<commit_before>Threat Model
============

This document outlines the threat model for SecureDrop 0.3 and is
inspired by the `threat model document <NAME> wrote for Pond
<https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20150913065100/https://pond.imperialviolet.org/threat.html>`__.
The threat model
is defined in terms of what each possible adversary can achieve. This
document is still a work in progress. If you have questions or comments,
please open an issue on GitHub or send an email to
<EMAIL>.

Assumptions
-----------

Assumptions about the source
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-  The source acts reasonably and in good faith, e.g. if the user were
   to give their codename or private key material to the attacker that
   would be unreasonable.
-  The source would like to remain anonymous, even against a forensic
   attacker.
-  The source obtains an authentic copy of Tails or the Tor Browser.
-  The source follows our :doc:`guidelines <../source>`
   for using SecureDrop.
-  The source is accessing an authentic SecureDrop site.

Assumptions about the admin and the journalist
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-  The admin and the journalist act reasonably and in good faith, e.g.
   if either of them were to give their credentials or private key
   material to the attacker that would be unreasonable.
-  The admin and the journalist obtain authentic copies of Tails.
-  The journalist follows our
   :doc:`guidelines <../journalist>` for using SecureDrop
   and working with submitted documents.

Assumptions about the person installing SecureDrop, usually the admin<commit_msg>Fix broken link in threat model doc.<commit_after>Threat Model
============

This document outlines the threat model for SecureDrop 0.3 and is
inspired by a `document <NAME> wrote for Pond
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150326154506/https://pond.imperialviolet.org/threat.html>`__.
The threat model is defined in terms of what each possible adversary
can achieve. This document is still a work in progress. If you have
questions or comments, please open an issue on GitHub or send an email
to <EMAIL>.

Assumptions
-----------

Assumptions about the source
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-  The source acts reasonably and in good faith, e.g. if the user were
   to give their codename or private key material to the attacker that
   would be unreasonable.
-  The source would like to remain anonymous, even against a forensic
   attacker.
-  The source obtains an authentic copy of Tails or the Tor Browser.
-  The source follows our :doc:`guidelines <../source>`
   for using SecureDrop.
-  The source is accessing an authentic SecureDrop site.

Assumptions about the admin and the journalist
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-  The admin and the journalist act reasonably and in good faith, e.g.
   if either of them were to give their credentials or private key
   material to the attacker that would be unreasonable.
-  The admin and the journalist obtain authentic copies of Tails.
-  The journalist follows our
   :doc:`guidelines <../journalist>` for using SecureDrop
   and working with submitted documents.

Assumptions about the person installing SecureDrop, usually the admin
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