
Defendant admits that he "did not object in the trial
court to his sentence on the grounds asserted here." However,
defendant argues that the state's failure to plead "deliberation"
in the indictment deprived the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction and that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. See Ailes v. Portland
Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 383, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including
on appeal). Defendant also argues that this court should review
the matter as "error apparent on the face of the record."
Even assuming that defendant were correct that
deliberateness is an element of the crime that must be pled in
the indictment -- a claim that we consider and reject for the
reasons explained below -- such a defect would not have deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction defines the scope of
proceedings that may be heard by a particular court of law and is
conferred by statute or the constitution. (14) See Charles E.
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure, §11 at 95 (13th ed 1989)
("A criminal court has jurisdiction, i.e., the power to determine
whether an accused is guilty of a particular crime and, if so, to
impose a punishment therefor, if it has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person of the accused."); see also
State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 393, 927 P2d 79 (1996) (holding that
legislature granted two separate kinds of jurisdiction to
district courts, i.e., same criminal jurisdiction as justice
court and concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts of
misdemeanors for which punishment may not exceed $3,000 fine).
Under the Oregon Constitution, circuit courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over all actions unless a statute or rule of law
divests them of jurisdiction. See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), §
2 (not changing jurisdictional scheme set out in original Article
VII); Or Const, Art VII (Original), § 9 (all jurisdiction not
vested by law in another court shall be vested in circuit
courts). In particular, the Oregon Constitution states that,
once a person has been indicted by a grand jury, that person can
be charged "in a circuit court with the commission of any crime
punishable as a felony." Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 5(3).
The trial court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction to try
defendant for the crime of aggravated murder, even if the
indictment arguable was defective. (15)
Defendant claims that, even if his jurisdictional
challenge is not well taken, this court should address the merits
of the issue as an "error apparent on the face of the record."
As noted, for this court to do so, the alleged error must be
"obvious, i.e., not reasonably in dispute." Lotches, 331 Or at
472. An analysis of Quinn and Apprendi, in appropriate context,
demonstrates that, not only is the alleged error not obvious, in
fact, there was no error.
In Quinn, this court stated that the new death penalty
statute enacted by initiative in 1978 and at issue in that case
"restore[d] deliberation as an additional element of
murder for which a greater penalty, death, may be
imposed much as it was under the pre-1971 statutory
scheme. Although it is in the form of an enhanced
penalty statute, an effect of the new statute is to
indirectly reestablish a crime of deliberate first
degree murder punishable by death."
290 Or at 403 (footnote omitted).
Thus, under the statutory scheme at issue in Quinn,
"deliberation" served to enhance the penalty for intentional
murder from life imprisonment to death, and indirectly created a
separate crime of deliberate murder. Following this court's
decision in Quinn, the legislature enacted statutes creating the
crime of aggravated murder. Separate crimes of murder and
aggravated murder are now defined statutorily. Because defendant
was charged under a different statutory scheme from the one at
issue in Quinn, that case does not support defendant's argument.
In fact, in State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 172, 752 P2d
1136 (1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds 492 US 914,
109 S Ct 3235, 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989), this court rejected an
argument much like the one defendant makes here. In Wagner, the
court described the aggravated-murder statutes and accompanying
pleading requirements as follows:
"The offense with which this defendant is charged is
aggravated murder as defined in ORS 163.095(2)(a)(E)
[murder of a witness], * * *. The ultimate facts that
make up that offense are clearly alleged in the
indictment. To be guilty of aggravated murder one does
not need to act 'deliberately.' If one is guilty of
aggravated murder but the jury does not unanimously
find that the perpetrator acted deliberately, the
guilty one is not sentenced to death but is yet guilty
of aggravated murder. There is no requirement of
pleading an indictment that requires the indictment to
set forth possible penalties that the law may fix for
guilt on a particular charge."
305 Or at 172 (emphasis added); see State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 53,
786 P2d 111 (1990) (Wagner "holds only that the three [penalty-phase] questions need not be alleged" in the indictment).
Furthermore, the Oregon Constitution now provides that:
"[T]he penalty for aggravated murder as defined by law
shall be death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings
as provided by law and otherwise shall be life
imprisonment with minimum sentence as provided by law."
Or Const, Art I, § 40.
Defendant's reliance on Apprendi also is misplaced.
Apprendi involved a defendant who fired several shots into the
house of an African-American family. The indictment did not
charge any "hate crime" sentencing enhancement under New Jersey
law. The defendant pleaded guilty to several counts set out in
the indictment, including second-degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose. In the penalty phase, however, the
sentence corresponding to that count was enhanced as a hate crime
beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying crime of second-degree unlawful firearm possession. The United States Supreme
Court held that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 US at 476,
120 S Ct at 2362-63. Under Apprendi, in the absence of a jury
trial to determine the enhanced sentence, the defendant would
have had to plead guilty to an indictment that contained the
factual findings necessary to support the sentence enhancement.
In this case, however, and unlike Apprendi, the prescribed
maximum statutory penalty for the crime of aggravated murder is
death and, moreover, the jury, not the trial court, decided that
defendant acted deliberately.
In summary, under the current aggravated murder scheme,
a sentence of death is not a "penalty enhancement." Rather, a
sentence of death is one of the penalties, as is life
imprisonment, that may be imposed for the commission of the crime
of aggravated murder. Because a sentence of death is not an
enhancement under the aggravated murder scheme, the state is not
required to allege in the indictment that the murder was
committed deliberately.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered defendant's other assignments of
error and every argument made in support of those assignments.
Based on our review, we conclude that no error occurred as
claimed in any of the assignments of error, including the ones
not discussed in this opinion.
The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.
1. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."
2. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
3. Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:
"No person shall be * * * compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself."
4. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."
5. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:
"No person * * * shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]"
6. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
7. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides, in part:
"No State shall * * * deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"
8. Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:
"No ex post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed[.]"
9. Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, provides, in part:
"No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto
Law * * *."
10. Defendant's prior objections to the victim-impact
evidence were tendered before the legislature changed the law.
11. Once those elements have been satisfied, an appellate
court must exercise discretion whether to review the purported
error. In deciding whether to review an error of law apparent on
the face of the record, an appellate court may consider: the
competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the
gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case;
how the error came to the court's attention; and whether the
policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error
have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the
trial court, in some manner, was presented with both sides of the
issue and given an opportunity to correct any error. Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991).
12. ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1995) provided:
"Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."
In this case, the jury did not consider subsection (C),
regarding provocation, so that subsection (D), ordinarily the
"Fourth Question," became in this case the "Third Question."
13. The court in Farrar suggested that the four questions
that ORS 163.150(b) requires could be asked in the following
manner:
"1. Was the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that death of the
deceased or another would result?
"2. Is there a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society? In
determining this issue, you shall consider any
mitigating circumstances offered in evidence,
including, but not limited to, the defendant's age, the
extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal
conduct and the extent of the mental and emotional
pressure under which the defendant was acting at the
time the offense was committed.
"(If raised by the evidence) 3. Was the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased?
"4. Should defendant receive a death sentence?
You should answer this question 'no' if you find that
there is any aspect of defendant's character or
background, or any circumstances of the offense, that
you believe would justify a sentence less than death."
Farrar, 309 Or at 177.
14. Subject matter jurisdiction differs from personal
jurisdiction, which governs the assertion over the person of the
accused. See ORS 131.205-235 (1993) (defining principles of
personal jurisdiction in criminal matters).
15. An indictment, if it is defective, may be reviewed for
error rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See,
e.g., State v. Trueax, 315 Or 396, 845 P2d 1291 (1993)
(discrepancy between caption of indictment charging sodomy in
third degree, required remand for entry of conviction for sodomy
in third degree, not new trial); State v. Woodson, 315 Or 314,
845 P2d 203 (1993) (amendment of indictment to allege attempted
rape rather than rape was not error). | c40df556e3f87ce72dd149330df2189ea134b85e2139139dd98675821682c3dd | 2001-12-28T00:00:00Z |
994b0d0b-a54b-4e50-a197-22f818e9814c | Kain v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 13, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KRIS KAIN and TRICIA BOSAK,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
BILL SIZEMORE,
Intervenor.
(SC S48796)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted November 1, 2001.
Margaret S. Olney, Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioners.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With her on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Gregory W. Byrne, Byrne & Associates, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the memorandum in support for intervenor.
DURHAM, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
DURHAM, J.
This is a proceeding under ORS 250.085(2) in which
petitioners challenge a ballot title certified by the Attorney
General for Initiative Petition 91 (2002). The proposed
initiative, if adopted, would amend the Oregon Constitution by
restricting the authority of government employers to sign certain
agreements regarding payment of money to unions and by relieving
public employee unions of the duty to represent or provide
services to employees who do not join the union or pay for its
services.
Initiative Petition 91 (2002) provides:
"BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OREGON:
"The Constitution of the State of Oregon is amended by
adding the following section:
"Section 1. No government employer shall sign or
otherwise make a contract or agreement (including an
extension to a contract or agreement in existence as of
the effective date of this section) that (a) requires a
public employee who is not a member of a union to pay
money to a union for any reason, or (b) authorizes
deducting money from the paycheck of a public employee
who is not a member of a union, and transferring the
money to a union or its agent or assign without the
employee's written authorization. No public employee
union shall be required to represent or provide other
services to a public employee who is not a member of
the union or does not pay the union for its services.
No employee shall be discriminated against for not
joining or being represented by a public employee
union."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title for the proposed initiative:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
IN UNIONIZED
WORKPLACE CANNOT SIGN
CERTAIN LABOR CONTRACTS,
UNIONS NEED
NOT REPRESENT NONMEMBERS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits public
employers in unionized workplace from signing contracts
requiring nonunion employees to pay money to union;
union may refuse to represent nonpayers.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects amendment
prohibiting public employers from signing contracts
requiring nonunion employees to pay money to union;
retains laws requiring unions to represent nonpayers.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently, public
employers in workplace where majority of employees have
voted to be represented by union may sign labor
contracts requiring employees who are not union members
to make payments in lieu of dues to union for
representation in collective bargaining. Unions must
represent all employees in bargaining unit, including
nonmembers. Measure prohibits public employers in
unionized workplaces from signing contracts requiring
nonmember employees to pay money to union for any
purpose and from deducting money from paycheck of any
nonmember for transfer to union without employee's
authorization. Unions not required to represent public
employees who are not union members or who do not pay
for union services. Prohibits discrimination against
public employees for not joining or being represented
by union. Other provisions."
This court reviews a ballot title for "substantial
compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035." ORS
250.085(5). Petitioners challenge the sufficiency of the
caption, result statements, and summary of the Attorney General's
ballot title. We have reviewed petitioners' challenges and, with
the exception of the argument regarding the result statements
discussed below, we conclude that the Attorney General's ballot
title substantially complies with statutory requirements.
ORS 250.035(2)(b) requires a "yes" vote result
statement that is a "simple and understandable statement of not
more than 25 words that describes the result if the state measure
is approved." ORS 250.035(2)(c) requires a "no" vote result
statement that is a "simple and understandable statement of not
more than 25 words that describes the result if the state measure
is rejected."
Petitioners argue that the term "nonunion" in each
result statement is not appropriate, because it is either
inaccurate or confusing. They point out that the phrase
"nonunion employees" does not appear in the proposed initiative,
is not synonymous with and does not describe employees who are
not union members, and generally refers (inaccurately, they
assert) to any employees who are not members of the union's
bargaining unit, such as confidential, supervisory, or managerial
employees. (1)
The statutory requirements that the result statements
be "understandable" and "describe[] the result" of approval and
rejection of the proposed initiative, ORS 250.035(2)(b), (c), are
designed to protect the voters' interest in an accurate
disclosure of those respective results. This court has stated
that misstatements, even by implication, of either existing law
or the law that the proposed measure would enact are not
appropriate in a ballot title. Novick/Bosak v. Myers, 333 Or 18,
___, ___ P3d ___ (November 30, 2001) (slip op at ___); Dale v.
Kulongoski, 321 Or 108, 113, 894 P2d 462 (1995). Such
misstatements potentially invite misleading arguments to support
passage or defeat of the proposed initiative.
We believe that the Attorney General intends the phrase
"nonunion employees" in the result statements to refer to members
of a public employee bargaining unit who are not union members
and who, therefore, do not pay union dues, but who may make fair-share payments in lieu of dues to the union. (2) The question
before the court is whether "nonunion employees" accurately
describes that group of public employees.
The dictionary definition of "nonunion" is:
"1 : not belonging to or affiliated with a trade
union * * * 2 : not recognizing or favoring trade
unions or trade unionists."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1539 (unabridged ed 1993).
The first of those definitions is broader in scope than
the employee group to which the Attorney General intends to
refer. That definition includes any employee "not belonging to
or affiliated with" a union, i.e., a group that embraces not only
bargaining unit members who pay no money to a union but also all
other employees of the public employer, including supervisory and
confidential employees. (3)
The second of the dictionary's definitions refers to a
distinct employee group, i.e., those who do not recognize or
favor unions. That definition carries the implication of
political or philosophical opposition to unions. Indeed, the
dictionary's word for that belief system is a related term,
"nonunionism," which the dictionary defines as follows: "[T]he
theories, opinions, or practices of those who do not support
trade unions[.]" Id.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the term chosen
by the Attorney General, "nonunion," does not describe accurately
the employee group to which the Attorney General meant to refer.
Moreover, the inaccuracy of that term likely will produce voter
confusion. Voters familiar with the definitions discussed above
could infer incorrectly from the Attorney General's result
statements that the proposed initiative would preclude
contractually mandated payments to unions by supervisory and
confidential employees, as well as all employees who politically
oppose unions.
Another term in the result statements contributes to
the likelihood of voter confusion from the term "nonunion." The
Attorney General uses the term "nonpayers" in each result
statement, apparently intending to refer to a union's bargaining
unit members who do not pay money to the union. However, because
the result statements imply that the terms "nonpayers" and
"nonunion employees" are synonyms, the term "nonpayers" simply
reinforces, rather than eliminates, the problems noted above
regarding the term "nonunion."
The Attorney General argues that petitioners' criticism
of the Attorney General's phrase, "nonunion employees," is faulty
because there is no meaningful difference between that phrase and
the phrase that petitioners recommend to the court, "non-union
members." That argument is unresponsive to the question before
the court, that is, whether the ballot title certified by the
Attorney General substantially complies with statutory
requirements. ORS 250.085(5). Consequently, we do not address
that argument. (4)
We conclude that, because the term "nonunion" is
incorrect and confusing in this context, the Attorney General's
result statements do not state accurately "the result" if the
voters approve or reject the proposed initiative. ORS
250.035(2)(b), (c).
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
1. Petitioners rely in part on ORS 243.650(19), which
defines "public employee" as follows:
"'Public employee' means an employee of a public
employer but does not include elected officials,
persons appointed to serve on boards or commissions,
incarcerated persons working under section 41, Article
I of the Oregon Constitution, or persons who are
confidential employees, supervisory employees or
managerial employees."
2. ORS 243.650(10) defines "fair-share agreement" in part
as follows:
"'Fair-share agreement' means an agreement between
the public employer and the recognized or certified
bargaining representative of public employees whereby
employees who are not members of the employee
organization are required to make an in-lieu-of-dues
payment to an employee organization except as provided
in ORS 243.666."
3. ORS 243.650(23) defines "supervisory employee" in part
as follows:
"'Supervisory employee' means any individual
having authority in the interest of the employer to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection therewith, the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature but requires the use of independent judgment."
ORS 243.650(6) defines "confidential employee" as
follows:
"'Confidential employee' means one who assists and
acts in a confidential capacity to a person who
formulates, determines and effectuates management
policies in the area of collective bargaining."
4. Because ORS 250.085(5) focuses the court's review on
the Attorney General's ballot title, the Attorney General's
criticisms of alternative words or phrases suggested by a ballot
title challenger often play no role in the court's analysis. See
generally Order Adopting Temporary Amendments to ORAP 11.30,
Chief Justice Order No. 01-111 (October 24, 2001), Oregon
Appellate Court Advance Sheets No. 23 at A-13 (November 12, 2001)
(deleting from ORAP 11.30(4)(b) requirement that petitioner
include in body of petition proposed ballot title that petitioner
believes would comply substantially with statutory requirements). | 1a4389eeebcc03a896f2ef37b98707ce7056380faea3b35a3c8ba314b71d6027 | 2001-12-13T00:00:00Z |
56e536d7-54e8-44ac-aaf9-adbf280a687c | State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman | null | S47733 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: December 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of
Jacara Murelle Ahlgren-Stillman,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel STATE OFFICE FOR SERVICES
TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Petitioner on Review,
and
LAURA AHLGREN,
Respondent,
v.
DONALD E. STILLMAN,
aka Donnie Stillman,
Respondent on Review.
_____________________________
In the Matter of
Keith Alexander Stillman,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel STATE OFFICE FOR SERVICES
TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Petitioner on Review,
and
LAURA AHLGREN,
Respondent,
v.
DONALD E. STILLMAN,
aka Donnie Stillman,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 96-275J-05; CA A107034; SC S47733)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 9, 2001.
Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
James A. Palmer, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.
Lynn M. Travis and Mary Kane, of the Juvenile Rights
Project, Inc., Portland, filed a response for minor children.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Jack A. Billings, Judge. 167 Or App 446, 1 P3d 500 (2000).
**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Balmer, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial
court terminated father's parental rights in his two minor
children, because of his incarceration and drug-related
activities. See ORS 419B.504 (1997) (providing for termination
of parental rights if court finds, inter alia, parent unfit by
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to child).
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not
demonstrate that father was unfit at the time of the termination
hearing. State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 167 Or App 446, 1 P3d
500 (2000). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals that is
essentially an appeal from a suit in equity, ORS 419A.200(5); ORS
19.415(3), this court may review de novo or may limit its review
to questions of law. ORS 19.415(4); see also Ken Leahy
Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 571, 994
P2d 112 (1999) (so stating). In this instance, because we reach
issues that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
address, and some of those issues are fact-dependent, we elect to
review the record de novo.
Before his most recent conviction and incarceration,
father abused methamphetamines and, before father met mother, he
had been convicted twice on drug charges. In fact, father met
mother when both were in a drug treatment program. They
eventually had a daughter (born in 1991) and a son (born in
1993). After father's third arrest in 1996 on a federal charge
of possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and in
light of mother's persistent drinking and methamphetamine use,
the State Office of Services to Children and Families (SOSCF) (1)
sought to terminate their parental rights. SOSCF postponed
action on that petition, notwithstanding father's impending
criminal trial and likely incarceration, and ultimately withdrew
the petition in January 1998, after father entered prison,
because mother appeared to be doing well in her efforts to
overcome her own drug problem. However, mother again relapsed
and, in August 1998, SOSCF filed another petition to terminate
both mother's and father's parental rights. At the subsequent
termination hearing in June 1999, mother conditionally stipulated
to terminating her rights; father did not. (2)
When father was arrested, SOSCF initially placed the
children for a short period in temporary care. Soon afterwards,
however, SOSCF placed the children with a foster parent in the
extended family, namely, mother's former step-mother. At the
time of the termination hearing, that foster parent could retain
the children only for a few more months. Thus, at least one
transition was in the offing for the children, although that
transition likely would to be to another member of the highly
supportive extended family.
At the termination hearing, SOSCF's case centered on
the children's need for permanence. A social worker who provided
counseling to the children testified on behalf of SOSCF that the
children needed permanency, predictability, and stability in
their lives, and that changes, such as those that might follow
from the pending termination proceeding, created tension for
them. For example, she testified that the older child exhibited
"parentified" behavior in the months preceding the termination
hearing, in that the child assumed an adult role in the foster
home in trying to take control of her situation. The child also
had gained a significant amount of weight during that period.
According to the social worker, that weight gain indicated "a
great deal of anxiety in her life and that she was probably
overeating to try to reduce that." Further, the social worker
testified:
"[T]hese children are very similar to other
children I work with that have been in long-term foster
care. They need permanency, they need safety, they
need to know where they're going to be next week, next
month, next year, and where they go to high school and
where they're going to be coming home from vacations.
"* * * * *
"Their life goes on hold, it continues to be on
hold developmentally. It's very difficult for a child
to continue to make progress in their life, go through
the developmental stages that they need to go through
to become adults if even their present is tentative,
that they don't know what's going to be predictable for
them.
"* * * Sometimes I've referred to children like
this as the ghost children because they seem
insubstantial in their connection with the world and
with reality and with present time because they're so
insecure about what's going to happen for them."
Other than that general testimony, which principally
concerned the effect of foster care on the children, there is
very little psychological evidence in the record pertaining to
the children. The record contains no written mental health
evaluation of either child. Indeed, the only testimony
concerning the psychological condition of the younger child was
that he was relatively quiet and reserved, and that he worried
about his parents. Moreover, there is virtually nothing in the
record that sheds light on any ill effects that the children
might have suffered from their parents' involvement with drugs
before the children were placed in foster care. (3)
SOSCF also focused on the possibility that father would
be unable to overcome his addiction to drugs and the likelihood
of a relapse. The agency introduced a psychological evaluation
of father, which was performed over two years before the
termination hearing, and several months before father's
conviction and sentencing. The psychologist who examined father
concluded that father at that time was likely to relapse because
he was externally motivated, i.e., he was motivated to cooperate
with counseling and treatment not through a sincere desire to
improve himself, but merely out of a desire to avoid the
consequences of noncompliance.
The psychological report concluded, however, that
"[c]hemical dependency is the primary psychological problem that
would impair [father's] ability to function as a parent." At the
termination hearing, the psychologist elaborated, testifying
that, other than chemical dependency, father had no serious
mental health problems: "He has * * * the ability to [be a good
parent] and lacks any serious psychological problems that would *
* * make that impossible or prevent him from doing that if that
is what he tried to do." SOSCF presented no more recent evidence
of father's mental health status.
Father, on the other hand, submitted evidence that he
had made progress in rehabilitation during his incarceration.
Father completed a multi-phase drug treatment program that began
before father's trial on the drug charges. The clinical
supervisor in charge of that program testified that, when father
entered the program, he was angry and resistant, he minimized the
significance of his addiction, and he was motivated to complete
the program out of a desire to obtain a lighter sentence at his
trial. However, after several weeks, the counselor observed that
father had made a significant turnaround in his attitude. At the
completion of the first phase of his treatment, father asked for
an additional four weeks of treatment. He was highly successful
in that program. The clinical supervisor also testified that
father sincerely came to appreciate the effect that his drug use
had had on his children and was addressing the deficits in his
life so that he could maintain custody of the children.
In addition, father's therapist for the second phase of
the drug treatment program stated that, notwithstanding a brief
relapse before beginning that phase, father was the most
successful client with whom she had ever worked. (4) Father also
took parenting classes, including an extensive, 72-hour parenting
class accredited through Chemeketa Community College. He
completed a 12-week human sexuality class and a 62-hour real
estate class. Father organized a prison 12-step program and
worked for the forest service. In all those endeavors, father
drew uniformly high praise from the officials in charge. (5)
At the time of the termination hearing, father's
remaining prison time was approximately four months. After that,
father predicted that he would reside in a halfway house or
possibly in home confinement. Father admitted that the children
might have to remain in foster care for as long as a year, until
he was able to find a job and provide a home for them. An SOSCF
representative testified that, given the amount of time that the
children already had spent in foster care, that period was simply
too long. She stated that SOSCF "is not willing to consider
[father] and is not able to consider him as a resource for his
children because he is incarcerated. What the children need is
permanency." The representative also testified that it was "in
the best interests of these children not to continue to wait any
longer as they've already waited for three years." She added
that
"the concern is his current incarceration, the length
of time it would take him to transition back into the
community to demonstrate that he is in fact clean and
sober. And that will take a long period of time in
order for him to demonstrate that. Based on that, the
agency does not feel it's in the children's best
interest to have them remain in foster care
indefinitely while the father demonstrates that to the
agency and to the community."
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence
that father was unfit. See ORS 419B.521(1) (setting clear and
convincing evidence standard). It based that finding on what
that court styled as father's "criminal conduct which impairs his
ability to adequately care for [the children], that's by virtue
of his incarceration." It also found that the children needed
permanency immediately. It found that father's desire to make
the children wait until he had established himself was an example
of father putting his needs ahead of the children's. The court
also thought that father's continued incarceration and the
likelihood that father would relapse into addiction upon release
from prison "pose[d] an unacceptable risk to the mental and
emotional well being of the children." The trial court therefore
terminated father's parental rights and committed the children to
the care of SOSCF.
On father's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The
court reviewed the evidence regarding father's incarceration and
noted that, in light of the short duration of the balance of his
sentence and potential time to be spent in a halfway house, "such
a relatively short period of separation" does not render a parent
unfit. Stillman, 167 Or App at 457. In addition, the court held
that SOSCF had not proved that father's prior drug use had made
him unfit as a parent. "[T]he point is not that we are certain
that father will succeed. Rather, the record does not show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he will not." Id. at 459.
The court concluded:
"On this record, neither father's incarceration
nor the possibility of a relapse provides clear and
convincing evidence that father is presently unfit
under ORS 419B.504 (1997). Accordingly, we need not
decide whether the conduct or condition that makes
father unfit also makes integration of his children
into his home improbable within a reasonable time."
Id. (citations omitted). Chief Judge Deits dissented,
maintaining that father was unfit and that the children's
integration into the father's home was improbable within a
reasonable time. Id. at 459-67 (Deits, C. J., dissenting). We
granted SOSCF's petition for review.
Generally, a court may terminate parental rights for
the purpose of freeing a child for adoption if the court finds
that termination is in the best interest of the child. ORS
419B.500. The specific bases for termination are set out in ORS
419B.502 to ORS 419B.508. Those statutes provide for termination
based on such circumstances as extreme parental misconduct,
unfitness, neglect, or abandonment. The statute that sets out
the formula for a termination upon a finding of parental
unfitness, ORS 419B.504, provides:
"The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court
finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child
and integration of the child into the home of the
parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable
time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.
In determining such conduct and conditions, the court
shall consider but is not limited to the following:
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as to
render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the
child for extended periods of time.
"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel
or sexual nature.
"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating
liquors or controlled substances to the extent that
parental ability has been substantially impaired.
"(4) Physical neglect of the child.
"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make the return of the child possible or failure of the
parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable
efforts by available social agencies for such extended
duration of time that it appears reasonable that no
lasting adjustment can be effected.
"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's
ability to provide adequate care for the child."
(Emphasis added.) The emphasized parts of the statute were added
in 1997. Or Laws 1997, ch 873, § 7.
Until 1997, ORS 419B.504 had provided that "integration
of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable
in the foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change." ORS 419B.504 (1995) (emphasis added); see Or Laws
1997, ch 873, § 7 (indicating changes to statute). The effect of
the amendment was to substitute the phrase "reasonable time" for
the phrase "foreseeable future." The former version of the
statute did not define "foreseeable future." By contrast, a
"reasonable time" now is defined. It "means a period of time
that is reasonable given a child's emotional and developmental
needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments." ORS
419A.004(21).
The legislative intent respecting the statute is
crucial to this case. To determine that intent, we look first to
the text and context of the statute. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). The text of
the statute is the best evidence of legislative intent. Id. at
610. If that intent is clear from the text, read in context,
further analysis is unnecessary. Id.
ORS 419B.504 sets out a two-part test for determining
whether to terminate parental rights, both parts of which must be
met before the court orders termination. First, the court must
address a parent's fitness: The court must find that the parent
is "unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental
to the child." That, in turn, requires a two-part inquiry: The
court must find that: (1) the parent has engaged in some conduct
or is characterized by some condition; and (2) the conduct or
condition is "seriously detrimental" to the child. Second -- and
only if the parent has met the foregoing criteria -- the court
also must find that the "integration of the child into the home
of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time
due to conduct or conditions not likely to change." That second
part of the test for termination requires the court to evaluate
the relative probability that, given particular parental conduct
or conditions, the child will become integrated into the parental
home "within a reasonable time."
The use of that phrase, "within a reasonable time,"
reflects a legislative concern that SOSCF and the courts achieve
a permanent home for a child more promptly than the phrase that
formerly was in the statute, "the foreseeable future," suggested.
In amending the statute, the legislature did not provide for a
specific time period for integration, but provided instead for
such a period of time as "is reasonable given a child's emotional
and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting
attachments." ORS 419A.004(21). That inquiry is child-specific.
It calls for testimony in psychological and developmental terms
regarding the particular child's requirements.
ORS 419B.090 demonstrates the broader context of the
two inquiries under ORS 419B.504. That statute declares that it
is the "policy of the State of Oregon to recognize that children
are individuals who have legal rights." ORS 419B.090(2)(a).
Those rights include the right to "[p]ermanency with a safe
family." ORS 419B.090(2)(a)(A). The legislature added that
statement of policy in 1997, during the same session in which it
revised ORS 419B.504. See Or Laws 1997, ch 873, § 2a (adding
statement). Consistent with the foregoing legislative policy,
the focus of both parts of the test for termination under ORS
419B.504 is on the detrimental effect of the parent's conduct or
condition on the child, not just the seriousness of the parent's
conduct or condition in the abstract. Thus, the court first must
identify the parent's conduct or condition, and then measure the
degree to which that conduct or condition has had a seriously
detrimental effect on the child.
In ORS 419B.504, the legislature has provided a non-exclusive list of six examples of conduct and conditions that
courts must consider, both in determining whether a parent is
unfit and in determining whether the parent's disqualifying
circumstances are not likely to change. But those statutory
examples are just that -- examples. The focus of that part of
the statute is on the parent's conduct or condition.
A significant part of the discussion and briefing in
this case has centered on the directive to the court to consider
"criminal conduct that impairs the parent's ability to provide
adequate care for the child." ORS 419B.504(6). As noted, the
trial court relied on that factor in concluding that father is
unfit and it was one of the bases for SOSCF's petition to
terminate father's parental rights.
The wording of ORS 419B.504(6) is broad. It authorizes
the court to consider any "[c]riminal conduct" that "impairs the
parent's ability to provide adequate care for the child."
"Criminal conduct" refers to an act -- under this statute, a
criminal act of the parent; it is not a reference to a
"condition" that affects the parent. Moreover, the criminal
conduct must "impair" the parent's ability to provide adequate
care for the child. Criminal conduct that meets those statutory
requirements could include such conduct as abetting the child's
own criminal conduct, stealing the child's property, or
soliciting the child to commit a crime. The question is,
however: Do the sequellae of a parent's criminal acts, such as
flight, concealment, or incarceration, also qualify as "criminal
conduct" under ORS 419B.504(6)?
That depends. The plain words of the statute require
the conduct to be "criminal." Flight and concealment -- to use
but two examples -- themselves may be criminal acts and, hence,
"criminal" conduct. Incarceration, on the other hand, is a
possible consequence of criminal conduct, but it is not, itself,
such conduct. Thus, it would be error for a court to rely on an
incarceration as "criminal conduct" and to base a decision to
terminate parental rights specifically on the basis of ORS
419B.504(6). (6)
However, the foregoing discussion does not place
incarceration, and its consequences for the children, outside the
purview of the court. A parent's imprisonment for a criminal act
is, in any event, a "condition" of the kind that the court is
entitled to consider under the wording of the first part of ORS
419B.504. It cannot be disputed reasonably that any prolonged
incarceration could be a condition so "seriously detrimental to
the child" as to warrant a finding of unfitness." (7) With that in
mind, we return to the analysis that the Court of Appeals
majority followed in this case.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of father's
fitness by considering his conduct or condition. In so doing,
the court focused principally on father's history of substance
abuse and the possibility that he would relapse. The court
concluded that the record did not establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that that conduct or condition rendered
father presently unfit under ORS 419B.504, given father's
activities while in prison in attempting to overcome his
addiction and to become a more responsible parent. Stillman, 167
Or App at 459.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, given father's
sincere and substantial efforts to address his drug problem while
in prison, father's history of drug abuse was not "conduct or
condition" that rendered him unfit at the time of the termination
hearing. In reaching that conclusion, we do not mean to minimize
the significant risks to which father subjected the children by
operating a drug manufacturing laboratory in the family home,
both in terms of the danger from the laboratory itself and of the
risks associated with having dangerous individuals in the home.
Indeed, it even might be true that, as the Court of Appeals
suggested, an attempt by SOSCF to terminate father's parental
rights at around the time of his arrest might have led to a
different outcome. But all that has occurred since that time
indicates that father's irresponsible behavior will not be
repeated. The statute requires us to evaluate whether father
presently, i.e., at the time of the termination hearing, was
unfit. On this record, the state has not shown that he was.
The Court of Appeals considered only briefly the fact
of father's incarceration. It noted that, at the time of trial,
father had four months left on his federal sentence and then
would have to spend several more months in a halfway house
establishing his ability to care for the children. The court
concluded that, in light of that relatively short period of
separation remaining before the family could be reunited,
father's incarceration also did not render him unfit. (8) That line
of analysis, however, improperly conflated the requirements of
the two parts of the test for determining whether termination of
parental rights is appropriate. It is only under the second,
"integration" part of the test under ORS 419B.504 that the court
considers whether there is a probability of integration of the
child into the parent's home "within a reasonable time." As we
have explained, the "fitness" inquiry comes first, and the period
of time that father's inability personally to care for the
children would continue adds nothing to the court's initial
determination respecting father's fitness.
As we have said, father's incarceration is a condition
of the kind that we may consider under ORS 419B.504 and, if it
were seriously detrimental to the children, would be sufficient
to warrant a finding of unfitness, notwithstanding the relatively
short period that it was likely to continue. Clearly, father's
unfinished incarceration and the period of time that he would be
required to spend in a halfway house precluded him personally
from providing adequate care for the children or otherwise
maintaining a normal parental role as the children's father.
Having concluded that father's "conduct or condition"
satisfies one of the statutory criteria for a finding of
unfitness, we turn to the second part of that fitness inquiry,
viz., whether that conduct or condition is "seriously
detrimental" to the children. (9) On that subject, the trial court
found that the children suffered serious anxiety about their
future. Our own de novo review of the record shows that evidence
concerning the "detriment" that the children have suffered was
related to and stemmed principally from the children's worry
about their parents' well-being and the uncertainty surrounding
the termination proceeding itself. (10)
Generally, the record demonstrates that the children
are relatively happy and well-adjusted. The foster mother
testified at length that the children have friends, play sports, are actively involved in other extra-curricular activities, and
do well in school. Indeed, virtually all the evidence of
detriment in the record concerned the older child (her
"parentified" behavior, her recent problems in school, and her
weight gain) and appeared to have been tied either to SOSCF's
curtailing of telephone conversations between father and the
children or to the pending termination proceeding itself.
Testimony concerning the younger child was simply that he was
quiet and worried about his parents. The children's therapist
summarized the effect on the children as follows: "They need
permanency, they need safety, they need to know where they are
going to be next week, next month, next year, and where * * *
they're going to be coming home from vacations."
The question before this court, then, is whether the
children's anxiety about their future, caused by father's
incarceration, is the sort of serious detriment contemplated in
the parental rights termination statute.
This court has considered the phrase "seriously
detrimental" in ORS 419B.504 on only one previous occasion, in
State v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 486 P2d 567 (1971). In that case,
the child initially was removed from the parents' home as a baby
and placed in foster care because of the parents' neglect. The
child subsequently was not returned to the parents; the state
moved to terminate parental rights, based on the parents'
inability to stabilize themselves financially or to find and
maintain adequate housing. With regard to the detriment to the
child, this court stated the following:
"There was testimony which was uncontradicted that
if the child were now taken from the foster parents and
placed with her natural parents it would have a
seriously detrimental effect upon the child. This same
testimony developed, however, that this is primarily
because the child has lived with foster parents for
almost all of her now almost six years. The
detrimental effect is not necessarily because of the
conduct of her natural parents, except that the child
may resent being taken from the better all-around
environment provided by her foster parents as compared
to that which would be provided by her natural parents.
"* * * * *
"We are of the opinion that the state of the
McMaster family is duplicated in hundreds of thousands
of American families, - transiency and incapacity,
poverty and instability. The witness was undoubtedly
correct when he stated that living in the McMasters'
household would not 'allow this child to maximize her
potential.' However, we do not believe the legislature
contemplated that parental rights could be terminated
because the natural parents are unable to furnish
surroundings that which would enable the child to grow
up as we would desire all children to do. When the
legislature used the phrase, 'seriously detrimental to
the child,' we believe that they had in mind a more
serious and uncommon detriment than that caused by the
conduct of parents such as the McMasters."
Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added).
We recognize that father's "conduct or condition" is
substantially different from that of the McMasters. We also
recognize that the legislature amended ORS 419B.504 after this
court's decision in McMaster to include conduct similar to the
McMasters' as grounds for termination. See Or Laws 1993, ch 33,
§ 140 (adding, among other things, rule that parent's lack of
effort to adjust circumstances to make return of child possible
itself may be ground for termination). Nonetheless, the evidence
concerning the resulting detriment to the children, viz., anxiety
relating to an impending transition, was similar. It does not
strike us as extraordinary that children involved in a
termination proceeding would experience anxiety about their
future. However, as in McMaster, we do not think that the level
of anxiety that the children have experienced here is the sort of
serious detriment that the legislature contemplated as providing
the basis for a conclusion that a parent is unfit.
This court has stated that "[t]he reason for
terminating parental rights ought to be related to the parent's
conduct as a parent." Simons et ux v. Smith, 229 Or 277, 280,
366 P2d 875 (1961). In this case, nothing in the record suggests
that father's personal relationship with his children was
anything but loving, strong, and positive. (11) The evidence was
uncontroverted that the children have enjoyed their visits with
father and are attached to him, and that father consistently has
written and telephoned the children throughout his incarceration.
We are aware that the fact that the children are doing
as well as they are, and even the fact that father has been able
to maintain the relationship with the children that he has, is
due largely to the fortuitous circumstance of a strong extended
family structure, which includes relatives who are willing to
serve as foster parents. In another case, given similar conduct
or condition on the part of the parent, but absent the strong
family support that has been and is present here, the children
might suffer such serious detriment as to satisfy the
requirements of ORS 419B.504. However, on this record, SOSCF has
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that father's
conduct or condition was seriously detrimental to his children so
as to warrant a finding of unfitness. The Court of Appeals'
similar conclusion was correct.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court erred in terminating father's parental rights. The
decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court was
correct.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
1. The 2001 Legislature abolished SOSCF and transferred
all its functions to the Department of Human Services. Or Laws
2001, ch 900, §§ 1, 5. That action has no effect on this
proceeding.
2. Mother stipulated that, if father's parental rights
were terminated, then her rights would be terminated as well.
Father's testimony--which we accept--was that he intended to
divorce mother, because mother either was unable or unwilling to
abandon her lifestyle of drug abuse. Thus, although this opinion
concludes that father's parental rights will not be terminated,
it should not be read as a basis for a similar disposition--or
any disposition--of mother's case.
3. In that regard, there is evidence in the record to the
effect that, after the arrest, the older child told the foster
mother that she remembered having seen a green liquid being
stirred in the family home. The trial court found, on that
basis, that "[f]ather was engaged in full-scale drug
manufacturing and the children knew it." Our own review of the
record does not support that finding with respect to the
children, for two reasons. First, the reference to a "green
liquid," without more, is not a sufficient basis for concluding
that either child had seen drugs. Indeed, the foster mother's
testimony indicated that even she was not certain that that was a
reference to drugs. Second, the older child was no more than
four years old at the time and, thus, even if the green liquid
had been drugs, it is not reasonable to infer that the child knew
that her father was involved in criminal activity. What the
record does support--and we so find--is that father's drug
manufacturing activity for a time placed the children in serious
physical danger.
4. In fact, father had contacted the therapist and
requested individual counseling to address the relapse. The
second phase of the drug treatment program ended in September
1997. Father was convicted and sentenced in June 1997 and
entered prison in November 1997. As of the time of the
termination hearing, father had been clean and sober for 26
months.
The psychologist who testified on behalf of SOSCF
expressed his opinion at the termination hearing that the fact
that father was able to maintain his sobriety in prison was not a
valid indicator of whether father would be able to do the same
outside of the controlled prison setting. The psychologist
conceded, however, that he had not seen father in over two years
and that additional information on father's behavior while in
prison, such as his voluntarily quitting smoking, organizing a
12-step program for the prison, and working cooperatively with
SOSCF, might alter the psychologist's opinion of father's chances
for success.
5. For example, the instructor of the prison parenting
class stated that father's "positive outlook and enthusiasm
served as a model for other students." The instructor of the
human sexuality class stated that father had shown himself to be
"a man of high principles and consistent sincerity." He
concluded that father was sincerely motivated by a desire to
enhance his parenting skills and found him to be "an engaging and
motivated student." The instructor of the real estate class
stated that father
"has shown extreme discipline and desire to learn. At
his request I have provided him personal attention
because of his exhibited desire and obvious ability to
comprehend the subject matter. I * * * have offered
this acknowledgment because [father] is one of the few
that deserves recognition for his devotion to his
family and his future in Society."
The forestry crew supervisor stated that father "demonstrated
outstanding work ethics in whatever he does."
6. In the present case, as noted, the trial court did rely
on father's incarceration to establish the "criminal conduct"
factor. However, father did not make an objection on that basis
and, therefore, the error was not preserved. In any event,
however, we do not believe that the mislabeling of incarceration
as "criminal conduct" rather than as a "condition" made a
difference. All the parties were aware, at all pertinent times,
that it was the fact of the incarceration and its effect on the
children that were at issue in the case.
7. In State v. Grady, 231 Or 65, 371 P2d 68 (1962), this
court declined to terminate the parental rights of a young mother
simply because she was incarcerated. Subsequently, that case was
cited for the proposition that "imprisonment was not held conduct
'seriously detrimental to the child.'" State v. McMaster, 259 Or
291, 299, 486 P2d 567 (1971). Whether or not that statement in
McMaster was a fair characterization of the holding in Grady, it
is not a fair characterization of the determination that a trial
court is authorized to make. The court may inquire into the
extent to which a parent's imprisonment is detrimental to the
child. If the court finds that the incarceration is seriously
detrimental to the child, then the first part of ORS 419B.504
permits--but does not require--the court to find that the parent
is unfit by reason of that condition.
8. In that connection, we observe that the Court of
Appeals did not cite ORS 419B.504(6) or otherwise acknowledge in
its analysis of the weight to be given father's incarceration
that the trial court based its finding of unfitness on its
conclusion that father's incarceration established that statutory
factor.
9. Because the Court of Appeals concluded that neither
father's incarceration nor his substance abuse made him unfit,
that court did not need to, and did not, address the detrimental
effect of father's conduct on the children. Neither did it need
to address whether integration of the children into father's home
was improbable within a reasonable time.
10. In that regard, we note that, other than the hearing
testimony of the children's therapist, the record contains no
psychological reports or evaluations of the children's mental or
emotional health; neither does it contain any evidence shedding
light on the effects of father's conduct or condition as a parent
on the children.
11. In that connection, we note that the trial court stated
that father's view that the children would not be harmed
seriously by waiting a few more months for him to become
available to parent them is "an example of father's continued
inability to put the children's needs ahead of his own." With
that comment, the trial court effectively told father that, by
asserting his desire to continue to parent the children, he
placed his own needs ahead of the children's; concomitantly, the
way to demonstrate his commitment to parenting the children was
to cease his efforts to do so. That clearly placed father in an
untenable position. This court took the opposite view of similar
behavior in State v. Grady, 231 Or at 68, commenting that "[w]e
deem it of no little significance and a display of the depth of
[mother's] maternal regard that, notwithstanding her penal
situation, she elected to contest the effort to take the child
away from her forever, and failing in the trial court, initiated
this appeal." | 79c47b3cf07937e1842fc37a84961e05ad70ce23ab9278654c49369fb610014d | 2001-12-20T00:00:00Z |
261bc438-0f6a-4f99-9f17-0603f4ab9006 | Novick v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 24, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48605)
On modified ballot title filed August 16, 2001.*
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the Filing of Modified Ballot Title for respondent.
With him on the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
The modified ballot title is certified. The
appellate judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS
250.085(9).
* Novick v. Myers, 332 Or 340, ___ P3d ___ (2001)
(referring ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review
proceeding determined that the Attorney General's
certified ballot title for a proposed initiative measure,
which the Secretary of State denominated as Initiative
Petition 48 (2002), failed to comply substantially with
statutory standards. Novick v. Myers, 332 Or 340, ___
P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court
referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification. The Attorney General has filed a modified
ballot title for the proposed initiative measure, and no
party to the ballot title review proceeding has objected.
See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out period within which party
may object to modified ballot title and requiring court
to certify modified ballot title if no objection filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative
Petition 48 (2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: DISTRIBUTES FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ALL STATE INCOME TAX REVENUE TO SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, SERVICE DISTRICTS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote requires
distribution of fifteen percent of state income tax
revenue (reduced by amount of certain local taxes) to
some local governments, service districts.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains the
current tax system where personal and corporate income
tax revenue collected by the state is directed to the
state general fund.
"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Currently,
state tax revenue collected from personal and
corporate income is directed to the state
general fund and is used to fund education,
public safety, human services, and other state
programs. Measure requires percentage of all
state income tax revenue to be 'equitably'
distributed for unrestricted use to the
general funds of some local governments and
local service districts providing 'essential
services.' Measure does not define
'equitably' or 'essential services.' Excludes
local school districts, metropolitan service
districts from 'local government' definition.
Distributes five percent in 2003; ten percent
in 2004; fifteen percent thereafter. Reduces
share distributed to local governments
imposing taxes on personal or business income,
revenue, or profits. Reduces revenue
available for state government expenditures
and provides no replacement funds. Other
provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 4d53b9c347d4fde555c02f069b42faa222d46255bee57225afdbbed944fa3d5e | 2001-08-24T00:00:00Z |
69730bd4-5862-44c4-bdba-1bb44bc0effd | Novick v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48524)
On modified ballot title filed September 10, 2001.*
No appearance by petitioner.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With him on
the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*332 Or 493, ____ P3d ____ (August 31, 2001) (referring
ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 38 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Novick v. Myers, 332 Or
493, ___, P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. The
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title for the
proposed initiative measure, and no party to the ballot title
review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot title and
requiring court to certify modified ballot title if no objection
filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 38
(2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION. FOR PUBLIC-WORKS
CONTRACTS: ELIMINATES COMPETITIVE-BIDDING
EXEMPTIONS, REGULATING
WAGES/BENEFITS;
PROHIBITS REQUIRING LABOR AGREEMENTS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: For public-works
contracts, 'yes' vote eliminates competitive-bidding
exemptions, regulating wages/benefits, and requiring
prevailing wages; prohibits union-worker preferences
and requiring labor agreements.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains laws
requiring awarding some (but not all) public contracts
to lowest responsible, qualified bidder; and payment of
prevailing wages/benefits and overtime.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current law
requires awarding certain public contracts through
competitive bidding to lowest responsible, qualified
bidder; exemptions allow other contracting methods for
other contracts; requires paying prevailing wages
(wages/benefits paid locally on similar projects) and
increased pay for overtime. Measure requires that all
contracts for public-works projects (including
contracts for public buildings' furnishings, fixtures)
be awarded to contractor submitting lowest bid to
provide not less than the quality of work or product
necessary to meet project specifications. Prohibits
project requirements that: include any project labor
agreement, regulate laborers' or subcontractors'
wages/benefits (including requiring prevailing wages),
require contractors to pay wages/benefits in amounts
greater than amounts that would be required in Oregon's
private sector, prefer contractors using union workers.
Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 51a487601edd99aac5df00f59cff7fd2075879baa41f0b65f686fa3a0871c82a | 2001-09-18T00:00:00Z |
b1600d34-721d-483c-8b1f-cc89429a5190 | Bosak v. Myers (S48563) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 4, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48563)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted July 31, 2001.
Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, argued
the cause and filed the petition for petitioners.
David F. Coursen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the answering memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.*
DE MUNIZ, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
*Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Petitioners in this ballot title review proceeding
challenge two aspects of the Attorney General's certified ballot
title for a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of
State denominated as Initiative Petition 45 (2002). We review
the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035. See ORS 250.085(5) (setting out standard of review).
The proposed measure would amend the Oregon
Constitution to allow an employee to refuse to pay for union
services that the employee does not wish to receive. The
Attorney General certified the following ballot title for the
proposed measure:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOWS WORKPLACE EMPLOYEES
REPRESENTED BY RECOGNIZED UNION TO REFUSE TO PAY
FOR UNION
REPRESENTATION 'SERVICES'
"RESULT of 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allows
individual employee in workplace represented by union
to refuse payment for undesired union 'services'
without modifying union's obligation to represent each
employee.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
law, rejects allowing union workplace employee to
refuse payment for undesired union 'services' without
modifying union's obligation to represent each
employee.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Under current law,
when majority of workplace employees select union as
collective bargaining representative, that union must
fairly represent all workplace employees and may
require all employees to contribute to representation
costs. Measure allows an individual employee to refuse
to pay for representation 'services' by identifying
unwanted 'services' in writing. Measure does not
change union's existing obligation to bargain for and
represent all covered employees. Measure does not
define 'service' or provide formula for valuing
specific 'services.' Measure affects existing contract
provisions that require payment for representation;
expressly prohibits future contracts from requiring
such payment. Measure requires union to notify
employees of right to withhold payment to union and
prohibits discrimination or harassment of employee for
exercising that right. Imposes penalties. Other
provisions."
Petitioners challenge the caption and the summary of
the certified ballot title. Petitioners' argument regarding the
caption is not well taken. We turn to petitioners' argument
regarding the summary.
Petitioners argue that the clause in the summary
stating that a "union must fairly represent all workplace
employees and may require all employees to contribute to
representation costs" misstates current law. See Dale v.
Kulongoski, 321 Or 108, 113, 894 P2d 462 (1995) (ballot title
should not misstate existing law, even by implication).
Petitioners maintain, and we agree, that a union may require cost
sharing by employees only through a negotiated collective
bargaining agreement. (1) Petitioners contend that the Attorney
General's wording incorrectly implies that unions unilaterally
may require all employees in the workplace to contribute to
representation costs. The Attorney General appears to agree that
union representation costs may be assessed against employees who
are not union members only as part of a negotiated collective
bargaining agreement, but denies that the disputed clause could
create any other impression.
We agree with petitioners. The Attorney General's
clause likely will mislead voters into believing that, under
current law, a union unilaterally may require employees to pay
for representation services that they do not desire. Because the
Attorney General's summary impliedly misstates current law, it
does not comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(d) (requiring a
"concise and impartial statement * * * summarizing the state
measure and its major effect").
Having concluded that the summary does not comply
substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(d), we refer the ballot title
to the Attorney General for modification.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
1. Unions and employers operating in the private sector
negotiate various forms of union security agreements. See
Patrick Hardin et al., eds., The Developing Labor Law: The
Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act (3rd ed
1992). In Oregon's public sector, ORS 243.666 authorizes the
negotiation of "fair share" agreements, as defined in ORS
243.650(10), to address union security. See Elvin v. OPEU, 313
Or 165, 170, 832 P2d 36 (1992) (discussing "fair share"
agreements). Union and employers negotiate union security
agreements to avoid the "free rider" problem. See Dale v.
Kulongoski, 321 Or 108, 111-12, 894 P2d 462 (1995) (discussing
"free rider" issue). | ee2b207e81cdaff895c8ffac7524f98853b3f2b811b2347600baba6d24a78da4 | 2001-10-04T00:00:00Z |
e01d5616-f199-4f8d-9d4e-bfcf56e52996 | State v. Azar | null | S069578 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 9
April 11, 2024
163
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
RAJI AFIFE AZAR,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 18CR28295) (CA A170612) (SC S069578)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 3, 2023.
Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs
was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section.
Joanna Hershey, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, Bushong and Masih, Justices, and Balmer, Senior
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
DeHOOG, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Bushong, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which
Garrett, J., and Balmer, S.J., joined.
______________
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Kenneth R. Walker, Judge.
318 Or App 724, 509 P3d 668 (2022).
** James, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Baldwin, Senior Judge, Justice pro tempore, participated in oral argument, but
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
164
State v. Azar
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
165
DeHOOG, J.
Under the Oregon Criminal Code, a person com
mits the offense of “computer crime” if, in relevant part, the
person accesses or uses (or attempts to access or use) a com
puter, computer system, or computer network for the pur
pose of committing theft. ORS 164.377(2)(c).1 At issue in this
case is whether defendant’s conduct fell within the scope of
that provision. That is, does knowingly selling stolen prop
erty using the online auction site eBay—conduct that defen
dant does not dispute would constitute theft by receiving
under ORS 164.0952—constitute computer crime?
The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, con
cluded that such conduct constitutes computer crime, and
it upheld the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal as to the relevant charges against
him. State v. Azar, 318 Or App 724, 738, 509 P3d 668 (2022).
As we explain below, we conclude that the legislature did
not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct
such as defendant’s, which may constitute “theft” within the
meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with
another’s protected interests in—or electronically located
on—a computer, computer system, or computer network
1 ORS 164.377(2) provides, in part:
“Any person commits computer crime who knowingly accesses, attempts
to access or uses, or attempts to use, any computer, computer system, com
puter network or any part thereof for the purpose of:
“*
*
*
*
*
“(c) Committing theft, including, but not limited to, theft of proprietary
information or theft of an intimate image.”
2 Under ORS 164.095(1),
“[a] person commits theft by receiving if the person receives, retains,
conceals or disposes of property of another knowing or having good reason to
know that the property was the subject of theft.”
Although “disposes” is not defined by statute, defendant does not dispute that
selling property that a person knows or should know is stolen constitutes theft
by receiving. See State v. Farmer, 44 Or App 157, 160, 605 P2d 716 (1980) (reach
ing that conclusion based upon ORS 164.055(1)(c), which provides that theft by
receiving constitutes theft in the first degree when “committed by buying, selling,
borrowing or lending on the security of the property”). We assume for purposes
of the present discussion that selling stolen property with the requisite mental
state constitutes theft by receiving, but we express no opinion on when in the
course of a transaction an online sale qualifies as “dispos[ing],” whether at the
time of the sale, at the time the property is physically transferred, or at some
other time.
166
State v. Azar
(computer),3 nor depends on computer technology as the
means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks
to unlawfully obtain. Here, the conduct with which the state
charged defendant involved the theft of merchandise that
bore no relationship to eBay’s or anyone else’s protected
interests in computers, their contents, or rights held in dig
ital form, and defendant was not dependent on computer
technology to gain access to something he sought to steal.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and, accord
ingly, reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Appeals.4
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal, “we view the evidence in the light most favor
able to the state to determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340,
343, 537 P3d 503 (2023). The Court of Appeals opinion sets
forth the relevant facts—which are undisputed—in some
detail. Azar, 318 Or App at 727-28. In brief, eBay is an inter
net site on which individuals can post items for sale either
through an online auction or at fixed, “buy-it-now” prices.
The eBay website processes purchasers’ payments using—
among other services—PayPal, an online payment platform.
Sellers can then transfer funds received via PayPal into
their own bank accounts.
3 The parties do not distinguish whether, for purposes of the computer crime
statute, using eBay’s online sales platform should be considered using (or access
ing) a “computer,” a “computer system,” a “computer network,” or some combina
tion of all three, nor do they suggest that any such distinction might bear on our
assessment of the arguments or our interpretation of ORS 164.377(2)(c). Thus, we
use those terms largely interchangeably and use the term “computer” to collec
tively reference all three terms.
4 At trial, the jury convicted defendant of three counts of computer crime
and other offenses. Four of those convictions were nonunanimous. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded defendant’s four nonunanimous convic
tions—including the three counts of computer crime at issue here—under Ramos
v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). Azar, 318 Or App
at 726. Our decision regarding defendant’s three computer crime convictions
does not affect the Court of Appeals’ ruling as to the remaining nonunanimous
conviction.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
167
As part of an investigation into a series of thefts
from several retail stores, undercover investigators sold
defendant various items of merchandise, falsely telling him
that the items had been stolen. Law enforcement officers
were then able to track the “stolen” merchandise by pur
chasing items from an eBay account associated with defen
dant and confirming that those items were the ones that
they had sold to defendant. Police later arrested defendant,
who admitted that he had used his sister’s eBay account to
sell stolen property. Defendant further admitted that he had
obtained the sales proceeds by transferring the funds from
his sister’s PayPal account into his own PayPal account, and
from there into his bank account.
B. Procedural History
As a result of that conduct, the state charged
defendant with, in relevant part, three counts of “computer
crime,” ORS 164.377(2)(c).5 The state’s theory, as set out in
the indictment, was that, by selling merchandise on eBay
that he believed to be stolen, defendant had “access[ed] and
use[d] a computer, computer system, and computer network
for the purpose of committing theft of property” by receiv
ing. At trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to
those counts, arguing that the state had not proved that he
had engaged in “computer hacking,” which, he asserted, was
required to establish computer crime.6 Defendant further
argued that, if the computer crime statute could be applied
broadly enough to encompass his conduct, then it would be
unconstitutionally vague. The trial court denied defendant’s
5 Defendant also was charged with and ultimately convicted of multiple
counts of attempted first-degree theft (ORS 161.405 and ORS 164.055), launder
ing a monetary instrument (ORS 164.170), and conspiracy (ORS 161.450). Those
other convictions are not at issue on review.
6 In State v. Nascimento, 360 Or 28, 42, 379 P3d 484 (2016), this court
addressed a different subsection of the computer crime statute, ORS 164.377(4),
which prohibits, in part, the unauthorized use or accessing of computers, com
puter systems, computer networks, or the data they contain. We observed that
such intrusion or unauthorized access by third parties was commonly referred to
as “hacking.” Nascimento, 360 Or at 42 (observing more generally that, as intro
duced, the bill that later encompassed “computer crime” was initially concerned
with the theft of cable television services). We understand defendant to use the
term “hacking” in the same way. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1018
(unabridged ed 2002) (defining “hacking,” as relevant here, to mean “the gaining
of unauthorized access to data in a system or computer”).
168
State v. Azar
motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted defendant of
those counts.
Defendant appealed, reprising his arguments from
the trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
defendant’s nonunanimous convictions for a new trial, but
it otherwise affirmed. Azar, 318 Or App at 726. In a split
decision, the majority held that “a person violates [ORS
164.377(2)] when the person’s use or access of a computer
is the direct, necessary means by which the person accom
plishes one of the prohibited purposes in ORS 164.377(2)(a)
through (c).” Id. at 737. The court rejected defendant’s argu
ment that computer crime is limited to computer hacking,
as well as his contextual argument that “theft” under ORS
164.377(2)(c) is limited to taking something from a computer
and does not encompass all conduct that might satisfy one
of the various statutory definitions of “theft.” In concluding
otherwise, the court reasoned that, because “theft” has an
“established legal meaning” in the Criminal Code, “theft”
as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms
of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiv
ing, see ORS 164.015(5) (incorporating ORS 164.095 (defin
ing that offense)). Id. at 733-34. As to defendant’s vagueness
challenge, the court explained that, because it construed
the computer crime statute to require that a defendant’s
“use or access[ing]” of a computer be “more than incidental”
and “the direct, necessary means” by which the defendant
“accomplishes one of the prohibited purposes” identified in
ORS 164.377(2)—including “[c]ommitting theft”—the stat
ute “would allow a person of ordinary intelligence to under
stand the scope of what is prohibited *
*
*.” Id. at 737-38.
That, the majority opinion concluded, resolved any constitu
tional concerns. Id.
Judge Pagán disagreed. He reasoned that the legis
lative history of ORS 164.377 indicated that the statute “was
intended to address the type of criminal activity we most
associate with hacking or other nefarious access to networks
or computers, not simply the use of electronics to commit
crimes.” Id. at 743 (Pagán, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part). Based in part on subsequent amendments
to ORS 164.377(2)(c), Judge Pagán viewed the computer
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
169
crime statute as somewhat “analogous to burglary—that
is, accessing a place a person is not allowed to be with the
intention of committing a crime in that place.” Id. at 740
(emphasis in original). Judge Pagán further reasoned that,
due to the ubiquitous nature of computer technology in mod
ern society, the majority’s understanding of the statute would
encompass far more conduct than the legislature could have
anticipated and would elevate any number of minor offenses
to Class C felonies, which could not, in his view, have been
what the legislature intended. Id. at 743.
Defendant sought review in this court, which we
allowed.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues on review that, as relevant
here, computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c) is limited to
“accessing or using another person’s computer, computer
system, or computer network to commit an unauthorized
taking of information or data from that computer, computer
system, or computer network *
*
*.” It follows, defendant rea
sons, that his conduct in utilizing eBay for the purpose of
selling merchandise that he believed to be stolen—conduct
that defendant appears to accept would be theft by receiv
ing under ORS 164.095 if successfully carried out—does
not constitute computer crime. More specifically, because
“theft” as that term is used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) does not,
in his view, encompass theft by receiving, his conduct of
using or accessing eBay online to commit that offense is not
“us[ing]” or “access[ing]” a computer “for the purpose of *
*
*
[c]ommitting theft” within the meaning of that paragraph.
Defendant thus concludes that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.
A. The Text and Context of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
“When, as here, a trial court denies a defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal based on an interpreta
tion of a statute, we review the denial for errors of law.”
State v. Haley, 371 Or 108, 112, 531 P3d 142 (2023). The
specific statutory question in defendant’s case is whether
ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses his undisputed conduct of
selling purportedly stolen merchandise on eBay. We resolve
170
State v. Azar
that question under the framework set out in State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Our goal is to determine
the intent of the legislature that enacted that provision. Id.
at 171. In making that determination, we consider the dis
puted statutory text in context, together with any available
legislative history that we find helpful. Id. at 172. If a stat
ute’s intended meaning remains unclear to us following our
examination of its text, context, and legislative history, we
may turn to general maxims of statutory interpretation for
additional guidance. See, e.g., Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin.
Services, 370 Or 382, 398 n 7, 520 P3d 406 (2022) (noting lim
ited circumstances in which it may be appropriate for courts
to consider general maxims of statutory interpretation).
In this case, the state charged defendant with com
puter crime based on his alleged violation of ORS 164.377
(2)(c), which provides:
“Any person commits computer crime who knowingly
accesses, attempts to access or uses, or attempts to use,
any computer, computer system, computer network or any
part thereof for the purpose of:
“*
*
*
*
*
“(c) Committing theft, including, but not limited to,
theft of proprietary information or theft of an intimate
image.”7
The disputed text here is “accesses *
*
* or uses *
*
*
any computer *
*
* for the purpose of *
*
* [c]ommitting theft.”
On its face, that language is quite broad and can plausibly
be understood to capture utilizing eBay to facilitate theft as
defined by Oregon law, including theft by receiving under
ORS 164.095, the specific form of “theft” underlying defen
dant’s charges. But, as we will explain, an examination of
the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c) leaves open the
question whether the legislature intended to capture conduct
such as defendant’s—specifically, the lawful use of another’s
computer system in the course of committing theft—when
it prohibited using or accessing computers “for the purpose”
of committing theft. That is, when—if ever—might using or
7 As originally enacted, the conduct addressed under ORS 164.377(2)(c) was
limited to “[c]ommitting theft.” Or Laws 1985, ch 537, § 8 (enacting House Bill
(HB) 2795 (1985)).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
171
accessing a computer in the course of committing a theft not
constitute use or access for the purpose of committing theft?
As noted, the Court of Appeals effectively concluded that a
person lacks that purpose when their use or accessing of a
computer is merely “incidental,” and not the “direct, neces
sary means” of committing the theft. See Azar, 318 Or App
at 737. As the following indicates, our ultimate conclusion
in this case aligns with the implicit reasoning of the Court
of Appeals—as well as that of the dissenting opinion in this
court—which we understand to be that, despite the facially
broad language of ORS 164.377(2)(c), the legislature did not
intend that provision to apply as expansively as its plain
terms could possibly reach. However, despite our agreement
on that point, we ultimately disagree as to what limitation
applies.
We turn to the relevant terms. Some of those terms
are defined within the computer crime statute itself. Those
include “access,” which means “to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, computer system or
computer network.” ORS 164.377(1)(a). At a minimum, con
ducting sales transactions through eBay necessarily entails
“communicat[ing]” with “a computer, computer system or
computer network,” and defendant does not contend that he
did not “access” eBay when he used that platform to market
items that he believed to be stolen. Similarly, although “uses”
is not statutorily defined, that term too is quite broad and, in
isolation, would seem to capture availing oneself of an online
service, such as eBay. The various meanings of “use” include
“to carry out a purpose or action by means of : make instru
mental to an end or process : apply to advantage : turn to
account : utilize.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2524
(unabridged ed 2002); see also PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (explain
ing that “words of common usage typically should be given
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning”). Thus, the
term “uses,” like the term “access,” might be understood to
apply to defendant’s alleged conduct: One who employs eBay
to conduct online sales “uses,” for at least that purpose, eBay
and, by extension, the computer, computer system, or com
puter network on which eBay operates.
172
State v. Azar
And, if all that ORS 164.377(2)(c) required were
that a person use or access a computer for any purpose bear
ing some nonincidental connection to an act of theft, then
our inquiry would likely be complete. However, even an ini
tial examination of the statutory context suggests certain
parameters around those otherwise broad terms. “A statute’s
context includes, among other things, its immediate con
text—the phrase or sentence in which the term appears—
and its broader context, which includes other statutes on the
same subject.” Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy,
371 Or 285, 290, 533 P3d 774 (2023). As noted above, the
various meanings of “use” include “to carry out a purpose or
action by means of,” Webster’s at 2524, and ORS 164.377(2)(c)
expressly states which “purpose” brings the “use” of a com
puter within the statute’s coverage: “the purpose of *
*
*
[c]ommitting theft *
*
*.” Moreover, given the legislature’s
chosen phrasing—“uses *
*
* for the purpose of,” rather than,
for example, “uses in the course of”—the legislature may
have sought to limit the application of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
to uses that in fact “carry out” that purpose, and not any
use that in some way facilitates “theft.”8 Under that reading,
defendant’s conduct would constitute computer crime only
if the act itself of using eBay constituted a theft within the
meaning of ORS 164.377(2)(c).
That qualifying language in ORS 164.377(2)(c)—
“for the purpose *
*
* of “[c]ommitting theft”—does not inde
pendently shed much light on the intended scope of the stat
ute. The word “purpose” commonly means “something that one
sets before [themselves] as an object to be attained: an end or
aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, exertion, or oper
ation: design.” Webster’s at 1847. So, for defendant’s conduct of
using or accessing the eBay platform to constitute computer
crime in this case, he must at least have had a certain objec
tive in mind, specifically, “[c]ommitting theft.” But, as noted
above, the word “use” itself appears to imply purpose-driven
conduct, and the fact that the state must prove a specific pur
pose does not provide any further indication whether having
8 As noted, the plain meanings of “use” include “to carry out a purpose,”
Webster’s at 2524, and, in turn, “carry out” conveys the idea of bringing some
thing to its conclusion, see id. at 344 (meanings of “carry out” include “to bring to
a successful issue” and “to continue to an end or stopping point”).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
173
that objective is sufficient to render a “use” of a computer
“computer crime” or, if not, what else the state must prove to
establish a violation of ORS 164.377(2)(c).
“Committing,” in turn, means, as pertinent here, to
engage in specific conduct that the law makes punishable as
a crime. See Black’s Law Dictionary 248, 334 (5th ed 1979)
(defining “commit” as “[t]o perpetrate *
*
* a crime” and
“crime” as a “positive or negative act in violation of penal
law”); see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746, 380 P3d
736 (2016) (“When a term is a legal one, we look to its estab
lished legal meaning as revealed by, for starters at least,
legal dictionaries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And
as ORS 164.377(2)(c) expressly provides, the relevant crime
for purposes of our analysis is “theft.” Again, however, noth
ing in the word “[c]ommitting” or its immediate context tells
us whether ORS 164.377(2)(c) contemplates anything more
than facilitating a theft by using or accessing a computer,
whether it be the extraction of something from that com
puter (as defendant argues), the successful completion of
some form of theft—even if, as here, the theft involves prop
erty wholly external to any computer—or the realization of
some other theft-related goal.
That brings us, finally, to the term “theft,” which
raises one of the parties’ central disputes in this case:
whether “theft,” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c), is intended
to encompass the various meanings of theft found in other
parts of the Criminal Code (as the state contends), or,
instead, “theft” has a narrower meaning when it comes to
computer crime, one that (as defendant argues) limits ORS
164.377(2)(c) in a way that excludes theft by receiving, the
form of theft prosecuted in this case. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that, under ORS 164.377(2)(c), “theft”
has the same meaning as it does elsewhere in the property
crimes chapter of the Criminal Code. As we also explain,
however, that conclusion does not resolve the ultimate ques
tion raised by defendant’s appeal, namely, whether that pro
vision reaches his specific conduct in this case.
We begin by observing, as defendant emphasizes,
that ORS 164.377 does not define “theft,” despite defining
many of the other terms that the statute uses. See, e.g., ORS
174
State v. Azar
164.377(1)(a) (defining “access”); ORS 164.377(1)(b) (defining
“computer”); ORS 164.377(1)(j) (defining “property”). Nor
does it expressly incorporate the meaning of that term from
the theft section of the property crimes chapter, including
the offenses identified in ORS 164.015 (stating that one
“commits theft” by, among other things, “commit[ting] theft
by receiving as provided by ORS 164.095”). Defendant relies
on those contextual clues as evidence that the legislature
intended for “theft” in ORS 164.377(2)(c) to have its plain
and ordinary meaning, which he argues is “an unauthorized
taking.” See Webster’s at 2369 (defining “theft” as “the act of
stealing; *
*
* the felonious taking and removing of personal
property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it” or
“the taking of property unlawfully (as by robbery, embezzle
ment, fraud)”); see also The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1334 (1st ed 1969) (defining “theft”
as “the act or an instance of stealing; larceny”). Under that
reading, “theft” would seem not to include theft by receiv
ing—at least as alleged here—because that crime does not
appear to require a “taking.” See ORS 164.095 (“A person
commits theft by receiving if the person receives, retains,
conceals or disposes of property *
*
*.”).
The state responds that the legislature had no need
to define “theft” for purposes of the computer crime statute,
because that term already had a well-defined legal meaning
in Oregon when it enacted that law: the meaning found in
ORS 164.015, which is not limited to theft by taking. And
because the two statutes appear in the same chapter of the
Criminal Code, the state would rely on this court’s “general
assumption” that “the legislature intended the same word to
have the same meaning throughout related statutes unless
something in the text or context of the statute suggest a
contrary intention.” Village at Main Street, Phase II v. Dept.
of Rev., 356 Or 164, 175, 339 P3d 428 (2014); see also State
v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 99, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (so stating).
The state also compares the computer crime statute to ORS
164.235, which narrows the scope of “theft” to “theft by a
physical taking” in prohibiting possession of burglar’s tools. It
argues that, because the legislature did not similarly narrow
the scope of “theft” in the computer crime statute, we should
not narrow it ourselves as a matter of statutory construction,
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
175
because that would violate our duty under ORS 174.010 to
avoid “insert[ing] what has been omitted” by the legislature.
We conclude that “theft” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c)
encompasses, as a general matter, those offenses identified as
theft in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving.9 The legis
lature enacted ORS 164.377 in 1985, Or Laws 1985, ch 537, § 8,
over a decade after it “eliminate[d] the traditionally distinct
crimes of larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, obtaining
property by false pretenses, receiving stolen property and
extortion and *
*
* consolidate[d] them into one crime called
‘theft.’
” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Code, Final Draft and Report § 123, 132
(July 1970); see also Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 123 (providing
five circumstances in which a person commits “theft”). Thus,
as the state notes and the Court of Appeals reasoned, “theft”
had a well-established legal meaning when the legislature
enacted the computer crime statute, a meaning not limited to
theft by taking. Moreover, House Bill (HB) 2795 (1985), which
included the computer crime provisions now compiled at ORS
164.377, also contained provisions amending the theft provi
sions of ORS chapter 164. Accordingly, we can safely assume
that the legislature was aware of the meaning of “theft” in
ORS 164.015 when it enacted ORS 164.677(2)(c). See Jack L.
Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 Or L Rev 583, 638
(2019) (noting that “
‘context’ for a statute is essentially any
thing of which the legislature could have been aware at the
time of a given enactment”). Additionally, ORS 164.015 and
ORS 164.377 are closely related, in that they both address
the wrongful interference with property rights of others and
appear in the same chapter of the Criminal Code. As a result,
unless something else about the text or context of either stat
ute suggests a contrary intention, we assume that the legisla
ture intended “theft” to have the same meaning in both. See
State v. Colgrove, 370 Or 474, 483, 521 P3d 456 (2022) (stating
that principle).
9 We need not determine whether “theft” as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) also
encompasses forms of theft defined by other statutes, including ORS 164.125
(theft of services) and ORS 164.162 (mail theft). Further, although we conclude
that, in theory, ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses theft by receiving, ORS 164.095,
which is a form of theft identified in ORS 164.015, we discuss below whether, as
a practical matter, it was intended to capture conduct of the sort admitted by
defendant.
176
State v. Azar
In our view, nothing suggests a contrary intention.
Defendant contends otherwise. He offers various contex
tual clues that he asserts support the view that “theft” in
ORS 164.377(2)(c) has a meaning independent of its statu
tory definitions, one limited to the unauthorized taking of
property from a computer. Among other things, defendant
argues that, because ORS 164.377(2)(a) and (2)(b) crimi
nalize conduct analogous to theft by deception, it would be
illogical for ORS 164.377(2)(c) to criminalize that same con
duct, which would result if we accepted the state’s meaning
of “theft.”
We are not persuaded. It is true that, in addition to
prohibiting using or accessing a computer for purposes of
committing theft, ORS 164.377(2) also proscribes two other
“theft-like” forms of conduct:
“Any person commits computer crime who knowingly
accesses, attempts to access or uses, or attempts to use,
any computer, computer system, computer network or any
part thereof for the purpose of:
“(a) Devising or executing any scheme or artifice to
defraud; [or]
“(b) Obtaining money, property or services by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
promises[.]”
And, as defendant points out, both ORS 164.377(2)(a)
and (2)(b) proscribe conduct analogous to theft by deception,
which is both separately defined in ORS 164.08510 and one of
the forms of theft listed in ORS 164.015. Defendant reasons
that, if the legislature had intended for ORS 164.377(2)(c)
to capture those other forms of theft, it would have had no
10 ORS 164.085(1) provides, in part:
“A person, who obtains property of another thereby, commits theft by
deception when, with intent to defraud, the person:
“(a) Creates or confirms another’s false impression of law, value, inten
tion, or other state of mind that the actor does not believe to be true;
“(b) Fails to correct a false impression that the person previously created
or confirmed; [or]
“*
*
*
*
*
“(e) Promises performance that the person does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed.”
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
177
reason to separately define computer crime to include the
conduct proscribed by ORS 164.377(2)(a) and (b).
We acknowledge that, as defendant observes, there
would appear to be considerable overlap between the con
duct that paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) proscribe and the conduct
that paragraph (2)(c) encompasses if, as the state argues,
“theft” in paragraph (2)(c) wholly incorporates ORS 164.015.
Notably, however, paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) are not entirely
coextensive with any form of theft listed in ORS 164.015.
Among other differences, paragraph (2)(a) prohibits simply
devising a fraudulent scheme—whereas theft by deception
requires actually obtaining property—and paragraph (2)(b)
applies to fraudulently obtaining services, not just property,
and therefore is broader than theft by deception and any
other form of theft defined in ORS 164.015.11 Moreover, as we
have recognized, “the fact that a proposed interpretation of a
statute creates some measure of redundancy is not, by itself,
necessarily fatal. Redundancy in communication is a fact of
life and of law.” Cloutier, 351 Or at 97; see also State v. Fonte,
363 Or 327, 343, 422 P3d 202 (2018) (noting that “it may be
possible for the same person to commit acts that constitute
more than one type of theft under ORS 164.015”). And here,
given the broad scope of the computer crime statute, we find
it likely that any perceived redundancy is the product of the
legislature’s effort to enact a comprehensive statute, and not
evidence that the legislature intended for ORS 164.377—
including its reference to “theft”—to be wholly self-contained.
In sum, the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
do not support defendant’s narrow construction, one that
would limit the scope of that provision to using or access
ing a computer for the purpose of taking something from
that or another computer. However, that conclusion does
not answer the question at the core of this case: When does
using or accessing a computer in the course of committing
theft amount to using or accessing the computer “for the
purpose of *
*
* [c]ommitting theft”? Is it whenever the use or
access facilitates a theft? Is it when, as the Court of Appeals
11 A separate theft statute, ORS 164.125 (theft of services), does cover obtain
ing services by deception, but the state has not argued that theft of services is
another form of theft covered by ORS 164.377(2)(c), nor has that statute been
offered as additional context for the computer crime statute.
178
State v. Azar
concluded, “the person’s use or access[ing] of a computer is
the direct, necessary means by which the person accom
plishes” a theft? See Azar, 318 Or App at 737.12 Or did the
legislature intend some different scope when it enacted the
computer crime statute? Because our assessment of the text
and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c) leaves open the question
whether that provision encompass defendant’s conduct, any
legislative history that sheds light on that question could
inform our final conclusion regarding the intended scope
of the statute. Thus, we now turn our attention to whether
anything in the legislative history of ORS 164.377 is helpful
in that regard.
B. The Legislative History of ORS 164.377
This court recognized in Nascimento, 360 Or at 42,
that the legislature’s primary concern in adopting the com
puter crime provisions of HB 2795 was computer “hacking”—
the unauthorized use or accessing of computers or the data
they contained. Defendant relies on that point to support his
argument that we should narrowly construe what it means
to “use” or “access” a computer system for purposes of com
mitting theft. Although the state agrees that the primary
concern of the legislature that established the offense of
computer crime was hacking, it attaches less significance to
that point than defendant. The state contends that the 1985
legislative history pertinent to that conduct focused on what
later became ORS 164.377(4) (prohibiting unauthorized
use or accessing of computers and their contents) and ORS
164.377(3) (prohibiting unauthorized alteration, damage, or
destruction of same), and not ORS 164.377(2), the provision
at issue in this case. The state further argues that, despite
having the principal goal of addressing computer hacking,
the legislature may well have had other objectives in mind
12 The Court of Appeals did not elaborate on its test, and it is not clear to us
whether, by requiring that the use of a computer be the “direct, necessary means”
of accomplishing a theft (and not merely “incidental”), that court intended to
require more than a causal relationship between the use and the result, and, if
so, what degree of necessity would suffice. We note that, although defendant’s use
of eBay may well have enhanced his ability to market the spoils of his crimes—as
well as to avoid apprehension—it is less than obvious how eBay was “necessary,”
at least if, by “necessary,” the Court of Appeals meant that defendant could not
have committed theft by receiving without his reliance on eBay, or on any com
puter technology for that matter.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
179
when it passed HB 2795. See Nascimento, 360 Or at 44 (not
ing that the “legislature may and often does choose broader
language that applies to a wider range of circumstances
than the precise problem that triggered legislative atten
tion” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Having reviewed the legislative history of the com
puter crime statute, we conclude that it does not support as
expansive an application of ORS 164.377(2)(c) as the Court of
Appeals’ opinion would allow. When it was first introduced
in the legislature, HB 2795 was directed at the theft of tele
vision cable services and included text amending the exist
ing theft of services statute, ORS 164.125. Tape Recording,
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee 1, Apr 11,
1985, Tape 425 (statement of Rep Randy Miller); see also Or
Laws 1985, ch 537, §§ 1-7. The “computer crime” text came
later at the request of the American Electronics Association
and was introduced as an amendment to HB 2795 by repre
sentatives of General Telephone Company of the Northwest
(General Telephone). Tape Recording, House Committee on
Judiciary, Subcommittee 1, May 6, 1985, Tape 576 (state
ment of Chair Richard Springer).
Sterling Gibson, a security officer for General
Telephone, testified that the purpose of the amendment was
to “prevent people from calling into someone’s computer”
and manipulating a business’s data. Id. When Chairperson
Springer asked whether the existing theft of services statute
already criminalized the conduct described in the amend
ment, Gibson responded that “a lot of times it may not be
theft[.]” Id. He continued that, even though “it may be con
strued as theft, *
*
* the actual act was the manipulation, or
changing of documents” that are “vital” to an organization’s
survival. Id. He further explained that that conduct “isn’t
theft, that’s manipulation” and later reiterated that “we’re
not necessarily dealing with the theft of something, [we’re
dealing with] manipulation.” Id. Gibson said that, in his
experience, when law enforcement sought to prosecute acts
of computer hacking, they had found the theft of services
statutes “too broad” and “not useable.” Id.
Echoing Gibson’s testimony, Legislative Counsel
Leslie Hammond later explained to the full House Committee
180
State v. Azar
on Judiciary that HB 2795 was intended to address “the
idea of people who use their computers or instruments to get
access to computer systems or networks and then gain by
using the information or program that belongs to someone
else.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB
2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A; see also id. (explaining
that the bill makes “it a crime for people to access a computer
system to which they don’t belong or to destroy or damage the
property”). Hammond also prepared a staff summary for the
committee explaining that the bill was intended to address
the problem of people “using computers to break into com
puter systems to steal information or programming.” Staff
Measure Summary, House Committee on Judiciary, HB
2795 (1985). The bill passed the committee without further
discussion. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A.
That legislative history readily supports what is
undisputed here: HB 2795’s proponents were most concerned
with the sort of conduct criminalized by subsections (3) and (4)
of ORS 164.377, which explicitly address the protection of
computers and their contents from intrusion. Admittedly
less clear is what conduct the legislature was targeting when
it chose to also criminalize using or accessing computers
for the purposes of “[c]ommitting theft,” ORS 164.377(2)(c).
But what evidence there is in the legislative history indicates
to us that, like subsections (3) and (4), ORS 164.377(2)(c)
was enacted to protect computers and their contents; it was
not enacted to provide broad protection from computers and
their potential value as instruments of crime, whether or
not a person’s crime bore any relationship to the computer
used or the contents accessed. In other words, the evidence
suggests a more limited understanding of ORS 164.377(2)(c),
one that, like computer hacking, was focused on computers,
their contents, and the access that computer technology
could give would-be thieves to electronically stored or man
aged data and services. That evidence includes (1) the mea
sure summary’s identified concern that individuals were
stealing “information or programming” from computers,
Staff Measure Summary, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795 (1985); (2) legislative counsel’s explanation that the
underlying concern was “people who use their computers or
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
181
instruments to get access to computer systems or networks”
and “using the information or program that belongs to some
one else,” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
HB 2795, May 13, 1985, Tape 613, Side A; (3) proponents’
accounts of electronically stored business data being manip
ulated or altered; and (4) the fact that HB 2795’s original
objective was to address those who were surreptitiously
acquiring cable television services—an electronically dis
tributed commodity—for free. We turn next to what that
limitation is; that is, what qualifies as “use” or “access”?
C. What qualifies as “use” or “access” under ORS 164.377
(2)(c)?
As we have just discussed, the legislative history
suggests that the legislature that enacted ORS 164.377(2)(c)
never intended that provision to reach every act of theft that
somehow involved using or otherwise accessing a computer.
Rather, the legislature’s overriding goal was to stop people
from getting into computer systems for nefarious purposes,
as Judge Pagán observed. That understanding suggests the
need for some limiting principle as to what constitutes use
or access for purposes of theft under the statute. We are
cognizant that our understanding of the legislative history
can only inform our construction of the legislatively enacted
text; it cannot justify the adoption of limitations that the
text of ORS 164.377(2)(c) cannot support. See ORS 174.010
(in construing statutes, courts may not insert what the
legislature has omitted). For that reason, we have already
rejected defendant’s argument that “theft” as used in ORS
164.377(2)(c) is limited to taking things from a computer—
the only permissible limitation on what constitutes a qualify
ing theft is that the person must have “use[d]” or “access[ed]”
a computer “for the purpose of” committing it.13 And, based
on our review of the text and context of ORS 164.377(2)(c),
we have also concluded that a qualifying theft may take any
one of the various forms of theft listed under ORS 164.015,
including, at least arguably, theft by receiving. However,
our review of the legislative history persuades us—as the
13 Indeed, nothing in the statute even limits its scope to crimes completed
entirely within the confines of a computer system. We address the implications of
that fact below.
182
State v. Azar
Court of Appeals seems to have been persuaded by other
considerations—that not every act of using or accessing a
computer in the course of engaging in theft qualifies as use
or access “for the purpose of *
*
* [c]ommitting theft.”
Before determining which acts do qualify, we first
note that we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ test, which
we understand to be that the person’s use or accessing of a
computer must be the “direct, necessary means” by which
the person committed a theft and that the use or access
must be more than “incidental.” Azar, 318 Or App at 738. For
one thing, that test does not adequately reflect the purpose
for which the legislature enacted the computer crime stat
ute, as reflected in its legislative history. And for another,
the Court of Appeals’ test is, in our view, unworkable. That
is, “direct [and] necessary” is susceptible to myriad mean
ings, and nothing in the Court of Appeals’ decision explains
which meaning applies.14 Notably, although defendant in
this case chose to employ computer technology in the course
of his criminal conduct, it is far from apparent that he could
not have committed the underlying offense without using
eBay, as the crime of “fencing” stolen property was commit
ted far before the advent of the internet or of electronics of
any sort. Thus, at least to the panel majority in the Court of
Appeals, “necessary” must mean something less than truly
“necessary,” but what may qualify is far from clear. See
Webster’s at 1511 (including, among other definitions of “nec
essary,” the ideas of being absolutely required, essential, or
indispensable).
Relatedly, the Court of Appeals’ requirement
that a person’s use or access of a computer be more than
14 The word “direct” is relatively clear and, when used in the term “direct
means,” appears to mean “leading by the *
*
* shortest way to a point or end” and
suggests immediacy between the use or accessing and its objective. See Webster’s
at 640 (defining the adjectival form of “direct”). But when such use or accessing
might be “necessary” is far less clear. It may require a merely practical necessity,
such that it suffices if the person’s decision to use a computer bears a “but for”
relationship with a prohibited outcome—e.g., “if he had not used a computer, he
would not have committed a theft”—or, instead, it may require that computer
technology play an essential or indispensable role in the commission of the per
son’s crime, such that the person could not have committed the charged offense
had they not had been able to use or access a computer. See id. at 1511 (defining
“necessary” to include “that cannot be done without : that must be done or had :
absolutely required : essential, indispensible”).
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
183
“incidental” does not improve matters. There is no way to
anticipate when a particular prosecutor, jury, or court will
view one or another use of computer technology as merely
“incidental.” We therefore do not share the Court of Appeals’
optimism that its test is sufficient to “allow a person of ordi
nary intelligence to understand the scope of what is pro
hibited” so as to alleviate defendant’s vagueness concerns.15
See Azar, 318 Or App at 738. Thus, although we agree with
the Court of Appeals that it is appropriate to articulate the
intended scope of ORS 164.377(2)(c), we disagree with its
ultimate determination as to what that scope is.
We, therefore, describe the scope of ORS 164.377(2)(c)
differently, in a way that is both workable—that is, under
standable and predictable—and true to the legislature’s
principal goal in enacting the computer crime statute, spe
cifically, to deter the targeting of computers and the data
they contain. In so doing, however, we find it significant that
the legislature also had in mind those who were using tech
nology as a means of surreptitiously gaining access to ser
vices they could not otherwise access—specifically, free cable
television services. Thus, in determining the scope of ORS
164.377(2)(c), we allow for the possibility that the legislature
intended for “computer crime” to capture at least some con
duct that reaches beyond the strict confines of any computer,
computer system, or computer network. Synthesizing those
principles, we conclude that, for a person’s use or accessing
of a computer to be “for the purpose of *
*
* [c]ommitting
theft” under ORS 164.377(2)(c), the theft at issue must either
interfere with another’s property rights in—or electronically
located on—a computer, computer system, or computer net
work, or depend on such computer technology as the means
15 Like the Court of Appeals majority, the dissent in this court appears to
recognize that, without some limiting principle, ORS 164.377(2)(c) has the poten
tial to capture significantly more conduct than the legislature intended. 372 Or
at 189-90 (Bushong, J., dissenting) (recognizing that some computer uses would
likely be too “incidental” to be what legislature intended to reach; observing
that the Court of Appeals described defendant’s computer use as the “principal
mechanism” of fencing operation). But neither the Court of Appeals majority nor
the dissent here suggests that, under ORS 164.377(2)(c), a person’s computer use
must be the “principal” means by which they accomplish their theft. Thus, like
the Court of Appeals, the dissenting opinion in this court offers only the unwork
able standard of computer use that is not “incidental.”
184
State v. Azar
of accessing the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully
obtain.
D. ORS 164.377(2)(c) does not apply to defendant’s conduct.
Turning to the application of that standard to this
case, we emphasize that, despite the limits that our construc-
tion may impose on the computer crime statute, ORS 164.377
(2)(c) remains broadly applicable. In addition to protecting a
broad range of property interests existing—physically or in
electronic form—on computers, computer systems, or com
puter networks, we have also construed that provision to
capture forms of theft that rely on the special access to pro
tected interests that computer technology might allow. Thus,
although we need not for purposes of this case delineate the
full range of conduct that ORS 164.377(2)(c) might reach, we
observe, for example, that it would necessarily capture such
conduct as manipulating computerized bank records or other
conduct that takes place via a computer but that affects
interests existing outside the digital realm. That being said,
even with that rather broad understanding of what it means
to access or use a computer for purposes of theft, it does not
encompass defendant’s conduct here.
In this case, defendant does not dispute that his
conduct in selling purportedly stolen property on eBay con
stituted theft by receiving. That conduct, however, did not
interfere with any interest that eBay or anyone else had in
a computer, computer system, or computer network, or in
any electronic contents thereof. Nor did defendant use eBay
or any other computer technology to gain access to property
that he sought to unlawfully obtain—to the extent that any
one actually accessed the purportedly stolen merchandise
at issue in this case, it is apparent that they did so by phys
ically entering the retail locations where such items were
sold. Under those circumstances, defendant’s conduct can
not have constituted computer crime.16
16 The dissent suggests that there is an incongruity between suggesting that
it might well be computer crime for a person to obtain the fruits of theft through
eBay, but not to dispose of them through the same platform. 372 Or at 190-91
(Bushong, J., dissenting). Even assuming that the dissent’s premise is correct, we
disagree that our construction leads to incongruous results. Much like the crime
of burglary focuses on the entry or remaining upon premises to commit a crime,
not on the departure from premises with the fruits of that crime, the legislature’s
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
185
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that a person does not violate ORS
164.377(2)(c) merely by permissibly using an online platform
such as eBay in the course of committing a theft, whether
theft by receiving or some other form of theft. Although ORS
164.377.(2)(c) broadly prohibits using or accessing a computer
to commit theft, the theft at issue must either (1) interfere
with another’s protected interests in either the computer or
its contents, or (2) depend on computer technology to gain
access to whatever it is that the person seeks to unlawfully
obtain. As alleged in this case, defendant’s conduct of theft
by receiving, while conducted on a computer, did not relate
to anything about the computer he used or its contents, and
defendant did not depend on a computer to gain access to the
purportedly stolen property. The trial court therefore erred
in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as
to the allegations of computer crime. We reverse the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquit
tal, reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and remand for further proceedings.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
BUSHONG, J., dissenting.
Defendant used a computer to sell stolen merchan
dise on eBay, obtaining money from those sales through
PayPal accounts that he accessed using a computer.1 The
majority opinion concludes that defendant’s use of a com
puter to commit those crimes does not constitute “computer
crime” in violation of ORS 164.377 because the legislative
focus in enacting the computer crime statute was on the use of computers as
means of—and protecting computers against—intrusion. 372 Or at 180-81 (dis
cussing that focus).
1 eBay is an internet platform that allows “private sellers to list goods they wish
to sell, either through an auction or at a fixed price.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 US 388, 390, 126 S Ct 1837, 164 L Ed 2d 641 (2006). The eBay website
processes purchasers’ payments using PayPal, which is an internet service that
allows “business[es] or private individual[s] to send and receive payments” online.
Comb v. PayPal Inc., 218 F Supp 2d 1165, 1166 (ND CA 2002). Sellers can transfer
funds processed through PayPal into their own bank accounts. Id.
186
State v. Azar
history suggests “a more limited understanding” of what
conduct the legislature intended to prohibit when it adopted
the computer crime statute in 1985. I disagree with that
conclusion. In my view, the majority opinion misreads the
legislative history to reach a result that is contrary to the
text of the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority opinion points out, a person com
mits computer crime in violation of ORS 164.377(2)(c) if the
person knowingly “accesses” or “uses” a computer, computer
system, or computer network, for the purpose of “commit
ting theft.”2 The majority opinion explains that “theft” had a
well-established meaning when the computer crime statute
was enacted and that theft by receiving as defined in ORS
164.015 was included in the conduct covered by the statute. I
agree with that reading of the statute’s text. But the major
ity opinion goes astray when it interprets “access” or “use”
narrowly to cover only conduct that “either interfere[s] with
another’s rights in—or electronically located on—a com
puter, computer system, or computer network, or depend[s]
on such computer technology as a means of accessing the
thing that the person seeks unlawfully to obtain.” 372 Or at
183-84.
That interpretation finds no support in the text or
context of the statute, and the majority opinion does not sug
gest that it does. Instead, the majority opinion relies on the
legislative history to support its narrow interpretation of
the statutory text. But that interpretation conflicts with the
plain meaning of the text, and we have long recognized that
“there is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the
legislature than the words by which the legislature under
took to give expression to its wishes.” State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
The words used here—to “access” and “use”—a
computer to commit theft are not limited by any words sug
gesting that the “rights” a person may have obtained or
2 The computer crime statute defines “computer,” “computer system,” and
“computer network.” See ORS 164.377(1)(b) - (d). Defendant does not dispute that,
by engaging eBay and PayPal online, he accessed a computer, a computer system,
or a computer network.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
187
interfered with when the person used or accessed a computer
must be “in or located on” a computer to constitute computer
crime. Nor are there any words limiting the reach of the
statute to using computer technology “as a means of access
ing the thing that the person seeks unlawfully to obtain.”
Instead, paragraph (1)(a) of the computer crime statute
broadly defines “access” to mean “to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make use
of any resources of a computer, computer system or computer
network.” ORS 164.377(1)(a) (emphasis added). The major
ity opinion interprets that definition to include a limitation
that the legislature omitted, contrary to accepted rules of
statutory interpretation. See ORS 174.010 (in interpreting
statutes, courts may not “insert what has been omitted”).
The majority opinion’s interpretation also overlooks
the fact that subsection (2) of the computer crime statute
expressly states what the purpose of using or accessing a
computer must be for the conduct to be considered computer
crime. That provision states that a person commits com
puter crime when the person knowingly uses or accesses
a computer “for the purpose of” (among other things) “[c]
ommitting theft.” ORS 164.377(2)(c). The statute does not
say that, to constitute computer crime, a person must use or
access a computer for “the purpose of” obtaining or interfer
ing with rights “in or located on” a computer, nor does it say
that the thief’s purpose must be to “access the thing that the
person seeks unlawfully to obtain.” But that is the effect of
the majority opinion’s interpretation.
Moreover, although the legislative discussions lead
ing to the enactment of the statute focused primarily on
the problem of “computer hacking,” as the majority opinion
points out, the legislature ultimately adopted a statute that
broadly covers conduct beyond “hacking.” That commonly
occurs during the legislative process. See, e.g., State v.
Nascimento, 360 Or 28, 44, 379 P3d 484 (2016) (recognizing
that the legislature “
‘may and often does choose broader lan
guage that applies to a wider range of circumstances than
the precise problem that triggered legislative attention’
”
(quoting South Beach Marina, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 301 Or
524, 531, 724 P2d 788 (1986))); Hamilton v. Paynter, 342 Or
188
State v. Azar
48, 55, 149 P3d 131 (2006) (“[T]he statutory text shows that,
even if the legislature had a particular problem in mind, it
chose to use a broader solution.”). That does not mean that
we must interpret the statute “in the broadest sense that
the text might permit.” Nascimento, 360 Or at 44. Rather,
“
‘legislative history would be a basis on which we appropri
ately may construe the text more narrowly’
” if that history
“
‘reveals that the legislature had a narrower understanding
of the term in mind, and if that narrower meaning is consis
tent with the text, even if not compelled by it[.]’
” Id. (quoting
State v. Walker, 356 Or 4, 17, 333 P3d 316 (2014)).
Here, the words used in the computer crime stat
ute—“access” and “use”—broadly apply to a wider range
of circumstances than the hacking problem that triggered
the legislative enactment in 1985. As explained above, the
“narrower meaning” adopted by the majority opinion is
inconsistent with the text enacted by the legislature, and
as explained below, there is no evidence in the legislative
history that the legislature had a narrower understanding
of those terms in mind when it included that text in the com
puter crime statute. In fact, if the legislature were to recon
sider the computer crime statute in 2024 and wanted to be
certain that the statute covered this type of conduct—using
a computer to access eBay to sell stolen goods for payments
processed through PayPal—it would not need to amend the
statute at all. The words in the existing statute—“using” or
“accessing” a computer, computer system, or computer net
work to commit theft (including theft by receiving)—work
just fine to encompass that conduct.
The legislative history confirms that the legislature
did not have a narrower meaning in mind when it defined
computer crime to include any use or access of a computer
to commit theft. The widespread use of computer technol
ogy was in its early stages when the bill that became ORS
164.377 was enacted in 1985. When the need for a computer
crime bill was initially discussed during a 1981 hearing
of the Senate Committee on Justice, Senator Kulongoski
asked whether it would be “a fair statement to say that the
purpose of the bill is not so much necessarily [the] problems
[of] today, as problems that could arise as we move into
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
189
an age where we utilize computers more and more[.]” Tape
Recording, Senate Committee on Justice, SB 439, Mar 25,
1981, Tape 83, Side B (statement of Sen Ted Kulongoski).
Two years later, one witness told the Senate Committee
on Judiciary that they were “living during a period of his
tory which has seen an incredible explosion of technological
advances,” and that “[e]very indicator predicts the 1980s to
be a decade of overwhelming technological change, proba
bly exceeding in impact all the years preceding them. In all
likelihood, in the next very few years ‘a computer in every
home’ will become a reality.” Testimony, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, SB 149, Feb 23, 1983, Ex A (statement of Terry
Hippenhammer). That witness further explained that col
leges and universities across the country were consider
ing requiring all students to own a microcomputer and he
broadly described the “potential abuse” that could occur. Id.
Another witness described computer crime as “the crime of
the future that is rapidly becoming the crime of the pres
ent.” Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 149,
Feb 23, 1983, Ex B (statement of Jim Mattis).
Thus, by the time the computer crime legislation
passed in 1985, the legislature was aware that its under
standing of how computers could be “used” or “accessed”
to commit crimes was limited and that the technology
was changing rapidly. Instead of enacting a law that nar
rowly addressed “hacking” and related problems that were
brought to the legislature’s attention at the time, the legis
lature chose to broadly define “computer crime” to include
“using” or “accessing” a computer for the purpose of com
mitting theft, regardless of how the computer was used to
commit the theft, the nature of the information or property
rights obtained or affected by a wrongdoer’s use or access of
a computer, or the wrongdoer’s ability to “otherwise access”
the property without using a computer.
That broad wording does not mean that the leg
islature necessarily intended “computer crime” to include
using a computer in any way to facilitate the commission of
a crime. Some uses are so incidental—sending an email to
confirm the time and place of a meeting before committing
a theft or using the internet to locate a store to shoplift, for
190
State v. Azar
example—that it is unlikely that the legislature would have
considered them to rise to the level of “computer crime.”
But where a defendant’s use of a computer is integral to the
operation of a criminal enterprise—the Court of Appeals
described defendant’s use of a computer in this case as “the
principal mechanism for his extensive fencing operation,”
State v. Azar, 318 Or App 724, 738, 508 P3d 668 (2022)—I
would conclude that the conduct is covered by the computer
crime statute.3
That conclusion is consistent with a common-sense
understanding of what it means to “access” or “use” a com
puter for the purpose of committing a crime. The defendant
in this case built a criminal enterprise centered on using a
computer to access eBay and PayPal to facilitate his illegal
fencing operation. The eBay website allowed defendant to
market stolen goods to millions of internet users, something
he could not have done without the website and a computer to
access it. The PayPal platform allowed defendant to receive
payments for those stolen goods without risk, something he
could not have done without that internet platform.4 And
given the scope of defendant’s fencing operation, using eBay
and PayPal instead of selling stolen goods in person may
have reduced the risk of attracting the attention of neigh
bors and law enforcement.
Under the majority opinion’s test, using a computer
“as a means of accessing the thing that the person seeks
unlawfully to obtain” would be a computer crime covered by
the statute. 372 Or at 183-84. Thus, under that test, using a
computer to obtain stolen goods as part of an illegal fencing
operation would be a computer crime but using a computer
to sell stolen goods as part of the same criminal enterprise
3 The majority opinion and this dissenting opinion attempt to discern how
the legislature intended a statute enacted in 1985 would apply to present day
circumstances. Given the evolution of our understanding of how computers can
be used to commit crimes, further legislation to clarify what was intended to be
a “computer crime” could remove any uncertainty in this area.
4 Without PayPal or a similar internet payment platform, defendant would
have to receive payment via the mail—which by its nature involves some risk of
loss—or in person. A person receiving payment for stolen goods in those ways
runs the risk that a check may bounce, that counterfeit currency may be given,
or that the buyer might choose to rob the seller instead of paying for the stolen
goods.
Cite as 372 Or 163 (2024)
191
would not be a computer crime. The majority opinion cites
no evidence in the statutory text, context, or legislative his
tory for such a distinction, nor does it offer any good reason
why the legislature would intend to criminalize as computer
crime using a computer to obtain stolen goods but not to sell
them.
Defendant’s use of a computer to conduct an illegal
fencing operation—which is theft by receiving under Oregon
law—falls squarely within the conduct that is prohibited by
the computer crime statute. The majority opinion’s contrary
conclusion based on its narrow interpretation of the statute
is, in my view, wrong. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Garrett, J., and Balmer, S.J., join in this dissenting
opinion. | a80d64743e62a0339d1a13e9f57932b90f099db82a4644347d9018b0f67c7a8e | 2024-04-11T00:00:00Z |
e538e5b6-a604-40cc-a0a9-096e6bfabd2e | Sizemore/Bosak v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 24, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
_____________________________
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48390; S48391)
(Consolidated for Opinion)
On modified ballot title filed August 16, 2001.*
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the Filing of Modified Ballot Title for respondent.
With her on the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
The modified ballot title is certified. The
appellate judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS
250.085(9).
* Sizemore/Bosak v. Myers, 332 Or 335, ___ P3d ___
(2001) (referring ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review
proceeding determined that the Attorney General's
certified ballot title for a proposed initiative measure,
which the Secretary of State denominated as Initiative
Petition 28 (2002), failed to comply substantially with
statutory standards. Sizemore/Bosak v. Myers, 332 Or
335, ___ P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter
802, section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the
court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General
for modification. The Attorney General has filed a
modified ballot title for the proposed initiative
measure, and no party to the ballot title review
proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot
title and requiring court to certify modified ballot
title if no objection filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative
Petition 28 (2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ELIMINATES BY 2007 MOST RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAXES SENIORS PAY; REQUIRES GOVERNMENT PAYMENT TO SENIOR RENTERS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote first
incrementally reduces, then within five years eliminates,
most residential property taxes seniors pay; also
requires counties to make payments to senior renters.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
property tax laws; rejects proposal to eliminate within
five years most property taxes seniors pay, and to
require payments to renters.
"SUMMARY: Amends Oregon Constitution. Current
laws tax residential property owners equally, but allow
low income seniors to defer property taxes. Measure
would eliminate within five years most property taxes on
seniors' primary residence. Measure does not affect
temporary voter-approved property taxes. Maximum
tax reduction is 150 percent of
property tax due on average home in
same county as taxpayer's primary
residence. In first year, seniors
80 and older receive maximum
reduction; seniors 65- 79 receive 25
percent reduction. By fifth year,
seniors 65 and older receive maximum
reduction. Measure also would
require counties to pay senior
renters amount equal to tax
reduction they would have received
as owners. Measure would reduce
revenues available for schools and
other government services funded by
property taxes. Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9) | f3f6b4ad28ec06607bc8f71db92cd05afed903fee5418c72569ceb518a7187f5 | 2001-08-24T00:00:00Z |
f53a4536-1bc3-41e1-8947-4a41828c72bc | Pennzoil Co. v. Dept. of Rev. | null | S47561 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 4, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PENNZOIL COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES,
Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(OTC 4301; SC S47561)
On appeal from the Oregon Tax Court.*
Carl N. Byers, Judge.
Argued and submitted March 2, 2001.
Paul H. Frankel, of Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, New
York, argued the cause for appellants. Carol Vogt Lavine and
Timothy R. Volpert, of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, filed
the briefs for appellants.
Marilyn J. Harbur, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs was Hardy
Myers, Attorney General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs and De Muniz, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, J.
The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
*15 OTR 101 (2000).
**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this tax case is whether proceeds that
taxpayer Pennzoil Company (Pennzoil) received in settlement of a
tort judgment constitute business income under Oregon's tax code
and, if so, whether apportionment of that income is
constitutionally permissible. The Tax Court held that the
proceeds were apportionable business income. Pennzoil Co. v.
Dept. of Rev., 15 OTR 101 (2000). For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
The facts are drawn from the parties' stipulations and
the Tax Court's findings. In January 1984, Pennzoil agreed to
purchase 3/7 of Getty Oil (Getty) stock. In return, Getty agreed
to place Pennzoil officers in key positions on the Getty board of
directors. The agreement provided that Pennzoil and the Getty
Trust would be the sole owners of Getty, holding 3/7 and 4/7 of
the company respectively. Another term of the agreement provided
for the two shareholders to divide Getty's assets if Pennzoil and
the Trust could not agree on a plan to restructure the company;
those assets included Getty's substantial and proven oil and gas
reserves.
A short time later, Pennzoil was surprised by a public
announcement that Texaco had acquired all of Getty's stock.
Pennzoil first sued Getty for specific performance in Delaware.
After losing that action, Pennzoil sued Texaco in Texas for
tortious interference with a contract. In that action, Pennzoil
claimed damages based on the loss of its bargain with Getty in an
amount equal to the cost of finding and developing one billion
barrels of oil reserves. A jury awarded Pennzoil more than $11.1
billion, including $3 billion in punitive damages. Texaco filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and, following a period of
negotiation, Pennzoil agreed to accept $3 billion in satisfaction
of the outstanding judgment.
Pennzoil received the settlement proceeds under a
carefully structured payment plan, initially investing the money
in high-grade securities. (1) Pennzoil segregated the securities
from ordinary operating business accounts so that it could avoid
classification as an "investment company" under federal
securities law and take advantage of a federal tax exemption for
income received by "involuntary conversion." The latter strategy
was only partially successful. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) applied the exemption to part of the proceeds, but decided
that approximately $2.1 billion was taxable income for 1988. The
question here is whether Oregon may apportion, for tax purposes,
that $2.1 billion.
Pennzoil's only activity in Oregon during the 1988 tax
year was the operation of a facility designed to blend, package,
and distribute motor oil and related automotive products. None
of Pennzoil's Oregon employees played a role in the Texas
litigation or the negotiations that followed. In 1988, and the
two years preceding, the Oregon facility operated at a reported
loss. Pennzoil's 1988 Oregon tax return treated the settlement
proceeds as nonbusiness income. However, the Department of
Revenue (department) disagreed and assessed an additional
corporate excise tax based on Oregon's share of the $2.1 billion.
These proceedings ensued.
The Tax Court held that the proceeds were business
income, subject to apportionment under ORS 314.650 (1987), (2)
because: (1) the income arose from Pennzoil's agreement with
Getty Oil; (2) Pennzoil's purpose in negotiating the Getty
contract was to acquire some of Getty's oil reserves; (3)
Pennzoil is in the business of acquiring and developing oil and
gas reserves; (4) negotiating the contract with Getty was
therefore in the regular course of Pennzoil's business; (5) the
transaction with Getty was inherently an integral part of
Pennzoil's regular business; and (6) income arising from that
transaction was apportionable as business income under the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), ORS
314.605 to 314.670 (1987).
Pennzoil challenges the Tax Court's ruling in three
assignments of error. First, Pennzoil asserts that the Tax Court
erred in determining that the proceeds were "business income."
Second, Pennzoil asserts that the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution prohibit Oregon from
taxing the proceeds. Finally, Pennzoil asserts that the Tax
Court erred by apportioning the proceeds under ORS 314.670 (1987)
in a manner that grossly and unconstitutionally distorts
Pennzoil's activity in Oregon.
We begin with Pennzoil's statutory argument. See
Stelts v. State, 299 Or 252, 257, 701 P2d 1047 (1985) (pertinent
statutes are considered before state and federal constitutions).
Income earned outside Oregon may be apportioned if it is
"business income." However, "nonbusiness income" that is earned
elsewhere may not be apportioned. (3) Pennzoil asserts that the
proceeds are "nonbusiness income" and, therefore, not subject to
apportionment. "Nonbusiness income" is defined as "all income
other than business income." ORS 314.610(5) (1987). "Business
income" is
"income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property
if the acquisition, the management, use or rental, and
the disposition of the property constitute integral
parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
operations."
ORS 314.610(1) (1987).
Previously, this court has recognized that ORS
314.610(1) has two parts: (1) income derived from "transactions
and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or
business[;]" and (2) income derived from property "if the
acquisition, the management, use or rental, and the disposition
of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's
regular trade or business operations." Willamette Industries,
Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 311, 316, 15 P3d 18 (2000). Each
part involves a separate test: part one requires a
"transactional test" and part two requires a "functional test."
If the income in question satisfies either test, then it may be
apportioned as "business income." Id.
Under the transactional test, "business income" is
"income arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade or business." The first question,
therefore, is: What transaction or activity gave rise to the
disputed income? See Hoechst Celanese Corporation, v. Franchise
Tax Board, 106 Cal Rptr 2d 548, 563, 22 P3d 324 (2001) (nature of
transaction or activity that gave rise to income is critical
factor); Western Natural Gas Co. v. McDonald, 202 Kan 98, 101,
446 P2d 781 (1968) (same). In addressing that question, we may
consider the frequency or regularity of the transaction and how
the income created by the transaction is used. Kemppel v. Zaino,
91 Ohio St 3d 420, 422, 746 NE2d 1073 (2001); Hoechst, 106 Cal
Rptr 2d at 563.
Here, the parties do not agree on what transaction or
activity gave rise to the settlement proceeds. Pennzoil contends
that the settlement proceeds arose from Texaco's tortious
interference with the contract between Pennzoil and Getty. The
department, however, asserts that the agreement itself gave rise
to the proceeds. The Tax Court agreed with the department,
concluding that
"it does not matter whether the contract was sold,
stolen, condemned, interfered with, or canceled; the
income realized from it by Pennzoil was income 'arising
from' that contract."
15 OTR at 109 (emphasis added).
Pennzoil challenges the Tax Court's decision, arguing
that that court ignored several important facts, including: (1)
Texaco's agreement to indemnify Getty for any litigation arising
out of the earlier deal between Getty and Pennzoil; (2) Texaco's
bankruptcy; and (3) Texaco's creditors opposition to Pennzoil's
efforts to enforce the judgment. Those facts, Pennzoil contends,
illustrate that Texaco's conduct gave rise to the jury award and,
ultimately, the settlement proceeds.
For many years, courts determining the tax consequences
of income received through litigation or settlement have asked:
"In lieu of what were the damages awarded?" See, e.g., Raytheon
Production Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 144
F2d 110, 113 (1st Cir 1944) (discussing that recoveries that
represent a reimbursement for loss of profits are "income"); see
also Getty v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 913 F2d 1486,
1490 (9th Cir 1990) (maintaining that any accession to wealth
received by taxpayer is presumed to be gross income includable in
taxpayer's return); accord Simpson Timber Company v. Dept. of
Rev., 326 Or 370, 375, 953 P2d 366 (1998) (condemnation proceeds
treated as income from voluntary sale of asset held by taxpayer
for purpose of producing "business income"). Substantial
evidence supports the Tax Court's finding that Pennzoil sought
damages against Texaco based on the loss of its contract with
Getty. See ORS 305.445 (setting out substantial evidence
standard of review). We conclude that Pennzoil received the
settlement proceeds in lieu of its agreement with Getty and that
the agreement gave rise to the disputed income.
The second question under the transactional test is:
Did the agreement with Getty occur in the "regular course of
[Pennzoil's] trade or business?" Again, we may consider the
frequency or regularity of the transaction, and how Pennzoil used
the resulting income. Kemppel, 91 Ohio St 3d at 422, Hoechst,
106 Cal Rptr 2d at 563. Pennzoil contends that the agreement
with Getty was for stock, a transaction that Pennzoil
characterizes as infrequent, irregular, and not in the course of
its trade or business.
The department, on the other hand, observes that during
Pennzoil's action against Texaco, Pennzoil repeatedly emphasized
that the reason for its agreement with Getty was to gain access
to Getty's oil reserves. That objective was reflected by a
provision requiring Getty's assets to be distributed in the event
that the two shareholders could not agree on a plan to
restructure the company. Because Pennzoil's purpose was to
acquire access to (or possession of) Getty's oil reserves, the
department argues, it is reasonable to conclude that Pennzoil
made the agreement in the regular course of its business, i.e.,
extracting, processing, and selling petroleum, natural gas and
minerals.
The frequency or regularity of a given transaction or
activity may be considered but is not determinative of whether
that transaction is in the "regular course of the taxpayer's
trade or business"; neither is the manner in which the taxpayer
spends income created by that transaction. Thus, even if it is
rare for Pennzoil to purchase stock in other oil companies -- an
argument weakened by the fact that Pennzoil used the settlement
proceeds to acquire nine percent of Chevron Oil, Katz, 22 Cal App
4th at 1362 -- we are persuaded that steps taken to acquire an
interest in established oil reserves are steps taken in the
"regular course of [Pennzoil's] trade or business." The Tax
Court's finding that Pennzoil sought and received damages from
Texaco based on the cost of developing one billion barrels of oil
reserves supports that conclusion. We conclude that the proceeds
are business income under the transactional test. Accordingly,
it is unnecessary to apply the functional test.
Having resolved the statutory question, we turn to
Pennzoil's second assignment of error. Pennzoil argues that
Oregon's apportionment of the proceeds violates limitations
imposed under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United
State Constitution. Under those clauses, states may tax income
that is earned elsewhere only if there is "some definite link,
some minimum connection, between [the taxing] state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." Miller
Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 US 340, 344-45, 74 S Ct 535, 98 L
Ed 744 (1954). The constitutional parameters for taxing
nondomiciliary corporations are defined by the unitary business
principle that permits states to "tax a corporation on an
apportionable share of the multistate business carried on in part
in the taxing State." Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division
of Taxation, 504 US 768, 778, 112 S Ct 2251, 119 L Ed 2d 533
(1992).
The unitary business principle supports a basis for
apportionment. Specifically, states may apportion capital
transactions that serve an operational function. Allied Signal,
504 US at 787. Taxpayers challenging apportionment must prove
that "the income was earned in the course of activities unrelated
to [those carried out in the taxing] State." Id. (quoting Mobile
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 US 425, 439, 100 S
Ct 1223, 63 L Ed 2d 510 (1980) (brackets in original)).
Pennzoil argues that its unitary business was
unaffected by the agreement with Getty or by Texaco's
interference with the agreement and that the disputed income has
no role in Pennzoil's Oregon operations. We are not persuaded.
As already explained, the agreement between Pennzoil and Getty
generated $2.1 billion of income that Texaco paid in lieu of
Pennzoil's right to acquire an interest in Getty's oil reserves.
The acquisition of oil reserves is related -- indeed is vitally
important -- to the continued blending and distribution of motor
oil in Oregon. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 US 46, 50, 76 S Ct 20, 100 L Ed 29 (1955) (taxpayer's
purchase of corn futures to insure adequate supply of raw
material was "vitally important to the company's business").
Pennzoil has failed to meet its burden. The disputed income
arose from activity that serves an operational function and,
therefore, Oregon may apportion that income.
Pennzoil's third and final assignment of error asserts
that its 1988 assessed tax liability in Oregon is
unconstitutional because it is out of proportion with the amount
of business it actually did in the state. Pennzoil argues that
formulary apportionment of the proceeds is per se
unconstitutional, because it results in a tax liability that is
approximately 844% larger than it would have been under a
separate accounting method. (4) As we understand Pennzoil's
argument, Oregon must sever large capital transactions from
unitary business income, because state apportionment of business
income is limited to business income generated within the state.
In other words, Pennzoil argues that the unitary business
principle does not apply to large capital transactions.
Our answer to Pennzoil's argument mirrors the Tax
Court's. First, we disapprove of the separate accounting method
that Pennzoil advocates. Indeed, the difficulty in applying a
separate accounting method to a multistate business is the very
reason for apportionment and the unitary business principle.
Second, if Oregon could sever a single capital transaction from
unitary business income simply because apportionment of that
income would result in distortion, then there would be little
point in maintaining the unitary business principle. Pennzoil's
unitary business succeeded in 1988 largely because of the
settlement proceeds received from Texaco. In 1988, Pennzoil
conducted part of its unitary business in Oregon. As a result,
Oregon is entitled to apportion the settlement proceeds as
unitary business income.
The judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed.
1. Pennzoil eventually used the proceeds to purchase about
nine percent of Chevron Oil's common stock. See Katz v. Chevron
Corporation, 22 Cal App 4th 1352, 1362, 27 Cal Rptr 2d 681 (1994)
(shareholder derivative suit challenging corporate directors'
defensive strategy in dealing with Pennzoil's purchase of 31.5
million shares for $2.1 billion).
2. ORS 314.650(1) (1987) provides:
"(1) All business income shall be apportioned to
this state by multiplying the income by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the property factor plus the
payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the
denominator of which is three."
3. Under UDITPA, "nonbusiness income" is allocated
entirely to the state in which it was earned. ORS 314.625 to
314.645 (1987).
4. In support of its argument, Pennzoil relies on Hans
Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 US 123, 51 S Ct
385, 75 L Ed 879 (1931), in which the Supreme Court held that,
although the taxpayer's business was unitary, the statutory
apportionment method operated "unreasonably and arbitrarily,"
because it attributed to the taxing state "a percentage of income
out of all appropriate proportion to business transacted" in the
state. Id. at 135.
Modernly, Hans Rees' is of limited value because
Oregon, like the majority of states, has a multi-factor
apportionment formula and, so far, the Court has refused to test
the application of a multi-factor apportionment formula to a
unitary multistate business by the principles of separate
accounting. See Development in the Law -- Federal Limitations on
State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 Harv L Rev 955, 1015
(1962) (discussing judicial treatment of apportionment formulas). | 841c79387ff67c388bfc1eeff4d8ec1b54d883d5349722ceee15cc13637fdce6 | 2001-10-04T00:00:00Z |
d8901a38-3023-4d8e-b59d-cdd377e8434c | Johnson v. Eastern Oregon State College | null | S48663 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Barbara Johnson, Claimant.
BARBARA JOHNSON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
EASTERN OREGON STATE COLLEGE
and SAIF CORPORATION,
Respondents on Review.
(WCB 95-07224, 95-05888; CA A98381; SC S48663)
En Banc
On petition for review filed June 27, 2001.*
Christopher D. Moore, Malagon, Moore, Johnson & Jensen,
Eugene, filed the petition for petitioner on review.
No appearance contra.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The appellate judgment is recalled. The petition for review
is allowed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration in light of Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc.,
331 Or 362, 15 P3d 548 (2000).
*Judicial review from the Workers' Compensation Board, 159 Or App 663, 978 P2d 451 (1999). | 3c270c8cb2f6cf804e5b688cf9a452b7143baba6d77d0add48000006b624d29c | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
3357affe-bf5e-45a2-b729-65bf3ad3f548 | Mount v. DCBS | null | S48664 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 4, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Cindy Mount, Claimant.
CINDY M. MOUNT,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
AND
BUSINESS SERVICES
and SAIF CORPORATION,
Respondents on Review.
(WCB 99-06487, CA A103636; SC S48664)
On petition for review filed July 12, 2001.*
Christopher D. Moore, Eugene, filed the petition for
petitioner on review.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of Koskela v.
Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362, 15 P3d 548 (2000).
*Judicial Review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 161 Or App 664, 986 P2d 28 (1999).
**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case. | cad0afd491d03eed118ffbc1fb12dfc1a4ced4d47b22b795e8821ee946f73b40 | 2001-10-04T00:00:00Z |
49bcb528-4ecd-4c49-924b-20adb6894828 | Novick v. Myers (S48605) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 9, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48605)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record July 19, 2001.
Steven Novick, in propria persona, filed the petition.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
GILLETTE, J.
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 48 (2002). The proposed measure,
if adopted, would phase in a revenue sharing procedure in which
15 percent of state personal and corporate income tax revenue
would be distributed "to local governments and those local
service districts providing essential services."
Petitioner is an elector who timely submitted written
comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the
Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore is
entitled to seek review in this court. See ORS 250.085(2)
(stating that requirement). We review the Attorney General's
certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially
complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (d). ORS
250.085(5).
Petitioner challenges only the "yes" result statement
in the Attorney General's ballot title. That statement provides:
"'Yes' vote requires distribution of fifteen
percent of all state income tax revenue to some local
governments, service districts that do not tax business
income."
A "yes" result statement must set out a "simple and
understandable statement of not more than 25 words that describes
the result if the state measure is approved." ORS 250.035(2)(b).
Petitioner asserts that the Attorney General's "yes" result
statement fails to comply with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(b), in that it suggests -- incorrectly -- that the
only local governments that are eligible to receive shared tax
revenues are those governments that do not themselves tax
business income. In fact, as petitioner points out, several such
governments will be qualified to receive shared tax revenues, but
their ordinary share will be reduced by the amount that they
raise through their own local taxes on personal or business
income, revenue, or profits.
The Attorney General concedes that petitioner's
criticism of the "yes" result statement is well taken, and we
agree. We hold that the Attorney General's "yes" result
statement fails to comply substantially with the requirements of
ORS 250.035(2)(b). Under ORS 250.085(8), Or Laws 2001, ch 802, § 2 (House Bill 2213 (2001), section 2), the ballot title is
referred to the Attorney General for modification. See Flanagan
v. Myers, 332 Or 318, ___ P3d ___ (2001) (explaining procedure
under 2001 legislative amendments to ORS 250.085).
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification. | 2924114dd0dd5d38b81d73b222bce2171ddfe5d04fde0a93a54f26398e2bd0d4 | 2001-08-09T00:00:00Z |
96a85300-da7b-4785-8a6b-fc5ffce71435 | State v. Peppard | null | S48401 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JOHN H. PEPPARD,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 951127; CA A93616; SC S48401)
On petition for review filed April 18, 2001.*
David Groom, Oregon Public Defender, and Rebecca Duncan,
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the petition for petitioner
on review.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001).
*Appeal from Clatsop County Circuit Court, Paula Brownhill, Judge. 172 Or App 311, 18 P3d 488 (2001).
**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case. | c3de2daa573a4c01d371d9a5affc0216c7c4428edf6695021a2d98391a91d22c | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
bd2ad4f6-4c3d-45ef-a173-81710fe3c12b | State v. Suter | null | S48779 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: October 25, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STEVEN MICHAEL SUTER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 96-1052; CA A95862; SC S48779)
On petition for review filed August 21, 2001.*
Mary M. Reese, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for petitioner on review. With her on the petition was
David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further consideration in light of State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001).
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Robert R. Selander, Judge. 157 Or App 107, 969 P2d 1035 (1998).
**Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case. | 1e3aa95655a19b2d2fe253659767cc4fd20356dc358e40ff18a7b99cb6fccad9 | 2001-10-25T00:00:00Z |
d41cc46c-06b0-45f8-8a48-95a2d4baf9ea | State v. Cook | null | S47104 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JEFFREY DALE COOK,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 1396-08502; CA A99394; SC S47104)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 6, 2001.
Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs was
David E. Groom, Public Defender.
Jennifer Scott Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review. With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Lyle C. Velure, Judge. 163 Or App 24, 986 P2d 1228 (1999).
**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, J.
This is a criminal case in which defendant was
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.992(4)(b)
(1995), which the police found during a warrantless search of
some clothing and a duffel bag. The Court of Appeals held that
"defendant had a privacy and possessory interest in the bag and
its contents before the bag was searched," but that suppression
of the evidence was not required, because "defendant had
abandoned his interests * * * in the bag before the search
occurred." State v. Cook, 163 Or App 24, 31, 34, 986 P2d 1228
(1999). We allowed defendant's petition for review and now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The parties agree with the Court of Appeals'
recitation of the facts, which we set out below:
"During the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Officers Petermen and Reynolds testified that on
September 8, 1996, at 1:30 a.m., they went to an
apartment complex after they were advised through a
radio dispatch of two persons possibly trying to
commit thefts from vehicles. The officers testified
that they did not know the name of the caller who had
informed the police department of the two suspects
and did not recall descriptions of the suspects.
Both officers began looking for the suspects in the
parking area of the complex. Although Officer
Petermen saw no broken glass, he testified that
windows are not always broken when items are stolen
from cars. Subsequently, for approximately two
minutes, Officer Petermen observed defendant, who was
bent down next to a garbage dumpster adjacent to the
parking area in the process of sorting clothing into
a duffel bag. Defendant's back was toward the
officer. The dumpster was in a semi-enclosed area.
Officer Petermen testified that, based on defendant's
behavior, 'it seemed reasonable to believe that the
actions that he was doing would be something
consistent with somebody who had committed a theft
from a vehicle.' Consequently, Officer Petermen
testified that he 'contacted [defendant] in the
doorway [to the area containing the dumpster], asked
[defendant] to step out, [and they] backed down the
hallway.' Defendant complied, after leaving the bag
and clothing on the ground.
"Officer Petermen testified:
"'A. Initially I asked [defendant]
what it was he was doing. He told me he
had been out for a walk when he discovered
a pile of clothing there and he thought he
may be able to use some of the clothing and
so he was going through the clothing to
find items which he may be able [to] use.
"'Q. Did he say whether the clothing
or the bag or anything in there was his?
"'A. He said none of the items that he
had been handling were his except a green
army jacket also in there lying down.'
"Officer Reynolds also recalled that defendant
originally 'denied that any of the property in there
was his and that he had just found all the stuff
inside and was going through it to see what he wanted
to take home.'
"Subsequently, Officer Petermen returned to the
enclosure where the dumpster was located. During
that time, defendant remained outside with Officer
Reynolds. When Officer Petermen searched the bag, he
"'found clothing, [a] magazine and a
syringe with a kitchen-type knife bound together
with string as well as two silver spoons, one
contained a white powder substance with a small
piece of white colored wadding along with a
second silver spoon, clear plastic baggie and a
Snickers candy bar.'
"Officer Petermen also found the name, 'Doreen Cook,'
written on the inside of the bag. Thereafter, the
officer returned to defendant, who again denied that
the bag was his. After Officer Petermen ascertained
that the name of defendant's wife was Doreen Cook and
indicated to defendant that that name was on the bag,
defendant admitted that the bag was his."
State v. Cook, 163 Or App at 26-27.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the seizure and search of the bag and
clothing violated his privacy and possessory interests under
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial
court denied defendant's motion, ruling that: "[T]he officer
had probable cause to suspect that a crime had been committed
and that the search of the duffel bag was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances, particularly since the defendant
initially denied ownership of the bag prior to the search[.]"
The trial court added that "it was completely appropriate for
the officers to determine ownership of the bag, not only to
return the bag to the appropriate owner but [also] to determine
if [defendant's possession of] the bag had indeed been [the]
result of some type of [theft]." (1)
The Court of Appeals held that "it is clear that
defendant had a privacy and possessory interest in the bag and
its contents before the bag was searched." 163 Or App at 31.
The court also noted that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the bag
belonged to [defendant] or to his wife." Id. That court
framed the issue as "whether defendant's disclaimer of
ownership should be held to be an abandonment of his protected
interests in the bag," a question that the court stated "turns
on whether defendant intended to forego exercising his
possessory and privacy interests in the bag." Id. at 32. The
Court of Appeals held that, under the circumstances, defendant
evidenced an intent to abandon his interest in the bag and
clothing before the search took place, and sustained the ruling
of the trial court on that ground. Id. at 34. On review,
defendant argues that his "disclaimer of ownership" did not
constitute an abandonment of his constitutionally protected
possessory and privacy interest in the property.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides that
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized."
The state agrees that the duffel bag and the clothing that
defendant sorted into the bag were effects protected from
unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, section 9.
The state also agrees that defendant had a possessory and
privacy interest in the bag and the clothing before the bag was
seized and searched. See State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729
P2d 524 (1986) (Article I, section 9, protects privacy and
possessory interests). The state contends, however, that
defendant "relinquished any possessory or privacy interest in
the bag and its contents, by leaving the items on the ground
when he agreed to talk to the officer, walking away from them
and repeatedly denying that the items were his."
In State v. Morton, 326 Or 466, 470, 953 P2d 374
(1998), this court recognized that individual privacy rights
can be "lost if, for example, the facts showed that the
defendant had abandoned the container before the police seized
it." In Morton, however, this court rejected the state's
abandonment argument because the defendant had dropped the
container (containing methamphetamine) as she was being seized
under an invalid arrest warrant. Under the circumstances, to
have allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant
would have permitted the police to exploit an illegal arrest.
Id. Although Morton is the most recent case in which this
court considered the abandonment of property and its potential
impact on individual possessory and privacy interests under
Article I, section 9, this court previously dealt with this
issue in a number of cases.
For example, in State v. Purvis, 249 Or 404, 411, 438
P2d 1002 (1968), a case decided under both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, section 9, (2) the defendant sought to suppress
evidence that police had obtained from hotel maids who had
removed the evidence from ash trays and waste baskets of a
hotel room that the defendant had occupied. This court
rejected the defendant's privacy arguments, stating:
"Defendant's claim to privacy terminated with respect
to items discarded by him and which he impliedly
authorized to be hauled away. * * *
* * * * *
"The objects which defendant deposited in the
ash trays and waste baskets can be regarded as
abandoned property."
249 Or at 410-11.
In State v. Belcher, 306 Or 343, 759 P2d 1096 (1988),
the defendant engaged in a fight at a tavern and ran from the
scene before the police arrived, leaving behind a backpack.
After reciting the trial court's findings that the defendant
had "[left] the pack behind; [with] no indication when if ever
he decided to return for it," this court agreed with the
state's argument that the defendant had abandoned the backpack
and that a police search for identification in the backpack did
not violate Article I, section 9, or the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 345-46.
State v. Pidcock, 306 Or 335, 759 P2d 1092 (1988),
involved a briefcase that was found along the side of a road
and turned over to the police, who searched it for
identification. Although this court concluded that the police
search for identification did not violate the defendant's
privacy rights under Article I, section 9, the court rejected
the state's argument "that [the] defendant 'abandoned the
property in a constitutional sense,'" holding:
"Defendant did not 'abandon' the briefcase until
after the deputies had opened the briefcase and
opened the envelopes [found within the briefcase] and
tested their contents without a warrant. When the
deputies opened the briefcase and tested the
contents, defendant was still actively attempting to
recover that property."
306 Or at 339.
Three important points emerge from the cases
discussed above. First, the determination whether a defendant
has relinquished a constitutionally protected interest in an
article of property involves both factual and legal questions,
which this court reviews in the same manner that it reviews
other search or seizure questions arising under Article I,
section 9. See State v. Bea, 318 Or 220, 230, 864 P2d 854
(1993) (court will not disturb trial court's findings of
historical fact if evidence supports them; however, court not
bound by trial court's ultimate holding on voluntariness of
consent to search, but assesses anew whether facts suffice to
meet constitutional standards).
Second, because Article I, section 9, protects both
possessory and privacy interests in effects, property law
concepts of ownership and possession are relevant, though not
always conclusive, in the factual and legal determination
whether a defendant relinquished all constitutionally protected
interests in an article of property.
Finally, for constitutional purposes, the question to
be resolved in the present case is whether the defendant's
statements and conduct demonstrated that he relinquished all
constitutionally protected interests in the articles of
property, so that both the warrantless seizure of the property
and the resultant search by the police were reasonable under
Article I, section 9. We now answer that question in this
case.
Because the police did not have a warrant to seize
and search the items, the state had the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the seizure and search were
reasonable under Article I, section 9. ORS 133.693 (4); see
State v. Tucker, 330 Or 85, 997 P2d 182 (2000) (state failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence that defendant lacked
protected interest in camera case left in automobile in which
defendant had been passenger).
Here, as noted earlier, the state agrees that
defendant had a possessory and privacy interest in the bag and
the clothing before they were seized and searched. The state
argues, however, that defendant lost or relinquished his
constitutionally protected interests in the bag and clothing
because he left those items on the ground when he agreed to
talk to the officer, he walked away from the items, and he
repeatedly denied ownership of the items. For the following
reasons, we reject the state's argument.
Defendant's only statements before the seizure and
search occurred were that he discovered the pile of clothing,
that the items, with the exception of an army jacked, were not
his, and that he was going through the clothing to find items
that he might have been able to use. The statements were
responsive to Officer Petermen's inquiry as to what defendant
was doing with the bag and clothes, and permitted the officers
reasonably to conclude that defendant did not own the bag and
clothing.
The fact that defendant told the officers that he did
not own the bag and clothes did not, however, permit the
officers to conclude that defendant intended to relinquish all
his constitutionally protected interests in those items.
Although defendant had relinquished his immediate physical
possession of the bag and clothing by leaving them on the
ground, undisputedly he did so only after Officer Petermen
instructed him to "step out" of the area near the dumpster
where defendant was sorting the clothes into the bag. Leaving
the items on the ground in compliance with the officer's
request to "step out" is not conduct demonstrating an intent
permanently to relinquish possession of the items or the
privacy interests that accompanied the right to possess them.
Under those circumstances, the officers could not have
reasonably concluded that defendant intended to relinquish his
possessory and privacy interests in the clothing and the bag.
Thus, the seizure of the clothing and bag followed by the
immediate search of those items violated defendant's possessory
and accompanying privacy interests protected by Article I,
section 9. See Owens, 302 Or at 207 ("The seizure of an
article by the police and the retention of it (even
temporarily) is a significant intrusion into a person's
possessory interest in that 'effect.'"). Because the
warrantless seizure and search of the bag and clothing was
unlawful, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to suppress.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. On review, the state does not argue that the officers
had probable cause to seize and search items for evidence of a
crime, or that the officers legally were entitled to seize and
search the items to determine their ownership.
2. The only reference in Purvis to the Oregon Constitution
is the phrase, "a seizure of the property would violate the
Fourth Amendment and its counterpart in our own constitution."
249 Or at 409. | 60a3bb7516e76a14ed666f26962e8cf8eaba80252a1eed83fa94c8ec88b8a740 | 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z |
f85a0b8f-b97e-4e82-89c8-e57ca2a7b65c | Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc. | 322 Or. 392, 908 P.2d 308 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 908 P.2d 308 (1995)
322 Or. 392
Ronald E. SHAW, By and Through Thomas Zollner, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ronald E. Shaw, deceased, Respondent on Review,
v.
PACC HEALTH PLAN, INC., an Oregon corporation, Petitioner on Review, and
United Employer Benefit Corporation, an Oregon corporation, Respondent, and
Holly Hart, dba Old Wives' Tales Restaurant, Defendant.
CC 9106-04101; CA A76072; SC S41799.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted May 1, 1995.
Decided December 29, 1995.
*310 I. Franklin Hunsaker, of Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass & Hoffman, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on briefs were Chrys A. Martin and Lori R. Metz.
Cynthia L. Barrett, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Jeffrey C. Carey, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae American Council of Life Insurance, Health Insurance Association of America, and Standard Insurance Company. With him on the brief were Phillip E. Stano and Theresa L. Sorota, Washington, D.C.
CARSON, Chief Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly granted the motion of defendant PACC Health Plan, Inc. (hereinafter "PACC"), for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's[1] state claims were preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
Defendant Holly Hart (hereinafter "employer") operates a restaurant in which she employed plaintiff as a server. In 1990, employer decided to purchase health insurance for her employees, and hoped to obtain health coverage for her employees by January 1991. She began working with an insurance broker, Mary Hummel (hereinafter "the broker"), who was employed by defendant United Employer Benefit Corporation (hereinafter "UEBC"), to investigate various plans. In August 1990, the employees completed medical history forms, which employer gave to the broker. The broker submitted those medical history forms, along with other application materials, to one insurance carrier. That carrier approved the group's application in October 1990, and provided an estimate for the cost of coverage.
Over the next two months, employer reviewed that carrier's plan information, as well as information from several other carriers, including PACC. In comparing the plans, employer realized that the first carrier's deductible for each employee was twice as high as PACC's, despite the fact that both carriers would charge employer identical premiums for each employee. Consequently, on December 26, 1990, the broker gave employer an application form for PACC's health plan. Employer completed the application form, but the employees did not complete updated medical history forms. Instead, employer redated the medical history forms that the employees had completed in August 1990 to December 1990. The broker then submitted the application and the redated medical history forms to PACC.[2] The broker told employer that her employees' health coverage should begin by January 1, 1991.
PACC received employer's application and the employees' medical history forms on January 2, 1991. A senior medical underwriter preliminarily approved the application and forwarded it to her supervisor, the director of underwriting, for routine review. However, before the application had received final *311 approval, plaintiff, one of the employees who was to be covered under the proposed plan, became ill and was hospitalized on January 9, 1991. His diagnosis was a respiratory condition known as pneumocystis, a condition that often occurs in people with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Plaintiff tested positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) at that time. On January 10, 1991, when employer learned that plaintiff was hospitalized, she called the broker and asked whether the application had been approved. The broker told her that it still was pending.
On either January 10 or 11, 1991, a nurse employed by PACC, who visited the hospital daily to pick up PACC's claim forms and to monitor the quality of care provided to PACC's insureds, learned that plaintiff was ill and suspected that plaintiff might have AIDS. The nurse called PACC's director of underwriting, whom she told about her suspicions.[3] The director reexamined employer's application and noticed that the medical history forms submitted with the application had not been completed within 45 days of the application date, as PACC required. PACC requested that each member of the group provide an updated medical history form.
The employees completed new forms on January 15, 1991, which the broker submitted to PACC. Plaintiff's new form was dated December 31, 1990, and reflected his condition as of that date, because employer thought that plaintiff's coverage should be effective as of January 1, 1991. On January 16, upon final review, PACC decided to deny employer's application for insurance coverage, allegedly for reasons other than plaintiff's medical condition.[4] Employer learned of the denial on January 17, 1991. PACC did not cover any claims related to plaintiff's hospitalization in January 1991.
Plaintiff filed this complaint, alleging common law claims against employer, UEBC, and PACC. Plaintiff claimed that: 1) PACC breached its oral promise to employer, made through the broker, to provide insurance coverage by January 1, 1991; 2) PACC and UEBC negligently processed employer's application; 3) PACC and UEBC denied employer's application in bad faith because, after learning that plaintiff was HIV positive, they conspired to create a pretextual basis for denying employer's application; and 4) employer breached her oral promise to plaintiff that insurance coverage would be provided effective January 1, 1991.
Before trial, plaintiff settled his claim against employer. The trial court granted PACC's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims against PACC were preempted by ERISA. Trial proceeded against UEBC on the claims that UEBC had negligently processed the application and that it had breached a fiduciary duty by denying employer's application for insurance in bad faith. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court granted UEBC's motion to dismiss the claim for bad faith denial of the application and breach of fiduciary duty. The claim for negligent processing of employer's application went to a jury, which returned a verdict for UEBC.
Plaintiff appealed the order granting PACC's motion for summary judgment and the order granting UEBC's motion to dismiss the claim for bad faith denial of the application and breach of fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claim for bad faith denial and breach of fiduciary duty against UEBC, but reversed the order granting PACC's motion for summary judgment. Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc., 130 Or.App. 32, 43, 881 P.2d 143 (1994). As to the order granting the motion for summary judgment, a majority of the panel held that plaintiff's claims "are not preempted, because plaintiff is seeking to enforce rights that arise outside of an ERISA plan and do not relate to it." Id. at 42, 881 P.2d 143. One judge dissented, maintaining that plaintiff's common law claims were preempted by ERISA. Id. at 43, 881 *312 P.2d 143 (De Muniz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
PACC petitioned for review in this court, arguing that plaintiff's claims against it were preempted. We allowed PACC's petition for review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Article VI, paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution, the "Supremacy Clause," provides:
The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. Federal preemption may occur "by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law." New York Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1995). In this case, PACC argues that Congress expressly preempted plaintiff's common law claims through the preemption provision contained in 29 U.S.C. section 1144, below.[5] We are faced, therefore, with a question of statutory interpretation: We must determine whether Congress intended to preempt the type of claim brought here when it enacted ERISA. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1983) ("In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue."); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 282 Or. 61, 80, 577 P.2d 1322, on recons. 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978) (Linde, J., concurring) ("The question of federal preemption is essentially one of statutory interpretation or, if one prefers, of Congressional intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29 U.S.C. section 1144(a), the ERISA preemption provision, provides, in part:
29 U.S.C. section 1003(a) provides, in part:
"[T]his subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained
An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined, in part, to be
In this case, the parties disagree whether employer's actions "established" an ERISA employee benefit plan at all.[6] If employer did not establish such a plan, ERISA does not preempt any of plaintiff's common law claims against PACC. PACC argues that employer had taken the steps necessary to "establish" an employee benefit plan for her employees, in the form of health insurance, even though PACC ultimately rejected the application for coverage, and that there was therefore an "established" plan that triggered ERISA's preemption provision. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that a plan *313 was not "established," because PACC had not given final approval to employer's application for coverage, and, thus, no actual plan ever existed. These competing arguments require us to determine what Congress meant when it referred to an employee benefit plan "established * * * by [an] employer."
As noted, ERISA is a federal statute. Therefore, our task is to identify and carry out the intent of Congress when it enacted ERISA. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1551, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1987) ("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1909, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985))). In doing so, we follow the methodology generally used in ERISA preemption cases by the Supreme Court of the United States. That is, "we begin * * * with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs." New York Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
We begin our analysis with the wording of the statute, specifically the word "established," together with the assumption, common to many statutory interpretation decisions of the Supreme Court, "that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S. Ct. 403, 406, 112 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1990) (quoting Park `N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S. Ct. 658, 661, 83 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1985)). There are several ordinary meanings for the word "establish," including "to make firm or stable," "to place, install, or set up in a permanent or relatively enduring position," and "to bring into existence, create, make, start, originate, found, or build usu[ally] as permanent or with permanence in view." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 778 (unabridged ed 1993).
From the foregoing, we believe that it is fair to state that ordinarily the word "establish" means to set something in place with the goal of making it long-lasting or permanent. That definition in turn suggests that an employee benefit plan actually must be in place before it is "established," causing ERISA to preempt any common law claims relating to the plan. That definition further suggests that it refers to the completion of the final steps in constructing something that will last for a significant time. It does not appear to refer to negotiations preceding the execution of an agreement. In short, Congress' use of the word "established" suggests that an employee benefit plan is not "established" and, therefore, does not exist for the purposes of ERISA, unless the plan is in place. In this case, the parties had engaged in preliminary steps that would have resulted in the establishment of a plan if the agreement to purchase insurance had been completed. However, because PACC denied employer's application, an employee benefit plan was never in place, i.e., it never was "established."
Moreover, ERISA provides that an employee welfare benefit plan comes into existence when a "plan, fund, or program * * * is * * * established * * * through the purchase of insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). (Emphasis added.) That phrasing suggests that an employer can "establish" an employee welfare benefit plan through the purchase of insurance or some other comparable arrangement.[7] Therefore, an employer's mere intention to purchase insurance, or even preliminary steps toward that end, are not sufficient to "establish" an employee benefit plan. Under the plain words of 29 U.S.C. section 1002, a plan that is solely in the form of insurance is not "established" for the purposes of ERISA unless and until the employer has purchased the insurance. Consequently, in this case, employer did not "establish" a plan, because the purchase of insurance never took place.
Our analysis of text also includes relevant decisions by the Supreme Court of *314 the United States. Although the Supreme Court has rendered several decisions pertaining to the scope of ERISA preemption, it has not examined the meaning of the word "established" in the context of employee benefit plans. Consequently, the Supreme Court's case law on ERISA preemption does not further our textual analysis.[8]
We now turn to the structure of ERISA, to determine whether any other provisions of the Act assist in our interpretation of what Congress meant by the word "established" in the context of employee benefit plans. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 1672, 104 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1989) (Supreme Court looks to provisions of whole law when interpreting federal statutes). Some of the text contained in ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions is helpful to our analysis, as we shall explain below.
ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions impose a duty of disclosure upon employers who have established employee benefit plans, requiring employers to furnish plan participants with a summary plan description. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(1). Employers also must file the summary plan description with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1021(b)(1). Section 1022(b) sets forth the information that employers must include in the summary plan description, such as information concerning the plan's administration, eligibility, and benefit requirements; claim procedures and remedies under the plan; and circumstances that may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial of benefits. The summary plan description also must contain "the source of financing of the plan and the identity of any organization through which benefits are provided." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). (Emphasis added.) That wording is helpful to our interpretation of the word "established," because it suggests that an employee benefit plan exists only if the employer can identify its benefit provider. If no provider exists, the employer would not be able to comply with ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements.
In this case, PACC never provided benefits to the employees, and an agreement never was in place that obligated PACC to do so. Instead, PACC rejected employer's application for coverage. Nor did employer have any other provider in January 1991. If we were to conclude that employer had "established" an employee benefit plan, employer would be unable to comply with ERISA's requirement that employers who have established plans must disclose the identity of their benefit providers. Consequently, the fact that employer had no benefit provider supports our conclusion that employer never "established" a plan.
ERISA's reporting requirements also require publication of an annual report with respect to employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(1)(A). Section 1023(e) specifically addresses the situation in which an insurance company provides the plan benefits. It provides, in part:
The phrase "[i]f some or all of the benefits under the plan are purchased from * * * an insurance company" is instructive. In drafting this section, Congress recognized that the only means by which an insurance company can become involved in an employee benefit plan is through the employer's purchase of benefits from that insurance company. Once that purchase has taken place, the insurance company can fulfill the reporting requirements contained in subsections 1023(e)(1) and (2). Without the purchase of benefits, an insurance company has only a potential connection to an employee benefit plan. If no other provider or source of funding exists, an employer could not have "established" a plan under ERISA.
In this case, if PACC had approved employer's application, "all of the benefits under the plan [would have been] purchased from * * * an insurance company." Such a purchase would have been employer's "establishment" of an employee benefit plan and further would have obligated PACC to comply with the reporting requirements contained in 29 U.S.C. section 1023(e). However, no purchase of insurance ever took place, because PACC denied employer's application. That fact further supports the conclusion that employer did not "establish" a plan, because the only method by which a plan can exist if an insurance company provides the benefits is through the employer's purchase of those benefits.
Nothing in the text or structure of ERISA suggests that the word "established" has more than one plausible meaning or that Congress intended that ERISA should preempt state laws, whether statutory or common law, as they pertain to potential plans. We have found nothing in the legislative history describing the purposes behind ERISA that suggests a different result. From our examination of the relevant federal statutory provisions, it is clear that, in order for an ERISA employee benefit plan to be "established by an employer" through the purchase of insurance, there first must be an agreement between the employer and the provider. Until a provider has an obligation under that agreement to provide benefits to beneficiaries or participants, an employer has not "established" an employee benefit plan.
The focus of our inquiry is on the existence of a plan that provides benefits. In this case, such a plan, in fact, did not exist. Because PACC did not approve employer's application, and employer did not provide health coverage to her employees through any other mechanism, employer did not "establish" an employee benefit plan. Plaintiff's claims, therefore, are not preempted by ERISA.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court for PACC Health Plan, Inc., on summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
[1] The original plaintiff in this action died on August 7, 1993. On October 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing this action to be continued through plaintiff's personal representative. We refer to the original plaintiff as "plaintiff" throughout this opinion.
[2] According to employer's testimony at trial, employer redated the forms at the broker's direction. However, the broker denied knowing that the old forms were outdated at the time that she submitted those forms to PACC.
[3] It is not entirely clear from the record how PACC's nurse found out about plaintiff's condition. It appears from testimony at trial that the nurse probably picked up a claim form completed for plaintiff, which listed PACC as plaintiff's insurance provider.
[4] PACC's purported reasons for denial are not clear from the record. There was conflicting testimony as to which of several factors, not including plaintiff's medical condition, provided the basis for PACC's denial of employer's application.
[5] Because Congress included an express preemption provision in ERISA, we consider only that method of federal preemption in this opinion.
[6] According to ERISA's definition section, there are three types of employee benefit plans: an "employee welfare benefit plan," an "employee pension benefit plan," and a plan that is a combination of both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). This case is concerned with an "employee welfare benefit plan."
[7] The language "or otherwise" encompasses other noncontractual or comparable arrangements that result in employer plan liability with the same consequences as the purchase of insurance. Because plaintiff's claim in this case centers on actions by PACC that prevented employer from purchasing insurance from PACC, we focus on ERISA's language that a "plan * * * is * * * established * * * through the purchase of insurance."
[8] Because the Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue, we ordinarily would next look to the federal courts to determine whether they have interpreted the same issue under ERISA as that presented here. When the federal courts are well-settled on a specific interpretation, this court may choose to follow that interpretation, if the underlying reasoning is persuasive. However, federal court decisions, other than those issued by the Supreme Court, are not binding on this court. Van De Hey v. U.S. National Bank, 313 Or. 86, 95 n. 9, 829 P.2d 695 (1992); Derenco v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Sav. and Loan, 281 Or. 533, 549, 577 P.2d 477 (1978).
The germinal federal case addressing whether a plan is "established" for ERISA preemption purposes is Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir 1982). In Donovan, the court determined that "[a] decision to extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program. * * * [I]t is the reality of a plan, fund or program and not the decision to extend certain benefits that is determinative." Id. at 1373. That test has been accepted widely by the federal courts. See Kenney v. Roland Parson Contracting Corp., 28 F.3d 1254, 1257 (DC Cir 1994) ("Every circuit that has since been required to decide whether, on the particular facts before it, a pension plan has come into being has adopted the [Donovan] approach."). Donovan's approach supports our conclusion that, in this case, employer did not "establish" an ERISA plan. As the Court of Appeals stated, "the goal toward which [employer's] conduct was directed, obtaining insurance, never became a reality," because employer never purchased insurance from PACC. Shaw v. PACC Health Plan, Inc., 130 Or.App. 32, 38, 881 P.2d 143 (1994). (Emphasis added.) Consequently, employer never "established" an employee benefit plan for the purposes of ERISA. | f3eca95f80e1052dd46540afdafd37dd9b5ad999619c3e3c1f74d1ee84c4f887 | 1995-12-29T00:00:00Z |
93d1a59c-cd62-4d78-be63-c1695653c7eb | Bosak v. Myers (S48606) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: October 4, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
TRICIA BOSAK
and JAMES SAGER,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48606)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted August 7, 2001.
Paul B. Gamson of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
filed the petition for petitioners.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent. With her on the answering memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.*
RIGGS, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
*Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
RIGGS, J.
This proceeding is brought under ORS 250.085(2) and
concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title for a
proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State has
designated (per standard form) as Initiative Petition 49 (2002).
Petitioners are electors who timely submitted written comments to
the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney
General's draft ballot title and who therefore are entitled to
seek review in this court. See ORS 250.085(2) (stating that
requirement). In reviewing the Attorney General's certified
ballot title, we must determine whether it substantially complies
with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). See ORS 250.085(5)
(providing the standard of review).
The proposed initiative would amend the Oregon
Constitution by adding the following section:
"Section 1. For tax years beginning on or after July 1,
2003, the rate of growth of spending of state income tax
revenue shall not exceed four percent (4%) per year. All
state income tax revenue collected by the state in excess of
the four percent allowed increase shall be returned to
taxpayers in proportion to the amount each taxpayer paid.
Any refund required under this section shall be made not
later than 150 days after the end of the fiscal year in
which the excess revenue was collected. For purposes of
this section, 'state income tax revenue' means revenue
collected by the imposition of the personal income tax, the
corporate income taxes, and corporate excise taxes."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title for Initiative Petition 49:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: LIMITS ANNUAL INCOME-TAX REVENUE SPENDING GROWTH
TO FOUR PERCENT; RETURNS EXCESS
REVENUE TO TAXPAYERS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote limits the annual
growth in spending of state income-tax revenue to four
percent; state must return all revenue exceeding limit to
taxpayers.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects four-percent
limit on annual growth in spending of state income-tax
revenue; rejects requiring state to return revenue exceeding
that limit.
"SUMMARY: Amends Oregon Constitution. Oregon statutes
currently limit biennial growth of state appropriations for
general governmental purposes to previous biennium's growth
rate for personal income in Oregon. Under Oregon
Constitution, the state currently must return excess income-
and excise-tax revenue to taxpayers when it collects at
least two percent more than it estimated it would collect.
This measure adds constitutional provision limiting annual
rate of growth in spending of 'state income tax revenue'
(personal and corporate income taxes, corporate excise
taxes) to four percent; growth limit not adjusted for
population changes or inflation. Measure requires state to
return to taxpayers all 'state income tax revenue' collected
in excess of growth limit. Measure limits state spending of
income-tax revenues without providing replacement revenues.
Other provisions."
Petitioners Bosak and Sager challenge the caption, vote
result statements, and summary of the Attorney General's
certified ballot title on the ground that they mischaracterize
the proposal as one that limits "spending growth." As to those
challenges, we conclude that petitioners' arguments are not well
taken.
Petitioners raise an additional challenge to the
caption, claiming that the use of the word "excess" will prove
confusing to voters. We agree with petitioners that the use of
the word "excess" in the caption does not comply substantially
with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). The word "excess" in
the caption is likely to lead voters to believe that, even if no
more than the permitted four-percent increase in state income tax
revenue is collected, the state will be obligated to return what
it does not spend. The text of the measure demonstrates that
that is not the case; thus, the caption is not accurate. Indeed,
the Attorney General has acknowledged that the phrase "returns
revenue exceeding limit" correctly describes the proposed
measure.
Having concluded that the caption likely would confuse
voters, and therefore does not comply substantially with
statutory requirements, we refer the ballot title to the Attorney
General for modification. See ORS 250.085(8) (providing for
referral); Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318, ___ P3d ___ (2001)
(determining that challenged ballot titles did not comply
substantially with statutory requirements and referring those
ballot titles to Attorney General for modification).
Finally, although the Attorney General asserts that it
is necessary to include the words "to taxpayers" in the caption,
we agree with petitioners that those words logically may be
inferred. Because, under the proposed measure, taxpayers are the
parties from whom the revenue originally was gathered, it is
reasonable to assume that the revenue that exceeds the limit
shall be returned to them.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification. | 09fe7b346a5c49aaf906db0b62b04c0a4abcfdcaa03fdf3d07ed08534efd6269 | 2001-10-04T00:00:00Z |
aa38ccfe-c672-4e48-9280-564270fb2028 | In re Lawrence | null | S46876 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: September 13, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
J. MARK LAWRENCE,
Accused.
(OSB 95-249, 97-123; SC S46876)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted May 3, 2001.
Paula J. Lawrence, Lawrence & Houser, P.C., McMinville, argued the cause and filed the
brief for the accused.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and
filed the briefs for the Oregon State Bar.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson, Riggs, and De Muniz,
Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 60 days, commencing
60 days from the date of filing of this decision.
*Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating various disciplinary
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and with
violating one statute. The trial panel found that the accused
violated Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-101(A)(1) (continuing
employment without full disclosure when exercise of judgment on
behalf of client is or may be affected by business, property, or
personal interests), dismissed the other charges, and reprimanded
him. The Bar and the accused both sought review in this court.
ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1 and BR 10.3. In
addition to the DR 5-101(A)(1) violation, the Bar continues to
allege that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) (committing
criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law) and ORS 9.460(1)
(failing to support constitution and laws of the United States
and this state) when he failed to timely file state and federal
tax returns. (1)
We consider the matter de novo and may adopt, modify,
or reject the decision of the trial panel. ORS 9.536(3); BR
10.6. The Bar has the burden of establishing alleged misconduct
by clear and convincing evidence. BR 5.2. For the reasons that
follow, we find that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR
5-101(A)(1), and that a 60-day suspension is the appropriate
sanction.
I. FACTS
We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence. The accused has been a member of the Bar since 1989.
After he was admitted to practice, the accused worked as a deputy
district attorney until 1992. In 1992, the accused opened his
own law office as a sole practitioner. His practice was not
lucrative financially, and he entrusted the bookkeeping for his
law practice to his mother, Hohman, who lives in Colorado.
Hohman is not a licensed tax preparer, and the accused did not
pay her for her bookkeeping services. The accused sent Hohman
the original documents she needed to keep the books for the
accused's law practice. The accused did not retain photocopies
of the documents for purposes of preparing his tax returns, and
he did not expect Hohman to prepare the tax returns for him.
In early 1993, the accused called Hohman, asking her to
send him the documents he needed to file his 1992 tax returns.
Hohman had not yet completed the accused's bookkeeping for that
year, but she told the accused not to worry about his taxes
because she guessed that he had not made enough money to owe
taxes that year. The accused received an extension of time until
August 1993 to file his 1992 tax returns, but he failed to file
his 1992 tax returns by that deadline. Hohman did not return any
records that the accused had requested in 1993.
Hohman eventually told the accused that she planned to
finish the accused's bookkeeping records for 1992 and 1993 by
April 1994. However, in early 1994, Hohman's computer failed,
and she was unable to recover any information from it. At that
time, Hohman was working full time as a bookkeeper for three
business customers who were paying clients. The accused's
bookkeeping was her lowest priority while she reconstructed the
files she had lost when her computer failed.
The accused called Hohman a number of times in 1994,
asking her to return to him the records he had sent to her. The
accused explained to Hohman that he needed to file his tax
returns. The accused thereafter missed the April 15, 1994,
filing deadline for his 1993 taxes. Late in October 1994, the
accused stopped sending Hohman his business records because "it
was not working." Hohman again promised to send the accused his
business records in time for him to file his tax returns for
1992, 1993, and 1994 by April 15, 1995. However, by early April
1995, Hohman had returned only some of the accused's records.
On or about April 1, 1995, the accused gave what
records he had to his licensed tax preparer. Thereafter, the tax
preparer told the accused that much of the documentation he
needed to prepare the accused's tax returns was missing. The
accused again called Hohman, asking her to find and return the
missing records. Hohman told the accused that she thought she
had sent him everything. The accused thereafter received an
extension until October 1995 to file his 1994 tax returns, but he
missed that filing deadline. In late 1995, the accused's sister
found the missing records in a storage unit that Hohman had
rented. When the accused received the records, he gave them to
his tax preparer.
In January 1996, the tax preparer completed the
accused's tax returns for 1992, 1993, and 1994. The accused paid
all taxes due, as well as late fees and accumulated interest for
those years. The Internal Revenue Service and the Oregon
Department of Revenue took no criminal action against the accused
for his untimely filings.
The tardy filings came to the attention of the Bar
after the accused testified under oath at a judgment debtor
examination in September 1995 that he had not filed any state or
federal tax returns for the years 1992, 1993, or 1994. The
debtor examination had arisen out of the accused's representation
of Rabon in a dissolution matter that forms the basis of one of
the Bar's complaints against the accused. In representing Rabon,
the accused failed to file a timely response, and the trial court
entered a default judgment against Rabon. The accused moved to
set aside the default and arranged for another lawyer, Houser, to
represent Rabon. The trial court denied the motion to set aside
the default judgment. Houser thereafter told both the accused
and Rabon that, in his opinion, Rabon had a viable legal
malpractice claim against the accused for having allowed the
default judgment to be taken.
The accused continued to represent Rabon for several
months on child support and visitation matters, without making
full written disclosure to Rabon of the possibility that his own
interests in avoiding a malpractice claim might affect his
professional judgment. However, the accused did obtain a written
release from Rabon providing that the accused would continue to
handle Rabon's dissolution and child support matters for no fee
in exchange for Rabon giving up any malpractice claim. The trial
court thereafter denied contempt and support modification motions
that the accused had filed on Rabon's behalf and imposed
sanctions on the accused and Rabon jointly and severally, in the
amount of $1,500. When the accused did not pay the sanction,
opposing counsel filed the judgment debtor examination against
the accused. It was during that examination that the accused
disclosed that he had not filed tax returns for 1992, 1993, and
1994.
On December 14, 1995, the State Professional
Responsibility Board referred both the Rabon and tax matters to
the Local Professional Responsibility Committee for
investigation. The Bar filed its first formal complaint against
the accused on March 4, 1997, more than a year after the accused
had paid all back taxes, penalties, and interest. The Bar
amended its complaint twice, and the charges were not heard until
January 26 and 27, 1999. The trial panel issued its decision on
August 16, 1999, which, as noted, found the accused had violated
DR 5-101(A)(1) and imposed a public reprimand.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A. DR 1-102(A)(2)
In its first cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that
the accused "knowingly and willfully" failed to file personal tax
returns timely for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, thereby violating
DR 1-102(A)(2). That rule provides:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"* * * * *
"(2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law[.]"
To find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), the Bar must
present clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed
a criminal act and that the act reflects adversely on the
accused's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.
In re Hassenstab, 325 Or 166, 175-76, 934 P3d 1110 (1997). We
may examine any evidence in the record that is relevant to that
question. In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 121, 949 P2d 710 (1997).
Proof of a conviction is not required to establish a violation of
the disciplinary rule. In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, ___, ___ P3d
___ (August 30, 2001) (slip op. at 6).
The Bar contends that the accused's failure to timely
file 1992, 1993, and 1994 federal and state tax returns violated,
respectively, two criminal statutes: 26 USC § 7203 and ORS
314.075(1). The federal statute, 26 USC § 7203, provides, in
part:
"Any person required under this title to pay any
estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by
regulations made under authority thereof to make a
return, keep any records, or supply any information,
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax,
make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution. * * *"
(Emphasis added.) The Oregon statute, ORS 314.075, provides, in part:
"No person, or officer or employee of a
corporation or a member or employee of a partnership,
shall, with intent to evade any requirement of any law
imposing taxes upon or measured by net income or any
lawful requirement of the Department of Revenue
thereunder:
"(1) Fail to pay any tax or to make, sign or
verify any return or to supply any information
required[.]"
(Emphasis added.)
Both statutes generally make it a crime not to file tax
returns at the time or times required by law. Violation of the
federal statute is a misdemeanor, while violation of the Oregon
statute is a Class C felony. 26 USC § 7203; ORS 314.991. The
accused contends that the Bar failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that his failure to file his tax returns
timely was "willful" under 26 USC § 7203 or that he acted with
the "intent to evade" the requirements of the law under ORS
314.075. According to the accused, he failed to file his tax
returns in a timely manner because he was unaware that it was a
crime to file untimely tax returns and because, under the
circumstances, it was impossible for him to file any sooner.
Accordingly, the accused maintains, the Bar did not show that he
was guilty of a criminal act.
As the term is used in 26 USC § 7203, "willful" means a
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Cheek
v. United States, 498 US 192, 201, 111 S Ct 604, 112 L Ed 2d 617
(1991). A willful violation is established by evidence of a
deliberate intent to disobey the filing requirement. Proof of an
evil motive or bad faith is not a required element of willful
failure to file tax returns under 26 USC § 7203. Id. at 200-01.
Moreover, a taxpayer's intent to report income and pay tax on it
sometime in the future "does not vitiate the willfulness required
by § 7203." Samsone v. United States, 380 US 343, 354, 85 S Ct
1004, 13 L Ed 2d 882 (1965).
In this proceeding, the accused admits that he failed
to file his tax returns for 1992, 1993, and 1994 in a timely
manner and that he was aware of his duty to do so. The accused
testified that he knew that April 15 is the statutory deadline
for filing tax returns. Moreover, the accused filed for
extensions of time in which to file his 1992 and 1994 returns,
but then he failed to file his returns by the extended deadlines.
In short, the accused knew that his conduct was unlawful. The
accused's assertion that he did not know that it was a crime to
fail to file tax returns at the time or times required by law is
not a defense to the charge that his failure to do so was
willful.
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a taxpayer may not be convicted of willful failure to
file a tax return if the taxpayer subjectively misunderstood the
tax laws or if the taxpayer was ignorant of the tax laws. Cheek,
498 US at 202. That holding does not aid the accused here. The
accused does not argue that he misunderstood the tax laws or that
he did not know of his legal duty to file his tax returns in a
timely manner. Rather, the accused's only argument is that he
did not know that his failure to do so carried criminal
consequences. Such a defense does not negate a finding of a
willful failure to file a tax return at the time or times
required by law. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 214 F Supp
629, 630-31 (DC Del 1963) ("wilfulness" required to sustain
convictions for failure to pay special wagering occupational tax
established by showing defendant knew tax was owed, even without
showing that defendant also knew failure to comply carried
criminal, not merely civil, sanctions). The accused committed a
criminal act when he willfully violated 26 USC § 7203 by failing
to file tax returns in the time or times required by law. (2)
Not every criminal act reflects adversely on a lawyer's
"fitness to practice law" within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(2).
As this court noted in In re White, 311 Or 573, 589, 815 P2d 1257
(1991), "[t]here must be some rational connection other than the
criminality of the act between the conduct and the actor's
fitness to practice law." White identified "pertinent
considerations" with respect to whether a criminal act adversely
reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law:
"[T]he lawyer's mental state; the extent to which the
act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law
enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the
extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and
the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct."
Id. We turn to those considerations in determining whether the
accused's violations of 26 USC § 7203 reflect adversely on his
fitness to practice law.
As we discuss later in this opinion, a lawyer's mental
state when engaging in particular conduct may be intentional,
knowing, or negligent. In this instance, the accused knew that
he had a duty to file tax returns timely, and he demonstrated
that he knew how to request extensions of time for filing. His
willful failure to file his tax returns at the time or times
required by law was an intentional act. Moreover, the accused's
violations of 26 USC § 7203 extended over three years. The
accused's repeated failures to file timely tax returns, and his
failure to take the steps necessary to be able to do so, reflect
disrespect for the law. The accused's conduct was not
"victimless," as his actions affected the federal government.
Based on those considerations, we conclude that the accused's
violations of 26 USC § 7203 reflect adversely on his fitness to
practice law. Having found both that the accused committed a
criminal act by failing to file timely tax returns for the years
1992, 1993, and 1994, and having found that such actions reflect
adversely on his fitness to practice law, we conclude that the
accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2).
B. ORS 9.460(1)
The Bar alleges that the accused's failure to file
timely tax returns for three years also violated ORS 9.460(1). (3)
Although, in the past, this court has found that the same conduct
can violate both the Code of Professional Responsibility and a
provision of ORS Chapter 9, see, e.g., In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 8
P3d 966 (2000); In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 949 P2d 710 (1997) In re
Bridges, 298 Or 53, 688 P2d 1335 (1984) (each so finding), such a
finding generally has not served to enhance the sanction that
this court has imposed for a violation or violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In this proceeding, the Bar does
not argue that a finding that the accused violated ORS 9.460(1),
in addition to DR 1-102(A)(2), for failing to file timely his tax
returns, would enhance the sanction that we would impose for the
accused's violation of the disciplinary rule. We conclude that a
finding that the accused violated ORS 9.460(1) would have no
practical effect on the sanction that we impose in this case.
Therefore, we decline to address the Bar's charge that the
accused violated that statute. See In re Kimmell, 332 Or at __
(slip op. at 9) (also declining to address Bar's charge of
statutory violation after finding violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility for same conduct because finding of
statutory violation would have no practical effect on sanction).
C. DR 5-101(A)(1)
The next matter on review is the Bar's fourth cause of
complaint. The Bar alleges that, by continuing to represent
Rabon when the accused had a potential conflict of interest
without providing proper written disclosure as defined by DR 10-101(B)(2), the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1). DR 5-101(A)(1)
provides, in part:
"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure,
"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests.
* * *"
(Emphasis added.) Under DR 10-101(B)(2), "full disclosure"
includes the requirement that the lawyer recommend that "the
recipient seek independent legal advice to determine if consent
should be given and shall * * * contemporaneously confirm[] [such
advice] in writing." (Emphasis added.)
As noted, the trial panel found that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A)(1). On review, the accused concedes that he
did not follow the letter of DR 10-101 because he did not advise
Rabon in writing of his potential conflict of interest.
According to the accused, however, the Bar has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence that he violated the "spirit" of
the full disclosure requirement because he took other steps to
protect Rabon's interests, including having him consult with
Houser. We disagree with the accused that the explicit wording
of the rule, requiring notice to the client in writing, may be
dispensed with so casually. See In re Brandt/Griffin, 331 Or
113, 135, 10 P3d 906 (2000) ("DR 10-101(B)(2) requires that an
oral disclosure be 'confirmed in writing'"). We conclude that
the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by failing to inform Rabon in
writing of the accused's potential conflict of interest.
III. SANCTION
Having found that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2)
and DR 5-101(A)(1), we turn to the appropriate sanction. This
court follows a well-established methodology in determining the
appropriate sanction for violating disciplinary rules. See In re
Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 652-53, 968 P2d 367 (1998) (describing
methodology). The Bar recommends a suspension of at least six
months for the tax matters, but is satisfied with a public
reprimand for the Rabon matter. The accused contends that he
challenged the trial panel's recommendation that he receive a
public reprimand for his violation of DR 5-101(A)(1) only because
the Bar has placed other aspects of the trial panel's decision at
issue by seeking review in this court. We accept without further
discussion the Bar's and the accused's agreement that a public
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the accused's violation
of DR 5-101(A)(1) in the Rabon matter. We turn to the
appropriate sanction for the accused's violation of DR 1-102(A)(2) in the tax matters.
A. Duty Violated
The accused violated his duty to the public to maintain
his personal integrity when he willfully violated 26 USC § 7203
by not filing his tax returns by the time or times required by
law. American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) 5.1. As noted in
the commentary to ABA Standard 5.0:
"The public expects the lawyer * * * to abide by
the law; public confidence in the integrity of officers
of the court is undermined when lawyers engage in
illegal conduct."
ABA Standards at 36.
B. Mental State
The ABA Standards recognize three mental states:
intentional, knowing, and negligent. A lawyer acts intentionally
by acting with the conscious objective or purpose of
accomplishing a particular result. A lawyer acts knowingly by
being consciously aware of the nature or attendant circumstances
of the conduct, but not having a conscious objective to
accomplish a particular result. A lawyer acts negligently by
failing to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or
that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation. ABA Standards at 7.
In this case, the accused's mental state in violating
26 USC § 7203 was intentional. The accused was aware of his
legal duty to file tax returns at the time required by law, and
he repeatedly failed to do so. That the accused intended to file
his tax returns at some later time does not mean that he did not
act intentionally when he failed to file his returns in a timely
manner.
C. Actual or Potential Injury
The accused's failure to file timely returns caused
actual injury, because it hindered the federal government in its
ability to administer the tax system and collect taxes.
D. Preliminary Sanction under ABA Standards
The accused's misconduct implicates two ABA Standards.
ABA Standard 5.11 provides, in part:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a
necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution
or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or
"(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice."
ABA Standard 5.12 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice."
E. Aggravating Factors
There are two relevant aggravating circumstances in
this proceeding. First, the accused engaged in a pattern of
misconduct by filing tax returns in an untimely manner for three
years. ABA Standard 9.22(c). Second, factoring in the Rabon
matter, the accused committed multiple violations of the
disciplinary rules. ABA Standard 9.22(d).
F. Mitigating Factors
There are several mitigating factors. First, the Bar
became aware of the accused's misconduct in 1995, but it did not
file a complaint until 1997, and the trial panel did not hear the
matter until 1999. The case was not at issue for argument before
this court until May 2001. The Bar concedes that it is
responsible for the long delay in this proceeding. During the
delay, the accused abandoned his solo law practice and joined a
law firm. His disciplinary record since the events that led to
this proceeding is unblemished. See In re Unrein, 323 Or 285,
288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996) (citing delay as particularly
significant mitigating factor when four years elapsed between
misconduct and court's decision, and no additional complaints had
been filed). On the facts of this proceeding, the significant
delay in the disciplinary process is an important mitigating
factor in determining the appropriate sanction. ABA Standard
9.32(j).
There are other mitigating factors. The accused has no
prior disciplinary record. ABA Standard 9.32(a). The accused
has cooperated fully during the disciplinary proceedings, ABA
Standard 9.32(e), and other penalties and sanctions have been
imposed on the accused in the form of penalties and interest, ABA
Standard 9.32(k).
Considering the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, the injury caused, and aggravating and mitigating factors,
it appears that a suspension from the practice of law would be
the appropriate sanction in this proceeding. We turn to this
court's case law to determine whether the Bar's recommendation of
a six-month suspension is appropriate.
G. Case Law
This court never has been sanguine about a lawyer's
failure to pay taxes. See, e.g., In re Morris, 215 Or 180, 182,
332 P2d 885 (1958) (warning lawyers that court will not be
lenient in discipline of lawyers who fail to file tax returns in
compliance with law). In In re DesBrisay, 288 Or 625, 629-30
n 2, 606 P2d 1148 (1980), which was decided before this court
began to follow the ABA Standards methodology, this court
described the range of sanctions that it had imposed in
situations in which lawyers had failed to file tax returns:
"The ethical violations in each case and our
dispositions of the proceedings are as follows: In re
Thomas Graham Walker, 240 Or 65, 399 P2d 1015 (1965)
(the accused was convicted of failing to file a return
for the year 1958 and was suspended for two years); In
re James L. Means, 218 Or 480, 342 P2d 1119 (1959) (the
accused pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to file
income tax returns. He had been disciplined before on
similar charges and was therefore permanently
disbarred); In re LeRoy L. Lomax, 216 Or 281, 338 P2d
638 (1959) (the accused pleaded guilty to two charges
of failing to file income tax returns and was suspended
from practice for one year); In re Maurice C. Corcoran,
215 Or 660, 337 P2d 307 (1959) (a suspension of 18
months was imposed when the attorney pleaded nolo
contendere to two counts of failing to file tax returns
and failed to file returns in two other years); In re
Richard R. Morris, 215 Or 180, 332 P2d 885 (1958) (the
attorney pleaded guilty to three charges of failing to
file returns and was suspended for one year); In re
McKechnie, 214 Or 531, 330 P2d 727 (1958) (McKechnie
was suspended from the practice of law for six months
after pleading guilty to failing to file tax returns in
two consecutive years); In re Claude M. Johns, Jr., 212
Or 587, 321 P2d 281 (1958) (Johns pleaded guilty to two
counts of failing to file tax returns and admitted that
he also failed to file returns in five earlier years.
He was suspended for one and one-half years); In re
Franz E. Wagner, 210 Or 457, 311 P2d 751 (1957) (the
accused was suspended for one year after he pleaded
guilty to three counts of failing to file tax returns);
In re Means, 207 Or 638, 298 P2d 983 (1956) (Means
pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to file federal
tax returns and did not dispute the bar's allegation
that he had failed to file returns 'over a period of
years' prior to the years covered by his guilty pleas.
Means was suspended from the practice of law for six
months)."
The court then noted that, although suspensions of six months to
two years were the appropriate sanction in most cases involving a
lawyer's failure to file taxes, a four-year suspension was
warranted in DesBrisay's case because of extenuating
circumstances and the accused's cavalier attitude. DesBrisay,
288 Or at 630-32.
In this proceeding, unlike the cases summarized above,
the accused did not fail to pay his taxes altogether. Neither
did he seek to evade paying them or falsify his tax obligations.
See In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 348 P2d 774 (1960) (disbarring
accused for felony of filing false and fraudulent returns;
distinguishing the seriousness of such misconduct from misconduct
in failure-to-file cases). The accused paid the penalties and
interest that accrued because of his late filings. The accused's
misconduct in this proceeding stemmed from his errors in judgment
in failing to keep copies of the records that he sent to Hohman
and in persisting to rely on her services even after it had
become evident that she was not able to provide the bookkeeping
service that he needed. Although we do not condone those errors,
they do not suggest the same level of disregard of legal duties
that was present in the cases summarized in DesBrisay and for
which lengthy suspensions from the practice of law were necessary
to protect the public.
Nonetheless, the willful failure to file tax returns in
a timely manner warrants a significant suspension from the
practice of law. Moreover, repeated failure to do so, and
violation of another rule as well -- in this instance, DR 5-101(A)(1) -- ordinarily would justify even a longer period of
suspension. Under other circumstances, we might agree with the
Bar that a six-month suspension, or more, would be the
appropriate sanction. In this proceeding, however, the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
See In re Wittemyer, 328 Or 448, 462, 980 P2d 148 (1999)
(appropriate sanction in discipline proceedings always depends on
facts and circumstances of that proceeding). The more than five-year delay, coupled with the accused's unblemished disciplinary
record in the intervening years, suggest that a six-month
suspension is not appropriate here. We conclude that suspending
the accused from the practice of law for 60 days is the
appropriate sanction.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 60 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision.
1. The Bar does not seek review of the trial panel's
dismissal of the second, third, and fifth causes of complaint.
2. Because the finding of a violation of 26 USC § 7203 is
a crime that provides a basis for discipline, we need not decide
whether the accused also committed a crime under the state
provision, ORS 314.075(1). The Bar does not argue otherwise.
3. ORS 9.460 provides, in part:
"An attorney shall:
"(1) Support the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of this state[.]" | 37a8d747f85a0b2ff81732e1f663fb7b86c089d7699f1cbe95c767488f11f95a | 2001-09-13T00:00:00Z |
1e4d8959-dd70-495b-b1b7-8e5d9e1f3e21 | Sizemore v. Myers (S48534) | null | S48534 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Respondent.
(SC S48534)
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record June 4, 2001.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner.
Kelly Knivila, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent. With her on the answering
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
DE MUNIZ, J.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
DE MUNIZ, J.
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 37 (2002). The proposed measure
would amend the Oregon Constitution to allow Oregon taxpayers to
deduct all state, federal and local "payroll taxes" from income
on their personal state income tax returns. The measure defines
"payroll taxes" to include all taxes that are calculated as a
percentage of income.
Petitioner is an elector who timely submitted written
comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the
Attorney General's draft ballot title and who, therefore, is
entitled to seek review in this court. See ORS 250.085(2)
(stating that requirement). We review the Attorney General's
certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially
complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (d). ORS
250.085(5).
Petitioner challenges only the "summary" in the
Attorney General's ballot title. A ballot title must contain a
"concise and impartial statement of not more than 125 words
summarizing the state measure and its major effect." ORS
250.035(2)(d). Here, that statement provides:
"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Currently,
individuals may deduct up to $5,000 ($2,500 if married,
filing separately) of federal income taxes paid from
taxable income on Oregon income tax returns. No other
federal, state or local taxes calculated as percentage
of personal income are deductible. Measure makes all
taxes calculated as percentage of income deductible on
Oregon income tax return. Defines taxes as FICA,
Medicare, self-employment and income taxes.
Establishes phase-in for new deductions beginning 2003
with 10 percent deduction and increasing 10 percent
each year. Prohibits implementation to affect 'kicker'
refunds due taxpayers for biennium in which measure is
approved. Prohibits legislature from altering current
partial deductibility of any affected tax. Reduces
state income tax revenues and provides no replacement
funds. Other provisions."
Petitioner contends that one sentence in the ballot
title summary is not impartial and that the summary, therefore,
fails to comply substantially with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(d). The sentence that petitioner challenges states
that the proposed measure "reduces state income tax revenues and
provides no replacement funds." Petitioner complains that there
is nothing in the proposed measure that deals with replacement
funds. He asserts that the phrase "provides no replacement
funds" is biased, because it points out a perceived flaw of the
proposed measure.
A ballot title summary must summarize the major effect
of a measure. The fact that a measure does not itself mention
its fiscal effects does not preclude the Attorney General from
doing so. See Nelson v. Roberts, 309 Or 499, 505-06, 789 P2d 650
(1990) (permissible to inform electorate of major loss of revenue
to general fund). The phrase "reduces state income tax revenues
and provides no replacements funds" summarizes the effect of
proposed measure in an impartial manner. It informs the voters
that the proposed measure will cause a reduction in state income
tax revenues and that this reduction will not be offset by any
corresponding increase provided for in the proposed measure. The
Attorney General's summary substantially complies with the
requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(d). Accordingly, we certify the
following ballot title to the Secretary of State:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: MAKES DEDUCTIBLE
ON OREGON PERSONAL INCOME TAX RETURNS ALL
TAXES
CALCULATED AS PERCENTAGE OF INCOME
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote makes deductible
on Oregon personal income tax returns federal, state
and local taxes calculated as percentage of income;
provides ten-year phase-in.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects amending
constitution to make deductible on Oregon tax returns taxes
calculated as percentage of income; retains partial
deduction for federal income taxes.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently,
individuals may deduct up to $5,000 ($2,500 if married,
filing separately) of federal income taxes paid from
taxable income on Oregon income tax returns. No other
federal, state or local taxes calculated as percentage
of personal income are deductible. Measure makes all
taxes calculated as percentage of income deductible on
Oregon income tax returns. Defines taxes as FICA,
Medicare, self-employment and income taxes.
Establishes phase-in for new deductions beginning 2003
with 10 percent deduction and increasing 10 percent
each year. Prohibits implementation to affect "kicker"
refunds due taxpayers for biennium in which measure is
approved. Prohibits legislature from altering current
partial deductibility of any affected tax. Reduces
state income tax revenues and provides no replacement
funds. Other provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10). | 94829708903d47ebbe02c067e87a38122d9ae038b0e26555c9fe32849eef1283 | 2001-08-16T00:00:00Z |
148216a4-1b6e-4391-9734-0ed92e56eef0 | Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B. | null | S069996 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | No. 7
March 28, 2024
133
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of A. J. A.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
Y. B.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 19JU05194) (CA A178747) (SC S069996)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 12, 2023.
Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section.
Robert Hansler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Inge D.
Wells, Assistant Attorney General.
MASIH, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the juvenile court are affirmed.
______________
* Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Tiffany Underwood, Judge.
323 Or App 322, 522 P3d 564 (2022).
134
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
135
MASIH, J.
In this case, mother challenges a determina-
tion made by the juvenile court under ORS 419B.476(2)(a)
concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July
2019, A was made a ward of the court, committed to the
legal custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS),
and placed in substitute care.1 Following a three-day per-
manency hearing in 2022, the juvenile court changed the
permanency plan for A from reunification to guardianship,
based on its determination that, despite DHS’s reasonable
efforts, mother had not made “sufficient progress” under
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) to make A’s safe return home possible.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling
without a written opinion. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.,
323 Or App 322, 522 P3d 564 (2022). We allowed review to
clarify the nature of the determination assigned to the juve-
nile court by ORS 419B.476(2)(a) and to address the related
question of our standard of review for that determination.
For the reasons that follow, we now hold that the
juvenile court’s “sufficient progress” determination is a legal
conclusion rather than a finding of fact, and we conclude
that the record developed in this case is legally sufficient to
support the juvenile court’s legal conclusion that mother’s
progress was insufficient to make possible A’s safe return
home and to support the court’s decision to change the
permanency plan from reunification to guardianship. We
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the juvenile court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Standard of Review
DHS bears the burden of proof at a permanency
hearing, and it must prove the facts supporting a change
to the permanency plan by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. ORS 419B.476(1) (requiring the permanency hear-
ing to be conducted in accordance with ORS 419B.310);
ORS 419B.310(3)(A) (requiring that “the facts alleged in the
1 “Substitute care” is an out-of-home placement directly supervised by DHS
or another agency and includes placement of a child in a foster family home, a
group home, or another child-caring agency. ORS 419A.004(34)(a).
136
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
petition showing the child to be within the jurisdiction of
the court *
*
* must be established,” as pertinent here, “[b]y
a preponderance of competent evidence”); Dept. of Human
Services v. T. L., 358 Or 679, 692, 369 P3d 1159 (2016) (stat-
ing that “DHS has the burden to prove that a parent has
not made sufficient progress to have the children returned
despite its reasonable efforts”).
In a dependency case in which we do not review
de novo, we generally review the juvenile court’s legal con-
clusions for errors of law,2 and we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition
to determine whether it supports that court’s legal conclu-
sions. Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 40, 57,
430 P3d 1021 (2018). In addition, we defer to the juvenile
court’s findings of fact if there is any evidence in the record
to support them. Id. at 57 (affirming juvenile court ruling
because “explicit and implicit factual findings, and the evi-
dence in the record on which they were based, supported
the juvenile court’s legal conclusions”). And, as we discuss
further below, we review a legal conclusion that is heavily
fact-dependent—such as a juvenile court’s determination
of “sufficient progress”—to determine whether the evidence
was sufficient to support it.
B. Historical Facts and Juvenile Court Jurisdictional Bases
The events that led to this dependency proceeding
began in July 2019. Mother left her son, A, who was then
about 18 months old, with his regular babysitter for a cou-
ple of hours.3 Mother returned to the babysitter’s home with
a pizza. When A wandered into the kitchen, where mother
was preparing to bake the pizza, mother became angry
and began yelling at him. She grabbed A’s right arm and
swung him around the kitchen while slapping him on the
hands and head. The babysitter took A away from mother.
Mother left the babysitter’s home and did not come back
that night. The next day, the babysitter called emergency
2 No
party
requested
de
novo
appellate
review
as
permitted
by
ORS
19.415(3)(b),
either in the Court of Appeals or in this court, and we choose to review for errors
of law. ORS 19.415(1).
3 A spent a great deal of time at the babysitter’s home, including some over-
night stays, to accommodate mother’s shift-work schedule.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
137
services because A’s arm was swollen and he avoided mov-
ing it. A was transported to the hospital, and, because he
was alone, authorities contacted DHS. At the hospital, med-
ical personnel determined that A’s arm was fractured. They
also noted that the right side of his face was bruised and
there were superficial abrasions on other parts of his body.
They reported to the police that they suspected child abuse.
DHS placed A in protective custody and filed a dependency
petition alleging physical abuse and failure to attend to A’s
basic needs.4 The juvenile court issued a shelter order based
on DHS’s petition, and it committed A to DHS’s temporary
custody for placement in substitute care.
Police and a Child Protective Services case worker
investigated the circumstances of A’s injuries and inter-
viewed mother and the babysitter, among others. Mother
denied that she had knowingly injured A, asserting, instead,
that she walked him out of the kitchen with both hands over
his head. Based on information provided by hospital staff
and the babysitter, the Marion County District Attorney’s
Office charged mother by information with first-degree
criminal mistreatment.
In September 2019, the juvenile court issued an
order establishing dependency jurisdiction over A based on
mother’s admissions that she needed the assistance of the
court and state to acquire the skills and training necessary
to safely parent A and that the no-contact order resulting
from the criminal charge prevented her from being a place-
ment resource.5
In January 2020, mother was indicted on one count
of first-degree criminal mistreatment and one count of
fourth-degree assault. In August 2020, following a bench
trial, mother was acquitted on the criminal mistreatment
charge but convicted of fourth-degree assault. The trial court
placed mother on probation and ordered her to complete an
4 A’s father was not available to parent A because he was serving a lengthy
prison sentence. The juvenile court also asserted dependency jurisdiction due to
father’s unavailability to parent A because of father’s incarceration. Father is not
a party on appeal.
5 The criminal court later amended the release agreement to allow mother to
have supervised contact with A.
138
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
anger management assessment and to participate in par-
enting classes.
In October 2020, the juvenile court entered a sup-
plemental dependency order, based on the stipulations of
the parties, which amended the original order to reflect
that “mother was convicted of recklessly causing physical
injury to the child.” The amended dependency order also dis-
missed the allegation concerning mother’s failure to attend
to A’s basic needs. The order otherwise continued A’s ward-
ship, A’s placement in substitute care, and the permanency
plan of reunification. In addition, the court ordered mother
to undergo a psychological evaluation and to participate in
parenting classes and other recommended services.
Mother subsequently submitted to a psychological
evaluation performed by Dr. Cook, who diagnosed mother
with various mental health conditions. Cook recommended,
among other things, that mother complete parenting classes
and engage in mental health treatment focusing on emo-
tional regulation and distress tolerance. Mother was also
interviewed by Dr. Carter, a domestic violence evaluator, who
concluded that, to parent A safely, mother needed to address
her unresolved “significant trauma issues” stemming
from events in her childhood and from her adult relation-
ships with her domestic partners. Beginning in June 2021,
mother began participating in trauma-based therapy with
Dean, a licensed clinical social worker. In July 2021, she
also began receiving one-on-one parenting coaching from
Keiser, a parent educator.
In August 2021, mother seemed to be making
progress in acquiring safe parenting skills, and DHS
returned A—then three years old—to mother’s care with
in-home parenting coaching by Hummer, an in-home safety
and reunification services specialist. Shortly thereafter,
Hummer reported to DHS that mother was having diffi-
culty parenting. During that time, DHS also received two
calls on its emergency hotline concerning the family. Davis,
the DHS child abuse investigator, responded. Mother told
Davis that A would hit and kick her, and she acknowledged
that she struggled to manage that behavior, because it trig-
gered a trauma response in her. Mother reported that she
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
139
was having “near panic attacks” because of A’s aggressive
behavior toward her and that, on multiple occasions, she
had locked herself in a room away from A or locked A in a
room away from her. DHS also learned that, on one occa-
sion, mother had tied A’s arm from the shoulder with a jump
rope to prevent him from hitting her and as a form of dis-
cipline. In September 2021, because DHS had determined
that mother was having difficulty parenting A and that her
actions presented a safety concern, DHS again removed A
from mother’s care. A had been in mother’s care for about
three weeks at that point.
After A was re-removed, DHS continued to pro-
vide mother with services aimed at reunification, including
continued therapy with Dean and parent-child-interaction
therapy with a new therapist, Irwin, which was designed
to help mother and A with bonding, attachment, behavior,
obedience, and parenting skills. DHS also facilitated super-
vised visitation with mother, including visits at mother’s
church and home to give her an opportunity to practice the
skills that she was learning. Although mother actively and
willingly engaged in the services that DHS provided to her,
her progress was slow.
By February 2022, A had been in substitute care for
over two and a half years, and DHS continued to have con-
cerns about mother’s parenting. Accordingly, DHS recom-
mended that A’s permanency plan be changed from reuni-
fication to guardianship. In arguing for that change, DHS
focused on the length of time that A had been in substitute
care, his multiple placements, the failed attempt to return A
to mother’s care, certain incidents in which mother became
disproportionately upset with A over trivial matters, and
mother’s tendency to confuse A by not using direct, age-
appropriate commands when asking him to do something.
C. The Permanency Hearing and Juvenile Court’s Ruling
The juvenile court conducted a permanency hear-
ing over the course of three days in February and April
2022. The court heard testimony from Cook, Carter, Keiser,
Hummer, Irwin, and Dean, as well as from DHS profes-
sionals who had interacted with mother and A, including
140
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
Rutherford, the family’s primary caseworker, and Davis,
the child abuse investigator. According to those witnesses,
although mother had begun to show observable improve-
ment in her ability to parent A effectively, she still had a
long way to go before A could be safely returned to her care.
The court also heard testimony from mother about her suc-
cessful completion or active participation in training and
services, implementation of training, and her plan for the
return of A, which included, among other things, using
her own mother (grandmother) as a babysitter or potential
live-in safety service provider.
The juvenile court announced its ruling at the con-
clusion of the hearing. The court explained that, before it
could change the permanency plan from reunification to
guardianship, it would have to determine that DHS had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family but that
mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A to be
safely returned home. In addition, under ORS 419B.476(5)(e),
if it were to determine that the permanency plan should be
the establishment of a legal guardianship, then it also would
be required to determine that neither placement of A with a
parent nor changing the plan to adoption was appropriate.
The court first addressed whether DHS had made
“reasonable efforts” to reunify the family, as required by ORS
419B.476(2)(a). The court described the services that DHS
had provided to mother, including parent-child interactive
training with Irwin, trauma therapy with Dean, parenting
coaching with Keiser, parenting classes with Hummer, and
referrals for eye movement desensitization and reprocessing
therapy to address her trauma. The court determined that
those services represented “reasonable efforts *
*
* to make
it possible for the ward to safely return home.”
Turning to whether mother had made “sufficient
progress” in safely parenting A, the juvenile court acknowl-
edged that mother had made some progress, and it agreed
that mother was “able to recite what she’s learned in parent-
ing classes [and] that she’s able to show that she’s absorbed
it.” However, the court concluded, mother “has not been
able to put that [knowledge] into practice.” The court noted
that mother remained unwilling to accept that her actions
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
141
had led to A’s removal and re-removal and that she did not
acknowledge her role in his broken arm or “the gravity of
tying [A] up with a jump rope.” The court observed that,
although mother had participated in trauma therapy, she
had not focused on the traumas that led her to respond inap-
propriately to A’s behavior and led Carter initially to refer
her to trauma therapy; instead, she had focused on other
traumatic experiences in her past that did not affect her par-
enting and had not been the primary basis for the referral.
Moreover, the court noted, when mother was asked whether
she intended to address the trauma that was affecting her
parenting, “her response was vague and noncommittal.”
The juvenile court also noted that, on multiple occa-
sions during the attempted reunification, mother had locked
herself away from A or turned her back on him and ignored
him when she felt unable to cope with his behavior or his
demands, noting that that response was deleterious to A’s
need and ability to form strong attachments to mother and,
generally, to his emotional development. Additionally, the
court expressed concern that mother’s plan for the future
included permitting the grandmother to care for A. Mother
had obtained a restraining order against the grandmother
in June 2019, after the grandmother, in the presence of A,
attempted to strangle mother and slapped mother’s then
four-year-old daughter.6 The court found that, despite the
training and services that DHS had provided to mother
and despite how eagerly and willingly mother had engaged
in those services, “there is still a disconnect where mom
doesn’t quite get it, doesn’t understand why it is a problem
and a safety concern to permit somebody access to her child
who has previously attempted to strangle her and has previ-
ously assaulted another.” The court also pointed to mother’s
testimony that she had ignored the grandmother for a year
after the attempted strangulation as a means to make the
grandmother more sensitive to her and her children’s needs.
The court connected mother’s response to the grandmother
to evidence that mother ignored A when his demands or
behavior overtaxed her, and it concluded that that “ignor-
ing behavior appears to be something that[,] despite the
6 The daughter lived with her father but had regular visitation with mother.
142
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
training and services that [mother] has received[, mother]
still relies on believing that these ignoring behaviors are
helpful, and that’s not something [A] needs.”
Ultimately, the court determined that a change in
the permanency plan from reunification to guardianship was
appropriate. In so concluding, the court stated, “I cannot con-
clude that [mother] has ameliorated the basis of jurisdiction
such that [A] could return home within a reasonable time,
as his health and [safety] are the top concern of the Court.”
The court observed that A had already been in substitute
care “for over one thousand days.” The court noted that Cook,
who had performed three parental-assessment psychological
evaluations on mother, the most recent of which had been
in October 2021, had testified that mother would need con-
tinuing mental health therapy in order to be able to respond
appropriately to parenting instruction, to reduce her “post-
traumatic reactivity” to A’s behavior, to meet A’s needs, and
to become a minimally adequate parent. Cook had opined
that it would take between one and two years to accomplish
those goals—“a substantial period of [A’s] life.”
For those reasons, the court concluded that, even
though mother had made substantial progress, and despite
DHS’s reunification efforts, “[A] cannot be safely returned to
[mother’s] care at this time and the evidence does not support
a determination that further efforts will make it possible for
[A] to safely return home within a reasonable time.” In that
regard, the court observed, quoting from ORS 419A.004(26),
that a “reasonable period of time” is measured by A’s “emo-
tional and developmental needs” and his “ability to form and
maintain lasting attachments,” and A had already spent
most of his life in substitute care. The court then made the
additional determination that ORS 419B.476(5)(e) requires
when a court determines that the permanency plan for a
ward should be changed from reunification to legal guard-
ianship—namely, that placement with the ward’s parents or
adoption is not appropriate. It found that placement of A with
a parent was not appropriate because, despite DHS’s reason-
able reunification efforts, A could not safely be returned to a
parent within a reasonable time. It further found that, based
on A’s attachment to a parent, adoption would not be in A’s
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
143
best interest. Finally, the court found that remaining in sub-
stitute care was necessary and in A’s best interest. The court
subsequently entered a written judgment changing the per-
manency plan from reunification to guardianship. 7
Mother appealed, challenging the juvenile court’s
ruling, and, as noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion.
II. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
On review, mother asserts that the juvenile court
applied an incorrect legal standard in making its “sufficient
progress” determination. As mentioned, the juvenile court, in
its oral ruling, stated, “I cannot conclude that [mother] has
ameliorated the basis of jurisdiction such that [A] could return
home within a reasonable time, as his health and [safety] are
the top concern of the Court.” Pointing to that statement,
mother argues that the juvenile court held her to a standard
that ORS 419B.476(2)(a) does not require. Mother asserts
that that statute does not require a parent to have completely
ameliorated the bases for the wardship to avoid a change in
A’s permanency plan. Rather, it requires sufficient progress
toward ameliorating the bases for the wardship to the extent
necessary to make the safe return of A to her care possible at
the time of the hearing or within a reasonable time after the
hearing. And, she argues, that is a question of law, not fact.
In addition, mother contends that DHS failed to
meet its burden to produce evidence sufficient to support
a determination that she had made insufficient progress
to permit A’s safe return home. She asserts that many—if
not all—of the witnesses at the permanency hearing tes-
tified that mother had made significant progress. Mother
acknowledges that she will need continued services, but she
argues that that is not a reason to conclude that she had not
made sufficient progress.
DHS, for its part, contends that whether a par-
ent has made sufficient progress to make possible the safe
return of a child is a factual finding, not a legal conclusion,
and that this court must defer to the juvenile court’s find-
ing in this case that mother had made insufficient progress
7 At the time of the hearing, no potential guardian had been identified.
144
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
if there is any evidence in the record to support it. DHS
agrees that the correct inquiry at the permanency hearing
was not whether the bases for dependency jurisdiction had
been completely ameliorated, but, rather, whether A could
safely be returned to mother’s care at the time of the hear-
ing or within a reasonable time thereafter. Here, however,
DHS argues that there was ample evidence in the record to
support the juvenile court’s finding that, despite mother’s
efforts, A would not be safe in her care, even with continued
support.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Permanency Proceedings
As we explained in S. J. M., before interpreting
the statutes at issue, it is helpful to place the permanency
decisions at issue in the case in context. 364 Or at 50-51.
When the juvenile court makes a child a ward of the court,
a series of complex statutes and proceedings come into play.
The statutes seek to protect the safety and well-being of chil-
dren and the rights of the parents. See ORS 419B.090(2) - (4)
(describing constitutional and statutory rights of children
and parents). There is a “strong preference that children
live in their own homes with their own families,” and DHS
is obligated, except in cases involving “extreme conduct,” to
work with families toward family reunification at the outset,
ORS 419B.090(5); see ORS 419B.502 (concerning “extreme
conduct”). But the statutes also recognize that “it is not
always possible or in the best interests of the child or the
public for children who have been abused or neglected to be
reunited with their parents.” ORS 419B.090(5). Children
have a right to “permanency with a safe family,” ORS
419B.090(2)(a)(A), and the state has an “obligation to create
or provide an alternative, safe and permanent home for the
child,” ORS 419B.090(5). And, as this court stated in S. J. M.,
“[t]hat right to permanency sometimes can conflict with a
parent’s interest in having additional time to make sufficient
progress for the child to be safely returned home.” 364 Or at
51.
The statutes governing permanency proceedings
(ORS 419B.470 to ORS 419B.476) were enacted in response
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
145
to federal legislation establishing requirements for state
substitute care and juvenile court systems, with the goal of
reducing the length of time that children spend in substi-
tute care. T. L., 358 Or at 689. ORS 419B.470 requires the
court to hold permanency hearings when a child is in sub-
stitute care and provides the deadlines for such hearings.
The purpose of a permanency hearing is to determine, or
update, the permanency plan for the child and to establish
the timetable and conditions for accomplishing that plan.
ORS 419B.476(2), (4), (5); T. L., 358 Or at 689 (so stating).
Permanency hearings provide court oversight of the perma-
nency plan, DHS’s efforts, and the parent’s progress in mak-
ing the child’s safe return home possible.
B. The “Sufficient Progress” Determination
ORS 419B.476 governs the conduct of permanency
hearings and changes to permanency plans. That statute
provides, in relevant part, that, at a permanency hearing,
if the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the
family, the court “shall *
*
* determine whether [DHS] has
made reasonable efforts *
*
* to make it possible for the ward
to safely return home and whether the parent has made suf-
ficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely
return home.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). It also provides that, in
making that determination, “the court shall consider the
ward’s health and safety the paramount concerns.” Id. Thus,
at a permanency hearing, the juvenile court reviews both
DHS’s efforts to provide services to the parent and the par-
ent’s progress in ameliorating the conditions that led to the
child becoming a ward of the court to determine whether the
child’s safe return home is possible at the time of the hear-
ing. If not, the court may determine that the permanency
plan for the child should be something other than reunifi-
cation, such as adoption, guardianship, or placement with a
relative. ORS 419B.476(5)(b)(B) - (D).8
In addition, ORS 419B.476(4)(c) gives the juvenile
court discretion to continue the current plan of reunification
if it determines that further efforts may make possible the
8 For a child 16 years of age or older, the juvenile court also can order that
the child be placed in “another planned permanent living arrangement.” ORS
419B.476(5)(b)(E).
146
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
child’s safe return “within a reasonable time” and, if it so
determines, to order the parents to “participate in specific
services for a specific period of time and make specific prog-
ress within that period of time[.]” Finally, ORS 419B.476(5)(e)
provides that, if the determination is to change the plan to
legal guardianship, then the court’s order “shall include *
*
*
the court’s determination of why neither placement with
parents nor adoption is appropriate.”
The “progress” that a parent must make is in ame-
liorating, to the extent necessary to make possible the child’s
safe return to the parent’s care, the circumstances that led
the juvenile court to make the child a ward of the court.
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) (court must determine whether the par-
ent has made “sufficient progress” to make it possible for
the ward to safely return home). “Progress” does not mean
completely ameliorating the bases for dependency jurisdic-
tion—inherent in the notion of “progress” is that the parent
need not establish at the time of the hearing that wardship
is no longer necessary and should be dismissed.9
Context supports that interpretation. For example,
the definition of “substitute care” in ORS 419A.004 contem-
plates continuing DHS involvement with the family: ORS
419A.004(34)(b)(C) excludes from the definition of “substi-
tute care,” “[i]n-home placement subject to conditions or lim-
itations[.]” DHS regulations also reflect that understanding.
For instance, OAR 413-040-0017(1) provides, in part, that a
caseworker may recommend “returning the child *
*
* to a
parent” when the caseworker has verified that the “identi-
fied impending danger safety threats can be managed with
an ongoing safety plan.”
Thus, we agree with mother and the state that a
parent can be found to have made sufficient progress to war-
rant the denial of a DHS request to change the permanency
plan away from reunification even if further services would
be required were the child to be returned home, and even if
9 Jurisdiction is based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the
facts alleged in the petition to make the child a ward of the court. ORS 419B.100;
ORS 419B.310(3)(a)(A). Thus, dependency jurisdiction will be dismissed only if
the conditions or circumstances giving rise to the court’s jurisdiction have been
completely ameliorated and DHS involvement is no longer necessary.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
147
the child will remain in the legal custody of DHS and sub-
ject to the juvenile court’s ongoing supervision.
C. Nature of the Determination
The juvenile court determined that DHS had made
reasonable efforts but that mother had not made sufficient
progress “to make it possible for the ward to safely return
home.” The parties disagree about whether that “sufficient
progress” determination is a finding of fact or a legal con-
clusion, and they contend that whether the juvenile court’s
permanency ruling should be affirmed depends upon that
distinction. We agree that the distinction is important: As
previously discussed, we accept the juvenile court’s findings
of fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them,
but we review legal conclusions for errors of law.
DHS points out that this court suggested, in S. J. M.,
that both the reasonable-efforts and sufficient-progress
determinations are findings of fact:
“In these cases, the juvenile court found that DHS had
made reasonable efforts to reunite L and A with their
parents. Those findings were not challenged. The juvenile
court also made findings, unchallenged here, that mother
and AJB had not made sufficient progress to allow them to
be reunited with their children.”
364 Or at 57. DHS relies on this court’s reference to “findings”
in S. J. M. to infer that we have already held that “sufficient
progress” is a factual finding. However, that issue was not
presented in S. J. M. The fact that our opinion in that case
happened to use the word “findings” in passing to describe
the nature of the determination does not reflect any consider-
ation of the issue before us here, and we give it little weight.
Mother, meanwhile, points to numerous Court of
Appeals decisions holding that “sufficient progress” is a
question of law. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. C. H.,
327 Or App 61, 63, 533 P3d 1112 (2023) (so stating); Dept.
of Human Services v. C. W., 312 Or App 572, 574, 493 P3d 74
(2021) (same); Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App
287, 294, 328 P3d 728 (2014) (same). Although those cases
are not controlling in this court, mother contends that they
correctly construe the statute.
148
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
Whether “sufficient progress” is a question of fact or
law depends on its function within the statute. To determine
that function, we consider the wording of the statute as a
whole and the context in which that phrase is used, as well
as the nature of the determination assigned to the juvenile
court. See State v. A. R. H., 371 Or 82, 89, 530 P3d 897 (2023)
(applying similar methodology to resolve whether juvenile
court determination, under ORS 163A.030, that youth was
not rehabilitated and must report as a sex offender, is find-
ing of fact or conclusion of law).
Turning first to the wording of the statute, we
observe that ORS 419B.476 does not direct the juvenile court
to “find” or make “findings” of reasonable efforts or sufficient
progress. Rather, it directs the juvenile court to “determine”
whether DHS’s efforts were reasonable and whether the par-
ent’s progress was sufficient to make it possible for the child
to safely return home. The word “determine” is ambiguous
and the use of that word rather than the word “find” does
not resolve the issue. However, this court has stated that the
terms “reasonable” and “sufficient” are important indicators
that determinations are legal and not factual:
“We acknowledge the temptation to treat indefinite
terms like ‘good cause,’ ‘sufficient reason,’ and ‘reasonable
period of time’ as calling for a subjective determination
and, thus, as invoking personal judgment. However, it is
clear that, when such terms appear in a statutory context,
they are focused on real, albeit sometimes difficult to dis-
cern, legal standards: the legislature’s view of what is ‘good,’
‘sufficient,’ or ‘reasonable.’
”
State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69, 86, 116 P3d 879 (2005) (empha-
sis in original).
Thus, the text of the statute suggests that the
juvenile court’s determinations of “reasonable efforts” and
“sufficient progress” are legal conclusions. Statutory con-
text lends some support to that interpretation. Under ORS
419B.100, the juvenile court has dependency jurisdiction in
cases involving, among others, a person “[w]hose condition
or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of”
that person. ORS 419B.100(1)(c). Whether the person’s con-
ditions or circumstances endanger the person’s welfare is a
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
149
legal determination, not a factual finding. That is, the role of
the juvenile court in a proceeding under ORS 419B.100(1)(c)
is to determine whether the facts as alleged and proved by
DHS establish the court’s authority to create or continue
the legal relationship between the child and the state as
required for wardship. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v.
N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639-40, 307 P3d 444 (2013) (a juve-
nile court’s determination of dependency jurisdiction, pred-
icated on its determination under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) that
a parent’s condition at the time of the hearing does or does
not present a risk of harm to a child, is a legal conclusion).
Similarly, under ORS 419B.476, “reasonable efforts” and
“sufficient progress” describe the legal standard that must
be met to justify the juvenile court’s decision to maintain or
change the permanency plan of a ward of the court.
Consideration of the nature of the sufficient prog-
ress determination points us in the same direction. As this
court stated in T. L., “a change in permanent plan from
return to parent to either guardianship or [another planned
permanent living arrangement] marks a profound change
of course in the path to finality for children in care.” 358 Or
at 692. That is so because it “divests the parent of family
reunification services as a matter of right from that time
forward,” id. at 691, insofar as, after a permanency plan
changes from reunification to guardianship, “the parent’s
status as the preferred placement for the child is effectively
terminated, unless and until the plan is changed at a sub-
sequent permanency hearing,” id. at 693. The court in T. L.
further noted that, “[a]lthough that consequence is not so
drastic as the termination of parental rights, the magnitude
of deprivation—including the potentially permanent denial
to a parent of custody and care of children—nevertheless is
grave.” Id. at 693. The nature of the competing interests at
stake, as well as text and context calling for the application
of a legal standard, persuade us that the juvenile court’s
“determination” of sufficient progress is a legal conclusion
that this court reviews for errors of law.
At the same time, we recognize that the suffi-
cient-progress determination, although ultimately a legal
conclusion, is heavily fact-driven. In N. P., the Court of
150
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
Appeals ably explained how an appellate court should apply
the error-of-law standard of review in evaluating whether
the juvenile court has erred in making a similarly fact-
driven, statutorily prescribed determination. As noted, the
issue in N. P. was whether the juvenile court’s dependency
jurisdiction over the child should continue. Under ORS
419B.100(1)(c), resolution of that issue depended on the juve-
nile court’s determination whether the child’s “condition or
circumstances [were] such as to endanger the welfare of
the person or others.” In explaining how it would apply the
error-of-law standard of review to the juvenile court’s deter-
mination, the Court of Appeals stated:
“Our non-de novo review of such a determination is
analogous to the deferential review of other factually pred-
icated determinations that are, ultimately, circumscribed
by limits of ‘matter of law’ sufficiency, for example, denials
of motions for directed verdict or motions for judgment of
acquittal. That is, we view the evidence, as supplemented
and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and
assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally suf-
ficient to permit that outcome. Specifically, with respect to
a juvenile court’s determination under ORS 419B.100(1)(c),
we: (1) assume the correctness of the juvenile court’s explicit
findings of historical fact if these findings are supported
by any evidence in the record; (2) further assume that, if
the juvenile court did not explicitly resolve a disputed issue
of material fact and it could have reached the disposition
that it reached only if it resolved that issue in one way, the
court implicitly resolved the issue consistently with that
disposition; and (3) assess whether the combination of (1)
and (2), along with nonspeculative inferences, was legally
sufficient to permit the trial court to determine that ORS
419B.100(1)(c) was satisfied.
“We emphasize that our non-de novo appellate review
function does not allow us to substitute our assessment of
the persuasiveness of the evidence for the juvenile court’s,
nor does it allow us to revisit the juvenile court’s resolution of
factual disputes or its choice among reasonable inferences.
Rather, as (again) with our review of rulings on motions for
directed verdicts or motions for judgment of acquittal, our
function is limited to determining whether the evidence
was sufficient to permit the challenged determination.”
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
151
257 Or App at 639-40. Because a juvenile court’s determi-
nation that a child’s conditions or circumstances are such
as to “endanger” the child’s welfare is comparable to the
“sufficient progress” determination that is at issue here,
we believe that the Court of Appeals’ approach in N. P. was
correct and equally applicable to our review of the juvenile
court’s determination of whether a parent has made “suffi-
cient progress” under ORS 419B.476(2)(a). Accordingly, we
adopt it here.
To summarize, then, in reviewing a juvenile court’s
determination to change a permanency plan because a par-
ent has not made “sufficient progress” to allow a child to
safely return home, appellate courts are bound by the juve-
nile court’s factual findings as to what efforts DHS has made
and what actions the parent has taken, so long as there is
any evidence in the record to support them, and we assume
that the juvenile court found all facts necessary to its rul-
ing, even if it did not do so explicitly. But the juvenile court’s
determination that a parent has or has not made “sufficient
progress” to allow the child to return home safely is a legal
conclusion that appellate courts review for errors of law,
and they do that by examining whether the facts explicitly
and implicitly found by the juvenile court, together with all
inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, were legally
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination. We
now turn to apply that standard of review here.
IV. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
Mother does not dispute that the evidence in the
record was legally sufficient to permit the juvenile court to
determine that DHS had made reasonable efforts to make
the safe return of A possible. Thus, the primary issue before
this court is whether the juvenile court erred in determin-
ing that, at the time of the hearing, mother had not made
“sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely
return home.”
As we have discussed, the juvenile court’s “suffi-
cient progress” inquiry is to determine whether the parent
has ameliorated the conditions or circumstances that led the
juvenile court to make the child a ward of the court to the
152
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
extent necessary to make possible—with continued services
from DHS if necessary—the child’s safe return to the par-
ent’s care. In this case, the statutory basis for the juvenile
court’s dependency jurisdiction is that A’s “condition or cir-
cumstances *
*
* are such as to endanger the welfare of the
[child],” based on the allegations that “mother was convicted
of recklessly causing physical injury to A” and that “mother
needs the assistance of the court and state to acquire the
skills and training necessary to safely parent this child.”
Here, the juvenile court principally based its deter-
mination that mother had not made sufficient progress in
alleviating the basis for the court’s dependency jurisdiction,
and, specifically, the allegations set out in the dependency
petition, on the following findings: (1) mother was unwill-
ing to accept that her actions had led to A’s removal and
re-removal, and she failed to acknowledge her role in his
broken arm or the gravity of tying up A with a jump rope;
(2) mother was unable to put the parenting lessons that she
had learned into practice; (3) mother failed or was unwilling
to address in therapy the past traumas that provoked inap-
propriate responses in her to A’s behavior; (4) mother chose
to lock herself away from A or turn her back on him and
ignore him when she felt unable to cope with his behavior or
his demands; (5) mother failed to understand why it would
be unsafe and unwise for her to permit the grandmother
to have contact with and responsibility for her child; and
(6), according to Cook, it would take mother another one to
two years of therapy and training to become a minimally
adequate parent.
Mother does not dispute that those findings are
supported by evidence in the record. Rather, she points to
testimony at the hearing by Rutherford, her caseworker,
suggesting that A’s safety could not be ensured without a
full-time, live-in safety service provider, and by Hummer,
a parenting coach, expressing concerns for A’s safety when
mother is unsupervised. Mother contends that Rutherford’s
and Hummer’s testimony seemed to reflect an unachievable
standard: that, if A’s safety cannot be guaranteed, then
the parent necessarily has not made sufficient progress.
Moreover, she argues, the juvenile court seemed to rely, at
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
153
least in part, on its finding that mother was “triggered” by
A’s normal, age-appropriate behaviors to bolster its con-
clusion that A’s safety could not be ensured. She contends
that there was no evidence in the record that episodes in
which she had felt “triggered” showed a pattern of violence
or otherwise demonstrated a safety threat to A to support
a determination of insufficient progress. In sum, mother
argues, the facts that the juvenile court set out in its ruling
and on which it relied are insufficient as a matter of law to
support the juvenile court’s determination that her progress
was insufficient, particularly given that many—if not all—
of the witnesses at the hearing testified that mother had
made significant progress, especially after A’s re-removal in
September 2021.
We see nothing in the juvenile court’s ruling that
suggests that the juvenile court’s insufficient progress deter-
mination was based on a finding that A’s safety could not
be guaranteed or ensured. Moreover, evidence in the record
supported the juvenile court’s findings that mother contin-
ued to be triggered by A’s behavior, that mother had not ade-
quately addressed her trauma triggers in therapy, that she
had reacted in the past with physical discipline when she
was overwhelmed and stressed and frustrated, and that she
did not recognize that her approach to physical discipline in
the past was something that was harmful to A. The juve-
nile court reasonably could infer from that evidence that
mother might react in an extreme way that endangers A.
Thus, even though mother had not reacted violently toward
A in the months before the permanency hearing, the juve-
nile court reasonably could infer from evidence in the record
that, if mother were confronted with situations that trig-
gered her when she was alone with A, without the support of
a safety service provider, she might react in a more extreme
way than she would when there was supervision, including
resorting to physical violence, and A would not be safe in her
care.
In reaching that conclusion, we are not unmindful
of the growing body of data and social science research that
mother has cited regarding the potential for bias in DHS’s
treatment of families of color, as hers is, which can lead to
154
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
skewed assessment measures and disparate interventions in
state child-welfare systems. Cook recognized as much and
sought to avoid such effects in mother’s case, advising DHS “to
pay attention to possible racial issues.” However, even Cook
estimated that mother would need one to two years, from the
date of his October 2021 evaluation, of additional DHS ser-
vices, including regular therapy and classes to address her
post-traumatic stress, her reactivity to A’s behavior, and her
lack of parenting skills. That testimony supported the juve-
nile court’s determination that A could not safely be returned
to mother’s care within a reasonable time.
To be sure, there is evidence in the record that, in
the months before the permanency hearing, mother had
engaged willingly and eagerly in the services DHS had pro-
vided her and that she had made some meaningful prog-
ress.10 Ultimately, however, the juvenile court’s “sufficient
progress” inquiry is explicitly centered on whether the
articulated bases for dependency jurisdiction have been suf-
ficiently ameliorated so that “the ward [may] safely return
home,” a determination that the juvenile court was required
to make with “the ward’s health and safety [as its] para-
mount concerns.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). What matters under
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) is whether the parent has made suffi-
cient progress, as a result of those services or otherwise,
to overcome the concerns that gave rise to juvenile court’s
dependency jurisdiction to the extent that it would be pos-
sible for the ward to safely return home, with or without
continued DHS services and support.11 Here, we conclude
10 Irwin, for example, submitted a report stating that mother had been mak-
ing real progress in acquiring parenting skills, and, at the time of the hearing, A
was compliant with mother’s requests 95 percent of the time. Rutherford testified
that, in the previous six to eight months, he had observed improvements in the
attachment and bond between mother and A; he had observed more warmth and
genuine feeling. Dean testified that mother’s ability to take criticism was improv-
ing, and Keiser noted improvement in mother’s ability to interact and play with
A, and in her responsiveness to parenting instruction.
11 Under ORS 419B.476, DHS’s goal in providing services is to make reuni-
fication possible. In cases in which the parent actively participates in and suc-
cessfully completes the services offered yet still is determined not to have made
sufficient progress to make possible the child’s safe return home, the question
may arise whether the services offered were reasonably aligned with the family’s
needs to effectuate the goal of reunification. That issue is not presented here,
however, as mother does not challenge the reasonableness of DHS’s efforts to help
the family achieve reunification.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)
155
that the facts found by the juvenile court were legally suf-
ficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that
mother had not made sufficient progress to make possible
the safe return of A, either at the time of the hearing or
within a reasonable time thereafter, and to support its deci-
sion to change the permanency plan from reunification to
guardianship.12
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the juvenile court are affirmed.
12 We also reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court’s statement, in
its oral ruling, that it “cannot conclude [mother] has ameliorated the basis for
jurisdiction such that [A] could return home within a reasonable time” shows
that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard in making its determina-
tion of insufficient progress. In context, that statement does not reflect a misap-
plication of the correct legal standard for a change in permanency plan; rather,
it is better understood to reflect the court’s determination that mother had not
made sufficient progress to make it safe for A to return home. Viewed as a whole,
the court’s statement of its findings of fact and conclusions of law reflects that
the court understood the nature of the determination it was to make under ORS
419B.476. | 16852c3df03e19554e865654f79197994cd195a8825a23fb8086b52524a48c14 | 2024-03-28T00:00:00Z |
2da35b6a-0d3a-40f0-95e5-0f526ffabea2 | Marcus v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LEWIS MARCUS,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48622)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted on August 8, 2001.
Lewis Marcus, pro se, argued the cause and filed the
petition.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With her on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
LEESON, J.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
LEESON, J.
This ballot title review proceeding under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
has denominated as Initiative Petition 54 (2002). For the
reasons explained below, we hold that the ballot title's summary
does not comply substantially with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(d). We refer the ballot title to the Attorney General
for modification. ORS 250.085(8); Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318,
323-24, ___ P3d ___ (2001) (August 2, 2001).
The proposed initiative measure would amend Article IV,
section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, by permitting registered
voters to "sign" initiative, referendum, and recall petitions
electronically. As relevant to petitioner's challenge, the
proposed measure would add the following text to the
constitution:
"(a) For the purposes of this subsection, words
'Electronic Signature' or 'Signature' or 'Sign' means
Registered Voter Approval by Electronic Transmission.
"(b) For the purposes of this subsection
'Electronic Transmission' means transmission via
computer or other means over the Internet or other
computer network to the computer receiving such
transmission.
"(c) For the purposes of this subsection,
'Registered Voter Approval' means entry and Electronic
Transmission by a registered voter of the information
required by paragraph (f) of this subsection."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot
title:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOWS REGISTERED
VOTERS TO SIGN INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL PETITIONS BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
OF 'SIGNATURE'
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allows
registered voters to sign initiative, referendum, and
recall petitions by electronic transmission of
'signature'; continues to allow handwritten signatures.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects proposal
permitting registered voters to sign initiative,
referendum, and recall petitions by electronic
transmission of 'signature'; retains current law
allowing handwritten signatures.
"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Current law
allows handwritten signatures on initiative,
referendum, and recall petitions, but does not provide
for 'signing' such petitions by electronic
transmission. Measure allows voters to 'sign'
petitions by electronic transmission. Electronic
transmission means computer transmission, through the
internet or other computer network. 'Electronic
signature' is not defined, but must include voter's
name and residential address, in substantial conformity
with voter registration information. Until government
provides each voter a unique identifier, voter also
must provide contact information, such as e-mail
address, telephone number, which shall not become
public record. Election officials must either validate
or prove signatures invalid using identifying
information provided by petition signer. Legislature
shall review electronic-petitioning process, and create
new provisions to standardize, but not hinder, process.
Other provisions."
(Emphasis added.)
ORS 250.035(2)(d) requires a ballot title for a
proposed state measure to include "[a] concise and impartial
statement of not more than 125 words summarizing the state
measure and its major effect." Petitioner challenges only the
clause emphasized above in the Attorney General's summary:
"'Electronic signature' is not defined." Petitioner contends
that the clause is inaccurate because subsection (a) defines
"Electronic Signature." That subsection provides: "For the
purposes of this subsection, words 'Electronic Signature' or
'Signature' or 'Sign' means Registered Voter Approval by
Electronic Transmission." Subsections (b) and (c), in turn,
define the terms "Electronic Transmission" and "Registered Voter
Approval." The Attorney General responds that, reading
subsections (a), (b), and (c) together, it is unclear how the
proposed measure defines the term "Electronic Signature."
The relevant meaning of "define" in this context is "to
* * * set forth the meaning of" a word or word group. Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary, 592 (unabridged ed 1993). The
proposed measure explains that, for purposes of the measure,
"Electronic Signature" means "Registered Voter Approval by
Electronic Transmission." The meanings of "Electronic
Transmission" and "Registered Voter Approval" appear in
subsections (b) and (c) of the proposed measure. That the
Attorney General finds the meaning of "Electronic Signature"
unclear does not mean that the proposed measure does not define
that term. Because the proposed measure sets forth the meaning
of "Electronic Signature," the Attorney General's statement that
the term lacks a definition is inaccurate and violates the
statutory requirement that the summary be an impartial statement
summarizing the measure. It follows that the Attorney General's
summary does not comply substantially with the requirement of ORS
250.035(2)(d). Under ORS 250.085(8), we refer the ballot title
to the Attorney General for modification.
Ballot title referred to the Attorney General for
modification. | 54438f4252ab119c990ea1f0c766ce3c017c978f568cc7ed4b50ec920e512b7a | 2001-08-30T00:00:00Z |
89619905-4530-41fc-b815-b5642ca5ebf5 | Novick v. Myers (S48562) | null | S48562 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 9, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48562)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record July 19, 2001.
Steven Novick, in propria persona, filed the petition.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
PER CURIAM
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 44 (2002). Petitioner is an
elector who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of
State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft
ballot title and who therefore is entitled to seek review in this
court. See ORS 250.085(2) (stating that requirement). We review
the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2). ORS 250.085(5). (1)
Petitioner challenges only the "yes" result statement
in the Attorney General's certified ballot title. We have
considered petitioner's argument and have determined that it is
not well taken. Accordingly, we certify the following ballot
title to the Secretary of State:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: DISTRIBUTES TEN PERCENT OF STATE
PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUE
TO SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote requires
distribution of ten percent of state personal and
corporate income tax revenue to some local governments
that do not tax business income.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote retains the current
tax system where personal and corporate income tax
revenue collected by the state is directed to the state
general fund.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Currently, all
state tax revenue collected from personal and corporate
income is directed to the state general fund and is
used to fund education, public safety, human services,
and other state programs. Measure requires ten percent
of state personal and corporate income tax revenue
(including corporate excise taxes) collected in tax
years beginning on or after July 1, 2003 to be
"equitably" distributed to local governments that do
not impose taxes on business income. Measure defines
"local governments" to include cities, counties, and
local service districts providing "essential services";
excludes local school districts and metropolitan
service districts from definition of "local
governments." Measure does not define terms
"equitably" or "essential services." Reduces revenue
available for state government expenditures and
provides no replacement funds.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
1. The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 250.085 in a
respect not relevant to this proceeding. | 411889d899d1f62c3997f62e177eb7361bd7156b3049ba65cdc3a6f590963de7 | 2001-08-09T00:00:00Z |
8e8fe549-39df-42c8-8020-c4efaef5bc57 | Kuerschner v. Myers | null | S48673 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CAROLINE E. KUERSCHNER,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48673)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted August 20, 2001.
Steven C. Berman, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petition for petitioner.
Jas. Jeffrey Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the answering memorandum for
respondent. With him on the answering memorandum were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
PER CURIUM
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 57 (2002). Petitioner is an
elector who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of
State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft
ballot title and who therefore is entitled to seek review in this
court. See ORS 250.085(2) (stating that requirement). We review
the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035 (2)(a) to (d). ORS 250.085(5). (1)
Petitioner challenges the Attorney General's caption,
"yes" and "no" vote result statements, and summary. We have
considered each of petitioner's arguments and conclude that none
is well taken. Accordingly, we certify the following ballot
title to the Secretary of State:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: OVERRIDES LAWS
LIMITING DEVELOPMENT ON FARMLAND,
FORESTLAND; REQUIRES APPROVING NEW
DWELLING
ON EACH TAX LOT
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote overrides state
and local laws that limit building new dwellings on
farmland and forestland; requires approving a new
dwelling on each tax lot.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote keeps existing
state and local laws that authorize but limit the
building or siting of new single-family dwellings on
farmland and forestland.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current local and
state laws authorize but limit building or siting new
dwellings on farmland or forestland. Measure requires
approval of a new single-family residence on farmland
and forestland on any tax lot one acre or larger,
provided listed conditions are met. Conditions include
limits on size of dwellings and related outbuildings,
and setback and waste disposal requirements. Overrides
existing state and local limits on building or siting
new dwellings on farmland and forestland. Creates new
definition of "parcel" based on receipt of separate tax
bill. Measure applies to fee owners and contract
purchasers. For tax lots under 10 acres, requires that
80 percent of land not be used for dwellings,
outbuildings; 90 percent for tax lots over 10 acres.
Other provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
1. The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 250.085 in a
respect not relevant to this proceeding. | 3ad697c64b34fd0a93555bea0fb9f26230d579405c557b98092056bb0a92f671 | 2001-08-30T00:00:00Z |
e0f66780-b06e-496c-862e-039f12a05621 | Sizemore/Novick v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 24, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BILL SIZEMORE,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
_______________________________________________________
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48280; S48283)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
On modified ballot title filed August 16, 2001.*
David F. Coursen, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, filed the Filing of Modified Ballot Title for
respondent. With him on the filing were Hardy Myers,
Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
No appearance contra.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette,
Durham, Leeson, Riggs and De Muniz, Justices.
The modified ballot title is certified. The
appellate judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS
250.085(9).
* Sizemore/Novick v. Myers, 332 Or 352, ___ P3d
___, (2001) (referring ballot title for modification).
The court in this ballot title review
proceeding determined that the Attorney General's
certified ballot title for a proposed initiative
measure, which the Secretary of State denominated as
Initiative Petition 19 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards.
Sizemore/Novick v. Myers, 332 Or 352, ___ P3d ___
(2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802, section 2
(now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification. The Attorney General has filed a
modified ballot title for the proposed initiative
measure, and no party to the ballot title review
proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting
out period within which party may object to modified
ballot title and requiring court to certify modified
ballot title if no objection filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative
Petition 19 (2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: PROHIBITS USING
PAYROLL DEDUCTION PROCESS, OTHER PUBLIC
RESOURCES TO COLLECT 'POLITICAL' MONEY FROM
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote prohibits
using any public resource, including payroll deduction
process, in collecting money used for 'political
purposes' (as defined), even if collection costs
reimbursed.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains
current law, rejects prohibition on using any public
resource, including payroll deduction process, in
collecting money used for 'political purposes' (as
defined).
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current law
permits voluntary payroll deductions from public
employees for political purposes, prohibits compelled
contributions; prohibits soliciting political
contributions on government time. Measure would
prohibit using payroll deduction process, taking any
other actions using 'public funds' -- even if funds reimbursed -- to collect money
for union or any other entity that uses any
portion of collected money for any 'political
purpose.' Use for 'political purpose'
includes direct, indirect contribution to
candidate, committee, party; expenditure
supporting or opposing candidate or ballot
measure, encouraging or discouraging petition
signatures; commingling with other money used
for political purpose. 'Public funds'
include public employee work time, public
buildings, equipment, supplies. Measure
allows using collected money for lobbying
(with exceptions), producing official Voter's
Pamphlet. Double penalty for violations.
Other provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | 4c2de04a3abbe1ec5539f4bc3db6f6cbdca5f42a99a5bb5d0a1aef063b935248 | 2001-08-24T00:00:00Z |
2817a80a-8c82-4e96-a5f0-4d9708b971df | In re Kimmell | null | S47464 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
ADAM KIMMELL,
Accused.
(OSB No. 98-82; SC S47464)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted May 3, 2001; reassigned June 20, 2001.
Adam Kimmell, in propria persona, Portland, argued the cause
and submitted the brief.
Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and submitted the brief for the Oregon State
Bar.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.
* Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating two disciplinary
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2) (prohibiting commission of "criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness to practice law"); and DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting
"engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation"). The Bar also alleged that the accused
violated ORS 9.527(1) (conduct justifying denial of Bar
admission). A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found that
the accused violated only DR 1-102(A)(3) and suspended him from
the practice of law for six months.
The Bar sought review of the trial panel's decision.
ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.3. This court
reviews the record de novo. ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6. The Bar has
the burden of establishing alleged misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence. BR 5.2. We hold that the accused violated
DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR 1-102(A)(3), and suspend him from the
practice of law for six months.
I. FACTS
The accused first was admitted to the practice of law
in New York in 1978. In 1985, he was admitted to practice in
California. In New York and California, the accused's practice
focused on business transactions. In 1991, the accused was
admitted to the practice of law in Oregon. From 1991 to the
present, he has had a solo practice primarily in the areas of
personal injury and criminal law.
On September 28, 1997, the accused entered a department
store, placed a jacket in a black shoulder bag that he was
carrying, and left the store without paying for the jacket.
After observing the accused's conduct via video surveillance,
store personnel apprehended him outside the store. The accused
objected to being detained and denied any wrongdoing. Even after
the jacket was found in his bag with the department store tags
still attached, the accused maintained that the jacket belonged
to him. Police arrested the accused and charged him with theft
in the second degree. ORS 164.045. (1)
Theft in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
ORS 164.045(2). However, because the accused had no prior
criminal convictions, the Multnomah County District Attorney's
office elected to prosecute the offense as a violation. Former
ORS 161.565(2) (1997), repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 1051, § 49.
The accused pleaded guilty to the offense, and the trial court
imposed a $200 fine, $100 of which would be suspended if the
accused attended an "anti-theft talk" within 90 days.
The Multnomah County District Attorney's office
notified the Bar of the accused's conviction and, in February
1999, the Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused. In
his answer, the accused admitted that he had committed the
alleged misconduct. However, he asserted that the Bar's
complaint should be dismissed because his "conduct was prosecuted
as a violation, and [former] ORS 161.565(4) [(1997)] provides
that such a conviction 'does not give rise to any disability or
legal disadvantage.'"
Before the trial panel, the accused conceded that he
had committed theft and that his conduct was dishonest and
intentional. He also testified that he had acted impulsively,
that he was remorseful and that, although he previously had
shoplifted as a child, he had learned from his most recent
"mistake" and "never would do it again." In support of those
contentions, the accused offered the testimony of Dr. True, a
licensed psychologist. True opined that, even when viewed
together with the accused's childhood shoplifting incidents, the
recent incident was not indicative of a pattern of criminal
behavior. However, True acknowledged that, without additional
treatment, there existed "at least some significant chance that *
* * similar incidents could happen in the future." Dr. Scherr, a
licensed psychologist who testified on the Bar's behalf, also
opined that, without treatment, the accused is "susceptible to
dishonest behavior."
As noted, the trial panel concluded that the accused's
misconduct was dishonest, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).
However, the trial panel concluded that, under former ORS
161.565(4) (1997), the accused could not be subject to discipline
under either DR 1-102(A)(2) or ORS 9.527(1). Based on the DR 1-102(A)(3) violation, the trial panel imposed a six-month
suspension and recommended that the accused's readmission be
conditioned on proof that he successfully had completed
counseling and had demonstrated that he was not likely to engage
in similar dishonest conduct in the future.
II. DISCUSSION
We first address the accused's assertion that, because
he pleaded guilty to a violation and not to a crime, former ORS
161.565(4) (1997) precludes lawyer discipline for the same
conduct, i.e., theft of the jacket. For the following reasons,
we reject that argument.
Former ORS 161.565(4) (1997) provided:
"Conviction of a violation does not give rise to
any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a crime." (2)
Under that statute, persons convicted of a violation are
prohibited from suffering "any disability or legal disadvantage"
that they would have suffered had they been convicted of a crime,
as opposed to a violation. (3)
Assuming, without deciding, that a disciplinary
sanction qualifies as either a "disability or legal disadvantage"
under former ORS 161.565(4) (1997), that statute does not apply
to this proceeding, because none of the charged violations in
this disciplinary action is based on the accused's conviction.
Proof of conviction is not required to find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) or ORS 9.527(1). Similarly, although DR 1-102(A)(2)
requires the court to examine an alleged "criminal act," this
court has held that proof that an accused lawyer was convicted
for such an act is not required to find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2). In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 120, 949 P2d 710 (1997).
Because this disciplinary action is not based on the accused's
conviction, but rather on the accused's conduct, former ORS
161.565(4) (1997) is not a defense to the violations alleged.
The accused argues, and the trial panel agreed, that
this court's application of ORS 161.705 in In re Sonderen, 303 Or
129, 734 P2d 348 (1987), supports his contention that former ORS
161.565(4) (1997) precludes Bar discipline here. (4) The accused's
reliance upon Sonderen is misplaced.
The court in Sonderen concluded that the accused lawyer
was not subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(2) when a felony
conviction later was reduced to a misdemeanor that was not a
crime involving moral turpitude. (5) Unlike the violations at issue
in this proceeding (DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), and ORS
9.527(1)), discipline under ORS 9.527(2) depends on proof of a
certain type of conviction. See Allen, 326 Or at 116 (ORS
9.527(2) authorizes court to discipline lawyers for conviction of
only two types of criminal offenses -- felonies and misdemeanors
involving moral turpitude). As noted, the violations at issue
here do not require proof of any conviction at all, much less any
particular type of conviction. Thus, Sonderen provides no
assistance to the accused.
In sum, we conclude that former ORS 161.565(4) (1997)
is not a defense to the disciplinary violations alleged in this
case. Consequently, if the Bar has established the alleged
violations by clear and convincing evidence, former ORS
161.565(4) (1997) does not preclude this court from disciplining
the accused.
We turn now to the alleged violations.
B. DR 1-102(A)(2)
DR 1-102(A)(2) provides that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "[c]ommit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law[.]" To find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(2), the
court must determine whether: (1) the accused committed a
criminal act; and (2) the act reflects adversely on the accused's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. Allen, 326
Or at 120.
The accused admits that he committed a criminal act,
namely theft. The accused also acknowledges that his conduct was
dishonest. On the basis of those concessions, we conclude that
the Bar has proven that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2) by
committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty.
C. DR 1-102(A)(3)
DR 1-102(A)(3) provides, in part, that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "[e]ngage in conduct
involving dishonesty[.]" The accused concedes that his conduct
was dishonest. Accordingly, we conclude that he violated DR 1-102(A)(3).
D. ORS 9.527(1)
As noted, the Bar chose, in addition to the
disciplinary rule violations, to charge the accused with a
violation of ORS 9.527(1). (6) Although, in the past, this court
has found that the same conduct can violate both the Code of
Professional Responsibility and a provision of ORS Chapter 9,
see, e.g., In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 8 P3d 966 (2000); In re
Allen, 326 Or 107, 949 P2d 710 (1997); In re Bridges, 298 Or 53,
688 P2d 1335 (1984) (each so finding), such a finding generally
has not served to enhance the sanction that this court has
imposed for the violation or violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In this case, the Bar does not
argue that a finding that the accused violated ORS 9.527(1), in
addition to DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR 1-102(A)(3), for theft of the
jacket would enhance the sanction that we would impose for the
accused's violations of the disciplinary rules. We conclude that
a finding that the accused violated ORS 9.527(1) would have no
practical effect on the sanction that we impose in this case.
Therefore, we decline to address the Bar's charge that the
accused violated that statute.
Having found that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(2)
and 1-102(A)(3) when he committed theft in the second degree, we
turn now to the question of sanction.
III. SANCTION
This court's methodology in determining the appropriate
sanction for violations of the disciplinary rules is well
established. See In re Jaffee, 331 Or 398, 408, 15 P3d 533
(2000) (describing methodology). Consistent with that
methodology, we refer to the American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA
Standards) and to this court's case law for guidance in
determining the appropriate sanction. In doing so, we are
mindful that
"[p]roceedings for the discipline of an attorney are
not to punish the attorney for the commission of a
crime. That matter is left to the criminal courts.
The objects of the proceedings here are to uphold the
dignity and respect of the profession, protect the
courts, preserve the administration of justice and
protect clients."
In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 166, 683 P2d 992 (1984).
In this case, the accused violated his duty to the
public to maintain standards of personal integrity. ABA Standard
5.1. As noted in the commentary to ABA Standard 5.0 at 36:
"The most fundamental duty which a lawyer owes the
public is the duty to maintain the standards of
personal integrity upon which the community relies.
The public expects the lawyer to be honest and to abide
by the law; public confidence in the integrity of
officers of the court is undermined when lawyers engage
in illegal conduct."
The accused admits that he acted intentionally, that
is, with the "conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result." See ABA Standards at 17 (defining "intent").
"Injury" includes actual or potential harm to a client,
the public, the legal system, or the legal profession. ABA
Standards at 6-7. As noted, the accused's conduct caused actual
and potential harm to the department store from which he stole.
The accused's conduct implicates several ABA Standards.
Disbarment generally is appropriate when a lawyer: (1) engages
in serious criminal conduct, such as a felony, and any lesser
crime that includes theft as a necessary element; or (2) engages
in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty that
"seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice" law. ABA Standard 5.11(a) and (b). (7) Suspension
generally is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
criminal conduct "that seriously adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice" law. ABA Standard 5.12.
Drawing together the duty violated, the accused's
mental state, and the injury caused, our initial determination is
that suspension or, possibly, disbarment is the appropriate
sanction. We next consider any aggravating and mitigating
factors, and this court's case law.
ABA Standard 9.22 identifies aggravating factors that
may be relevant in a particular situation. Here, the accused has
a prior disciplinary record. ABA Standard 9.22(a). After
becoming an inactive member of the California Bar in 1992, the
accused filed documents in California courts and continued to
represent that he was admitted to practice law in California.
Based on that misconduct, the accused was disciplined in Oregon
in 1996 for violating DR 3-101(B) (prohibiting unlawful practice
of law) and DR 2-101(A)(1) (prohibiting communications about
lawyer that are materially misleading). Although the accused was
sanctioned for those violations before he engaged in the
misconduct at issue, their significance is lessened in this
proceeding, because they involved misconduct different in kind
from that at issue here and resulted only in a public reprimand.
See In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (setting out
nonexhaustive list of factors that serve to heighten or diminish
significance of earlier misconduct). The accused also acted with
a dishonest and selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.22(b). (8)
Only one mitigating factor is present: The accused
expressed remorse. ABA Standard 9.32(l).
In determining the appropriate sanction, this court
also examines the accused's conduct in the light of this court's
prior case law. The accused contends that "not all thefts are
equally 'serious'" and that, because his theft was an isolated
act that did not arise "in a professional context," only a short
suspension is warranted. The Bar disagrees. Relying on a
footnote in In re Pierson, 280 Or 513, 517-18 n 1, 571 P2d 907
(1977), in which this court questioned the relevance of the
distinction between theft from a client and theft from a
nonclient, the Bar submits that "theft is theft" and asks this
court to disbar the accused.
Theft from a client is the most egregious form of theft
that can be committed by a lawyer and generally warrants
disbarment. See, e.g., In re King, 320 Or 354, 359, 883 P2d 1291
(1994) (so stating); In re Phelps, 306 Or 508, 520, 760 P2d 1331
(1988) (where an accused "steals funds from a client, the
sanction is disbarment," despite mitigating circumstances);
Pierson, 280 Or at 518 (single conversion of client funds will
result in disbarment).
This court also has held that theft from someone other
than a client may result in disbarment or a lengthy suspension.
For example, in In re Pennington, 220 Or 343, 348 P2d 774 (1960),
the court disbarred a lawyer who misappropriated partnership
funds. In doing so, the court noted that violating a fiduciary
duty owed to a partnership was "no less abhorrent" than violating
a fiduciary duty owed to a client. Similarly, in In re Murdock,
328 Or 18, 968 P2d 1270 (1998), this court disbarred a lawyer who
embezzled more than $9,000 from his law firm. In In re Stodd,
279 Or 565, 568 P2d 665 (1977), a lawyer was suspended for two
years after he converted funds from a nonprofit organization of
which he was president.
Other cases involving theft from someone other than a
client have not resulted in disbarment or a lengthy suspension.
In In re Mahr, 276 Or 939, 556 P2d 1359 (1976), this court
imposed a 90-day suspension on a lawyer who was convicted of
second-degree theft after stealing a plug socket from a
department store. In In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 683 P2d 992
(1984), a lawyer who converted his wife's joint ownership
interest in a vehicle received a public reprimand. In doing so,
the court emphasized that the accused's poor judgment arose from
his ongoing marital dissolution proceeding and that the act for
which he was convicted was unlikely to recur. Id. at 167.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that,
historically, this court has been of the view that there is a
distinction between lawyer theft that results in a violation of a
fiduciary duty and lawyer theft that does not. In most
instances, a lawyer who misappropriates property or funds while
acting in a fiduciary capacity will be sanctioned more severely
than a lawyer who misappropriate property or funds outside that
capacity. (9)
Having made that distinction, and keeping in mind that
the accused was not acting in a fiduciary capacity when he
committed the theft at issue, we note that theft is,
nevertheless, an act of "serious misconduct involving moral
turpitude," Mahr, 276 Or at 943. In this proceeding, the
accused admits that he committed theft, that the decision to
commit theft "came easily" to him, that he acted intentionally,
that his conduct was dishonest, and that he was "surprised" by
how seriously the Bar took that misconduct. The accused's
conduct demonstrates a disrespect for the law that he has taken
an oath to uphold, calling into question that which is required
of every lawyer -- good moral character. See In re Tobiga, 310
Or 46, 51-52, 791 P2d 830 (1990) (admission statute requires
showing of good moral character to protect public in their
dealings with practitioners).
Because this case involves aggravating factors, a more
lengthy suspension than the 90-days imposed in Mahr is warranted.
However, because this case does not involve the violation of a
fiduciary duty, a suspension that is shorter than the two-year
suspension imposed in Stodd is appropriate. Accordingly, we
conclude that the accused's violations of DR 1-102(A)(2) and DR
1-102(A)(3) warrant a six-month suspension.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months, commencing 60 days from the date of filing
of this decision.
1. ORS 164.045 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of theft in the
second degree if, by other than extortion, the person:
"(a) Commits theft as defined in ORS 164.015; and
"(b) The total value of the property in a single
or aggregate transaction is $50 or more but is under
$200 in a case of theft by receiving and under $750 in
any other case."
ORS 164.015 provides, in part:
"A person commits theft when, with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate property
to the person or to a third person, the person:
"(1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof[.]"
2. Although the legislature repealed former ORS 161.565
(1997) in its entirety, Or Laws 1999, ch 1051, § 49, subsection
(4) of that statute appears merely to have been renumbered. ORS
153.008(2) (1999) now provides:
"Conviction of a violation does not give rise to
any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a crime."
Or Laws 1999, ch 1051, § 3.
3. Under the criminal code, a violation is not a "crime."
See ORS 161.515(2) (defining "crime" as "either a felony or a
misdemeanor"). "Violations" are distinguishable from "crimes" in
that imprisonment may not be imposed for conviction of a
violation, ORS 153.018(1), whereas imprisonment may be imposed
for conviction of a crime, ORS 161.515(1).
4. ORS 161.705 permits sentencing courts to reduce certain
felonies to misdemeanors.
5. ORS 9.527(2) provides that this court may discipline a
lawyer if the lawyer
"has been convicted in any jurisdiction of an offense
which is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a
felony under the laws of this state, or is punishable
by death or imprisonment under the laws of the United
States, in any of which cases the record of the
conviction shall be conclusive evidence[.]"
6. ORS 9.57 provides, in part:
"The Supreme Court may disbar, suspend or
reprimand a member of the bar whenever, upon proper
proceedings for that purpose, it appears to the court
that:
"(1) The member has committed an act or carried on
a course of conduct of such nature that, if the member
were applying for admission to the bar, the application
should be denied[.]"
7. The accused contends that his shoplifting should not be
considered a "serious crime" for purposes of ABA Standard
5.11(a). The ABA Standards do not differentiate among degrees or
kinds of thefts. The commentary to ABA Standard 5.11 provides:
"A lawyer who engages in any of the illegal acts
listed [in ABA Standard 5.11(a)] has violated one of
the most basic professional obligations to the public,
the pledge to maintain personal honesty and integrity.
This duty to the public is breached regardless of
whether a criminal charge has been brought against the
lawyer."
However, as demonstrated infra, not all thefts merit disbarment.
8. We note that the Bar asserts that other aggravating
factors apply. However, we only discuss those that we find to be
relevant.
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 625 (6th ed 1990), explains
that one acts in a "fiduciary capacity"
"when the business which he transacts, or the money or
property which he handles, is not his own or for his
own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as
to whom he stands in a relation implying and
necessitating great confidence and trust on the one
part and a high degree of good faith on the other
part." | 8001e8a9e563536a8290d340ccc89ad75fc272576a84deb9e4a65546fce882a6 | 2001-08-30T00:00:00Z |
35d18b96-d05a-4194-9922-7155a8ee2417 | DeYoung/Thomas v. Board of Parole | null | S47467 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: July 6, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DENNIS MARTIN DEYOUNG,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
___________________________________
EDWARD ANDREW THOMAS,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND
POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A106889, A105130; SC S47467, S47322)
(Consolidated for Briefing, Argument, and Opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 2, 2000.
Daniel M. Carroll, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioners on review. With him on the brief were
David E. Groom, State Public Defender, and Irene B. Taylor,
Deputy Public Defender.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
*On judicial review of orders of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision.
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 31, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
These two petitions, consolidated for briefing,
argument, and opinion, seek review of dismissals by the Court of
Appeals of petitions for judicial review of orders issued by the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (Board). The
petitions challenge the dismissal orders of the Court of Appeals
only to the extent that they designate the Board as the
prevailing party on appeal and allow costs -- specifically, a
$100 prevailing party fee -- payable by petitioners. Petitioners
argue that, under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals had no
authority to designate a prevailing party or to award costs. We
conclude that the Court of Appeals had that authority and,
accordingly, affirm.
Factually, the two cases differ only slightly.
Petitioner DeYoung sought judicial review of a Board order that
denied him re-release after a parole violation and set a new
release date five years in the future. The Board moved to
dismiss the petition on the ground that its order was a "decision
relating to a release date" and, therefore, was exempt from
judicial review. See ORS 144.335(3) ("[B]oard's order is final
and is not subject to judicial review when the board makes any
decision relating to a release date"); Quintero v. Board of
Parole, 329 Or 319, 986 P2d 575 (1999) (affirming dismissal of
petition for judicial review of order denying re-release and
setting new release date). The Court of Appeals granted the
motion, issuing a dismissal order that designated the Board as
the prevailing party and allowed costs in the amount of $100 (as
a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190), payable by DeYoung.
DeYoung moved for reconsideration of the award of costs
arguing, inter alia, that there was no statutory authority for
recovering costs from either party in a review of an order of the
Board. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, stating in its
order that it had authority to award costs, including the
prevailing party fee provided in ORS 20.190(1), under ORS 20.120
and ORS 20.310, both set out post. DeYoung then brought the
present petition for review.
Petitioner Thomas's case also began when he sought
judicial review of a Board decision revoking post-prison
supervision and setting a new release date. However, because the
Board's supervisory authority over him expired before the Court
of Appeals took any action, the Board moved to dismiss review as
moot. The Court of Appeals granted the motion, issuing a
dismissal order that designated the Board as the prevailing
party, allowed costs payable by Thomas, and included a $100 money
judgment, again as a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190.
Thomas moved to recall the appellate judgment and
petitioned for reconsideration of that part of the dismissal
order that imposed costs. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion, this time citing ORS 20.120 and ORS 20.190 as authority
for the award of costs and prevailing party fee. Thomas then
sought review by this court, and we consolidated his petition
with that of DeYoung.
As noted, the Court of Appeals cited three statutes as
authority for its decision to impose costs on petitioners. The
first, ORS 20.120, provides:
"When the decision of an officer, tribunal, or
court of inferior jurisdiction is brought before a
court for review, such review shall, for all the
purposes of costs and disbursements, be deemed an
appeal to such court upon errors in law, and costs
therein shall be allowed and recovered accordingly."
The second, ORS 20.310, provides, in part:
"(1) In any appeal to the Court of Appeals or
review by the Supreme Court, the court shall allow
costs and disbursements to the prevailing party, unless
a statute provides that in the particular case costs
and disbursements shall not be allowed to the
prevailing party or shall be allowed to some other
party, or unless the court directs otherwise. * * *
"(2) Costs and disbursements on appeal to the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court or on petition for
review by the Supreme Court are the filing or
appearance fee, the reasonable cost for any bond or
irrevocable letter of credit, the prevailing party fee
provided for under ORS 20.190, the printing, including
the abstract of record, required by rule of the court,
postage for the filing or service of items that are
required to be filed or served by law or court rule,
and the transcript of testimony or other proceedings,
when necessarily forming part of the record on appeal."
Finally, ORS 20.190 provides for a prevailing party fee to be
awarded in addition to other costs and disbursements:
"(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (5)
of this section, a prevailing party in a civil action
or proceeding who has a right to recover costs and
disbursements in the following cases also has a right
to recover, as a part of the costs and disbursements,
the following additional amounts:
"(a) In the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, on
an appeal, $100."
Petitioners contend that the foregoing statutes do not
authorize cost awards in their cases. They argue, first, that,
because their petitions for judicial review were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the Board was not a "prevailing party" for
purposes of ORS 20.310 and ORS 20.190. Petitioners reason that,
if the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits
of their petitions, it also lacked authority to designate a
prevailing party or award costs.
In support of that reasoning, petitioners point to
general case law pertaining to how a court must respond when it
finds that it lacks jurisdiction over a case. See, e.g.,
Oregonians for Health and Water v. Kitzhaber, 329 Or 339, 334,
986 P2d 1167 (1999) (dismissing petition for review raising issue
outside scope of statute the conferred limited direct review
authority on Supreme Court); Meyer v. Joseph, 295 Or 588, 668 P2d
1228 (1983) (dismissing certified appeal sua sponte on
discovering lack of jurisdiction). Petitioners also rely on two
"prevailing party" cases, Berger Farms v. First Interstate Bank,
330 Or 16, 21-22, 995 P2d 1159 (2000), and Stelljes/Dumler v.
State Board of Parole, 307 Or 365, 769 P2d 177 (1989), which they
argue stand, respectively, for the following propositions: (1) a
court may award costs only if it has jurisdiction to decide the
case or appeal on the merits; and (2) a court may award costs
only if a party actually prevails "on the merits."
Petitioners misconstrue Berger Farms and
Stelljes/Dumler. Those jurisdiction cases stand only for the
proposition that an appellate court must dismiss a case and must
refrain from making any decision on the merits when it lacks
jurisdiction. They do not hold either that designating a
prevailing party is a decision on the merits or that such a
designation otherwise is precluded when an appeal or review is
dismissed. Although both cases contain some statements,
discussed below, that superficially seem useful to petitioners,
it is clear, on closer inspection, that the actual holdings are
not on point.
Berger Farms involved a contract dispute. The
contracts in question contained clauses to the effect that all
disputes arising out of the contracts would be resolved by
binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), 9 USC § 1 et seq. One party to the contract filed an
action against the other in circuit court, alleging several
claims. The defendant moved to stay the action pending
arbitration of the claims under the FAA. The trial court denied
the motion, the defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately concluded that most of the claims were subject to
arbitration and that the action must be stayed with respect to
those claims. The defendant then sought an award of attorney
fees on appeal under the attorney fees provisions of the
contracts, which provided for reasonable attorney fees and other
costs to the prevailing party "if any legal action, arbitration
or other proceeding is brought." 330 Or at 19. Over the
plaintiffs' objection, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney fees
to the defendant.
On the plaintiffs' petition for review of the attorney
fees order, this court reversed. The court noted, with respect
to the attorney fees that the defendant had incurred on the
claims that were held to be arbitrable, that the Court of Appeals
had decided that the trial court must stay proceedings on those
claims pending arbitration:
"The effect of that decision was to halt the court
proceedings on the arbitrable claims, thereby
suspending the court's involvement in those claims. It
follows that the Court of Appeals had no authority to
award attorney fees incurred on those claims, because
it already had determined that an arbitrator must
decide the underlying dispute. Stated differently,
because the Court of Appeals was without authority to
decide the merits of the parties' underlying dispute on
the arbitrable claims, it likewise was without
authority to decide whether defendant was entitled to
attorney fees arising out of that dispute."
Id. at 21-22.
Petitioners focus on the last sentence of the foregoing
paragraph as support for their theory that appellate courts are
without authority to decide entitlement to costs if those courts
have no authority to decide the merits of the underlying claim.
However, we agree with the Board that Berger Farms is a case
concerned with the scope of mandatory arbitration and the FAA,
and that it does not purport to speak to the more general
question of what it means to prevail for purposes of the general
statutes that provide for costs and disbursements. That fact is
made evident not only by the authorities that are cited in the
relevant part of the Berger Farms opinion -- all federal cases
pertaining to the scope of binding arbitration under the FAA --
but also by the fact that the opinion does not refer to any of
the statutes that ordinarily govern awards of costs and attorney
fees in this state. (1) Ultimately, when Berger Farms is read in
its entirety, it becomes clear that its superficially favorable
wording does not sweep beyond the context of binding arbitration.
There also is clear support in older case law from this
court for the Board's view that authority to dismiss an appeal
for lack of jurisdiction includes the authority to award costs,
particularly when, as in the present cases, the respondent has
moved for dismissal and the court has granted that motion. In
Portland & O.C. Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 86 Or 206, 167 P 270 (1917),
for example, this court granted the respondent's motion to
dismiss an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, yet awarded costs
and disbursements under Lord's Oregon Laws section 565 (a
predecessor statute to ORS 20.190). The appellant moved to
recall the mandate for costs, arguing that the court lacked
jurisdiction to award costs if it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the appeal. The court rejected that argument:
"In the very nature of things we had the power to
decide the motion [to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction], because, until a decision there could be
no authoritative adjudication. Although the appeal
terminated in a decision that we lacked jurisdiction to
hear the cause on the merits[,] the very act of
deciding the motion [to dismiss] was equivalent to a
determination that we possessed the power to decide the
motion, and therefore * * * to dispose of the appeal.
Granting the motion to dismiss made the respondent the
prevailing party on appeal and it was properly allowed
$15 costs and the necessary disbursements, as provided
by sections 565 and 566, [Lord's Oregon Laws]."
Id. at 209-10. See also McCargar v. Moore, 88 Or 682, 687-88,
173 P 258 (1918) (whether motion to dismiss is oral or written,
appellee ordinarily is prevailing party and is entitled to costs
of appeal when appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). (2)
Although Doyle and McCargar speak to much older versions of the
costs and disbursements statutes, they retain their logical force
and dispose of petitioners' theory about the effect of a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on a court's continuing
authority to award costs.
Petitioners also suggest, in a related but more general
sense, that a decision "on the merits" is required to justify
awarding a prevailing party fee. They rely on Stelljes/Dumler.
However, we disagree with petitioners' reading of that case.
In Stelljes/Dumler, two petitioners, Dumler and
Stelljes, sought judicial review of orders by the Board of Parole
setting release dates. (3) Immediately thereafter, and before the
Court of Appeals issued any decisions, the Board withdrew both
the challenged orders and issued new orders that essentially gave
the petitioners the relief that they sought from the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed Dumler's
petition, designating him as prevailing party and awarding him
costs, but denying his claim for a prevailing party fee under ORS
20.190. For reasons that are unclear, Stelljes was permitted to
continue his review proceeding, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately affirmed the Board's new order and designated the
Board as the prevailing party. However, when Stelljes petitioned
for costs and a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190, the Court
of Appeals awarded costs, but denied the request for a prevailing
party fee.
Dumler and Stelljes both sought review of the Court of
Appeals' orders to the extent that the orders denied their claims
for prevailing party fees. Because the issue had not been raised
or briefed, this court expressly declined to consider the
seemingly obvious question whether the petitioners were entitled
to costs under the circumstances at all. Stelljes/Dumler, 307 Or
at 369 n 8. We noted only that ORS 183.497 generally controls
the award of costs in judicial reviews of administrative actions
and that ORS 183.482(6) provides for an award of costs in such
reviews if the agency withdraws an order before the date set for
hearing and modifies it in the petitioner's favor, but that
neither of those statutes was applicable to judicial review of
Board orders. Id. at 368.
With respect to prevailing party fees provided under
ORS 20.190, this court concluded that the statute would not
support an award of prevailing party fees in Dumler's and
Stelljes' cases:
"We conclude that in order to receive a prevailing
party fee in these cases, petitioners had to prevail on
the merits in the Court of Appeals. They did not do
so. The Court of Appeals dismissed Dumler's petition,
and Stelljes case was decided in favor of the Board.
Petitioners may have benefitted from the Board's new
orders; however, any such benefit resulted from the
Board's action, not from any decision on the merits by
the Court of Appeals. Thus they did not prevail on the
merits in the Court of Appeals and, therefore, are not
entitled to ORS 20.190 prevailing party fees."
Id. at 369 (emphasis in original). Petitioners suggest that the
operative words in the foregoing quoted paragraph are "on the
merits."
Petitioners are mistaken. The operative words are "in
the Court of Appeals." The party asserting entitlement to the
prevailing party fee must show, at a minimum, that the party's
victory happened in the Court of Appeals, rather than in some
other forum. A victory in some other forum, even if achieved
only after invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
does not mean that a party has prevailed for purposes of the
award of a prevailing party fee. See, e.g., ORAP 13.05(3) (party
qualifies as "prevailing" for purposes of allowance of costs --
including prevailing party fee -- "only if the court reverses or
substantially modifies the judgment or order from which the
appeal or judicial review was taken" (4) (emphasis added)).
In sum, we are persuaded that petitioners' arguments
pertaining to the Court of Appeals' authority to impose costs in
connection with the dismissal of their petitions for judicial
review are not well taken. Although appellate courts may decline
to award costs to the prevailing party in cases of dismissal, for
reasons of fairness or otherwise, (5) a party nevertheless may be
said to have prevailed on appeal, for purposes of costs and
disbursements, by obtaining dismissal of the appeal or petition.
Petitioners next argue that the cost awards in their
cases were unauthorized because there is no specific statutory
authority in the statutes that govern judicial review of Board
orders for awarding costs to the prevailing party. Petitioners
begin by noting (correctly) that costs and attorney fees are
controlled entirely by statute and are not recoverable in the
absence of a statute or contractual provision that authorizes
such an award. See Compton v. Weyerhaeuser, 302 Or 366, 367, 730
P2d 540 (1986) (costs, like attorney fees, not recoverable in
absence of statute or contractual provision authorizing award).
Petitioners then assert that we must interpret ORS 144.335, the
statute that governs judicial review of Board orders, as the
complete authority of appellate courts with respect to judicial
review of such orders. Petitioners conclude that, because that
statute makes no mention of costs or disbursements, it follows
that no statute authorizes cost awards in any review of a Board
order, regardless of any general authority to award costs under
ORS chapter 20.
Petitioners have not identified anything persuasive in
ORS 144.335 itself or in this court's cases discussing costs and
disbursements that supports their view that authority to impose
costs on review of a Board order may derive only from a statute
that speaks specifically to that kind of proceeding. (6)
Petitioners argue that, even if the general cost award
provisions in ORS chapter 20 might have some theoretical
relevance in a review of a Board order, none of the provisions
cited by the Court of Appeals provides actual authority for
imposing costs and prevailing party fees in their cases. Because
it is largely dispositive, we first consider petitioners'
arguments with respect to ORS 20.120.
Petitioners argue that ORS 20.120 does not confer
affirmative authority to allow costs on judicial review, but,
instead, provides only that a party's right to recover costs on
judicial review shall be allowed in the same manner and to the
same extent as that party's right to recover costs in an appeal.
Petitioners contend that, "[because] costs and disbursements may
only be awarded on appeal pursuant to express statutory
authority, any award of costs on judicial review must be
specifically authorized under the statutes governing that
review."
But, assuming that petitioners' initial premise, viz.,
that ORS 20.120 is not a source of substantive authority to award
costs, is correct, their conclusion logically does not follow.
The traditional requirement that authority to award costs, on
appeal or otherwise, must be "express" cannot be so easily
transformed into petitioners' suggested requirement that such
authority must appear in the statutes governing the specific type
of judicial review in which the award is made.
Neither do petitioners adequately explain why ORS
20.310, which appears to confer express general authority to
award costs "in any appeal," is not relevant in this context. It
is at least arguable that, because judicial reviews are to be
deemed appeals "for all the purposes of costs and disbursements,"
ORS 20.120, costs also are authorized in any judicial review,
unless some statute otherwise provides. And, in any event, this
court previously has construed ORS 20.120 as authorizing by
itself cost awards on judicial review of an administrative
agency's order. In Compton, 302 Or 366, the court ordered a
workers' compensation claimant who unsuccessfully challenged a
Workers' Compensation Board order in this court to pay that
board's costs. The claimant sought reconsideration, arguing that
the court did not have authority to impose costs on a private
party seeking review of an administrative agency's order. The
claimant relied on Shetterly, Irick & Shetterly v. Emp. Div., 302
Or 139, 143, 727 P2d 117 (1986), in which the court had
determined that a provision of the Administrative Procedures act
(APA), ORS 183.497, precluded allowing costs against a private
party when review of a state agency order occurs "as provided in"
the APA. Compton, 302 Or at 367-68 (quoting ORS 183.497(2) and
Shetterly, 302 Or at 143.
The Compton court noted, first, that judicial review of
decisions of the Workers' Compensation Board is governed by the
workers' compensation statutes, not the APA. Compton, 302 Or at
368. The court then stated:
"Shetterly held effectively that ORS 183.497
superseded ORS 20.120 with regard to the cases within
the purview of ORS 183.497. However, ORS 20.120 still
controls cases not subject to the APA costs limitation.
Compton is such a case.
"ORS 20.120, a version of which first appeared in
the General Laws of Oregon § 554, p 226 (Deady & Lane
1843-1872), provides the statutory authorization for
'costs or disbursements' on review of decisions of a
'tribunal.' Before the APA costs provision existed,
the Court of Appeals relied on this statute to uphold
an award of costs by the circuit court in an appeal
from the Workers' Compensation Board. Cunningham v.
State Compensation Department, 1 Or App 127, 459 P2d
892 (1969). The later enactment of the APA cost
provision, which does not apply to review of workers'
compensation cases, does not change this."
Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
Compton thus holds that ORS 20.120 is authority for
imposing costs and disbursements on judicial review of a
administrative agency's order, except when review is "as provided
in" the APA. Because judicial review of the Board orders in the
present case are not as provided in the APA, ORS 183.315(1) and
(5)(a), ORS 20.120 would appear to authorize an award of costs
upon review.
Petitioners argue, however, that the holding in Compton
-- that ORS 20.120 authorizes cost awards in judicial reviews
that are not controlled by the APA -- is unsound and should not
be applied to the present controversy. Petitioners suggest that
the Compton decision should be disregarded as an interpretation
of ORS 20.120, because Compton itself disregarded a prior
interpretation of ORS 20.120 by this court that was at odds with
the interpretation in Compton. Petitioners refer to State ex rel
v. Estes, 34 Or 196, 55 P 25 (1898).
We do not agree with petitioners that Estes construes
ORS 20.120 in a way that conflicts with the interpretation
announced in Compton. In Estes, a physician whose license had
been revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners sought review of
the Board's order in the circuit court. The circuit court
reversed the Board order, but denied the physician's motion for
costs. This court affirmed the denial of costs. The court noted
that the "general" statute providing for recovery of costs and
disbursements (presumably Hill's Annotated Laws section 549, the
predecessor to ORS 20.190) had no application, because that
statute applied only to appeals from the judgment of a court.
The court then noted that the statute specifically governing
review of orders of the Board of Medical Examiners expressly
prohibited awards of costs against the Board. Finally, the court
concluded that "the act in question having made no provision for
the recovery of costs in case the action of the board be
reversed, defendant is not entitled to recovery from the relators
as in an ordinary action: Hill's Ann. Laws § 564, 565." 34 Or
at 213 (emphasis added). Estes does not construe Hill's
Annotated Laws section 565 (which now appears at ORS 20.120). If
it suggests anything about that statute, it is that the statute
authorized costs awards in "ordinary" judicial reviews under that
statute, but that the review at issue was an exception to that
statute and a different statute specifically prohibited cost
awards against the Board of Medical Examiners. That suggestion
is not inconsistent with the interpretation of ORS 20.120 offered
in Compton.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject petitioners'
argument that there is no statutory authority for an award of
costs and disbursements to the Board if the Board prevails on
judicial review of one of its orders. We need not consider
petitioners' arguments that neither ORS 20.310, ORS 20.015, nor
any other provisions mentioned in the Court of Appeals' orders
authorize cost awards. According to the interpretation announced
in Compton, ORS 20.120 authorizes cost awards to the prevailing
party in any judicial review that the APA does not govern (a
category that includes the present cases as they were considered
in the Court of Appeals). (7)
Petitioners' final argument specifically pertains to
the prevailing party fee provided under ORS 20.190. Under ORS
20.190, that fee is available in a "civil action or proceeding."
Petitioners argue that judicial review of an order of the Board
is a criminal proceeding and, therefore, is not a civil action or
proceeding within the meaning of ORS 20.190. In that regard,
petitioners note that the term "criminal" "pertains to or is
connected with the law of crimes, or the administration of penal
justice," Black's Law Dictionary, 372 (6th ed 1990), a category
that arguably includes Board decisions that subject a party to
continued incarceration for a crime. Petitioners also rely on
the definition of "civil judicial proceeding" that appears in a
separate statute, ORS 182.090(3): "As used in this section,
'civil judicial proceeding' means any proceeding, other than a
criminal proceeding as defined in ORS 131.005(7), conducted
before a court of this state." "Criminal proceeding," under ORS
131.005(7) means "any proceeding which constitutes part of a
criminal action or occurs in court in connection with a
prospective, pending or completed criminal action." Petitioners
contend that, under the foregoing definition, judicial review of
Board orders are criminal proceedings, because such review takes
place in a court (in their case, the Court of Appeals) and is "in
connection with a * * * completed criminal action," i.e., the
administration of penal sanctions.
We are not persuaded. We note, first, that ORS
182.090(3) specifically pertains to costs and expenses in a
particular circumstance -- when a state agency is a party to
litigation and the court finds against the agency and also finds
that the agency acted "without reasonable basis in fact or law."
The statute has a limited scope. It is not context for purposes
of determining the meaning of the term "civil action or
proceeding" in ORS 20.190. Moreover, and even if ORS 182.090(2)
were relevant, the judicial reviews in this case are not reviews
"in connection with" a "completed criminal action." "Criminal
action" is defined for purposes of ORS 131.005(7) (the statute
cross-referenced in ORS 182.090(2)) as an "action at law by means
of which a person is accused of the commission of a violation,
misdemeanor or felony." ORS 131.005(6). That definition does
not sweep so broadly as to include, as petitioners suggest, all
proceedings that pertain to the administration of penal
sanctions. Put differently, petitioners' status as prisoners or
parolees may be the result of a criminal action that is
completed, but administrative proceedings respecting that status,
and judicial review of those administrative proceedings, are so
far removed from the criminal actions that they cannot be said to
be "connected with" them.
For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by petitioners'
arguments that focus on the meaning of the term "criminal." It
may be that the term "criminal" broadly pertains to anything that
is connected with crime or the administration of penal justice,
but that is not dispositive here. The statute at issue, ORS
20.190, refers to any "civil action or proceeding" (emphasis
added), and the terms that logically correspond, "criminal
actions" and "criminal proceedings," (8) are more limited in scope
than the adjective "criminal." A "criminal action" is a
"[p]roceeding by which [a] person charged with a crime
is brought to trial and either found not guilty or
guilty and sentenced. An action, suit, or cause
instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal
laws."
Black's Law Dictionary at 372. A "criminal proceeding" is a
proceeding
"instituted and conducted for the purpose either of
preventing the commission of crime, or for fixing the
guilt of a crime already committed and punishing the
offender."
Id. at 374.
Neither of the foregoing definitions describe judicial
review of an order of the Board. Although any judicial review of
a Board order necessarily arises because there once was a
criminal action, such review is not a criminal action or
proceeding itself. It is a civil proceeding and, as such, is
within the scope of the prevailing party fee statute, ORS
20.190. (9)
In summary, we have considered each of petitioners'
arguments that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority in
awarding costs (i.e., a prevailing party fee) to the Board when
it dismissed their petitions for judicial review. None of those
arguments is well taken. The statutes authorize such awards; the
Court of Appeals did not err.
The orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
1. Berger Farms discussed ORS 20.015 and ORS 20.096(5) in
regard to the claims that the court determined were
nonarbitrable. With respect to those claims, however, there was
no question that the Court of Appeals had authority to decide
entitlement to attorney fees.
2. Lord's Oregon Laws section 565 is a predecessor statute
to ORS 20.190. At the time that Portland & O.C. Ry. Co. and
McCargar were decided, Lord's Oregon Laws section 565, provided:
"Costs, when allowed to either party, are as
follows:
"1. In the supreme court, on an appeal to the
prevailing party, fifteen dollars * * *."
3. Stelljes/Dumler was decided before the legislature
enacted ORS 144.335(3), making Board orders that relate to a
release date unreviewable.
4. Petitioners also suggest that their position is
supported by U-Cart Concrete v. Farmers Ins., 290 Or 151, 619 P2d
882 (1980), which they interpret as holding that, when a court
neither affirms nor reverses a judgment, no party has prevailed
for purposes of awarding costs. However, U-Cart Concrete does
not announce that proposition, but addresses only the narrow
question whether, in the Supreme Court, a respondent on review
may recover costs upon denial of a petition for review.
5. See ORS 20.310(1) (court shall allow costs and
disbursements to the prevailing party in any appeal, unless
statute provides otherwise or "unless the court directs
otherwise").
6. Petitioners cite In re King, 165 Or 103, 115, 105 P2d
870 (1940), for the proposition that the right to recover costs
must be found within the statute prescribing the procedure for
judicial review. However, in that case, the court held that a
general catchall cost statute did not apply to the particular
proceeding at issue (review of findings and recommendations of
the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar). The case does
not hold that the specific statute that governs judicial review
of an agency's orders is the exclusive source of authority for
costs and disbursements in such proceedings.
7. Petitioners also have argued, in a related vein, that
the Court of Appeals was without authority to award prevailing
party fees against them under ORS 20.190 because that statute
conditions entitlement to prevailing party fees upon the party
otherwise having a right to recover costs and disbursements, and
no statute in fact authorizes costs and disbursements. Our
conclusion, under Compton, that cost awards are authorized in any
judicial review not "as provided in" the APA, undermines that
argument.
8. Black's defines "civil action" generally as "[a]ll
types of actions other than criminal proceedings." Black's Law
Dictionary at 245.
9. Petitioners also argue that parole review is a criminal
proceeding under the analysis set out in Brown v. Multnomah
County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977). However, Brown,
which deals primarily with determining whether a procedure is
criminal for purposes of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, has no bearing on the question here, viz., what the
legislature that enacted ORS 20.190 intended by the term "civil
action or proceeding." | 6bb7997c4a53c38a1b8ddcde03d1ff4b85b9edde9f7f2a99a2e8219e94e5e8cb | 2001-07-06T00:00:00Z |
70401cc4-dc6b-4881-b8d8-902e2b3308bb | Kain v. Myers | null | S48744 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: September 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KRIS KAIN
and TRICIA BOSAK,
Petitioners,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48744)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted September 12, 2001.
Margaret S. Olney, Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.
Jas. Jeffrey Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the answering memorandum. With her on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs and De Muniz, Justices.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
PER CURIAM
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 70 (2002). We review the
Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a)
to (d). ORS 250.085(5). (1)
Petitioners challenge only the Attorney General's
summary. We have considered petitioners' arguments and conclude
that none is well taken. Accordingly, we certify the following
ballot title to the Secretary of State:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: SPECIFIES FACTORS
GOVERNING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER PAY
AND JOB RETENTION; PROHIBITS ANY
CONSIDERATION OF SENIORITY
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote requires that
school boards use specifically listed and equally
weighted factors in setting teacher pay and job
security; prohibits any consideration of seniority.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote allows school
boards to continue current practice of considering
seniority as a factor in setting teacher pay and in job
security.
SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Currently, school
boards must consider seniority in the event of layoffs.
School boards currently also determine criteria for
salary increases. Measure requires public school
teacher pay and job security to be based only on
listed, equally weighted factors, including teaching
and communication skills, educational credentials,
increase in appropriate student knowledge under
teachers' instruction, work ethic, appropriate
classroom environment, other specified factors, but not
including seniority. Defines public school teacher.
Requires retention of teachers with the highest overall
performance and best qualified to teach the assigned
courses, without regard to seniority, when layoff
occurs. Across-the-board cost of living pay increases
allowed if base pay is performance-based. Applies to
all collective bargaining agreements entered into after
its effective date. Other provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
1. The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 250.085 in a
respect not relevant to this proceeding. | 1132cbb2a8f033dd3ada4f0ea083f275b890ce2d4e995dd3f900bde3b8157ad6 | 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z |
76663542-d62e-4bb4-8c29-da9ac04d3c77 | Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills | 320 Or. 509, 888 P.2d 544 | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | 888 P.2d 544 (1995)
320 Or. 509
Edwin M. ERRAND, Petitioner on Review,
v.
CASCADE STEEL ROLLING MILLS, INC., an Oregon corporation, Respondent on Review.
CC CV91283; CA A80487; SC S41195.
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted September 2, 1994.
Decided February 2, 1995.
Sharon C. Stevens, of Callahan and Stevens, Keizer, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.
Ronald W. Atwood, of Williams, Zografos, Peck & Atwood, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs was Brad G. Garber.
Robert Wollheim, of Welch, Bruun, Green & Wollheim, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass'n and Oregon Workers' Compensation Attys.
Deborah L. Sather, of Stoel Rives Boley Jones & Grey, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Self-Insured Ass'n.
Jerald P. Keene, of Roberts, Reinisch, MacKenzie, Healey & Wilson, P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Associated Oregon Industries and Oregon Restaurant Ass'n.
VAN HOOMISSEN, Justice.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court against defendant, his employer, alleging statutory and common law negligence claims and seeking damages for economic losses, past and future medical bills, lost wages, and *545 impairment of earning capacity. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that defendant is immune from liability and that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Workers' Compensation Law. ORS 656.018.[1] The Court of Appeals affirmed. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 126 Or.App. 450, 454-55, 869 P.2d 358 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Plaintiff, a worker at defendant's manufacturing plant, had a preexisting condition of chronic infectious paranasal sinusitis that was not caused by his current work experiences or environment. That preexisting condition, which predisposes plaintiff to experience airway irritation, became symptomatic due to his inhalation of substances in the workplace. Plaintiff sought treatment for his symptoms and filed a workers' compensation claim. The insurer denied the claim, explaining that "it does not appear your condition was worsened by or arose out of and in the course of your employment, either by accident or occupational disease." Plaintiff appealed that denial.
A referee defined the issue as whether plaintiff's work exposure caused or worsened his chronic infectious paranasal sinusitis or "caused a complex of symptoms that would be recognized in workers' compensation law as a disease." After noting that plaintiff's sinusitis predisposed him to experience airway irritation, the referee found:
*546 The referee upheld the insurer's denial of the claim. In its final order, the Workers' Compensation Board adopted the referee's order and held that plaintiff had not established that his condition was compensable, because work was not the "major cause" of his condition. Plaintiff did not seek judicial review of the Board's order.
Plaintiff then brought this action in circuit court against his employer, based on inhalation of and exposure to particulates in the workplace, alleging statutory and common law claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Workers' Compensation Law and that, under ORS 656.018, defendant is immune from liability. The trial court granted defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding:
"* * * * *
Plaintiff argues on review that the exclusivity provisions of ORS 656.018 do not apply because, although his respiratory symptoms occurred in and were caused by the workplace, he did not have a "compensable injury," as defined in the Workers' Compensation Law and, therefore, he is not entitled to compensation for his condition. See ORS 656.005(7)(a) (defining "compensable injury"); ORS 656.018(1) (limiting complying employer's liability to that "arising out of compensable injuries"). From this, plaintiff further argues that the undisputed fact that he was not entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law demonstrates that his injury did not fall within the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018. That is, plaintiff is arguing that even if he is a subject worker and defendant is a complying employer, ORS 656.018 does not apply in this case because, as a matter of law, his condition is not compensable.
Defendant responds that a mechanical application of the statutory definition of "compensable injury" to ORS 656.018 would defeat the legislative intent behind the exclusivity provision by allowing anyone whose claim is found not to be compensable to sue the employer in a civil action. Defendant asks this court to interpret ORS 656.018 as exclusive and in place of all other liability that an employer either has or might have if the employee's condition in question is "work-related" or "occurring at work." We first turn to the text of ORS 656.018 and to the definition of "compensable injury," ORS 656.005(7)(a), in the context of the Workers' Compensation Law, to discern whether the legislature intended that a civil claim such as plaintiff's be barred. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (to discern intent of legislature, court first examines the text and context of statute).
ORS 656.018(1) provides that a complying employer's liability "is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers * * *." ORS 656.018(2) likewise provides that the "rights given to a subject worker * * * for compensable injuries under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker's *547 employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, [except as otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Law]." (Emphasis added.)
ORS 656.003 provides that, "[e]xcept where the context otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter govern its construction." We turn to the issue whether the statutory definition of compensable injury applies to ORS 656.018. The wording of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), that "[n]o injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury," and the language of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), that certain conditions may be "compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause," provide, in essence, that certain injuries, diseases, or conditions, although related to work, may not be "compensable" under certain circumstances, i.e., unless the "major contributing cause" criteria found in subparagraph (A) or (B) are met.[3]
From the foregoing description of the text of the definition of "compensable injury" in ORS 656.005(7)(a), it appears to us that the legislature was using the word "compensable" to convey different meanings. In the main part of ORS 656.005(7)(a), the "compensable injury" referred to may be simply an "accidental injury" "arising out of and in the course of employment." However, the limitations set forth in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of ORS 656.005(7)(a) make it clear that one who suffers an "accidental injury" "arising out of and in the course of employment" as described in paragraph (a) nevertheless may have an injury that is not "compensable," unless the "major contributing cause" test has been met. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), (B); see also SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or. 1, 8-9, 860 P.2d 254 (1993) ("compensable injury" encompasses an application of the criteria found in ORS 656.005(7)(a), including the limitations found in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of that statute, in making initial determination of compensability).
The question is whether the legislature intended the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018 to refer to some definition of compensable injury other than that set forth in ORS 656.005(7)(a), as qualified and limited by subparagraphs (A) and (B). Cf. Dethlefs v. Hyster Co., 295 Or. 298, 309-10 & n 10, 667 P.2d 487 (1983) (in cases decided before the addition of subparagraphs (A) and (B) to ORS 656.005(7)(a), court indicated that legislative intent behind Workers' Compensation Law was to avoid common law litigation and to grant employers immunity against liability for compensable injuries, but also recognized that it "is arguable that an action for damages may be maintained against an employer of the worker if a disease or injury is not `compensable'").
The definition of "compensable injury" found in ORS 656.005(7)(a), which includes the limitations found in subparagraphs (A) and (B), governs statutory construction of that term as used in the Workers' Compensation Law "[e]xcept where the context otherwise requires." ORS 656.003; see also Astleford v. SAIF, 319 Or. 225, 232-33, 874 P.2d 1329 (1994) (under ORS 656.003, a given statutory definition does not apply when the context, which includes the structure and purpose of the workers' compensation system as a whole, demonstrates that the use of the definition would be inappropriate); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (use of same term throughout a statute generally indicates that the term has the same meaning throughout the statute).
*548 In plaintiff's workers' compensation case, the referee denied compensation because plaintiff's symptoms were not the major contributing cause of his condition. Under ORS 656.802 (defining occupational disease), ORS 656.804 (occupational disease considered "injury" for purposes of Workers' Compensation Law), ORS 656.005(7)(a) (as interpreted by this court in Drews), and the facts as found by the referee and adopted by the Board, it has been established that plaintiff did not have the right to be compensated under the Workers' Compensation Law for the injury he suffered, as that term is defined and used in ORS 656.005(7)(a), in the light of the "major contributing cause" limitations found in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B). The exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018 specifies that the liability of employers under the workers' compensation scheme "is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers[.]" ORS 656.018(1)(a) (emphasis added). In plaintiff's workers' compensation case, it was established that the employer had no liability to compensate plaintiff under the Workers' Compensation Law. By providing for an employer's freedom from "other" liability, it may be inferred from the exclusivity provision that there must exist, as a predicate for that freedom, some actual liability under the Workers' Compensation Law before the exclusivity provision may protect the employer from "all other liability." Thus, the text of the exclusivity provision, specifically its use of the term "liability," further supports the conclusion that the statutory definition of "compensable injury" applies to ORS 656.018.
We turn to the question of what the definition of "compensable injury" means. The dissent relies on the fact that specific types of injuries are excluded under ORS 656.005(7)(b), quoted supra at note 2, to try to demonstrate that the context requires that ORS 656.005(7)(a)'s definition of "compensable injury" covers every work-related injury that ORS 656.005(7)(b) does not exclude. The dissent argues, in effect, that the definition of "compensable injury" stops after the words "or resulting in disability or death" in ORS 656.005(7)(a), and that the balance of the text merely establishes conditions that may lead to non-payment of compensation for what otherwise is a compensable injury. We disagree. To the extent that the dissent is suggesting that unless something is specifically codified as "not a compensable injury" for purposes of ORS 656.005(7)(b), it therefore is a compensable injury for purposes of the exclusivity provision, the context certainly does not demonstrate that this is the only permissible construction of the statutes.[4] The entire text of the statute is the legislature's definition of "compensable injury." The definition includes the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B). That is, unless the major contributing cause standard is satisfied, consequential conditions (subparagraph (A)) and resultant conditions (subparagraph (B)) are not "compensable injuries." When the legislature, in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), declares that "[n]o injury or disease is compensable" as a consequential condition, absent compliance with the major contributing cause proof standard, it is defining a compensable injury, not merely announcing further conditions under which a compensable injury will be paid. We apply the entire text, not only one part, of subsection (7)(a) as the relevant definition.
The dissent says that, if the legislature intended the "major contributing cause" limitations to apply to "compensable injuries" as used in the exclusivity provision, it would have put those limitations in ORS 656.005(7)(b) rather than in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B). The context does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. ORS 656.005(7)(b) is part of the context of ORS 656.005(7)(a). The exclusions in ORS 656.005(7)(b) do not demonstrate that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B) are merely limitations on "a subclass of `compensable injuries' for which workers will not receive benefits," as the dissent asserts. 320 Or. at ___, 888 P.2d at 553. The conditions described in *549 subparagraphs (7)(a)(A) and (B) are compensable injuries if their major contributing cause is a compensable injury, whereas the conditions described in subsection (7)(b) are not compensable injuries despite the existence of a causal link to an injury described in (7)(a). That distinction explains why the legislature defined the conditions under which "consequential" or "resultant" conditions are compensable injuries in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B), rather than in the context of the conditions categorically excluded from "compensable injury" under ORS 656.005(7)(b).
The foregoing discussion explains why, in our view, plaintiff's argument about the scope of the immunity provided in ORS 656.018 appears more likely to be correct than does the argument of defendant. That is not to say, however, that defendant's construction of the relevant statutes is not plausible also. We conclude that, although the text and context of ORS 656.018 tend to support the conclusion that the legislature did not intend the exclusivity provision of that statute to bar a civil action where an injury has been determined not to be compensable because it was not a "major contributing cause" of a condition, the text and context of the relevant statutes do not settle the issue. We therefore turn to the legislative history of ORS 656.018 and ORS 656.005(7)(a) to aid in discerning the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143.
The exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018 was amended essentially to its present form in 1977. See Or.Laws 1977, ch. 514, § 1. We have found no legislative history that indicates that the 1977 amendments were intended to alter the scope of the exclusivity provision in any way relevant to the issue at hand. Before 1977, the relevant provisions were in essentially the same form as when they were enacted in 1965, when a major overhaul of the Workers' Compensation Law was undertaken, moving from elective to compulsory workers' compensation coverage:
"Every employer who satisfies the duty required by subsection (1) of section 5 of this 1965 Act is relieved of all other liability for compensable injuries to his subject workmen, the workmen's beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries, except as specifically provided otherwise in ORS 656.002 to 656.590." Or. Laws 1965, ch. 285, § 6(1).
The 1965 Workers' Compensation Law also introduced for the first time a statutory definition of "compensable injury":
We have examined the legislative history of the 1965 enactments and the later amendments to the exclusivity provision and the definition of "compensable injury" before 1990, and have found nothing that sheds light on the issue at hand. However, in Cope v. West American Ins. Co., 309 Or. 232, 236, 785 P.2d 1050 (1990), a case decided before the 1990 amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a), this court indicated that the statutory definition of "compensable injury" found in ORS 656.005(7)(a) applied to that term as it is used in the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018(1)(a). See Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992) (this court's interpretation of a statute becomes a part of the statute as if written into it at the time of its enactment).
The question is whether the 1990 legislature intended that its amended definition of "compensable injury," found in the current version of ORS 656.005(7)(a), would apply to the exclusivity provisions of ORS 656.018. If the legislature intended the new definition of "compensable injury" to apply, then the exclusivity provision would apply when the "accidental injury" "arising out of and in the course of employment" was the "major contributing cause" of a resulting or consequential condition requiring medical services. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), (B).
We turn to the history of the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law, in which the definition of "compensable injury" was amended to include the "major contributing *550 cause" limitations.[5] It is clear from the text and the legislative history of the 1990 amendments that those changes were intended to have the effect of reducing the number of workers who could recover for work-related injuries under the workers' compensation system. See Or.Laws 1990, ch. 2, § 3 (Spec.Sess.) (changing requirements regarding objective findings and compensable injuries); Exhibit E, Joint Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 5, 1990 (fiscal analysis showing cost savings expected from reducing number of compensable injuries); Joint Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 3, 1990, Tape 7, Side B (testimony from various witnesses regarding fewer compensable injuries).
The legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the definition of compensable injury in ORS 656.005(7)(a) reveals that the joint committee reviewing the amendments considered the potential impact of the change in compensability on the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law:
"* * * * *
"* * * * *
Not surprisingly, that legislative history indicates that Williamson, a witness on behalf of the claimant's bar, essentially argued what plaintiff is arguing in the present case, and that Keene, a witness on behalf of the insurance defense bar, essentially argued what defendant is arguing in the present case. However, the exchanges quoted above also indicate that Representative Edmundson, one of the legislative committee members, believed that just as the definition of "compensable injury" narrowed, so also the exclusivity provision narrowed, because the new definition would apply to the term "compensable injuries" as used in ORS 656.018.
During the House floor debate, Representative Edmundson made similar statements:
Moreover, during that floor debate, Representative Dwyer commented:
No other legislator voiced disagreement with Representative Edmundson's and Representative Dwyer's conclusions during floor debate, and neither the amended definition of "compensable injury" nor the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018(1) were further amended to address the issue.
We conclude that this legislative history supports a conclusion that the legislature intended the definition of "compensable injury" as amended in 1990 to apply in the context of the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018(1).
*552 Oregon courts long have recognized that the workers' compensation system involves a trade-off, offering certain advantages, as well as disadvantages, to both employers and employees. See, e.g., Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 521-22, 783 P.2d 506 (1989) ("The scheme penalized some members of both campsthose plaintiffs who could prove actionable negligence of their employers, and so obtain damages beyond their medical expenses, and other employers who could defeat liability either because they had not been negligent or because they could show the worker was guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk."); McGarrah v. SAIF, 296 Or. 145, 160, 675 P.2d 159 (1983) ("Workers' compensation systems are founded on political compromise."). Undoubtedly, the 1990 legislature changed the nature of the trade-off when it narrowed the definition of "compensable injury" in ORS 656.005(7)(a) to reduce the number of injuries that would be compensated under the Workers' Compensation Law. The history available to us does not, however, justify a conclusion that the 1990 legislature intended that change to work solely in favor of employers, thus relieving employers of liability while keeping the workers' end of the bargain unchanged.[6]
In sum, we conclude that the 1990 legislature intended the present definition of "compensable injury" in ORS 656.005(7)(a) to apply to ORS 656.018, because that result is consistent with the text and context of those statutes, because the context does not otherwise require, ORS 656.003, and because the legislative history supports that conclusion. Thus, we conclude that the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018 does not provide defendant with immunity from plaintiff's civil claims here, because plaintiff did not have a "compensable injury" within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7)(a) and ORS 656.018(1).[7]
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
GRABER, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. In my view, the majority misreads the applicable statutes and, in doing so, undermines some of the fundamental purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law.
This case involves an application of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, ORS 656.018, which provides in part:
"* * * * *
"(2) The rights given to a subject worker and the beneficiaries of the subject worker for compensable injuries under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker's employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, except to the extent the worker is expressly given the right under *553 this chapter to bring suit against the employer of the worker for an injury."
On review, plaintiff argues that the exclusivity provision does not bar a civil action against his employer because, although plaintiff's symptoms arose in the course and scope of his employment, plaintiff does not have a "compensable injury" as defined in ORS 656.005(7)(a). The majority agrees with plaintiff's argument.
Plaintiff and the majority are wrong. Plaintiff has a "compensable injury" within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7)(a), even though he did not carry the burden of proving that he should receive benefits. Plaintiff and the majority blur the distinction between "compensable injuries" (the scope of the Workers' Compensation Law) and "compensation" (entitlement to benefits). That distinction has been in the statutory scheme from its inception and, until now, the exclusivity provision has been construed to cover all "compensable injuries," even those that do not result in the payment of "compensation."
This court has established a method of construing statutes, which applies to the provisions in question. Our overriding aim is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). First, we examine the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. When reading the text of a statute, certain principles apply, including the principle that the text means what this court's prior interpretation thereof states. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992). The context of a statute includes its historical development. Krieger v. Just, 319 Or. 328, 336, 876 P.2d 754 (1994). If the meaning of a statute is unclear from the text and context, the court looks to legislative history and then, if the meaning still is unclear, to "general maxims of statutory construction," to determine the legislature's intent. PGE, 317 Or. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143.
At present, ORS 656.005(7)(a) defines "compensable injury." It provides, as relevant here:
ORS 656.005(7)(a) supplies a two-step analysis. The first step is to decide whether a worker's injury falls within the definition i.e., whether the worker's injury is a "compensable injury." If the workers' injury is a "compensable injury," then the second step is to take into consideration the "limitations" in subparagraphs (A) and (B). Those subparagraphs describe a subclass of "compensable injuries" for which workers will not receive benefits. In effect, subparagraphs (A) and (B) say that, even if a worker has a "compensable injury," the worker must prove that the "compensable injury" should be compensated; the worker must establish that the compensable injury in fact caused the harm complained of. Either the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive benefits, or the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive no benefits. Either way, however, every injury that is "an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment" is a "compensable injury," no matter how subparagraphs (A) and (B) affect the workers' ability to collect benefits.[1]
*554 The foregoing reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) is based on the plain grammar, structure, and logic of the paragraph. That reading is even clearer when that paragraph is contrasted to ORS 656.005(7)(b). ORS 656.005(7)(b) provides:
"`Compensable injury' does not include:
That is, paragraph (b) contains a list of exclusions from the definition of "compensable injury." By contrast, in ORS 656.005(7)(a), subparagraphs (A) and (B) are worded as "limitations" on what kinds of "compensable injuries" are "compensable" (that is, entitling the worker to receive benefits). Subparagraphs (A) and (B) limit the "compensable injuries" that may be "compensated" to those compensable injuries that the worker can prove under a specified standard. They are not, however, excluded from the definition of "compensable injury." For the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, the legislature has defined what is a "compensable injury" in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and what is not a "compensable injury" in 656.005(7)(b). When the legislature uses different terms in different sections of the same statute, it is deemed to do so intentionally, and we give effect to the difference. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (stating general principle). Here, the majority has failed to give effect to the distinction between exclusions from the definition of "compensable injury" (ORS 656.005(7)(b)) and limitations on benefits payable for a "compensable injury" (ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B)).
In short, ORS 656.005(7)(a) simply recognizes that some "compensable injuries" will not in fact be compensated. We next must examine ORS 656.018. The pertinent part of ORS 656.018 provides that "[t]he liability of every employer who satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers." (Emphasis added.) The phrase that we are called on to interpret is the emphasized one.
The wording of that phrase covers all "compensable injuries" by its plain terms; it is not limited to those "compensable injuries" for which benefits are paid. The context of ORS 656.018 likewise supports an expansive reading. The context includes the policy statement in the Workers' Compensation Law, codified at ORS 656.012. ORS 656.012 suggests that the exclusivity provision should apply to all injuries that arise in the course and scope of employment. The legislature expressed its decision to reduce litigation, ORS 656.012(2)(b), and to expedite resolution of claims, ORS 656.012(2)(c). Those legislative decisions resulted from the legislature's finding that court procedures concerning injuries arising in the course and scope of employment lead to unnecessarily "long and costly litigation" that is detrimental to the economic welfare of society. ORS 656.012(1)(b).
*555 Another principle comes into play in this case. As noted above, when this court construes a statute, that construction becomes part of the statute construed. This court has construed the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, which has remained essentially intact since enactment in 1913, to cover all work-related events unless a specific statutory exception applies (such as the exception for willful and unprovoked aggression).
In Martelli v. R.A. Chambers and Associates, 310 Or. 529, 533-35, 800 P.2d 766 (1990), this court discussed the history of the Workers' Compensation Law and of the exclusivity provision:
"`[T]he right to receive such sum or sums [as workers' compensation] shall be in lieu of all claims against his employer on account of such injury or death except as hereinafter specially provided.'
"* * * * *
"* * * * *
"* * * [T]he compensation law was extensively revised in 1965 * * *. The immunity of an employer from any worker's claims, other than for workers' compensation, was continued in section 6 of the 1965 Act, as worded in the 1913 Act * * * and now phrased in modern terms, in ORS 656.018(1) * * *."
In Olds v. Olds, 88 Or. 209, 213-14, 171 P. 1046 (1918), the court held that the exclusivity provision of the 1913 Workers' Compensation Law "confers a special privilege upon an employer, thereby releasing him from the common-law liability to respond in damages for a personal injury that has been caused by his negligence, unless he formally renounces the benefits thus bestowed." That rule was restated in Reynolds et al. v. Harbert et al., 232 Or. 586, 591, 375 P.2d 245 (1962); "[i]t is our conclusion that the statutory scheme was intended to provide that a workman covered by Chapter 656 must accept the benefits thereof as his exclusive remedy except in the enumerated situations mentioned in the statute." (Emphasis added.)[2]See also Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lbr. Co., 173 Or. 682, 689, 147 P.2d 199 (1944) ("When a workman has become subject to the act he can not recover from his employer for injuries sustained by him, unless the facts give rise to one of the exceptions specified in the act."); Ellis v. Fallert et al, 209 Or. 406, 413-14, 307 P.2d 283 (1957) ("The Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act offers compensation to workmen who are within its purview for negligent and for non-negligent injuries and provides that such compensation is `in lieu of all claims against his employer' except as provided * * *. [T]he remedy under the act is exclusive." (emphasis in original)); Shoemaker v. Johnson, 241 Or. 511, 519, 407 P.2d 257 (1965) ("the rights and remedies provided by the act are exclusive"). In some of those cases, such as Bigby, this court recognized explicitly that exclusivity barred the claim even though the plaintiff could obtain nothing under the workers' compensation scheme. Bigby, 173 Or. at 685-92, 147 P.2d 199.
When the legislature "continued" the exclusivity provision by simply updating its wording in 1965, the legislature effectively re-enacted the 1913 statute, with knowledge of how that statute had been interpreted by this court. See Billings v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 225 Or. 52, 56, 357 P.2d 276 (1960) (this court assumes that, when the legislature re-enacts a section of a statute, it does so with *556 knowledge of prior rulings by this court construing that statute).[3]
This court has continued to read the post-1965 exclusivity provision to apply to all work-related injuries. Those interpretations are part of ORS 656.018 in its post-1965 form. See Stephens, 314 Or. at 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (stating principle).
In Leech v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 259 Or. 161, 485 P.2d 1195 (1971), this court concluded that the plaintiff, a dependent child of a deceased employee, was barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statutes from bringing a civil action. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated:
The court held that the rationale of Bigby survived the 1965 amendments to the workers' compensation statutes and that exclusivity continued to bar claims related to on-the-job events even for those plaintiffs who could obtain no workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 164-66, 147 P.2d 199.
In Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 556 P.2d 683 (1976), a worker argued that the exclusivity provision should not control, because the employer had acted with the deliberate intention of causing injury or death to the employee; therefore, one of the statutory exceptions to the exclusivity provision applied. This court concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the employer had acted with the deliberate intention to injure the employee or someone else, and it affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the employer's favor. 276 Or at 513-14. The court noted that "[t]he Workmen's Compensation Law provides the sole and exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by a workman in the course and scope of his employment when the employer is subject to and fully complying with the provisions of the Act, unless the facts give rise to one of the exceptions specified in the Act." Id. at 812, 556 P.2d 683. See also Nicholson v. Blachly, 305 Or. 578, 581, 753 P.2d 955 (1988) ("The exclusive remedy of injured employees against their employers for injuries suffered in the course and scope of employment is to receive workers' compensation benefits.").
This court has construed ORS 656.018 and its predecessors consistently to grant immunity with respect to all accidental injuries that arise in the course and scope of employment, i.e., all "compensable injuries." At the same time, it always has been true that a worker can sustain a compensable injury (on-the-job event) but collect no compensation (benefits). Over the years, this court has recognized that fact in three categories of cases.
One category of such cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to an extrinsic reason, such as untimeliness of the claim. Rhode v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 108 Or. 426, 217 P. 627 (1923), is the earliest example. In Rhode, this court held that a worker who suffered an accidental injury in the course and scope of employment, but who failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of the statutes, was not entitled to relief. The court stated:
"The case, like so many other accidents, presents pitiable features, but whosoever claims under the statute must bring himself *557 within its terms. This the claimant has not done in this instance, and as a matter of law he is not entitled to relief in these proceedings." 108 Or. at 441, 217 P. 627.
The court never has deviated from that holding and has restated it repeatedly. See, e.g., Dragicevic v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 112 Or. 569, 571, 230 P. 354 (1924) (court will not "entertain" claim that is untimely filed); Rosell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 164 Or. 173, 192, 95 P.2d 726 (1940) (same); Landauer v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 175 Or. 418, 421, 154 P.2d 189 (1944) (same); Johnson v. Compensation Department, 246 Or. 449, 452, 425 P.2d 496 (1967) (same); Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity, 301 Or. 743, 748, 725 P.2d 356 (1986) ("a claimant may not avoid the notice requirements if the [employer] has clear procedures for reporting accidents and injuries and the employe knows or should know of and is able to follow the procedures, but does not").
A second category of cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to an intrinsic reason, such as failure to sustain the applicable burden of proof. Vale v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 160 Or. 569, 86 P.2d 956 (1939), is the earliest example of a case in this second category. In Vale, the plaintiff, survivor of a deceased worker, claimed that the worker's death was caused by an accident arising in the course and scope of the worker's employment. The plaintiff argued that the worker's death had resulted from contaminated food that the employer had provided to the worker. The court stated:
Again, the court never has deviated from that holding and has restated it repeatedly. See, e.g., McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 161 Or. 191, 200, 87 P.2d 202 (1939) ("there is no evidence [that worker's being struck by lightening in the course and scope of employment resulted in] injury to the decedent's heart. It is a mere possibility lacking proof"); Dimitroff v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 209 Or. 316, 323, 306 P.2d 398 (1957) ("We have repeatedly held that a claimant under the Act has the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to compensation."); Grandell v. Roseburg Lbr. Co., 251 Or. 88, 91, 444 P.2d 944 (1968) (upholding denial of benefits to worker because "work activity was not a material contributing factor in producing his heart attack"); Marston v. Compensation Department, 252 Or. 640, 644, 452 P.2d 311 (1969) ("[s]ince there is a total lack of medical testimony that the bumping of claimant's head either caused or contributed to his condition, there is no evidence to support [an award of compensation]"); Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or. 27, 30, 602 P.2d 259 (1979) (worker failed to offer sufficient evidence to "establish * * * a worsening of the underlying disease"); Harris v. SAIF, 292 Or. 683, 689, 642 P.2d 1147 (1982) (in order to collect under the Workers' Compensation Law, claimant "has the burden of proving that he is so disabled").
A third category of cases recognizes that a worker can sustain an on-the-job injury but collect no benefits due to statutory limits on the nature of benefits payable. Leech v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. is an example. In that case, a person (a dependent child of a deceased worker) was omitted from the compensation benefit schedule with respect to an on-the-job injury of the deceased worker. As noted above, the dependent child was barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision from pursuing a civil action. 259 Or. at 170, 485 P.2d 1195. See also Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lbr. Co., 173 Or. at 692, 147 P.2d 199 (beneficiary omitted from compensation schedule could obtain nothing under Workers' Compensation Law, but still was barred from bringing a civil action). More recently, in Hathaway v. Health Future Enterprises, 320 Or. 383, 386-87, 884 P.2d 549 (1994), and Nicholson v. Salem Area Transit, 320 Or. 391, 395, 884 P.2d 864 (1994), this court recognized that "palliative care" is not compensable even though a worker has suffered a compensable injury for which the palliative care is given.
*558 The foregoing cases, which span the whole history of workers' compensation in Oregon, show that this court has recognized that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy available to workers covered under the Workers' Compensation Law for accidental injuries that arise in the course and scope of their employment, while at the same time recognizing that not all compensable injuries result in an award of compensation. The majority focuses on the words "liability" and "other liability" in ORS 656.018(1)(a), asserting that they imply "that there must exist, as a predicate for that freedom [from civil suit on the part of the employer], some actual liability under the Workers' Compensation Law." 320 Or. at 518, 888 P.2d at 548. The majority errs in that analysis. The term "liability" does not necessarily mean responsibility to pay money; it may refer to liability to defend against an action or claim, whether or not the employer ultimately is obliged to pay. There are two reasons why the latter reading, rather than the majority's reading, is the applicable one. First, the context suggests it. ORS 656.018(2) contains a provision parallel to ORS 656.018(1)(a), which limits the worker to act under the workers' compensation system for compensable injuries; "the right * * * to bring suit against the employer," not an obligation to pay money, is the core concern. Second, this court's prior caseswhich are part of the statute uniformly have interpreted ORS 656.018 in a manner that is at odds with the majority's interpretation.
To use a metaphor: the land of workers' compensation benefits that actually are available has never abutted the land of permissible civil actions. Between those lands has flowed a river of "compensable injuries" for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action may be brought. That river is formed by the three streams described above (intrinsic reasons why a compensable injury results in no compensation, extrinsic reasons for that result, and statutory limits on the nature of benefits payable). Today the majority makes a radical departure from those established principles.
The majority bases that departure on the 1990 amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a), when the legislature amended the definition of "compensable injury" to include the "major contributing cause" "limitations" contained in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B). The majority concludes that the 1990 amendments narrowed the definition of "compensable injury" and "so also the exclusivity provision narrowed." 320 Or. at 523, 888 P.2d at 551. But the 1990 amendments did not narrow the exclusivity provision.
Before 1990, the Workers' Compensation Law applied to all accidental injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." The current definition of "compensable injury" likewise encompasses all accidental injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." Accordingly, what is covered by the concept of "compensable injury" has not changed. The only thing that has changed is how much causation a worker needs to show to receive compensation for certain compensable injuries. A worker must now show that the compensable injury is the "major contributing cause" of the consequential condition, disability, or need for treatment in certain circumstances. Before 1990, there was no such statutory requirement. Thus, the 1990 change was a change of degree, not a change of coverage of the Workers' Compensation Law.
To return to the earlier metaphor, the legislature can change the boundary line and create, for the first time, contiguity between the land of workers' compensation benefits that actually are available and the land of permissible civil actions. The legislature also can narrow or widen the river that now exists between those landsthe river of compensable injuries for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action may be brought (subject only to constitutional limitations, which, as noted below, are not at issue in this case). The question before us is which of those changes the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.005(7)(a) wrought. In my view, ORS 656.005(7)(a) plainly constitutes a slight widening of the river.
As the discussion above shows, the text and context of the Workers' Compensation Law (including this court's prior interpretations and the historical development of the statutes) make clear the definition of "compensable injury" contained in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and applied to ORS 656.018 and *559 the legislative intent behind those provisions. Thus, the court's inquiry should stop here. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (explaining methodology).
The majority finds ambiguity in the statute where there is none, by confusing "compensable injuries" with "compensation" and by ignoring the difference between ORS 656.005(7)(a) and (b). Because of the alleged ambiguity, the majority then proceeds to analyze the legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the definition of "compensable injury," ORS 656.005(7)(a). From that scant legislative history, the majority concludes that plaintiff's claim is not a "compensable injury" under the definition provided in ORS 656.005(7)(a) and, therefore, that the exclusivity provision does not apply. The majority thus concludes that the legislature made a geologic change that eliminated the river of compensable injuries for which no benefits are available and for which no civil action may be brought.
Assuming that the statutes are ambiguous and that an inquiry into legislative history is called for, the material on which the majority relies does not support its drastic result. First, the legislative history of the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.005(7)(a) is not clear. Conflicting testimony before the Joint Special Committee on Workers' Compensation and statements on the House floor concerning how federal courts have interpreted other workers' compensation statutes does not provide a clear indicator of legislative intent. Further, the statement on the House floor by Representative Dwyer, quoted by the majoritythat he was "inclined to agree" that the major-contributing-cause test "may subject * * * an employer[ ] to tort action"does not resolve this ambiguity in legislative intent, but rather heightens it. 320 Or. at 524, 888 P.2d at 551 (emphasis added). His is not a statement of certitude; it is a statement of possibility.
In addition, there was no amendment to ORS 656.018 before the legislature. Most of the discussion quoted by the majority related to witnesses' and legislators' understanding of ORS 656.018. 320 Or. at 521-24, 888 P.2d at 550-551. To the extent that legislators were commenting on their understanding of that long-existing provision, their comments have no bearing on what ORS 656.018 meant. See DeFazio v. WPPSS, 296 Or. 550, 561, 679 P.2d 1316 (1984) ("The views legislators have of existing law may shed light on a new enactment, but it is of no weight in interpreting a law enacted by their predecessors.").
The majority also discusses the legislative history of ORS 656.005(7)(a) without giving effect to the legislative history of the whole package of interrelated 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law. The broader purposes of the 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law are revealed by the legislative history of the 1990 special session during which the legislature revised that law extensively. The underlying theme of all the 1990 amendments was to make the system more cost-effective for employers and more efficient. See Exhibit B, Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 3, 1990 (letter from the Governor's Workers' Compensation Labor Management Advisory Committee to Governor Neil Goldschmidt proposing changes to Workers' Compensation system, requested by Governor Goldschmidt, to "control the costs of Oregon's workers' compensation program"); Exhibit P, Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 3, 1990 (summary fiscal analysis provided by Legislative Fiscal Office concerning "anticipated premium reductions" associated with the proposed changes); Exhibit F, Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 7, 1990 (analysis provided by SAIF Corporation discussing cost savings under proposed changes); Testimony of Matt Hersee, Administrator, Workers' Compensation Division, Department of Insurance and Finance, Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, May 7, 1990, Tape 26, Side A (discussing anticipated savings that will result from proposed changes). As the discussion below will demonstrate more fully, the majority's interpretation of ORS 656.005(7)(a) is at odds with that theme.[4]
To summarize, the 1990 legislative history itself is unclear. The majority errs by relying on it.
If the majority were correct in finding an ambiguity, then, the second step in statutory *560 interpretation (legislative history) would not resolve such an ambiguity. The third level of analysis would be required, that is, the application of maxims of statutory construction. See PGE, 317 Or. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143 (describing methodology). The majority's result could not survive at that third level, because its reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) violates the principle that a statute should not be construed to produce an unreasonable or absurd result. See State v. Garcias, 298 Or. 152, 159, 690 P.2d 497 (1984) (stating principle). As has already been mentioned, one of the chief objectives of the workers' compensation statutes is to reduce the litigation and social costs of having workers and employers fully litigate claims concerning workplace injuries. By adopting a workers' compensation system, the legislature hoped to reduce costs for all parties involved and find a comprehensive and efficient means of dealing with on-the-job injuries. See ORS 656.012(2)(d) (stating objectives of the Workers' Compensation Law); see also Bigby, 173 Or. at 692, 147 P.2d 199 (stating purposes of pre-1965 version of Workers' Compensation Law). The position taken by the majority seriously undermines that objective by making the overall incentives of the workers' compensation system topsy-turvy and irrational.
After today, an injured worker will seek to pursue a worker's compensation claim as limply as possible, so as to achieve the goal of having the Workers' Compensation Board declare the claim noncompensable.[5] Once noncompensability is determined, the worker can then bring a civil action against the employer and avoid the exclusivity provision altogether. By creating a system in which workers have an incentive to pursue litigation to acquire damages for work-related injuries, the majority jeopardizes the receipt of "prompt" medical treatment and the assurance of income benefits (contrary to the policies set out in ORS 656.012(2)(a), (c)) and increases litigation (contrary to the policy set out in ORS 656.012(b)). Indeed, the more serious the worker's condition, the greater the incentive to pursue a civil claim and the greater the trespass on the legislatively stated policies.
The implications of today's decision for employers and their insurers are equally peculiar. The employer, who now has the incentive to resist workers' compensation claims, will take up the position presently occupied by the injured worker, that is, attempting to have the claim declared compensable, so as to retain the protection of ORS 656.018. The workers' compensation insurance carrier, who now has the same incentive as the employer to resist claims, will be opposed to the employer's interest and will instead have the same goal as the worker, to have the claim declared noncompensable, so the insurer will not have to pay the claim unless the same carrier also happens to cover the employer for general liability insurance.
Self-insured employers will pay non-meritorious claims to eliminate the risk of civil actions, and insured employers will encourage their insurers to do the same. That practice, although costlier than present practices, would be a reasonable way to avoid even greater costs, and potential awards of damages, associated with litigation. The greater costs will be passed on to consumers, workers, and employers. The speedy, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of claims concerning on-the-job injuries, desired by the legislature, will become more difficult.
In short, the majority's reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) undercuts the raison d'etre of the workers' compensation system. The workers' compensation system represents a legislatively mandated "bargain" between employers and workers. The system gives *561 workers the opportunity to seek compensation for work-related injuries and diseases without the need to prove fault on the employer's part; in exchange, workers give up the right to sue the employer for work-related injuries and diseases. Workers benefit from the security of knowing that, if they prove their claims, they will be compensated quickly; employers benefit from limited liability and reduced litigation costs. That bargain is implicit in the policy statement accompanying the Workers' Compensation Law, ORS 656.012, and has been recognized by this court.
In Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 521-22, 783 P.2d 506 (1989), this court described the bargain this way:
The overall bargain suggests that the employer is not civilly liable for on-the-job activities and conditions if the employer provides the required workers' compensation coverage and if those activities and conditions fall short of being willful and unprovoked aggression. See ORS 656.018(3) (exemption from liability does not apply when injury caused by willful and unprovoked aggression of person otherwise exempt). The majority's interpretation of the statutory definition of "compensable injury," however, guts the bargain. Every claimant will have the opportunity and the incentive to try to "opt out" of the workers' compensation system. The legislature did not intend that result.
Under a proper reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a), plaintiff has a compensable injury, because he has an "injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment." The Board found that plaintiff has "transient irritation of the upper respiratory tract and paranasal sinuses as a result of inhalation of substances found in his work place." (Emphasis added.) The Board then held that "[t]he medical evidence, however, does not support the conclusion that [plaintiff] has a compensable disease," because "[h]is symptomatic response to irritants is not a pathological process." In other words, although plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment (was a compensable injury), the evidence adduced at the hearing did not entitle plaintiff to collect benefits.[6]
Whether or not plaintiff received benefits, defendant's asserted liability here "arise[es] out of compensable injuries" and, therefore, the workers' compensation system "is exclusive and in place of all other liability." ORS 656.018(1). Plaintiff thus is foreclosed, under ORS 656.018(2), from pursuing the present action. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.
*562 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
CARSON, C.J., joins in this opinion.
[1] ORS 656.018 provides in part:
"(1)(a) The liability of every employer who satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers, the workers' beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer on account of such injuries or claims resulting therefrom, specifically including claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by third persons from whom damages are sought on account of such injuries, except as specifically provided otherwise in this chapter.
"* * * * *
"(2) The rights given to a subject worker and the beneficiaries of the subject worker for compensable injuries under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker's employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, except to the extent the worker is expressly given the right under this chapter to bring suit against the employer of the worker for an injury."
It is undisputed that plaintiff was a subject worker and defendant was a complying employer for purposes of ORS 656.018.
[2] ORS 656.005(7) provides in part:
"(a) A `compensable injury' is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations:
"(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.
"(B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.
"(b) `Compensable injury' does not include:
"(A) Injury to any active participant in assaults or combats which are not connected to the job assignment and which amount to a deviation from customary duties;
"(B) Injury incurred while engaging in or performing, or as the result of engaging in or performing, any recreational or social activities primarily for the worker's personal pleasure; or
"(C) Injury the major contributing cause of which is demonstrated to be by clear and convincing evidence the injured worker's consumption of alcoholic beverages or the unlawful consumption of any controlled substance, unless the employer permitted, encouraged or had actual knowledge of such consumption."
ORS 656.802 provides parallel provisions regarding "occupational disease":
"(1) As used in this chapter, `occupational disease' means any disease or infection arising out of and in the course of employment caused by substances or activities to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period of regular actual employment therein, and which requires medical services or results in disability or death * * *.
"* * * * *
"(2) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the disease or its worsening. Existence of the disease or worsening of a preexisting disease must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings."
ORS 656.804 provides:
"An occupational disease, as defined in ORS 656.802, is considered an injury for employees of employers who have come under this chapter, except as otherwise provided in ORS 656.802 to 656.807."
[3] In SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or. 1, 8, 860 P.2d 254 (1993), this court stated: "`Compensable injury' encompasses an application of the criteria found in ORS 656.005(7)(a), including the limitations found in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of that statute, in making an initial determination of compensability." Defendant here argues that "this court should interpret the word `compensable' in ORS 656.018(1), as it recently did in SAIF v. Drews, supra, 318 Or. at 8-9, 860 P.2d 254, to mean `accidental.'" Defendant misreads this court's ruling in Drews. In Drews, this court did not find that the words "compensable" and "accidental" were interchangeable as used in ORS 656.005(7)(a). In setting forth the test for applying the definition of "compensable injury" in the context of ORS 656.308, this court in Drews described the injury discussed in the first part of ORS 656.005(7)(a) as an "accidental injury." However, this court went on to make it clear that the "accidental injury" so described was not compensable, unless the limitations in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) or (B), if applicable, were satisfied. Id. at 8-9, 860 P.2d 254.
[4] Although both ORS 656.005(7)(a) and (b) are part of the context of ORS 656.018, ORS 656.005(a) is more helpful to a determination of what ORS 656.018 means, because it states what a "compensable injury" is, while ORS 656.005(7)(b) only states what a "compensable injury" is not, at least under the described conditions.
[5] The parallel provisions of ORS 656.802 (occupational disease) were amended at the same time to state the "major contributing cause" standard for occupational diseases. Or.Laws 1990, ch. 2, § 43 (Spec.Sess.).
[6] Because we decide this case on statutory grounds, we need not consider plaintiff's arguments based on Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution ("every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done in his person, property, or reputation").
[7] Defendant expresses concern that interpreting the exclusivity provision in a manner that does not preclude civil actions for noncompensable conditions could lead injured workers to bypass the workers' compensation system entirely in order to take their cases before juries and that, had the legislature sought to provide workers with such an election to proceed outside the Workers' Compensation Law, such a policy choice would be evident from the law itself. Nothing in our decision here supports a conclusion that workers may elect to bypass the workers' compensation system. In view of the procedural posture of this case, we do not decide whether a Board determination that plaintiff's claim is not a compensable injury is a prerequisite to this action in circuit court.
[1] The majority argues that this court recognized a more limited definition of "compensable injury" in SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or. 1, 8, 860 P.2d 254 (1993). 320 Or. at 516 n. 3, 888 P.2d at 547 n. 3. The majority is wrong, for three reasons. First, the majority takes the sentence that it quotes out of context. The majority omits the cautionary sentence that limited the court's discussion to the narrow question presented: "As we interpret ORS 656.308(1) and 656.005(7)(a) together, they work in this case as follows[.]" Drews, 318 Or. at 8, 860 P.2d 254. Second, and relatedly, Drews did not decide the issue that we must decide today. In Drews, this court was not faced with the question that we consider here, of defining the entire range of "compensable injuries."
Third, in its discussion of Drews, as in the remainder of the opinion, the majority makes the mistake of freely interchanging the distinct concepts of "compensable injury," "compensable," "compensation," and "compensated."
[2] The statutory exceptions included willful and unprovoked aggression, for example. ORS 656.156 (1961).
[3] Before 1965, the Workers' Compensation Law contained no separate definition of "compensable injury." Rather, from 1913 to 1965, the definition was contained within the applicable exclusivity provision. From 1913 until 1965, the exclusivity provision applied to any employee "who * * * sustains an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of his employment." See, e.g., ORS 656.152 (1963) (so providing). That is the same phrase used in ORS 656.005(7)(a) to define a "compensable injury." The scope of "compensable injury" covered under the Workers' Compensation Law has always been the same; since 1913, it has applied to accidental injuries arising in the course and scope of employment.
[4] This case presents an opportunity to make a general observation about the use of legislative history. Much of the majority's discussion concerns statements of two witnesses before a committee and of two legislators. Much of the dissent's discussion concerns the manifest general intention of the legislature in enacting the 1990 amendments to the workers' compensation laws. In general, an examination of legislative history is most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative intent behind an enactment. By contrast, an examination of legislative history is most fraught with the potential for misconstruction, misattribution of the beliefs of a single legislator or witness to the body as a whole, or abuse in the form of "padding the record" when the views of only a small number of persons on a narrow question can be found.
[5] The majority blithely assumes, by way of a footnote, 320 Or. at ___ n. 7, 888 P.2d at 552 n. 7, that an injured worker could not "elect to bypass the workers' compensation system," but fails to explain why not. For the purpose of this dissent, however, I accept the assumption.
[6] Plaintiff argues that such a result would be contrary to Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides in part that "every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation." Plaintiff did not preserve that argument below; therefore, this court should not consider it. See Leiser v. Sparkman, 281 Or. 119, 122, 573 P.2d 1247 (1978) ("The parties to an appeal are restricted to the theory upon which [the case was tried] in the court below.").
I would note, however, that the workers' compensation scheme has withstood Article I, section 10, challenges since Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or. 503, 517-18, 154 P. 106 (1915). Recently, in Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 523, 783 P.2d 506 (1989), this court again stated that, so long as the party injured is not left without a remedy, Article I, section 10, is not violated. As discussed above, plaintiff is not left without a remedy. Plaintiff has a remedy, because he had an opportunity to prove that his condition was compensable; he has simply failed to prove his case. | b5ce02a4b65e97b627722d132b820d12b7a191d8f8e7c8c5ec374653cc72a112 | 1995-02-02T00:00:00Z |
2ed0e0c6-84c4-4709-9d5e-075bf4fa3ed2 | State v. Clegg | null | S46908 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 23, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
GROVER CLEVELAND CLEGG, JR.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 94-02-30944; CA A90925; SC S46908)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 3, 2000.
Susan Elizabeth Reese, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for petitioner on review.
John C. Bradley, Deputy District Attorney, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Leeson, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, William C. Snouffer, Judge. 161 Or App 201, 984 P2d 332 (1999).
** Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; Riggs and De Muniz, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
The issue in this criminal case is the admissibility at
trial of certain testimony offered under various exceptions to
the hearsay rule. The trial court admitted the testimony at
issue and defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and other
crimes. In a divided en banc opinion, the Court of Appeals
affirmed defendant's convictions. State v. Clegg, 161 Or App
201, 984 P2d 332 (1999). For the reasons that follow, we hold
that the testimony was admissible. We affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds.
Because the jury convicted defendant on all counts, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.
State v. Hayward, 327 Or 393, 399, 963 P2d 667 (1998). On July
30, 1993, defendant's wife, Christina (Tina) Clegg, was shot and
killed by two gunmen wearing ski masks who burst into the Albina
Head Start office where Tina worked as a receptionist. One of
the men walked directly toward Tina and shot her several times;
the last three shots were in a straight line down her back, in a
manner that indicated that the shooter had stood over her and
shot downward. After shooting, the men asked for money, but left
without taking anything of value. One of Tina's coworkers also
was shot in the chest in the incident. One of the intruders
carried a silver gun, but police never found the murder weapon.
At least in part because of the manner in which Tina was
murdered, police soon began to suspect that the motive for the
attack was not robbery, as first thought, but Tina's murder.
Ultimately, defendant was indicted and charged with
aggravated murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, felony
murder, intentional murder, assault, burglary, and two counts of
solicitation to commit aggravated murder. The charges were based
on allegations that defendant arranged for the murder of his
wife. At trial, the state's theory of the case was that
defendant had orchestrated the foregoing events because he was
unhappy in his marriage to Tina, but did not want to risk either
losing his home or paying child support as a result of divorce,
and because he wished to collect the proceeds of a $100,000
insurance policy on Tina's life. According to the state,
defendant asked his brother, Randall Clegg, to find someone to
kill his wife.
The state presented evidence that Randall had made more
than one effort to find a killer. Randall first hired a man
named Deskins to murder Tina for about $1,000. Deskins borrowed
a gun from a friend, and Randall loaned Deskins a car and
provided him with a photo album containing pictures of Tina.
Deskins did not carry out his assignment, however. On one
occasion, Deskins failed to carry out the plan because Tina
unexpectedly went to church. The next day, Randall again loaned
Deskins his car, telling him to return it after he had committed
the murder. However, Deskins instead picked up a few friends,
began drinking, and ultimately drove Randall's car into a pole.
The police officer who dealt with the collision found assorted
unfired bullets in the car and, in the trunk, a box of shotgun
shells, a long-sleeved black T-shirt, and a black ski mask.
About two weeks later, Randall hired two other
individuals, Steward and Matthews, to kill Tina. The two also
were to be paid $1,000 for the job. Tina's teenage daughter
testified that, on the night before the murder, she saw defendant
with Randall and Matthews in the basement of defendant's house;
the Cleggs were showing Matthews a small silver gun. After the
murder, Steward told friends that he had stolen the car that was
used in the murder and that Matthews was the shooter. Two of
Tina's fellow employees confirmed that Steward was one of the two
intruders on the day of the murder, but was not the one who shot
Tina.
Although there was direct evidence linking Randall,
Steward, and Matthews to Tina's murder, (1) the state's case against
defendant was circumstantial. The state presented evidence that,
in the year before the murder, defendant often had talked to
coworkers about his marital unhappiness and frequently stated
that he would have his wife killed rather than pay child support.
In addition, defendant told coworkers that, if his wife were to
die, he would receive $100,000 in life insurance benefits, his
mortgage would be paid off, and he would be able to keep his
children. Defendant's insurance agent testified about
defendant's efforts, within hours of Tina's murder, to inquire
about the extent of the coverage. Finally, various witnesses,
including the investigating police officers and defendant's
friends and coworkers, testified about defendant's relative lack
of grief over Tina's death and his lack of interest in
apprehending the killers.
The piece of evidence tending most directly to connect
defendant with the crime was testimony concerning a telephone
conversation between defendant and Tina only moments before the
murder. From that conversation, a juror could infer that
defendant was attempting to ensure that Tina would be present in
the office at the time that her killers arrived. The testimony
came from of one Tina's coworkers, Hughes.
Hughes testified that, about two to five minutes before
the murder, she walked up to Tina's window just as Tina was
hanging up the telephone after a conversation with defendant. (2)
Hughes observed that Tina looked happy; Hughes asked Tina what
accounted for her good mood. Hughes stated that Tina "told me
that her husband loved her." Hughes then testified as follows:
"And I said, 'Oh and what brought that on?' And she
said, 'I just talked to Grover and told him Gladys was
going to take me to the bank and he said, "No, no, no,"
and insisted I not let Gladys take me, that he was
going to take me when he took me to lunch.'"
In response to the prosecutor's announcement of intent
to use the foregoing part of 'Hughes's testimony at trial,
defendant objected on the ground that the statement was hearsay
not within any exception to the hearsay rule. In the
alternative, and to the extent that Hughes's testimony was
admissible, defendant objected to it on the ground that its
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
The state argued, among other things, that Hughes's
testimony was admissible under OEC 803(3), which provides:
"The following are not excluded by [OEC 802, the
general rule against hearsay], even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
"* * * * *
"(3) A statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical
condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain or bodily health, but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the
declarant's will."
In particular, the state asserted that Tina's statement to Hughes
was admissible because it concerned whether Tina intended to go
to the bank with Gladys or to wait to do so until she went to
lunch with her husband. Moreover, the state argued, Tina's
statement to Hughes was admissible because it concerned the state
of her marriage, which was relevant because the defense had
contended that the Cleggs' marriage was happy and free of
conflict. (3)
The trial court admitted the testimony as state-of-mind
evidence under OEC 803(3). Defendant did not ask for a limiting
instruction, and none was given. At the conclusion of the trial,
defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On appeal, defendant assigned error to, among other
things, the trial court's evidentiary ruling regarding that
hearsay testimony. In response, the state argued that the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed because Hughes's statement was
not actually hearsay, inasmuch as it was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. The state also repeated its
contention that the statement, if it were hearsay, was admissible
under OEC 803(3) as evidence of Tina's state of mind.
In an en banc opinion, a divided Court of Appeals
agreed with defendant that the evidence was hearsay that was not
admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule
and that the trial court had erred in admitting it on that basis.
Clegg, 161 Or App at 207-10. (4) Notwithstanding the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the trial court erred, however, that
court affirmed defendant's convictions, because it concluded that
the error was harmless. Id. at 211. We allowed defendant's
petition for review.
"Hearsay" is "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." OEC 801(3).
The first issue that we address is whether Hughes's testimony
included hearsay.
Hughes's testimony recounted her conversation with
Tina. In that conversation, Tina in turn recounted her telephone
conversation with defendant. As a result, Hughes's testimony
included several out-of-court statements -- Tina's statement to
Hughes, which, in turn, included Tina's own statements to
defendant during their phone conversation, and defendant's
statements to Tina -- each of which potentially poses a hearsay
problem if offered for its truth. To determine whether Hughes's
testimony was inadmissible hearsay, therefore, we first determine
whether any statement was offered for its truth. (5)
Neither Tina's statements to defendant nor defendant's
statements to Tina during their telephone conversation were
offered for their truth. The prosecution did not seek to prove
either that Gladys was going to take Tina to the bank or that
defendant was going to take Tina to lunch. Accordingly, those
statements are not hearsay. (6) Tina's statement to Hughes,
however, was offered to prove exactly what it asserted, namely,
that defendant had just called Tina (7) and that, when Tina
suggested to defendant that she might be leaving her office, he
tried to persuade her not to go. Accordingly, those statements
by Tina to Hughes are hearsay and are admissible only if they
qualify under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In Oregon, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as
provided in [OEC 801] to [OEC 806] or as otherwise provided by
law." OEC 802. The question thus becomes whether Tina's
statement to Hughes qualifies under one of the exceptions to
which OEC 802 refers.
As noted, Tina's account of her conversation with
defendant is hearsay, because it was offered to prove the truth
of its contents, viz., that Tina in fact told defendant that
Gladys was going to take her to the bank and that defendant in
fact responded by "insist[ing] I not let Gladys take me, that he
was going to take me when he took me to lunch." The trial court
ruled that Tina's statement was admissible under OEC 803(3), the
"state-of-mind" exception. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The
Court of Appeals' majority stated that the problem with applying
OEC 803(3) was that
"the evidence at issue was introduced to show
defendant's state of mind or intentions, not the
victim's state of mind. The victim's state of mind --
that she was happy and that she intended to go to the
bank after lunch -- as shown by her relation of her
conversation to her coworker, was not relevant to any
material issue in this case."
Clegg, 161 Or App at 208 (emphasis in original). The court went
on to state:
"The language of OEC 803(3) makes it clear that
evidence is not excluded by the hearsay rule if it is a
statement of the 'declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition, such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain or
bodily health * * *.' (Emphasis added.) As noted
above, the principal purpose of Kendra Hughes's
statements was not to show the victim's state of mind.
Rather, the evidence was offered to show defendant's
state of mind. The language of OEC 803(3) does not
authorize the admission of evidence of the state of
mind or intentions of someone other than the declarant.
"* * * * *
"Kendra Hughes's testimony regarding the victim's
statement about intending to go to the bank with
defendant after lunch was not admissible to show that
defendant asked the victim not to go to the bank until
after lunch -- or inferentially, that defendant wanted
the victim to stay at her office until the gunmen
arrived."
Clegg, 161 Or App at 208-10 (emphasis in original).
In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the Court of
Appeals appears improperly to have conflated three distinct
inquiries, viz.: (1) whether the statement actually reflected
some aspect of Tina's then-existing state of mind and, therefore,
is not excluded by the general rule against hearsay; (2) whether
the evidence is relevant and therefore admissible for the purpose
of establishing that state of mind; and (3) whether the state may
use that evidence, if it is admissible for that purpose, for any
other purpose. We consider each question in turn.
Tina's report of her conversation with defendant is not
a direct commentary on her "state of mind, emotion, sensation or
physical condition," as described in OEC 803(3). However, a
statement, for purposes of the hearsay rule, includes oral
"assertions" as well as nonverbal conduct intended as an
assertion. OEC 801(1)(a) and (b). Therefore, even if a
statement merely reflects the declarant's state of mind or
reasonably supports an inference as to the declarant's state of
mind, it constitutes an assertion of the declarant's state of
mind for purposes of OEC 803(3). See Christopher B. Mueller and
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 4 Federal Evidence, § 438, 417 (2d ed 1994)
(statements should be read with reference to speaker's expressive
or communicative intent; therefore, all statements that shed
light on state of mind, not only those that expressly describe
some mental aspect, fall within state-of-mind exception).
One inference that may be drawn from Tina's statement
to Hughes is that Tina had intended to go with Gladys to the bank
before lunch. That is, Tina was stating to Hughes her intent or
plan. A statement of the declarant's then-existing intent or
plan expressly is included as an example of a statement of the
declarant's state of mind in OEC 803(3). As noted, defendant did
not assert that, even if some parts of Tina's statement to Hughes
were admissible, other parts were not. Thus, under the exception
set out in OEC 803(3), Tina's assertion of her intent to allow
Gladys to take her to the bank and her reasons for that intent
are not excludable under the general rule against hearsay.
Although Tina's statement is not excluded by the rule
against hearsay, it still would not be admissible unless it were
relevant. As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that Tina's
intention to go to the bank "was not relevant to any material
issue in this case." Clegg, 161 Or App at 208. In so
concluding, however, the court took an unduly narrow view of the
relevance standard.
Under OEC 401, "relevant evidence" is evidence that has
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." As this
court stated in State v. Titus, "[t]he rule establishes a 'very
low threshold' for the admission of evidence." 328 Or 475, 481,
982 P2d 1133 (1999) (quoting State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 255 n
8, 855 P2d 621 (1993)).
The state's theory of the case was that Tina's murder
was the product of a plan devised by defendant and his brother to
have her killed at her office during an apparent robbery attempt.
The last time that the conspirators had planned to attack Tina,
she foiled their plan by unexpectedly going to church. It was
essential to the success of the plan that Tina be at her office
at the time that the gunmen arrived. Tina's intent to go to the
bank with Gladys again threatened to foil that plan. Evidence
that Tina planned to be away from her place of work before lunch
takes on particular relevance when considered together with
evidence that defendant immediately sought to change Tina's plan
and to induce her to remain where she might be killed pursuant to
a murder-for-hire plan. (8) The evidence, therefore, was relevant
under the minimal standard applicable to such determinations.
Having concluded that Tina's hearsay statement was
admissible as relevant state-of-mind evidence, we turn to the
question whether the state could use that testimony to prove
defendant's participation in the murder-for-hire scheme.
As noted, defendant did not ask the trial court to give
the jury an instruction limiting the use of Hughes's testimony.
Generally, once evidence has been admitted without restriction,
it can be used by the jury for any purpose. See generally OEC
105 ("When evidence which is admissible * * * for one purpose but
not admissible * * * for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly"); John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on
Evidence, § 54, 242 (5th ed 1999) ("[F]ailure to make a
sufficient objection to incompetent evidence waives any ground of
complaint of the admission of the evidence. * * * But it has
another equally important effect. If the evidence is received
without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case
and is usable as proof to the extent of its rational persuasive
power.); American Produce Co. v. Marion Creamery & Poultry Co.,
214 Or 103, 112, 327 P2d 1104 (1958) (quoting earlier version of
McCormick's Evidence to same effect). Moreover, as we have
shown, the very timing of defendant's telephone call, even
without information respecting its contents, had some tendency to
prove what the contents demonstrated more clearly, viz., that
defendant wanted to keep Tina at the office. The prosecution was
entitled to use Hughes's testimony to establish that defendant
had participated in the murder-for-hire plan by persuading Tina
not to go to the bank but, instead, to wait at her desk, thereby
ensuring that she would be present when the gunmen arrived. The
Court of Appeals' contrary ruling was error.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Hughes's
testimony concerning what Tina told her was admissible. The
Court of Appeals' contrary ruling was error. As noted, that
court nevertheless affirmed defendant's conviction, because it
ruled that admission of 'Hughes's testimony, although error, was
harmless. Thus, the Court of Appeals reached the correct result
-- affirmance. (9)
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Randall and Steward were charged with and convicted of
crimes related to the murder and the assault on the coworker.
The Court of Appeals affirmed those convictions without opinion,
and this court subsequently denied review. State v. Clegg, 153
Or App 718, 957 P2d 1231, rev den 327 Or 431 (1998); State v.
Steward, 151 Or App 804, 960 P2d 394 (1997), rev den 326 Or 465
(1998). Matthews never was brought to trial, because he was
killed a few weeks after the murder in an unrelated incident.
2. Other witnesses testified that Tina earlier had
reported that she had been planning to go out to lunch with
defendant. Still others confirmed that defendant telephoned his
wife in the moments before the murder and that they had observed
Hughes and Tina engaging in a conversation around that time.
3. The state argued in the alternative that the evidence
was admissible under the so-called "residual exception" to the
hearsay rule, OEC 804(3)(f), which provides:
"The following are not excluded by [OEC 802] if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
"* * * * *
"(f) A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of the
Oregon Evidence Code and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this paragraph unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party the intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant, sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing, or as soon as practicable
after it becomes apparent that the statement is
probative of the issues at hand, to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it."
Because of our disposition of this case under OEC 803(3), we need
not address whether Hughes's testimony would have been admissible
in any event under OEC 804(3)(f).
4. The Court of Appeals did not consider the admissibility
of the statement under the residual exception, OEC 804(3)(f).
5. As noted, the state argued below that none of the
challenged statements was offered for its truth but that, even if
any were so offered, it was admissible.
6. In any event, defendant's statements to Tina do not
themselves present a second level of hearsay, even if offered for
the truth of their contents. OEC 801(4)(b) provides, in part:
"A statement is not hearsay if:
"(b) The statement is offered against a party and
is:
"(A) That party's own statement * * *."
(Emphasis added.)
7. Other evidence at trial established that defendant
telephoned Tina on the morning of the murder.
8. In this connection, we note that the Court of Appeals'
concern that the state principally meant to use Hughes's
testimony to prove defendant's state of mind or intentions, and
its reliance on the legislative commentary to OEC 803(3) to
discredit that effort, is misplaced. The legislative commentary
states that "statements of intent by a declarant [are] admissible
only to prove the declarant's future conduct, not the future
conduct of another person." Clegg, 161 Or App at 208. This is
not a case in which evidence was being offered to show that
defendant actually went to the bank later. The evidence was used
to suggest by inference something about defendant's motive, but
defendant has not even attempted to show why, if the evidence
otherwise were admissible, the prosecution was not entitled to
rely on the various inferences that were available from the
evidence.
9. Defendant's alternative argument that the prejudicial
effect of Hughes's statement outweighed its probative value is
not well taken. Defendant's request to Tina that she stay at the
office is not like, for example, evidence of prior bad acts.
Indeed, the request was intrinsically innocuous. It is only in
context that the request's sinister quality is manifest. | b47b3eea712dde19a2f131f5004f087eaae4e2f69ed3e25a1fc466e251d0593a | 2001-08-23T00:00:00Z |
1fb962eb-3751-4a36-891f-4495d8b90b1c | Oxley v. Myers | null | S48714 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 30, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
GARY F. OXLEY,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
TIM NESBITT,
Intervenor.
(SC S48714, S48715, S48716)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
On petitions to review ballot titles.
Argued and submitted August 20, 2001.
David H. Remes, pro hac vice, Washington, D.C., argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on the petition were James N.
Gardner and Lynda N. Gardner, of Gardner & Gardner, Portland.
Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent. With her on the answering memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
Lynn-Marie Crider, Salem, filed an answering memorandum for
intervenor.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
PER CURIAM
Ballot titles certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
PER CURIAM
These three ballot title review proceedings, which have
been consolidated for argument and opinion, are brought under ORS
250.085(2) and concern the Attorney General's certified ballot
titles for proposed initiative measures denominated by the
Secretary of State as Initiative Petitions 61, 62, and 63 (2002).
Petitioner is an elector who timely submitted written comments to
the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney
General's draft ballot title for each initiative measure and who
therefore is entitled to seek review in this court. See ORS
250.085(2) (stating that requirement). We review the Attorney
General's certified ballot titles to determine whether they are
in "substantial compliance" with the requirements of ORS
250.035(2)(a) to (d). ORS 250.085(5). (1)
Petitioner challenges all parts of each of the three
ballot titles that the Attorney General certified. We have
considered each of petitioner's arguments and determine that none
is well taken. Accordingly, we certify the following ballot
titles to the Secretary of State:
For Initiative Petition 61:
CREATES PROGRAM TO NEGOTIATE
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICES FOR
PARTICIPATING
OREGONIANS;
CAPS
RETAIL PRICES FOR PARTICIPANTS
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote creates Oregon
Prescription Drug Cost Reduction Program to negotiate
prescription drug prices; program caps retail prices
that participating pharmacies can charge program
participants.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects creation of
Oregon Prescription Drug Cost Reduction program to
negotiate prescription drug prices; rejects capping
prices that participating pharmacies charge program
participants.
SUMMARY: Creates Oregon Prescription Drug Cost
Reduction Program for Oregon residents who choose to
participate. Program negotiates prescription drug
prices with manufacturers, with goal of reducing prices
to level comparable to "maximum net price that can be
charged by manufacturers to federal purchasers under
the federal supply service schedule." Program sets
maximum retail prices that participating pharmacies can
charge program participants. If program establishes a
preferred drug list, a participant may purchase a non-listed drug through the program if a treating physician
determines the listed drug will not satisfactorily
address the person's health needs. Program coordinates
with health plan sponsors, insurers, others to provide
benefit of negotiated retail prices to participants in
their plans who also participate in program. Program
participants pay administrative costs. Other
provisions.
For Initiative Petition 62:
CREATES PROGRAM TO NEGOTIATE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES;
CAPS RETAIL PRICES IF SPECIFIED
GOAL NOT REACHED
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote creates program
to negotiate prescription drug prices for participants;
caps retail drug prices if negotiated prices not
comparable to those charged federal purchasers.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects creation of
program to negotiate prescription drug prices; rejects
capping retail prices if negotiated prices not
comparable to those charged federal purchasers.
SUMMARY: Creates Prescription Drug Cost Reduction
Program for Oregonians choosing to participate.
Program negotiates prescription drug prices with
manufacturers, with goal of reducing prices to level
comparable to "maximum net price that can be charged by
manufacturers to federal purchasers under the federal
supply service schedule [FSSS]." Program caps retail
prices that participating pharmacies can charge program
participants. Creates board to design program, adopt
implementing rules. Board determines by 2005 whether
program drug prices are reasonably comparable to those
charged federal purchasers under FSSS, plus dispensing
fee. If they are not, board caps retail prices for
"any or all" prescription drugs sold to anyone in
Oregon, taking into account drug prices and reasonable
costs of drug production, research and development,
distribution, marketing, administration, investment
return. Other provisions.
For Initiative Petition 63:
CREATES PROGRAM TO PURCHASE,
DISTRIBUTE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
FOR STATE AGENCIES,
OTHER
PARTICIPANTS,
INCLUDING
HEALTHCARE PLANS
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote creates program
to negotiate prescription drug prices, purchase drugs
in volume for state agencies and other participants,
including healthcare plans, employers and individuals.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote rejects creating
program to negotiate prescription drug prices, purchase
drugs in volume for state agencies and other
participants, including healthcare plans, employers,
individuals.
SUMMARY: Creates Oregon Prescription Drug Discount
Purchasing Program. The program negotiates prices of
prescription drugs with manufacturers and purchases
prescription drugs in volume for state agencies that
dispense prescription drugs to patients. Program also
purchases prescription drugs for other drug purchasers
that choose to participate, including the Public
Employee Benefits Board, Oregon Health Plan, cities,
counties, school districts, employers, labor
organizations, healthcare plan sponsors, healthcare
providers, and individuals. Program distributes
prescription drugs, using existing wholesalers and
retail pharmacies if that provides good consumer
service and is cost-effective. Once implemented,
program is self-financing, with participants paying
administrative costs. Measure creates board to design
program and adopt implementing rules. Board analyzes
prescription drug costs, makes recommendations for
further action to make prescription drugs accessible
and affordable. Other provisions.
Ballot titles certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
1. The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 250.085 in a
respect not relevant to this proceeding. | eb0aad896e65291079f4ec7e3624d8f16608d0394fc578198d9fc66b92b1c6f6 | 2001-08-30T00:00:00Z |
c37b0ab1-59f1-4173-8449-cee912b27dc9 | Novick v. Myers | null | S48668 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: September 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48668)
On petition to review ballot title.
Argued and submitted September 12, 2001.
Steven Novick, in propria persona, argued the cause and
filed the petition.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent.
With him on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General,
and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
PER CURIAM
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
PER CURIAM
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 56 (2002). We review the
Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (d). ORS 250.085(5). (1)
Petitioner challenges the "Result of 'Yes' Vote" and
summary portions of the Attorney General's certified ballot
title. We have considered petitioner's arguments and conclude
that none is well taken. Accordingly, we certify the following
ballot title to the Secretary of State:
AMENDS CONSTITUTION: FOR PUBLIC-WORKS
CONTRACTS:
ELIMINATES COMPETITIVE-BIDDING
EXEMPTIONS AND
PREVAILING-WAGE
REQUIREMENTS; PROHIBITS UNION
PREFERENCES
RESULT OF "YES" VOTE: "Yes" vote eliminates, for
public-works contracts, competitive-bidding exemptions
and requiring prevailing wages/benefits; and, for those
contracts, prohibits preferring contractors using union
workers.
RESULT OF "NO" VOTE: "No" vote retains laws
exempting certain public-works contracts from
competitive-bidding requirement and requiring public-works contractors to pay workers prevailing wages and
benefits.
SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current law
requires, with certain exemptions, awarding public
contracts through competitive bidding to lowest
responsible, qualified bidder; requires paying
prevailing wages (wages/benefits paid on similar
projects). Measure requires awarding all contracts for
public-works projects to the responsible, qualified
contractor submitting lowest bid to provide not less
than the quality of work or product necessary to meet
project specifications. Prohibits (with exceptions)
denying "responsible, qualified" status for reasons
unrelated to work quality, timeliness. Prohibits laws,
requirements, contracts, and "government actions" that:
require contractors to pay wages/benefits in amounts
greater than amounts that would be required in Oregon's
private sector; or give advantages or preferences to
contractors using union workers. Does not exempt
contractors from minimum-wage, overtime-pay
requirements. Other provisions.
Ballot title certified. This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
1. The 2001 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 250.085 in a
respect not relevant to this proceeding. | 33df646de17f16513520d6724b2c13a5022a5ad83f7248c7ef7ca1001a511099 | 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z |
f5b90137-9e64-4480-a543-fb2e47a28c41 | Marcus v. Myers (Certification) | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: September 17, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LEWIS MARCUS,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48622)
On modified ballot title filed September 7, 2001.*
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the filing of modified ballot title for respondent. With her on
the filing were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
No appearance by petitioner.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9).
*332 Or 463, ___ P3d ___ (2001) (referring ballot title for
modification).
The court in this ballot title review proceeding
determined that the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
a proposed initiative measure, which the Secretary of State
denominated as Initiative Petition 54 (2002), failed to comply
substantially with statutory standards. Marcus v. Myers, 332 Or
463, ___ P3d ___ (2001). Under Oregon Laws 2001, chapter 802,
section 2 (now codified as ORS 250.085(8)), the court referred
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. The
Attorney General has filed a modified ballot title for the
proposed initiative measure, and no party to the ballot title
review proceeding has objected. See ORS 250.085(9) (setting out
period within which party may object to modified ballot title and
requiring court to certify modified ballot title if no objection
filed).
The modified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54
(2002) states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: ALLOWS REGISTERED VOTERS TO
SIGN INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL PETITIONS BY
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF 'SIGNATURE'
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote allows
registered voters to sign initiative, referendum, and
recall petitions by electronic transmission of
'signature'; continues to allow handwritten signatures.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects proposal
permitting registered voters to sign initiative,
referendum, and recall petitions by electronic
transmission of 'signature'; retains current law
allowing handwritten signatures.
"SUMMARY: Amends Constitution. Current law
allows handwritten signatures on initiative,
referendum, and recall petitions, but does not provide
for 'signing' such petitions by electronic
transmission. Measure allows voters to 'sign'
petitions by electronic transmission. Electronic
transmission means computer transmission, through the
internet or other computer network. 'Electronic
signature' must include voter's name and residential
address, in substantial conformity with voter
registration information. Until government provides
each voter a unique identifier, voter also must provide
contact information, such as e-mail address, telephone
number, which shall not become public record. Election
officials must either validate or prove signatures
invalid using identifying information provided by
petition signer. Legislature shall review electronic-petitioning process, and create new provisions to
standardize, but not hinder, process. Other
provisions."
The modified ballot title is certified. The appellate
judgment shall issue in accordance with ORS 250.085(9). | b2b238f8adab382c12ac04ce8b8b728bc366de9ab800417b739f95d685a77976 | 2001-09-17T00:00:00Z |
69c957f3-39cb-4c36-a18f-25b634c65274 | State v. Branstetter | null | S47567 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
WILLIAM THOMAS BRANSTETTER,
Petitioner on Review.
____________________________
PIONEER HUMANE SOCIETY,
Respondent on Review,
and
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
WILLIAM THOMAS BRANSTETTER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR97-0077; CA A100029; SC S47567)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 9, 2001.
Jay Edwards, Salem, argued the cause and filed the petition
for petitioner on review.
Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review State of Oregon. With
her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
No appearance for respondent on review Pioneer Humane
Society.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
remaining assignments of error.
*Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Rudy M. Murgo, Judge. 166 Or App 286, 1 P3d 451 (2000).
**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; De Muniz, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
Defendant seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his appeal from a trial
court order that forfeited certain animals that he owned to an
animal care agency. Although the trial court's forfeiture order
was issued during, and had the same case number as, defendant's
prosecution on charges of first-degree animal neglect, ORS
167.330, the forfeiture order was based on a different statute,
ORS 167.347. That statute provides for forfeiture of animals
that have been impounded pending final disposition of a criminal
animal-neglect charge, and does not make the forfeiture
contingent on the defendant being found guilty in the criminal
case. The Court of Appeals concluded that the forfeiture
proceeding and order were part of the criminal action against
defendant and, therefore, could not be appealed, because that
criminal action had ended in acquittal. State v. Branstetter,
166 Or App 286, 289-90, 1 P3d 451 (2000). (1) We hold that the
forfeiture order arose out of a "special statutory proceeding"
and, thus, was appealable under ORS 19.205(4), a statute that
authorizes appeals from such proceedings. We therefore remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
remaining assignments of error.
In January 1997, the Umatilla County Sheriff's
Department received a complaint that defendant's animals -- 11
horses and one donkey -- were being neglected. A deputy
investigated the complaint, found evidence of neglect, and
applied for a warrant to impound the animals, as provided in ORS
167.345(2). (2) A search warrant issued and the animals were
impounded and placed into the care of the Pioneer Humane Society
("the humane society"). (3)
Defendant was arrested and charged with 12 counts of
first degree animal neglect. ORS 167.330. His first trial on
those charges ended in a mistrial. Before defendant was tried
again, the humane society filed a petition in the criminal
action, as authorized by ORS 167.347(1), (4) seeking forfeiture of
defendant's animals. The state moved to become a co-petitioner
in the forfeiture matter; that motion was granted over
defendant's objection.
After a hearing respecting the forfeiture petition, ORS
167.347(2), (5) the court found that the petitioners had established
probable cause to believe that the animals had been neglected in
violation of ORS 167.330, and it ordered the animals forfeited
unless defendant posted a $2,700 bond (which the court found to
be the amount expended by the humane society in caring for the
animals from the date of impoundment until the date of the
order). (6) When defendant failed to post the bond, the trial court
entered an order of forfeiture. Thereafter, defendant was tried
for the second time on the criminal animal-neglect charges. He
was acquitted on all counts. The acquittals had no effect on the
forfeiture order.
After his acquittal, defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal from the forfeiture order, attempting to challenge it on
various constitutional grounds. However, the state argued in its
respondent's brief in the Court of Appeals that the forfeiture
order was unappealable and, specifically, that the jurisdictional
statute on which defendant relied, ORS 138.053(1), was
inapplicable, because it does not provide for an appeal from an
acquittal.
A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed
with the state and dismissed the appeal. In doing so, the Court
of Appeals also rejected an alternative theory of appellate
jurisdiction, viz., that the forfeiture order was appealable
under ORS 19.205(4), because it arose out of a "special statutory
proceeding." (7) After considering the case law surrounding ORS
19.205(4), the court concluded that, to qualify as a special
statutory proceeding under that statute, a proceeding must be
separate from any other proceeding. Branstetter, 166 Or App at
290. The court concluded that a forfeiture proceeding under ORS
167.347 could not fulfill the separateness requirement because,
by the express wording of ORS 167.347, the petition that
initiates a forfeiture proceeding must be filed "in the criminal
action." Id. at 295. (8) We allowed defendant's petition for
review.
Defendant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
determining that it was without jurisdiction to consider his
appeal. Defendant acknowledges that the right to appeal is
purely statutory, State v. K.P., 324 Or 1, 4, 921 P2d 380 (1996),
but argues that the order at issue is appealable under one or
both of the statutes that the Court of Appeals considered and
dismissed as inapplicable.
Because the case was brought in the criminal
proceeding, we first consider defendant's arguments with respect
to ORS 138.053(1), which is a part of the criminal procedure
code. That statutes provides:
"This section establishes the judgments and orders
that are subject to the appeal provisions and to the
limitations on review under ORS 138.040 and 138.050. A
judgment or order of a court, if the order is imposed
after judgment, is subject to ORS 138.040 [which
provides for appeal by a defendant] * * * if this
disposition includes any of the following:
"(a) Imposes a sentence on conviction."
"(b) Suspends imposition or execution of any part
of a sentence.
"(c) Extends a period of probation.
"(d) Imposes or modifies a condition of probation
or of sentence suspension.
"(e) Imposes or executes a sentence upon
revocation of probation or sentence suspension." (9)
The issue need not detain us long. As noted, the Court of
Appeals concluded that ORS 138.053(1) does not authorize an
appeal from an acquittal. It reasoned:
"ORS 138.053(1) provides that a judgment or order in a
criminal case is appealable only if it imposes a
sentence on conviction, suspends imposition or
execution of any part of a sentence, or makes a
decision relating to probation. None of those events
occurred here or could have occurred here or could have
occurred here. There can be no sentence, probation or
other sanction after an acquittal."
Branstetter, 166 Or at 289-90 (emphasis in original). We agree.
We turn to defendant's alternative theory -- that the
forfeiture order arose out of a "special statutory proceeding"
and therefore is appealable under ORS 19.205(4). As noted, the
Court of Appeals rejected that theory on the basis of case law
that the Court of Appeals read to require that a special
statutory proceeding cannot be a part of but, instead, must be
separate from, any other proceeding. The Court of Appeals
concluded that a forfeiture proceeding could not fulfill the
separateness requirement, because the filing direction in ORS
167.347 expressly makes the proceeding part of another action.
In arguing the contrary view, defendant adopts the
position articulated by the Court of Appeals' dissent -- that it
is erroneous to conclude that, simply because ORS 167.347 permits
a petition for forfeiture be filed in such action, the forfeiture
proceeding provided in that statute is part of that action.
Defendant (and the Court of Appeals' dissent) suggest that the
fact that the forfeiture proceeding is essentially civil in
nature, the fact that neither the outcome of the forfeiture
proceeding nor the outcome of the criminal action has any effect
on the other proceeding, the fact that there are differing
standards of proof required for forfeiture as opposed to
conviction in the criminal action, and the fact that the parties
are different in the forfeiture proceeding and the civil action,
all point to a conclusion that the forfeiture proceeding is
separate from the criminal action and is a special statutory
proceeding for purposes of the appellate review statutes.
The parties agree that, for purposes of ORS 19.205(4),
a "special statutory proceeding" must be "separate" from any
other proceeding. In fact, this court's case law establishes
that "separateness" in some sense is a necessary attribute of a
special statutory proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Threet, 294 Or
1, 5, 653 P2d 960 (1982) (illustrating requirement). The parties
part company, however, over how separateness is to be assessed.
The state appears to argue that formal separateness, i.e.,
separate case names and numbers, is required. Consistent with
that formalistic approach, the state suggests that the express
authorization in ORS 167.347 that a forfeiture petition may be
filed "in the criminal action" establishes the legislature's
intent to create integrated, rather than separate, proceedings
for all purposes. Defendant advocates for a more functional
approach to the problem -- one that looks at identity of issues
and parties and at whether and how the proceeding at issue
affects and is affected by the related proceeding.
We begin by noting that the state's approach is
undermined significantly by the fact that, although ORS 167.347
permits a forfeiture proceeding to be filed before the outcome of
the criminal case, it does not require such a filing.
Furthermore, a separate statute, ORS 167.350, authorizes
forfeiture "in addition to * * * any other sentence," when a
defendant is found guilty of the underlying criminal act. We now
turn to the cases that discuss and apply the requirement that
special statutory proceedings be separate from every other
proceeding. We begin with Threet, the case in which this court
first articulated the separateness requirement.
The question in Threet was whether a circuit court
order compelling witnesses to appear and testify before a grand
jury was appealable under ORS 19.205(4) (10) as the product of a
"special statutory proceeding." Based on the historical use of
that term in the cases and statutes, this court held that
"separateness" is a necessary attribute of a special statutory
proceeding and suggested that a reason for that requirement is
that it avoids disruption of other judicial proceedings. Threet,
294 Or at 5. Applying the principles that it derived from
earlier cases, the Threet court concluded that proceedings to
compel grand jury testimony under ORS 136.617-.619 were not
special statutory proceedings. The court specifically noted that
such proceedings "only come into play when a witness refuses to
testify or produce evidence on the ground of self-incrimination
'[i]n any criminal proceeding before a court of record or in any
proceeding before a grand jury.'" Id. at 7. The Threet court
also noted that allowing appeals from such orders would disrupt
and, at times, even abort grand jury proceedings. Id.
The majority below read Threet as dispositive with
respect to the question whether ORS 19.205(4) applies to the
forfeiture proceeding in the present case. We disagree.
Although Threet repeatedly states that a special statutory
proceeding must be "separate" and "distinct" from any other
proceeding, it nowhere holds that the fact that a particular
proceeding shares a case number with another proceeding
necessarily removes that proceeding from the scope of ORS
19.205(4). In fact, the Threet opinion discusses separateness
primarily in functional terms, i.e., in terms of whether a
proceeding "depends" on another for its existence and whether an
appeal from one proceeding will disrupt the other proceeding. (11)
Neither is the actual holding in Threet inconsistent
with defendant's position in the present case. In Threet, the
proceeding to decide the motion to compel testimony arose out of,
and purported to resolve, a potentially problematic event in the
criminal or grand jury proceeding, i.e., a witness's refusal to
testify. There was a strong dependent relationship between the
subject matter of the two proceedings and a strong logical reason
for viewing them as inseparable for purposes of appeal.
By contrast, there is no necessary connection between
the content of a forfeiture proceeding under ORS 167.347 and the
criminal action in which, by statute, the forfeiture petition may
be filed. Although a forfeiture proceeding under ORS 167.347
formally depends on a criminal action for its existence in that
it can go forward only if a criminal action of a specified sort
is pending, that kind of forfeiture proceeding does not arise out
of the criminal action, resolve any controversy in the criminal
action, or otherwise affect or depend on the substance of the
criminal action. Threet does not control this case.
The same is true of the other major case that deals
with the separateness requirement announced in Threet, Garganese
v. Dept. of Justice, 318 Or 181, 864 P2d 364 (1993). Garganese
involved the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, ORS 646.605 et
seq. The court there considered whether a proceeding under ORS
646.618(2) to challenge an investigative demand issued by the
Department of Justice (department) was a "special statutory
proceeding" within the meaning of ORS 19.205(4). The department
argued that the proceeding was not sufficiently "separate and
distinct" to qualify as a special statutory proceeding, because
it was only a constituent part of a trade practices enforcement
action under a related statute, ORS 646.632.
In analyzing the problem, the court noted that the
department may serve investigative demands on persons other than
those whom they suspect of violating the Unlawful Trade Practice
Act and that challenges by such persons under ORS 646.618(2)
necessarily would be separate and distinct from an enforcement
proceeding against a suspect under ORS 646.632. The court then
stated:
"Although the recipient of an investigate demand in
many cases will be the target of the investigation,
because proceedings under ORS 646.618(2) and 646.632 do
not necessarily involve the same parties, that is not
always the case under the statutory scheme. Because
the existence of a proceeding under one of those
statutes is not dependent on the existence of a
proceeding under the other, we conclude that the two
proceedings are separate and distinct."
Id. at 187. The court acknowledged that allowing rulings on
investigative demands to be appealed might delay an enforcement
action under ORS 646.632 when the prosecutor is using the demand
to determine whether there is probable cause to proceed, but
concluded that that fact does not preclude jurisdiction under ORS
19.205(4), because the appeal would not disrupt a judicial
proceeding that actually was in progress. Id. at 187-88.
Garganese does not aid the state here. There was no
question that the investigative and enforcement proceedings at
issue in Garganese could be distinct. Instead, the issue was
whether the investigative demand proceedings could be deemed to
be "separate and distinct," when they generally had a strong
functional connection to a larger enforcement action under ORS
646.632. However, the Garganese court concluded that the
proceedings there were "separate and distinct," because there was
no necessary substantive connection between them (they might, in
fact, involve different parties). The court had no occasion to
consider whether the result necessarily would be different when
two proceedings were substantively unconnected, but nevertheless
were linked by, for example, a common case number.
In fact, we have been able to identify only one case
from this court that appears to deal with circumstances analogous
to those presented in this case. In State v. K.P., a petitioner
who had served a probationary sentence after a conviction on a
charge of second-degree theft sought an order from the court that
had entered her conviction setting aside the conviction and
sealing the records that related to it, as authorized by ORS
137.225. The trial court granted the requested relief, but
expressly excluded police investigation reports from the list of
records to be sealed. The petitioner appealed, arguing that the
court was required to seal the police investigative reports along
with the other records. K.P., 324 Or at 3-4.
When the case reached this court, the court first
considered a threshold procedural issue, viz., whether the order
setting aside the conviction and sealing the records was
appealable. After considering and rejecting other possible
statutory bases for appeal, the K.P. court concluded that the
order was appealable under ORS 19.205(4). Id. at 6.
Although the K.P. opinion offered no explanation of its
jurisdictional conclusion, that conclusion nonetheless is
relevant to the present controversy, because of certain parallel
factual circumstances. The petitioner in K.P. had filed her
motion to set aside and seal records of her conviction under the
same case name and numbers as the criminal action, and her motion
was treated both by the trial court and this court as an
extension of that criminal action. Despite those facts, this
court had no difficulty in concluding that the process for
sealing the records was a "special statutory proceeding" and,
presumably, that it was separate and distinct from the criminal
action for purposes of ORS 19.205(4). K.P. thus indicates that
the fact that a proceeding formally is part of another proceeding
in the sense that it shares a common case number does not prevent
such a proceeding from being "separate from any other proceeding"
for purposes of ORS 19.205(4).
In the opinion below, the majority suggested that K.P.
is distinguishable from the present case, because the K.P. court
had concluded that the record-sealing proceeding in that case was
a new proceeding and not part of the criminal proceeding.
Branstetter, 166 Or App at 293. In the view of the Court of
Appeals' majority, it would be impossible for a court to draw a
similar conclusion with respect to the forfeiture proceeding at
issue in this case, because the legislature expressly made the
forfeiture proceeding part of a criminal action by requiring that
the petition for forfeiture be filed in the criminal action.
The state as much as concedes that there is no evidence
of a specific legislative intent to preclude appeals from
forfeiture orders issued under ORS 167.347 by persons who are
acquitted in the related criminal action. It even acknowledges
that such an intent is unlikely, given that the legislature
clearly has provided a right to appeal a forfeiture order to
persons who are convicted in the criminal action. (12) We agree
that when, as here, a person convicted of animal abuse
nonetheless could appeal a resulting forfeiture, the suggestion
that the legislature intentionally would withhold that same
privilege from someone who was acquitted of the charges simply is
not plausible. The state contends, nonetheless, that the
legislature did intend to make the forfeiture proceeding part and
parcel of the criminal action and that, as a necessary
consequence of that choice, the forfeiture proceeding cannot be a
special statutory proceeding for purposes of ORS 19.205(4).
At bottom, the state's argument rests entirely on the
fact that ORS 167.347 provides that an animal care agency's
petition to forfeit an animal that has been impounded pending a
criminal action may be filed "in the criminal action." The state
argues -- as it must -- that that phrase, by itself, establishes
a legislative intent that the forfeiture proceeding be treated as
part of the criminal action for all purposes.
The phrase does not stand by itself, however. The
statutory context clearly demonstrates that the forfeiture
proceedings and the criminal action are not of a piece. We note
specifically that ORS 167.347(3) sets out a burden of proof
(probable cause) that would be incongruous (if not
unconstitutional) as the legal standard for finding against a
defendant in a criminal action. The participation as parties by
entities other than the state, such as county animal shelters and
other animal care agencies, is equally incompatible with the
criminal proceedings. We think that it is clear from the wording
of ORS 167.347 and its statutory context that the legislature did
not consciously intend that a forfeiture proceeding under ORS
167.347 be deemed to be "part" of the criminal action. We
conclude, as the court did in K.P., that, despite a shared case
name and number, the proceeding at issue is sufficiently separate
and distinct from the criminal action to which it relates to
qualify as a special statutory proceeding for purposes of ORS
19.205(4).
The opinion in the Court of Appeals raises one
additional issue that we address. In a footnote, the Court of
Appeals majority suggested that allowing forfeiture orders to be
appealed as special statutory proceedings was undesirable,
because it could deprive trial courts of jurisdiction to try the
criminal cases in which the forfeiture proceeding occurs:
"If defendant were entitled under ORS 19.205(4) to
appeal from the order that forfeited his interest in
the animals, he would file his notice of appeal in his
criminal case, as he did here, because that is the only
case in which it could be filed. If he had done that
before his second trial on the animal neglect charges,
the filing of the notice would have deprived the trial
court of jurisdiction to conduct that trial. See,
e.g., ORS 19.270(1); ORS 138.083; Macy v. Blatchford,
154 Or App 313, 324, 961 P2d 873, rev allowed 328 Or
194 (1998)."
Branstetter, 166 Or App at 295 n 5.
We disagree with that assessment. ORS 19.270(1), the
first statute cited by the Court of Appeals, provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the
cause when the notice of appeal has been served and filed."
(Emphasis added). The "cause" is not always the entire case.
See State ex rel Gattman v. Abraham, 302 Or 301, 311, 729 P2d 560
(1986) ("cause" was chosen by legislature because "it has a broad
meaning and may include a case or proceeding or any part thereof
depending upon the circumstances"). As the court there stated:
"ORS 19.033(1) [now ORS 19.270(1)] means that the
appellate court has jurisdiction of the issue or matter
on appeal, be it a case, action at law, suit in equity,
cause of action, cause of suit, proceeding, or claim
for relief. The purpose of the statute is to give the
appellate court jurisdiction of the issue or subject
matter of the appeal to the exclusion of the lower
court except as provided in the statute. It was not
the intention to oust the trial court of jurisdiction
of those parts of the litigation which are not directly
involved in the appeal."
Id. at 310-11 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Consonant with Gattman, we hold that, in an appeal from
a final disposition in the particular kind of forfeiture
proceeding that occurs pursuant to ORS 167.347, the "cause" being
appealed is the special statutory proceeding. The criminal
prosecution is not implicated in that appeal, and the appeal does
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed to trial
on the criminal matter. (13)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of
the remaining assignments of error.
1. See 138.053(1) (providing for appeal from certain
specified dispositions in criminal cases; acquittal not
included).
2. ORS 167.345(2) provides, in part:
"If there is probable cause to believe that any
animal is being subjected to treatment in violation of
ORS 167.315 to 167.340, a peace officer, after
obtaining a search warrant in the manner authorized by
law, may enter the premises where the animal is being
held, provide food and water and impound such animal."
3. ORS 167.345(3) provides:
"A court may order an animal impounded under
subsection (2) of this section to be held at any animal
care facility in the state. A facility receiving the
animal shall provide adequate food and water and may
provide veterinary care."
4. ORS 167.347(1) provides:
"If any animal is impounded pursuant to ORS
167.345(2) and is being held by a county animal shelter
or other animal care agency pending outcome of criminal
action charging a violation of ORS 167.310 to 167.340,
prior to final disposition of the criminal charge, the
county or other animal care agency may file a petition
in the criminal action requesting that the court issue
an order forfeiting the animal to the county or other
animal care agency prior to final disposition of the
criminal charge. The petitioner shall serve a true
copy of the petition upon the defendant and the
district attorney."
5. ORS 167.347(2) provides:
"Upon receipt of a petition pursuant to subsection
(1) of this section, the court shall set a hearing on
the petition. The hearing shall be conducted within 14
days of the filing of the petition, or as soon as
practicable."
6. That standard, and the bond requirement, are set out in
ORS 167.347(3)(a), which provides:
"At a hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (2)
of this section, the petitioner shall have the burden
of establishing probable cause to believe that the
animal was subjected to abuse, neglect or abandonment
in violation of ORS 167.310 to 167.340. If the court
finds that probable cause exists, the court shall order
immediate forfeiture of the animal to the petitioner,
unless the defendant, within 72 hours of the hearing,
posts a security deposit or bond with the court clerk
in an amount determined by the court to be sufficient
to repay all reasonable costs incurred, and anticipated
to be incurred, by the petitioner in caring for the
animal from the date of initial impoundment to the date
of trial."
7. ORS 19.205(4) provides:
"An appeal may be taken from the circuit court in
any special statutory proceeding under the same
conditions, in the same manner and with like effect as
from a judgment, decree or order entered in an action
or suit, unless such appeal is expressly prohibited by
the law authorizing such special statutory proceeding."
8. Judge Edmonds dissented. He would have held that the
forfeiture proceeding provided at ORS 167.347 is a separate
statutory proceeding and that the forfeiture order in this case
is appealable under ORS 19.205(4). Branstetter, 166 Or App at
297-306 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
9. ORS 138.040 provides, in part:
"[T]he defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a judgment or order described under ORS 138.053 *
* *. The following apply upon such appeal or cross-appeal:
"(1) The appellate court may review:
"(a) Any decision of the court in an intermediate
order or proceeding.
"(b) Any disposition described under ORS 138.053
as to whether it:
"(A) Exceeds the maximum allowable by law; or
"(B) Is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual."
10. The statute at the time of the Threet decision and
several of the other decisions discussed in this opinion was
numbered ORS 19.010(4), but was in all material respects the same
as its present version. We refer to the present version of the
statute throughout this opinion.
11. In that regard, see the Threet opinion's discussion of
earlier "special statutory proceeding" cases. 294 Or at 5-6.
12. When a defendant is convicted, forfeiture may be made a
part of the sentence. ORS 167.350. As such, it could be
appealed under ORS 138.040. The state acknowledges that, given
that fact, one would expect a parallel right of appeal for
defendants who are acquitted. The state suggests, however, that
the legislature's failure to so provide was a drafting oversight,
but one that this court has no authority to correct.
13. We recognize that, despite its conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of defendant's appeal,
the Court of Appeals' majority "respond[ed] briefly" to
defendant's arguments on the merits. Branstetter, 166 Or App at
296. But those observations were dicta; whether the Court of
Appeals will adopt them or take some other view is a matter for
that court to decide. | a76585d78b768182666c9827e2240e7ef6a5edd9c0e891ddace37913eca357a6 | 2001-08-16T00:00:00Z |
39f9b5d3-a67a-424e-b27c-97f3e9b1eccf | Flanagan v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 2, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BRIDGET FLANAGAN,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
GREG WASSON,
Intervenor.
(SC S47890, S47891, S47892)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
En Banc
On petitions to review ballot titles.
Argued and submitted January 4, 2001.
Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
petitions and briefs for petitioner. With him on the petitions
and briefs was Stoel Rives LLP.
Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the responses for respondent. With
him on the responses were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Philip Schradle, Special
Counsel to the Attorney General.
Greg Wasson, intervenor, filed a response pro se.
GILLETTE, J.
Ballot titles referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
GILLETTE, J.
These consolidated ballot title review proceedings
under ORS 250.085(2) concern the Attorney General's certified
ballot titles for three proposed initiative measures, which the
Secretary of State has denominated as Initiative Petitions 7, 8,
and 9 (2002). Petitioner timely submitted written comments to
the Secretary of State concerning the Attorney General's draft
ballot titles and is entitled to seek review in this court. See
ORS 250.085(2) (stating that requirement). We review the
Attorney General's certified ballot titles to determine whether
they "substantial[ly] compl[y] with the requirements of ORS
250.035." See ORS 250.085(5) (stating that standard). (1) In these
proceedings, the parties agree -- and we concur -- that the
Attorney General's certified ballot titles do not comply
substantially with ORS 250.035. Under such circumstances, ORS
250.085(5) (1999) -- the statute that was in effect when the
petitions were filed -- directed this court to certify to the
Secretary of State ballot titles that do meet the statutory
standard. The fundamental issue that the parties have joined
here is whether this court constitutionally may carry out that
function. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
legislative changes to ORS 250.085 make it unnecessary for this
court to resolve that question.
On September 11, 2000, after receiving and considering
petitioner's comments, the Attorney General certified the ballot
titles for Initiative Petition 7, (2) Initiative Petition 8, (3) and
Initiative Petition 9. (4)
Each of the proposed measures purports
to expand rights of political speech on private property,
particularly the right to gather signatures to qualify initiative
petitions for the ballot. As written, the measures seek to
expand and confirm the right to gather signatures in shopping
centers that this court had recognized in Lloyd Corporation v.
Whiffen, 315 Or 500, 849 P2d 446 (1993). The emphasized parts of
each of the ballot titles set out above identify the rule of law
stated in Whiffen. Id. at 514.
Three days after the Attorney General's certifications,
however, this court issued Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or
38, 11 P3d 228 (2000). That case overruled Whiffen and held that
petitioners seeking signatures to qualify initiative petitions
for the ballot do not have a constitutional right to solicit
signatures on private property, such as shopping centers, without
the owner's permission.
Petitioner then filed the present challenges to the
Attorney General's ballot titles, arguing that the summaries in
the ballot titles misstate the law. Before Stranahan, it
arguably would have been correct to state, as two of the
summaries did, that the proposed constitutional amendments would
"extend" the signature-gathering right. It also arguably would
have been correct to state, as all three of the summaries did,
that the Oregon Constitution "now entitles persons to collect
initiative signatures on public property and at large private
shopping centers, subject to reasonable restrictions to prevent
interference with the owners' business." After Stranahan,
however, neither statement is correct.
A ballot title must not misstate existing law, either
directly or by implication. Adams v. Kulongoski, 323 Or 253,
259, 915 P2d 967 (1996); see also ORS 250.035 (setting out
statutory requirements for ballot titles). It is uncontested
that, after this court's decision in Stranahan, the ballot titles
for Initiative Petitions 7, 8, and 9 misstate existing law.
Until the 2001 Legislative Assembly amended it, ORS
250.085(5) required this court both to "review the title for
substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035" and,
if the Attorney General's ballot title did not so comply, to
"certify a title meeting this standard to the Secretary of
State." ORS 250.085(5) (1999). Under the 1999 statutory scheme,
if a petitioner correctly identified deficiencies in the Attorney
General's ballot title, then there was only one way that this
court could carry out its duty under ORS 250.085(5) to "certify a
title meeting [the statutory] standard": The court was required
to write a different ballot title.
In the past, pursuant to that legislative directive,
this court has rewritten many infirm ballot titles. See, e.g.,
Starrett v. Myers, 330 Or 139, 998 P2d 671 (2000) (revising
ballot titles to comply with ORS 250.035); Zehner v. Myers, 330
Or 162, 5 P3d 600 (2000) (same). Nonetheless, some members of
this court from time to time had expressed misgivings with the
foregoing procedure, suggesting that this court's writing or
rewriting of ballot titles might violate the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. See Dudley v. Jenks, 331 Or
1, 10-11, 10 P3d 257 (2000) (summarizing cases in which those
concerns had been expressed). Before petitioner brought the
present proceedings, however, parties had not focused their
briefing on that constitutional issue. Now, the enactment of HB
2213 obviates any need to address those concerns.
In HB 2213, the legislature deleted the phrase
"and shall certify a title meeting this standard to the Secretary
of State" from ORS 250.085(5) and added three new subsections --
(8), (9), and (10) -- to that statute. We set them out in their
entirety here, because they form the basis for our disposition of
this case:
"(8) If the Supreme Court determines that the
title certified by the Attorney General or prepared by
the Legislative Assembly substantially complies with
the requirements of ORS 250.035, the court shall
certify the title to the Secretary of State. If the
Supreme Court determines that the title certified by
the Attorney General or prepared by the Legislative
Assembly does not substantially comply with the
requirements of ORS 250.035, the court shall modify the
ballot title and certify the ballot title to the
Secretary of State or refer the ballot title to the
Attorney General for modification.
"(9) Not later than five business days after the
Supreme Court refers a ballot title to the Attorney
General under this section, the Attorney General shall
file a modified ballot title with the Supreme Court and
serve copies of the modified ballot title on all
parties to the ballot title review proceeding. If no
party to the ballot title review proceeding files an
objection to the modified ballot title within five
business days after the date the modified ballot title
is filed, the Supreme Court shall certify the modified
ballot title to the Secretary of State and enter an
appellate judgment the next judicial day. If any of
the parties to the ballot title review proceeding
timely files a petition objecting to the modified
ballot title, the Supreme Court shall review the
modified ballot title to determine whether the modified
ballot title substantially complies with the
requirements of ORS 250.035.
"(10) Upon the filing of a petition under
subsection (9) of this section objecting to a modified
ballot title:
"(a) If the Supreme Court determines that the
modified ballot title substantially complies with the
requirements of ORS 250.035, the court shall certify
the modified ballot title to the Secretary of State; or
"(b) If the Supreme Court determines that the
modified ballot title does not substantially comply
with the requirements of ORS 250.035, the court shall
modify the ballot title and certify the ballot title to
the Secretary of State or refer the modified ballot
title to the Attorney General for additional
modification and further proceedings under subsection
(9) of this section."
HB 2213, section 2 (emphasis added).
As the emphasized parts of the newly enacted
subsections demonstrate, the statute no longer requires this
court, whenever it concludes that the ballot title certified by
the Attorney General fails to comply substantially with the
requirements of ORS 250.035, to write and certify to the
Secretary of State a corrected ballot title. (5) Instead, the
statute gives the court the discretion either: (1) to revise and
certify to the Secretary of State a legally sufficient ballot
title; or (2) to "refer" the matter to the Attorney General to
correct the deficiencies in the ballot title.
As we have explained, this is a case in which the
Attorney General's certified ballot titles do not comply
substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035. The question
thus becomes: Which of the two alternative dispositional models
provided in the newly enacted ORS 250.085(8) shall this court
utilize?
The answer is not difficult. Referring the matter to
the Attorney General raises no constitutional issues respecting
the proper role of the judiciary and the separation of powers.
Given the uncertainty and delay that necessarily would attach to
any effort by this court to address the constitutional issues
further, we perceive no reason to follow that option in this
case.
Having identified the ways in which each of the three
ballot titles certified by the Attorney General fails to comply
substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035, we refer the
ballot titles to the Attorney General for modification.
Ballot titles referred to the Attorney General for
modification.
1. The 2001 Legislature amended ORS 250.085(5) in certain
respects that we discuss post. Or Laws 2001, ch 802, § 2
(hereafter "HB 2213"). The Governor signed the bill on July 19,
2001. It became effective on its passage. HB 2213, § 4. The
amendments to ORS 250.085(5) did not alter the "substantial
compliance" standard of review.
2. The ballot title certified by the Attorney General for
Initiative Petition 7 states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REQUIRES OWNERS OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY OPEN TO PUBLIC TO
PERMIT FREE SPEECH ON ALL SUBJECTS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote requires owners
of private property open to public to permit free
speech on all subjects, including petitioning,
political campaigning, commercial advertising,
religion, obscenity.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects requiring
owners of private property open to public to permit
free speech on all subjects, including petitioning,
political campaigning, commercial advertising,
religion, obscenity.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Constitution now
entitles persons to collect initiative signatures on
public property and at large private shopping centers,
subject to reasonable restrictions to prevent
interference with the owners' business, but grants no
right to engage in other types of speech or expressive
activity on any private property. Measure would extend
the right of free speech "on any subject whatever" to
interior and exterior areas of all private property
open to the general public, without exception. Measure
thus would require owners of such property to permit
all expressive activities, including circulation of
petitions and solicitation of signatures for initiative
petitions; political campaigning; commercial
advertising; religious speech; and obscenity. Measure
would prohibit the application of civil and criminal
trespass laws to nullify or detract from that right."
(Emphasis added.)
3. The ballot title certified by the Attorney General for
Initiative Petition 8 states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: EXPANDS RIGHT
TO PETITION FREELY TO ALL LOCATIONS IN
PRIVATELY-OWNED BUSINESSES OPEN TO PUBLIC
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote expands
signature-gathering right, requiring owner of any
private business open to public to permit citizens to
solicit petition signatures anywhere on premises.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects expanding
signature-gathering right to require privately-owned
businesses open to public to permit citizens to solicit
petition signatures anywhere on premises.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. The Oregon
Constitution now entitles persons to collect initiative
signatures on public property and at large private
shopping centers, subject to reasonable restrictions to
prevent interference with the owners' business, but
grants no right to solicit signatures on other private
property. The measure would extend citizens' right to
petition, entitling citizens to petition freely in any
privately-owned business to which the public is
invited. The measure thus would require owners of such
businesses to permit citizens to solicit petition
signatures, without interference, at all interior and
exterior areas of those businesses, without exception.
The measure would prohibit the application of civil and
criminal trespass laws to nullify or detract from that
right."
(Emphasis added.)
4. The ballot title certified by the Attorney General for
Initiative Petition 9 states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: EXPANDS PETITIONING RIGHT
TO ALL PRIVATELY-OWNED BUSINESSES OPEN TO PUBLIC,
SUBJECT TO REASONABLE REGULATION
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote expands
signature-gathering right, requiring owners of private
businesses open to public to permit citizens to solicit
petition signatures, subject to reasonable regulation.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote rejects expanding
signature-gathering right to require privately-owned
businesses open to public to permit citizens to gather
signatures subject to reasonable regulation.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. The Oregon
Constitution now entitles persons to collect initiative
signatures on public property and at large private
shopping centers, subject to reasonable restrictions to
prevent interference with the owners' business, but
grants no right to solicit signatures on other private
property. The measure would extend citizens' right to
petition, entitling citizens to petition freely in any
privately-owned business to which the public is
invited, subject to reasonable time and place
regulations. The measure thus would require owners of
such businesses to permit citizens to solicit petition
signatures, at all interior and exterior areas of those
businesses, imposing only reasonable time and place
regulations. The measure would prohibit the
application of civil and criminal trespass laws to
nullify or detract from that right."
5. The newly enacted subsection (3) of ORS 250.085
specifically is made applicable to pending ballot title review
cases by HB 2213, § 3(2). | ecf853ea1d9dfb77f3b6920e8fe9b7c05a46932a9ca6a7591b49674da540479b | 2001-08-02T00:00:00Z |
f3f0de34-6479-43b3-a28e-6547d9d91957 | Menasha Corp. v. Crawford | null | S47076 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | Filed: August 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Garrett W. Crawford, Claimant.
MENASHA CORPORATION
and LUMBERMANS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Respondents on Review,
v.
GARRETT W. CRAWFORD,
Petitioner on Review.
(WCB 98-03327; CA A105040; SC S47076)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 8, 2000.
Mike Stebbins, of Stebbins & Coffey, North Bend, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Jerald P. Keene, of Reinisch, Mackenzie, Healey, Wilson &
Clark, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondents on review.
David L. Runner, Lead Appellate Counsel, Salem, filed the
brief for amici curiae SAIF Corporation, Pape Group, Inc., and
Timber Products Company.
G. Duff Bloom, of Cole, Cary, Wing & Bloom, P.C., Eugene,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order
of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.
*Judicial review from the Workers' Compensation Board. 164 Or App 174, 988 P2d 451 (1999).
**Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 30, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
The issue in this workers' compensation case is whether
claimant is entitled to receive nearly two years' worth of
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, based on a physician's
after-the-fact certification that claimant had been disabled for
that period. An administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) held that claimant was entitled to
temporary compensation for the period in question. The Court of
Appeals reversed. Menasha Corp. v. Crawford, 164 Or App 174, 988
P2d 451 (1999). We allowed claimant's petition for review and
now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are undisputed. On October 11, 1995,
claimant reported to his employer that he had suffered an injury
to his lower back. The next day, claimant saw Dr. Davis, who
confirmed the back injury and released claimant to light work.
Eight days later, Davis released claimant to regular work. In
the meantime, employer fired claimant. On October 27, 1995,
employer's insurer denied claimant's claim for compensation.
Claimant appealed the denial of his claim. On January
16, 1997, an ALJ reversed the denial. On July 15, 1997, the
Board affirmed the ALJ's decision. Neither employer nor
employer's insurer (collectively "employer") sought further
review, and the merits of that adjudication are not before us.
As the case comes to us, claimant is a worker who has had a valid
claim for an on-the-job injury to his back, which claim was in
accepted status after July 15, 1997.
Claimant was referred to and began treating with
another physician, Dr. Bert, on December 13, 1995. On September
30, 1997, Bert performed surgery on claimant's back. On December
1, 1997, after an inquiry by claimant's lawyer, Bert certified
retroactively that claimant had been unable to work for the
period from October 20, 1995 (the date that Davis released
claimant for regular work), until September 30, 1997 (the date of
surgery).
On January 27, 1998, Bert released claimant for light
work. On February 4, 1998, two physicians retained by employer
concluded that claimant's back condition was "medically
stationary." (1) Bert concurred.
On March 9, 1998, employer's insurer closed the claim
and awarded TTD benefits from September 30, 1997 (the date of
surgery), until February 4, 1998 (the date on which claimant was
determined to be medically stationary). A later modification
added the period from October 12, 1995 (the date of injury),
until October 20, 1995 (the date that Davis released claimant for
regular work). Claimant was not awarded benefits for the nearly
two-year gap between October 20, 1995, and September 30, 1997.
Claimant challenged the award, seeking compensation for
the period from October 20, 1995, until September 30, 1997. An
ALJ concluded that, although ORS 656.262(4)(g) (2) restricts
retroactive awards of TTD during the period of time in which the
claim is open, a TTD award for the period from October 20, 1995,
until September 30, 1997, nonetheless was appropriate. The ALJ
explained:
"The payment of temporary disability 'pursuant to
ORS 656.268,'" as provided in [former] ORS
656.262(4)(f) [1995], concerns the payment of temporary
disability during the carrier's processing of open
claims to closure. Thus, ORS 262.268 refers to
procedural temporary disability benefits which may
accrue prior to claim closure. ORS 656.268 does not
set forth the requirements for substantive entitlement
to temporary disability; those requirements are set
forth in ORS 656.210 and 656.212. Kenneth P. Bundy, 48
Van Natta 2501, 2503 (1996).
"Here, inasmuch as claimant's claim has been
closed, the issue is claimant's substantive right to
temporary disability benefits. A claimant's
substantive entitlement to temporary disability
benefits, which is set forth in ORS 656.210 and
656.212, is determined on claim closure and is proven
by a preponderance of the evidence in the entire record
showing that the claimant was disabled due to the
compensable injury before being declared medically
stationary. * * * Neither ORS 656.210 nor ORS 656.212
contains any language which limits a worker's
substantive entitlement to temporary disability to only
those periods for which there is contemporaneous
authorization by the attending physician. Bundy,
supra. Therefore, claimant need not show
contemporaneous authorization of time loss to be
entitled to those substantive benefits."[ (3)]
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
As noted, the ALJ relied on the Board's earlier
decision in Bundy. In that decision, the Board had held that ORS
656.262(4)(g) applies only to "procedural" obligations. That was
true, the Board stated, for two reasons: First, the verbs in ORS
656.262(4)(g) are in the present tense, implying that the statute
applies only when the claim is open. Second, when the
legislature added what is now ORS 656.262(4)(g), it did not
revise ORS 656.210 and ORS 656.212, the statutes that authorize
TTD and temporary partial disability compensation (TPD),
respectively. Neither of those statutes specifically limits TPD
and TTD only to those periods for which a physician has issued a
contemporaneous authorization. As a result, the Board held in
Bundy that ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not apply to a claim at
closure. 48 Van Natta 2501, 2503 (1996).
On review in the present case, the Board affirmed,
again asserting (as it had in Bundy) that a claimant's
"substantive" entitlement to temporary disability benefits is
determined when the claim is closed. Citing its earlier decision
in Bundy, the Board concluded that a worker substantively is
entitled to temporary disability benefits for those periods
during which the worker is able to prove that he or she was
unable to work as a result of a compensable injury and that
substantive entitlement to such benefits is not contingent on
contemporaneous authorization of time loss by the attending
physician. Garret W. Crawford, 51 Van Natta 1 (1999). One
member of the Board concurred specially, opining that the
substantive/procedural distinction on which Bundy depended was
eliminated when the legislature enacted former ORS 656.262(4)(f)
(1995) and former ORS 656.268(3)(d) (1995), (4) and that the statute
required a physician to authorize any award of temporary
disability. The member declined to dissent, however, because the
Board's decision in Bundy still was the law. Id. at 2.
Shortly after the Board issued its Crawford decision,
the Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, reversed Bundy.
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bundy, 159 Or App 44, 978 P2d 385 (1999). (5)
In Bundy, the Court of Appeals described the issue as "whether
ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies to only procedural obligations to pay
temporary disability while a claim is open, or whether it also
applies to the substantive entitlement to benefits at claim
closure." 159 Or App at 49.
We examine the Court of Appeals' decision in Bundy at
length, because it squarely presents the legal issue that we
address in the present case. A majority of the full Court of
Appeals concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not permit a
physician to make an award of temporary compensation retroactive
for more than 14 days. The majority rejected the Board's
conclusion that ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies only to pending
"procedural" claims: "On its face, ORS 656.262(4)(g) is not
limited to benefits that are due and payable during the time that
the claim is open." Bundy, 159 Or App at 50. In the majority's
view, the fact that "the verbs in the statute are in the present
tense does not negate the possibility that the statute also
applies to awards of time loss [i.e., temporary disability] made
at claim closure." Id. (footnote omitted). In addition, "the
reference to ORS 656.268 in both sentences [of ORS 656.262(4)(g)]
is a reference to a statute that addresses the process of claim
closure." Id. The Court of Appeals majority ultimately
concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g) is ambiguous and proceeded to
examine the legislative history of the statute. See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (establishing that paradigm of statutory interpretation).
From that review, the majority concluded that ORS 656.262(4)(g)
prevents a physician from authorizing retroactive benefits more
than 14 days into the past. 159 Or App at 50-54.
Judge Wollheim, joined by Judges De Muniz and
Armstrong, dissented. The dissent noted that the
substantive/procedural distinction on which the Board relied was
not found in the workers' compensation statute but, rather,
existed in the Court of Appeals' case law. Specifically, the
dissent argued that
"[s]ubstantive time loss is the temporary total
disability award, which the injured worker is entitled
to receive at the time of closure by virtue of proof
that the injured worker experienced a period of
temporary total disability before claim closure."
159 Or App at 55 (Wollheim, J., dissenting). Conversely,
"[a]n injured worker's procedural entitlement to time
loss is the temporary total disability benefits that
the employer or insurer is obligated to pay on an open
claim by virtue of the procedures of claim processing
before the injured worker becomes medically
stationary."
Id.
The dissent in Bundy maintained that ORS 656.262(4)(g)
concerns only open claims and procedural benefits, i.e., "when
payment must be made, when payment is not due and payable, and
when payment may be unilaterally suspended." Bundy, 159 Or App
at 57 (Wollheim, J., dissenting). The dissent then asserted that
ORS 656.268, which is cross-referenced in ORS 656.262(4)(g), is a
procedural statute that describes the process for awarding
temporary benefits on a claim at the time of closure. Id. at 57-58. According to the dissent:
"The first sentence of [ORS 656.262](4)(g) is
expressly limited to temporary disability benefits not
due and payable 'pursuant to ORS 656.268.' That
statute is only a procedural statute. Because
temporary disability benefits suspended under the first
sentence of subsection (4)(g) are, by definition, being
paid pursuant to ORS 656.268, this sentence is limited
to the procedural entitlement to temporary disability
benefits. The second sentence of subsection (4)(g)
expressly refers to an attending physicians's
authorization of temporary disability benefits 'under
ORS 656.268.' The explicit reference to ORS 656.268
limits the application of this sentence of (4)(g) to
the procedural entitlement of temporary benefits while
the claim is open. * * * Thus, like the first
sentence, the second sentence of subsection (4)(g) is
also limited to the procedural entitlement to temporary
disability benefits."
Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The
dissent concluded, without reaching the legislative history, that
ORS 656.262(4)(g) does not establish any temporal limit on the
temporary compensation that might be paid when a claim is closed.
Id. at 56-63.
On employer's petition for judicial review in the
present case, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bundy. Menasha
Corp. v. Crawford, 164 Or App 174, 988 P2d 451 (1999). We
allowed claimant's petition for review.
The issue before us turns on the meaning of ORS
656.262(4)(g) and is a question of the legislature's intent. As
did the Court of Appeals, we examine the text and context of the
statute to determine that intent. PGE, 317 Or at 610. If the
legislature's intent is clear from the text and context, further
inquiry is unnecessary. Id. at 611. For convenience, we again
set out ORS 656.262(4)(g):
"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable pursuant to ORS 656.268 after the worker's
attending physician ceases to authorize temporary
disability or for any period of time not authorized by
the attending physician. No authorization of temporary
disability compensation by the attending physician
under ORS 656.268 shall be effective to retroactively
authorize the payment of temporary disability more than
14 days prior to its issuance."
The authorization of the attending physician triggers
the duty to pay temporary disability benefits. Subsection (4)(a)
of ORS 656.262, provides:
"The first installment of temporary disability
compensation shall be paid no later than the 14th day
after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of
the claim, if the attending physician authorizes the
payment of temporary disability compensation."
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (4)(d) of the same statute
provides:
"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable for any period of time for which the insurer or
self-insured employer has requested from the worker's
attending physician verification of the worker's
inability to work resulting from the claimed injury or
disease and the physician cannot verify the worker's
inability to work, unless the worker has been unable to
receive treatment for reasons beyond the worker's
control."
Viewed in light of subsections (4)(a) and (4)(d), the
first sentence of subsection (4)(g) is clear. It describes two
additional sets of circumstances in which temporary disability
compensation is not due and payable: (1) after the claimant's
attending physician ceases to authorize such compensation; and
(2) for any other period of time "not authorized by the attending
physician."
The first sentence leaves open this question: Should a
worker receive TTD when an attending physician belatedly
concludes that the worker is temporarily totally disabled? The
second sentence of subsection (4)(g) answers that question: The
attending physician's authorization of temporary total disability
payments can be retroactive for up to 14 days -- but no more.
The foregoing statutes state the positive law basis for
awarding TTD. TTD benefits are not due and payable if the claim
does not meet the qualifying statutory criteria.
ORS 656.268, the statute twice cross-referenced in ORS
656.262(4)(g), sets out the procedures for terminating TTD
benefits. That statute provides, in part:
"(4) Temporary total disability benefits shall
continue until whichever of the following events first
occurs:
"(a) The worker returns to regular or modified
employment;
"(b) The attending physician advises the worker
and documents in writing that the worker is released to
return to regular employment;
"(c) The attending physician advises the worker
and documents in writing that the worker is released to
return to modified employment, such employment is
offered in writing to the worker and the worker fails
to begin such employment; or
"(d) Any other event that causes temporary
disability benefits to be lawfully suspended, withheld
or terminated under ORS 656.262(4) or other provisions
of this chapter."
As did the dissent in Bundy, claimant here argues that
the text of ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies only to open claims, not to
circumstances in which a claim is being closed and an award is
being finalized. As our examination of that statute in context
demonstrates, however, the text and context of ORS 656.262(4)(g)
do not permit such an interpretation: Neither ORS 656.262(4)(g)
nor any other statute that provides context for ORS 656.262(4)(g)
makes a distinction between a pending claim and a claim at the
time of closing respecting retroactive compensation. (6)
The workers' compensation statutes provide for TTD in
ORS 656.210 (7) and for TPD in ORS 656.212. (8) To be payable, such
compensation must have both a physician's initial and continuing
authorization. "The first installment of temporary disability
compensation shall be paid * * * if the attending physician (9)
authorizes the payment of temporary disability compensation."
ORS 656.262(4)(a). An attending physician may authorize payment
of disability benefits and payment may continue only for the
period of time authorized by those sections. ORS 656.262(4)(h).
An employer may suspend payment of TTD or TPD at the end of the
period until the attending physician reauthorizes the temporary
disability. ORS 656.262(4)(h). Such compensation is not due and
payable for any period for which the attending physician cannot
verify the worker's inability to work, if the insurer or self-insured employer has requested verification of that inability.
ORS 656.262(4)(d). Further, if the insurer or self-insured
employer has requested, but has not received, some form of
verification from the attending physician, that physician's
services are not compensable until the physician submits such
verification. ORS 656.262(4)(f).
ORS 656.262(4)(g) applies in conjunction with ORS
656.268, the statute that determines a claimant's entitlement to
claim closure as well as the claimant's entitlement to TTD.
Consistent with the first sentence of ORS 656.262(4)(g), ORS
656.268 provides that TTD continues until the attending physician
advises the claimant and documents in writing that the claimant
is released to return to regular employment. ORS 656.268(4)(b).
In addition, that same subsection provides that TTD shall
continue until "[a]ny other event that causes temporary
disability benefits to be lawfully suspended, withheld or
terminated under ORS 656.262(4) * * *." ORS 656.268(4)(d)
(emphasis added).
In sum, the statement in ORS 656.262(4)(g) that "[n]o
authorization * * * shall be effective * * * retroactively * * *
more than 14 days" establishes that the legislature did not
intend to permit physicians to certify retroactive temporary
compensation for a period greater than 14 days. Context does not
alter that fact: No related statutory provision states that ORS
656.262(4)(g) applies only to certain kinds of claims but not to
others, or that the statute applies to claims while they are
pending but not to claims at the time of their closure. The
statutory text viewed in context is unambiguous. We need not
examine legislative history to determine the legislature's
intent. PGE, 317 Or at 611.
Application of the statute to this case is
straightforward. On October 20, 1995, Davis released claimant
for regular work. Under ORS 656.262(4)(g), temporary disability
benefits no longer were due and payable to him, because the
"attending physician cease[d] to authorize temporary disability."
Later, Bert retroactively certified claimant as fully disabled
from October 20, 1995, but Bert's later certification is, as we
have shown, subject to the clearly worded limitation in the
second sentence in ORS 656.262(4)(g). The Court of Appeals thus
properly remanded the case to the Board to recalculate claimant's
award of TTD benefits.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
order of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.
1. "Medically stationary," as defined in ORS 656.005(17),
means that "no further material improvement would reasonably be
expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time."
2. The statute that was in effect at the commencement of
this case, ORS 656.262(4)(f) (1995), was renumbered in 1997 as
ORS 656.262(4)(g), but was not otherwise changed. ORS
656.262(4)(g) provides:
"Temporary disability compensation is not due and
payable pursuant to ORS 656.268 after the worker's
attending physician ceases to authorize temporary
disability or for any period of time not authorized by
the attending physician. No authorization of temporary
disability compensation by the attending physician
under ORS 656.268 shall be effective to retroactively
authorize the payment of temporary disability more than
14 days prior to its issuance."
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations refer to the
current version of the Oregon Revised Statutes.
3. "Time loss," as used herein by the ALJ, the Board, and
the Court of Appeals, is a shorthand for temporary disability
compensation under ORS 656.210 and ORS 656.212.
4. In 1999, former ORS 656.268(3)(d) (1995), was
renumbered as ORS 656.268(4)(d), but was otherwise unchanged.
5. This court accepted review in Bundy, 329 Or 318, 994
P2d 122 (1999), but later dismissed review as improvidently
allowed, 329 Or 503, 991 P2d 1058 (1999). The order of dismissal
did not disclose the reasons for the court's decision to dismiss.
6. The Bundy dissent purported to find such a distinction,
based on the difference in wording between ORS 656.262(4)(g)
("not due and payable") and ORS 656.268(4)(d) ("suspended,
withheld, or terminated"). The two statutes are harmonizable,
however, when one recognizes that benefits are "terminated" when
they no longer are due and payable.
7. ORS 656.210(1) states:
"When the total disability is only temporary, the
worker shall receive during the period of that total
disability compensation equal to 66-2/3 percent of
wages, but not more than 100 percent of the average
weekly wage nor less than the amount of 90 percent of
wages a week or the amount of $50 a week, whichever
amount is lesser. Notwithstanding the limitation
imposed by this subsection, an injured worker who is
not otherwise eligible to receive an increase in
benefits for the fiscal year in which compensation is
paid shall have the benefits increased each fiscal year
by the percentage which the applicable average weekly
wage has increased since the previous fiscal year."
ORS 656.210(2)-(4) further defines the methods of calculating
temporary total disability benefits.
8. ORS 656.212 states:
"When the disability is or becomes partial only
and is temporary in character:
"(1) No disability payment is recoverable for
temporary disability suffered during the first three
calendar days after the worker leaves work or loses
wages as a result of the compensable injury. If the
worker leaves work or loses wages on the day of the
injury due to the injury, that day shall be considered
the first day of the three-day period.
"(2) The payment of temporary total disability
pursuant to ORS 656.210 shall cease and the worker
shall receive for an aggregate period not exceeding two
years that portion of the payments provided for
temporary total disability which the loss of wages
bears to the wage used to calculate temporary total
disability pursuant to ORS 656.210."
9. An attending physician generally is a licensed
physician who primarily is responsible for treating a worker's
compensable injury for the earlier of 30 days from the date of
first visit on the initial claim or 12 visits. ORS
656.005(12)(b)(B); see also ORS 656.245(5) (authorizing certain
nurse practitioners and physician assistants who practice in
rural areas to authorize payment of temporary disability
compensation for 30 days from date of first visit on claim). | 793d783ecc5e72b08966a36eec3d41e75d9aa467d749557e0f2c096e326a4e92 | 2001-08-16T00:00:00Z |
60942e5c-edd4-4cba-9361-db2a79803bfb | ONRC Action v. Columbia Plywood, Inc. | null | S47437 | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: June 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ONRC ACTION,
and KLAMATH FOREST ALLIANCE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
COLUMBIA PLYWOOD, Inc.
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
ONRC ACTION,
and KLAMATH FOREST ALLIANCE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v.
COLUMBIA PLYWOOD, Inc.
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellee.
(USDC CV-97-03087-CO; USCA 98-36233, 99-35019; SC S47437)
En Banc
On certified questions from United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit order dated April 10, 2000; certification
accepted June 6, 2000.
Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, David Thompson, and Thomas G.
Nelson, Circuit Judges.
Argued and submitted January 10, 2001.
William C. Carpenter, Jr., Eugene, argued the cause and
filed the brief for plaintiffs-appellants.
Karen O'Kasey, of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant-appellee.
With her on the brief was Patricia M. Dost.
Jas. Jeffrey Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the brief for amici curiae Environmental Quality Commission and
Department of Environmental Quality.
LEESON, J.
First certified question answered.
LEESON, J.
This case is before the court on certified questions of
Oregon law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. ORS 28.200 et seq.; ORAP 12.20. We accepted the
certified questions. See Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson
Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (discussing factors
court considers in exercising discretion to accept certified
questions). We summarize the following facts from the Ninth
Circuit's certification order and the excerpt of record filed in
that court.
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters unless the
discharge is allowed by a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 33 USC §§ 1311(a), 1342
(1994). A state may administer its own NPDES permit program
within its boundaries if the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency certifies it to do so. Id. § 1342(b). Oregon
has a certified NPDES program that the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) administers and enforces. The DEQ
program includes issuing NPDES permits and processing
applications for the renewal of NPDES permits. ORS 468.035; ORS
468.065. To renew an NPDES permit, the applicable administrative
rule requires the permit holder to file an application for
renewal with DEQ at least 180 days before the expiration of the
existing permit. OAR 340-045-0030(1).
In 1984, Columbia Plywood Corporation (defendant)
received an NPDES permit allowing it to discharge pollutants into
the Klamath River until November 30, 1989. On August 21, 1989,
fewer than 180 days before that permit would have expired,
defendant applied to DEQ to renew it. In a letter dated August
24, 1989, DEQ informed defendant that defendant's renewal
application was incomplete, because it was not signed and dated
in two places. The letter indicated that DEQ was returning the
unsigned and undated parts of the application to defendant and
that, after defendant properly had signed and dated those parts,
DEQ would consider the application "complete for filing." The
letter also stated that, if DEQ did not take final action on
defendant's renewal application by November 30, 1989, the date on
which defendant's 1984 NPDES permit would expire, then the 1984
permit would "remain in effect until the final action is taken."
Defendant signed and dated the parts of the application
that DEQ had returned to it, and filed those parts with DEQ on
September 1, 1989. Since 1989, defendant has continued to
discharge pollutants into the Klamath River under the terms of
its 1984 NPDES permit, because DEQ took no final action on
defendant's renewal application. As noted, DEQ told defendant in
August 1989 that, after defendant had submitted a complete
renewal application, defendant's 1984 NPDES would remain in
effect until DEQ took final action.
In 1997, ONRC Action and Klamath Forest Alliance
(plaintiffs) filed suit in federal district court seeking, among
other things, to enjoin defendant from continuing to discharge
pollutants into the Klamath River in violation of the CWA. See
33 USC § 1365 (1994) (providing authority for citizens to enforce
provisions of CWA through citizen suits). Plaintiffs contended
that defendant's 1984 NPDES permit had expired on November 30,
1989, that defendant had not timely applied to renew that permit,
and that DEQ had not renewed it. Plaintiffs argued that DEQ
lacked authority to waive the 180-day filing requirement in OAR
340-045-0030(1) and that its decision to do so and to extend
defendant's 1984 NPDES permit was invalid. Accordingly,
plaintiffs contended, defendant's 1984 NPDES permit expired on
November 30, 1989, and, since then, defendant has been
discharging pollutants into the Klamath River without a valid
NPDES permit, in violation of the CWA. An affidavit from a DEQ
water quality manager submitted on defendant's behalf stated that
DEQ considered defendant's application to have been timely filed
and that the terms of defendant's 1984 NPDES permit "continue in
force."
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that
in 1989 DEQ properly had waived the 180-day filing requirement in
OAR 340-045-0030(1) (1989) and that plaintiffs had not been
prejudiced by that waiver. A magistrate judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon held that OAR
340-045-0030(1) (1989) is a procedural rule for the benefit of
DEQ and permit holders and that, under federal and Oregon law,
DEQ may waive the provisions of the rule "if such waiver does not
prejudice plaintiffs." The court then found that plaintiffs had
suffered no prejudice. Accordingly, it granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment. After a United States District
Court judge adopted the magistrate judge's findings and
recommendations, plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit frames the issues of Oregon law on
appeal to that court as a dispute between the parties about
whether, under this court's opinion in Anaconda Company v. Dept.
of Rev., 278 Or 723, 565 P2d 1084 (1977), DEQ had authority to
waive the 180-day filing requirement and whether, under this
court's opinion in Hoffman v. City of Portland, 294 Or 150, 654
P2d 1106 (1982), plaintiffs must show that they have been
prejudiced substantially by that waiver before a court may find
that DEQ's waiver was invalid. The Ninth Circuit certified the
following questions to this court:
"1. Can [DEQ] waive [OAR] 340-045-0030(1), which
requires that an applicant file a renewal application
180 days before its [NPDES] permit expires, by
accepting a renewal application filed less than 180
days before the NPDES permit's expiration date? If
not, then:
"2. Is [DEQ's] extension of the NPDES permit
beyond its original five-year term, pursuant to [OAR]
340-045-0040, invalid because the waiver is invalid, or
must the waiver have prejudiced the plaintiffs before
the waiver can be held invalid?"
Before turning to the first certified question, we note
the unusual procedural posture in which this case comes to this
court. Plaintiffs' argue that defendant is violating the CWA by
continuing to discharge pollutants into the Klamath River,
because defendant's 1984 NPDES permit expired on November 30,
1989. That argument actually is a collateral attack on DEQ's
decision to accept defendant's application for renewal of its
1984 NPDES permit even though defendant had not filed for renewal
at least 180 days before its 1984 permit was set to expire. (1)
Normally, review of an agency action comes to this court under
the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, ORS 183.310 et seq. In
this case, the validity of DEQ's decision to accept defendant's
application to renew its NPDES permit arises in the context of a
federal citizen lawsuit challenging a permit holder's compliance
with the CWA. That unusual procedural posture does not affect
this court's legal analysis of whether DEQ erred in accepting
defendant's application for renewal of its 1984 NPDES permit.
See ORS 183.482(8)(a) (court may overrule agency action taken as
result of erroneous interpretation of provision of law); ORS
183.484(5)(a) (same). We turn to the first certified question.
DEQ's letter to defendant on August 24, 1989, expressed
the agency's view that it may accept as timely an application for
renewal that is filed fewer than the 180 days specified in OAR
340-045-0030(1) (1989). Amici DEQ and the Environmental Quality
Commission (EQC), appearing at this court's request, maintain
that one purpose of the 180-day filing requirement in the rule is
to provide for the efficient administration and processing of
NPDES permit applications. They argue that the requirement was
not intended to "deprive DEQ of authority to accept a NPDES
permit renewal application" submitted fewer than 180 days before
the permit holder's current permit expires. See ORS
468.035(1)(n) (DEQ may "perform such * * * acts as may be
necessary, proper or desirable to carry out effectively the
duties, powers and responsibilities of [DEQ]"); ORS 468.045(1)(c)
(DEQ to "[a]dminister and enforce the laws of the state
concerning environmental quality").
This court previously has explained the proper inquiry
in challenges involving an agency's interpretation of its own
administrative rule:
"Where * * * the agency's plausible interpretation
of its own rule cannot be shown either to be
inconsistent with the wording of the rule itself, or
with the rule's context, or with any other source of
law, there is no basis on which this court can assert
that the rule has been interpreted 'erroneously.' It
follows that * * * this court cannot overrule, under
ORS 183.482(8)(a) [or ORS 183.484(5)(a)], an agency's
interpretation of its own rule."
Don't Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy Facility Siting, 320 Or 132,
142, 881 P2d 119 (1994). Accordingly, our task is to determine
whether DEQ's and EQC's interpretation of OAR 340-045-0030 (1989)
is plausible.
OAR 340-045-0030 (1989) provides:
"(1) Any person wishing to obtain a new, modified,
or renewal NPDES permit from the Department shall
submit a written application on a form provided by the
Department. Applications must be submitted at least
180 days before a NPDES permit is needed. All
application forms must be completed in full and signed
by the applicant or his legally authorized
representative. The name of the applicant must be the
legal name of the owner of the facilities or his agent
or the lessee responsible for the operation and
maintenance.
"(2) Applications which are obviously incomplete
or unsigned will not be accepted by the Department for
filing and will be returned to the applicant for
completion.
"(3) Applications which appear complete will be
accepted by the Department for filing.
"(4) If the Department later determines that
additional information is needed, it will promptly
request the needed information from the applicant. The
application will not be considered complete for
processing until the requested information is received.
The application will be considered to be withdrawn if
the applicant fails to submit the requested information
within 90 days of the request.
"(5) An application which has been filed with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in accordance with Section
13 of the Federal Refuse Act or an NPDES application
which has been filed with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency will be accepted as an application
filed under this section provided the application is
complete and the information on the application is
still current."
(Emphasis added.)
The emphasized part of OAR 340-045-0030(1) (1989) is
the provision that is at issue in this case. The word "must"
indicates that the 180-day filing requirement is mandatory. See
Fleming v. United Services Automobile Assn., 329 Or 449, 456, 988
P2d 378 (1999) (term "must" describes mandatory requirement).
Plaintiffs argue that, under Anaconda, DEQ lacked authority to
accept defendant's renewal application, because it was not filed
timely. We first analyze whether Anaconda controls DEQ's
interpretation of OAR 340-045-0030(1) (1989).
In Anaconda, a tax case, this court construed former
ORS 314.405(2) repealed by Or Laws 1977, ch 870, § 22, which
provided, in part:
"If requested by the taxpayer, * * * the taxpayer
shall have an opportunity to confer with the
[Department of Revenue (department)] * * * as to the
proposed assessment at any time prior to the date such
assessment is made."
(Emphasis added.) See Anaconda, 278 Or at 726 (quoting statute).
The taxpayer in that case, a corporation, had made such a
request, but the department failed to confer with it before
making the assessment. This court held that former ORS 314.405
required the department to comply with the statutory requirement
that it provide a taxpayer a conference upon request and that,
absent a showing by the department that its error was harmless,
the department's failure to comply with that statutory obligation
rendered its subsequent assessment invalid. Id. at 728-30.
Unlike the statute that was at issue in Anaconda, the
provision of the administrative rule that is at issue here
imposes an obligation on the permit holder, not on the agency, to
comply with a mandatory requirement. Thus, the reason that the
Anaconda court gave for invalidating the department's assessment
-- the department's failure to comply with an obligation that the
statute imposed on the department in its dealings with a taxpayer
-- is absent here. Anaconda does not support plaintiffs'
argument that DEQ lacked authority to accept defendant's permit
renewal application even though the application did not meet the
180-day filing requirement in OAR 340-045-0030(1) (1989).
Nonetheless, the issue remains whether OAR 340-045-0030 (1989)
prevented DEQ from accepting defendant's renewal application.
See Don't Waste Oregon, 320 Or at 142 (prescribing analysis of
text and context of rule and other sources of law). We turn to
that issue.
As noted, OAR 340-045-0030(1) (1989) contains a
mandatory requirement that a permit holder file an application to
renew an existing NPDES permit at least 180-days before its
existing permit expires. However, nothing in the text of the
rule requires DEQ to reject a renewal application that is not
filed timely. Moreover, other provisions of the rule, which
provide context for our analysis of the 180-day filing
requirement in section (1), permit the conclusion that DEQ may
accept an application filed fewer than 180 days before the permit
expires, so long as the application is "complete."
The sentence immediately following the 180-day filing
requirement in section (1) of OAR 340-045-0040 (1989) provides:
"All application forms must be completed in full and signed by
the applicant or his legally authorized representative." Section
(2) provides that "obviously incomplete or unsigned" applications
"will not be accepted by [DEQ] for filing and will be returned to
the applicant for completion." Section (3) provides that DEQ
will accept "complete" applications, but that section does not
make DEQ's acceptance of an application contingent on the 180-day
filing requirement in subsection (1). Section (4) authorizes DEQ
to request additional information from an applicant after the
application has been filed and provides that the application will
be deemed "complete" only when DEQ has received the additional
information. Section (4) also allows the applicant 90 days to
complete the application by providing the requested information.
Finally, section (5), again without reference to the 180-day
filing requirement in section (1), provides that DEQ will accept
for filing applications filed with the United States Army Corps
of Engineers or Environmental Protection Agency, provided that
the application is "complete." Reading the 180-day filing
requirement in context with the other provisions of OAR 340-045-0030 (1989) reveals that the completeness of an application, not
when it was filed, is the primary criterion that DEQ considers in
determining whether to accept an application. The 180-day filing
requirement for applicants to renew an existing NPDES permit thus
appears to be intended to facilitate DEQ's processing of renewal
applications, not to constrain DEQ in the manner that plaintiffs
suggest. Plaintiffs do not cite any other provision of law that
suggests that DEQ lacks authority to accept defendant's permit
renewal application. See Don't Waste Oregon, 320 Or at 142
(requiring such showing).
DEQ's and EQC's interpretation of OAR 340-045-0030(1)
(1989) is plausible; therefore, we cannot say that their
interpretation of the rule is erroneous. Id. Accordingly, the
answer to the first certified question is that DEQ has the legal
authority to accept and process permit renewal applications that
do not meet the 180-day filing requirement in OAR 340-045-0030(1)(1989). In light of that answer, we need not answer the
second certified question.
First certified question answered.
1. The magistrate judge, citing Citizens for a Better
Environment-California v. Union Oil Co. of California, 83 F3d
1111 (9th Cir 1996) cert den sub nom 519 US 1101, 117 S Ct 789,
136 L Ed 2d 731 (1997), held that the CWA permits plaintiffs to
attack collaterally DEQ's decision to waive the 180-day filing
requirement. | 516a53f2567d5a18ecb4acb5e7d2142963b0912d6e62b7d37388935964a047ec | 2001-06-08T00:00:00Z |
c7357add-6f81-4a72-8e15-5f691ab0b7d2 | Novick v. Myers | null | null | oregon | Oregon Supreme Court | FILED: AUGUST 31, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General, State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S48524)
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record July 19, 2001.
Steven Novick, Portland, in propria persona, filed the
petition.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the
answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.
DURHAM, J.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
DURHAM, J.
Petitioner challenges the ballot title certified by the
Attorney General for Initiative Petition 38 (2002). ORS
250.085(2). The proposed initiative measure would add the
following text to the Oregon Constitution:
"Section 1. Taxpayers [sic] right to the highest
quality services at the most competitive price.
Contracts for public construction projects, including
contracts to provide furnishings and/or fixtures for
public buildings, shall be awarded to the contractor
who submits the lowest bid to provide not less than the
quality of work and/or product necessary to meet or
exceed the specifications established for the project.
This section applies to all public works projects
undertaken by or on behalf of the state or any
political subdivision of the state, including local
governments and taxing districts.
"(a) Nothing in the specifications or
requirements for a public works project shall include
any kind of project labor agreement; regulate the wages
or benefits paid to laborers or subcontractors; require
the contractor awarded the bid to pay wages or provide
benefits, the total of which is greater than the
contractor would be required to pay an employee if
performing work for any private sector customer or
client in Oregon; or give an advantage or preference to
a contractor that uses union workers over a contractor
that does not.
"(b) Nothing in this 2002 Amendment requires a
government entity to award a contract to a bidder that
the government entity believes is not capable of
satisfactorily fulfilling the contract.
"(c) If a government entity is required by federal
law to act in violation of this 2002 amendment, the
government entity shall only do so to the minimum
extent necessary to conform to the federal requirement.
"(d) If any word, phrase, clause, or part of this
amendment is invalidated by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the remaining words, phrases, clauses,
and parts shall remain in full force and effect."
For that proposed initiative measure, the Attorney
General certified the following ballot title:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION. FOR PUBLIC-WORKS
CONTRACTS, ELIMINATES: EXEMPTIONS FROM
COMPETITIVE BIDDING, REGULATING WAGES/
BENEFITS, REQUIRING LABOR AGREEMENTS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote eliminates, for
public-works contracts: exemptions from competitive-bidding process; regulating wages/benefits (including
requiring prevailing wages); requiring labor
agreements; union-worker preferences.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains laws
requiring awarding some (but not all) public contracts
to lowest responsible, qualified bidder; and payment of
prevailing wages/benefits and overtime.
"SUMMARY: Amends constitution. Current law
requires awarding certain public contracts through
competitive bidding to lowest responsible, qualified
bidder; exemptions allow other contracting methods for
other contracts; requires paying prevailing wages
(wages/benefits paid locally on similar projects) and
increased pay for overtime. Measure requires that all
contracts for public-works projects (including
contracts for public buildings' furnishings, fixtures)
be awarded to contractor submitting lowest bid to
provide not less than the quality of work or product
necessary to meet project specifications. Prohibits
project requirements that: include any project labor
agreement, regulate laborers' or subcontractors'
wages/benefits (including requiring prevailing wages),
require contractors to pay wages/benefits in amounts
greater than amounts that would be required in Oregon's
private sector, prefer contractors using union workers.
Other provisions."
ORS 250.035(2) sets out the requirements for a ballot
title caption, result statements, and summary for a state
initiative measure. (1) Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of
each segment of the certified ballot title. This court reviews
the Attorney General's ballot title for "substantial compliance
with the requirements of ORS 250.035." ORS 250.085(5).
The Attorney General's ballot title caption identifies
three types of legal provisions that the proposed measure would
"eliminate" "for public-works contracts." Petitioner draws
attention to one of those provisions: "eliminates: * * *
requiring labor agreements." He argues that that phrasing is
inaccurate because Oregon law currently does not require labor
agreements or, more accurately, project labor agreements, for
public works contracts. (2) Thus, petitioner contends, the Attorney
General's caption misleads the voters into believing that, by
approving the proposed measure, they would "eliminate" a
"requirement" regarding labor agreements in public works
contracts that, in fact, does not exist. Petitioner submits
that, for the sake of accuracy, the Attorney General should have
used the words "prohibits" or "repeals/prohibits," not the word
"eliminates." Petitioner repeats his arguments in challenging
the phrase "eliminates * * * requiring labor agreements," which
also appears in the Attorney General's "yes" vote result
statement.
The Attorney General responds that petitioner's
criticism is not well taken because the caption "plainly tells
the voters that the items following the word 'ELIMINATES' would
not be allowed under the proposed measure." The Attorney General
also points out that the proposed measure refers to
"requirements" in the following passage: "(a) Nothing in the
specifications or requirements for a public works project shall
include any kind of project labor agreement * * *."
The parties acknowledge that Oregon statutes impose
detailed procedures and requirements on the public contract
bidding process, ORS 279.027, and impose express standards of
responsibility on bidders who seek to become a "lowest
responsible bidder" on a public contract, ORS 279.029. In
addition, ORS 279.350(1) requires any contractor or subcontractor
on a public works project to pay not less than the "prevailing
rate of wage," as defined in ORS 279.348(1). ORS 279.352(1) also
requires that the specifications for every public works contract
include a prevailing rate of wage provision. However, the
Attorney General does not take issue with petitioner's contention
that current Oregon law contains no requirement that a public
works contract contain a "labor agreement" or a "project labor
agreement."
In Rice v. Myers, 326 Or 419, 423, 952 P2d 533 (1998),
this court stated:
"When a ballot title caption purports to make a
representation regarding the present state of the law,
the representation must not be misleading."
Rice involved an argument that a certified caption, "Increases
Sentences for Persons with Prior Convictions for Listed Crimes,"
gave
"a false impression that the measure would increase
sentences only for repeat offenders when, in fact, [the
measure] also would affect the sentences of first-time
offenders."
Id. Applying the principle quoted above, this court stated:
"[W]e agree that the Attorney General's certified
caption could leave a reasonable reader with the
misleading impression that the measure applies only to
repeat offenders. To the contrary, Measure 53 imposes
a minimum 14-month sentence, and Measure 54 imposes a
minimum 18-month sentence, on persons who have never
been convicted of a 'major crime.' The Attorney
General's caption is under-inclusive. By describing
the impact of the measure on one class of offenders,
while excluding any reference to another class of
offenders, the Attorney General's certified caption
misleads the voters as to the full breadth of the
measure and fails reasonably to identify the subject
matter of the measure. See, e.g., Witt v. Kulongoski,
319 Or 7, 872 P2d 14 (1994) (illustrating this court's
application of the foregoing principle in modifying an
under-inclusive and, therefore, inadequate ballot title
caption)."
Id. at 423-24.
In determining whether the Attorney General's caption
in this proceeding "could leave a reasonable reader with a
misleading impression," id. at 423, about the effect of the
proposed measure on existing law, we begin with the ordinary
dictionary definition of the key terms in the caption.
"Eliminate," in this context, means:
"2a : to cast out : REMOVE, EXPEL, EXCLUDE, DROP,
OUST * * * b : to cause the disappearance of esp. as a
factor or element in a process or situation : get rid
of : ERADICATE * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 736 (unabridged ed 1993).
The dictionary furnishes the following pertinent definitions of
"require," the word root for "requiring":
"2a : to ask for authoritatively or imperatively :
claim by right and authority : insist upon usu. with
certainty or urgency : DEMAND, EXACT * * * 3a : to call
for as suitable or appropriate in a particular case
* * * b : to demand as necessary or essential (as on
general principles or in order to comply with or
satisfy some regulation) : make indispensable * * * 5 :
to impose a compulsion or command upon (as a person) to
do something : demand of (one) that something be done
or some action taken : enjoin, command, or
authoritatively insist (that someone do something
* * *."
Id. at 1929.
In light of those definitions, we conclude that the
phrase "eliminates * * * requiring labor agreements," could leave
a reasonable reader with the misleading impression that the
proposed measure would remove a public agency's authority under
existing law to demand or compel acceptance of a "labor
agreement" by public works contractors. As noted, current Oregon
law creates no such legal authority. The Attorney General's
contention that "eliminates * * * requiring" only refers to a
prospective prohibition on described conduct fails to acknowledge
that those words, in this context, connote the eradication of a
public agency's existing legal authority to engage in the
described conduct, i.e., to demand acceptance of a labor
agreement by public works contractors. Voters might evaluate the
proposed measure differently if they assumed, incorrectly, from
the phrasing of the caption, that Oregon public agencies were
exercising existing statutory authority to require public
contractors to accept labor agreements. In accordance with the
discussion in Rice, we conclude that the likelihood that the
caption could leave a reasonable reader with a misleading
impression about the present state of Oregon law necessitates a
modification of the caption.
The parties agree that substituting the term
"prohibits" for the term "eliminates" would resolve the problem
noted in the foregoing discussion. However, we express no
opinion, at this point, as to the appropriate solution. We refer
the ballot title to the Attorney General to make the necessary
change in the caption.
For the same reasons that we determined that the
caption required modification, we conclude that petitioner's
identical challenge to the Attorney General's "yes" vote result
statement is well taken. We also refer that part of the ballot
title to the Attorney General for modification.
Petitioner makes other challenges to the Attorney
General's caption, result statements, and summary.
We reject those challenges without further discussion.
Except as noted above, the Attorney General's ballot title
satisfies this court's substantial compliance standard of review.
For the reasons stated above, we refer the ballot title
to the Attorney General for modification. ORS 250.085(8);
Flanagan v. Myers, 332 Or 318, ____, ____ P3d ____ (2001).
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification.
1. ORS 250.035(2) provides:
"The ballot title of any state measure to be
initiated or referred shall consist of:
"(a) A caption of not more than 15 words that
reasonably identifies the subject matter of the state
measure. The caption of an initiative or referendum
amendment to the constitution shall begin with the
phrase, 'Amends Constitution,' which shall not be
counted for purposes of the 15-word caption limit;
"(b) A simple and understandable statement of not
more than 25 words that describes the result if the
state measure is approved. The statement required by
this paragraph shall include either the phrase, 'I
vote' or 'vote yes,' or a substantially similar phrase,
which may be placed at any point within the statement;
"(c) A simple and understandable statement of not
more than 25 words that describes the result if the
state measure is rejected. The statement required by
this paragraph shall not describe existing statutory or
constitutional provisions in a way that would lead an
average elector to believe incorrectly that one of
those provisions would be repealed by approval of the
state measure, if approval would not have that result.
Any thing or action described both in the statement
required by paragraph (b) of this subsection and in the
statement required by this paragraph shall be described
using the same terms in both statements, to the extent
practical. Any different terms must be terms that an
average elector would understand to refer to the same
thing or action. The statement shall include either
the phrase, 'I vote' or 'vote no,' or a substantially
similar phrase, which may be placed at any point within
the statement; and
"(d) A concise and impartial statement of not more
than 125 words summarizing the state measure and its
major effect."
2. Oregon law does not provide a special definition of the
phrase "project labor agreement" that appears in section 1(a) of
the proposed measure. Typically, that phrase describes an
agreement between the owner or project manager of a construction
project and one or more labor organizations. Such agreements
commonly describe the employee working conditions, including
wages, grievance procedures, and union security provisions, that
will apply during the life of the project, as well as any
agreements protecting the project from labor strikes and
slowdowns. See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated
Bldrs. Of Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 US 218, 221-22,
113 S Ct 1190, 122 L Ed 2d 565 (1993) (illustrating typical
provisions of project labor agreement).
We recognize, as do the parties, that a project labor
agreement is distinguishable from a collective bargaining
agreement. However, contrary to petitioner's contention, we
conclude that the Attorney General's phrase, "labor agreement,"
is, for purposes of the ballot title, an adequate shorthand
reference to a "project labor agreement" and is unlikely to cause
voter confusion. | 3bb94052a44c41471782a03d4aae58096dd4245166b5bc43ab363e7a4bb626fc | 2001-08-31T00:00:00Z |