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1995_94-1244

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), we held that a district court's rejection of a defendant's qualified-immunity defense is a "final decision" subject to immediate appeal under the general appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The question presented in this case is whether a defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment.IIn 1983, South Coast Savings and Loan Association, a new institution, applied to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB or Board) for the approval necessary to obtain account insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).l Under FHLBB regulations, approval of new institutions was to be withheld if their "financial policies or management" were found to be "unsafe" for any of various reasons, including "character of the management." 12 CFR § 571.6(b) (1986). Accordingly, when FHLBB approved South Coast for FSLIC insurance in March 1984, it imposed a number of requirements, including the condition that South Coast "provide for employment of a qualified full-time executive managing officer, subject to approval by the Principal Supervisory Agent"-FHLBB's term for the president of the regional Home Loan Bank when operating in his oversight capacity on behalf of FHLBB. Record, Exh. B, Resolution No. 84-164, , 10(p) (Mar. 29, 1984). The Board's resolution also required that, for a period of three years, any change in South Coast's chief management position be approved by FHLBB. Ibid.1 FHLBB, FSLIC, and the regulatory scheme described in this opinion no longer exist, having been eliminated by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 183.302Shortly after obtaining FHLBB's conditional approval, South Coast was succeeded in interest by Pioneer Savings and Loan Association, another new institution. Pioneer named respondent Pelletier as its managing officer, subject to FHLBB consent, which Pioneer sought in mid-May 1985. Only a few weeks earlier, however, on April 23, 1985, FHLBB had declared insolvent Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association, where respondent had at one time held a senior executive position. An inquiry by FSLIC pointed to potential misconduct by high-level management of the failed institution, which ultimately became the subject of an FSLIC lawsuit against several Beverly Hills officers, including respondent.The FSLIC suit had not yet been filed at the time Pioneer sought the Board's consent to hire respondent; but FSLIC's pending investigation into Beverly Hills' collapse caused petitioner Behrens, the FHLBB "Supervisory Agent" then responsible for monitoring Pioneer's operations, to write Pioneer on May 8, 1986, withholding approval and advising that respondent be replaced. On receipt of the letter Pioneer asked respondent to resign and, when he refused, fired him.Three years later, in 1989, respondent brought suit in federal court, naming petitioner as defendant in a complaint that included Bivens damages claims for two alleged constitutional wrongs. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Respondent charged, first, that petitioner's action in writing a letter that had effectively discharged him from his post at Pioneer, in summary fashion and without notice or opportunity to be heard, violated his right to procedural due process. Second, he claimed that he had been deprived of substantive due process by petitioner's alleged interference with his "clearly established and Constitutionally protected property and liberty rights ... to specific employment and to pursue his profession free from undue governmental interference." First Amended Complaint, 38, reprinted in App. 7, 16. The complaint alleged303that petitioner's letter, along with other, continuing efforts to harm respondent's reputation, had cost respondent not only his position at Pioneer, but also his livelihood within the savings and loan industry. The complaint also contained other claims-against petitioner and against the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (petitioner's immediate employer), FHLBB, and the United States; none of these is relevant to the present appeal.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. With regard to the Bivens claims, he asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions, taken in a governmental capacity, "d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). The District Court ruled in favor of petitioner on the statute-of-limitations ground and therefore dismissed the procedural due process Bivens claim, and the substantive due process Bivens claim to the extent it related to petitioner's letter and respondent's loss of employment at Pioneer. It refused, however, to dismiss respondent's suit "to the extent [it was] based on other alleged subsequent acts of defendan[t] preventing and continuing to prevent [respondent] from securing employment." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89-969 (CD Cal., Oct. 5, 1989), reprinted in App. 27-28. The court also denied petitioner's summary judgment motion, without prejudice, on the ground that it was premature given the lack of discovery.Petitioner immediately appealed the District Court's implicit denial of his qualified-immunity defense regarding the remaining Bivens claim. The Court of Appeals entertained the appeal, notwithstanding its interlocutory nature, holding that "a denial of qualified immunity is an appealable 'final' order under the test set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949) ... , regardless of whether that denial takes the form of a refusal to grant a defendant's304motion to dismiss or a denial of summary judgment." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 865, 870 (CA9 1992). It said in dictum, however, that a defendant claiming qualified immunity could not "take advantage of the several opportunities for immediate appeal afforded him by bringing repeated pretrial appeals," and that "[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a government official is entitled to and all that we will entertain." Id., at 870-871. On the merits of the appeal, the court rejected the argument that petitioner enjoyed qualified immunity because he had not violated any "clearly established right." It said that the question whether respondent had a constitutionally protected property interest in his Pioneer employment (subject, as it was, to regulatory approval) was not properly before the court, since the claims relating specifically to his discharge had been dismissed as time barred. Id., at 871-872. (The Court of Appeals noted in dictum, however, id., at 869, n. 6, that the District Court had applied an unduly short limitations period.) With respect to the claimed deprivation of post-Pioneer employment, the court held that the "nebulous theories of conspiracy" set out in respondent's complaint-although "insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment"-made out a proper Bivens claim. 968 F. 2d, at 872-873.Upon remand, the District Court reversed its earlier statute-of-limitations ruling in light of the Court of Appeals' dictum, and reinstated the claims relating to employment at Pioneer. After discovery, petitioner moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, contending that his actions had not violated any "clearly established" right of respondent regarding his employment at Pioneer or elsewhere. The District Court denied the motion with the unadorned statement that "[m]aterial issues of fact remain as to defendant Behrens on the Bivens claim." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. CV 89-0969 (CD Cal., Sept. 6, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert.3055a. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which, on respondent's motion, the District Court certified as frivolous. In an unpublished order, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal "for lack of jurisdiction." Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, No. 94-56507 (CA9, Nov. 17, 1994), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. la. We granted certiorari, 514 U. S. 1035 (1995).IISection 1291 of Title 28, U. S. C., gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over "all final decisions" of district courts, except those for which appeal is to be had to this Court. The requirement of finality precludes consideration of decisions that are subject to revision, and even of "fully consummated decisions [that] are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). It does not, however, bar review of all prejudgment orders. In Cohen, we described a "small class" of district court decisions that, though short of final judgment, are immediately appealable because they "finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Ibid. See also Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 142-145 (1993) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)). The issue in the present case is the extent to which orders denying governmental officers' assertions of qualified immunity come within the Cohen category of appealable decisions.As set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), the qualified-immunity defense "shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," id., at 818 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S.306555,565 (1978)). Harlow adopted this criterion of "objective legal reasonableness," rather than good faith, precisely in order to "permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial." 457 U. S., at 819, 813. Unsurprisingly, then, we later found the immunity to be "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal [immunity] question." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 526. And, as with district-court rejection of claims to other such entitlements distinct from the merits, see, e. g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct, supra, at 145-146 (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 662 (1977) (right not to be subjected to double jeopardy), we held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell, supra, at 530. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 311-312 (1995).While Mitchell did not say that a defendant could appeal from denial of a qualified-immunity defense more than once,2 it clearly contemplated that he could raise the defense at successive stages:"Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evi-2 Interestingly, however, Mitchell itself dealt with the second of two interlocutory appeals on immunity claims. See 472 U. S., at 515-519. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court assigned any significance to the successive aspect of the second appeal.307dence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts." 472 U. S., at 526 (citation omitted).Thus, Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a "final" judgment subject to immediate appeal. Since an unsuccessful appeal from a denial of dismissal cannot possibly render the later denial of a motion for summary judgment any less "final," it follows that petitioner's appeal falls within § 1291 and dismissal was improper.Indeed, it is easier to argue that the denial of summary judgment-the order sought to be appealed here-is the more "final" of the two orders. That is the reasoning the First Circuit adopted in holding that denial of a motion to dismiss on absolute-immunity grounds was not "final" where the defendant had stated that, if unsuccessful, he would later seek summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds:"Since the district court has not yet determined whether [the defendant] has qualified immunity, and that he will have to stand trial, its decision is not an appealable collateral order." Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F.2d 704, 707 (1988). The problem with this approach, however, is that it would logically bar any appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage where there is a possibility of presenting an immunity defense on summary judgment; that possibility would cause the motion-to-dismiss decision to be not "final" as to the defendant's right not to stand trial. The First Circuit sought to avoid this difficulty by saying that the defendant could render the motion-todismiss denial final by waiving his right to appeal the summary judgment denial. See id., at 708. But quite obviously, eliminating the ability to appeal the second order does not eliminate the possibility that the second order will vindicate the defendant's right not to stand trial, and therefore308does not eliminate the supposed reason for declaring the first order nonfinal.The source of the First Circuit's confusion was its mistaken conception of the scope of protection afforded by qualified immunity. Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid "standing trial," but also to avoid the burdens of "such pretrial matters as discovery ... , as '[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.'" Mitchell, supra, at 526 (emphasis added) (quoting from Harlow, supra, at 817). Whether or not a later summary judgment motion is granted, denial of a motion to dismiss is conclusive as to this right. We would have thought that these and other statements from Mitchell and Harlow had settled the point, questioned by JUSTICE BREYER, see post, at 317, that this right is important enough to support an immediate appeal. If it were not, however, the consequence would be, not that only one pretrial appeal could be had in a given case, as JUSTICE BREYER proposes, but rather, that there could be no immediate appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss but only from denial of summary judgment. That conclusion is foreclosed by Mitchell, which unmistakably envisioned immediate appeal of "[t]he denial of a defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity." 472 U. S., at 527.The Court of Appeals in the present case, in the first of its two decisions, rested its "one-appeal" pronouncement upon the proposition that resolving the question of entitlement to qualified immunity "should not require more than one judiciously timed appeal." Pelletier, 968 F. 2d, at 871. It did not explain how this proposition pertains to the question of finality, but we suppose it could be argued that a category of appeals thought to be needless or superfluous does not raise a claim of right "too important to be denied review," as our Cohen finality jurisprudence requires, see 337 U. S., at 546.309In any event, the proposition is not sound. That one appeal on the immunity issue may not be enough is illustrated by the history of respondent's claims for loss of employment at Pioneer in the present case. Because these claims had initially been dismissed as time barred, the Court of Appeals refused to decide (and thus evidently regarded as an open question) whether one who holds his job subject to regulatory approval can assert a constitutionally cognizable expectation of continued employment. See Pelletier, supra, at 871-872. Thus, the question whether petitioner was entitled to immunity on these claims was not presented to any court until petitioner's summary judgment motion-and, by operation of the Ninth Circuit's one-appeal rule, has never been addressed by an appellate court.That is assuredly an unusual set of circumstances, but even in a case proceeding in a more normal fashion resolution of the immunity question may "require more than one judiciously timed appeal," because the legally relevant factors bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on summary judgment than on an earlier motion to dismiss. At that earlier stage, it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for "objective legal reasonableness." On summary judgment, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the Harlow inquiry. It is no more true that the defendant who has unsuccessfully appealed denial of a motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment, than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss has no need to make a motion for summary judgment.33JU8TICE BREYER suggests that the second of two pretrial qualified-immunity appeals does not come within Cohen's class of immediately ap-310The Court of Appeals expressed concern that a second appeal would tend to have the illegitimate purpose of delaying the proceedings. See 968 F. 2d, at 870-871. Undeniably, the availability of a second appeal affords an opportunity for abuse, but we have no reason to believe that abuse has often occurred. To the contrary, successive pretrial assertions of immunity seem to be a rare occurrence.4 Moreover, if and when abuse does occur, as we observed in the analogous context of interlocutory appeals on the issue of double jeopardy, "[i]t is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims." Abney, 431 U. S., at 662, n. 8. In the present case, for example, the District Court appropriately certified petitioner's immunity appeal as "frivolous" in light of the Court of Appeals' (unfortunately erroneous) one-appeal precedent. This practice, which has been embraced by several Circuits, enables the district court to re-pealable final orders because it is insufficiently "separable" from the claim raised on the first appeal, see post, at 316. But the Cohen "separability" component asks whether the question to be resolved on appeal is "conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 527 (1985). The appropriate comparison, then, is between the decision sought to be reviewed and the claim underlying the action itself-not between the decision and any previous appeal, as JusTICE BREYER suggests. And again, Mitchell clearly states that a denial of qualified immunity, whether on a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, is an "appealable 'final decision.''' Id., at 530.4 We are aware of only five reported cases-Mitchell itself, Nelson v.Silverman, 999 F.2d 417 (CA9 1993), Abel v. Miller, 904 F.2d 394 (CA7 1990), Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43 (CA2 1989), and the present case-in which Courts of Appeals have been twice asked to review successive pretrial assertions of immunity. See Abel, supra, at 396 ("Paucity of precedent [on successive interlocutory appeals] must reflect the forbearance of public officials rather than lack of opportunity"); Kaiter v. Boxford, 836 F.2d 704, 706 (CA1 1988) ("[I]n every case we have found which permitted interlocutory review of an immunity ruling, the defendant's entire claim to immunity was raised in a single proceeding").311tain jurisdiction pending summary disposition of the appeal, and thereby minimizes disruption of the ongoing proceedings. See, e. g., Chum an v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (CA9 1992); Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 448-449 (CA6 1991); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 576-577 (CAlO 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (CA7 1989). In any event, the question before us here-whether there is jurisdiction over the appeal, as opposed to whether the appeal is frivolous-must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order. "Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular case." Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 405 (1957). See also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994). As we have said, an order denying qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an "issue oflaw," Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 530, is immediately appealable.IIIOur rejection of the one-interlocutory-appeal rule does not dispose of this case. Respondent proposes two other reasons why appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available. First, he argues that no appeal is available where, even if the District Court's qualified-immunity ruling is reversed, the defendant will be required to endure discovery and trial on matters separate from the claims against which immunity was asserted. Respondent reasons that a ruling which does not reach all the claims does not "conclusively determin[e] the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial," id., at 527, and thus the order denying immunity cannot be said to be "final" within the meaning of Cohen.It is far from clear that, given the procedural posture of the present case, respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the proposition for which he argues; but we will address the proposition on its merits. The Courts of Appeals have312almost unanimously rejected it,5 and so do we. The Harlow right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general; when immunity with respect to those claims has been finally denied, appeal must be available, and cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition of other claims to the suit. Making appealability depend upon such a factor, particular to the case at hand, would violate the principle discussed above, that appealability determinations are made for classes of decisions, not individual orders in specific cases. Apart from these objections in principle, the practical effect of respondent's proposal would be intolerable. If the district court rules erroneously, the qualified-immunity right not to be subjected to pretrial proceedings will be eliminated, so long as the plaintiff has alleged (with or without evidence to back it up) violation of one "clearly established" right; and both that and the further right not to be subjected to trial itself will be eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive relief (for which no "clearly established" right need be alleged).Second, respondent asserts that appeal of denial of the summary judgment motion is not available because the denial rested on the ground that "[m]aterial issues of fact remain." This, he contends, renders the denial unappealable under last Term's decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S., at 313-318. That is a misreading of the case. Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.5 See, e. g., McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944,949 (CA6 1995); Green v.Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1148-1151 (CAll 1991) (en bane); Di Martini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922, 924-925 (CA9 1989), cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1204 (1991); Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 961-963 (CA4 1988); De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 717-718 (CAlO 1988); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 742, n. 1 (CA2 1988); Scott v. Lacy, 811 F. 2d 1153, 1153-1154 (CA7 1987); De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1188-1190 (CA1 1986); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401, 403-404 (CA8 1984). Only the Third Circuit holds otherwise. See Prisco v. United States Dept. of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 95-96, cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1089 (1989).31356, and Johnson surely does not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable. Johnson held, simply, that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly "separable" from the plaintiff's claim, and hence there is no "final decision" under Cohen and Mitchell. See 515 U. S., at 313-318. Johnson reaffirmed that summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an "abstract issu[e] of law" relating to qualified immunity, id., at 317-typically, the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was "clearly established," see, e. g., Mitchell, supra, at 530-535; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 190-193 (1984).Here the District Court's denial of petitioner's summary judgment motion necessarily determined that certain conduct attributed to petitioner (which was controverted) constituted a violation of clearly established law. Johnson permits petitioner to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow standard of "objective legal reasonableness." This argument was presented by petitioner in the trial court, and there is no apparent impediment to its being raised on appeal. And while the District Court, in denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, did not identify the particular charged conduct that it deemed adequately supported, Johnson recognizes that under such circumstances "a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed." Johnson, supra, at 319. That is the task now facing the Court of Appeals in this case.314The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered

OCTOBER TERM, 1995SyllabusBEHRENS v. PELLETIERCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITNo. 94-1244. Argued November 7, 1995-Decided February 21, 1996Respondent was fired as provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association after petitioner, the federal official responsible for monitoring Pioneer's operations, recommended such action because respondent was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution. Respondent filed this suit, seeking, inter alia, damages for alleged constitutional wrongs under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. In partially denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the Bivens claims, the District Court rejected petitioner's asserted defense of qualified immunity from suit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, but also stated, in dictum, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal. Ultimately, the court affirmed the District Court's rejection of petitioner's qualified-immunity defense, based on the allegations made in respondent's complaint. On remand and after further proceedings, the District Court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. Petitioner's appeal from that denial, his second pretrial appeal based on a rejection of the qualified-immunity defense, was summarily dismissed by the Ninth Circuit "for lack of jurisdiction."Held: A defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on a motion to dismiss does not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment. Pp. 305-314.(a) The Ninth Circuit's one-interlocutory-appeal rule is rejected. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530, this Court held that a district court's denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Mitchell plainly contemplated that a government officer could raise the qualified-immunity defense at both the motion-to-dismiss and the summary-judgment stage, see 472 U. S., at 526, and clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense at either stage is a "final" judgment subject to immediate appeal. An unsuccessful appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss cannot possibly render the later denial of a motion for summary judgment any300Syllabusless "final" than it would be absent the prior decision. It follows that petitioner's appeal seeks review of a "final decision" within § 1291 and that its dismissal by the Court of Appeals was improper. The Ninth Circuit's proposition that no more than one judiciously timed appeal should be necessary to safeguard a defendant's right to qualified immunity is unsound, because the factors determinative of the qualified-immunity question will be different on summary judgment, where the court looks to the uncontested evidence, than on an earlier motion to dismiss, where it merely looks to the allegations of the complaint. pp.305-311.(b) Respondent's additional arguments as to why dismissal was proper-(l) that the order denying qualified immunity could not be said to be "final" under Cohen since, even if it were to be reversed, petitioner would nonetheless be required to endure discovery and trial on other matters, and (2) that, under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, the denial of summary judgment is not immediately appealable because it rests on the determination that a genuine dispute exists as to material issues of fact-are also rejected. Pp.311-313.Reversed and remanded.SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 314.Lenard G. Weiss argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Christine A. Murphy.Cornelia T. L. Pillard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara L. Herwig, and Richard A. Olderman.Samuel T. Rees, by appointment of the Court, 515 U. S. 1101, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Michael J. White. ** Louise H. Renne, Dennis Aftergut, G. Scott Emblidge, Ronald R. Ball, David J. Erwin, J. Kenneth Brown, Norman Herring, Edward J. Foley, Charles J. Williams, James K. Hahn, Katherine J. Hamilton, Gregory P. Priamos, Edward J. Cooper, Rene Auguste Chouteau, Mark G. Sellers, David B. Brearley, and Robert E. Murphy filed a brief for the City and County of San Francisco as amicus curiae urging reversal.301Full Text of Opinion

1984_82-2157

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion for the Court.The issue presented is whether an employer who participates in a multiemployer benefit plan that is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., must allow the plan to conduct an audit involving the records of employees who the employer denies are participants in the plan.IAPetitioners are two large multiemployer benefit plans, the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund and the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund (hereinafter referred to collectively as Central States). [Footnote 1] Governed by § 302(c)(5) of Page 472 U. S. 562 the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, these plans operate as trusts for the purpose of providing specified health, welfare, and pension benefits to employees performing work that is covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated by various affiliates of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Teamsters).Respondents (hereinafter referred to collectively as Central Transport) are 16 interstate trucking companies, each of which, either individually or through a multiemployer association, engages in collective bargaining with the Teamsters. Pursuant to that bargaining, each has become a signatory to the National Master Freight Agreement and supplemental, individual collective bargaining agreements. Under these collective bargaining agreements, each employer must make weekly contributions to Central States for each employee who performs work covered by the collective bargaining agreements, and each employer agrees to be bound by the trust agreements that govern Central States.Because the plans are so large -- with thousands of participating employers -- Central States relies principally on employer self-reporting to determine the extent of an employer's liability. [Footnote 2] Central States polices this self-reporting Page 472 U. S. 563 system by conducting random audits of the records of participating employers.BOn December 5, 1979, Central States contacted Central Transport to arrange an audit, which it described as part of a program of "periodic reviews of participating employer contributions for the benefit of Plan Participants and their Beneficiaries.'" 522 F. Supp. 658, 662 (ED Mich.1981). The audit was to take place at Central Transport's offices and was to encompass, among other subjects, the "`[d]etermination of eligible Plan Participants covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements.'" Ibid,. Among the documents the auditors requested access to were payroll, tax, and other personnel records of those employees who the employer claimed were not plan participants.Central States explained that access to these records would allow the auditors independently to determine the membership of the class entitled to participate in the plans, and thus to verify that Central Transport was making all required contributions. [Footnote 3] Central Transport, however, insisted that 60% of its employees were not covered by the plans, and that Central States had no right to examine any records of noncovered employees. When Central Transport refused to allow the requested audit, Central States filed an action in Federal District Court seeking an"order permitting its auditors to conduct an independent verification of Central Transport's complete payroll records in order to determine Page 472 U. S. 564 whether the duties and status of each of its employees has been accurately reported by Central Transport."Id. at 660. [Footnote 4]The parties agreed that the facts of the case were not in dispute, and that the court should treat their pleadings as cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Central States. After examining Central States' contractual relationship with Central Transport and Central States' responsibilities under ERISA, the court concluded that Central States had a right to conduct the requested audit. The audit was a reasonable means of "independently verify[ing] the status and duties of all individuals employed by Central Transport in order to insure that proper benefit contribution payments are being made." Ibid. The court thus ordered "that Central Transport provide to the audit representatives of Central States all of the documentation requested and that the audit procedure undertaken by Central States be allowed to continue." Ibid. [Footnote 5]The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 698 F.2d 802 (1983). Interpreting the collective bargaining agreements and trust documents in light of ERISA, the Court of Appeals held that Central States had to show "reasonable cause" to believe that a specific employee was covered by the plans before gaining a right of access to that employee's records. Id. at 809-812. We granted certiorari, 467 U.S. 1250 (1984), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Page 472 U. S. 565IIThe documents governing Central Transport's contractual relationship with Central States include the collective bargaining agreements between Central Transport and various affiliates of the Teamsters and the trust agreements of the Central States plans. Generally, the collective bargaining agreements obligate Central Transport to participate in the Central States plans and to be bound by Central States' trust agreements. The trust agreements, which have been signed by Central Transport, govern the operation of the plans.These trust documents include a number of provisions that are highly supportive of the right to audit claimed by Central States' trustees.AWe note first that the Pension Fund trust agreement [Footnote 6] places on each participating employer the responsibility to make "continuing and prompt payments to the Trust Fund as required by the applicable collective bargaining agreement." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-44 (Art. III, § 1). The trustees are designated the recipients of all contributions and are "vested with all right, title and interest in and to such moneys." Ibid. (Art. III, § 3).The agreement contains various specific and general grants of power to the trustees to enable them to administer the trusts properly. Most generally, the agreements authorize the trustees to "do all acts, whether or not expressly authorized . . . which [they] may deem necessary or proper for the protection of the property held [under the trust agreement]." Id. at A-47 (Art. IV, § 14(e)). The agreement also grants broad powers relating to the collection of employer contributions, Page 472 U. S. 566 such as the power "to demand and collect the contributions of the Employers to the Fund," id. at A-45 (Art. III, § 4), and the power to"take such steps . . . as the Trustees in their discretion deem in the best interest of the Fund to effectuate the collection or preservation of contributions . . . which may be owed to the Trust Fund."Ibid.Among the more specific grants of trustee power is a power to demand and examine employer records:"Production of Records -- Each employer shall promptly furnish to the Trustees, upon reasonable demand the names and current addresses of its Employees, their Social Security numbers, the hours worked by each Employee and past industry employment history in its files and such other information as the Trustees may reasonably require in connection with the administration of the Trust. The Trustees may, by their representatives, examine the pertinent records of each Employer at the Employer's place of business whenever such examination is deemed necessary or advisable by the Trustees in connection with the proper administration of the Trust."Id. at A-46 (Art. III, § 5) (emphasis added).BCentral States' trustees interpret these provisions as authorizing random field audits like the one at issue in this case. In particular, they argue that the records of not-concedely-covered employees are "pertinent records" because their examination is a "proper" means of verifying that the employer has accurately determined the class of covered employees. The plans have a substantial interest in verifying the employer's determination of participant status, the trustees argue, because an employer's failure to report all those who perform bargaining unit work may prevent the plans from notifying participants and beneficiaries of their entitlements and obligations under the plans and may create Page 472 U. S. 567 unfunded liabilities chargeable against the plans. [Footnote 7] Moreover, an employer has an incentive to underreport the number of employees covered, because such underreporting would reduce his liability to the plans.The reasonableness and propriety of the audit are confirmed, the trustees argue, by the accounting profession's generally accepted auditing standards, which articulate the elementary principle that for an auditor to verify a certain selection decision, he must refer to a universe broader than the selection itself:"When planning a particular sample, the auditor should consider the specific audit objective to be achieved and should determine that the audit procedure, or combination of procedures to be applied will achieve that objective. The auditor should determine that the population from which he draws the sample is appropriate for the specific audit objective. For example, an auditor would not be able to detect understatements of an account due to omitted items by sampling the recorded items. An appropriate sampling plan for detecting such understatements would involve selecting from a source in which the omitted items are included."American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 350.17, p. 223 (1985) (emphasis added). Page 472 U. S. 568The trustees' determination that the trust documents authorize their access to the records here in dispute has significant weight, for the trust agreement explicitly provides that "any construction [of the agreement's provisions] adopted by the Trustees in good faith shall be binding upon the Union, Employees and Employers." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-48 (Art. IV, § 17). [Footnote 8] There has been no evidence of a bad-faith motive behind the trustees' determination of the scope of their powers under the trust agreement or behind their determination of the auditing program's propriety. The trustees assert that the requested audit is highly relevant to the trust's legitimate interests, and this assertion fully conforms to generally accepted auditing standards. Thus, if our inquiry were merely an inquiry into the trust agreement, the trustees' right to conduct the audit in question would seem clear.IIIThe Court of Appeals, nonetheless, rejected the Central States trustees' interpretation of their contractual power. In the court's view, such an auditing power would be unreasonable in light of the policies and protections embodied in ERISA. We agree with the Court of Appeals that trust documents cannot excuse trustees from their duties under ERISA, and that trust documents must generally be construed in light of ERISA's policies, see 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D), but we find no inherent inconsistency between ERISA and the interpretation of the trust agreement offered by the Central States trustees. Indeed, we find the Page 472 U. S. 569 trustees' interpretation of their documents to be entirely reasonable in light of ERISA's policies.An examination of the duties of plan trustees under ERISA, and under the common law of trusts upon which ERISA's duties are based, makes clear that the requested audit is highly relevant to legitimate trustee concerns.AThis Court has on a number of occasions discussed the policy concerns behind ERISA. In Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S. 359, 446 U. S. 361 (1980), we noted that Congress enacted ERISA after "almost a decade of studying the Nation's private pension plans" and other employee benefit plans. [Footnote 9] Congress found that there had been a "rapid and substantial" growth in the "size, scope, and numbers" of employee benefit plans and that "the continued wellbeing and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). But it also recognized that "owing to the inadequacy of [pre-ERISA] minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may [have been] endangered." Ibid. We have recognized that one of ERISA's principal purposes was "to correct this condition by making sure that, if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement -- and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit -- he actually will receive it." 446 Page 472 U. S. 570 U.S. at 446 U. S. 375. One of the methods of accomplishing this was the provision of "minimum standards" that would "assur[e] the equitable character of [employee benefit plans] and their financial soundness." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).BIn general, trustees' responsibilities and powers under ERISA reflect Congress' policy of "assuring the equitable character" of the plans. Thus, rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility. [Footnote 10] Under the common law of trusts, as under the Central States trust agreements, trustees are understood to have all "such powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes of the trust." 3 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 186, p. 1496 (3d ed.1967) (hereinafter Scott). [Footnote 11]The manner in which trustee powers may be exercised, however, is further defined in the statute through the provision of strict standards of trustee conduct, also derived from the common law of trusts -- most prominently, a standard of loyalty and a standard of care. Under the former, a plan Page 472 U. S. 571 fiduciary"shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and . . . defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan."29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). See also § 1103(c)(1); cf. § 186(c)(5). Under the latter, a fiduciary"shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."§ 1104(a)(1)(B). [Footnote 12]An examination of the structure of ERISA in light of the particular duties and powers of trustees under the common law leaves no doubt as to the validity and weight of the audit goals on which Central States relies. ERISA clearly assumes that trustees will act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled, so that those funds can be used on behalf of participants and beneficiaries, and that trustees Page 472 U. S. 572 will take steps to identify all participants and beneficiaries, so that the trustees can make them aware of their status and rights under the trust's terms.COne of the fundamental common law duties of a trustee is to preserve and maintain trust assets, Bogert § 582, at 346, and this encompasses "determin[ing] exactly what property forms the subject matter of the trust [and] who are the beneficiaries." Id. § 583, at 348 (footnotes omitted). The trustee is thus expected to "use reasonable diligence to discover the location of the trust property and to take control of it without unnecessary delay." Id. at 355. [Footnote 13] A trustee is similarly expected to "investigate the identity of the beneficiary when the trust documents do not clearly fix such party" and to "notify the beneficiaries under the trust of the gifts made to them." Id. at 348-349, n. 40.The provisions of ERISA make clear that a benefit plan trustee is similarly subject to these responsibilities, not only as a result of the general fiduciary standards of loyalty and care, borrowed as they are from the common law, but also as a result of more specific trustee duties itemized in the Act. For example, the Act's minimum reporting and disclosure standards require benefit plans to furnish all participants with various documents informing them of their rights and obligations under the plan, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1022, 1024(b), [Footnote 14] a task that would certainly include the duty of determining who is in fact a plan participant. [Footnote 15] The Act also Page 472 U. S. 573 requires that a benefit plan prevent participant employers from gaining even temporary use of assets to which the plan is entitled, see § 1106(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting trustees from "caus[ing] the plan to engage in a transaction, if . . . such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect . . . extension of credit" to a participating employer), a requirement that would certainly create a trustee responsibility for assuring full and prompt collection of contributions owed to the plan. [Footnote 16]Moreover, that these trustee duties support the auditing authority claimed in this case is strongly suggested by the other provisions of ERISA as well as by the positions of the administrative agencies charged with the administration of the Act. For example, § 209 of the Act supplements the benefit plans' duties to furnish reports to plan participants by requiring employers to maintain records on employees and to furnish to benefit plans the information needed for the plans' fulfillment of their reporting duties. 29 U.S.C. § 1059. The Secretary of Labor has explicitly interpreted the trustees' duty to prevent employer use of trust assets as creating a plan duty to verify employer determinations and requiring plans to adopt systems for policing employers. And the Secretary has endorsed the appropriateness of field auditing programs for this purpose. Thus, the Secretary notes that"many multiple employer plans have adopted written procedures for the orderly collection of delinquent employer contributions which involve reasonable, diligent and systematic Page 472 U. S. 574 methods for the review of employer contribution accounts by means of, for example, . . . field audits."In the Department's view, plans "which do not establish and implement [such] collection procedures" may "by failing to collect delinquent contributions" be found to have violated § 406's prohibition of extensions of credit to employers. Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-1, 41 Fed.Reg. 12740, 12741 (1976); accord, Department of Labor Advisory Op.No. 78-28A (Dec. 5, 1978) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. A71-A74).In light of the general policies behind ERISA as well as the particular provisions of the statute, we can only conclude that there is no conflict between ERISA and those concerns offered by Central States to justify its audit program. Both the concern for fully informing participants of their rights and status under a plan and the concern for assuring the financial integrity of the plans by determining the class of potential benefit claimants and holding employers to the full and prompt fulfillment of their contribution obligations are proper and weighty within the framework of ERISA.IVThe Court of Appeals offered a number of reasons why the requested audit would nevertheless be improper as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals largely relied on the presence of alternative means of protecting a plan's interests to conclude that a plan's access to employee records could safely be limited to those instances where a plan shows "reasonable cause" to believe that a specific employee is a participant. The court speculated that "[t]he Funds enjoy a number of protections against being called upon to dispense benefits to a participant on whose behalf no contributions or insufficient contributions were made," 698 F.2d at 813, that the plans thus did not need primarily to rely on its own monitoring to safeguard its interests, and that therefore "the possibility of Page 472 U. S. 575 liability . . . on the part of . . . the Funds [could] not justify the broad audit [the trustees] seek." Ibid.AThe Court of Appeals first noted that employer contributions could effectively be policed by interested unions or by the Secretary of Labor, thus diminishing the trustees' interests in independently monitoring employer compliance. Moreover, in the court's view, a plan's reliance on union or Government oversight of an employer's contributions would be more consistent with federal policies in the pension and labor fields than would be a plan's reliance on the sort of audit at issue here.(1)The notion that federal policy favors union enforcement of an employer's collectively bargained obligations to a benefit plan, to the exclusion of enforcement by the plan's trustees, simply did not survive last Term's decision in Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U. S. 364 (1984). In Schneider, we held that a benefit plan could bring an independent action for judicial enforcement of an employer's trust obligations, and we in large part relied on the proposition that there was no federal policy favoring trustee dependence on a union's use of a grievance and arbitration system for such enforcement. [Footnote 17]Of greatest significance here is this Court's conclusion that compelling benefit plans to rely on unions would erode the protections ERISA assures to beneficiaries, for the diminishment of trustee responsibility that would result would not necessarily be made up for by the union. ERISA places strict duties on trustees with respect to the interests of Page 472 U. S. 576 beneficiaries, and unions' duties toward beneficiaries are of a quite different scope.A trustee's duty extends to all participants and beneficiaries of a multiemployer plan, while a local union's duty is confined to current employees employed in the bargaining unit in which it has representational rights. The breadth of the trustee's duty may result in a very different view of the special situations that may exist in any single unit, and, as we recognized in Schneider, a union's arrangements with a particular employer might compromise the broader interests of the plan as a whole:"These are multiemployer trust funds. Each of the participating unions and employers has an interest in the prompt collection of the proper contribution from each employer. Any diminution of the fund caused by the arbitration requirements of a particular employer's collective bargaining agreement would have an adverse effect on the other participants."466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 373 (footnotes omitted). See also Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 361 U. S. 459, 361 U. S. 469 (1960). See generally Schneider, supra, at 466 U. S. 376, n. 22 (the union's duty "runs only to the members of its collective bargaining unit, and is coextensive with its statutory authority to act as the exclusive representative for all the employees within the unit"). [Footnote 18]Similarly, a local union's duties to bargaining unit workers is a general duty to act in the group's interests regarding the overall terms and conditions of employment. The trustees' Page 472 U. S. 577 duty, in contrast, is to provide specific benefits to those who are entitled to them in accordance with the terms of a plan. That the general nature of a union's duty may result in less than full protection to individual entitlements has been well recognized in our cases, and we have accordingly refrained from making enforcement of such entitlements rest primarily on union action. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 450 U. S. 742 (1981) (union goal of maximizing overall compensation for the bargaining unit as a whole may prevent it from effectively policing employer's payment to each employee of statutory minimum wages). In Schneider, we recognized that in the context of ERISA primary reliance on unions would allow "wide discretion and would provide only limited protection," 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 376, n. 22, to those participant and beneficiary rights that the statute was designed to ensure:"A primary union objective is 'to maximize overall compensation of its members.' Thus, it may sacrifice particular elements of the compensation package 'if an alternative expenditure of resources would result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a whole.'"Ibid. (citation omitted). See also NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 453 U. S. 336 (1981) ("The atmosphere in which employee benefit trust fund fiduciaries must operate, as mandated by [29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)] and ERISA, is wholly inconsistent with th[e] process of compromise and economic pressure [that characterizes collective bargaining]").The rationale in Schneider and our other cases in this area thus precludes a holding that a benefit plan must primarily rely on union monitoring of an employer's compliance with its trust obligations. [Footnote 19] Page 472 U. S. 578(2)There are also compelling reasons why the Department of Labor's power to police employer compliance must be rejected as an alternative to audits by the plans themselves. Indeed, the structure of ERISA makes clear that Congress did not intend for Government enforcement powers to lessen the responsibilities of plan fiduciaries.First, the Department of Labor denies that it has the resources for policing the day-to-day operations of each multiemployer benefit plan in the Nation. The United States, as amicus, informs us that approximately 900,000 benefit plans file annual reports with the Secretary of Labor, and that between 11,000 and 12,000 of these are multiemployer plans. As the petitioners' situations illustrate, some multiemployer plans can be quite large. See n 1, supra. It is therefore not surprising that the United States argues that"[i]t is thus wholly unrealistic to suggest that centralizing all auditing authority in the Secretary would provide protection to benefit plan participants comparable to that afforded by trustee audits."Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 11.Second, although ERISA grants the Secretary of Labor broad investigatory powers, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1134, neither the structure of the Act nor the legislative history shows any congressional intent that plans should rely primarily on centralized federal monitoring of employer contribution requirements. Indeed, Congress expressly withheld from the Secretary the authority to initiate actions to enforce an employer's contribution obligations. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(b)(2), 1145. In contrast, as we have noted, trustees Page 472 U. S. 579 were given the authority to sue to enforce an employer's obligations to a plan. § 1132.BThe Court of Appeals also challenged Central States' need for the audit because of the likelihood that covered employees would themselves come forward to assure that employers are making required contributions on their behalf. The court emphasized that participants could become aware of their status through the Act's reporting provisions. 698 F.2d at 813 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1021). But although the reporting requirements are designed to assure that participants receive information about their status and rights, they do so by placing a reporting duty on the plans. Thus, to give participants initial notice of their status, the plans need to know the identities of participants. See nn. 14 15 supra, and accompanying text. That is, of course, precisely the information that Central States sought to verify in its requested audit. [Footnote 20] Page 472 U. S. 580CThe Court of Appeals' remaining reason for questioning Central States' interest in the audit focused on the fact that a benefit plan would have an action against a delinquent employer should any benefit claims ever be made by a participant who had never been the subject of contributions. We reject the notion that the plan's ultimate ability to remedy an employer's breach of its obligations forecloses the plan from seeking to deter such breaches or to discover them early. Such a suggestion ignores the trustees' fiduciary duty to inform participants and beneficiaries of their rights, to gain immediate use of trust assets for the benefit of the trust, to avoid the time and expense of litigation, and to avoid unfunded liabilities that might eventually prove uncollectable as a result of insolvencies. For a plan passively to allow an employer to create such unfunded liabilities would jeopardize the participants' and beneficiaries' interests as well as those of all participating employers who properly comply with their obligations. See Schneider, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 373, and n. 17.The Court of Appeals' argument obviously conflicts with one of the principal congressional concerns motivating the passage of the Act, that plans should assure themselves of adequate funding by promptly collecting employer contributions. [Footnote 21] In ERISA, Congress sought to create a pension system in which "[a]ll current accruals of benefits based on current service . . . [would] be paid for immediately." H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 14 (1973). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1082. As the Reports accompanying the bills declared:"The pension plan which offers full protection to its employees is one which is funded with accumulated assets which at least are equal to the accrued liabilities, Page 472 U. S. 581 and with a contribution rate sufficient to maintain that status at all times."Id. at 7; S.Rep. No. 93-127, pp. 9-10 (1973) (identical language). [Footnote 22]VGiven Congress' vision of the proper administration of employee benefit plans under ERISA, we have little difficulty holding that the audit requested by Central States is well within the authority of the trustees as outlined in the trust documents. But we should also specify what we do not hold. First, we do not hold that under ERISA a benefit plan's interests in fully identifying participants and beneficiaries require that it conduct the sort of audit in question. This case involves only the trustees' right to conduct this particular kind of audit program, not their duty to do so. Second, we have no occasion to determine whether ERISA would independently confer on the trustees a right to perform the sort of audit demanded in this case in the face of trust documents that explicitly limit the audit powers of trustees. Cf. 29 Page 472 U. S. 582 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). Last, we have no occasion in this case to analyze what sort of factual showing would be necessary to a claim that a particular auditing program was being conducted in a manner that violated ERISA's fiduciary duties of loyalty or care. Although we do not question the proposition that the auditing powers of a benefit plan are limited to prudent actions furthering the legitimate purposes of the plan, there is no reason in ERISA or the plan documents of this case why the kind of audit requested here should, as a matter of law, be considered outside the scope of proper plan administration. [Footnote 23]The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed.It is so ordered

U.S. Supreme CourtCentral States Pension Fund v. Central Transp., 472 U.S. 559 (1985)Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fundv. Central Transport, Inc.No. 82-2157Argued November 27, 1984Decided June 19, 1985472 U.S. 559SyllabusPetitioners are multiemployer benefit plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plans operate under trust agreements for the purpose of providing health, welfare, and pension benefits to employees performing work that is covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated between a labor union and respondent trucking companies. Under these collective bargaining agreements, each employer must make weekly contributions to petitioners for each such employee, and each employer agrees to be bound by the trust agreements. Because they are so large, petitioners rely on employer self-reporting to determine the extent of an employer's contribution liability, and police this self-reporting system by conducting random audits of the participating employers' records. When respondents refused to allow petitioners' requested audit of respondents' payroll, tax, and personnel records, including records of employees who respondents claimed were not plan participants, petitioners filed an action in Federal District Court seeking an order permitting the audit. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioners had to show "reasonable cause" to believe that a specific employee was covered by the plans before gaining a right of access to that employee's records.Held: Respondents must allow petitioners to conduct the requested audit. Pp. 472 U. S. 565-581.(a) Various provisions of the trust agreements granting the trustees power to enable them to administer the trusts properly, including a provision granting power to demand and examine pertinent employer records, support the right to audit claimed by petitioners. Moreover, petitioners' assertion that the requested audit is highly relevant to the trust agreements' legitimate interests fully conforms to generally accepted auditing standards. Pp. 472 U. S. 565-568.(b) Petitioners' trustees' interpretation of the trust agreements as authorizing the requested audit is not inconsistent with ERISA, and indeed, is entirely reasonable in light of ERISA's policies. Rather Page 472 U. S. 560 than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the scope of their authority and responsibility. Under the common law, trustees have all such powers as are necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the trust purposes, and an examination of ERISA's structure in light of the common law leaves no doubt as to the validity and weight of the audit goals on which petitioners rely. Both the concerns for fully informing participants of their rights and status under a plan and for assuring the financial integrity of the plans by determining the class of potential benefit claimants and by holding employers to the full and prompt fulfillment of their contribution obligations are proper and weighty within ERISA's framework. Pp. 472 U. S. 568-574.(c) A benefit plan should not have to rely on union monitoring of an employer's compliance with its trust obligations as an alternative to audits by the plans themselves. Cf. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U. S. 364. A trustee's duty extends to all participants and beneficiaries of a multiemployer plan, whereas a union's duty is confined to current employees employed in the bargaining unit in which it has representational rights. Nor would the Department of Labor's policing of employer compliance be an acceptable alternative. That Department has insufficient resources for such policing, and neither ERISA's structure nor its legislative history shows any congressional intent that benefit plans should rely primarily on centralized federal monitoring of employer contributions requirements. Pp. 472 U. S. 575-579.(d) To rely on covered employees themselves to come forward to assure that employers make the required contributions would not be feasible. While ERISA's reporting requirements are designed to assure that participants receive information about their status and rights, they do so by placing a reporting duty on the plans. Thus, to give participants initial notice of their status, the plans would need to know the participants' identities, the very information that the requested audit here sought to verify. P. 472 U. S. 579.(e) The fact that a benefit plan could bring an action against a delinquent employer as the employer's breaches of its obligations are discovered does not foreclose the plan from seeking to deter such breaches or discover them early. To suggest that a plan should be so foreclosed ignores the trustees' various fiduciary duties under ERISA and conflicts with ERISA's concern that plans should assure themselves of adequate funding by promptly collecting employer contributions. Pp. 472 U. S. 580-581.698 F.2d 802, reversed.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., Page 472 U. S. 561 filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 472 U. S. 582.

2002_02-311

Syllabusfrom precedents in which this Court has found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable. The record of the sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly stemmed from inattention, not strategic judgment. Until the trial court denied their bifurcation motion, they had had every reason to develop the most powerful mitigation case possible. During the sentencing process itself, counsel did not focus exclusively on Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder; rather they put on a halfhearted mitigation case instead. The Maryland Court of Appeals' assumption that counsel's investigation was adequate reflected an unreasonable application of Strickland. In deferring to counsel's decision not to present every conceivable mitigation defense despite the fact that counsel based their alleged choice on an inadequate investigation, the Maryland Court of Appeals further unreasonably applied Strickland. And the court's conclusion that the social services records revealed incidences of sexual abuse, when they in fact did not, reflects "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2). Contrary to the State's and the United States' contention, the record as a whole does not support the conclusion that counsel conducted a more thorough investigation than the one this Court describes. Ultimately, this Court's conclusion that counsel's investigation was inadequate does not mean that Strickland requires counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require counsel to present such evidence at sentencing in every case. Rather, the conclusion is based on the much more limited principle that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable" only to the extent that "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, supra, at 690-691. Pp. 523-534.(c) Counsel's failures prejudiced Wiggins' defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the proceeding's result would have been different. Strickland, supra, at 694. This Court assesses prejudice by reweighing the aggravating evidence against the totality of the mitigating evidence adduced both at trial and in the habeas proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 397-398. The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present here is powerful. Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother and physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape while in foster care. His time spent homeless and his diminished mental capacities further augment his mitigation case. He513thus has the kind of troubled history relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 319. Given the nature and extent of the abuse, there is a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing, and that a jury confronted with such mitigating evidence would have returned with a different sentence. The only significant mitigating factor the jury heard was that Wiggins had no prior convictions. Had it been able to place his excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance. Wiggins had no record of violent conduct that the State could have introduced to offset this powerful mitigating narrative. Thus, the available mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of his moral culpability. Pp. 534-538.288 F.3d 629, reversed and remanded.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 538.Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.With him on the briefs were Ian Heath Gershengorn and Lara M. Flint.Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General of Maryland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, and Kathryn Grill Graeff and Ann N. Bosse, Assistant Attorneys General.Dan Himmelfarb argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Robert J. Erickson. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by Alfred P. Carlton, Lawrence J. Fox, David J. Kessler, and Robin M. Maher; for the Constitution Project by Virginia E. Sloan and Stephen F. Hanlon; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by David A. Reiser, Eleanor H. Smith, and Lisa B. Kemler; for the National Association of Social Workers et al. by Thomas C. Gold-514JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, Kevin Wiggins, argues that his attorneys' failure to investigate his background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life history at his capital sentencing proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In this case, we consider whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in upholding the Maryland Court of Appeals' rejection of this claim.I AOn September 17, 1988, police discovered 77-year-old Florence Lacs drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 585, 724 A. 2d 1, 5 (1999). The State indicted petitioner for the crime on October 20, 1988, and later filed a notice of intention to seek the death penalty. Two Baltimore County public defenders, Carl Schlaich and Michelle Nethercott, assumed responsibility for Wiggins' case. In July 1989, petitioner elected to be tried before a judge in Baltimore Countystein and Amy Howe; and for Janet F. Reno et al. by Robert S. Litt, Kathleen A. Behan, and John A. Freedman.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Kristofer Jorstad, A. Scott Hayward, and Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Larry Long of South Dakota, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Jerry W Kilgore of Virginia, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.515Circuit Court. Ibid. On August 4, after a 4-day trial, the court found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft. App. 32.After his conviction, Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury, and the trial court scheduled the proceedings to begin on October 11, 1989. On September 11, counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of sentencing in hopes of presenting Wiggins' case in two phases. Id., at 34. Counsel intended first to prove that Wiggins did not act as a "principal in the first degree," ibid.-i. e., that he did not kill the victim by his own hand. See Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413 (1996) (requiring proof of direct responsibility for death eligibility). Counsel then intended, if necessary, to present a mitigation case. In the memorandum in support of their motion, counsel argued that bifurcation would enable them to present each case in its best light; separating the two cases would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting their claim that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder. App. 36-42, 37.On October 12, the court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings commenced immediately thereafter. In her opening statement, N ethercott told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually killed Lacs. Id., at 70-71. Counsel then explained that the judge would instruct them to weigh Wiggins' clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She concluded: "'You're going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. But he's worked. He's tried to be a productive citizen, and he's reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no convictions, period .... I think that's an important thing for you to consider.'" Id., at 72. During the proceedings themselves, however, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins' life history.Before closing arguments, Schlaich made a proffer to the court, outside the presence of the jury, to preserve bifurca-516tion as an issue for appeal. He detailed the mitigation case counsel would have presented had the court granted their bifurcation motion. He explained that they would have introduced psychological reports and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins' limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state on the one hand, and the absence of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for empathy, and his desire to function in the world on the other. See id., at 349-351. At no point did Schlaich proffer any evidence of petitioner's life history or family background. On October 18, the court instructed the jury on the sentencing task before it, and later that afternoon, the jury returned with a sentence of death. Id., at 409-410. A divided Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 597 A. 2d 1359 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1007 (1992).BIn 1993, Wiggins sought postconviction relief in Baltimore County Circuit Court. With new counsel, he challenged the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, arguing that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. App. to Pet. for Cert. 132a. To support his claim, petitioner presented testimony by Hans Selvog, a licensed social worker certified as an expert by the court. App. 419. Selvog testified concerning an elaborate social history report he had prepared containing evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents. Relying on state social services, medical, and school records, as well as interviews with petitioner and numerous family members, Selvog chronicled petitioner's bleak life history. App. to Pet. for Cert. 163a.According to Selvog's report, petitioner's mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home alone517for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage. Id., at 166a-167a. Mrs. Wiggins' abusive behavior included beating the children for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked. She had sex with men while her children slept in the same bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner's hand against a hot stove burner-an incident that led to petitioner's hospitalization. Id., at 167a171a. At the age of six, the State placed Wiggins in foster care. Petitioner's first and second foster mothers abused him physically, id., at 175a-176a, and, as petitioner explained to Selvog, the father in his second foster home repeatedly molested and raped him. Id., at 176a-179a. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and began living on the streets. He returned intermittently to additional foster homes, including one in which the foster mother's sons allegedly gang-raped him on more than one occasion. Id., at 190a. After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job Corps program and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor. Id., at 192a.During the postconviction proceedings, Schlaich testified that he did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history, even though the State made funds available for that purpose. App. 487-488. He explained that he and Nethercott, well in advance of trial, decided to focus their efforts on "'retry[ing] the factual case'" and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder. Id., at 485-486. In April 1994, at the close of the proceedings, the judge observed from the bench that he could not remember a capital case in which counsel had not compiled a social history of the defendant, explaining, "'[n]ot to do a social history, at least to see what you have got, to me is absolute error. I just-I would be flabbergasted if the Court of Appeals said anything else.'" Id., at 605. In October 1997, however, the trial court denied Wiggins' petition for postconviction relief. The court concluded that "when the decision not to investigate ... is a matter of trial tactics, there is no518ineffective assistance of counsel." App. to Pet. for Cert. 155a-156a.The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that trial counsel had made "a deliberate, tactical decision to concentrate their effort at convincing the jury" that appellant was not directly responsible for the murder. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court observed that counsel knew of Wiggins' unfortunate childhood. They had available to them both the presentence investigation (PSI) report prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation, as required by Maryland law, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1988), as well as "more detailed social service records that recorded incidences of physical and sexual abuse, an alcoholic mother, placements in foster care, and borderline retardation." 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court acknowledged that this evidence was neither as detailed nor as graphic as the history elaborated in the Selvog report but emphasized that "counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant's background." Id., at 610,724 A. 2d, at 16 (emphasis in original). Counsel knew that at least one uncontested mitigating factor-Wiggins' lack of prior convictions-would be before the jury should their attempt to disprove Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder fail. As a result, the court concluded, Schlaich and Nethercott "made a reasoned choice to proceed with what they thought was their best defense." Id., at 611-612, 724 A. 2d, at 17.CIn September 2001, Wiggins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The trial court granted him relief, holding that the Maryland courts' rejection of his ineffective assistance claim "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000)). The court rejected the State's defense of counsel's "tactical" decision to "'retry519guilt,'" concluding that for a strategic decision to be reasonable, it must be "based upon information the attorney has made after conducting a reasonable investigation." 164 F. Supp. 2d, at 558. The court found that though counsel were aware of some aspects of Wiggins' background, that knowledge did not excuse them from their duty to make a "fully informed and deliberate decision" about whether to present a mitigation case. In fact, the court concluded, their knowledge triggered an obligation to look further. Id., at 559.Reviewing the District Court's decision de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on petitioner's direct responsibility. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 639-640 (2002). The court contrasted counsel's complete failure to investigate potential mitigating evidence in Williams, 288 F. 3d, at 640, with the fact that Schlaich and N ethercott knew at least some details of Wiggins' childhood from the PSI and social services records, id., at 641. The court acknowledged that counsel likely knew further investigation "would have resulted in more sordid details surfacing," but agreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals that counsel's knowledge of the avenues of mitigation available to them "was sufficient to make an informed strategic choice" to challenge petitioner's direct responsibility for the murder. Id., at 641-642. The court emphasized that conflicting medical testimony with respect to the time of death, the absence of direct evidence against Wiggins, and unexplained forensic evidence at the crime scene supported counsel's strategy. Id., at 641.We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1027 (2002), and now reverse.II APetitioner renews his contention that his attorneys' performance at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right520to effective assistance of counsel. The amendments to 28 U. S. C. § 2254, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), circumscribe our consideration of Wiggins' claim and require us to limit our analysis to the law as it was "clearly established" by our precedents at the time of the state court's decision. Section 2254 provides:"(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or"(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."We have made clear that the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to "grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts" of petitioner's case. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 413; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 694 (2002). In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a "governing legal principle" to "a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 76 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 407). In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of our precedent "unreasonable," the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. See Lockyer, supra, at 75. The state court's appli-521cation must have been "objectively unreasonable." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S., at 409.We established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id., at 687. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id., at 688. We have declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead have emphasized that "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Ibid.In this case, as in Strickland, petitioner's claim stems from counsel's decision to limit the scope of their investigation into potential mitigating evidence. Id., at 673. Here, as in Strickland, counsel attempt to justify their limited investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead. In rejecting the respondent's claim, we defined the deference owed such strategic judgments in terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting those judgments:"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circum-522stances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id., at 690-691.Our opinion in Williams v. Taylor is illustrative of the proper application of these standards. In finding Williams' ineffectiveness claim meritorious, we applied Strickland and concluded that counsel's failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confessions, because counsel had not "fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background." 529 U. S., at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)). While Williams had not yet been decided at the time the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered the decision at issue in this case, cf. post, at 542 (SCALIA, J., dissenting), Williams' case was before us on habeas review. Contrary to the dissent's contention, post, at 543, we therefore made no new law in resolving Williams' ineffectiveness claim. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 390 (noting that the merits of Williams' claim "are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland"); see also id., at 395 (noting that the trial court correctly applied both components of the Strickland standard to petitioner's claim and proceeding to discuss counsel's failure to investigate as a violation of Strickland's performance prong). In highlighting counsel's duty to investigate, and in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, we applied the same "clearly established" precedent of Strickland we apply today. Cf. 466 U. S., at 690-691 (establishing that "thorough investigation[s]" are "virtually unchallengeable" and underscoring that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations"); see also id., at 688-689 ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable").In light of these standards, our principal concern in deciding whether Schlaich and Nethercott exercised "reasonable523professional judgmen[t]," id., at 691, is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itself reasonable. Ibid. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 415 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (noting counsel's duty to conduct the "requisite, diligent" investigation into his client's background). In assessing counsel's investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, measured for "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms," Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen "from counsel's perspective at the time," id., at 689 ("[E]very effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight").B 1The record demonstrates that counsel's investigation drew from three sources. App. 490-491. Counsel arranged for William Stejskal, a psychologist, to conduct a number of tests on petitioner. Stejskal concluded that petitioner had an IQ of 79, had difficulty coping with demanding situations, and exhibited features of a personality disorder. Id., at 4445, 349-351. These reports revealed nothing, however, of petitioner's life history. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25.With respect to that history, counsel had available to them the written PSI, which included a one-page account of Wiggins' "personal history" noting his "misery as a youth," quoting his description of his own background as "'disgusting,'" and observing that he spent most of his life in foster care. App. 20-21. Counsel also "tracked down" records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) documenting petitioner's various placements in the State's foster care system. Id., at 490; Lodging of Petitioner. In describing the scope of counsel's investigation into petitioner's524life history, both the Fourth Circuit and the Maryland Court of Appeals referred only to these two sources of information. See 288 F. 3d, at 640-641; Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608609, 724 A. 2d, at 15.Counsel's decision not to expand their investigation beyond the PSI and the DSS records fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989. As Schlaich acknowledged, standard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins' trial included the preparation of a social history report. App. 488. Despite the fact that the Public Defender's office made funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to commission such a report. Id., at 487. Counsel's conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have referred as "guides to determining what is reasonable." Strickland, supra, at 688; Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 396. The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor." ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989) (emphasis added). Despite these well-defined norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources. Cf. id., 11.8.6, p. 133 (noting that among the topics counsel should consider presenting are medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences (emphasis added)); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1982) ("The lawyer also has a substantial and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and525to the court at sentencing .... Investigation is essential to fulfillment of these functions").The scope of their investigation was also unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the DSS records. The records revealed several facts: Petitioner's mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without food. See Lodging of Petitioner 54-95, 126, 131-136, 140, 147, 159-176. As the Federal District Court emphasized, any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of any aggravating factors in petitioner's background. 164 F. Supp. 2d, at 559. Indeed, counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless; this case is therefore distinguishable from our precedents in which we have found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable. See, e. g., Strickland, supra, at 699 (concluding that counsel could "reasonably surmise ... that character and psychological evidence would be of little help"); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U. S. 776, 794 (1987) (concluding counsel's limited investigation was reasonable because he interviewed all witnesses brought to his attention, discovering little that was helpful and much that was harmful); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168, 186 (1986) (concluding that counsel engaged in extensive preparation and that the decision to present a mitigation case would have resulted in the jury hearing evidence that petitioner had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail). Had counsel investigated further, they might well have discovered the sexual abuse later revealed during state postconviction proceedings.526The record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment. Counsel sought, until the day before sentencing, to have the proceedings bifurcated into a retrial of guilt and a mitigation stage. See supra, at 515. On the eve of sentencing, counsel represented to the court that they were prepared to come forward with mitigating evidence, App. 45, and that they intended to present such evidence in the event the court granted their motion to bifurcate. In other words, prior to sentencing, counsel never actually abandoned the possibility that they would present a mitigation defense. Until the court denied their motion, then, they had every reason to develop the most powerful mitigation case possible.What is more, during the sentencing proceeding itself, counsel did not focus exclusively on Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder. After introducing that issue in her opening statement, id., at 70-71, Nethercott entreated the jury to consider not just what Wiggins "is found to have done," but also "who [he] is." Id., at 70. Though she told the jury it would "hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life," id., at 72, counsel never followed up on that suggestion with details of Wiggins' history. At the same time, counsel called a criminologist to testify that inmates serving life sentences tend to adjust well and refrain from further violence in prison-testimony with no bearing on whether petitioner committed the murder by his own hand. Id., at 311-312. Far from focusing exclusively on petitioner's direct responsibility, then, counsel put on a halfhearted mitigation case, taking precisely the type of " 'shotgun'" approach the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. When viewed in this light, the "strategic decision" the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel's limited pursuit of mitigating evidence resembles more a post hoc rationaliza-527tion of counsel's conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.In rejecting petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, the Maryland Court of Appeals appears to have assumed that because counsel had some information with respect to petitioner's background-the information in the PSI and the DSS records-they were in a position to make a tactical choice not to present a mitigation defense. Id., at 611-612, 724 A. 2d, at 17 (citing federal and state precedents finding ineffective assistance in cases in which counsel failed to conduct an investigation of any kind). In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation, however, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Even assuming Schlaich and Nethercott limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons, Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy. Rather, a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy. 466 U. S., at 691.The Maryland Court of Appeals' application of Strickland's governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable. Though the state court acknowledged petitioner's claim that counsel's failure to prepare a social history "did not meet the minimum standards of the profession," the court did not conduct an assessment of whether the decision to cease all investigation upon obtaining the PSI and the DSS records actually demonstrated reasonable professional judgment. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 609, 724 A. 2d, at 16. The state court merely assumed that the investigation was adequate. In light of what the PSI and the DSS records actually revealed, however, counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy528impossible. The Court of Appeals' assumption that the investigation was adequate, ibid., thus reflected an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result, the court's subsequent deference to counsel's strategic decision not "to present every conceivable mitigation defense," 352 Md., at 610, 724 A. 2d, at 16, despite the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what we have made clear was an unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable. As we established in Strickland, "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." 466 U. S., at 690-691.Additionally, the court based its conclusion, in part, on a clear factual error-that the "social service records ... recorded incidences of ... sexual abuse." 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. As the State and the United States now concede, the records contain no mention of sexual abuse, much less of the repeated molestations and rapes of petitioner detailed in the Selvog report. Brief for Respondents 22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26; App. to Pet. for Cert. 175a-179a, 190a. The state court's assumption that the records documented instances of this abuse has been shown to be incorrect by "clear and convincing evidence," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(1), and reflects "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). This partial reliance on an erroneous factual finding further highlights the unreasonableness of the state court's decision.The dissent insists that this Court's hands are tied, under § 2254(d), "by the state court's factual determinations that Wiggins' trial counsel 'did investigate and were aware of [Wiggins'] background,'" post, at 550. But as we have made clear, the Maryland Court of Appeals' conclusion that the scope of counsel's investigation into petitioner's background met the legal standards set in Strickland repre-529sented an objectively unreasonable application of our precedent. § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, the court's assumption that counsel learned of a major aspect of Wiggins' background, i. e., the sexual abuse, from the DSS records was clearly erroneous. The requirements of § 2254(d) thus pose no bar to granting petitioner habeas relief.2In their briefs to this Court, the State and the United States contend that counsel, in fact, conducted a more thorough investigation than the one we have just described. This conclusion, they explain, follows from Schlaich's postconviction testimony that he knew of the sexual abuse Wiggins suffered, as well as of the hand-burning incident. According to the State and its amicus, the fact that counsel claimed to be aware of this evidence, which was not in the social services records, coupled with Schlaich's statement that he knew what was in "other people's reports," App. 490491, suggests that counsel's investigation must have extended beyond the social services records. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-36; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26-27, n. 4; Brief for Respondents 35. Schlaich simply "was not asked to and did not reveal the source of his knowledge" of the abuse. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27, n. 4.In considering this reading of the state postconviction record, we note preliminarily that the Maryland Court of Appeals clearly assumed both that counsel's investigation began and ended with the PSI and the DSS records and that this investigation was sufficient in scope to satisfy Strickland's reasonableness requirement. See Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court also assumed, erroneously, that the social services records cited incidences of sexual abuse. See id., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. Respondents' interpretation of Schlaich's postconviction testimony therefore has no bearing on whether the Maryland Court of530Appeals' decision reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.In its assessment of the Maryland Court of Appeals' opinion, the dissent apparently does not dispute that if counsel's investigation in this case had consisted exclusively of the PSI and the DSS records, the court's decision would have constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. See post, at 543-544. Of necessity, then, the dissent's primary contention is that the Maryland Court of Appeals did decide that Wiggins' counsel looked beyond the PSI and the DSS records and that we must therefore defer to that finding under § 2254(e)(1). See post, at 544-551. Had the court found that counsel's investigation extended beyond the PSI and the DSS records, the dissent, of course, would be correct that § 2254(e) would require that we defer to that finding. But the state court made no such finding.The dissent bases its conclusion on the Maryland Court of Appeals' statements that" '[c]ounsel were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate childhood,'" and that" 'counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant's background.'" See post, at 540, 545 (quoting Wiggins v. State, supra, at 608, 610, 724 A. 2d, at 15, 16). But the state court's description of how counsel learned of petitioner's childhood speaks for itself. The court explained: "Counsel were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate childhood. Mr. Schlaich had available to him not only the pre-sentence investigation report ... but also more detailed social service records." See 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. This construction reflects the state court's understanding that the investigation consisted of the two sources the court mentions. Indeed, when describing counsel's investigation into petitioner's background, the court never so much as implies that counsel uncovered any source other than the PSI and the DSS records. The court's conclusion that counsel were aware of "incidences of ... sexual abuse" does not suggest otherwise, cf. supra, at 518, because the court assumed that counsel531learned of such incidents from the social services records. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15.The court's subsequent statement that, "as noted, counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant's background," underscores our conclusion that the Maryland Court of Appeals assumed counsel's investigation into Wiggins' childhood consisted of the PSI and the DSS records. The court's use of the phrase "as noted," which the dissent ignores, further confirms that counsel's investigation consisted of the sources previously described, i. e., the PSI and the DSS records. It is the dissent, therefore, that "rests upon a fundamental fallacy," post, at 544-that the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that Schlaich's investigation extended beyond the PSI and the DSS records.We therefore must determine, de novo, whether counsel reached beyond the PSI and the DSS records in their investigation of petitioner's background. The record as a whole does not support the conclusion that counsel conducted a more thorough investigation than the one we have described. The dissent, like the State and the United States, relies primarily on Schlaich's postconviction testimony to establish that counsel investigated more extensively. But the questions put to Schlaich during his postconviction testimony all referred to what he knew from the social services records; the line of questioning, after all, first directed him to his discovery of those documents. His subsequent reference to "other people's reports," made in direct response to a question concerning petitioner's mental retardation, appears to be an acknowledgment of the psychologist's reports we know counsel commissioned-reports that also revealed nothing of the sexual abuse Wiggins experienced. App. 349. As the state trial judge who heard this testimony concluded at the close of the proceedings, there is "no reason to believe that [counsel] did have all of this information." Id., at 606 (emphasis added).532The State maintained at oral argument that Schlaich's reference to "other people's reports" indicated that counsel learned of the sexual abuse from sources other than the PSI and the DSS records. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 33, 35. But when pressed repeatedly to identify the sources counsel might have consulted, the State acknowledged that no written reports documented the sexual abuse and speculated that counsel must have learned of it through "[o]ral reports" from Wiggins himself. Id., at 36. Not only would the phrase "other people's reports" have been an unusual way for counsel to refer to conversations with his client, but the record contains no evidence that counsel ever pursued this line of questioning with Wiggins. See id., at 24-25. For its part, the United States emphasized counsel's retention of the psychologist. Id., at 51; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. But again, counsel's decision to hire a psychologist sheds no light on the extent of their investigation into petitioner's social background. Though Stejskal based his conclusions on clinical interviews with Wiggins, as well as meetings with Wiggins' family members, Lodging of Petitioner, his final report discussed only petitioner's mental capacities and attributed nothing of what he learned to Wiggins' social history.To further underscore that counsel did not know, prior to sentencing, of the sexual abuse, as well as of the other incidents not recorded in the DSS records, petitioner directs us to the content of counsel's October 17, 1989, proffer. Before closing statements and outside the presence of the jury, Schlaich proffered to the court the mitigation case counsel would have introduced had the court granted their motion to bifurcate. App. 349-351. In his statement, Schlaich referred only to the results of the psychologist's test and mentioned nothing of Wiggins' troubled background. Given that the purpose of the proffer was to preserve their pursuit of bifurcation as an issue for appeal, they had every incentive to make their mitigation case seem as strong as possible.533Counsel's failure to include in the proffer the powerful evidence of repeated sexual abuse is therefore explicable only if we assume that counsel had no knowledge of the abuse.Contrary to the dissent's claim, see post, at 547, we are not accusing Schlaich of lying. His statements at the postconviction proceedings that he knew of this abuse, as well as of the hand-burning incident, may simply reflect a mistaken memory shaped by the passage of time. After all, the state postconviction proceedings took place over four years after Wiggins' sentencing. Ultimately, given counsel's likely ignorance of the history of sexual abuse at the time of sentencing, we cannot infer from Schlaich's postconviction testimony that counsel looked further than the PSI and the DSS records in investigating petitioner's background. Indeed, the record contains no mention of sources other than those it is undisputed counsel possessed, see supra, at 523-524. We therefore conclude that counsel's investigation of petitioner's background was limited to the PSI and the DSS records.3In finding that Schlaich and Nethercott's investigation did not meet Strickland's performance standards, we emphasize that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the "constitutionally protected independence of counsel" at the heart of Strickland. 466 U. S., at 689. We base our conclusion on the much more limited principle that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable" only to the extent that "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id., at 690-691. A decision not to investigate thus "must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances." Id., at 691.534Counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background did not reflect reasonable professional judgment. Their decision to end their investigation when they did was neither consistent with the professional standards that prevailed in 1989, nor reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the social services records-evidence that would have led a reasonably competent attorney to investigate further. Counsel's pursuit of bifurcation until the eve of sentencing and their partial presentation of a mitigation case suggest that their incomplete investigation was the result of inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment. In deferring to counsel's decision not to pursue a mitigation case despite their unreasonable investigation, the Maryland Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland. Furthermore, the court partially relied on an erroneous factual assumption. The requirements for habeas relief established by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) are thus satisfied.IIIIn order for counsel's inadequate performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must show that counsel's failures prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 692. In Strickland, we made clear that, to establish prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id., at 694. In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. In this case, our review is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis.The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present in this case is powerful. As Selvog reported based on his conversations with Wiggins and members of his fam-535ily, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 18-19, Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother. He suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in foster care. The time Wiggins spent homeless, along with his diminished mental capacities, further augment his mitigation case. Petitioner thus has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 319 (1989) (" '[E]vidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse' "); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 112 (1982) (noting that consideration of the offender's life history is a "'part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death' "); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating Ohio law that did not permit consideration of aspects of a defendant's background).Given both the nature and the extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form. While it may well have been strategically defensible upon a reasonably thorough investigation to focus on Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder, the two sentencing strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Moreover, given the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney might well have chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the direct responsibility challenge, particularly given that Wiggins' history contained little of the double edge we have found to justify limited investigations in other cases. Cf. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U. S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168 (1986).536The dissent nevertheless maintains that Wiggins' counsel would not have altered their chosen strategy of focusing exclusively on Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder. See post, at 553-554. But as we have made clear, counsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to whether to focus on Wiggins' direct responsibility, the sordid details of his life history, or both, because the investigation supporting their choice was unreasonable. See supra, at 524-527. Moreover, as we have noted, see supra, at 526, Wiggins' counsel did not focus solely on Wiggins' direct responsibility. Counsel told the sentencing jury "[y]ou're going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life," App. 72, but never followed up on this suggestion.We further find that had the jury been confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence. In reaching this conclusion, we need not, as the dissent suggests, post, at 554-556, make the state-law evidentiary findings that would have been at issue at sentencing. Rather, we evaluate the totality of the evidence-"both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding[s]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S., at 397-398 (emphasis added).In any event, contrary to the dissent's assertion, it appears that Selvog's report may have been admissible under Maryland law. In Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A. 2d 223 (1995), the Maryland Court of Appeals vacated a trial court decision excluding, on hearsay grounds, testimony by Selvog himself. The court instructed the trial judge to exercise its discretion to admit "any relevant and reliable mitigating evidence, including hearsay evidence that might not be admissible in the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial." Id., at 73, 665 A. 2d, at 244. This "relaxed standard," the court observed, would provide the factfinder with "the opportunity to consider 'any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less537than death.'" Ibid. See also Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 172-173, 699 A. 2d 1170, 1177 (1997) (noting that the trial judge had admitted Selvog's social history report on the defendant). While the dissent dismisses the contents of the social history report, calling Wiggins a "liar" and his claims of sexual abuse "uncorroborated gossip," post, at 554, 555, Maryland appears to consider this type of evidence relevant at sentencing, see Whittlesey, supra, at 71, 665 A. 2d, at 243 ("The reasons for relaxing the rules of evidence apply with particular force in the death penalty context"). Not even the State contests that Wiggins suffered from the various types of abuse and neglect detailed in the PSI, the DSS records, and Selvog's social history report.Wiggins' sentencing jury heard only one significant mitigating factor-that Wiggins had no prior convictions. Had the jury been able to place petitioner's excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance. Cf. Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 139-140, 786 A. 2d 631, 660 (2001) (noting that as long as a single juror concludes that mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence, the death penalty cannot be imposed); App. 369 (instructing the jury: "If you unanimously find that the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstance does outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then consider whether death is the appropriate sentence").Moreover, in contrast to the petitioner in Williams v. Taylor, supra, Wiggins does not have a record of violent conduct that could have been introduced by the State to offset this powerful mitigating narrative. Cf. id., at 418 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting) (noting that Williams had savagely beaten an elderly woman, stolen two cars, set fire to a home, stabbed a man during a robbery, and confessed to choking two inmates and breaking a fellow prisoner's jaw). As the Federal District Court found, the mitigating evidence in this case is538stronger, and the State's evidence in support of the death penalty far weaker, than in Williams, where we found prejudice as the result of counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Id., at 399. We thus conclude that the available mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, "might well have influenced the jury's appraisal" of Wiggins' moral culpability. Id., at 398. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered

OCTOBER TERM, 2002SyllabusWIGGINS v. SMITH, WARDEN, ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUITNo.02-311. Argued March 24, 2003-Decided June 26, 2003In 1989, petitioner Wiggins was convicted of capital murder by a Maryland judge and subsequently elected to be sentenced by a jury. His public defenders, Schlaich and Nethercott, moved to bifurcate the sentencing, representing that they planned to prove that Wiggins did not kill the victim by his own hand and then, if necessary, to present a mitigation case. The court denied the motion. At sentencing, Nethercott told the jury in her opening statement that they would hear, among other things, about Wiggins' difficult life, but such evidence was never introduced. Before closing arguments and outside the presence of the jury, Schlaich made a proffer to the court to preserve the bifurcation issue for appeal, detailing the mitigation case counsel would have presented. Schlaich never mentioned Wiggins' life history or family background. The jury sentenced Wiggins to death, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. Represented by new counsel, Wiggins sought postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. He presented expert testimony by a forensic social worker about the severe physical and sexual abuse he had suffered at the hands of his mother and while under the care of a series of foster parents. Schlaich testified that he did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history before sentencing, even though state funds were available for that purpose, and explained that he and N ethercott had decided to focus on retrying the factual case and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder. The trial court denied the petition, and the State Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that trial counsel had made a reasoned choice to proceed with what they considered their best defense. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Wiggins relief on his federal habeas petition, holding that the Maryland courts' rejection of his ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit found trial counsel's strategic decision to focus on Wiggins' direct responsibility to be reasonable.Held: The performance of Wiggins' attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Pp. 519-538.511(a) A federal writ can be granted only if a state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established" precedents of this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). This "unreasonable application" prong permits the writ to be granted when a state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a petitioner's case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362,413. For this standard to be satisfied, the state court decision must have been "objectively unreasonable," id., at 409, not just incorrect or erroneous. An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687. Performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, which is defined in terms of prevailing professional norms. Id., at 688. Here, as in Strickland, counsel claim that their limited investigation into petitioner's background reflected a tactical judgment not to present mitigating evidence and to pursue an alternative strategy instead. In evaluating petitioner's claim, this Court's principal concern is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case, but whether the investigation supporting their decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itselfreasonable. The Court thus conducts an objective review of their performance, measured for reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, including a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time of that conduct. Id., at 688, 689. Pp. 519-523.(b) Counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation. Their decision not to expand their investigation beyond a presentence investigation (PSI) report and Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) records fell short of the professional standards prevailing in Maryland in 1989. Standard practice in Maryland capital cases at that time included the preparation of a social history report. Although there were funds to retain a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to commission a report. Their conduct similarly fell short of the American Bar Association's capital defense work standards. Moreover, in light of the facts counsel discovered in the DSS records concerning Wiggins' alcoholic mother and his problems in foster care, counsel's decision to cease investigating when they did was unreasonable. Any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing such leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of aggravating factors from Wiggins' background. Indeed, counsel discovered no evidence to suggest that a mitigation case would have been counterproductive or that further investigation would have been fruitless, thus distinguishing this case512Full Text of Opinion

1966_4

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.When this case was here the last time, [Footnote 1] we held that the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Company violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, and we directed the District Court "to order divestiture without delay." United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 376 U. S. 662. That was on April 6, 1964. It is now nearly three years later, and, as we shall see, no divestiture in any meaningful sense has been directed. The United States, now an appellee, maintains that the issues respecting divestiture are not Page 386 U. S. 132 before us. The threshold question does indeed involve another matter. Appellants were denied intervention by the District Court, and came here by way of appeal, 32 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. § 29. We noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U.S. 970.IThe initial question concerning intervention turns on a construction of Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled "Intervention of Right." At the time the District Court ruled on the motions, that Rule provided, in relevant part,"Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by . . . disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof."As amended effective July 1, 1966, subsequent to the time these motions to intervene were denied, Rule 24(a)(2) provides that there may be intervention of right"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."California, one of the appellants, is a State where El Paso sells most of its gas, and its purpose in intervening was to assure that Pacific Northwest, illegally merged with El Paso, or its successor, would be restored as an effective competitor in California. As we noted in the prior opinion, Pacific Northwest had been "a substantial factor in the California market at the time it was acquired by El Paso." 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 658. It was to restore that "competitive factor" that divestiture was ordered. Id. at 376 U. S. 658-662. Southern California Edison, another Page 386 U. S. 133 appellant, is a large industrial user of natural gas purchasing from El Paso sources and desirous of retaining competition in California. Cascade Natural Gas is a distributor in Oregon and Washington, and its sole supplier of natural gas was Pacific Northwest, and will be the New Company created under the divestiture plan. Cascade maintains that there has been a grossly unfair division of gas reserves between El Paso and the New Company, particularly in the southwest field known as the San Juan Basin. Moreover, the District Court approved contracts between El Paso and the New Company for delivery of gas both from Canada and from the San Juan Basin, and allowed El Paso, unilaterally and without application to the Federal Power Commission, to saddle new and allegedly onerous prices and other conditions on the New Company. Moreover, the stock of West Coast Transmission Co., Ltd., was ordered sold for the benefit of El Paso. Pacific Northwest had owned about a fourth of West Coast Transmission's stock, and that ownership gave Pacific Northwest, it is said, special insight into and access to the Canadian gas supply. These factors, implicating the ability of Pacific Northwest to perform in the future, give Cascade, it is argued, standing to intervene.Under old Rule 24(a)(3), those "adversely affected" by a disposition of property would usually be those who have an interest in the property. [Footnote 2] But we cannot read it to mean exclusively that group.Rule 24(a)(3) was not merely a restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity. If it had been, there would be force in the argument that the rigidity of the older cases remains unaltered, restricting intervention as of right very narrowly, as, for example, where there is a fund in court to which a third party asserts Page 386 U. S. 134 a right that would be lost absent intervention. Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 311, 177 U. S. 316; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 218 F. 336, 339. But the Advisory Committee stated that Rule 24 "amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in equity." We therefore know that some elasticity was injected, [Footnote 3] and the question is, how much. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Central Trust Co. case, "It is not always easy to draw the line." Ibid.In Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U. S. 502, a consent decree was entered in an antitrust suit, designed to protect Panhandle from Columbia which had acquired domination of the former to stifle Page 386 U. S. 135 its competition. The decree sought to assure opportunities for competition by Panhandle. A security holder of Panhandle sought to intervene on Panhandle's behalf when the consent decree was reopened, and was denied that right. We reversed, noting at the outset that"the circumstances under which interested outsiders should be allowed to become participants in a litigation is, barring very special circumstances, a matter for the nisi prius court. But where the enforcement of a public law also demands distinct safeguarding of private interests by giving them a formal status in the decree, the power to enforce rights thus sanctioned is not left to the public authorities nor put in the keeping of the district court's discretion."Id. at 312 U. S. 506.We noted that Panhandle's economic independence was "at the heart of the controversy." Ibid. In the present case, protection of California interests in a competitive system was at the heart of our mandate directing divestiture. For it was the absorption of Pacific Northwest by El Paso that stifled that competition and disadvantaged the California interests. It was indeed their interests, as part of the public interest in a competitive system, that our mandate was designed to protect. In that sense, the present case is very close to Pipe Line Co. Apart from that, but in the spirit of Pipe Line Co., we think that California and Southern California Edison qualify as intervenors under Rule 24(a)(3). Certainly these two appellants are "so situated" geographically as to be "adversely affected" within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(3) by a merger that reduces the competitive factor in natural gas available to Californians. We conclude that it was error to deny them intervention. We need not decide whether Cascade could have intervened as of right under that Rule. For there is now in effect a new version of Rule 24(a) which, in subsection (2), recognizes as a proper element in intervention "an interest" in the "transaction which is the subject of the action." This Rule applies to Page 386 U. S. 136 "further proceedings" in pending actions. 383 U.S. 1031. Since the entire merits of the case must be reopened to give California and Southern California Edison an opportunity to be heard as of right as intervenors, we conclude that the new Rule 24(a)(2) is broad enough to include Cascade also, and, as we shall see, the "existing parties" have fallen far short of representing its interests. We therefore reverse the District Court in each of these appeals, and remand with directions to allow each appellant to intervene as of right to vacate the order of divestiture and to have de novo hearings on the type of divestiture we envisioned and made plain in our opinion in 376 U. S. 376 U.S. 651.IIThe necessity for new hearings needs a word of explanation.The United States on oral argument stated that the decree to which it agreed and which it urges us to approve was made in "settlement" of the litigation. We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle suits after, as well as before, they reach here. The Department of Justice, however, by stipulation or otherwise has no authority to circumscribe the power of the courts to see that our mandate is carried out. No one except this Court has authority to alter or modify our mandate. United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U. S. 316, 366 U. S. 325. Our direction was that the District Court provide for "divestiture without delay." That mandate, in the context of the opinion, plainly meant that Pacific Northwest or a new company be at once restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the California market.We do not undertake to write the decree. But we do suggest guidelines that should be followed:(1) Gas Reserves. The gas reserves granted the New Company must be no less in relation to present existing Page 386 U. S. 137 reserves than Pacific Northwest had when it was independent, and the new gas reserves developed since the merger must be equitably divided between El Paso and the New Company. We are told by the intervenors that El Paso gets the new reserves in the San Juan Basin -- which, due to their geographical propinquity to California, are critical to competition in that market. But the merged company, which discovered them, represented the interests both of El Paso and of Pacific Northwest. We do not know what an equitable division would require. Hearings are necessary, followed by meticulous findings made in light of the competitive requirements to which we have adverted.As already indicated, the proposed decree provides the terms of contracts [Footnote 4] imposed on the New Company respecting the purchase and gathering of gas from various sources. It is urged that these contracts are onerous, detrimental to the New Company, and partial to El Paso interests. We do not pass upon the wisdom or desirability of the proposed contracts. It is enough to note that they were proposed by El Paso, that the changes, reluctantly acceded to by the Government, will redound to the substantial benefit of El Paso, and that the New Company has had no opportunity to evaluate the advisability of the terms or to negotiate for better terms. Nor has the Federal Power Commission had the opportunity to pass Page 386 U. S. 138 upon the contracts. The terms of these contracts should be negotiated by the New Company under such restrictions as the Natural Gas Act may impose.(2) Financial Aspects. As noted, El Paso is allowed to sell the stock of West Coast Transmission Co., Ltd., brought into the merger by Pacific Northwest, and keep the proceeds, which, if stock prices at the time of the proposed divestiture are considered, might result, it is alleged, in a profit of $10,000,000 or more, while the New Company gets the stock of Northwest Production Co., which, from 1960-1963, showed heavy losses. It is charged that, by the proposed decree, El Paso is saving the cream for itself and foisting the "cats and dogs" on the New Company. It is also earnestly argued that the New Company will sorely need the valuable and fairly liquid stock of West Coast Transmission if it is to have the working capital necessary to restore the competitive balance that the merger destroyed. These are highly relevant arguments. Certainly a plan of divestiture of the kind we envisaged must establish a New Company in the same or comparable competitive position that Pacific Northwest was in when the illegal merger obliterated it.It is also pointed out that some $53,000,000 of taxable losses which Pacific Northwest had were utilized by El Paso during the years following the ill-starred merger. It is argued that, since these tax loss carry-overs were, in a real sense, an asset of Pacific Northwest utilized by El Paso, the New Company should receive other assets or a reduction in debt of equivalent value. These allegations, if proven, require remuneration of some kind to the New Company. For it must be a viable, healthy unit, as able to compete as Pacific Northwest was when it was acquired by El Paso.(3) Control of El Paso. The divestiture decree provides that El Paso is to cause the formation of the New Company, whose chief executive shall be approved by Page 386 U. S. 139 El Paso, the Government, and the court. The new company is to file an application with the Federal Power Commission "at the earliest practicable date" requesting the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to acquire, own, and operate the properties to be received from El Paso. [Footnote 5] When the necessary certificates, authorizations, and orders are obtained from the FPC, El Paso is to transfer to the New Company the properties and assets set forth in the plan of divestiture, generally those which El Paso received from Pacific Northwest. In return, the New Company is to assume certain of El Paso's indebtedness and issue to El Paso all its common stock. El Paso is to transfer the New Company stock to the New Company's chief executive, as voting trustee. The New Company's chief executive shall release the stock only in accordance with the plan for divestment of El Paso's interest in the stock. Under the plan, El Paso is ordered completely to divest itself of all interest in the New Company stock within three years after the transfer of the assets to the New Company. Alternate methods of divestment are provided. (1) El Paso may, within 18 months of the transfer, distribute at least 80% of the shares to holders of El Paso common stock who are willing to exchange their El Paso shares for New Company shares, and who shall own no other El Paso shares immediately after the exchange. The remainder of New Company stock would be disposed of by a public offering. (2) If El Paso does not dispose of the New Company stock under the first alternative, it is to dispose of the New Company stock "by one or more sales to the public." At such public offering, no El Paso officer or director and no owner of El Paso's capital stock, Page 386 U. S. 140 in excess of one-half of one percent of the total shares outstanding, shall be permitted to purchase New Company stock. [Footnote 6]Thus, the El Paso-Pacific Northwest combination will not begin to be severed until the regulatory approvals have been obtained. Complete divestiture is not required until three years after the transfer of assets. An earlier divestiture is permissible, but divestiture is mandatory only after three years. During the interregnum between the entry of the decree and the regulatory approvals and between the transfer of assets and El Paso's eventual disposition of the New Company stock, El Paso will continue to reap the benefits of the illegal combination. Moreover, prior to the eventual disposition of the New Company stock, all the stock is to be voted by the New Company's chief executive. The chief executive is to be approved by El Paso, and El Paso is the beneficial owner of the stock to be voted by him. Even though the chief executive is subject to the ultimate control and supervision of the District Court, there is danger that he may vote the New Company stock in a manner calculated to perpetuate the very conditions which led us to order severance of the illegal combination.Even after the mandatory disposition of the new company stock, there is considerable danger that El Paso interests may end up controlling the New Company. The decree, to be sure, provides that neither El Paso officers and directors nor owners of more than one-half of one percent of El Paso stock shall purchase New Company stock at a public offering. But the decree does not prohibit Page 386 U. S. 141 members of the families of such prohibited purchasers from obtaining New Company stock. Further, under the terms of the decree, it would be possible for a group of El Paso stockholders, each with less than one-half of one percent of El Paso stock, to acquire at the initial public offering enough New Company stock substantially to influence or even to dominate the New Company. Or such a group could combine with the families of prohibited purchasers in order to control the New Company. After the exchange or public offering, there is no restriction on the number of New Company shares El Paso shareholders may acquire. Thus, there is a danger that major El Paso stockholders may, subsequent to the exchange or public offering, purchase large blocks of New Company stock and obtain effective control. Thus, there has been no studied attempt to ensure the swift severance of the illegal combination or to make sure that the New Company's stock does not end up controlled by El Paso interests. Disposition of all of the stock with all convenient speed is necessary, and conditions must be imposed to make sure that El Paso interests do not acquire a controlling interest. For if they do, the New Company might well be only El Paso under the masquerade of a beard.The proposed decree bypasses completely the prospect of an outright purchase of the assets of the New Company or its stock by outside interests. Two purchasers apparently are anxious and eager, and before the United States knuckled under to El Paso and "settled" this litigation, it represented to the District Court that a "sale to a third party is both a desirable and possible alternative to the El Paso plan." No alternative of that kind was chosen. El Paso carried the day, obtained a decree that promises to perpetuate, rather than terminate, this unlawful merger, and that threatens to turn loose on the Page 386 U. S. 142 public a New Company unable to maintain the competitive role that Pacific Northwest filled before this illegal transaction took place.The convenience of El Paso would be the easier choice. The enforcement of our mandate and § 7 of the Clayton Act is the harder one; but that is the criterion we follow.The evil with which the proposed decree is permeated reflects the attitude or philosophy of the District Court which was frankly stated after our remand as follows:"The Court: You see, what this plan proposes is a division of the country, a division of the market, a division of the reserves, one area to New Company and another area to El Paso. That's what the root of this plan is.""Now, if you're going to get New Company down here in competition in Southern California from the San Juan Basin, you'd upset the whole scheme. To even that situation up, you're going to have to put El Paso up in the Northwest in competition there, and that's a kind of ridiculous thing -- long pipelines from these various sources.""It seems to me to make a lot of sense that New Company operating in the Northwest from very much closer Canadian reserves, and Northwest reserves, and El Paso down in the Southwest, with reserves in the San Juan Basin, serving the Southern California area, among some other areas. That seems to me to make a lot of sense."The proposed decree in its various ramifications does precisely that. It therefore does the opposite of what our prior opinion and mandate commanded. Once more, and nearly three years after we first spoke, we reverse and remand, with directions that there be divestiture without delay and that the Chief Judge of the Circuit or the Judicial Council of the Circuit (28 U.S.C. § 332) Page 386 U. S. 143 assign a different District Judge to hear the case. Cf. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 926, and its sequel, United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 57; Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657.Reversed

U.S. Supreme CourtCascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967)Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.No. 4Argued January 12, 1967Decided February 27, 1967*386 U.S. 129SyllabusAlmost three years ago, this Court directed the District Court to order "without delay" that appellee El Paso Natural Gas Co. divest itself of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., whose acquisition by El Paso was found to have violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 376 U. S. 662. Following remand, leave was unsuccessfully sought under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene in the divestiture proceedings by various parties, including appellants, the State of California, where El Paso sells most of its gas; Southern California Edison, a large industrial natural gas user in California, and Cascade Natural Gas, a distributor in Oregon and Washington, whose sole supplier of natural gas was Pacific Northwest. Rule 24(a)(3) then provided for intervention of right when the applicant is "so situated" as to be "adversely affected by . . . disposition of property" under court control. Amended Rule 24(a)(2), which became effective after the intervention motions were denied, provides for intervention of right"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property . . . and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest"unless it is adequately represented by existing parties. The District Court thereafter approved a divestiture plan whereby a New Company would be formed by El Paso to receive the properties and assets which El Paso received from Pacific Northwest. Appellants, claiming that the conditions under which the New Company would be established would fail to create a competitive pipeline in keeping with this Court's mandate, appealed from the District Court's denial of their motions to intervene.Held:1. The District Court erred in denying appellants the right to intervene in the divestiture proceedings. Pp. 386 U. S. 133-136. Page 386 U. S. 130(a) The category under old Rule 24(a)(3) of "so situated" as to be "adversely affected," by disposition of property was not limited exclusively to those with an interest in property. Pp. 386 U. S. 133-135.(b) Protection of California interests in a competitive system was "at the heart of our mandate" directing divestiture (cf. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U. S. 502, 312 U. S. 506). Both the State of California and Southern California Edison qualified as intervenors of right under old Rule 24(a)(3). P. 386 U. S. 135.(c) Since the entire merits of the case must be reopened to give those parties an opportunity to be heard as of right as intervenors, the new Rule 24(a)(2), which is applicable to "further proceedings" in pending actions, is broad enough to include Cascade as an intervenor as of right, since it has "an interest," not otherwise adequately represented, in the "transaction which is the subject of this action." Pp. 386 U. S. 135-136.2. Though the Attorney General has the right to settle litigation, such "settlement" cannot circumscribe the execution of this Court's mandate. P. 386 U. S. 136.3. The following guidelines are suggested for the new decree:(a) The New Company's gas reserves must not be proportionately less to the existing reserves than those which Pacific Northwest had when it was independent, and reserves developed after the merger must, after thorough hearings, be equitably divided between El Paso and the New Company. Pp. 386 U. S. 136-137.(b) The terms of gas acquisition contracts should be negotiated by the New Company, after full opportunity to evaluate their advisability, under such restrictions as the Natural Gas Act may impose. Pp. 386 U. S. 137-138.(c) The competitive position of the New Company and its financial viability must be comparable to that which Pacific Northwest enjoyed before the illegal merger obliterated it. P. 386 U. S. 138.(d) The severance of the illegal combination, whether by sale to outside interests or otherwise, must be swiftly made, and effected in such a manner as to ensure that the New Company's stock does not end up under control of El Paso interests. Pp. 386 U. S. 138-142.4. A District Judge different from the one who heard the case before shall be assigned to hear the case on remand. Pp. 386 U. S. 142-143.Reversed and remanded. Page 386 U. S. 131

1981_80-2100

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue in this case is whether the at-large system of elections in Burke County, Ga., violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Burke County's black citizens.IBurke County is a large, predominately rural county located in eastern Georgia. Eight hundred and thirty-one square miles in area, [Footnote 1] it is approximately two-thirds the size of the State of Rhode Island. According to the 1980 census, Burke County had a total population of 19,349, of whom 10,385, or 53.6%, were black. [Footnote 2] The average age of blacks Page 458 U. S. 615 living there is lower than the average age of whites, and therefore whites constitute a slight majority of the voting age population. As of 1978, 6,373 persons were registered to vote in Burke County, of whom 38% were black. [Footnote 3]The Burke County Board of Commissioners governs the county. It was created in 1911, see 1911 Ga. Laws 310-311, and consists of five members elected at large to concurrent 4-year terms by all qualified voters in the county. The county has never been divided into districts, either for the purpose of imposing a residency requirement on candidates or for the purpose of requiring candidates to be elected by voters residing in a district. In order to be nominated or elected, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election, and a runoff must be held if no candidate receives a majority in the first primary or general election. Ga.Code § 34-1513 (Supp.1980). Each candidate must run for a specific seat on the Board, Ga.Code § 34-1015 (1978), and a voter may vote only once for any candidate. No Negro has ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners.Appellees, eight black citizens of Burke County, filed this suit in 1976 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The suit was brought on behalf of all black citizens in Burke County. The class was certified in 1977. The complaint alleged that the county's system of at-large elections violates appellees' First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights, as well as their rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, and 1983, by diluting the voting power of black citizens. Following a bench trial at which both sides introduced extensive evidence, the court issued an order on September 29, 1978, stating that appellees were entitled to prevail and ordering that Burke County be Page 458 U. S. 616 divided into five districts for purposes of electing County Commissioners. App. to Juris.Statement 62a. The court later issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated that, while the present method of electing County Commissioners was "racially neutral when adopted, [it] is being maintained for invidious purposes" in violation of appellees' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 71a, 96a.The Court of Appeals affirmed. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (CA5 1981). It stated that, while the proceedings in the District Court took place prior to the decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), the District Court correctly anticipated Mobile and required appellees to prove that the at-large voting system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose. 639 F.2d at 1375-1376. The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and that its conclusion that the at-large system was maintained for invidious purposes was "virtually mandated by the overwhelming proof." Id. at 1380. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 U.S. 811 (1981), and now affirm. [Footnote 4]IIAt-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts. The minority's voting power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along strict majority-minority lines. While multimember districts have been challenged for Page 458 U. S. 617 "their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. 158-159 (1971), this Court has repeatedly held that they are not unconstitutional per se. Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 446 U. S. 66; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 412 U. S. 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 403 U. S. 142. The Court has recognized, however, that multimember districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment if "conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination" by minimizing, canceling out or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 403 U. S. 149. See also White v. Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 765. Cases charging that multimember districts unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of racial minorities are thus subject to the standard of proof generally applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), made it clear that, in order for the Equal Protection Clause to be violated, "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Washington v. Davis, supra, at 426 U. S. 240. Neither case involved voting dilution, but in both cases, the Court observed that the requirement that racially discriminatory purpose or intent be proved applies to voting cases by relying upon, among others, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), a districting case, to illustrate that a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of equal protection cases charging racial discrimination. Arlington Heights, supra, at 429 U. S. 265; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 426 U. S. 240. [Footnote 5] Page 458 U. S. 618Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis both rejected the notion that a law is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than another. Arlington Heights, supra, at 429 U. S. 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 242. However, both cases recognized that discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence."Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."Ibid. Thus, determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, at 429 U. S. 266.In Mobile v. Bolden, supra, the Court was called upon to apply these principles to the at-large election system in Mobile, Ala. Mobile is governed by three commissioners who exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the municipality. 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 59. Each candidate for the City Commission runs for one of three numbered posts in an at-large election and can only be elected by a majority vote. Id. at 446 U. S. 59-60. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile alleging that the at-large scheme diluted their voting strength in violation of several statutory and constitutional provisions. The District Court concluded that the at-large system "violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by improperly restricting their access to the political process," Bolden v. Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 399 (SD Ala.1976), and ordered that the commission form of government be replaced by a mayor and a nine-member City Council elected from single-member districts. Id. at 446 U. S. 404. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 571 F.2d 238 (CA5 1978). This Court reversed.Justice Stewart, writing for himself and three other Justices, noted that, to prevail in their contention that the at-large voting system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs had to prove the Page 458 U. S. 619 system was "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.'" 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 66, quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 403 U. S. 149. [Footnote 6] Such a requirement"is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 66, and White v. Regester is consistent with that principle. 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 69. Another Justice agreed with the standard of proof recognized by the plurality. Id. at 446 U. S. 101 (WHITE, J., dissenting).The plurality went on to conclude that the District Court had failed to comply with this standard. The District Court had analyzed plaintiffs' claims in light of the standard which had been set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1975) (per curiam). [Footnote 7] Zimmer set out a list of factors [Footnote 8] gleaned from Page 458 U. S. 620 Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, and White v. Regester, supra, that a court should consider in assessing the constitutionality of at-large and multimember district voting schemes. Under Zimmer, voting dilution is established "upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors." 485 F.2d at 1305.The plurality in Mobile was of the view that Zimmer was"decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause -- that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient."446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 71. The plurality observed that, while "the presence of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose," the mere existence of those criteria is not a substitute for a finding of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 446 U. S. 73. The District Court's standard in Mobile was likewise flawed. Finally, the plurality concluded that the evidence upon which the lower courts had relied was "insufficient to prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present case." Ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS rejected the intentional discrimination standard, but concluded that the proof failed to satisfy the legal standard that, in his view, was the applicable rule. He therefore concurred in the judgment of reversal. Four other Justices, however, thought the evidence sufficient to satisfy the purposeful discrimination standard. One of them, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, nevertheless concurred in the Court's judgment because he believed an erroneous remedy had been imposed.Because the District Court in the present case employed the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer, it is urged that Page 458 U. S. 621 its judgment is infirm for the same reasons that led to the reversal in Mobile. We do not agree. First, and fundamentally, we are unconvinced that the District Court in this case applied the wrong legal standard. Not only was the District Court's decision rendered a considerable time after Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, but the trial judge also had the benefit of Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (1978), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit assessed the impact of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights and held that "a showing of racially motivated discrimination is a necessary element in an equal protection voting dilution claim. . . ." 571 F.2d at 219. The court stated that"[t]he ultimate issue in a case alleging unconstitutional dilution of the votes of a racial group is whether the districting plan under attack exists because it was intended to diminish or dilute the political efficacy of that group."Id. at 226. The Court of Appeals also explained that, although the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer were important considerations in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those factors."The task before the fact finder is to determine, under all the relevant facts, in whose favor the 'aggregate' of the evidence preponderates. This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case."571 F.2d at 224 (footnote omitted).The District Court referred to Nevett v. Sides and demonstrated its understanding of the controlling standard by observing that a determination of discriminatory intent is "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution" under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. App. to Juris.Statement 68a. Furthermore, while recognizing that the evidentiary factors identified in Zimmer were to be considered, the District Court was aware that it was "not limited in its determination only to the Zimmer factors," but could consider other relevant factors as well. App. to Juris.Statement 70a. The District Court then proceeded to deal with what it considered to Page 458 U. S. 622 be the relevant proof, and concluded that the at-large scheme of electing commissioners, "although racially neutral when adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes." Id. at 71a. That system, "while neutral in origin . . . , has been subverted to invidious purposes." Id. at 90a. For the most part, the District Court dealt with the evidence in terms of the factors set out in Zimmer and its progeny, but, as the Court of Appeals stated:"Judge Alaimo employed the constitutionally required standard . . . , [and] did not treat the Zimmer criteria as absolute, but rather considered them only to the extent they were relevant to the question of discriminatory intent."639 F.2d at 1376. Although a tenable argument can be made to the contrary, we are not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court applied the proper legal standard.IIIAWe are also unconvinced that we should disturb the District Court's finding that the at-large system in Burke County was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 769-770, we stated that we were not inclined to overturn the District Court's factual findings,"representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherwise."See also Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 443 U. S. 468 (1979) (BURGER, C.J., concurring in judgment). Our recent decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273 (1982), emphasizes the deference Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 requires reviewing courts to give a trial court's findings of fact."Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless Page 458 U. S. 623 clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings. . . ."456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 287. The Court held that the issue of whether the differential impact of a seniority system resulted from an intent to discriminate on racial grounds "is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard." Id. at 456 U. S. 287-288. The Swint Court also noted that issues of intent are commonly treated as factual matters. Id. at 456 U. S. 288. We are of the view that the same clearly erroneous standard applies to the trial court's finding in this case that the at-large system in Burke County is being maintained for discriminatory purposes, as well as to the court's subsidiary findings of fact. The Court of Appeals did not hold any of the District Court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous, and this Court has frequently noted its reluctance to disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts. See, e.g., Berenyi v. Information Director, 385 U. S. 630, 385 U. S. 635 (1967); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 368 U. S. 408-409 (1962); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 336 U. S. 275 (1949). We agree with the Court of Appeals that, on the record before us, none of the factual findings is clearly erroneous.BThe District Court found that blacks have always made up a substantial majority of the population in Burke County, App. to Juris.Statement 66a, n. 3, but that they are a distinct minority of the registered voters. Id. at 71a-72a. There was also overwhelming evidence of bloc voting along racial lines. Id. at 72a-73a. Hence, although there had been black candidates, no black had ever been elected to the Burke County Commission. These facts bear heavily on the issue of purposeful discrimination. Voting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black interests without fear of political consequences, and, without bloc voting, the minority candidates would not lose elections solely because of their race. Because it is sensible to expect that at least some Page 458 U. S. 624 blacks would have been elected in Burke County, the fact that none have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful exclusion. See White v. Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 766.Under our cases, however, such facts are insufficient in themselves to prove purposeful discrimination absent other evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 430 U. S. 167 (1977); White v. Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 765-766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 149-150. See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 66 (plurality opinion). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals thought the supporting proof in this case was sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination. The supporting evidence was organized primarily around the factors which Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (CA5 1978), had deemed relevant to the issue of intentional discrimination. These factors were primarily those suggested in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973)The District Court began by determining the impact of past discrimination on the ability of blacks to participate effectively in the political process. Past discrimination was found to contribute to low black voter registration because, prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks had been denied access to the political process by means such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries. The result was that "Black suffrage in Burke County was virtually nonexistent." App. to Juris.Statement 71a. Black voter registration in Burke County has increased following the Voting Rights Act to the point that some 38% of blacks eligible to vote are registered to do so. Id. at 72a. On that basis, the District Court inferred that "past discrimination has had an adverse effect on black voter registration which lingers to this date." Ibid. Past discrimination against blacks in education also had the same effect. Not only did Burke County schools discriminate against blacks as recently as 1969, but also some schools Page 458 U. S. 625 still remain essentially segregated, and blacks, as a group, have completed less formal education than whites. Id. at 74a.The District Court found further evidence of exclusion from the political process. Past discrimination had prevented blacks from effectively participating in Democratic Party affairs and in primary elections. Until this lawsuit was filed, there had never been a black member of the County Executive Committee of the Democratic Party. There were also property ownership requirements that made it difficult for blacks to serve as chief registrar in the county. There had been discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the hiring of county employees, and in the appointments to boards and committees which oversee the county government. Id. at 74a-76a. The District Court thus concluded that historical discrimination had restricted the present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in the political process. Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized, that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, serve to maintain the status quo.Extensive evidence was cited by the District Court to support its finding that elected officials of Burke County have been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black community, [Footnote 9] which increases the likelihood that the political process was not equally open to blacks. This evidence ranged from the effects of past discrimination which still Page 458 U. S. 626 haunt the county courthouse to the infrequent appointment of blacks to county boards and committees; the overtly discriminatory pattern of paving county roads; the reluctance of the county to remedy black complaints, which forced blacks to take legal action to obtain school and grand jury desegregation; and the role played by the County Commissioners in the incorporation of an all-white private school to which they donated public funds for the purchase of band uniforms. Id. at 77a-82a.The District Court also considered the depressed socioeconomic status of Burke County blacks. It found that proportionately more blacks than whites have incomes below the poverty level. Id. at 83a. Nearly 53% of all black families living in Burke County had incomes equal to or less than three-fourths of a poverty-level income. Ibid. Not only have blacks completed less formal education than whites, but also the education they have received "was qualitatively inferior to a marked degree." Id. at 84a. Blacks tend to receive less pay than whites, even for similar work, and they tend to be employed in menial jobs more often than whites. Id. at 85a. Seventy-three percent of houses occupied by blacks lacked all or some plumbing facilities; only 16% of white-occupied houses suffered the same deficiency. Ibid. The District Court concluded that the depressed socioeconomic status of blacks results in part from "the lingering effects of past discrimination." Ibid.Although finding that the state policy behind the at-large electoral system in Burke County was "neutral in origin," the District Court concluded that the policy "has been subverted to invidious purposes." Id. at 90a. As a practical matter, maintenance of the state statute providing for at-large elections in Burke County is determined by Burke County's state representatives, for the legislature defers to their wishes on matters of purely local application. The court found that Burke County's state representatives "have retained a system which has minimized the ability of Burke County Blacks to participate in the political system." Ibid. Page 458 U. S. 627The trial court considered, in addition, several factors which this Court has indicated enhance the tendency of multimember districts to minimize the voting strength of racial minorities. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 143-144. It found that the sheer geographic size of the county, which is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode Island, "has made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places or to campaign for office." App. to Juris.Statement 91a. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the size of the county tends to impair the access of blacks to the political process. Id. at 92a. The majority vote requirement, Ga.Code § 34-1513 (Supp.1980), was found "to submerge the will of the minority," and thus "deny the minority's access to the system." App. to Juris.Statement 92a. The court also found the requirement that candidates run for specific seats, Ga.Code § 34-1015 (1978), enhances appellees' lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate. Because Burke County has no residency requirement, "[a]ll candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in lilly-white' [sic] neighborhoods. To that extent, the denial of access becomes enhanced." App. to Juris.Statement 93a.None of the District Court's findings underlying its ultimate finding of intentional discrimination appears to us to be clearly erroneous, and as we have said, we decline to overturn the essential finding of the District Court, agreed to by the Court of Appeals, that the at-large system in Burke County has been maintained for the purpose of denying blacks equal access to the political processes in the county. As in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 767, the District Court's findings were "sufficient to sustain [its] judgment . . . and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb them."IVWe also find no reason to overturn the relief ordered by the District Court. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals discerned any special circumstances that would militate Page 458 U. S. 628 against utilizing single-member districts. Where"a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not 'exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the 'condition that offends the Constitution.'"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 433 U. S. 282 (1977) (emphasis deleted), quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 418 U. S. 738 (1974). [Footnote 10]The judgment of the Court of Appeals isAffirmed

U.S. Supreme CourtRogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)Rogers v. LodgeNo. 80-2100Argued February 23, 1982Decided July 1, 1982458 U.S. 613SyllabusBurke County, Ga., a large, predominately rural county, has an at-large system for electing members of its governing Board of Commissioners. No Negro has ever been elected to the Board. Appellee black citizens of the county filed a class action in Federal District Court, alleging that the at-large system of elections violated, inter alia, appellees' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights by diluting the voting power of black citizens. Finding that blacks have always made up a substantial majority of the county's population, but that they are a minority of the registered voters, that there had been bloc voting along racial lines, and that past discrimination had restricted the present opportunity of blacks to participate effectively in the political process, the District Court held that, although the state policy behind the at-large electoral system was "neutral in origin," the policy was being maintained for invidious purposes in violation of appellees' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. The court then ordered the county to be divided into districts for purposes of electing County Commissioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court properly required appellees to prove that the at-large system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose, that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and that its conclusion that the at-large system was maintained for invidious purposes was "virtually mandated by the overwhelming proof."Held:1. The Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the District Court applied the proper legal standard where it appears that the District Court demonstrated its understanding of the controlling standard by observing that a determination of discriminatory intent was "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution" under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Pp. 458 U. S. 616-622.2. Where neither the District Court's ultimate findings of intentional discrimination nor its subsidiary findings of fact appear to be clearly erroneous, and such findings were agreed to by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not disturb the findings. Pp. 458 U. S. 622-627.3. Nor is there any reason to overturn the relief ordered by the District Court where neither that court nor the Court of Appeals discerned Page 458 U. S. 614 any special circumstances that would militate against utilizing single-member districts. Pp. 458 U. S. 627-628.639 F.2d 1358, affirmed.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 458 U. S. 628. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 458 U. S. 631.

1963_386

"MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.The Federal Power Commission, in its regulat(...TRUNCATED)

"U.S. Supreme CourtFPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964)Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc.No(...TRUNCATED)

1957_45

"MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.The General Accounting Office audited transp(...TRUNCATED)

"U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R. Co., 355 U.S. 253 (1957)United Stat(...TRUNCATED)

1995_95-210

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"OCTOBER TERM, 1995SyllabusHOLLY FARMS CORP. ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ET AL.CERTIORA(...TRUNCATED)

2002_01-705

"(2) The result of appealing to plausibility is not affected by either of the other textual features(...TRUNCATED)

"OCTOBER TERM, 2002SyllabusBARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. PEABODY COAL CO. ET AL.CERTI(...TRUNCATED)

1997_96-910

"158 CHICAGO v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONSSyllabusLiberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348, 354-3(...TRUNCATED)

"OCTOBER TERM, 1997SyllabusCITY OF CHICAGO ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS ET AL.CERTIOR(...TRUNCATED)