user31187: Scenario: 
Step 1: User-1 initiates the TXN-1 to pay to User-2 and the TXN is not yet confirmed with the ongoing block POW. 
Step 2: What prevents fraudster (anyone a miner or someone listening/participating in the network), to double spend or divert the payment to User-3 with a new TXN-2 by copying the data from pending TXN-1 including the User-1's signature? 
Step 3: if the miners reject both TXN-1 and TXN-2 as a suspicious or double spend activity in the current block POW, what prevents the same fraudster to issue a new TXN-3 by copying the TXN-2 with the next block POW? 
Thanks in advance. 

user5406: The signature corresponds to the transaction it signs. You can't use the same sig to send the money to another address, because that would require a different transaction for which the signature would not resolve to valid.

31187: <p>Scenario: </p>

<p>Step 1: User-1 initiates the TXN-1 to pay to User-2 and the TXN is not yet confirmed with the ongoing block POW. </p>

<p>Step 2: What prevents fraudster (anyone a miner or someone listening/participating in the network), to double spend or divert the payment to User-3 with a new TXN-2 by copying the data from pending TXN-1 including the User-1's signature? </p>

<p>Step 3: if the miners reject both TXN-1 and TXN-2 as a suspicious or double spend activity in the current block POW, what prevents the same fraudster to issue a new TXN-3 by copying the TXN-2 with the next block POW? </p>

<p>Thanks in advance. </p>
 5406: <p>The signature corresponds to the transaction it signs. You can't use the same sig to send the money to another address, because that would require a different transaction for which the signature would not resolve to valid.</p>
