<commit_before># **********************************************************
# Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Google, Inc.  All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2009-2010 VMware, Inc.  All rights reserved.
# **********************************************************
#
# Dr. Memory: the memory debugger
#
# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
# version 2.1 of the License, and no later version.
#
# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Library General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
#
###########################################################################
# Dr. Memory default suppression file

##################################################
# i#65: uninitialized value deliberately used to generate a random number

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#65 (generate random number)
system call NtDeviceIoControlFile InputBuffer
ADVAPI32.dll!*
...
ADVAPI32.dll!SystemFunction036

##################################################
# i#257: real leak in VS2008 STL std::numpunct<>::_Init

LEAK
name=default i#257 (real leak in VS2008 STL std::numpunct<>::_Init)
# this frame can be inlined: *!std::_Maklocstr<>
...
*!std::numpunct<*>::_Init

##################################################
# Activation context leaked for certain threads
#
# i#286: when I use _beginthreadex() I see this leak even when explicitly calling
# _endthread().  Not sure whether csrss frees it when it frees the stack
# but suppressing under the assumption it's a false positive.
# I don't see this when using CreateThread.
#
# i#506: InitCommonControlsEx leaks some activation contexts too, with a bunch of
# different frames at the top of the stack

LEAK
name=default i#286 (activation context leak)
ntdll.dll!Rtl*ActivationContext*

LEAK
name=default i#286 (activation context leak)
ntdll.dll!*
ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack

# i#286: the first two frames for _beginthreadex are:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack
#   KERNEL*.dll!CreateRemoteThread*

# i#369
#   ntdll.dll!<VARIOUS>
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack

# i#445: for remote threads (e.g., nudges) the stacks start with:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack
#   ntdll.dll!LdrpInitializeThread
#   ntdll.dll!_LdrpInitialize
#   ntdll.dll!LdrInitializeThunk

# i#506: for InitCommonControlsEx the stacks start with:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContextEx/RtlpAllocateActivationContextStackFrame
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContextEx
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContext

##################################################
# i#306: these are stored on ntdll!RtlCriticalSectionList
# using an 8-byte-in pointer

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#306 (critical section 8-byte-in pointer)
...
ntdll.dll!RtlInitializeCriticalSection

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#306 (critical section 8-byte-in pointer)
...
ntdll.dll!RtlInitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount

##################################################
# i#337: real bug in RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext.
# w/o symbols RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext shows up
# as LdrUnlockLoaderLock so we match all.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#337 (real bug in RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext)
ntdll.dll!*
ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateHeap

##################################################
# i#455: real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#455 (real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping)
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING capacity
kernel32.dll!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping

# w/o symbols shows up as various nearby exports.
# so far we've only seen it called from GetPrivateProfileStringA so we match that.
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#455 (real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping)
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING capacity
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!GetPrivateProfileStringA

##################################################
# i#462, i#504, i#1224: Deliberate write to beyond TOS

# with symbols
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
CRYPTBASE.dll!AesEncrypt

# w/o symbols
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
CRYPTBASE.dll!SystemFunction036

# Typically the function is AesEncrypt, but we don't rely on syms.  Also this
# happens frequently enough that we can take advantage of the i#838 optimization
# for whole module suppressions and avoid taking a call stack.
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#504 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
RSAENH.dll!*

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
ADVAPI32.dll!*

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1224 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffff?(%esp)
bcryptPrimitives.dll!*

##################################################
# i#492: false positive that needs per-bit granularity (i#113)
# There is a chance of false negative on user-passed input to this
# routine, but it's hard to make this suppression any more specific
# w/o doing mod+offs. The risk is considered short-term until have
# per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#492 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!DoubleWideCharMappedString::DoubleWideCharMappedString

# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#492 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!UspFreeMem

##################################################
# i#493: Not fully analyzed but look similar to i#492.
# Likely will go away w/ per-bit granularity (i#113).
# Again, single routine since doesn't depend on caller,
# and some risk of false negative, but considered short-term
# until have per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!CStackAllocator::Free
# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!UspFreeMem

# the next 4 all have the same no-syms stack:
# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!ScriptPositionSingleGlyph

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!GenericEngineGetBreakingProperties

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!GenericEngineGetGlyphs

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!ShapingGetGlyphPositions

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!CUspShapingDrawingSurface::GenericGlyphOut

# callstacks on vista
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
USP10.dll!*
USP10.dll!Script*

# cmp instead of test, seen recently on win7 calc
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=cmp    0x1c(%ebp)*
usp10.dll!CUspShapingDrawingSurface::GenericGlyphOut
# w/o syms
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=cmp    0x1c(%ebp)*
usp10.dll!ScriptPositionSingleGlyph

##################################################
# i#494: Custom data not all initialized

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#494 (custom data not all initialized)
system call NtConnectPort parameter #6
UxTheme.dll!...
USER32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#497: Likely will go away w/ per-bit granularity (i#113).
# Again, single routine since doesn't depend on caller,
# and some risk of false negative, but considered short-term
# until have per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#497 (gdiplus bit manip)
instruction=test   0x??(%e??) $0x??
gdiplus.dll!DpRegion::FreeData

# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#497 (gdiplus bit manip)
instruction=test   0x??(%e??) $0x??
gdiplus.dll!GdipCreateSolidFill

##################################################
# i#511: bit manip uninit
# Either will be handled by per-bit granularity,
# is too complex (like i#529), or perhaps is a real
# uninit but deliberate for random number gen:
# regardless we want to suppress.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#511 (rc4_key bit manip)
instruction=mov    (%ebx,%esi,1) -> %al
RPCRT4.dll!rc4_key

# w/o symbols.
# this func takes a single OUT pointer so low likelihood
# of false neg since undef pointer will likely be unaddr
# though could be a nearby internal func that maps to this
# w/o syms: we'll live w/ the false negative risk.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#511 (rc4_key bit manip)
instruction=mov    (%ebx,%esi,1) -> %al
RPCRT4.dll!UuidCreate

##################################################
# i#529: multi-instr partial xor-with-self
# No good symbols so we match these instructions:
#  test   0x70(%esi) $0x00000400
#  test   0x70(%esi) $0x00000200
#  test   0x70(%ebx) $0x00000100
#  test   0x70(%edi) %esi
# On Vista, this bitfield seems to be a short, so we get "data16 test" for the
# instruction.  These are in Ndr* routines, but without symbols we sometimes get
# NDRContextUnmarshall as the nearest export, so we use N*.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#529 (multi-instr partial xor-with-self)
instruction=*test   0x70(%e??) *
RPCRT4.dll!N*
RPCRT4.dll!*

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#529 (alternate bit-level fp)
instruction=test   %esi %eax
RPCRT4.dll!N*
RPCRT4.dll!*

##################################################
# i#709: bit manip uninit
# Highly probable bit-level definedness issue, as it is masking all but the low
# bit in the test instruction.  This is often hit during shutdown.  Different
# Windows versions reach it through different stacks, but it's always reached
# through ntdll.  Unfortunately the ntdll frames are more than 12 frames deep so
# we just match five clbcatq.dll frames and hope user data doesn't get this deep
# into the module.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#709
instruction=test   0x??(%esi) $0x??
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*

##################################################
# i#733: false pos leak from plfCreateLOCALFONT
# This function looks like it's creating a linked list whose nodes are all
# allocated from within a single array.  The first array element is the last
# node in the list, and the last array element is the head of the list which is
# returned.  Unless we change our leak scanner to follow pointers reachable via
# mid-chunk pointers, we won't be able to handle this kind of leak.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#733
GDI32.dll!plfCreateLOCALFONT

# w/o symbols
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#733 (nosyms)
GDI32.dll!...
GDI32.dll!CreateFontIndirectExW
GDI32.dll!CreateFontIndirectW

##################################################
# i#18: false pos leak from ole32.dll!EventEntry::CreatePoolEntry
# CreatePoolEntry allocates a 24 byte EventPoolEntry object that has an
# SLIST_ENTRY field in it.  The link pointer is at offset 0xC in the struct, and
# so we get a mid-chunk pointer and a possible leak.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (win7)
# "*" below is LockEntry on Win7 and EventPoolEntry on Vista.
ole32.dll!*::operator new
ole32.dll!EventPoolEntry::CreatePoolEntry
ole32.dll!EventPoolEntry::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!CRWLock::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!COleTls::TLSAllocData
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (nosyms win7)
<ole32.dll+0x3f0ce>
<ole32.dll+0x3f10d>
<ole32.dll+0x40e77>
<ole32.dll+0x408f4>
<ole32.dll+0x4080b>
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols on Vista
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (nosyms win vista)
<ole32.dll+0x597ca>
<ole32.dll+0x3204f>
<ole32.dll+0x34acb>
<ole32.dll+0x57cf2>
<ole32.dll+0x57ea2>

##################################################
# i#18: one-time true leak in LockEntry::ThreadInit
# ole32.dll!LockEntry::ThreadInit is called once from CoInitialize, but neither
# CRWLock::ThreadCleanup or LockEntry::ThreadCleanup are ever called.  This
# looks like an intentional, one time leak of a pool of lock entries designed
# to have the same lifetime as the process.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak
ole32.dll!LockEntry::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!CRWLock::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!COleTls::TLSAllocData
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak (nosyms win7)
<ole32.dll+0x40739>
<ole32.dll+0x408e5>
<ole32.dll+0x4080b>
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak (nosyms vista)
<ole32.dll+0x57d2c>
<ole32.dll+0x57ce3>
<ole32.dll+0x57ea2>

##################################################
# i#743: bit manip uninit
# Highly probable bit-level definedness issue, similar to i#709.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#743
instruction=test   0x*(%???) $0x??
CLBCatQ.DLL!...
ole32.dll!*
# Reached through ole32.dll!CoCreateInstanceEx, but that frame is more than 11
# frames deep so we drop it.

##################################################
# i#745: bit manip uninit
# Bit-level definedness issue.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 bit-level in ShouldShowExtension
instruction=test   * $0x??
SHELL32.dll!CFileExtension::_ShouldShowExtension
SHELL32.dll!CFileSysItemString::ShouldShowExtension

# We don't have any exports to hang our hat on, so our instruction is very
# specific, and possibly brittle.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 bit-level in ShouldShowExtension (nosyms win7)
instruction=test   0xffffffdc(%ebp) $0x02
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#745: Bit-level uninit false pos in shell32.dll!_GetExtensionFlags.
# Can see where one bit is selected in shell32.dll!ShowSuperHidden, which
# _GetExtensionFlags calls.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 true uninit in _GetExtensionFlags
instruction=test   %eax %eax
SHELL32.dll!CFileSysItemString::_GetExtensionFlags

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 true uninit in _GetExtensionFlags (nosyms win7)
instruction=test   %eax %eax
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#751: possible THREAD object leak
# Hasn't been fully investigated to determine where the mid-chunk pointer is
# rooted and to see if we could implement a heuristic to detect this as true
# reachability.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak
rpcrt4.dll!AllocWrapper
rpcrt4.dll!operator new
rpcrt4.dll!ThreadSelfHelper

# These are fairly fragile nosyms suppressions, since we have no exports.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak (nosyms a)
rpcrt4.dll!...
rpcrt4.dll!RpcBindingFromStringBindingW

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak (nosyms b)
rpcrt4.dll!...
ntdll.dll!*
# Nearest export is TpCallbackIndependent
ntdll.dll!*
kernel*.dll!BaseThreadInitThunk

##################################################
# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
# Something is wrong with the way this thread terminates that prevents these two
# objects from being cleaned up.  It might be desirable to hook the thread
# termination and save the TEB contents for the reachability scan at shutdown to
# silence system leaks like these.
LEAK
name=default i#753: RtlpUpdateTEBLanguage leak
ntdll.dll!RtlpUpdateTEBLanguage
...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!_CRT_INIT

# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
LEAK
name=default i#753: LdrpSearchResourceSection_U leak
ntdll.dll!LdrpSearchResourceSection_U
...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!_CRT_INIT

# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
LEAK
name=default i#753: leaks in thread not cleaned up by shell32 (nosyms)
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!*

##################################################
# i#737: weird unaddr in msxml3.dll
# msxml3!MpHeapFree reads from the start of the page
# containing the Rtl heap allocation being freed,
# which often ends up as an unaddressable access.
# MpHeapFree is called from msxml3!MemFree which is called
# from msxml3 routines, so we look for 3 in a row.
# We hope that app data passed in will not go through 3
# layers before any bug there is found.
# Also happens in msxml6.dll.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#737: msxml heap probe
msxml?.dll!*
msxml?.dll!*
msxml?.dll!*

##################################################
# i#752: GDI usage errors seen in system libraries on Chrome shutdown

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#752: riched shutdown A
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
# w/ syms top frame is RICHED20.dll!CCcs::DestroyFont
RICHED20.dll!...
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrShutdownProcess

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#752: riched shutdown B
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
# w/ syms top frame is RICHED20.dll!CW32System::~CW32System
RICHED20.dll!...
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrShutdownProcess

##################################################
# i#757: RPC binding leaks in sspicli.dll
# We use "SspiCli.dll!Cre*" as the last frame to match either
# CreateRpcConnection or CredUnmarshalTarget which is the nearest export.
LEAK
name=default i#757: RPC binding leaks in sspicli.dll
RPCRT4.dll!...
SspiCli.dll!*
SspiCli.dll!Cre*

##################################################
# i#781: argv[] leak in mingw CRT

# The bottom frame is __mingw_CRTStartup but we don't always have symbols.

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#781: argv[] possible leak in mingw CRT
msvcrt.dll!...
msvcrt.dll!__getmainargs
*!*

##################################################
# i#790: possible leak in msvcrt/mingw CRT
# XXX: need to analyze
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#790: strcpy_s possible leak in CRT
msvcrt.dll!strcpy_s
msvcrt.dll!...
*!__mingw_CRTStartup

##################################################
# i#817: possible leaks in msvcrt CRT
# XXX: need to analyze
# Using * b/c happens with static CRT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817a: _setenvp possible leak in CRT
*!_setenvp
*!_CRT_INIT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817b: _setargv possible leak in CRT
...
*!_setargv
*!_CRT_INIT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817c: __onexitinit possible leak in CRT
*!__onexitinit
...
*!_CRT_INIT

##################################################
# i#607 part A: w/o symbols in msvcr*d.dll we don't intercept
# an internal alloc routine and thus when wrapping we report
# its touches of heap headers.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#607 msvcr*d.dll w/o syms
MSVCR*D.dll!...
MSVCR*D.dll!initptd

##################################################
# i#988 suppressing handle leaks from system dll

# i#988 c#1 c#3 from nudge_handle test
HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#1 NtOpenKey
system call NtOpenKey
...
*!__crtLCMapStringA
*!setSBUpLow

# i#988-c#2 for windows creation and destroy
HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtConnectPort
system call NtConnectPort
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtGdiCreateSolidBrush
system call NtGdiCreateSolidBrush
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtGdiCreatePatternBrushInternal
system call NtGdiCreatePatternBrushInternal
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateIoCompletion
system call NtCreateIoCompletion
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtDuplicateObject
system call NtDuplicateObject
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateKeyedEvent
system call NtCreateKeyedEvent
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateWorkerFactory
system call NtCreateWorkerFactory
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

##################################################
# i#1039: real bug where MSVCR80D!DebuggerProbe fails to initialize 3 of the 6
# exception arg slots it allocates.  The top MSVCR80D.dll frame is
# DebuggerProbe but that's not exported.

UNINITIALIZED READ
system call NtRaiseException EXCEPTION_RECORD.ExceptionInformation
ntdll.dll!RtlRaiseException
KERNEL32.dll!RaiseException
MSVCR80D.dll!*
MSVCR80D.dll!*
MSVCR80D.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1043: exception handling leak in mingw CRT
# This was fixed between mingw g++ 4.5.2 and 4.7.2 so we may be able
# to remove the suppression once we no longer support those versions.

LEAK
name=default i#1043: EH leak in mingw CRT
*!__cxa_get_globals

# i#1509: I removed the 2nd frame b/c mingw g++ 4.7.3 ends up
# skipping this frame:
#*!__cxa_allocate_exception

##################################################
# i#1134: TlsGetValue after TlsFree in mingw CRT
# This was fixed between mingw g++ 4.5.2 and 4.7.2 so we may be able
# to remove the suppression once we no longer support those versions.
# XXX i#1134c#3: but I see it in 4.7.3 too!

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1134: mingw CRT TlsGetValue after TlsFree
KERNEL*.dll!TlsGetValue
*!__mingwthr_run_key_dtors*

##################################################
# i#1140: MessageBox leaks we need to analyze
# This one is expanded to handle missing symbols.

LEAK
name=default i#1140 MessageBox
IMM32.dll!Imm*
IMM32.dll!...
USER32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1155: real bug in VS2012/VS2013 istream

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1155 VS2012/VS2013 istream
*!std::_Find_elem<>
*!std::num_get<>::_Get?fld

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1155-nosyms VS2012/VS2013 istream
*!std::_Throw_future_error
*!std::num_get<>::_Get?fld

##################################################
# i#960: real mismatches of Windows API layer vs C layer in CRT when we
# don't have syms and thus can't see
# internal alloc routines.  We don't need to suppress in static CRT b/c w/o
# syms we won't see the libc layer at all.
# For -replace_malloc, the app calling libc won't have MSVCR*.dll at the
# top as we'll replace that frame.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#960 CRT mismatch
MSVCR*.dll!*

# Variant seen in i#1431
INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#960 CRT mismatch B
MSVCP*.dll!*
...
MSVCR*.dll!exit

##################################################
# i#1240: real mismatches in VS2010 CRT
# We can rely on symbols here as without them we wouldn't see the operator stubs.
# For /MD*, the i#960 suppression already covers it.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1240 CRT mismatch A
*!Concurrency::details::Hash<*>::*

# Hash destructor is inlined into another class
INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1240 CRT mismatch B
*!Concurrency::details::ContextBase::~ContextBase

##################################################
# i#1241: Python suppressions
# Can be in libpython* or python executable so we use "*python*"

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1241 python malloc
*python*!PyObject_Free

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1241 python malloc
*python*!PyObject_Realloc

##################################################
# i#1275: real mismatches in VS2012 CRT
# We can rely on symbols here as without them we wouldn't see the operator stubs.
# For /MD*, the i#960 suppression already covers it.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1275 CRT mismatch
*!Concurrency::details::ContextBase::CancellationBeaconStack::~CancellationBeaconStack

##################################################
# i#1279: leak in LdrpGetNewTlsVector
# Without syms though the top frames are unreliable.
# But we should reach LdrInitializeThunk solely inside ntdll,
# which makes this clearly not an app leak.

LEAK
name=default i#1279 LdrpGetNewTlsVector
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrInitializeThunk

##################################################
# i#1298: real bug in MSVCRT stat()
# The actual bug is in _stat64i32() called from stat(), but for /MD we
# might not have symbols.  We limit to the comparison to ':' (0x3a)
# and avoid missing an uninit in the rest of the string via instruction=.
# VS2013 has this as an unaddr w/ two frames above stat and cmp to 0x003a.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1298 real MSVCRT stat bug
instruction=*cmp * $0x*3a
...
*!stat

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1298 real MSVCRT stat bug VS2013
instruction=*cmp * $0x*3a
...
*!stat

##################################################
# i#1300: real bug in Perflib
# We match any registry query from pdh to avoid issues with missing symbols.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1300 real Perflib bug
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING.*
ADVAPI32.dll!...
KERNEL32.dll!...
pdh.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1302: SockSocket final 9 EA bytes are left uninit

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1302 SockSocket EA
system call NtCreateFile parameter #9
MSWSOCK.dll!SockSocket

##################################################
# i#1303: real bug in ATL
# Static link has an ATL:: prefix, but dynamic link with ATL.dll
# does not.  Dynamic w/o symbols has an unreliable second frame,
# so we do not include static's "*!ATL::CAxHostWindow::OnSize".

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1303 real ATL bug
KERNEL32.dll!MulDiv
*!*AtlPixelToHiMetric

##################################################
# i#1316: real bug in UxTheme.dll on WinXP
# These are in internal non-exported routines, and the nearest
# exported routine varies by version, so if the user has no symbols
# then we can't reliably use a func name here.
# The exported GetThemeBackgroundContentRect should be enough.
# There are three instructions accessing the region, so we use
# callstack only.
#
# For reference, the callstack with debug symbol:
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetDrawnImageSize
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetScaledContentMargins
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetBackgroundContentRect
# UxTheme.dll!GetThemeBackgroundContentRect

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1316 real UxTheme.dll bug
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!GetThemeBackgroundContentRect

##################################################
# i#1324: deliberate uninit in mingw runtime
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1324 mingw runtime
*!__mingw_glob
*!__mingw_CRTStartup

##################################################
# i#599: known reachable allocs in MSCRT

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc A
...
*!_mtinit*

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc B
...
*!_ioinit

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc C
...
*!_?alloc_crt

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc D
...
*!pre_cpp_init

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc E
...
MSVCR*.dll!_flsbuf

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc F
...
*!_Mtxinit

# Regular leaks show up here too, so we suppress all
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!
LEAK
name=default i#599 mingw un-freed alloc A
...
*!__mingw_CRTStartup

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 mingw un-freed alloc B
*!*mingwthr_add_key_dtor

##################################################
# i#1329: NtUserMessageCall COPYDATASTRUCT.lpData
# Padding in the data used for WM_COPYDATA.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1329 WM_COPYDATA padding
system call NtUserMessageCall COPYDATASTRUCT.lpData
USER32.dll!SendMessageW
SHELL32.dll!SHAppBarMessage

##################################################
# i#1381: NtGdiDrawStream buffer on win8.1
# Suppress what we believe is a real bug in
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::DrawBackgroundDS where it does not initialize the
# final 4 bytes of the buffer passed to NtGdiDrawStream on Windows 8.1.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1381 NtGdiDrawStream buffer on win8.1
system call NtGdiDrawStream parameter #2
GDI32.dll!...
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1437: Handle Leaks to be investigated

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#1437-c#1 handle leaks from SHELL32.dll!SHFileOperationW
system call NtDuplicateObject
...
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!SHFileOperationW

##################################################
# Handle leaks to be suppressed

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#1437-c#3 handle leaks from callbacks of TppWorkerThread
...
ntdll.dll!*Callback
ntdll.dll!TppWorkerThread
KERNEL32.dll!BaseThreadInitThunk

##################################################
# i#1474: real bug in VS2013 istringstream

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1474 VS2013 istringstream
# we saw both _FXp_getw and FXp_getw (in c#7)
*!*FXp_getw
*!*FDtento
*!*Stofx

##################################################
# i#1535: Possible false positive for AddSidToBoundaryDescriptor.

LEAK
name=default i#1535 AddSidToBoundaryDescriptor false positive
...
ntdll.dll!RtlAddSIDToBoundaryDescriptor
*!AddSIDToBoundaryDescriptor

##################################################
# i#1588: GDI usage error from SHELL32.dll!CDragDropHelper::InitializeFromBitmap

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#1588: InitializeFromBitmap with symbol
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!InternalDeleteDC
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
SHELL32.dll!CDragDropHelper::*

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#1588: InitializeFromBitmap without symbol
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
SHELL32.dll!Ordinal*

##################################################
# i#1565/i#1720: false positive from RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages

# RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages is split up and only appears
# with symbols.  We thus use a generalized callstack:

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1720 RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages false positive
ntdll.dll!...
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!CreateProcessInternalW

##################################################
# i#1669: win10-specific process creation error
# XXX: the 2nd param here is not PUNICODE_STRING: we
# should update the database.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1669 win10 create process
system call NtApphelpCacheControl UNICODE_STRING content
...
KERNELBASE.dll!CreateProcessInternalW
<commit_msg>i#1749,i#1324: generalize mingw_glob suppression<commit_after># **********************************************************
# Copyright (c) 2011-2015 Google, Inc.  All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2009-2010 VMware, Inc.  All rights reserved.
# **********************************************************
#
# Dr. Memory: the memory debugger
#
# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
# version 2.1 of the License, and no later version.
#
# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Library General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
#
###########################################################################
# Dr. Memory default suppression file

##################################################
# i#65: uninitialized value deliberately used to generate a random number

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#65 (generate random number)
system call NtDeviceIoControlFile InputBuffer
ADVAPI32.dll!*
...
ADVAPI32.dll!SystemFunction036

##################################################
# i#257: real leak in VS2008 STL std::numpunct<>::_Init

LEAK
name=default i#257 (real leak in VS2008 STL std::numpunct<>::_Init)
# this frame can be inlined: *!std::_Maklocstr<>
...
*!std::numpunct<*>::_Init

##################################################
# Activation context leaked for certain threads
#
# i#286: when I use _beginthreadex() I see this leak even when explicitly calling
# _endthread().  Not sure whether csrss frees it when it frees the stack
# but suppressing under the assumption it's a false positive.
# I don't see this when using CreateThread.
#
# i#506: InitCommonControlsEx leaks some activation contexts too, with a bunch of
# different frames at the top of the stack

LEAK
name=default i#286 (activation context leak)
ntdll.dll!Rtl*ActivationContext*

LEAK
name=default i#286 (activation context leak)
ntdll.dll!*
ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack

# i#286: the first two frames for _beginthreadex are:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack
#   KERNEL*.dll!CreateRemoteThread*

# i#369
#   ntdll.dll!<VARIOUS>
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack

# i#445: for remote threads (e.g., nudges) the stacks start with:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateActivationContextStack
#   ntdll.dll!LdrpInitializeThread
#   ntdll.dll!_LdrpInitialize
#   ntdll.dll!LdrInitializeThunk

# i#506: for InitCommonControlsEx the stacks start with:
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContextEx/RtlpAllocateActivationContextStackFrame
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContextEx
#   ntdll.dll!RtlActivateActivationContext

##################################################
# i#306: these are stored on ntdll!RtlCriticalSectionList
# using an 8-byte-in pointer

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#306 (critical section 8-byte-in pointer)
...
ntdll.dll!RtlInitializeCriticalSection

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#306 (critical section 8-byte-in pointer)
...
ntdll.dll!RtlInitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount

##################################################
# i#337: real bug in RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext.
# w/o symbols RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext shows up
# as LdrUnlockLoaderLock so we match all.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#337 (real bug in RtlpLowFragHeapAllocFromContext)
ntdll.dll!*
ntdll.dll!RtlAllocateHeap

##################################################
# i#455: real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#455 (real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping)
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING capacity
kernel32.dll!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping

# w/o symbols shows up as various nearby exports.
# so far we've only seen it called from GetPrivateProfileStringA so we match that.
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#455 (real bug in kernel32!BaseDllReadWriteIniFileViaMapping)
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING capacity
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!GetPrivateProfileStringA

##################################################
# i#462, i#504, i#1224: Deliberate write to beyond TOS

# with symbols
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
CRYPTBASE.dll!AesEncrypt

# w/o symbols
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
CRYPTBASE.dll!SystemFunction036

# Typically the function is AesEncrypt, but we don't rely on syms.  Also this
# happens frequently enough that we can take advantage of the i#838 optimization
# for whole module suppressions and avoid taking a call stack.
UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#504 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
RSAENH.dll!*

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#462 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffffc(%esp)
ADVAPI32.dll!*

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1224 (write beyond TOS)
instruction=mov    %e?? -> 0xfffffff?(%esp)
bcryptPrimitives.dll!*

##################################################
# i#492: false positive that needs per-bit granularity (i#113)
# There is a chance of false negative on user-passed input to this
# routine, but it's hard to make this suppression any more specific
# w/o doing mod+offs. The risk is considered short-term until have
# per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#492 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!DoubleWideCharMappedString::DoubleWideCharMappedString

# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#492 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!UspFreeMem

##################################################
# i#493: Not fully analyzed but look similar to i#492.
# Likely will go away w/ per-bit granularity (i#113).
# Again, single routine since doesn't depend on caller,
# and some risk of false negative, but considered short-term
# until have per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!CStackAllocator::Free
# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!UspFreeMem

# the next 4 all have the same no-syms stack:
# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!ScriptPositionSingleGlyph

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!GenericEngineGetBreakingProperties

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!GenericEngineGetGlyphs

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!ShapingGetGlyphPositions

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
usp10.dll!CUspShapingDrawingSurface::GenericGlyphOut

# callstacks on vista
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=test   * $0x??
USP10.dll!*
USP10.dll!Script*

# cmp instead of test, seen recently on win7 calc
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=cmp    0x1c(%ebp)*
usp10.dll!CUspShapingDrawingSurface::GenericGlyphOut
# w/o syms
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#493 (bit manip)
instruction=cmp    0x1c(%ebp)*
usp10.dll!ScriptPositionSingleGlyph

##################################################
# i#494: Custom data not all initialized

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#494 (custom data not all initialized)
system call NtConnectPort parameter #6
UxTheme.dll!...
USER32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#497: Likely will go away w/ per-bit granularity (i#113).
# Again, single routine since doesn't depend on caller,
# and some risk of false negative, but considered short-term
# until have per-bit granularity.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#497 (gdiplus bit manip)
instruction=test   0x??(%e??) $0x??
gdiplus.dll!DpRegion::FreeData

# w/o symbols
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#497 (gdiplus bit manip)
instruction=test   0x??(%e??) $0x??
gdiplus.dll!GdipCreateSolidFill

##################################################
# i#511: bit manip uninit
# Either will be handled by per-bit granularity,
# is too complex (like i#529), or perhaps is a real
# uninit but deliberate for random number gen:
# regardless we want to suppress.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#511 (rc4_key bit manip)
instruction=mov    (%ebx,%esi,1) -> %al
RPCRT4.dll!rc4_key

# w/o symbols.
# this func takes a single OUT pointer so low likelihood
# of false neg since undef pointer will likely be unaddr
# though could be a nearby internal func that maps to this
# w/o syms: we'll live w/ the false negative risk.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#511 (rc4_key bit manip)
instruction=mov    (%ebx,%esi,1) -> %al
RPCRT4.dll!UuidCreate

##################################################
# i#529: multi-instr partial xor-with-self
# No good symbols so we match these instructions:
#  test   0x70(%esi) $0x00000400
#  test   0x70(%esi) $0x00000200
#  test   0x70(%ebx) $0x00000100
#  test   0x70(%edi) %esi
# On Vista, this bitfield seems to be a short, so we get "data16 test" for the
# instruction.  These are in Ndr* routines, but without symbols we sometimes get
# NDRContextUnmarshall as the nearest export, so we use N*.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#529 (multi-instr partial xor-with-self)
instruction=*test   0x70(%e??) *
RPCRT4.dll!N*
RPCRT4.dll!*

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#529 (alternate bit-level fp)
instruction=test   %esi %eax
RPCRT4.dll!N*
RPCRT4.dll!*

##################################################
# i#709: bit manip uninit
# Highly probable bit-level definedness issue, as it is masking all but the low
# bit in the test instruction.  This is often hit during shutdown.  Different
# Windows versions reach it through different stacks, but it's always reached
# through ntdll.  Unfortunately the ntdll frames are more than 12 frames deep so
# we just match five clbcatq.dll frames and hope user data doesn't get this deep
# into the module.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#709
instruction=test   0x??(%esi) $0x??
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*
CLBCatQ.DLL!*

##################################################
# i#733: false pos leak from plfCreateLOCALFONT
# This function looks like it's creating a linked list whose nodes are all
# allocated from within a single array.  The first array element is the last
# node in the list, and the last array element is the head of the list which is
# returned.  Unless we change our leak scanner to follow pointers reachable via
# mid-chunk pointers, we won't be able to handle this kind of leak.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#733
GDI32.dll!plfCreateLOCALFONT

# w/o symbols
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#733 (nosyms)
GDI32.dll!...
GDI32.dll!CreateFontIndirectExW
GDI32.dll!CreateFontIndirectW

##################################################
# i#18: false pos leak from ole32.dll!EventEntry::CreatePoolEntry
# CreatePoolEntry allocates a 24 byte EventPoolEntry object that has an
# SLIST_ENTRY field in it.  The link pointer is at offset 0xC in the struct, and
# so we get a mid-chunk pointer and a possible leak.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (win7)
# "*" below is LockEntry on Win7 and EventPoolEntry on Vista.
ole32.dll!*::operator new
ole32.dll!EventPoolEntry::CreatePoolEntry
ole32.dll!EventPoolEntry::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!CRWLock::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!COleTls::TLSAllocData
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (nosyms win7)
<ole32.dll+0x3f0ce>
<ole32.dll+0x3f10d>
<ole32.dll+0x40e77>
<ole32.dll+0x408f4>
<ole32.dll+0x4080b>
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols on Vista
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#18 CreatePoolEntry mid-chunk linked list leak (nosyms win vista)
<ole32.dll+0x597ca>
<ole32.dll+0x3204f>
<ole32.dll+0x34acb>
<ole32.dll+0x57cf2>
<ole32.dll+0x57ea2>

##################################################
# i#18: one-time true leak in LockEntry::ThreadInit
# ole32.dll!LockEntry::ThreadInit is called once from CoInitialize, but neither
# CRWLock::ThreadCleanup or LockEntry::ThreadCleanup are ever called.  This
# looks like an intentional, one time leak of a pool of lock entries designed
# to have the same lifetime as the process.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak
ole32.dll!LockEntry::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!CRWLock::ThreadInit
ole32.dll!COleTls::TLSAllocData
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak (nosyms win7)
<ole32.dll+0x40739>
<ole32.dll+0x408e5>
<ole32.dll+0x4080b>
# CoInitializeEx does a tail call, so we don't see it here.

# w/o symbols: callstack is all private syms so we use modoffs despite being
# OS-specific and brittle.
# FIXME i#741: Find a less-brittle way to write this.
LEAK
name=default i#18 LockEntry::ThreadInit pool leak (nosyms vista)
<ole32.dll+0x57d2c>
<ole32.dll+0x57ce3>
<ole32.dll+0x57ea2>

##################################################
# i#743: bit manip uninit
# Highly probable bit-level definedness issue, similar to i#709.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#743
instruction=test   0x*(%???) $0x??
CLBCatQ.DLL!...
ole32.dll!*
# Reached through ole32.dll!CoCreateInstanceEx, but that frame is more than 11
# frames deep so we drop it.

##################################################
# i#745: bit manip uninit
# Bit-level definedness issue.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 bit-level in ShouldShowExtension
instruction=test   * $0x??
SHELL32.dll!CFileExtension::_ShouldShowExtension
SHELL32.dll!CFileSysItemString::ShouldShowExtension

# We don't have any exports to hang our hat on, so our instruction is very
# specific, and possibly brittle.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 bit-level in ShouldShowExtension (nosyms win7)
instruction=test   0xffffffdc(%ebp) $0x02
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*
shell32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#745: Bit-level uninit false pos in shell32.dll!_GetExtensionFlags.
# Can see where one bit is selected in shell32.dll!ShowSuperHidden, which
# _GetExtensionFlags calls.
UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 true uninit in _GetExtensionFlags
instruction=test   %eax %eax
SHELL32.dll!CFileSysItemString::_GetExtensionFlags

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#745 true uninit in _GetExtensionFlags (nosyms win7)
instruction=test   %eax %eax
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#751: possible THREAD object leak
# Hasn't been fully investigated to determine where the mid-chunk pointer is
# rooted and to see if we could implement a heuristic to detect this as true
# reachability.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak
rpcrt4.dll!AllocWrapper
rpcrt4.dll!operator new
rpcrt4.dll!ThreadSelfHelper

# These are fairly fragile nosyms suppressions, since we have no exports.
POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak (nosyms a)
rpcrt4.dll!...
rpcrt4.dll!RpcBindingFromStringBindingW

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#751: possible THREAD object leak (nosyms b)
rpcrt4.dll!...
ntdll.dll!*
# Nearest export is TpCallbackIndependent
ntdll.dll!*
kernel*.dll!BaseThreadInitThunk

##################################################
# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
# Something is wrong with the way this thread terminates that prevents these two
# objects from being cleaned up.  It might be desirable to hook the thread
# termination and save the TEB contents for the reachability scan at shutdown to
# silence system leaks like these.
LEAK
name=default i#753: RtlpUpdateTEBLanguage leak
ntdll.dll!RtlpUpdateTEBLanguage
...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!_CRT_INIT

# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
LEAK
name=default i#753: LdrpSearchResourceSection_U leak
ntdll.dll!LdrpSearchResourceSection_U
...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!_CRT_INIT

# i#753: System leak from a shell32 thread that loads setupapi.dll.
LEAK
name=default i#753: leaks in thread not cleaned up by shell32 (nosyms)
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!RtlLoadString
...
setupapi.dll!*

##################################################
# i#737: weird unaddr in msxml3.dll
# msxml3!MpHeapFree reads from the start of the page
# containing the Rtl heap allocation being freed,
# which often ends up as an unaddressable access.
# MpHeapFree is called from msxml3!MemFree which is called
# from msxml3 routines, so we look for 3 in a row.
# We hope that app data passed in will not go through 3
# layers before any bug there is found.
# Also happens in msxml6.dll.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#737: msxml heap probe
msxml?.dll!*
msxml?.dll!*
msxml?.dll!*

##################################################
# i#752: GDI usage errors seen in system libraries on Chrome shutdown

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#752: riched shutdown A
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
# w/ syms top frame is RICHED20.dll!CCcs::DestroyFont
RICHED20.dll!...
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrShutdownProcess

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#752: riched shutdown B
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
# w/ syms top frame is RICHED20.dll!CW32System::~CW32System
RICHED20.dll!...
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrShutdownProcess

##################################################
# i#757: RPC binding leaks in sspicli.dll
# We use "SspiCli.dll!Cre*" as the last frame to match either
# CreateRpcConnection or CredUnmarshalTarget which is the nearest export.
LEAK
name=default i#757: RPC binding leaks in sspicli.dll
RPCRT4.dll!...
SspiCli.dll!*
SspiCli.dll!Cre*

##################################################
# i#781: argv[] leak in mingw CRT

# The bottom frame is __mingw_CRTStartup but we don't always have symbols.

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#781: argv[] possible leak in mingw CRT
msvcrt.dll!...
msvcrt.dll!__getmainargs
*!*

##################################################
# i#790: possible leak in msvcrt/mingw CRT
# XXX: need to analyze
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#790: strcpy_s possible leak in CRT
msvcrt.dll!strcpy_s
msvcrt.dll!...
*!__mingw_CRTStartup

##################################################
# i#817: possible leaks in msvcrt CRT
# XXX: need to analyze
# Using * b/c happens with static CRT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817a: _setenvp possible leak in CRT
*!_setenvp
*!_CRT_INIT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817b: _setargv possible leak in CRT
...
*!_setargv
*!_CRT_INIT

POSSIBLE LEAK
name=default i#817c: __onexitinit possible leak in CRT
*!__onexitinit
...
*!_CRT_INIT

##################################################
# i#607 part A: w/o symbols in msvcr*d.dll we don't intercept
# an internal alloc routine and thus when wrapping we report
# its touches of heap headers.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#607 msvcr*d.dll w/o syms
MSVCR*D.dll!...
MSVCR*D.dll!initptd

##################################################
# i#988 suppressing handle leaks from system dll

# i#988 c#1 c#3 from nudge_handle test
HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#1 NtOpenKey
system call NtOpenKey
...
*!__crtLCMapStringA
*!setSBUpLow

# i#988-c#2 for windows creation and destroy
HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtConnectPort
system call NtConnectPort
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtGdiCreateSolidBrush
system call NtGdiCreateSolidBrush
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#2 NtGdiCreatePatternBrushInternal
system call NtGdiCreatePatternBrushInternal
...
USER32.dll!CreateWindowEx?

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateIoCompletion
system call NtCreateIoCompletion
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtDuplicateObject
system call NtDuplicateObject
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateKeyedEvent
system call NtCreateKeyedEvent
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#988 c#6 NtCreateWorkerFactory
system call NtCreateWorkerFactory
...
ntdll.dll!TpAllocWork

##################################################
# i#1039: real bug where MSVCR80D!DebuggerProbe fails to initialize 3 of the 6
# exception arg slots it allocates.  The top MSVCR80D.dll frame is
# DebuggerProbe but that's not exported.

UNINITIALIZED READ
system call NtRaiseException EXCEPTION_RECORD.ExceptionInformation
ntdll.dll!RtlRaiseException
KERNEL32.dll!RaiseException
MSVCR80D.dll!*
MSVCR80D.dll!*
MSVCR80D.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1043: exception handling leak in mingw CRT
# This was fixed between mingw g++ 4.5.2 and 4.7.2 so we may be able
# to remove the suppression once we no longer support those versions.

LEAK
name=default i#1043: EH leak in mingw CRT
*!__cxa_get_globals

# i#1509: I removed the 2nd frame b/c mingw g++ 4.7.3 ends up
# skipping this frame:
#*!__cxa_allocate_exception

##################################################
# i#1134: TlsGetValue after TlsFree in mingw CRT
# This was fixed between mingw g++ 4.5.2 and 4.7.2 so we may be able
# to remove the suppression once we no longer support those versions.
# XXX i#1134c#3: but I see it in 4.7.3 too!

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1134: mingw CRT TlsGetValue after TlsFree
KERNEL*.dll!TlsGetValue
*!__mingwthr_run_key_dtors*

##################################################
# i#1140: MessageBox leaks we need to analyze
# This one is expanded to handle missing symbols.

LEAK
name=default i#1140 MessageBox
IMM32.dll!Imm*
IMM32.dll!...
USER32.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1155: real bug in VS2012/VS2013 istream

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1155 VS2012/VS2013 istream
*!std::_Find_elem<>
*!std::num_get<>::_Get?fld

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1155-nosyms VS2012/VS2013 istream
*!std::_Throw_future_error
*!std::num_get<>::_Get?fld

##################################################
# i#960: real mismatches of Windows API layer vs C layer in CRT when we
# don't have syms and thus can't see
# internal alloc routines.  We don't need to suppress in static CRT b/c w/o
# syms we won't see the libc layer at all.
# For -replace_malloc, the app calling libc won't have MSVCR*.dll at the
# top as we'll replace that frame.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#960 CRT mismatch
MSVCR*.dll!*

# Variant seen in i#1431
INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#960 CRT mismatch B
MSVCP*.dll!*
...
MSVCR*.dll!exit

##################################################
# i#1240: real mismatches in VS2010 CRT
# We can rely on symbols here as without them we wouldn't see the operator stubs.
# For /MD*, the i#960 suppression already covers it.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1240 CRT mismatch A
*!Concurrency::details::Hash<*>::*

# Hash destructor is inlined into another class
INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1240 CRT mismatch B
*!Concurrency::details::ContextBase::~ContextBase

##################################################
# i#1241: Python suppressions
# Can be in libpython* or python executable so we use "*python*"

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1241 python malloc
*python*!PyObject_Free

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1241 python malloc
*python*!PyObject_Realloc

##################################################
# i#1275: real mismatches in VS2012 CRT
# We can rely on symbols here as without them we wouldn't see the operator stubs.
# For /MD*, the i#960 suppression already covers it.

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1275 CRT mismatch
*!Concurrency::details::ContextBase::CancellationBeaconStack::~CancellationBeaconStack

##################################################
# i#1279: leak in LdrpGetNewTlsVector
# Without syms though the top frames are unreliable.
# But we should reach LdrInitializeThunk solely inside ntdll,
# which makes this clearly not an app leak.

LEAK
name=default i#1279 LdrpGetNewTlsVector
ntdll.dll!...
ntdll.dll!LdrInitializeThunk

##################################################
# i#1298: real bug in MSVCRT stat()
# The actual bug is in _stat64i32() called from stat(), but for /MD we
# might not have symbols.  We limit to the comparison to ':' (0x3a)
# and avoid missing an uninit in the rest of the string via instruction=.
# VS2013 has this as an unaddr w/ two frames above stat and cmp to 0x003a.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1298 real MSVCRT stat bug
instruction=*cmp * $0x*3a
...
*!stat

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1298 real MSVCRT stat bug VS2013
instruction=*cmp * $0x*3a
...
*!stat

##################################################
# i#1300: real bug in Perflib
# We match any registry query from pdh to avoid issues with missing symbols.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1300 real Perflib bug
system call NtQueryValueKey UNICODE_STRING.*
ADVAPI32.dll!...
KERNEL32.dll!...
pdh.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1302: SockSocket final 9 EA bytes are left uninit

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1302 SockSocket EA
system call NtCreateFile parameter #9
MSWSOCK.dll!SockSocket

##################################################
# i#1303: real bug in ATL
# Static link has an ATL:: prefix, but dynamic link with ATL.dll
# does not.  Dynamic w/o symbols has an unreliable second frame,
# so we do not include static's "*!ATL::CAxHostWindow::OnSize".

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1303 real ATL bug
KERNEL32.dll!MulDiv
*!*AtlPixelToHiMetric

##################################################
# i#1316: real bug in UxTheme.dll on WinXP
# These are in internal non-exported routines, and the nearest
# exported routine varies by version, so if the user has no symbols
# then we can't reliably use a func name here.
# The exported GetThemeBackgroundContentRect should be enough.
# There are three instructions accessing the region, so we use
# callstack only.
#
# For reference, the callstack with debug symbol:
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetDrawnImageSize
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetScaledContentMargins
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::GetBackgroundContentRect
# UxTheme.dll!GetThemeBackgroundContentRect

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1316 real UxTheme.dll bug
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!GetThemeBackgroundContentRect

##################################################
# i#1324: deliberate uninit in mingw runtime
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1324 mingw runtime
*!__mingw_glob

##################################################
# i#599: known reachable allocs in MSCRT

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc A
...
*!_mtinit*

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc B
...
*!_ioinit

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc C
...
*!_?alloc_crt

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc D
...
*!pre_cpp_init

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc E
...
MSVCR*.dll!_flsbuf

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 MSCRT un-freed alloc F
...
*!_Mtxinit

# Regular leaks show up here too, so we suppress all
# XXX: 3rd-party apps won't have syms for __mingw_CRTStartup!
LEAK
name=default i#599 mingw un-freed alloc A
...
*!__mingw_CRTStartup

REACHABLE LEAK
name=default i#599 mingw un-freed alloc B
*!*mingwthr_add_key_dtor

##################################################
# i#1329: NtUserMessageCall COPYDATASTRUCT.lpData
# Padding in the data used for WM_COPYDATA.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1329 WM_COPYDATA padding
system call NtUserMessageCall COPYDATASTRUCT.lpData
USER32.dll!SendMessageW
SHELL32.dll!SHAppBarMessage

##################################################
# i#1381: NtGdiDrawStream buffer on win8.1
# Suppress what we believe is a real bug in
# UxTheme.dll!CImageFile::DrawBackgroundDS where it does not initialize the
# final 4 bytes of the buffer passed to NtGdiDrawStream on Windows 8.1.

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1381 NtGdiDrawStream buffer on win8.1
system call NtGdiDrawStream parameter #2
GDI32.dll!...
UxTheme.dll!*
UxTheme.dll!*

##################################################
# i#1437: Handle Leaks to be investigated

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#1437-c#1 handle leaks from SHELL32.dll!SHFileOperationW
system call NtDuplicateObject
...
SHELL32.dll!*
SHELL32.dll!SHFileOperationW

##################################################
# Handle leaks to be suppressed

HANDLE LEAK
name=default i#1437-c#3 handle leaks from callbacks of TppWorkerThread
...
ntdll.dll!*Callback
ntdll.dll!TppWorkerThread
KERNEL32.dll!BaseThreadInitThunk

##################################################
# i#1474: real bug in VS2013 istringstream

UNINITIALIZED READ
name=default i#1474 VS2013 istringstream
# we saw both _FXp_getw and FXp_getw (in c#7)
*!*FXp_getw
*!*FDtento
*!*Stofx

##################################################
# i#1535: Possible false positive for AddSidToBoundaryDescriptor.

LEAK
name=default i#1535 AddSidToBoundaryDescriptor false positive
...
ntdll.dll!RtlAddSIDToBoundaryDescriptor
*!AddSIDToBoundaryDescriptor

##################################################
# i#1588: GDI usage error from SHELL32.dll!CDragDropHelper::InitializeFromBitmap

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#1588: InitializeFromBitmap with symbol
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!InternalDeleteDC
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
SHELL32.dll!CDragDropHelper::*

GDI USAGE ERROR
name=default i#1588: InitializeFromBitmap without symbol
system call NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
GDI32.dll!DeleteDC
SHELL32.dll!Ordinal*

##################################################
# i#1565/i#1720: false positive from RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages

# RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages is split up and only appears
# with symbols.  We thus use a generalized callstack:

INVALID HEAP ARGUMENT
name=default i#1720 RtlGetThreadPreferredUILanguages false positive
ntdll.dll!...
kernel32.dll!*
kernel32.dll!CreateProcessInternalW

##################################################
# i#1669: win10-specific process creation error
# XXX: the 2nd param here is not PUNICODE_STRING: we
# should update the database.

UNADDRESSABLE ACCESS
name=default i#1669 win10 create process
system call NtApphelpCacheControl UNICODE_STRING content
...
KERNELBASE.dll!CreateProcessInternalW

{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.1715974430631846, 'fraction_numerical': 0.03861103080530661, 'mean_word_length': 5.865475796669974, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 53, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 67, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 18}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 10, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
{'dir': 'git-commits-cleaned', 'id': '1536054', 'n_tokens_mistral': 21988, 'n_tokens_neox': 19815, 'n_words': 6486}