Datasets:

bwang0911

/

law_stackexchange

like 0

Why is drunk driving causing accident punished so much worse than just drunk driving? When people drink and drive and then cause an accident especially where if someone dies they get years and years in prison but just the act of drunk driving is punished way more lenient. Shouldn't the 2, drunk driving and drunk driving then causing accident be similarly punished? I feel like a lot of times it's luck whether an accident happens.

Moral luck You have raised the issue of moral luck, a long recognized problem in criminal theory. The classic expositions of this issue are by Thomas Nagel, in his chapter, "Moral Luck" (1979) and Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck" (1976). Specifically, you are describing what they call outcome luck, or consequential luck. Driving while intoxicated vs. driving while intoxicated and causing death is not the only example where moral luck results in a distinction in punishment. Other examples are: dangerous driving vs. dangerous driving that causes death a successful offence vs. an attempted offence (generally resulting in a maximum sentence less than that of the successful offence) Nagel writes: If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to the sidewalk, he can count himself morally lucky if there are no pedestrians in its path. If there were, he would be to blame for their deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for manslaughter. But if he hurts no one, although his recklessness is exactly the same, he is guilty of a far less serious legal offence and will certainly reproach himself and be reproached by others much less severely. To take another legal example, the penalty for attempted murder is less than that for successful murder – however similar the intentions and motives of the assailant may be in the two cases. His degree of culpability can depend, it would seem, on whether the victim happened to be wearing a bullet-proof vest, or whether a bird flew into the path of the bullet – matters beyond his control. ... ... How is it possible to be more or less culpable depending on whether a child gets into the path of one’s car, or a bird into the path of one’s bullet? Perhaps it is true that what is done depends on more than the agent’s state of mind or intention. The problem then is, why is it not irrational to base moral assessment on what people do, in this broad sense? It amounts to holding them responsible for the contributions of fate as well as for their own – provided they have made some contribution to begin with. ... If the object of moral judgment is the person, then to hold him accountable for what he has done in the broader sense is akin to strict liability, which may have its legal uses but seems irrational as a moral position. Two offered justifications for making distinctions based purely on outcome Two considerations often raised as justification for differential treatment based on outcome are (David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, "The Case against Moral Luck", 26 LAW & PHIL. 405 (2007), pp. 415–17) epistemological / evidential — the person who actually killed a person was more likely to have been driving more recklessly the theory that the actor should have to internalize the risk, fully, when they set out on a risky activity — if they happen to kill someone, the risk of this higher punishment was part of what they should have accounted for when deciding to embark on the risky activity A couple of quotes from Enoch and Marmor: All other things being equal, the occurrence of an accident is plausibly considered as at least some prima facie evidence for recklessness, or indeed for a higher degree of recklessness. A conception of fairness that requires agents to internalize the costs of their risky activities does not necessarily reflect a view of responsibility or blameworthiness. It may simply reflect a judgment about the appropriate distribution of the costs of risky activities.

"I have done nothing wrong" You got up in court and, when the judge asked if you had done anything wrong, you said: "yes" (guilty). So, in the eyes of the law, you are in the wrong. Police are entitled to make mistakes and, when they do, the accused can either accept the consequences of that mistake by pleading guilty and paying the penalty or they can defend themselves and show that the police made a mistake. Unfortunately, while you have a right to a defence, you don't have a right to a defence at no cost.

It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.

Yes Usually, whoever got their hands on the defendant first would have first crack at it. The second jurisdiction would commonly not prosecute provided that justice was done in the first but they can - double jeopardy is not in play as a bar as they are different legal systems but courts usually apply the spirit that a person shouldn’t be punished twice for the same act.

The distinction is a question of culpability, not just the harm caused. The law, at least in the criminal law context, is not fundamentally consequentialist in its philosophy. The end consequence of an act for which someone is at fault in some way isn't the only thing that matters in criminal law. Instead, there is basically a two dimensional grid. On one axis is the seriousness of the harm caused on the "eye for an eye" theory of proportionality between punishment and the harm caused. Thus, homicide is more serious than causing serious bodily injury or raping someone, which is more serious than causing bodily injury that is not serious or sexual in nature. Grand theft is more serious than shoplifting. It doesn't make economic sense to spend $70,000 a year to incarcerate someone for many years to prevent people from stealing $15 items, unless very extreme aspects of the person's criminal history suggest that this seemingly minor incident demonstrates a high risk of future offenses that are far more serious because it proves that a hardened criminal hasn't reformed himself or herself. On the other axis is basically a measure of how evil and malicious someone would have to be to do such a thing which is called culpability. At once extreme, first degree murder, for example, is calculated, premeditated harm to another. At the other extremes are completely non-culpable conduct (either due to lack of any fault-worthy conduct or because someone is mentally incapable in the eyes of society of engaging in culpable conduct like a baby or someone with dementia or someone having hallucinations relevant to the conduct that kills someone, ordinarily negligent conduct that kills someone, and criminally negligent conduct that kills someone. In between the extremes is conduct that is reckless or is impulsive or carried out in the heat of passion or by someone with diminished capacity. Only moderately culpable conduct is punishable only by a civil lawsuit for compensatory damages, and non-culpable conduct isn't even punishable in a civil lawsuit in the absence of special circumstances in which strict liability is imposed in lieu of proof of culpability. Less culpable conduct commands less serious sentences, and more culpable conduct commands more serious sentences. Why single out culpability? Basically, this is a crude way a predicting, based upon someone's past actions, the risk that the pose in the future. (Our evaluation of culpability is further refined and adjusted by factors related to the individual defendant and not the particular offense involved, like a criminal defendant's status as a juvenile or adult, and the individuals history of prior criminal convictions.) Conduct that constitutes first degree murder corresponds more or less to psychopathy, an incurable psychiatric condition in which someone lacks all empathy and takes selfish delight in harming others out of boredom or for personal gain. Psychopathy is a technical term that is modern abnormal psychology's closest synonym to saying that someone is unredeemable and evil, and conduct for which the death penalty is available, mostly in conduct that is most highly diagnostic of psychopathy, since the usual goal of incarceration, to return someone to the community once they are no longer an appreciably elevated threat to it, can never be achieved in the case of someone who is unredeemable and evil, because their condition is an incurable part of who they are as a person and their lack of empathy makes them incapable of emotionally distinguishing between right and wrong or feeling guilt. This intuition bears out. The more culpable an offense is, the more likely it is that the offender scores high on standardized measures of the extent to which someone displays signs of psychopathy that are exemplified in serial killers and the worst con men. Intermediate levels of liability correspond more or less to impulsivity that can turn violent (which is associated with a variety of incurable psychiatric conditions and also with the developmental states of adolescence and young adulthood and with instances of excessive intoxicant consumption, especially in men), in which someone knows what they are doing is wrong but lacks sufficient self-control to prevent themselves from acting until it is too late and they have calmed down, at least until they "age out" or or take steps to treat the symptoms of the conditions or addictions or intoxicated excesses. Their lack of self-control makes them a potential risk to others even though they empathize and feel guilt, but not like the risk associated with a psychopath who just doesn't care at all if they are doing something that violates intuitive moral codes of conduct. Negligence, i.e. inattentiveness and carelessness pose even less of a threat to the community and while it could be due to something like attention deficit disorder, could also be due to extenuating circumstances like sleep deprivation or being overwhelmed with too much at once to keep track of everything at once. Negligence harm generally isn't even momentarily malicious due to loss of control and the person who harms someone negligently will often immediately regret the harm that they caused and will try to refrain from doing so again and will try to make things right. Such a person is far less of a future threat to society, but still more of a threat than someone who doesn't harm others in the first place in any manner in which they are at fault. Who decides? Reasonable people (and even reasonable judges) can and do have differences of opinion on the relative importance of seriousness of harm and culpability in determining a sentence for a conviction of a particular course of illegal conduct. The difficulty in balancing the apples and oranges factors of seriousness of harm (which, in part, reflects a person's capacity to inflict serious harm in the future and also reflects society's judgment about how serious it is to do something with ill intent) and culpability. To insure that these factors are balanced in a predictable and fair way, we embody the weighing of those two factors in a collective legislative judgment codified in a state or national penal code, rather than a case by case decision making process by judges. The modern trend towards giving more weight to culpability. If anything, the tendency at the present is for legislative judgment to give more weight to culpability than it has in the past as social science methods in criminology have demonstrated that culpability demonstrated in criminal conduct actually carried out by a person is indeed highly predictive of that person's future dangerousness to society For example, cruelty to animals is an offense which reflects very high levels of culpability despite often involving relatively modest amounts of harm viewed in a human-centric way. But, cruelty to animals is increasingly being upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony, because it is a very diagnostic litmus test for psychopathy in an individual and very frequently eventually escalates to causing serious harm to humans. Similarly, drunk driving when it is charged based upon a traffic stop, rather than an accident that occurred while someone was driving drunk, is a very low harm offense, just like any other traffic offense, and historically has only been a misdemeanor. But, in cases where someone is repeatedly convicted of drunk driving, the culpability is high and the conduct tends to reflect a very difficult to self-regulate addiction and substance abuse problem that is highly likely to recur and to eventually result in a high harm accident. Repeated convictions are what distinguish an incident where someone is basically just criminally negligent in driving when they should have known that they shouldn't, from the far more serious case where someone recklessly and with indifference to the well being of others drives drunk knowing full what the risk that they are exposing other people to. And because repeat drunk driving convictions are more culpable and reflect a personal character of the offender that shows a high likelihood of causing future harm to others, many states are starting to upgrade repeat drunk driving from a misdemeanor to a felony even though the actual harm from the specific incident of drunk driving that only gives rise to a traffic stop is still just as low the fifth or sixth time someone is convicted as it was the first time. Conclusion So, in sum, assigning different penalties to different levels of culpability is a way to allocate limited correctional and punishment resources in a manner proportionate to the future risk of dangerousness that the current conviction provides undeniable evidence of in a non-arbitrary manner. Indeed, most people simply internalize the notion that more culpable conduct deserves more serious punishment because it is wrong, without conceptualizing in the more theoretical abnormal psychology informed and utilitarian framework in which I have described it above to demonstrate the implicit logic and wisdom behind the gut instinct that more culpable conduct should be punished more seriously, especially when its cause is not a passing incident that is unlikely to recur.

I think you should read this section in conjunction with 708.4: Any person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another commits willful injury, which is punishable as follows: A class “C” felony, if the person causes serious injury to another. A class “D” felony, if the person causes bodily injury to another. So a person who commits an assault with the intent to inflict serious injury, and actually does inflict serious injury, will not get away with a 708.2(1) aggravated misdemeanor. They may instead be convicted under 708.4(1), a class C felony, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000-$10,000. This is a more serious crime than the class D felony of 708.2(4) for someone who does not intend to cause a serious injury but does so anyway. As an exercise, you can make yourself a 3x3 grid of all possible combinations of intent and result among "no injury", "bodily injury", "serious injury", and I think you'll find that the severity increases with either worse intent or worse result.

In the US, there is no general legal duty to aid. Certain states (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington – about 10 states) have imposed such a duty. Otherwise, duty arises only because you have caused the peril, or because you have certain pre-existing relations with the person. Pennsylvania does have a duty to assist law, applicable to drivers of vehicles involved in an accident that results in injury or death (involved in, not just caused). PA also has a Good Samaritan law which relieves a person of liability for a good faith rendering of assistance, which does not otherwise impose a positive duty on individuals.

Yes, such a scenario is plausible, and there are some cases where it has probably happened. But since juries do not normally give reasons for their votes, it is hard to establish when it has and when it has not happened, and I have seen no statistics on such occurrences. By the way, "Jury Nullification" is simply when one or more jury members vote in a particular way because of something other than the law and evidence as presented in the trial. Most often the term is used when a jury votes to acquit because they dislike or disapprove of the law involved. For example, in the 1850s a number of people accused of violating the US Fugitive Slave Law by harboring runaway slaves were acquitted, reputedly because juries who disliked the law (quite unpopular in many northern states) no matter what the evidence. Later, during Prohibition, some people charged with possessing or selling alcohol were acquitted, reputedly by juries who disapproved of Prohibition. In both cases, it is hard to get authoritative sources that specific cases were actual instances of jury nullification. Anyway, a juror need not "ask" for jury nullification, that juror just votes to acquit. A jury that votes to acquit (or convict) because of political or personal views about the accused might be said to be "biased" but I am not sure if that would be described as "jury nullification".

Question Concerning Responding to Employer of Minor Daughter Paid Under Minimum Wage My high school daughter worked for about a year for an employer who owns a tutoring company in our town. Due to friction between my daughter and the employer, my daughter recently quit but she realized that she was being underpaid for much of this year (2023) because the minimum wage here in California is currently $15.50 for 2023 but she was still getting paid $14.00, the California minimum wage for 2022, when she recently quit (in August 2023). Now according to my daughter there is a provision in California law which allows employers to pay only 85% of minimum wage for new workers with no prior experience for their first 160 hours of work. For 2023, that "new worker" wage level would work out to $13.17 per hour, but my daughter said that she exceeded her first 160 hours of work for the employer back in March 2023. So, basically, my daughter was being paid under the proper CA 2023 minimum wage for over the past 4 months. When my daughter contacted her former employer about this problem, the employer was apologetic and emailed back saying that a financial transaction to her to correct for the underpayment would be sent as soon as my daughter emailed back an enclosed payment settlement form. The settlement form basically says "I hereby agree that the net payment of $XXX represents the full and final settlement of my account with Company XXX", and there are signature lines at the bottom of the form for my daughter's signature as well as my signature as her parent. I'm currently thinking "Why should I, the parent, need to sign anything here?". The employer underpaid my daughter and she acknowledges that she underpaid my daughter, so it seems that she is responsible for paying my daughter the money she already owes her for the work that my daughter already did, regardless of whether I sign any form or not. Any thoughts on all of this?

Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.

Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies.

What follows is a broad overview. I'm not an expert in this; I just have a bit of experience in this due to a tax situation my wife & I experienced a few years ago. Please do not rely on this advice except as a starting point for more Googling. Your obligations (and your assistant's) will depend on whether the assistant is an employee or an independent contractor. In general, an independent contractor is someone you hire to "get a job done"; you have minimal control over the manner, time, place, tools, etc., that the assistant uses. An employee, on the other hand, is someone you hire to come to work at a particular time and do the job a particular way. (I'm glossing over some details here; see the IRS link above for more details.) If your assistant is an independent contractor, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you must provide them with Form 1099-MISC, and file a copy with the IRS as well. Your assistant will then be liable for income taxes on this amount, as well as self-employment tax (see below.) If your assistant is actually an employee, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you are required to provide them with a W-2 form, as well as filing a copy with the IRS. In addition, if you pay them more than a higher threshold ($2200 in a tax year or $1000 in any quarter for 2020), you are responsible for withholding taxes from their paychecks, as well as paying the employer's portion of Social Security, Medicare, and/or federal unemployment taxes. How to figure these taxes is complex, but generally the employee must provide you with a completed W-4, and then you must provide them (and the IRS) with a W-2 at the end of the tax year. See Publication 15: Employer's Tax Guide for all the gory details. The self-employment tax is designed to effectively cover the employer's portion of these taxes for self-employed workers. As you might imagine, employers are often tempted to misclassify employees as "independent contractors", since this means that this tax liability gets pushed from them onto their workers, as well as just making the employer's life easier. The Feds will not take kindly to such misclassification if it is discovered. Finally, for the state of Connecticut, consult the CT 1009-MISC filing guide (if your assistant is an independent contractor) or the Connecticut employer's tax guide (if they are an employee). The distinction is pretty much the same as at the federal level.

An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.

Given that they told me I would get back pay and I worked conditional on that information, am I entitled to it? You are entitled to backpay in accordance with the terms you accepted from HR. The employer's refusal to pay you from October 1st is in violation of Austria's Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at § 860a. At this point you have fully complied with the conditions on which your continued employment was contingent. From then on, the employer's belatedness in revoking its commitment to backdate your start date to October 1st is not cognizable: Prior to your full compliance with the conditions of academic nature, there was no possible way for you to be aware of the employer's repudiation of its obligations regarding the October-December compensation. The employer's failure to timely notify you of the unilateral change is especially notorious and hard to justify. Your employment & relocation to Austria suggests that the employer had --and waived-- ample opportunity to inform you that any work you perform prior to addressing the contingent aspect will not be compensated. Even if the employer ventures with a dubious allegation of that sort, it is unlikely to survive § 1152.

There is a specific exemption in 29 USC 213(c)(3) that The provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions. See this article for further analysis, a propos state laws. Incidentally, the act defines "oppressive child labor" as: a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor if and to the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being. Without the statutory exemption, if you are under 16 and employed by a non-parent, in any occupation, that is oppressive child labor. But because of the specific exemption, what would otherwise be statutorily oppressive child labor is allowed. The political "why" question (why did the bill contain such language) is extremely difficult to answer. The only substantive clues that I have seen are in a 1959 dissertation by G.E. Paulsen and this article on the passage of the act. It seems to be a legislative compromise relating stricter original standards, and was particularly driven by the need to allow children to work on family farms. The relevant clause was added from the floor of the House on May 24, 1938 by Rep Charles Kramer (CA). This is recorded on p. 7441 of the Congressional Record, which, unfortunately, is not freely available online. The two toughest questions were asked by Schneider (WI), Kramer's reply in parentheses: The gentleman's amendment would exempt children engaged only in the making of moving pictures? (The gentleman is correct) There are very few young people employed in that occupation? (Very few. There are hardly more than 10 employed at one time.) Shirley Temple was in fact invoked by Kramer.

I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.

They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...

Can Hawaii secede from the U.S. through legal means? Can Hawaii secede from the U.S. through legal means or is it forbidden by U.S. law? I am asking, because I doubt the U.S. would accept the result of a referendum that rules that the Hawaiians want to secede from the U.S. just like Russia or China wouldn't accept it.

Currently, there is no legal means for a state to secede form the U.S. A quick Google search yields So you want to secede from the U.S.: A four-step guide - The Washington Post: "When the Confederate states seceded in 1861 and were then defeated in the Civil War, the argument is that they demonstrated that you can't secede from the Union. The 1869 Supreme Court case TEXAS v. WHITE ET AL (Legal Information Institute) determined that the secession was never actually a real thing in the eyes of the federal government. The Confederate States of America wasn't an independent country any more than your house is its own country simply because you say it is. 'The Constitution, in all its provisions,' the justices wrote, 'looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States.'" Also from that Post piece: In 2006, Justice Antonin Scalia was asked by screenwriter Dan Turkewitz if the idea of Maine seceding from the country made sense as a possible plot point. Scalia, perhaps unexpectedly, replied. "I cannot imagine that such a question could ever reach the Supreme Court," Scalia wrote. "To begin with, the answer is clear. If there was any constitutional issue resolved by the Civil War, it is that there is no right to secede. ... Secondly, I find it difficult to envision who the parties to this lawsuit might be. Is the State suing the United States for a declaratory judgment? But the United States cannot be sued without its consent, and it has not consented to this sort of suit." A state could secede if the US Constitution was amended to allow secession, but the chances of that happening are low. Also see Secession in the United States - Wikipedia

Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) ("The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’") (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.").

[C]an this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants? Yes. If the case did not depend on the fact that they were lawfully resident in the US, then it would apply to those who are not lawfully present in the US. For the case to apply to some people but not others, there must be a distinguishing difference that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The question then is whether lawful residence is a distinguishing difference here, and it seems that no court has ruled on the question. Referring to current events, it would be possible for the executive branch to assert that the 14th amendment does not grant citizenship to one born in the US of parents who were not lawfully present. This would end up in court. For example, such a person could sue to compel the government to issue a passport, or, if the government sought to deport such a person, the person could assert US citizenship in deportation proceedings. At that point, the court would have to rule on the question, whereupon it would almost certainly rule that the 14th amendment does grant such citizenship. See, for example, Plyler v. Doe, in which the court ruled that illegal immigrants in a state are within its jurisdiction for the purpose of the equal protection clause. It would be odd indeed for the court to rule that the same word means something different in the previous sentence. Furthermore, in a footnote, the court writes [W]e have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ." ... [N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. You ask: [H]ow is it that foreign diplomats' children born in United States do not have birthright to US citizenship because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and children of tourists and illegal immigrants do have the birthright to US citizenship? Consider what happens when an illegal immigrant commits a crime in the territory of a US state: the person is subject to trial and punishment in the state's criminal justice system. A foreign diplomat who commits a crime, on the other hand, or indeed the child or other family member of a foreign diplomat, is immune from prosecution. That is what distinguishes diplomats from illegal aliens such that the first sentence of the 14th amendment applies to the latter, but not the former.

It's not regulated by international law. Depending on the laws of the intended destination country, it may be the case that none of the members of the family are permitted to enter, or that they can enter, but only two can enter as a "couple", while the others are legally completely separate (or even excluded from the country). According to one blog, at present in the United States, a foreign national must actually intend to practice polygamy in the United States to be ineligible for an immigrant visa. The current law does not prevent a polygamist or someone who practiced polygamy in the past or expresses a belief in polygamy from being eligible for an immigrant visa. But aliens coming to the United States to practice polygamy are barred. Before 1990, there was a law on the books by which someone who merely "advocated the practice of polygamy" could have been barred. This question has been answered on Quora for the U.S., again for the U.S. (where the question asked about "US and EU"), and for Canada. Basically, the whole family can't legally immigrate as a unit. However, determining who is the "real" wife, if any of them, would depend on the facts of the case, the specific laws of the target jurisdiction, and the purpose of the determination. It could very well be that every one of the other marriages would void a new marriage in the destination country and entitle the children to child support, but none of them would entitle the wife to a spouse's visa or the father to visitation rights after a purported divorce. See also this answer about whether it's possible for a married immigrant to commit bigamy by entering the United States pretending to be unmarried. Sure there are people who try, and it's more likely to succeed with the cooperation of the foreign spouse(s), but it's against the law and can be grounds for deportation, imprisonment, annulment of the second marriage, or exclusion of any polyspouse who is outside the country.

Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).

Does the unitary executive allow the President of the United States to suspend the law at his discretion for purposes of national security? No. The unitary executive theory pertains to independent agency autonomy, not to the authority of the executive branch to disregard statutes.

Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.

What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married.

Can defendants arraigned in federal court sometimes be "out on bail" secretly with no way for the public to know about or verify the bail? In this answer to my Politics SE question *Is former president Trump "out on bail" as Chris Christie asserts? If so, were campaign funds used? which ends: Bail is a particular type of bond in which the defendant submits an upfront payment that will be held until he returns to court, but there's no indication Trump was asked to post bail. there is a discussion about what "but there's no indication" means, including: Isn't posting bail generally a matter of public knowledge? We often hear about person X was released wrt case Y for Z amount of money. Which would bolster this answer. and Generally yes, it's disclosed to the public. I just don't know if it's legally required to be disclosed, or whether the judge has discretion. Law is weird... Chuckles that Politics SE would think Law is weird aside, this has piqued my curiosity. Christie is a former US attorney with extensive experience in arraignments for corruption and similar crimes, and would be keenly aware of the difference between bond and bail. Further, the "out on bail" statement was made on national television amidst a discussion on truth and honesty in politics. And yet I can't tell if the "out on bail" assertion is true, false, or currently unknowable with any certainty. Question: Can defendants arraigned in federal court sometimes be "out on bail" secretly with no way for the public to know about or verify the bail?

Here is one of the three Trump appearance bonds. As you can see, it is a personal recognizance bond, and not a dollar amount bond. He promises to appear, as required, and there is no money involved. There is a direct indication that he was not required to "post bail", which is a stronger statement that "no indication that he was".

Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.

The question is ill framed, but I'll try to reframe it and answer it. New Jersey v. Andrews is a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court (its highest appellate court), which held that you do not have a 5th Amendment right to refuse to disclose a password that if disclosed might reveal incriminating password protected information. Andrews attempted to appeal this to the U.S. Supreme Court with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Freedom Foundation. But, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Andrews' petition for certiorari (i.e. refused to take up the case, leaving it in force in New Jersey) on May 17, 2021. As explained in an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in support of granting Andrews' Petition for Certiorari: In an opinion dated, August 10, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court, based on Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), extended the “foregone conclusion” doctrine to cellphones and held that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not protect an individual from being compelled to recall and truthfully disclose a password to his cellphone under circumstances where that disclosure may lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1274-75 (N.J. 2020). The basic issue is that the 5th Amendment does not protect documents written by a potential criminal defendant from disclosure (and such a person can be forced to turn over those records or provide, for example, a physical key to a file cabinet to allow them to be obtained by authorities), but the 5th Amendment does protect a potential criminal defendant from having to testify in a way that would be self-incriminating. It isn't clear on which side of this divide a forced disclosure of a password lies. The same amicus brief notes a law review article which stated that: the Fifth Amendment law of compelled access to encrypted data as a “fundamental question bedeviling courts and scholars” and “that has split and confused the courts” citing Laurent Sacharoff, "Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices", 87 Fordham L. Rev. 203, 203, 207 (2018). Neither the federal courts below the U.S. Supreme Court, nor the courts of another state can overturn a ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and all state courts in the state of New Jersey are required to follow the precedents of the New Jersey Supreme Court including New Jersey v. Andrews. There is an unresolved split of authority on this legal issue at the national level. Three courts one step below the U.S. Supreme Court (including the New Jersey Supreme Court) have resolved it as New Jersey did, four courts one step below the U.S. Supreme Court have taken the opposite position, and at least one state (Florida) has an internal split of authority over the issue. Forty-five states (including Florida which is split at the intermediate appellate court level), the District of Columbia's local courts, and eleven intermediate federal appellate courts, however, have not yet definitively ruled on this emerging 5th Amendment interpretation issue. Massachusetts reached the same conclusion as New Jersey did in Andrews. Commonwealth v. Gelfatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 615 (Mass. 2014). So did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit. United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017). Indiana has held that the 5th Amendment privilege prohibits the government from demanding that someone disclose a password that if disclosed might reveal incriminating information. Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958 (Ind. 2020). So did Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 550 (Pa. 2019). Utah's Supreme Court held that the 5th Amendment prohibits forced disclosures of passwords in October of 2021. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit also took this position. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012). The Florida Supreme Court had not addressed the issue (as of early 2021) and there was a split of authority over this issue in Florida's intermediate appellate courts at that time. Compare Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 651 (Fla. App. 2019) and G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1062-63 (Fla. App. 2018) with State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. App. 2016). What often happens when there is a split of authority between a small number of state supreme courts and intermediate federal appellate courts, like the one present here, but not all that many states and intermediate federal appellate courts (often called "circuits) have chimed in, is that the U.S. Supreme Court declines to resolve the split until more jurisdictions have considered the issue. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court allows the law regarding that issue to "develop" and guide it in some future case in which the issue will be resolved. If the lower appellate courts tend to clearly favor one resolution or the other, the U.S. Supreme Court will often take a case to ratify the clear majority view (although sometimes it contradicts that majority position instead). And, if the split remains fairly even after a large number of jurisdictions of taken a position, the U.S. Supreme Court may then step in an resolve the issue one way or the other. But, there are many splits of authority on legal issues in U.S. federal law including constitutional law (probably hundreds) that have remained unresolved for a very long period of time, sometimes for decades, including some which are quite well developed. Also, since this issue involves the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in a very direct way, there is really nothing that Congress can do to resolve the split.

Does a bail-jumper have any recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information? No. The bail-jumper has no recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information for reasons discussed at greater length below in response to another question posed which is somewhat broader. Say that a person is a bail-jumper, that is, someone who fails to appear in court after being let out on bail. If they are apprehended by a bail bondsman with the help of illegally obtained information, do they have any sort of recourse? The person apprehended has very little recourse. The relevant case law has held that an apprehension of a bail-jumper by a private sector bail bondsman or a private sector bounty hunter hired by a private sector bail bondsman, is not "state action" and hence not subject to the constitutional protections that apply to illegal conduct by law enforcement officers acting under color of state law. This is true even though bail bondsman attempting the apprehend a bail-jumper is given profoundly broad statutory authority to take actions that would otherwise be illegal for a private person to engage in when doing so, and even though the bail bondsman is, in substance, enforcing a direction of a court which is a governmental agency. Certainly, nothing equivalent to the exclusionary rule or Miranda or a lawsuit against the bail bondsman under Section 1983 for a violation of the bail-jumpers civil rights would be available. (Also, the exclusionary rule that applies to exclude evidence obtained illegally in violation of the 4th and/or 6th Amendments doesn't operate to prevent a criminal defendant detained by law enforcement from being detained on an outstanding warrant, even if the arrest is based upon illegally obtained information, although if law enforcement did it, the bail-jumper could bring a 1983 actions against the offending law enforcement officers subject to qualified immunity.) The bail-jumper would probably have a right to sue the company that disclosed the information illegally for breach of a privacy tort if this was done in a timely fashion. But, attorneys' fees can't be recovered in a case like that, the statute of limitations is typically short, and damages that could be awarded would normally not extend to any harm involving the criminal defendant's failure to be successful in bail-jumping. So, ordinarily the damages would be nominal at best. Likewise, there might be a claim against the bail bondsman for participation in a civil conspiracy with the company that provided the information to commit a privacy tort. But, this has all of the downsides associated with suing the company providing the information, and also, would pose an additional problem: it is quite likely that a suit against the bail bondsman by the bail-jumper for acts occurring while the bail-jumper is jumping bail is either contractually waived by the bail-jumper in a bail bond agreement with the bail bondsman that courts would uphold despite the fact that it arguably involves an intentional tort by the bail bondsman, or would be barred by a bail bondsman's immunity from liability created under an applicable state statute or the common law of that state created by judicial decisions. Furthermore, in some states, a suit like this by a bail-jumper against the bail bondsman and also against the company providing the information, would be barred under the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" that bars someone who has engaged in illegal or improper conduct in connection with the claim for which relief is sought from utilizing the courts in connection with that set of facts. Realistically, probably the best legal strategy for criminal defendants who have obtained private bail bonds would be to bring a class action against the companies that provide the information and the bail bondsmen who have used it, ideally brought on behalf of criminal defendants who are not bail-jumpers as well as those who are bail-jumpers, seeking injunctive relief only to prohibit continuation of this practice prospectively, subject to contempt of court sanctions from the issuing court if the company or bail bondsman defendants did so.

Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something).

Will he break any laws by saying that (assuming the actual truth cannot be found out)? The statement made outside the courtroom is not itself perjury, since it is not made under oath. But that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be legal consequences. It would be powerful evidence in a perjury prosecution (surely enough for a conviction even standing alone long after the trial is over but within the statute of limitations for perjury in the jurisdiction from the date of the sworn statement, if any), and would be a waiver of 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination, generally, in the perjury case. It might also be strong evidence (enough to convict standing alone) in a timely obstruction of justice prosecution. This statute of limitations could also run from the date of the sworn statement, or from the date of a false unsworn statement that caused a conviction to be reopened. If the statement made in court was favorable to the prosecution, it might bring these charges after the conviction in the underlying case is final. But, the out of court statement would probably be grounds for the party benefitting from the original statement to seek a mistrial or to have a judgment set aside if the verdict or judgment is consistent with the sworn statement. If the out of court statement was made before the trial was over, the witness could be recalled and the out of court statement could be used to impeach the in court statement. It might constitute a probation or parole violation. If the witness were testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the out of court statement would probably breach the deal and deny the witness the benefit of the cooperation deal. The out of court statement might constitute contempt of court if made while the proceeding in which the statement was made was still pending. Depending on the nature of the statement, the out of court statement might constitute defamation for which some one whose reputation was tarnished might sue for money damages. (There is immunity from civil liability for in court statements.) It would violate the ethical rules of many professions. For example, an attorney would probably be disbarred for doing that. Arguably, in this situation, the statute of limitations could run from the later unsworn statement date rather than the date of the sworn statement. If the witness is a state or federal government employee, this could lead to impeachment proceedings, in the state legislature, or Congress, respectively. The aftermath of the Lewinsky Scandal (link below) involving Bill Clinton touches on many of these possibilities: Further investigation led to charges of perjury and to the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 by the U.S. House of Representatives. He was subsequently acquitted on all impeachment charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in a 21-day Senate trial. Clinton was held in civil contempt of court by Judge Susan Webber Wright for giving misleading testimony in the Paula Jones case regarding Lewinsky and was also fined $90,000 by Wright. His license to practice law was suspended in Arkansas for five years; shortly thereafter, he was disbarred from presenting cases in front of the United States Supreme Court. Easier and Harder Cases The easier cases are those where it is undeniably clear from other evidence that the witness lied under oath, and the out of court statement merely puts the cherry on top of an already solid perjury case. The hard cases aren't the cases where "the actual truth cannot be found out". Instead, the hard cases are the cases where there is strong evidence that the statement made in court, under oath was true. For example, suppose Ted Cruz is asked in court: "Were you the Zodiac killer?" (A crime ridiculously attributed to him despite the fact that it is something that happened when he was a small child who live many hundreds of miles away.) And he says, "No" in court, but then leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "I am the Zodiac killer, I lied about that under oath in court today." Similarly, suppose that a DNA test on a certain blue dress shows a perfect match to President Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton says under oath in court, that the substance tested came from him on a certain day, in a certain place, when a certain person was wearing it, in a certain way (also confirmed by a witness and surveillance video). Then, he leaves the courtroom and says in a press conference on the court house steps: "Someone else was the source of that genetic material. I never met that person, and I was in Kenya on the day alleged and I've never set foot in the White House. I lied about all of this under oath in court today." In these cases, there is no plausible way to make an obstruction of justice or perjury charge stick, or to upset a verdict or judgment consistent with the truthful sworn statement. Contempt of court is still possible, as would professional ethics violations, but other consequences would be less obvious, because the act would come across more as absurd instead of something that genuinely confounds the truth. The legal consequences associated with the conduct in the original post are mostly aimed at sanctioning genuinely fraudulent conduct. Our legal system is more confused about how to respond to lies so blatant that they only amount to feeble and ineffectual gaslighting that no reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would believe (but that might incite crazy conspiracy theory thinking supporters). The harder case would lie in the uncanny valley between a bad joke and a pathetically weak attempt to mislead people, even though the law is clear about how to deal with clear sarcasm and convincing attempts to lie that can't be clearly proven or disproven with other evidence.

No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent.

No, a defendant may not remain silent on cross-examination. Witnesses who voluntarily testify in their own defense are subject to cross-examination on that testimony. In Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, (1900), a murder defendant testified that he was at two bars and then his cabin the night of the crime. The trial court held that having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the defendant was subject to cross examination about what he was wearing that night, his connections to a co-defendant, the co-defendant's clothes, and who else was at the cabin with him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that if a defendant voluntary makes a statement about the crime at trial, the prosecution may cross-examine him with as much latitude as it would have with any other witness: The witness having sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).

Is use of force in defense of another legal if the person being defended opposes the use of force? Bob threatens John with a gun. Alice, who is also carrying a gun (legally), draws her gun and aims at Bob, intending to shoot him in defense of John, who is unarmed. John says to her, "Don't shoot him!" Alice shoots Bob anyway. Is this legal? Assume that it would have been unquestionably legal had John consented or remained silent.

england-and-wales Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice). John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that. Why did John oppose the use of force? Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant. Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant.

No. Under Texas Penal Code Title 2 Subchapter A, one of three three conditions must be true to use the defense-of-others defense, that the person against whom force is used unlawfully and with force entered the person's residence, vehicle of business (not applicable), or attempted to forcibly remove the person from same (idem), or attempted aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Abortion is not statutorily murder in Texas, even if it is illegal.

Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.

An example of where this is not allowed is Seattle, WA. Municipal code SMC 12A.06.025 states It is unlawful for any person to intentionally fight with another person in a public place and thereby create a substantial risk of: Injury to a person who is not actively participating in the fight; or Damage to the property of a person who is not actively participating in the fight. B. In any prosecution under subsection A of this Section 12A.06.025, it is an affirmative defense that: The fight was duly licensed or authorized by law; or The person was acting in self-defense. You can see from adjacent sections that "mutual combat" is not legal. I recognize that there is this meme about Seattle, but this is a distortion of an incident when the police turned a blind eye to a fight. We have police issues, no doubt: there is nothing legal about such fights. Of course, for a licensed event, you can "fight". Of course the potential legality depends on how mutual combat is defined. Illinois v. Austin 133 Ill.2d 118 and citations therein, subsequently Illinois v. Thompson, 821 NE 2d 664 define it thus: Mutual combat is a fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or where two persons, upon a sudden quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and where death results from the combat. Similar death-definitions are found in Donaldson v. State, 289 SE 2d 242, Iowa v. Spates, 779 NW 2d 770. The law looks askance of such behavior. For the sake of clarity, a term other than "mutual combat" would be preferable.

In the U.S. it does not. U.S. has strong Castle Law doctrines and self-defense laws that allow the use of firearms for self-defense within the home. The sign is that the homeowner is armed and will defend himself if there is an intruder. Florida is also a stand your ground state which means that in public, self-defense is valid use of force for civilians even if they have the ability to flee the would be criminal. As anecdotal evidence, when I was living in the state, my boss was telling me the story of how he got a gun and went to do some paperwork at the sheriff's office. When the deputy received the paperwork, he saw that the gun was going to be used for home defense and told my boss, "In the case of home defense, if, God forbid someone enters your home looking to do harm to you and yours, remember: Shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us."

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.

In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable.

Leading customers to use cheaper solution invented for another domain instead of expensive patented solution. Infringement? Let's say there is a patented product A for domain A and there is a product B that does the same work but is invented for a different domain B. If a company in domain A shows its customers that they can also use product B for domain A, is it an infringement of the patent? The intention is obviously to lead users to be able to access the cheap solution. In case it is an infringement, what if a Youtuber makes a tutorial and shows how to use the cheap solution to the domain A to people? I don't think there is a way to prevent this even if the company does not want it. For example, there is a broadcasting camera tracker which cost around 100k~200k but a similar product that does the same work but was invented for robotics is just 1k. What's your thought? Added: Patent of the product A, intended for the broadcasting industry: https://patents.google.com/patent/AU2013257788B2/en?assignee=ncam&oq=ncam An example of product B, used for different domains. https://www.intelrealsense.com/tracking-camera-t265/ A similar algorithm is used on both products. According to the patent, it sounds like using product B for the broadcasting industry is infringing their IP. I want my customers to be able to buy a tracker for under $200.

There are several issues - one is that patents are given for specific ways of solving a problem, sometimes very narrowly different from other ways of solving a problem, not for a result. There are usually many ways to achieve a result. Another, that you bring up, is “field of use”. That comes into play in method claims but not usually in device or systems claims. A claim to a “thing”- system, device, machine etc. is infringed by another thing (that fits within the claimed definition) just sitting on a shelf in a box. Intended use is not traditionally relevant. If a device for any intended use fits the words of a claim, it infringes. In your case the preamble of a system claim says “system for mixing or compositing in real-time, computer generated 3D objects”. At least in the US that would not usually be limiting to that use but just taken as a description of the thing, not requiring actual specified use to infringe. Read it as “capable of being used for”. Method claims can limit field of use. A method for getting rust cleared from a screwdriver that had a step “provide a rusty screwdriver” would be limited to that use. Another example would be a back scratcher configured exactly as a small garden rake but claimed in a method for scratching one’s back. Assume the garden rake is known - the backscratcher as a thing could not be patented, but a method of using something of a certain shape and design (small garden rake) to scratch your back could be. Someone with a garden rake couldn’t scratch their back even though they owned the garden rake. Note that a small garden sold as good for use as a backscratcher would be committing contributory infringement unless they had a license. Something being covered by a patent owned by its manufacturer does not mean it, or its use, does not infringe some other patent owned by a totally unrelated entity. Of course it is possible a manufacturer has licensed relevant patents of others. The patent you link to is not only described as used for broadcast. Gaming and other entertainment uses are mentioned. As mentioned in another answer, the Intel device works in a way that doesn’t fall under the claims of the sited patent. It has two cameras in total while the claims require a main camera and two additional cameras to do the position determination another with other inertial sensors. Some uses of the Intel device could theoretically infringe method claims in one or more un-sighted, unknown, patents. If someone bolted the intel device to a “film camera” and used the combination as described in the method claim you might get the quality image you need and only use the intel device for the position information. Then you might infringe.

You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling.

It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.

The answer to this depends very much in which country you are in, and how you go about implementing it. First of all, this might seem obvious, but copyright only applies if you copy something that is covered under copyright. If you copy an idea - that having a library that solves problem X is useful - and that is the only aspect you copy, then under U.K. Copyright law, there is no copyright infringement, as ideas are not copyrighted. However, if you copy aspects of the library interface, or the object model of the original library, then it's a derived work, and the copyright of the new work is only partly yours. If you translate the source into a new language, then the copyright is largely still with the original author. Every country implements copyright law in their own way. One of the principle differences are in the available "fair use" clauses. You may find that you are entitled to a fair use clause for creating a "compatible" library, or you may be allowed to quote small aspects of the original in your new work. You need to check up on your countries laws.

Under the America Invents Act of 2012 nothing would happen unless someone - the original inventor or any third party - filed for an Inter Partes Review. The cost of filing to try to get an IPR going is $15,500. If the published information about the original inventor's work passed some hurdle, an IPR can be instituted by the USPTO. It is a trial-light proceeding that is estimated to cost at least $100,000. Any claims that are found invalid are invalid for everyone (pending any appeals). The AIA did introduce a new "feature" that could help you hypothetical first inventor to stay in business if he/she was actually producing and selling the thing. It is called "prior user rights" and lets you keep making what ever you were making at the location you are making them at. It is not automatic. Rather it is a defense in an infringement suit. Even before the AIA there was no such thing as "have the patent canceled". The issue of the first inventor's prior art would come up at a patent infringement lawsuit.

However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor.

Your lawyers should understand that you're dealing with a private company that can make and enforce its own policies when it comes to allowing access to the their store. If Google's policy is to require you to do research and diligence on a possible trademark infringement of your App, that's legal, as long as Google's requirements don't not violate local or national laws of the variant of their store. The idea that another company or individual can allege infringement, yet not communicate sufficiently with you or Google, may not seem fair, but as a response to that, Google can play it safe and not open themselves up to liability by removing your App or making you resubmit under a new name. That is outlined in Google's TOS, which you agreed to. Your only recourse is to keep talking to Google and keep trying to contact the complainant.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

Is it trademark fair use to use company name/logo on your resume? I have an online resume website that I created, and I list the logos of companies I've work with over the course of my career. Rather than a dry date list of work experience, I'm just listing the names and logos of the companies on the website. I even have a disclaimer stating this in no way represents endorsement or sponsorship. I assume this use of the names / logos is considered fair use, an anyone can put a companies name or logo on their resume to state where and who they've work with when talking about their work experience / history. This is exactly what I'm doing here, and what happens when people fill out their LinkedIn profiles too. Is is considered trademark fair use to use a company logo on your resume? My website is an online resume / portfolio to use as a digital resume outside of LinkedIn or other places. For reference, it's located here: http://chrispietschmann.com

No, it's not fair use. It's also not nominative fair use (the fair use equivalent for trademarks) as another answer suggests. Why is it not nominative fair use? There are three conditions for nominative fair use (taken from Wikipedia): The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). The user only uses as much of the mark as is necessary for the identification (e.g. the words but not the font or symbol). The user does nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. This applies even if the nominative use is commercial, and the same test applies for metatags. The first two conditions really rule out any right to use a company's logo on a resume. Instead, the careful reader will notice that nominative fair use is actually the legal basis for your right to name the companies on your resume at all.

This is fine. You can use initials, shortened names, common nicknames (Bob/Robert), omit middle names, and so forth without causing yourself any problems. Things can get more complicated if you sign by a name that is different from names that you normally use elsewhere - such as if you are called Christopher Smith and you sign as Donald Jones, having not used that name before - but there's no fundamental difference of principle. One example case is Scott v Soans [1802] 102 ER 539, where the defendant John Soans objected to the suit being made against "Jonathan otherwise John Soans". The Lord Chief Justice ruled that "Jonathan otherwise John" could be his name, and that if he'd signed a contract using that name then "what objection could be made to it?" There are several other similar cases from past centuries, some of which may no longer be reliable law since they turn on points of procedure that aren't relevant today, but the general thrust is that if you sign a contract under a certain name, then you can be sued under that name. (And you can sue other people using whatever name you like.) Mistakes in names can be corrected as part of the general process of contractual interpretation, called "rectification". This more often arises when dealing with company names, say when there are a half dozen closely linked companies with related names, and the issue is which one of them is actually meant to be named; there are some recent cases of this kind, such as Liberty Mercian Ltd v Cuddy Civil Engineering Ltd [2013] EWHC 2688 (TCC). Generally speaking, as Lord Denning said in Nittan v Solent Steel [1980] EWCA Civ J1023-4, We do not allow people to take advantage of a misnomer when everyone knows what was intended. Further, the doctrine of "estoppel by convention" means that if you sign a contract under whatever name, then act as if you were bound by the contract, you can't then wriggle out of it on the grounds that the name is not really your own. In Scots law, which includes certain doctrines imported from Roman civil law, there is a distinction between error in persona and error in nomine. The former means that you were mistaken about who your counterparty really was (such that you wouldn't have made the contract had you known the truth) and the latter means that you had the intended person but made a mistake about their name. The law of error in Scotland is not quite the same as in England and Wales, but in this case it gets to the same basic result: if you agreed on who was to be bound, that's what matters, regardless of the names used.

THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.

I suspect contract law will affect the ability to do this. Terms like "USB" and the associated logos etc are intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, etc) owned by the USB Consortium. If you don't comply with their terms, you probably cannot describe your product as a USB product. THE USB-IF LOGOS MAY BE USED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE PASSED USB-IF COMPLIANCE TESTING AND ARE CURRENTLY ON THE INTEGRATORS LIST. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE COMPANY BE ASSIGNED A USB VENDOR ID NUMBER.

The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.

It would not be a copyright. Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright, but it could be a trademark under common law ( e.g. state law in the U.S.) or could be registered. Some people think a trademark defines a product. That is not the case, a trademark identifies the source of a product or service.

Probably yes. But it is only a trademark violation when used in connection with a sale of good and services in a manner that is suggests affiliation with the programming language. Thus, you can have a bar named "C++" but not you own programming language or updates to an existing programming language.

“Fair Use” is a (US) copyright concept: it has no relevance to Trademarks. A Trademark may also be subject to copyright, for example, the word Google is a trademark but it is not copyright - the Google logo is both a trademark and subject to copyright. You infringe a trademark when you use it in such a way that people think that your goods and services are their goods and services. You don’t infringe a trademark when you use it to actually refer to them or their goods and services- that is what trademarks are for.

Is performing another's duty a valid form of consideration? Under state law parents have a legal duty to among other things educate minor children until they graduate from high school or an approved equivalent. The state also provides for public schools which are mostly taxpayer funded (the final two years of my high school education would have cost my parents about $1,500 in unavoidable fees). Both of my parents signed nine legal documents that spelled out every party's responsibilities ad nauseam. My high school agreed to pay for 50 credit hours at a local college and accept those credits as the complete fulfillment of my high school graduation requirements. My guess is that the district received some manner of a discount. But were my parents to purchase this it would cost them about $47,000. My father is trying to abrogate the deal he signed -- so far he hasn't met with success because the paperwork itself clearly states that all of the signatories (me, Mom, Dad, my counselor, and the principal) must agree to and countersign any modification to the agreement. He states that since I am receiving the benefit, an education valued at about $47,000, and he "could have" satisfied the state's educational requirement in another way (sent me to a parochial school or laugh homeschooled me) the contract(s) he signed are invalid because the fact that he doesn't have to pay required text book fees, technology fees, lab fees, diploma and registration fees doesn't count as "consideration" so it isn't a binding contract. PS: My father is so smart that he felt no need to have a lawyer review anything before he signed it.

Contracts are routinely held to be valid even when there is negligible or literally zero financial “gain” (compensation, which they take into consideration in order to enter into the contract). A document purporting to be a contract might be held invalid if it is a bare promise like “I promise to give you $100 on Friday”, but you can make it an enforceable contract by including “if you give me a french fry today”. Reasoning that party “could have” done something else does not invalidate a contract, for example the party might have had $3 at the time and could have purchased a whole bag of fries. The only imaginable relevance of “I could have” thinking would be if the terms of the contract are so unclear that the party would not reasonably have understood the contract to have obligated them to pay $100, or that they would have reasonably believed that they were to receive a suitcase full of french fries. There is a (huge) difference between subjective errors in interpreting a contract and objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is fundamentally about the linguistic structure of the agreement, i.e. words like “it” which have no intrinsic referent, or “required books and clothing” (which could mean “required books and all clothing”, or “required books and required clothing”). There may be special rules of legal interpretation addressing how such ambiguities are resolved (this one is not well established, but is known in some spheres as the “across-the-board rule”). Personal interpretation does not enter into decisions as to the validity of a contract: if you misinterpret the words of a contract, regardless of how strong your proof is that at the time you did not understand the contract, that doesn’t matter, unless you can show that at the time you were actually not competent (did not know Armenian and could not have understood what the contract required). The courts look at the words of the contract, assume that the parties have availed themselves of wise legal counsel, and understand how the courts would interpret the contract, then they filter the words of the contract through a sieve composed of rules constituting "the law", and declare what parties A and B must do.

There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.

A voicemail greeting, like any original sequence of words, will be protected by copyright. Making and publishing a copy without permission would be an infringement of that copyright, and could subject the person who does it to a civil lawsuit. However, such a greeting normally has no commercial value, and it is hard to see how any actual damages could be assessed. In the US, statutory damages could apply, but since the greeting is unlikely to carry a copyright notice, the person sued might claim to be an "innocent infringer", which could significantly reduce the damages assessed. (However if such a person had read this answer, and that were brought out in court, s/he would be on notice of the copyright protection, and could not claim to be "innocent".) Moreover, the defendant could still raise the defense of fair-use (In the US). The would be no harm to the market for the work, since there is no market, which would favor fair use. The whole of the work would probably be used, which would tend against fair use. A greeting is somewhat creative, more so than a work of non-fiction, although usually less so than actual fiction or verse, which leans slightly against fair use. It is hard to say if this kind of reuse would be considered transformative, it would probably depend on what sort of commentary, if any, was provided. In all, a fair use defense seems pretty close to a coin flip, but not as predictable. In any case, judges often do not favor suits over technical infringements of works with no commercial value where no meaningful damage has occurred, and often award minimal damages within the statutory range, which is wide. Given all that, the risk of suit seems low. The question mentions "school district administrators" If the person doing this is a student, this might be looked on negatively by the school district, which might be able to frame it as against some district policy or other. Consider possible repercussions carefully. As always on Law.SE, this is not legal advice. Before acting you may wish to consult an actual lawyer.

If you are truely home-schooled, and your parents (or teacher) has not formed some kind of private school in which to teach you, then you cannot obtain a work-permit. In the State of California, the school or private school satellite program issues work permits for the students. Issuing work permits is dependent on meeting certain school criteria (grades, academic record, attendance, whatever the school wants). California has decided that parents may not issue work permits for home schooled kids. You can read more about it on The HomeSchool Association of California's website along with the California Department of Education. The Employer can also decide not to hire minors (there is quite a bit of record-keeping, possible fines, and lengthy record-retention policies). You may be able to work out something to be a tutor unaffiliated with the school, which would fall under the self-employment exemption for a work permit.

Is sales person required by law to give a copy of signed contract at the time you sign up for service? No. If I would ask for copy of all documents from that company are they required by law to send her these copies? No. Is there a law that mandates process on how contracts should be signed in California? There are many, however, they relate to specific classes of contract. In general, it is not a requirement that a contract be signed or even written; verbal contracts are totally legitimate. Given that every single transaction where money changes hands in return for goods and/or services is or is part of a contract it is not feasible that they all be signed. Have you bought a cup of coffee today? Did you sign a contract when you did? Here's the thing Your friend has learned several valuable business lessons: the first is some people in business will rip you off. If you are a consumer then you have (some) legal protection, however, if you are in business then the courts and the legislature expect you to look after yourself. Your friend has signed a contract. Pretty much, any court will consider that what they signed would be the entire contract unless there was compelling evidence to the contrary. Her word that the sales rep said there would be no break charges would not on its own be compelling evidence. Your friend has an obvious incentive to lie. Here is the second lesson: don't sign anything unless and until you have read and understood it; hire a lawyer if you need to in order to understand it. Now, either under the contract the company is legitimately allowed to charge these fees or it isn't. Without having a copy of the contract you have no way to tell. Thus the third lesson: always keep your own copy of everything you sign. What your friend can do is: nothing. Don't pay the bill, write to them saying that she disputes that she owes them any money at all. If you want to be provocative, suggest which court would be most convenient if they want to prove the debt. Odds are this will go no further. If they do proceed with a summons then they will need to state their case. At that point she can request through the court a copy of the contract they are relying on. If their claims are legit she can simply roll over.

There is nothing wrong with this requirement. The teacher or professor isn't requiring you to change your opinion. Instead, the requirement is simply to marshall evidence in favor of an opinion that you may not hold. Being able to do this is a valuable rhetorical skill (and a skill which lawyers must routinely employ). For example, in competitive debate, you often do not have the freedom to decide whether you will be arguing in favor or against a resolution, and may not even know which side you will be advancing until moments before the event starts. Freedom of conscience does not extend to freedom from understanding people who disagree with your deeply held belief. UPDATE: Requiring a whole classroom of students (possibly many classrooms of students) to advocate with multiple representatives for a bill does seem problematic, in terms of election laws and probably in terms of the legal requirements that apply to the university, and also possibly in terms of "forced speech", because in requiring the advocacy to be submitted to the official and take a particular position, goes beyond the "let's pretend" veneer that applies in most debate contexts.

Tell your parents Given the circumstances it is a near certainty that the least he will do if you do not pay for the damage is make contact with them. It will be far, far better for you if they learn it from you rather than him. What could he do? He (or his insurance company) can contact your parents - he will almost certainly do this. He (or his insurance company) can sue you for negligence. Children are responsible for their own torts providing they have the capacity to recognize and avoid risk and harm - based on your question I have (and a court would have) no doubt that that you are. If you lose the case, and don't pay, he can have the government seize whatever you own in order to sell it to pay the debt you owe. If this happened in British Columbia or Manitoba he can sue your parents. He could report you to the police - they may or may not choose to prosecute if what you did was criminal: it probably wasn't but the police may investigate to determine this. If he is insured he may be required to notify the police.

If you were on your parents policy with the understanding you were a student in college, then yes, they can drop you and refuse to pay. You need to read the terms of the insurance very carefully, somewhere in there it says that the policy is only in effect while you are enrolled as a full time student. You (or your parents) broke this agreement, and the insurance company doesn't have any obligation to pay. Should I refuse to acknowledge the debt as mine? Can I claim it's the insurance company's debt? No, the debt is yours from the moment of service, the insurance company's job is to cover some of that expense on your behalf. It isn't the insurance company's debt, it is yours. Contact my old insurance company and try to get them to pay up? Unfortunately you will not be successful at this. You violated the terms of your insurance (not being enrolled in school), the company has no obligation to pay. Your parents may be owed some refund of money for any extra premiums they paid while you were not enrolled, but that would be the extent of the insurance company's obligation. Negotiate with the dentist office to reduce the bill and just pay it? This is probably the best route to go. Insurance companies often negotiate fixed prices for certain procedures that are different than what they would charge uninsured customers. You can ask your dentist if they have any kind of help for uninsured patients. Simply have them fix the charge so that it's accurate (it should be $700, not $1400, since I already paid half), and pay in full? If you already paid $700, and $700 was your insurance providers portion, then yes, the bill that the dentist sends to you should be $700, not $1400. Make sure though that the entire bill is $1400 though, not $2100 ($700 your portion, and $1400 insurance).

Why is research grade ethanol seemingly exempted from excise duties while pure ethanol ment for consumption isn't? At Sigma-Aldrich I can buy one liter of unadulterated ethanol for just 26.60 EUR. This ethanol contains no additives and is pure enough for analytical purposes. Its made by fermenting grain or sugarcane. The solution contains 95.5% ethanol. However, when I try to buy the same amount of consumer grade ethanol, then I suddenly have to pay 73.63 EUR because of excise duties. This is strange because the research grade ethanol from Merck is about as pure as the consumer grade one. In the EU pure ethanol is only exempt from excise duties when it is denatured in some way but the ethanol sold by Merck / Sigma-Aldrich doesn't seem to be denatured in any way. It is not marketed as a biofuel either. Its an ethanol solution that's nearly as pure as the consumer grade ethanol but it somehow is still exempt from excise duties. Why is that? EDIT: Apparently the website can show different prices depending on the country you live in. Here's a screenshot of the prices I'm seeing. I live in the Netherlands. Here's the price at checkout. Some tax is added but I don't think its excise duty related. The total price is still far lower then the price you pay for consumer grade ethanol.

Because there’s an exemption Which requires denaturing. But there’s also an exemption to the exemption for when denaturing is not appropriate. Such as for laboratory use.

You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy.

It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement.

Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff-

OK, the prohibition on commercial use stems from either: The tort of passing off; this is a private civil matter between the model and the publisher, or Breach of s18 of the Australian Consumer Law which involve misleading or deceptive conduct; this is a public civil matter with strict liability (i.e. intention or negligence is irrelevant) between the ACCC and the publisher with fines of up to $1,100,000 for a body corporate and $220,000 for an individual. In both cases the cause of action arises from the possible presumption by a person who views the photograph that the model in it is endorsing the goods or services that you are selling. The standard is: Would a reasonable person, viewing the photograph in context, come to the conclusion that the model is endorsing the goods or services (either because they really like it or they were paid to show they really liked it). Context is everything here. Some examples: If you a photo studio selling the actual photograph then there is no endorsement. If you are using the photograph to promote the studio there is. If you are showing a crowd scene (e.g. at a football match) there is no endorsement. If you are showing a building and the people are incidental there is no endorsement. If you are showing individuals or small groups in a way that promotes your goods or services there is endorsement. So, look at the photograph and the purpose you are using it for: could a reasonable person draw the conclusion that the people in it are endorsing your application?

Yes, that would be legal, indeed required According to the Michigan Dept of the Treasury: Individuals or businesses that sell tangible personal property to the final consumer are required to remit a 6% sales tax on the total price (including shipping and handling charges) of their taxable retail sales to the State of Michigan. Sales of electricity, natural or artificial gas and home heating fuels for residential use are taxed at a 4% rate. Michigan does not allow city or local units to impose sales tax. According to the official Michigan State Sales Tax Handbook Groceries and Prescription Drugs are exempt from sales tax, but prepared food is not. This includes restaurant food, and would, I think, include drinks served in a bar. When I worked in a Michigan restaurant and bar about 40 years ago, sales tax was charged, to the best of my memory.

Giving someone drugs without their knowledge or consent, say in food or drink, is a criminal act. At the least it is a form of assault, and possibly a more serious crime could be supported by the facts. Note that people's reactions to drugs vary, and serious harm or even death can result from drugs that do not have serious effects on most people. Very serious criminal charges might then result. The facts should be reported to the police. If this is a case where the people receiving the drugs know about them, and want them, that is a very different matter, although it may still be illegal depending on the nature of the drugs. Note that under US law, an uninvolved witness is not normally required to report a crime, although reporting is strongly encouraged. This rule is different in different countries. That is, in some countries an ordinary citizen may be legally required to report a crime. In at least one state any person is required to report a crime if a victim is in danger of bodily harm (Wisconsin statute 940.34) There may be similar provisions in the laws of other states. People with some sort of duty of care, or who are made "mandated reporters" by statute, such as teachers and health professionals, may be legally required to file reports when they know or have reason to believe that a crime is underway or has taken place. Such statutes vary from state to state, and will be different in non-US countries.

If an appellate court interprets a constitutional clause, that interpretation only has precedential weight as long as the clause (and other clauses it interacts with) go unchanged. Some aspects of the original interpretation might have some persuasive weight on the way the new clause is interpreted (for example, if the new clause uses language that the court previously used or interpreted). But other than taking potentially persuasive guidance from that kind of interaction, a new constitutional clause is interpreted de novo (anew, without deference to previous interpretations). An example of this can be found in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). The Supreme Court had to interpret the newly ratified 21st Amendment which ended prohibition. Prior to the Twenty-First Amendment, it would obviously have been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for [the privilege of moving beer across a state border]. But, the 21st Amendment changed that (cleaned up): The amendment which prohibited the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors into any state in violation of the laws thereof abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors. The words used are apt to confer upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.

Work time when unable to work due to power outage (germany) I'm working in an office space where I don't have fixed daily hours but a weekly amount of hours in my contract. Electricity is necessary to do my job (on computers). We had a power outage due to a snow storm, resulting in ~2 hours without electricity. In those 2 hours, I took my 30 minute mandatory pause. When it seemed like the outage would take longer, the manager told us to either call it a day and go home, or wait it out and continue working when power was back. I waited it out and continued work after the outage. However, the company is of the opinion that the time we waited until the power came back is not work time. I did a little research online and so far found that time spent in the workplace unable to work because of reasons beyond my own ability to work is at the employers risk. I know that I need to accept different tasks that would be possible during the outage and are doable by my abilities. However, I wasn't asked to do something else. My question is whether the company or my research is correct and if the company can subtract 1.5 hours from my worktime ? Did giving me the choice of going home (which of course means doing overtime on other days to meet the weekly quota) or staying put the risk in my lap ? Should I have actively asked to get other work assigned ?

If you were in the office, and ready to take instructions what to do from your manager, then you were legally working and need to be paid. There's plenty of things you can do in an office without electricity unless it's too dark. If the manager didn't ask you to do anything, it's the company's problem, not yours. If you took the opportunity to leave for 90 minutes to do your weekly shopping, then you shouldn't get paid.

Get a lawyer. That employer is skating on very, very thin ice. You can’t have a non-compete agreement in Germany at all without the employer paying reasonable compensation. What is reasonable is decided by courts, but half your last regular salary is not “reasonable”. Especially if this would endanger your status of being allowed to work in Germany. If you were a non-German EU citizen, any non-compete agreement would be immediately invalid because it violates the right of free movement; how nonEU citizens are affected, I don’t know. The rest of the agreement seems quite illegal to me. I would think that any good employment lawyer would love to take your case.

I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.

No, they are not obliged to take you back early As you say in your TL;DR you arranged 4 months leave and your employer no doubt made arrangements to deal with your absence. Now, you want to return early; they are not obliged to allow you to do so just as you would not be obliged to do so if they wanted you to cut your leave short. No doubt the current pandemic has changed the situation and in its absence, they might have been more willing to have you back early. But then, you wouldn't want to be coming back early. Your employment status is that you are employed and on leave. Subject to the details of your employment contract; there is nothing stopping you taking another job - there is a huge demand for logistics workers particularly in the health sector at the moment; much of it unskilled work. dIf you want to be unemployed, you can always resign.

There appears to be no specific number of hours. This article touches on the matter, presenting a slew of cases where e.g. the prisoner was on a hunger strike (self-imposed starvation is not cruel and unusual punishment). Gardener v. Beale upheld a 2-meal plan with 18 hours between dinner and brunch to be allowed. This was, however a temporary exception rather than a long term policy which was to provide 3 meals not spaced further apart than 12 hours. There does not seem to be any period deemed to be legally too long, however a prison system may have (probably does) have a policy, which cannot simply be ignored.

A declaration of intent among absent people becomes effective as soon as it reaches the recipient, § 130 Ⅰ 1 BGB. To reach the recipient means the declaration of intent must under normal circumstances (e. g. not on statutory holidays), get into the “territory” of the recipient (for example a mailbox), and be physically available and intelligible (e. g. readable script [no water/rain damage]). Note, it is not necessary that the recipient actually reads your letter, but it must be possible. Generally, it is presumed you check your mailbox at least once a day, so mail is considered to be delivered the next (business) day unless it arrived/was opened earlier. Ultimately, if it matters, you’ll need to prove when your declaration of intent reached the recipient. I have sent it on February end and if the HR has not received it on time even after notifying then how is it my mistake? It is your risk who you entrust with delivery. It is not the recipient’s fault if you chose an untrustworthy or too slow carrier. Why should I serve a longer notice period? Because you signed the employment contract. Seriously, your employer has a protected interest to trust in you fulfilling your part of the agreement. Business needs a certain level of predictability, so they can organize a replacement employee. If they don’t need or “don’t like” you, you can still ask to be dismissed earlier via a mutual Aufhebungsvertrag, § 311 Ⅰ BGB. Does the notice to the recipient to pick up the post count as delivered? No, a notification about registered mail being available for pickup is not a substitute for your declaration of intent. Again, it must be possible for the recipient to identify the message.

united-states If they have a contract with the employee which specifies that such IP is assigned to the company at creation, such a contract is valid until and unless a court holds that it is void. It might be held void as against public policy,. or as being "unconscionable", but it might well not be so held. An even broader contract, which claimed any and every kind of IP created by an employee, even if crated during off hours and not at the work site nor with company resources is more likely to be held void, but even this is not certain to be held void. In the absence of a contract explicitly assigning such IP to the company, the company might attempt to apply the rule that makes works created by an employee within the scope of employment works-made-for-hire (WFH). This is in 17 USC 101 (the definitions section of the copyright law). This would affect copyrights, but not patents or other IP. There is very little US case law interpreting the "scope of employment". But there seems some reason to believe that work that was not assigned by the employer, not intended to benefit the employer, not used by the employer, not done within usual working hours nor using company resources, and not of the specific type normally assigned to or carried out by the employee, is probably not "within the scope" of the employee's employment. If that is so, the work would not be WFH, and only an explicit written contract, signed by the employee (or the employee's authorized agent) could transfer the copyright.

Basically, "in the course of your employment" means "while you are working, or should be working, for the employer". If you're not using company resources or time to create or acquire the works in question, and the works are unrelated to company business, they're quite unlikely to become the company's property. (Particularly since the company almost certainly doesn't have an interest in controlling the distribution of your vacation photos.) When you let your personal side projects and the company's stuff get intertwined, that's where the troubles begin. Works made on company time, or using company resources, or to do company-related things, may be claimed by the company, and this agreement basically says you'll cede ownership of the works to them, patents and all, for whatever amount of money they decide it's worth paying you.

Who has ultimate responsibility for a child injured on a school trip? A school is going on an excursion. The child is given the permission slip to take home and get signed by his legal guardian, but he forges the signature instead. On the excursion, he gets injured. Who is legally responsible for the child? Is it the school (since the waiver is void, and by default the school is responsible for the child when a roll is taken) or the parent (since the school sincerely thought the parent had signed the waiver and if the waiver was correctly signed then the parent would be responsible)? Preferred jurisdiction Australia; I will accept any answer however.

So many things were not addressed, so a precise answer is not possible. But to try to raise the proper questions you should be thinking about: Should the school have known the permission slip was forged? Was the forgery particularly bad, and the school was lax in not examining it? Did the student have a history of forging slips that the school should have been aware of? If the school was negligent in accepting an obviously bad signature, they may find their exposure is increased. If the school had no reasonable way to know the slip was forged, they were acting reasonably in taking the student on an excursion. Was the injury typical, foreseeable and recoverable? Such as a broken ankle on a hike? Minor accidents happen even when all reasonable precautions are taken. The injury will heal with time and care. Was the activity that lead to the injury inherently risky / dangerous? There is definitely a question of if the school took all reasonable precautions. Even if permission was legitimately given, the school is responsible for taking reasonable precautions, especially if the activity has inherit and obvious dangers. (for example, river-rafting or rock climbing) What sort of "responsibility" are you interested in? If you're asking who is financially responsible for the cost of treating the injury, then regardless of how it occurred, it would likely fall to the child's health insurance (presumably provided by the parents). If the school was truly negligent in allowing a forged permission slip to a dangerous activity, then they could be found responsible for extraordinary costs associated with the injury, other costs (pain, suffering, loss of opportunity, emotional consequences, etc) and perhaps even punitive damages. If you're suggesting that someone might be criminally responsible, then a very high bar would need to be cleared. It would need to be proven that a school representative (eg. teacher or administrator) deliberately put the kid in danger for some reason, knowing what the likely outcome would be. That standard seems extremely unlikey to be met.

A medical practitioner may use whatever methods s/he thinks proper and appropriate, subject to the limits of malpractice law, and to the right of the patient (or patient's parent or guardian for a child) to give informed consent to any procedure or treatment. A patient can not insist on a treatment or method that the doctor or dentist does not wish to perform, having only the right to seek another practitioner. Nor is a practitioner required to use only procedures covered by insurance, unless bound by contract to do so (as may be the case with some "in-network" or HMO agreements). Again, the patient is free to seek treatment elsewhere. So the parent could insist that the dentist not use "conscious sedation" by withholding consent, the dentist may then refuse to treat at all, unless perhaps this was an emergency situation not allowing the parent to seek another treatment venue.

If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.

Rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are legally irrelevant, what "counts" is rights as actually recognized by a particular nation. Article 9 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile") corresponds, to a fair extent, to Due Process rights under US law, whereas article 26 (the education article) does not correspond to anything in the US Constitution, though there may be state constitution correlates. Article 28 ("Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized") isn't enforceable in any meaningful sense. The right to a trial by a jury of one's peers is an example of a right that can be waived – that is a right that you have to option to exercise, each time the question arises. There is no mechanism in the US whereby a person can irrevocably go on record as always waiving that right. Theoretically, Congress could pass a law enabling a person to make some legal choice irrevocably: there are irrevocable financial and contractual decisions, where in the later case you may irrevocably waive your common law right to sue for damages. But the concept of fundamental constitutional rights is so important to the way that US courts think, that I doubt that a law enabling irrevocable waiver of enumerated constitutional rights would pass legal review. A constitutional amendment would be necessary: but that simply means it will be harder, not that it's impossible. Things could be different under a different constitutional framework. It might be possible to waive your Article 30 right to an 8 hour work day or voting rights per Article 66 in North Korea.

Permission is not a physical thing that disappears when a piece of paper evidencing that permission is lost or handed to another party. When someone gives you permission as part of an agreement having the necessary characteristics of a contract, then the revocation of that permission is governed by the terms of the contract itself and your jurisdiction's contract-law. You may not need any permission to use the photos you paid to have taken. (For example, in the U.S. if they were taken in a public place and you are not displaying them for profit.) Or, you might need permission due to various rules or laws protecting minors – only an IP lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction can confirm this is the case – and, unless it was drafted by a competent lawyer, it is quite possible that your "permission statement" was legally insufficient or defective. Or, you might have legally secured necessary permission and still have that permission even though you handed the "permission statement" back to the parents of the subject. In practice: Only a lawyer in your jurisdiction can offer an opinion on which of these scenarios is in fact the case. And only via litigation can you establish further confidence that legal opinion is correct.

The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion.

School districts / states do generally have the power to set the curriculum including the viewpoint that will be officially conveyed. One well-known major restriction on such viewpoint restrictions is that the schools cannot restrict the free exercise of a religion, and cannot take a position on a religion. Apart from the religion third-rail, schools have pretty free reign in setting the curriculum, see Evans-Marshall v. Tipp City for one instantiation. In this case, the teacher assigned various books, including Heather Has Two Mommies, one of the books that prompted an outcry. The upshot of that case is that a teacher cannot invoke the First Amendment to override policy. This article (draft version, easier to handle) (published version, annoying footnote structure) reviews the topic, and section III covers prior cases. It notes that the cases of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell do not address the constitutionality of these education laws, though the reasoning in the prior cases might be applicable if there were a suit over curriculum. There is an implication that some of these rules have been enforced in the past, but most of the evidence is in the form of news stories (Beall v. London City School BOE is not available in the open). The article does engage in a somewhat deeper study of enforcement in Utah, where it was enforced (until it was repealed). Enforcement is necessarily indirect. The law require school districts to have a particular curriculum; violation would come when an individual teacher taught contrary to the prescribed curriculum. Those laws do not contain any provision like "a teacher who violates these rules gets fired", instead, punishment is via the general rule that you have to teach what is in the state-mandated curriculum. Rather than officially terminating a teacher for violating this curricular guideline, districts use vague reasons for non-renewal such as "due to problems with communication and teamwork" (from Evans-Marshall).

Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.

How many indictments before imprisonment? Donald Trump, ex-president of U.S.A., has many indictments on him, but yet he is still roaming as a free citizen. Questions: How many indictments does it take for Donald Trump to be imprisoned? Can a person who is indicted, before running for president, become president? What's the purpose of indicting Mr. Trump if indictments are only an accusation?

How many indictments does it take for Donald Trump to be imprisoned? An unlimited amount. Imprisonment is usually authorized as a result of a conviction rather than from an indictment. Pretrial detention following an indictment but prior to a conviction is permitted, but discretionary in the judgment of the judge. Also, there is a right to post a judicially determined reasonable bond to obtain release from pretrial detention after one is indicted and before one is convicted in the vast majority of cases (including the ones that President Trump is facing). Can a person who is indicted, before running for president, become president? Yes. Indeed, the majority view of legal scholars (it is has never been tested in a real case) is that someone who is convicted and serving prison sentence can still become President if that is who the voters choose. What's the purpose of indicting Mr. Trump if indictments are only an accusation? An indictment is a pre-requisite to trying someone for a felony in federal court. To convict someone of a crime one needs to first indict them, then have a jury trial, and then have a jury unanimously vote to convict a person, before they can be convicted of a crime and sentenced for it. Even after conviction, there is a statutory (but not a constitutional) right to a direct appeal of that conviction to an appellate court. Also, an indictment is more than a mere accusation. An indictment in a determination of a grand jury that probable cause exists to believe that the person indicted committed the crime charged. In the federal court system grand juries are composed of 16 to 23 members and 12 members of the grand jury must concur in a decision to indict a defendant on a charge for there to be an indictment on that charge. This prevents people from enduring criminal prosecutions on charges that a majority of a grand jury finds are so baseless that there is not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant committed that crime. The grand jury must base its decision to indict or not on actual evidence in support of the charges in the form of sworn witness testimony and exhibits, not just the allegations of the prosecutor. As a practical matter, the standards of professionalism in federal criminal prosecutions is so high that almost all charges sought by federal prosecutors from grand juries result in indictments on those charges (federal grand juries refuse to indict approximately one in 16,000 times). But, in state courts that use grand juries, which can't pick and choose only the best cases to prosecute, grand juries routinely refuse to indict defendants on a substantial share of charges brought to them by prosecutors (on the order of one in 20). One source notes: Statistical figures showing a higher prevalence of grand jury reluctance to follow the government in ages past are almost nonexistent. However, a table of felony arrests in New York County between 1900 and 1907 found on page 111 of the 1926 book The Prisoner at the Bar by Arthur Train provides some rare illumination. In those seven years, some 5,214 out of 57,241 people were arrested by the police on felony charges whom New York state grand jurors decided not to indict. Grand juries are especially likely to decline to indict defendants in cases involving celebrities, politicians, law enforcement officers, and other high profile cases with political implications. See also Kaeleigh Wiliams, "Grand Juries Should Not Hear Police Misconduct Cases: Grand Juries will Indict Anything, but a Police Officer" SLU Law Journal Online 79 (2021).

Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of "the tranquility to which the nation has been restored" by "the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States" (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled "prospective pardon" after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a "pardons FAQ", the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't.

The short answer is no. The President has plenary and absolute power to pardon anyone other than himself, before or after conviction, of any federal crime. Therefore, his constitutional exercise of this power, whatever its motive, can not constitute a crime, although it could be a ground for impeaching the President or retaliating against the President politically. In historical practice, Presidents and Governors have been increasingly loathe to use the pardon power, and tend to use it only when they are political lame ducks, precisely because the political costs of a pardon can be so high. UPDATE: Also, to be clear, a President cannot pardon a crime before it is committed, so a true "pre-emptive pardon" does not exist. A President can pardon a crime that has not produced a conviction, but that is very different from pardoning a crime that has not yet occurred. Further, a pardon does not relieve an individual of civil liability, for example, monetary liability to another private individual, for the same conduct, or of state criminal law liability. It extends only to federal crimes and the civil collateral consequences of any conviction of that crime if there has been a conviction of that crime. For example, a pardon relieves the person pardoned from collateral consequences such as a prohibition on possessing a firearm, a loss of the right to vote, or a prohibition on the right to engage in a licensed occupation that felons are prohibited from being licensed to perform. But, a pardon does not relieve the person pardoned, for example, of engaging in wire fraud, of civil liability for money damages to the person defrauded. Similarly, while one can pardon a criminal contempt conviction, in which a court punishes someone with incarceration or a fine for violating a court order, a pardon can not relieve someone from a civil contempt citation which imposes incarceration or a per day fine (usually) until someone complies with a court order that it is within the power of that person to comply with (e.g. an order directing someone to testify in a civil lawsuit or to turn over the password to a Swiss bank account).

Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.

Generally you can't, since a basic Personality rights exist for eveyone that must be balanced with public interest. Allthough court proceedings are generally public, even the publication of when court sessions take place are very restrictive in the amount of information given out about what the session is about. How a court publishes this information seems to differ from court to court: public notice inside the court, press releases and sometimes an internet list. Indictments, generally, may not be published before the proceedings begin (§ 353d StGB). Proceedings before an Indictment Since an Indictment will only be accepted by a court if the chances are that it more likely succeed than fail, you may assume that the police or state attorneys will be even more restrictive about publicizing any information about any criminal complaint (or investigation). So the answer to your question, based on the reasons above is: no, there is no way to check this on google (from official sources) Sources: Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz - Wikipedia (German) Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights - Wikipedia § 169 - Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz – GVG) Publicity Justiz-Ticker - Berlin.de § 353d StGB - Unlawful disclosure concerning judicial hearings

united-states Perjury only applies to someone who actually does testify and is untruthful. A person who refuses to testify at all, when ordered to do so by a subpoena, is committing contempt of court. It is possible, in principle, for the court to order them jailed indefinitely until they do testify (civil contempt). It is also possible for them to be prosecuted criminally afterward (criminal contempt).

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).

Who is at fault in a car accident when running a red light? This question is prompted by me sitting at a green light today while multiple people streamed through from the opposite direction, turning to their left, against a red turn arrow. (Throughout this question, assume right-side traffic, as in North America, and no one-way streets.) If I have a green light and enter a clear intersection, then it would seem obvious that an unseen red light runner on the cross-street, coming from my left/right, would be at 100% fault for hitting me and causing an accident. But suppose I am sitting at an intersection waiting to go straight through and facing a red light, while traffic on the opposite side of the intersection has a green left-turn arrow, and are turning across my intended path. The left-turning cars lose their green arrow, get a red arrow (or red light, or other signal that they no longer have the right-of-way), and I now get a green light, but the line of cars still continues, turning left and driving across in front of me, running their red left-turn arrow. If I now enter the intersection and an accident occurs, who is at fault? Is it the opposing car for obviously running a red left-turn arrow? Or is it me for performing an unsafe action, even though I had a green light? I can imagine that I would be allocated some/all fault if I can see all these cars driving in front of me but still enter the intersection, yet at other times there is some car wanting to turn that is lagging all of the others and it enters the intersection after I have already entered it (and I don't see them coming, making it like the original red light runner scenario I mentioned above). In such a case I would expect the turning car to be at fault. So there would seem to be an area where fault allocation moves from one driver to another. I'm mainly interested in US interpretations, but any jurisdiction would be interesting to me.

The apportionment of fault will be highly case specific, based on ordinary principles of negligence. In one example, the fault was apportioned with 60% of the fault to the late left turner and 40% of the fault to the driver advancing imprudently into the intersection on a green light. See Pierce v. ING Insurance, 2006 NSSM 31 (my annotations and emphasis): [11] I believe that Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] was late in entering this intersection. I do not accept that he could not have stopped on the amber which he asserts. However, I am not prepared to find that he is solely responsible at law for the collision. [12] As stated above, I am unable to conclude with precise exactitude which signal light was on when Mr. Pierce [the left-turning driver] entered the intersection. I can conclude that the amber light had ceased and the green light for Mr. Williams [the through driver] had turned on at some point prior to the collision. The intersection is a well known intersection and given Mr. MacKinnon’s evidence of the relative speed of Mr. Pierce’s vehicle and what I understand to be the distances involved, I cannot accept that the signal light was green and turned to amber as Mr. Pierce entered the intersection. [13] On the other hand I am struck by two inescapable facts. First, the fact that Mr. MacKinnon who was stopped next to Mr. Williams did not proceed through the intersection because he knew it would not be safe to do so. While to some extent I take Mr. Boyte’s point that Mr. MacKinnon was, because of his experience with the intersection “hyper aware” to the prospect of drivers being late, I cannot entirely dismiss the fact that he obviously exercised prudence in not proceeding. The fact that Mr. Williams did not see Mr. Pierce’s vehicle is not an answer. In fact, just to the opposite in my view. [14] In my opinion, there is clear a duty on drivers stopped at an intersection to ascertain that the intersection is clear before proceeding once a light turns from red to green. Had Mr. Williams discharged this duty, the collision could well have been avoided. Your scenario is even more stark—not just a single late left turner, but an entire line of late left turners, readily apparent as an obstacle to safe advance. I would not be surprised if a judge were to attribute even more than 40% fault to the driver entering on the green. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has even said (Pirie v. Skantz, 2016 BCCA 70, para. 14): ... where a through driver ... should have become aware of the left-turning driver’s own disregard of the law in circumstances that afforded him a sufficient opportunity to avoid the accident through the exercise of reasonable care, the through driver may be found wholly or primarily at fault for the accident.

In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.

Yes A police officer (or other emergency service driver) will turn their lights and siren on as soon as they have a need to do so. This may be in response to something they've seen or in response to an emergency call. Since you can't see and hear what they can see and hear this may seem sudden or arbitrary to you. Your obligations, as spelled out in the 2019 California Drivers Handbook (p. 74) are: Emergency Vehicles You must yield the right-of-way to any police vehicle, fire engine, ambulance, or other emergency vehicle using a siren and red lights. Drive to the right edge of the road and stop until the emergency vehicle(s) have passed. However, never stop in an intersection. If you are in an intersection when you see an emergency vehicle, continue through the intersection and then, drive to the right as soon as it is safe and stop. ... You have to get out of their way. However, they are still obliged to drive safely subject to the circumstances (e.g. that they are on the wrong side of the road traveling fast) and, in the event of a collision, you may not necessarily be at fault.

Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.

I think you have understood it correctly. And the diagrams make things clearer as to why, when you are intending to use an exit other than the first exit, it is better to enter the two-lane roundabout via the left lane. The reason is because if you are in the right lane and do not exit, you must be alert to the need to yield to left-lane traffic that might be exiting. Using the left lane when you have planned ahead-of-time that you will not be using the first exit helps avoid a potential yield situation. The guide seems to emphasize that the lane you enter is the lane you should stay in throughout and is the lane you should end up exiting from. This is clear from the diagrams showing that you can exit directly from the left lane (by crossing through the right lane on the way out); it's captioned "Vehicle H must yield to vehicle G." As far as I can tell, none of that is prescribed by regulation other than the requirement to yield to left-lane traffic. But the material in the guide might inform the standard of care (see also an Alberta example), and following the guide might be expected as part of a driving test.

The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. This article gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is US v. Broca-Martinez, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being "unconfirmed" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion. Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires.

Spain also considers a group of cyclists as a single vehicle in some circumstances. This guide from the Dirección General de Tráfico shows, at page 10, about right of way: También se tiene prioridad de paso cuando el vehículo de motor vaya a girar, a la derecha o a la izquierda, para entrar en otra vía y el ciclista esté próximo o cuando circulando en grupo el primero haya iniciado el cruce o haya entrado en una glorieta. or [The cyclist] also has right of way [with respect to a motor vehicle] when the motor vehicle is going to turn, right or left, to enter another road and the cyclist is nearby, or when cycling in a group the first has started the crossing or has entered the roundabout. I can see no other differences related to travelling in group; in particular the only references to red lights and pedestrian crossings is that cyclists must stop at them, without mentioning any difference if part of the group has already passed.

Pull over to the right edge, stop, and wait until the emergency vehicle has passed. Do it safely. California Code Section 21806: [...] the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection, and thereupon shall stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed. 21807: The provisions of Section 21806 shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property.

What is a "lead defendant" in U.S. law? In its opposition to the government's motion for a protective order in United States of America v. Donald J. Trump, Waltine Nauta, and Carlos De Oliveira, Waltine Nauta's defense refers to Donald Trump as the "lead defendant". I'm wondering whether this is a precisely defined legal term. The term is apparently in common use, including in official government communication (e.g. here, here, here), but I can't find a definition for it anywhere. The term seems to appear neither in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Wikipedia article on Obergefell v. Hodges says "Wymyslo was substituted as the lead defendant, and the case was restyled Obergefell v. Wymyslo", but none of the documents in the references for that statement contain the term "lead defendant". The statement seems to indicate that the lead defendant is the first one in the list of defendants, whose name is used for the case style. If so, does this have any legal relevance beyond the style? In the original indictment and the superseding indictment, Walt Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira are referred to as "Trump's co-conspirators", whereas Trump himself is never referred to as a "co-conspirator". That might suggest that Trump is alleged to be something like the "lead conspirator", but the conspiracy statute makes no distinctions among the conspirators. So my impression is that "lead defendant" is just an informal term for the defendant whose name appears first in the list of defendants, and that this carries no legal implications. Is that correct?

england-and-wales "Lead defendant" is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be "principal defendant" which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: "Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"

where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida.

The legal term for what you're talking about is "prejudice." When a lawsuit (or a claim, or a party) is dismissed by a court "with prejudice," that means that the same cause of action cannot be brought again by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. It is also possible to dismiss a claim "without prejudice," meaning the same claim can be brought at a later date. When, exactly, a civil case can be dismissed with or without prejudice will depend on the jurisdiction where you're litigating. However, the general rule is that once the suit is underway, most dismissals are with prejudice. For example, in U.S. federal court, the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the suit without prejudice only up until the defendant responds to the complaint (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)), unless all of the defendants agree to be sued again later (this does happen, sometimes, but normally only as part of a broader settlement). So, yes; you can lose your substantive legal rights if you refuse to follow the court's procedural rules. Most courts, especially in federal court, where there is a fairly permissive standard of pleading, will give plenty of leeway to pro se litigants, but in the end they have to follow the rules. In my own experience, when pro se claims are dismissed, it's generally on the merits. If cases are dismissed for procedural reasons, it's almost always a case of a pro se litigant refusing to listen to the judge's clear instructions for what they need to do (or, more often, not do).

No. A governor could not be held liable in a lawsuit on those grounds. Governors in every U.S. state have governmental immunity from liability in tort (and a lawsuit for wrongful death is a kind of tort lawsuit) for their official actions, and there is no U.S. state in which this kind of lawsuit would fall within an exception to that governmental immunity. There is not private cause of action against a state government executive branch official under federal law for a violation of "Trump administration official guidelines for reducing the covid-19 mitigation." Indeed, it isn't clear that a federal statute creating such a private cause of action that purported to pierce a state law official's governmental immunity from liability, even if it were enacted, would be constitutional. In contrast, if a corporation violated such a guideline, the violation of the guideline would be evidence of negligence, although probably not conclusive evidence, in a suit for wrongful death by a non-employee brought against the corporation.

canada The name of the accused must appear in the indictment or information. See R. v. Turmel, 2005 QCCA 6, interpreting Criminal Code, s. 581: Nowhere is it mentioned that the name of the accused must be included in each count: the fact that the name of the accused appears in the heading of the indictment is sufficient. Practically, this is one of the barriers to private prosecutions. Private individuals do not have the same investigatory resources and powers as government to allow them to identify people that they will charge.

In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.

In all cases of speech in U.S. Jurisprudence, the speech uttered is presumed First Amendment Protected unless proven otherwise. Critical to this proof is the intent of the speaker and his/her word choice and usage. In order to prove that Trump uttered unprotected speech, the prosecution must show that the language was deliberately spoken by Trump to promote Imminent Lawless Action (Brandenberg v. Ohio). That means that not only must the actions come with a defined time of action, but it also means that you have to prove Mens Rea - that Trump knew in his mind at the time he spoke that the words would incite. Finally, you cannot cherry pick a quote but rather must view the totality of the events in question. Trump did make statements against violence prior to and following the speech in question, which suggests he was not advocating for violent actions taken that day. The word "fight" which does not always mean a violent. Miriam-Webster's definition of "to fight" is: 1 : to struggle in battle or in physical combat. 2 : to argue angrily : quarrel. 3 : to try hard While the first definition of the word does indicate physical violence, but the second and third are possible to do with no violence whatsoever. The concept of fighting for something is often used by people at constitutionally protected protests and gatherings and the use of the term has never been used to convict the speaker for the misinterpretation of the words by the person who hears them. If this were the case, you can expect the Beastie Boys to get slapped with criminal charges for their advocacy of fighting for the right to Party (incidentally, the song never once advocates for violence in the pursuit of wild teen parties... it's merely a list of the restrictions and hypocrisies of the rule makers and enforcers). What's more, Mafia Dons don't normally go down for specific instructions to "kill the mook" but rather for RICO charges. Their whole organization is corrupt and thus they can be held responsible for the corrupt actions of people in their chain of command in the organization. There has yet to be any evidence supporting that Trump knew and participated in the planning of the assault on Congress. Yes, there was planning prior to the events, which means people would have done this without Trump's speech... which means they were not instructed specifically by him at the time. Trump could have said something different and the results would be the same. On top of that... the violence at Congress was started during Trumps speech, not after it... and the place where the speech was given was far enough away from Capitol Hill that it would be difficult to argue that the first wave of rioters even heard the speech let alone were influenced by it. You can believe this was Trumps goal all you want, but the fact of the matter is the law says that Trump does not have to do anything to prove his intent. The burden of proof rests with he who doubts is enforce and in order to prove the speech was unprotected, you have to show clear evidence Trump did intend for the riot to happen.

Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.

Typo in disclaimer - worst case scenario I've noticed a typo on an investment company's disclaimer in a brochure, to the effect: This company and its research affiliate June continue to have such dealings and June also have other ongoing business dealings with other firms whose products are included herein. Clearly some one replaced all instances of "may" and replaced with "June." Question In the event that anything relating to this disclaimer does make its way all the way to court, what would the implications be? Would this be insufficient to cover the legal liability it was originally written to, given that it's now effectively garbled and ambiguous?

Garbled and ambiguous? I guess it took you all of 20 seconds to work out what it meant. Why do think a court can’t do that too? Documents contain typos, that doesn’t necessarily make them ambiguous. The automatic correction of typos is known as the Scrivener’s doctrine - a scrivener being an almost archaic term for a clerk, scribe, or notary, because documents were written for many centuries before the invention of the typewriter.

Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause.

Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.

My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.

Contracts are routinely held to be valid even when there is negligible or literally zero financial “gain” (compensation, which they take into consideration in order to enter into the contract). A document purporting to be a contract might be held invalid if it is a bare promise like “I promise to give you $100 on Friday”, but you can make it an enforceable contract by including “if you give me a french fry today”. Reasoning that party “could have” done something else does not invalidate a contract, for example the party might have had $3 at the time and could have purchased a whole bag of fries. The only imaginable relevance of “I could have” thinking would be if the terms of the contract are so unclear that the party would not reasonably have understood the contract to have obligated them to pay $100, or that they would have reasonably believed that they were to receive a suitcase full of french fries. There is a (huge) difference between subjective errors in interpreting a contract and objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is fundamentally about the linguistic structure of the agreement, i.e. words like “it” which have no intrinsic referent, or “required books and clothing” (which could mean “required books and all clothing”, or “required books and required clothing”). There may be special rules of legal interpretation addressing how such ambiguities are resolved (this one is not well established, but is known in some spheres as the “across-the-board rule”). Personal interpretation does not enter into decisions as to the validity of a contract: if you misinterpret the words of a contract, regardless of how strong your proof is that at the time you did not understand the contract, that doesn’t matter, unless you can show that at the time you were actually not competent (did not know Armenian and could not have understood what the contract required). The courts look at the words of the contract, assume that the parties have availed themselves of wise legal counsel, and understand how the courts would interpret the contract, then they filter the words of the contract through a sieve composed of rules constituting "the law", and declare what parties A and B must do.

is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general".

To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml.

A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire.

If someone robs a bank at which (s)he has an account, can the bank deduct that amount from the robber's account? Bob has $100,000 in an account at First Example Bank. Bob robs the bank, taking $50,000, and he escapes. He is never caught, but the bank is 100% sure that he is the one who robbed the bank. Can they deduct $50,000 from his account to cover the loss, effectively turning the robbery into a withdrawal? Obviously, this doesn't make the robbery any less illegal, but it does offset the bank's loss.

If there has been no trial establishing Bob's guilt, the bank does not know that it was Bob who did rob the bank. Even if the bank has Bob on the security video feed, claiming that, "As my name is Bob, I will shoot anyone who does not follow my instructions", and Bob left behind his driver's licence at the heist, the bank does not know that it was Bob. The bank could sue Bob in a civil action in order to get the money back. It would have to follow some procedures to notify Bob of the lawsuit and, if he did not appear, it would win by default. If Bob were to appear, he could make his case about why the bank should not be entitled to that money ("It was not me" / "I only took $1,000" / whatever). After the trial had happened, the bank still could not take the money right away. Maybe Bob would offer some other assets worth $50,000 to pay the bank. After it had become evident that Bob was unwilling or unable to comply with the payments, then the bank could ask the court to seize Bob's assets. The court would decide which assets could be seized, would order to have them seized, and then would provide them to the bank. That does not mean that Bob would be free to use his $100,000 during this time. Before the trial is over, the bank could request the judge to freeze Bob's account, as a way of ensuring that he does not withdraw the money from it. The judge would evaluate the likelihood of Bob losing the trial and refusing to honour it (and whatever Bob's lawyer's objections to this are) and decide on the issue. But that would only affect Bob's ability to use the money, not his ownership.

If you want to get out, and are willing to lose $270, you can not sign the lease and demand a return of your security deposit. You could ask for a return of the other fees as well, but you are less likely to be successful. They would probably have trouble enforcing a security deposit against you if you didn't have a lease with them, and would probably have trouble demanding you sign a lease when they changed the unit. You should probably get it all back, because you applied for it, but it probably isn't worth litigating over. I would also encourage you to turn to social media sites if they have one, or to sites like Yelp, if they do not. Many businesses are sensitive to this and if you are truthful if could provide you with some leverage.

We are talking about larceny and larceny & destruction of property in the two cases. So at the minimum, there are more laws that apply. But what are the laws? Florida names its Larceny statute... Theft: 812.014 Theft.— (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. Destroying someone's else property in Florida is in the statute on Criminal Mischief: 806.13 Criminal mischief; penalties; penalty for minor.— (1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism thereto. So, yes, you would additionally get the criminal mischief charge, but... that only grants monetary damages of 250 USD plus the damages done to the items for first timers, but it can become upgraded to a felony in the third degree - which has a maximum limit of 5 years. Note that damaging items in the course of theft is specifically an aggravating factor for the theft charge, if grand theft is combined with property damage of 1000 USD and more. A bicycle costing between 750 and 5000 USD is grand theft, felony in the third degree according to 812.014.(2)(c)1. This is also the 5 years limit. One could get both sentences... but still only sit 5 years, because often sentences are served concurrently, only rarely consecutively. So, no, you do not necessarily commit a higher offense just for breaking the lock - you'd need to have a 1000 USD damage for that - but you most certainly commit additional offenses that can result in a higher verdict in the end.

You greatly underestimate the capacity of banks to handle high volumes of transactions. There are many corporate and governmental bank customers that deposit thousands of checks a day. At the peak of tax season, the IRS deposits millions of them per day. Nationwide, about 4,389,000,000 checks are deposited each year and 17,500,000 checks are deposited each day (in the entire U.S.). You would need millions of checks per day to overwhelm a bank. And, while it is not a crime to deposit a check, it is generally a crime to deposit a check written on a cancelled bank account or with insufficient funds. So, unless you have a lot of money to deposit (which people who try crazy schemes like this one usually do not), sooner or later, you will run out and you will start knowingly writing bad checks, which usually is a crime. Banks are free to decide that they will not do business with you as a customer, or will establish special procedures for dealing with you in particular (e.g. assigning you a "personal banker"). They are also free to refuse to, for example, handle deposits of checks under $1, and can enact policies limiting the number of deposits a customer can make per day (most mobile deposit systems already have such limitations). Many bank accounts also charge a fee for each check deposited, so if you deposit 1,000,000 checks per business day, you are going to be paying the bank an immense amount of transaction fees. And, most deposit agreements may be amended prospectively by the bank at any time with notice to you if they find that they want to change its terms. Simply put, as a practical matter, your evil plan to deposit the bank to death won't work. There is no viable way to conduct a sustained "denial of service attack" on a bank by making too many deposits.

In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime.

The customers are able to leave, so there's no reason it could be a crime. Even if they weren't able to operate the lock themselves, they are presumably able to leave by asking a staff member. There is no way this could be remotely considered false imprisonment. Depending on the layout and size of the store and presence/lack of other fire exits, this might violate fire safety regulations.

Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED

Can a bank sue someone that starts a bank run that destroys the bank? No (assuming, of course, as is the usual case, that the person who starts the bank run is not engaged in perpetrating a defamatory falsehood). Most bank runs are, and certainly the Silicon Valley Bank bank run was, based upon wide disclosure of a true fact. In the case of SVB, the bank run was triggered by the fact that its balance sheets failed to reflect the true value of fixed nominal rate bonds that it held as assets. In the usual case, a lawsuit also isn't a very helpful option to a bank that suffers a bank run. In the case of SVB, the bank had a book value (which is often a fair measure of a bank's value since its assets are so monetized) of $34 billion which was reduced to a pittance by the run on it. Even if someone who started a run on the bank had a moderately high net worth of $3.4 million that could be collected in a money judgment, that would cover a mere 0.01% of the loss to the bank, and there would be serious issues over the causation of any loss (i.e. how much of the losses suffered bound to occur sooner or later anyway due to causes unrelated to someone who triggered a panic). Another fine point of procedure is that when a bank becomes insolvent, it is promptly taken over by the FDIC or similar regulatory agency, which installs a receiver. This makes it effectively impossible for the bank itself to sue anyone. If the bank would otherwise have had a right to sue, the receiver for the bank would have the right to sue rather than the bank itself. But, this subtly while not irrelevant, doesn't capture the core reason for the question.

Someone withdrew money from my bank account - what are my rights? Someone withdrew money from my checking account (in several transactions) without my knowledge or permission. I was able to see the withdrawal slips online, and my signature was forged. I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? I live in California.

I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.

Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.

If there has been no trial establishing Bob's guilt, the bank does not know that it was Bob who did rob the bank. Even if the bank has Bob on the security video feed, claiming that, "As my name is Bob, I will shoot anyone who does not follow my instructions", and Bob left behind his driver's licence at the heist, the bank does not know that it was Bob. The bank could sue Bob in a civil action in order to get the money back. It would have to follow some procedures to notify Bob of the lawsuit and, if he did not appear, it would win by default. If Bob were to appear, he could make his case about why the bank should not be entitled to that money ("It was not me" / "I only took $1,000" / whatever). After the trial had happened, the bank still could not take the money right away. Maybe Bob would offer some other assets worth $50,000 to pay the bank. After it had become evident that Bob was unwilling or unable to comply with the payments, then the bank could ask the court to seize Bob's assets. The court would decide which assets could be seized, would order to have them seized, and then would provide them to the bank. That does not mean that Bob would be free to use his $100,000 during this time. Before the trial is over, the bank could request the judge to freeze Bob's account, as a way of ensuring that he does not withdraw the money from it. The judge would evaluate the likelihood of Bob losing the trial and refusing to honour it (and whatever Bob's lawyer's objections to this are) and decide on the issue. But that would only affect Bob's ability to use the money, not his ownership.

No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it.

I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million.

First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.

The Consumer Rights Act gives you an initial 30 days to reject it, if it is faulty, and claim a full refund from the dealer that sold it to you. After that time your rights are pretty strong for at least 6 months. It is not completely clear to me what the exceptions are, but if it is the timing chain then there can be no case that this is "wear and tear" as they last something like 80,000 miles or 10 years. Which and Citizen Advice have tools to determine your rights.

Your tax advisor was legally correct, but perhaps not very savvy. Unfortunately, the best way to resolve this sort of situation is to avoid it: You should have insisted your employer stop withholding for PA as soon as you moved out of state. Once someone else has possession of your money the burden is on you to get it back, and the burden can be (practically) quite high before it runs afoul of any serious laws. The fact is that your filings are correct, and the PA Department of Revenue is being ridiculous. If they can't be satisfied with reasonable and adequate evidence backing your return you can file administrative appeals at little cost in hopes of reaching a more reasonable agent. However, if I were in this situation, since NC's tax rate is higher, I would just amend my NC return to claim a credit for taxes paid (even though erroneously) to another state. (This takes advantage of our federalist system and your state citizenship and puts the burden on NC to collect the "correct" difference from PA if they care enough. You also don't have to fight for the actual return of money with your new state because presumably you will owe them taxes again this year, and if they haven't returned what you claim you're owed then you just deduct it from what you owe this year.)

What are the legal ramifications for someone whose birth was concealed? I understand that in the US, concealment of birth is against the law. I looked it up, and apparently it is a felony in most US states. (FYI I'm asking because it pertains to a work of fiction I'm writing before anyone gets the wrong idea about me!) Here's the question... What are the legal ramifications towards an individual whose parents are deceased but they committed concealment of birth when the individual was born. As a result, this individual has no SSN and might not legally exist. Could they be in legal jeopardy in any way? Can the US or their state of birth (lets say WV) compel them to register in some way?

Does this person have witnesses to his existence? Particularly before the age of five? Under 8 U.S. Code § 1401, native-born citizens include a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States; If he appears out of nowhere, he is likely to be suspect of illegal immigration. Age may be a factor there, too.

In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.

It's not clear which "they" reported having no records, but you need to check with the court that convicted you. The police often destroy records decades before the courts will. Even if the court has no such record, I would be concerned about a record of your conviction existing in the national databases like NCIC. To address that, I would file a motion to expunge your conviction and then either get an order saying that the motion was granted, or that there is no conviction to expunge. I wouldn't rely on anything other than a court order. Until then, my instinct would be to simply answer honestly any questions put to you when registering as a voter or firearm owner. I don't believe it's illegal to submit an application when you have a criminal record, though I'm confident it would be illegal to lie on the application. (The actual answer to this question would depend on your jurisdiction, which you haven't provided. You should consult a lawyer to get a reliable answer.) It also occurs to me that you may simply be mistaken in believing that you were convicted. Frequently, courts will allow someone to enter some kind of conditional plea but refrain from entering a conviction if they behave themselves or meet some other criteria. If the court is satisfied with the defendant's performance, the charges may be dismissed altogether and eventually automatically expunged.

If you falsely claim to be a US citizen in order to obtain work, vote in a US election, or receive public benefits in the United States, you can be deported, lose a green card, or be banned from ever obtaining a green card or US Visa. See https://dyanwilliamslaw.com/2015/02/why-lying-about-being-a-u-s-citizen-can-stop-you-from-becoming-a-permanent-resident-and-what-you-can-do-to-overcome-this-obstacle/ and https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-falsely-claiming-us-citizen-can-deportable.html for more detail. This very much includes checking an incorrect box on an I-9 form when obtaining a job, although that is not usually considered a "benefit". In fact incorrect I-9 statements are a common source of such bans. However, if a person lies in response to a merely curious question, when no government or private benefit, and no job eligibility is involved, the ban should not, as far as I can see, come into effect, nor should that be grounds for deportation, or indeed any criminal or immigration action. If a person falsely claims to be a US Citizen merely to obtain social status or personal importance or reputation, that would seem not to be a crime under the doctrine of U.S. v. Alvarez, nor should it lead directly to any immigration consequences, althoguh I suppose it might draw attention to someone who is deportable on other grounds.

An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.

So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.

Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one).

So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.

In what forum would Iran sue Pakistan in for damages? According to reports, Iran may claim $18 billion in damages from Pakistan for an unfinished pipeline if Pakistan does not complete its part of it as agreed. What forum would such a claim take place in?

According to reports, one potential forum is the International Court of Arbitration. All reports I see say that the agreement specifies that the forum will be an arbitration forum. Whether it can be any arbitration forum or if it must be the ICC, or can be selected from a list, depends on the specific wording of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement of 2009, which I have not been able to find.

This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops.

One of the biggest problems here is in proof of injury attributable to an individual... With asbestos, you can prove that direct exposure in a certain instance caused a long-term harm. Just because you were around asbestos doesn't mean you get lung cancer, so if you don't actually suffer any harm (or any harm yet), you won't get awarded damages. Similarly with lead, you have to prove both the exposure, the entity which exposed you to it, and harm that you suffered. Just being around a lead pipe or paint doesn't mean you get damages, you need to have suffered harm. The problem with second-hand smoke is that you can be exposed to it from many different sources. Any problems you have (lung cancer) would need to be proven as a direct consequence of one specific (or prolonged) exposure. I could see this working if a non-smoking spouse developed cancer from a smoking spouse being exposed to it for years, but you can't just say "I walked by Joe Camel in the street while he was smoking now I have cancer and it is his fault". So the issue becomes who is responsible for your damages. You can't narrow it down to one smoker (or even cigarette smoke, as lung cancer can develop from other sources), so just proving that your cause-effect is directly related to smoke will be difficult. After that you can't say one single person caused it (unless they forcefully locked you in a room and chain-smoked for a year). So who do you sue? All of smoking society? You might just as well sue God for putting those people on earth, really the only recourse you would have is to sue the tobacco companies, the individual smokers are not going to be held liable as a group.

Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”

Graffiti artists are routinely found financially liable for their work, but assertions of copyright infringement by graffiti artists are vanishingly rare, so I don't know if that has ever happened in that context. In many jurisdictions, filing a lawsuit against someone waives any statute of limitations defense you may have against counterclaims filed by the person you are suing in any related matter. So, if that rule applies, a counterclaim for financial loss from graffiti could be brought in a copyright infringement lawsuit, even though the statute of limitations on the damages claim would otherwise have run. But, I don't know if such a rule applies to copyright infringement claims filed in federal court.

You could probably hire a Pennsylvania lawyer to intervene in the case on your behalf and file a motion to seal the evidence in the case, and there is a good chance that it would be granted, and quite possibly, unopposed by the parties. But, the fact that it has already been made available to the public on the Internet could cause the court to deny your request on the grounds that it is futile to do so.

How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.

The settlement was a politically motivated act to provide de facto disaster relief and express a moral apology in a cash that there is no plausible way that the U.S. would lose if it litigated the case on the merits. The articulated basis for making the payment would not survive a seriously argued dispositive motion from the United States government, either on behalf of the U.S. government itself, or against the federal law enforcement officials involved under Bivens. A complaint making such a claim would barely survive a motion for a Rule 11 sanction for making a frivolous claim if the government pushed the point, and then, only on the theory that it advanced a good faith argument for change in the law, not on the theory that it was supported by existing law. The Parkland case was considerably weaker than the Charleston shooter of 2015 case even, because Parkland involved a discretionary law enforcement decision, while Charleston arguably involved a non-discretionary administrative matter (although the government probably could have won that case as well).

Where when and how did the idea of “reasonableness” originate? What period did it come into regular legal usage? Did it originate as a judicial device first or did it begin as something that would be explicitly coded into statutes?

See Harold J. Berman, "The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale" (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 1651, p. 1691, n. 101: the translation of "reason" into "reasonableness" and the exaltation of "common sense" are English developments of the seventeenth century, to which Coke contributed. At p. 1718-19: Coke had said it is the nature of law to be reasonable, and that the test of reasonableness is its ability to withstand the test of time. See also S.E. Thorne, "Dr. Bonham's Case" (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 543, p. 543: To students of the origins of American constitutional law and theory no judicial utterance of Sir Edward Coke can surpass in interest and importance his so-called dictum in Dr. Bonham's case, decided in the Court of Common Pleas in 1610. It is widely regarded as foreshadowing not merely the power which American courts to-day exercise in the disallowance of statutes on the ground of their conflict with the constitution, but also that very test of 'reasonableness' which is the ultimate flowing of that power. This concept as a ground of review arose in the context of "conflict between Parliament and the Crown over the nature and limits of prerogative and the common law" (Michael Foran, "The Constitutional Foundations of Reasonableness Review: Artificial Reason and Wrongful Discrimination" (2022) 26:3 Edinburgh Law Review 295, p. 299). In one case, the Case of Prohibitions (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 E.R. 1342 (K.B.), Coke repealed a judgment of King James I, on the basis that the judgment was not grounded in the common law. Coke said: "causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law." This is in contrast to a view that Crown action would not be substantively reviewable. By defining reasonableness as something that can only be determined through the wisdom of judges, Coke was broadening the judicial power.

Warrants are issued upon probable cause The Supreme Court defined this in 1964 in Beck v. Ohio as: whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense In the context of warrants, the Oxford Companion to American Law defines probable cause as: information sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that the wanted individual had committed a crime (for an arrest warrant) or that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found in a search (for a search warrant) In Brinegar v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court defines probable cause as: where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed In the scenario that you describe the testimony of the child almost certainly gives rise to probable cause. A warrant issued on that basis is likely to be broad enough for the investigation to follow the path that you suggest - if the child claims there were inappropriate photos sent to them and there was evidence of subsequent deletion, law enforcement are entitled to trace that back to wherever it leads.

Yes, a judge may use the bible when making a decision. However, the usage nearly always takes the form of citation (in the form of scholarly texts) rather than precedent. That said, the lines get blurry sometimes. In Banks v. Maxwell, 171 S.E. 70 (N.C. 1933), the N.C. Supreme Court was tasked with resolving a dispute where the plaintiff had been gored by a bull. As a means of anchoring precedent and establishing a strict liability rule when a bull has previously gored, it stated "[t]he familiar rule of liability for injuries inflicted by cattle has remained approximately constant for more than 3,000 years. This rule of liability was expressed by Moses in the following words..." The court goes on to cite Exodus 21:28-30.

Nope. Even if we were to accept this definition of law as some written decree, and I'm unsure that's the case1, there are civilisations with written law that predate the Ten Commandments. Babylonian Law (c.1800 BC) predates the Ten Commandments. Also, the Code of Ur-Nammu predates even that (c.2050 BC). 1. Most definitions of law don't require that it be written, but rather that it is some system of rules that govern the behaviour of some group of people.

The concept of law predates writing. "Law" refers not only to the system of rules, as your definition notes, but to the individual rules making up that system (for example, there is a law that prohibits theft). An act is, more generally than the definition you quote, a thing that is done (for example, someone who is discovered committing a crime can be said to have been "caught in the act.") This also does not depend on writing. In our literate times, however, when a legislature (or any body, such as a corporate board of directors), wants to achieve something, someone writes a description of a proposed result. When the body makes a formal decision to adopt the written document (by a vote, for example), it is deciding to do the thing described in the document; that is, it is deciding to act. Typically, for a legislature, the thing it's doing is to create, modify, or repeal a law. It's not very difficult to see how a document that describes a legislature's desire to act came to be called an act. In some contexts, however, it can also be called a law. So the word law can refer to the entire system (as in law school), to a particular act (as in the legislature passed a law today called the XYZ Act), or indeed to a particular rule or section of an act (as in the law in question is subparagraph 2(B)(ii)(b) of the XYZ Act). Law can also refer to case law, of course, or regulatory law, so we tend to use statutory law or statute to denote the laws created through the legislative process. In conclusion, the word "law" has several related meanings, so its use can be imprecise. When speaking about specific paragraphs, precision may be in order. In a case like this, where a paragraph create exceptions to rules laid out in a preceding paragraph, it doesn't make a lot of sense to describe each paragraph as a "law." The numbered items in statutory text can be called many things, and usually have different names depending on the level at which they are found. So I would not know whether these are sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, or something else. If I were unable to find the correct terminology for (in this case) India, would probably use a generic term like "items."

The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

There are many countries / states / provinces in North America, each with their own laws on this subject, so this question is potentially quite broad. I will focus on the United States. To this day, it is legal in all 50 US states for a parent to strike a child as a means of discipline ("corporal punishment"), but laws generally include a requirement that the force used is "reasonable" in some sense. However, it is not legal for a parent to cause serious injury to a child. The line between "reasonable punishment" and "serious injury" seems to not be well defined, and may have shifted over time due to changes in law, court decisions, or prosecutorial discretion. So the answer may hinge on what you mean by the word "beating". However, spanking seems to be generally considered "reasonable" under the law. I found the following article which explores this issue in depth: Coleman, Doriane Lambelet; Dodge, Kenneth A;, and Campbell, Sarah Keeton. Where and how to draw the line between reasonable corporal punishment and abuse. 73 Law and Contemporary Problems 107-166 (Spring 2010). http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss2/6

Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while.

Is a "login timestamp" considered as personal data according to GDPR? If software is saving the timestamp of the last login of a user, would that timestamp itself be considered personal data by GDPR?

You ask the wrong question first What do you save in the database? Let's take an example of a door: Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save who passed this door? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save when the door was opened? Do you have a legitimate interest to know/save both? Only now, once you have established that you have any interest in the door passing at all, you have to start to figure out if it is personal data - if you have no interest in saving it in the first place, there's little reason to figure that out. Let's say you have a legitimate interest to save both, because behind the door is the server room, and physical access is limited to authorized personnel and you want to know when who was in there for figuring out if or who was responsible for changes. Now, which of the data is Personal Identifiable Data for you? You know where the door is. That's in itself Location Data, but if you don't know who or when the door was opened, then it is not PII. It becomes PII if you connect it with a person. A pin-code used by the whole department is not always PII, but can become PII in a very small to medium-sized department. e.g. one of all the 20 000 employees in a facility is just saying "an employee" and is not identifiable, but one of 20 is much more likely is, as you can correlate that with other data to possibly identify a smaller group. The Employee ID or Card would be most definitely PII if saved. Similar, if the login date is saved to the account list on some server. The timestamp on itself is not a PII, if only the timestamp is recorded and no other information exists. Like, if the front door only logs "The door was opened/closed" but not who did it, to count customers or schedule maintenance. However, together with other information - such as the door being access restricted and the paystubs from timekeeping when all those access carriers were in the building and having a tight access restriction to a decently small group (see above) - that can quickly become PII. It is enough that the information from different information sources compiled can become enough to say "it was one of these few people", as that is enough to make it identifiable under GDPR Art.4. Once you know it is PII, you need to handle it as PII. As such, you need consent or a legitimate interest. That's why I pulled the other test before figuring out if it is indeed PII: Ic you have already figured out that this data is required for some legitimate reason, such as that you need to know the door operation log to ensure some other compliance, then you can proceed through the other parts of the GDPR compliance. Now, OP asked about a login timestamp. That is by necessity bound to an identifier, such as a login name. As such, it is the Keycard or Employee ID example and automatically PII because it is tied to a PII. Definitions The GDPR defines PII in Article 4 ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The US Department of labor defines quite similar PII is defined as information: (i) that directly identifies an individual (e.g., name, address, social security number or other identifying number or code, telephone number, email address, etc.) or (ii) by which an agency intends to identify specific individuals in conjunction with other data elements, i.e., indirect identification.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel).

From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes.

You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.

Cookies are information stored on the end users device and require consent¹ per the ePrivacy directive, even if the cookies or similar technologies don't contain personal data. Conditions for consent are defined by the GDPR. This was also confirmed by the "Planet49" case. 1. consent is required unless the storage of or access to information on the end users device is either strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, or necessary for technical reasons. E.g. functional cookies like a shopping cart feature in a web shop are fine, as are cookies used solely for security purposes or technical features like TLS session resumption. It is however likely that this cookie does qualify as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. The cookie contains an ID that lets you single out/distinguish this user from all other users, even though that ID doesn't link the user to a real-world identity. It is also possible to argue that the cookie is entirely anonymous, but the safer approach is to treat it as personal data. Similarly, other features of the website necessarily involve the processing of personal data, such as processing the user's IP address, if only for the purpose of responding to their HTTP requests. The GDPR's criteria for valid consent are mainly about ensuring that the consent is a freely given unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. For example, consent can never be the default, it needs to be an opt-in. However, Art 7(1) GDPR says that the data controller has the burden of proof of showing that valid consent was given. The GDPR itself does not provide further guidance on what this means specifically. I would argue that it can be decomposed into two aspects: Showing that valid consent was given. The manner in which you ask for consent must enable a free choice, and must respect that "no consent" is the default. For example, you could archive screenshots of the cookie management flow to show that there is a free choice. You could archive the frontend software so that it can be demonstrated that the cookie is not set until consent is given. Showing that this user gave consent. There is a wide variety of opinions on how to do that. My personal opinion is that the existence of a cookie paired with a valid consent flow to set that cookie demonstrates that the cookie can only have been set in a valid manner. However, there are consent management solutions that provide additional insight, such as the user's entire history of giving and revoking consent. For example, the user's browser might generate a pseudonymous ID enabling that user's consent history to be stored on some server. Indeed, that would be personal data, and this would have to be disclosed transparently. It would not be valid to use the consent management information for other purposes, for example by using the consent management ID for analytics purposes. Storing the user's consent history is definitely appropriate if you have a concept of identity, such as for signed-in users. I have doubts whether this is also helpful on websites that don't have user accounts, and I have not heard of a case where the existence of such records made a difference. After all, such records can only be relevant if the user gave consent but later disputes this in a complaint with a DPA or in a lawsuit. Which approach to choose will depend on more specific guidance provided by your country's data protection authority, and on the risk balance appropriate for your business. After all, the purpose of such compliance work is not to be 100% safe from lawsuits, but to reduce risks from enforcement/litigation to acceptable levels. What is acceptable is ultimately a business decision. E.g. the only 100% safe way to do web analytics is to have no analytics at all, but that is not acceptable for most businesses.

Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed).

The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit.

Is there any country in the EU that forbids ritual cattle slaughter? Is there any country in the EU that forbids ritual cattle slaughter? If so, where are the halal and kosher certified meats sourced from?

Quite the contrary. In most European countries, shechita is - at least under certain conditions - legal. Only in the blue-marked countries is it generally forbidden; in the green-marked countries prior anaesthesia is required. That is, pre-cut stunning is required in Sweden, Belgium and Denmark (and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, but these are not in the EU). Simultaneous stunning is required in Finland. Post-cut stunning is required in Austria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia and Greece. Only in Slovenia is ritual slaughter banned. Map source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ritual_slaughter_laws_Europe_map.svg

It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.

What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married.

In the United States, blasphemy is really not a crime even if it severely offends certain people and tends to cause them to want to riot and kill the person who offends them. Most Americans who are familiar with the law and the U.S. Constitution strongly support this policy and think it is obviously right. Not every country interprets its freedom of speech laws (if it even has freedom of speech laws) in this way. For example, Canada has a law against blasphemy, as do almost all countries which have an official state religion (which is called the "establishment" of a religion). Also many countries have seemingly contradictory constitutional provisions and courts have to resolve their relative priority. For example, many Muslim countries have constitutions that simultaneously contain a right to freedom of speech and a provision that says that Sharia law is the supreme law of the land (e.g. both Afghanistan and Iraq recently enacted constitutions that say both of those things). A court could decide that the Sharia law provision prevails over freedom of speech in the event that the two conflict, or could reach the opposite conclusion. Nothing on the face of a constitution like that will tell the court how to resolve the issue. Many other countries have laws against intentionally and publicly offending someone's religious beliefs, which is similar to, but not the same as, a blasphemy law. Blasphemy, narrowly interpreted, means saying something that contradicts the doctrines of the nation's official religion, without regard to whether it is offensive - so, for example, saying that Mary the Mother of Jesus got pregnant the ordinary way, rather than having a virgin birth, would be blasphemy even if no one was offended by you saying that in a country where Roman Catholicism or Lutheranism or the Anglican Church was the official religion. A narrow Blasphemy law offends the idea of separation of church and state because it makes the government the ultimate determiner of what the doctrines of the nation's official religion says and allows a government to have an official religion. It is also notable that there are two parts to the freedom of religion in the United States. One part is the "free exercise clause" which allows people to practice the religion of their choice. The other part is the "establishment clause" which prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another or even favoring being religious over being not religious. The "free exercise clause" is similar to the stance that the Koran takes towards "People of the Book" but applied to any kind of religious belief not just Jews and Christians. Many conservatives in the United States are strong supporters of the free exercise clause, but think that the establishment clause should only apply to the federal government (so the state and local governments can establish a religion). Other conservatives think that the establishment clause should only prevent the government from preferring one denomination of Christianity over another denomination, even though the drafters of the constitution and courts ever since then have made clear that this was not the intent of the establishment clause. Article 11 of the Treaty of Tripoli, signed by the President and ratified by the Senate so that it took effect in 1797, just six years after the Bill of Rights was adopted, for example, specifically noted that the freedom of religion in the United States included Muslims. Many countries have a freedom of religion that protects free exercise but does not have an establishment clause. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights similarly protects only free exercise and does not prohibit governments from having an established religion. Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is usually not enforceable in the courts unless a country decides that it will enforce it. It does not usually have the effect of causing the laws of a country to be invalidated the way that an unconstitutional law would be invalidated. Put another way, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and most other international human rights treaties are usually determined by courts to be not "self-executing". So, it is up to the legislative process in a particular country to decide how to implement human rights if it does so at all. In contrast, Europe has a treaty that is part of the Council of Europe organization with similar provisions, that is binding on member states even if it violates their laws (i.e. it is "self-executing").

The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.

There is a general EU anti-discrimination directive 2000/43 which in Article 3(1)(h) which applies the standards to housing. This document analyzes Czech anti-discrimination law. If you were discriminated against on the basis of being English, that could support legal action. There is no current EU or Czech legislation that guarantees a right to operate in the language of your choice. There have been calls to create some such legislation. Such legislation would be the implementation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says that Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. There is under Article 9 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages a right to use regional or minority languages in judicial proceedings, but there is no generic "right to use your own language". There are occasional cases where governments are sued because their actions linguistically discriminate. As observed here, there was a case in Belgium where the government was sued for not subsidizing French education in non-French territories, but the court said that "Art. 14 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing children or parents a right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice".

Jan Böhmermann faces prosecution in Germany for violating their penal code section 103 as discussed here. Lèse-majesté is not a crime in the UK, though apparently it was a common law crime in Scotland until 2010 (though not prosecuted since 1715). Though there is always the possibility of a defamation lawsuit, depending on what you say.

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

Does withholding non-medical information affect medical consent? In an episode of the medical drama 'House', a patient needing a liver transplant is offered a live donation from her girlfriend. During the episode there's a continual argument over the ethics of whether they should tell the donor that the patient was about to break up with her prior to the hospital admission. I am wondering whether the doctor and patient, both strongly believing that the donor would withdraw consent if she knew, would be liable to lawsuit or even committed a crime by hiding this information? Would the doctors be obliged to tell the donor or even be allowed if they wanted to as it is not sensitive medical information?

The primary question is whether remaining silent would constitute a breech of medical ethics. The pertinent ethical principle is AMA Opinion 2.15 One of the requirements is that the donor be assigned an advocate team whose interest is the donor, not the patient, and these should generally be distinct individuals in order to avoid conflict of interest. Assuming that the donor's team is aware of this fact, they have a duty to disclose it, since it materially affects the donor's willingness to donate the organ. The ethical opinion does not specifically address "patient breaking up with a directed donor", but there is a general obligation to share information, and it would probably be found to be a breach of medical ethics to suppress relevant non-medical information. The ethics of directed donation from live donors is not well-developed. I will mention that Potential donors must be informed that they may withdraw from donation at any time before undergoing the operation and that, should this occur, the health care team is committed to protect the potential donor from pressures to reveal the reasons for withdrawal. If the potential donor withdraws, the health care team should report simply that the individual was unsuitable for donation. From the outset, all involved parties must agree that the reasons why any potential donor does not donate will remain confidential for the potential donor’s protection. In situations of paired, domino, or chain donation withdrawal must still be permitted. Physicians should make special efforts to present a clear and comprehensive description of the commitment being made by the donor and the implications for other parties to the paired donation during the informed consent process. Neither team can tell the patient that the reason the girlfriend withdrew was because they ratted him out (anyhow, we can suppose she said something to him on her own). The hospital knows this fact, and has both a duty to the patient to solve a medical problem but also to the donor to be sure that the consent is informed. The hospital would be suppressing a fact relevant to the donor's willingness to undergo the operation, which is a breach of duty. This fact is not protected by HIPAA, or any other California statute, so does not supersede the obligation to reveal relevant facts.

No You say you won't disclose personal information, therefore, you can't disclose personal information. Now, if your privacy policy said "We won't disclose your personal information except ..." then, so long as you did the "..." that would be fine (subject to privacy law).

There is no time limit on performing a legal abortion. §2599-bb of the bill says that a physician may perform an abortion when, according to the practitioner's reasonable and good faith professional judgment based on the facts of the patient's case: the patient is within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of pregnancy, or there is an absence of fetal viability, or the abortion is necessary to protect the patient's life or health It is left to ordinary language interpretation to understand what "abortion" is. The ordinary meaning of abortion does not include act that follow birth or a child. The law as amended still defines homicide as conduct which causes the death of a person under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the second degree, or criminally negligent homicide and deleted the clause which included the clause an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks (this is how abortion past 24 weeks was formerly illegal). The definitions say that A person, when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive Once a fetus becomes a person by being born, the homicide statute prohibits killing the person. So apart from the fact that killing a person is not "an abortion", the law does not make it legal to kill any man being who has been born and who is alive. As for what constitutes "health", that is not delimited by law, that is, it says simply "health", not "physical health". In general, "health" without modifiers means any kind of health. In fact, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 it was found that whether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery is considered

Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance.

Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented.

If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law.

You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation).

In California, all parties to a conversation (people being recorded) have to agree to a recording. There are no special rules pertaining to husbands and wives. It is sufficient that the parties are aware that the recording is being made and they continue to talk, knowing that fact. There are exceptions, under Cal. Penal 633.5, in that surreptitious recordings are allowed in order to gather evidence of "extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m". To be used as evidence, there are also "predicate rules" to the effect that you have to prove who the voices are from, that the recording hasn't been altered, and that the recording is reliable (e.g., there isn't a mysterious 18 minute gap).

Is it illegal to hire by age in the US? Maybe one of the fields that has the most "ageism" is programming and software engineering jobs. There were multiple times I hear of the CEO or SVP at the final approval stage: "we want to hire a more junior person", and rejected the candidate and the 10 hours of interviews by 6 tech people and 3 manager level people. Some say, before age 35, a person is most creative and productive, and it is all about productivity. In reality, when you are 25 or 28, you are more likely to stay up working till 3am, sleep, and wake up at 9am and continue to work. However, most companies claim they want 40 hours per week and work life balance, so they won't burn somebody out in 1.5 years and then have to dump them. Also, programming and software engineering isn't like painter or poet or novelist. They don't need that much creativity. They are more like engineers building roads or bridges, where experience is important too. One other reason I can think of is, if the manager is 32, he wouldn't want to hire somebody 38 or 45, because then that person appears more like a manager than he or she is. (and that a 28 year old is more like to listen to the 32, and a 45 year old is probably less likely). And just because they want to hire somebody 35 or under, isn't it ageism and therefore, discrimination by age, and therefore illegal in the US? I even talked to a lawyer that says, "if we sue, that means these cases are flying all over the sky" (and therefore it is like people quietly accept them). It also appears that the CEO or SVP are bold enough to even at the final offer approval stage, say "rejected. We want a more junior person."

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) protects certain applicants and employees 40 years of age and older from discrimination on the basis of age in hiring, promotion, discharge, compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment. U.S. Department of Labor. State child labor laws establish minimum ages for certain kinds of work (e.g. working on heavy machinery, or serving alcohol), and age limitations on obtaining commercial driver's licenses and commercial pilot's licenses can as a practical matter impose minimum ages for employment. Usually, this is a minimum age for certain jobs between age 12 and 21 depending upon the nature of the work. Apart from these limitations, discrimination based upon age in employment is not prohibited in the United States. So, for example, if an employer wants to hire 25 years olds rather than 35 year olds, simply because they are younger, this is permitted by law in most or all U.S. states.

It would probably be very easy for a third-year associate to find someone willing to pay him $250 to spend an hour fighting a traffic ticket. But if you're talking about a full-time job practicing law with a base salary equal to $250/hour, I'll go out on a limb and say the chances are literally zero. That rate works out to about $520,000 annually, and there is probably not a firm in the world paying that much to third-year associates. Even among the highest-paying firms, the average is closer to $200K, which puts you at $96/hour. The highest associate pay I've hard of is about $330K, and that's for associates at the top of an eight-year pay schedule. And of course, if you're at a top-paying law firm, you're working closer to 60 hours a week than 40. And if you're at the top of their payscale, you're probably closer to 80 hours than 60. So even at $330K, you're still only at about $105/hour. Luckily, these firms often offer very handsome bonuses, but even if you were somehow pulling down $330K for only 40 hours a week, you'd need a $190,000 bonus to get yourself to $250/hour. For lawyers, at least, this does not happen. Anywhere. If it did, it would not happen to a third-year associate. If it did, it would not happen to a third-year associate from a second-tier law school. (It is not at all uncommon for a third-year associate to charge $250/hour, but that associate is not getting paid all or even most of that money.)

You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions.

It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.

You would have to look at your contract with the company or the company's rules. Some companies have clauses that say they own things you develop while working for them and some don't. Without knowing your specific company's policy, it is impossible to say.

The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move.

Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes.

Yes, but maybe no. In many state universities that I am familiar with, there are contractual guarantees that exempt regular academic staff from the "we pwn all your stuff" rule, which does not extend to other staff. (I had to toss back a contract for subcontracted work once because they asserted automatic ownership of copyright). It depends on your contract, entirely. Which, if it is non-existent, is a bit problematic. Their claim would be based on "work for hire" law, 17 USC 101, where the central question is whether it is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment". If this is a work for hire, they have more than a right to the proceeds of the work, they own the work and can sue you for publishing without permission. Work for hire means they own the copyright, and only the copyright owner can authorize publication. You do not legally have to have an attorney to request a release, but you should have one, because if you request a release, you are admitting that this is a work for hire. Your lawyer would tell you not to admit to such a thing. Of course, if you are reasonably certain that this is a work for hire and don't intend to contend otherwise, that kind of foot-shooting is not a concern. If your lawyer delivers a formal letter to your boss, the boss will almost certainly hand it to the university attorneys, and both parties will then take the hardest line possible, in defense of the interests of their clients.

Was this a case of negligent homicide, and have any other offences been committed here? Disclaimer: I do not aim to take a position on the ethics of this situation with this question. This question, and all details of the hypothetical case at hand, merely arose from a discussion I recently had, and the law surrounding it intrigued me. Facts of this hypothetical case Joanne is the mother of Jordan, who is fourteen years old. She is a single mother after she left her ex-boyfriend, because he abused her. She's a manager at her local supermarket. She is also a content creator on the platform OnlyFans, where she makes large sums of money posting explicit content of herself. Jordan was unaware, until a certain point, that her mother had an OnlyFans account. One day, at school, Jordan's peers reveal to him, in brutally humiliating fashion, that they have discovered his mother's OnlyFans account. Not only that, but an unknown source has leaked some of the content she uploads there. This leads to intense bullying. For a fortnight, Jordan is too embarrassed to speak about it to anyone. However, he eventually opens up to his mother about the bullying, and that it has been caused by her content on OnlyFans. He pleads with her to, at the least, engage in what he considers damage control, and delete the account, and that the extra money isn't a necessity. Despite this, Joanne refuses and continues to upload and sell content on OnlyFans. The onslaught of teasing and bullying against Jordan continues. After around a month, he musters the courage to discuss his plight with his teachers. Much to his disbelief and frustration, the teachers say that, while they have noticed ‘unusual’ behaviour towards him, in class, for a while now, and while that behaviour may have indicia of bullying, they don't have enough evidence to take any action that would make a difference. In fact, they find the entire ordeal incredibly awkward themselves (though this they do not explicitly mention). Around a month and a half have elapsed since the first instance of bullying, and the bullying has not ceased. Jordan contemplates moving schools, but he convinces himself that it's futile, because, to him, everyone around his age in his town knows about his mother's OnlyFans account. Ultimately, after an acrimonious argument with his mother, in which he pleads one more time for her to delete her OnlyFans account, and she refuses, Jordan takes his own life. Questions of law In England and Wales, could Joanne be found guilty of gross-negligence manslaughter? Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Thanks in advance for any responses, and I apologise in advance if you find either the hypothetical or the questions asinine.

Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution. Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother. A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found here. The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in this law review article with the following abstract: In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text message, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction was unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal encouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed, her purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a much longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about whether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual character as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected. As such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing conceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A utilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce harm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies voluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide as valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the foreseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but libertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to seek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting suicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not encouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise between these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing accomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical reasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and excused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why aiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even these statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement alone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing causation doctrine, is unprecedented. Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, "The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide" 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019). In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point. Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide.

There is virtually no chance this would be admissible. When a defendant argues that abuse at the hands of third party led to a mental defect that excuses her from culpability, the prosecution is free to rebut that argument. However, the prosecution's evidence must be relevant, i.e., it must have a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Here, none of the proffered evidence has any real bearing on any fact of consequence: The fact that the defendant is taller than the alleged abuser does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that the defendant's "fake" voice (what does that even mean?) is deeper than the alleged abuser's does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that young white women have more Tinder matches than middle-aged Indian men does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. Even if you could find some thin reed on which to hang the relevance of these racial and gender stereotypes, the evidence would likely still be excluded under Rule 403, as the probative value would be so trivial that it would be outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.

Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.

australia Although the alleged victim has not been found, this case from the upi.com archives dated 25/09/1986 is worthy of note (emphasis mine): A woman jailed for murdering her husband had her conviction reversed when a witness testified she saw the man on television -- in a crowd at a cricket match -- three years after he allegedly was killed. The New South Wales Court of Appeal Wednesday overturned the murder conviction of Margaret Burton, saying the case against her relied on a web of circumstantial evidence and that the new evidence provided reasonable doubt of her guilt. Burton, however, still must complete an 8-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. She was sentenced to life in prison on Nov. 8, 1984, for the May 1983 murder of her husband. She and Ronald Burke, a close friend, also were sentenced to eight years in jail for conspiracy to murder her husband, Peter Burton. Peter Burton's body never was found. At the appeals court hearing, Judy Edmonds testified she is sure she saw Peter Burton in the crowd at a televised cricket match in January. Edmonds was shown a videotape of part of the cricket match and identified a man in sunglasses as Peter Burton. She said she was a close friend of his. Another witness, Jan Dyson, told the court the man in the videotape bore a remarkable resemblance to Peter Burton. Lawyers for Margaret Burton argued before the appeals court her conviction should be overturned because the prosecution failed to prove Peter Burton was dead. Appeals Court Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street agreed, saying it is not for the court to decide whether or not the person on the videotape is Peter Burton, but it is the court's responsibility to determine how a reasonable jury would have regarded the new evidence.

Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.

Daniel Fleetwood, and his wife who watched the movie with him, were bound by a confidentiality agreement: She can't say much more because she had to sign a confidentiality agreement. Basically, both he and his wife signed a contract, if they had said anything they would have been in breach of that contract and could have been sued. Such agreements are standard, even for actors, so presumably, the lawyers at Disney know what they are doing when they write such a contract. NDAs such as this often specify hefty fines. I am doubtful that his illness would have meant they would have lost a case against him in that situation - it would have meant a whole lot of negative publicity, but if the contract was legally binding, the health condition does not matter. Daniel himself died five days after watching the movie.

This is a pretty good example of "Contributory Negligence". Depending on the precise details of the case, both (or multiple) parties may have contributed to Karen's injuries. She certainly had some role by ignoring posted signs and wearing inappropriate footwear. But the shop may have made access too easy. Maybe they didn't have a front-desk person posted in a safe-area, causing her to go seeking an employee. The shop had a dangerous bin of metal shavings without a lid on it, and at a height and location where a single misstep means someone could fall into it head-first. They had dangerous crane-control mechanism in easy reach that didn't need a Key or other Lock-out mechanism. Ultimately, the details will matter. But it should be straightforward for mediation or a trial to determine each parties contribution to the overall unsafe situation and injuries. Taking the description above at face-value, I think Karen and the shop might both be found partially responsible for the injuries. It may not be a 50/50 split, but Karen likely acted unreasonably, and the shop, despite OSHA compliance, may well have created more hazards than appropriate.

The court will presume that. You say there is no doubt that he was the attacker but the matter isn't subject to opinion. It has to be proved in court, because if there should be a tiny bit of uncertainty, or some uncertainty, or a lot of it, then the opinion "he did it" becomes "trial by media" or other euphemism. Not just that, but Hadi Matar can plead "not guilty" to the offense as charged. The law might allow that he could be guilty of a different offense, but not what the charge is. A theoretical scenario: Hadi Matar ran onto the stage to shout at Rushdie, but someone in the audience threw a knife. Maybe it is "obvious" to you that it didn't happen here, but a criminal trial isn't about what is obvious, but the truth. Take another case where X commits a crime but frames Y for it, so it seems obvious to all that Y must have done it. The trial will follow a procedure, not the sway of opinion. The outcome of the trial might depend on Y showing that is was impossible to have committed the crime, but not know who X is. So the court will presume that Hadi Matar is innocent, unless proved beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty as charged.

Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? The baby was born in the United States but has been living in Brazil for 6 years. The mother is a Brazilian citizen.

Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.

The applicable state law is here. Section 461-A:2 guides the interpretation of the chapter: I. Because children do best when both parents have a stable and meaningful involvement in their lives, it is the policy of this state, unless it is clearly shown that in a particular case it is detrimental to a child, to: (a) Support frequent and continuing contact between each child and both parents. (b) Encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after the parents have separated or divorced. (c) Encourage parents to develop their own parenting plan with the assistance of legal and mediation professionals, unless there is evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or neglect. (d) Grant parents and courts the widest discretion in developing a parenting plan. (e) Consider both the best interests of the child in light of the factors listed in RSA 461-A:6 and the safety of the parties in developing a parenting plan. II. This chapter shall be construed so as to promote the policy stated in this section. The law gets no more specific than to refer to the fact of being a parent. The law does not favor males over females, or vice versa, and the law does not discriminate between a parent who is a minor versus a parent who is a legal adult. The rights of parents are equal, ab initio. However, the recognition of the rights of a father does depend on the legal establishment of paternity whereas the law takes maternity to be self-evident. This may have been dealt with at birth, or may require a legal process if paternity is contested. If that part is sorted out, then disagreements about custody etc. which can't be worked out through agreement possibly with a mediator can be resolved in court. The court will determine what constitutes the "best interests of the child". That is all there is to it, legally. That does not mean that a judge making a decision is absolutely immune from thinking that the minor father is less able take care of the child. Starting next year, a minor can seek emancipation, but until then (and until there is emancipation), the minor's parent have veto power over the father's wishes.

Child custody (and alimony) are determined by state courts, so the exact details are state-dependent. There is no legal basis for a person preventing thrie former spouse from moving (assuming the host country doesn't deny a visa), but the courts would be involved in determining whether the child can be taken along: parent A cannot legally just pack up the kids and bolt. When parents don't agree, then the court must determine what outcome is in the best interest of the child. If the children want to move, that counts in favor of them moving ("counts in favor" does not mean "decides the matter"). If the moving parent doesn't have viable employment prospects abroad, that counts against them moving. The amount of time each parent spends with the children also matters, not to mention the laws of your state (here is what the California courts say: "Move-Away" Situations). Generally speaking, the moving parent has to provide notice, then the non-moving parent has to file a legal action to block the move. Your attorney will discuss all of the relevant considerations with you. The fact of a parent moving to another country does not per se invalidate court-ordered support, but the court can modify an order if circumstances warrant (there's no obvious reason why moving to France would result in modification of such an order).

The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court.

The Supreme Court rules in US v. Wong Kim Ark ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment, which states All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside It is not disputed that said areas are "in the United States". The court found that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is intended to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state neither of which are the case in your scenario. Technically, the child is not "eligible" for citizenship, the child has US citizenship, it is just a matter of getting a government official to recognize it (e.g. in issuing a passport).

Skyborn are a known phenomenon. Country Citizenship? Generally, the kid automatically gets citizenship from his mom (and father) through bloodline, so our skyborn on that plane is likely that citizenship(s). There are cases that can't grant a citizenship that way (among them: Vatican is only granted ex officio) The sky is also treated as an extension of the land below. If the country you fly over has Jus Soli, it grants citizenship to the baby born above it. The USA has Jus Soli in its 14th amendment, our skyborn baby has dual citizenship to whatever country the mom is from. And in case the plane is over unclaimed water - think a nonstop flight Vancouver-Tokyo by Lufthansa - maritime law applies: The airplane is registered somewhere and treated as territory of that land while over international water. Lufthansa is in Germany, so the kid is, on paper, born in Berlin Germany (as that is what Germany prescribes for air- or seaborn). Germany does not use the unrestricted jus soli but the first test is the bloodline to determine what's the kid's citizenship is, unless the kid would have no citizenship through bloodline. So, if any one parent is German, the child is German. jus soli applies mostly to children of someone who has a permanent residence permit for at least 3 years and has been in Germany for the last 8 years: then the kid is (also) German, even if that grants dual citizenship - till the child is 23 and has to choose one of its citizenships. However, if all known parents are stateless or can't grant the kid citizenship through their bloodline (Yes, that happens!), then the kid born on this international flight has the right to become a German citizen - but some rules still apply. Which City/District/State is responsible? Now, which state's office is responsible? That is even more tricky. Technically, OP's kid that is born in Nebraskan Airspace is a Nebraskan, so it should be a Nebraskan birth-certificate. But the general rule in maritime practice would be to file the papers in the next port the ship lands, that would be Maryland if applied to planes. For a german registered ship or plane (my Lufthansa example), the responsible municipality would be Berlin, unless another municipality is responsible. US State citizenship? And then, I thank hszmv for this US Addendum: It should be pointed out that in the U.S. state citizenship is based on primary residency and can be changed over time. I've personally been a Maryland citizen, a Florida Citizen, and a Maryland citizen for a second time in my life. Usually state citizenship denotes exclusively where your vote is cast. No state can restrict a U.S. citizen from taking up residence in that state per constitution. So the Nebraska vs. MD distinction is academic only... the kid could move to California for the rest of his life without much fanfare. So, as a result, let's assume the parents of the Skyborn actually live in New York. Then te kid gets registered as a New York Citizen, his place of birth is "Above Nebraska" (or the state's equivalent rule) on OP's hypothetical. The couple on the Lufthansa flight could ask to have Berlin (Germany) written into the record, as that is where the interior of all Lufthansa planes is to be considered under the law over international waters.

In general, in the absence of a reason to the contrary, an individual parent can consent to medical care for the parent's child, even if the other parent wouldn't have agreed to it. This is where to begin the analysis. Often, when parents aren't married there is a custody decree from a court that spells out who does and does not have custody of a child with respect to issues like medical care, but it does not appear that this is the case here. The way paternity law works is that there are certain circumstances which cause someone to be presumed to be a parent until disproven (a couple of which are conclusive presumptions that can't be overcome with facts at some point), but a lack of a presumption doesn't mean that you aren't a parent, just that it is harder to prove that you are a parent. Someone who is, or is presumed to be, a parent, continues to be a parent until that status is legally terminated (usually in a legal proceeding, but sometimes by operation of law). Since you are an actual parent, you continue to be a parent and have that authority, until that status in terminated for purposes of the law or until a court order limits your parental authority. A lack of a father's name on a birth certificate does not create a presumption that a child does not have a father or that you are not a father, although the name of a different man on a birth certificate does create a presumption which can become conclusive at some point, that the person named on the birth certificate is the father. Often this presumption becomes conclusive after five years, although I haven't (as I write this) confirmed that this is the case in New York. It isn't clear from the question if there is a different man named as a father on the birth certificate although it sounds as if it simply fails to name any father. And, often paternity petitions are disfavored or disallowed once a child turns eighteen for at least some purposes. A written acknowledgement of paternity delivered to the appropriate vital statistics record keeping office can establish paternity if not contested. The standard version of this form must be signed by both parents, in each case before two witnesses. The extent to which you are acknowledged as the parent of the child by the mother and others, and the extent to which you are involved in a child's life is also relevant to legal paternity, because a termination of parental rights can proceed in the absence of showing these things. The fact that the child share's your last name and that you are actively involved enough in the child's life to make it seem unlikely that this could be established even if a proceeding was brought, and in the absence of a formal termination of parental rights proceeding, you would not normally have your legal status as a parent terminated. So, probably, you are legally the child's parent whose authority is not limited by any custody decree, and therefore, you are entitled to authorize a vaccination. But, for a wide variety of reasons, it would be prudent to have your paternity formally established under the law if you are going to have an ongoing involvement in your child's life. Also, as DaleM notes, if you have the child with you, even if you are not the legal parent, you would usually be considered "in loco parentis" and have the authority to do this even in the absence of actual paternity.

Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea

Is deliberate radio interference a crime? I know that it is forbidden by FCC regulations to deliberately interfere with radio communications, but is it a crime?

Yes. 47 U.S. Code § 333 (part of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended) bans willful or malicious interference. § 501 imposes a general penalty for any violation of the Communications Act that doesn’t have a different penalty defined elsewhere in the Act. A first offense is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $10,000 fine and/or up to a year in jail. Subsequent offenses are felonies punishable by up to 2 years in prison. In practice, this might result in only a civil action by the FCC. But it is forbidden by Congress and can be punished by imprisonment.

You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html

Using Tor is not illegal. Nor is hiding your IP address, which is - among other things - what Tor does. Going to .onion links is not illegal. What you find and interact with at those .onion sites may be illegal. See Law StackExchange Is it legal to host a directory of .onion urls? Running a Tor Relay is not illegal. That could change. Running an Exit Relay could expose your IP address as the Relay, so that could lead investigators of illegal activity to you. Read https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en As always, check your state laws http://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-laws/computer-crimes.html And do your own research with the links above and at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network) and at https://www.torproject.org/

I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds.

What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area.

I can’t think of any laws against pretending to commit a crime, per se. For example, undercover police officers often pretend to buy or sell illicit goods, to see who will take them up on the offer. However, pretending to commit some crimes could be a crime. if you intentionally pretend to be violent or unstable, and this “puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact,” that could be common assault.

Boggs v. Merideth was a pretty big case involving private drones and the privacy of neighbors. Happened in Kentucky, though. I would suggest taking a look at that.

It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law.

Are Drone Intrusion Prevention Systems (Drone IPS) systems illegal? A drone intrusion prevention product being advertised at RSA Conference this year has piqued my interest, and I'm trying to determine whether it and other drone IPS systems are illegal. For background, a WIPS is a device which looks for unexpected WiFi access points nearby and purposefully sends de-authentication packets in order to prevent them from working. In August 2015 the FCC ruled that doing this to hotel guests was illegal, citing Section 333 of the Communications Act 1934. This appears to tally with the FCC's guidance. However, it has been pointed out to me that this precedent may not be applicable as the ruling was in relation to internet service being denied. One could potentially also argue that such actions are in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) under the same provisions which make denial-of-service (DoS) attacks illegal. UK law also has provisions under the Communications Act 2003 and the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA), with similar advice given by OFCOM (1, 2, 3) as the FCC gives. Drone Intrusion Prevention Systems are a similar concept, designed as security devices which identify drones in the vicinity and inject commands into the control channel in order to disable them. The advertised use-case is to prevent an attacker from using a drone to spy on people's screens, or gain entry to a secured facility. The apparent functionality is that the system identifies a drone in the area, and an operator can choose to have the system disable or otherwise inhibit that drone's functionality. One could argue that injecting commands into the control stream would constitute a violation of both the CFAA and CMA since it causes a computerised system (the drone) to stop functioning or be taken over without the consent of the drone operator. A key thing to note in both cases is that the denial of service is not indiscriminate in terms of jamming the radio spectrum: devices operating on that band will continue to work unless specifically targeted. 47 U.S.C. § 333 states: No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or operated by the United States Government. It is clear to me that indiscriminately jamming a radio band is illegal under both the US and UK Communications Acts. What is not clear to me is whether interjecting additional commands is illegal, nor whether a drone user operating within the vicinity of such a device counts as "authorized" under this particular facet of law. From what I have read, the term appears to refer to communications which are not themselves in violation of the Communications Act, but I'm not certain whether this matters. Are these devices illegal under US/UK law? Is there any precedent in this matter?

For the USA, the FCC has a few words to say on the subject: “Generally, “jammers” — which are also commonly called signal blockers, GPS jammers, cell phone jammers, text blockers, etc. — are illegal radio frequency transmitters that are designed to block, jam, or otherwise interfere with authorized radio communications.” (https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf) In addition, the FCC specifically calls out WiFi blocking devices using deauth attacks as you described, calling them “Willful or malicious interference” in a warning they issued in 2015 This is the closest thing to precedent I could find, related specifically to WiFi . That pretty much sums it up. If the device’s primary purpose involves disabling radio communication, it is illegal. It does not matter to the FCC how targeted or filtered the attack may be, it is still unauthorized. At the core of the issue, you (a private citizen) are not allowed to maliciously or willfully interfere with someone operating their radio, no ifs, ands, or buts. Drone IPS system using such an attack would most likely be illegal. The FCC may change this interpretation in the future, but for now it is illegal.

It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK.

The U.S. could pass a law directing Apple to create software for fair compensation. Similar statutes have been passed in wartime compelling companies to do all sorts of things and companies don't have all of the rights of individuals. If it can be done (not obvious in the case of existing products in the market place), it might be possible for the government to compel it to do so; if it can't be done, it can't be compelled and not all things are possible retroactively. There would also be a constitutional contracts clause issues with such a law impairing contracts between Apple and its customers when applied to existing phones retroactively. Whether it could require Apple to create a law enforcement back door depends upon whether 4th Amendment privacy rights trump the creation of a means to do so. There is an expectation of privacy in electronic records, but it is not absolute. But, there is no law on the books requiring this from Apple. It does not flow naturally from existing powers of law enforcement under existing statutes. It goes beyond what a subpoena would ordinarily require someone to do, and a subpoena is the main means by which governments compel people to provide information. In my opinion, a court faced with that question would rule that a statute requiring Apple to do this prospectively would be constitutional, but no such statute exists. However, this is currently an open legal question because there is no statute of the kind that have been litigated in a manner that produced a binding precedent.

Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished.

Probably The US, like all other nations, has absolute sovereignty over its airspace. There is no clear line between airspace and space but 60,000 feet is clearly in the former. The US, like all other nations except Lichtenstein for some reason, is a signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation which, among other things, makes it an act of war to use force against a civilian aircraft. Now, acts of war are not, per see, illegal - there are international laws about armed conflict and there are philosophical arguments about just and unjust wars but war itself is a political rather than a legal construct. Article 5 of the convention gives the right to all other states the right to operate civil aircraft within US airspace (and vice-versa) without prior permission (apart from regularly scheduled flights which do require permission) subject to compliance with the convention. Relevantly, unmanned balloons are dealt with in Annex 4 - it states that permission is not needed for light meteorological balloons but is needed for any other balloon which might enter foreign airspace. The Chinese claim that the balloon was “mainly” meteorological but the convention requires it to be “exclusively” meteorological. It also requires it to be “light” meaning having a payload weighing less than 4kg - unless the payload of this ballon was made of unobtainum, it weighed more than 4kg. They also argue that it drifted off course and entered US airspace inadvertently. This would be a legitimate claim if the entry of US airspace was unlikely at the planning and launch stages of the operation. We simply do not have the information to assess this claim. The US claim that this was a surveillance aircraft. If this is so, then the aircraft is not a civil aircraft and the Chicago Convention does not apply which brings us back to pure sovereignty - the US can do what it likes with things in its own airspace. There is a treaty between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact members dating from the 1990s that allow surveillance overflights of each other’s territories. However, there are two problems with this: China was never a signatory, and the US withdrew during the Trump Presidency. So, if this wasn’t a balloon that inadvertently and unexpectedly drifted off course, the US was allowed to shoot it down.

No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.

No, it's not illegal... Ads are shown as a contract between the site that hosts it and the advertising company. The contract does not stipulate that customers need to buy something, in fact, the contract can't force the customer to buy anything! At best, the contract can pay the hosting site based on the ad being shown, clicked, or any sale made after it. ...but you will do exactly the opposite Advertizement is made to put your own brand into the head of people. In fact, most ads don't have any effect on people. As I am writing this, ads for a kid TV, travels to Turkey and the primetime films for the weekend on the TV-station I have on are shown. I have no intention of consuming any of these advertised products. Impact of a campaign is measured by two metrics: people reached, and people responding. People reached is measured in clicks. People responding is measured in changes in earnings or sales. Clicking the ad increases the reached rating. If the rating is bad, the ad campaign is just ineffective... which leads to the most paradoxical thing: Bad advertisement and good advertisement both lead to more advertisement - bad to level out the missing response, good to maximize the response. By clicking on the ad you just funnel more money to the ad industry. When does it get illegal? [DDOS] The only way it would become illegal is if John Doe sets up a computer - or rather a botnet - and has that network click the ads thousands of times per second. Google can handle easily 83,000 searches per second, twitter gets more than 9000 tweets that are distributed to millions of people, Tumbler and Instagram handle together about 2500 posts per second. In fact, every second, more than 100000 Gigabytes of traffic run through the net. To have an impact on one site, you need to be truly a large number of calls... and then it is called a DDOS. DDOS is illegal under the CFAA, in this case 18 UC 1030: (a)Whoever— (5) (A)knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the UK, you'd break the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 section 3, because denying someone else service via DDOS is unauthorized, clearly unauthorized, and prevents access to any data (the website) on any computer (the server): (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2)This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer But can a DDOS be protest? [NO!] Anonymous attempted to petition to make DDOS a legal form of protest in 2013. The petition got 6,048 of the 25000 signatures needed to warrant an answer by the white house - unlike people in 2016 asking for a Death Star. At least it prompted Joshua I. James to write a research paper about the proposal in March. He too points to the CFAA and Section 5A, especially the sentence I quoted above. Among a lot of stipulations, he points out that internet protest in the shape of a DDOS would need to follow the same rules as a legal protest on the streets - which for example demands that entrance to businesses can't be blocked, and one is not allowed to harass employees and customers. According to the general rules for legal protest as given, there are still a number of challenges. First and foremost, entrances to businesses should not be blocked. In terms of DDoS, if sustained denial of service takes place, then access (entrance) to the server (business)is effectively blocked. This means that, at a minimum, sustained denial of service should be considered as a non-legal approach to protesting. Thus, he concludes sustained DDOS is per se can't be a legal protest, and even a non-sustained DDOS would impact people using the site in a way they will deem harassing - which means that even a non-permanent DDOS can't be a legal protest. And then comes the final blow: DDOS, unlike a real protest on the streets, can't, by its very nature, inform people of why there is protest, even if it were a form of protest! This means that nobody knows it is meant to be a protest and not a normal DDOS, and as it can't convey what the action is about, it can't be a proper protest.

"Botnet" refers to an illicit collection of remotely-controlled computers taking commands from a C2 (Command and Control server) and is thus by definition always illegal. However, there is no law against releasing or using software which accepts commands of various types from a central server, and this is quite common for remote access tools, as long as the user consents. It is only called a botnet if the users do not consent to its presence. If they do consent, it's not a botnet. One example is DarkComet, which includes features such as remote file editing, screen viewing, and keylogging. All of these features have legitimate uses, and a network of computers controlled with this software would not be considered a botnet unless it was created illegally in the first place. It's like the term "battery". Battery is never legal, but that doesn't mean that boxers are breaking the law by participating in that sport and punching each other. If you consent to being punched, then it's not battery. Likewise if you consent to running a remote access tool, it's not a botnet.

Easy way to check if libel has been committed? We have an article about someone's activities that I believe was written carefully to avoid libel: http://pdacamp.com/Sam-Wolanyk-and-Tangod-Up-In-Blues/ Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) Is there an easy resource to get legal advice on whether this falls under libel or not, or do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe?

Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.

You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.

You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.

Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.

Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.

Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.

There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.

The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.

Murder due to temporary insanity Due to an unfortunate event outside of his control, "Juan" temporarily goes insane. Due to his insanity, he commits an extremely heinous crime (say, for example, a school shooting.) Still a raving lunatic, he surrenders to the police. While awaiting trial, Juan receives medical treatment that causes him to stop being insane. Legally speaking, what happens? From what I understand, an insanity plea results in being committed to a mental institution indefinitely. However, Juan is no longer insane and doesn't require further treatment. N.B. This question was originally worded quite differently. My revision was primarily to remove unnecessary details; the core of the question remains the same.

canada The terminology in Canada "not criminally responsible reason on account of mental disorder" (NCRMD) (Criminal Code, s. 16). A finding of NCRMD is a special verdict that results in the accused being placed under the jurisdiction of the Review Board.1 Assuming for the sake of analysis that such an outcome is made out in the circumstances that you've described (much would depend on the expert evidence), such an outcome would not necessarily lead to indefinite detention. The options available are: absolute discharge; conditional discharge; or detention in custody in a hospital And even when in detention in a hospital, there is a regular review and the person is released when detention is no longer necessary for public safety. The burden is not on the detained to show that the chance of a repeat is essentially zero. That would be a great exaggeration of the barrier to release and incorrectly reverses the burden. Instead, the Review Board must find evidence that there is a significant continuing risk to the public, at the time of the hearing, in order to keep the person in custody. There is no burden on the accused or on anyone to rule out future occurrences with any certainty. Latimer and Lawrence explain: The Supreme Court of Canada further clarified in R. v. Winko that Section 672.54 does not create a presumption of dangerousness. In other words, while the protection of society is paramount, there must be clear evidence of a significant risk to the public before a court or Review Board can maintain control over an accused through the imposition of a conditional discharge or detention order. Some extracts from Winko: Restrictions on his or her liberty can only be justified if, at the time of the hearing, the evidence before the court or Review Board shows that the NCR accused actually constitutes such a threat there is never any legal burden on the NCR accused to show that he or she does not pose a significant threat to the safety of the public A past offence committed while the NCR accused suffered from a mental illness is not, by itself, evidence that the NCR accused continues to pose a significant risk to the safety of the public. 1. This is one major difference between NCRMD and the defence of automatism, which is a defence based on negation of the elements of the offence and would result in a standard acquittal if successful, with no jurisdiction for the Review Board to impose detention or conditions.

If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this.

I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it.

Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.

Maybe, but probably not, although this would be a question of fact to resolve on a case by case basis under broad legal standards by a jury, and would also depend upon the state where it took place, and upon the nature of the employer of the paramedic. The hypothetical facts in this case are rich enough and ambiguous enough that the case could go either way depending upon how it was presented and what could be proven at trial. This is a case it would be good to take to a medical malpractice/personal injury lawyer in the jurisdiction where it happened to be evaluated. Usually a PI lawyer would not charge you for doing so or would ask for only a nominal fee. Additional factual investigation would probably also be necessary regarding some of the key facts identified below. It's complicated and there are multiple issues presented in this case where the law is not uniform from state to state. The general rule is that a medical professional has to carry out the delivery of medical care to a patient with the reasonable care that would be taken by a medical professional of that type. If the medical professional fails to take reasonable care, and that negligence failure to do so causes injury, then there is civil liability for medical malpractice. A threshold issue would be whether a medical professional-patient relationship was established. This would be a question of fact for a jury and would be a question upon which various potentially applicable state and federal laws would often not be uniform. On these facts, it could easily go either way. In federal court and in a majority of state courts (although there is variation from state to state) you need to know the name of the paramedic you dealt with who provided the bad advice to bring a successful lawsuit before suing. In a minority of states, you could sue first and get the name of the paramedic in discovery through the court process from the hospital after the lawsuit was commenced. The standard of reasonable care liability in this case would be judged by the standard of a reasonable paramedic, not a reasonable doctor. But, often states would have statutes that would limit the liability of paramedics in these situations to liability for gross negligence (which the facts in the question would probably not suffice to show), but not for ordinary negligence (which a jury could come out either way upon and which would hinge heavily on expert testimony). These tort reform type laws differ considerably from state to state. Whether or not particular conduct was negligent or grossly negligent, is a question ultimately decided by a jury under very broad and general legal standards after the fact in a trial, based largely upon expert testimony, on a case by case basis, unless the facts are unequivocally clear one way or the other, which is rarely the case. With my layman's level of knowledge about what a reasonable paramedic should be able to diagnose, I could see this determination going either way. Two cases with identical facts in front of the same judge in separate trials, in which juries are presented with exactly the same evidence could come out differently. The resolution of one case of the question of whether a particular act constituted negligence giving rise to liability is not binding as precedent and is not admissible as evidence in another case (subject to a narrow exception called "collateral estoppel" which applies when the same individual is sued by multiple people for the same conduct in different lawsuits that have resulted in final orders resolving key questions of fact that the lawsuits have in common). Many states would require that someone suing the paramedic have a medical professional certify that the paramedic's actions constituted legal negligence before the suit could go forward in a court. If there is a medical professional-patient relationship, and if the medical professional was found to have negligently caused injury, the medical professional's employer would have vicarious liability in some (but not all) states under a respondiat superior doctrine. Usually, the paramedic at an ER would be an employee of a private EMS ambulance company or a municipal fire department, and not of the hospital that runs the ER. But, some hospitals have their own in house paramedics. Also, some hospitals are run by for profit or nonprofit private companies, some are state or local governmental agencies, and some a federal government agencies. Usually only a small minority of the medical professionals in a hospital are employed by that hospital, and most of them merely have "privileges" to provide medical services for which they bill patients separately while working for their own professional corporation through which they are self-employed. Legally, the hospital itself is more like a hotel or a WeWork office space than to being a firm that directly provides medical services, although it isn't quite that black and white. Holding the ER directly responsible for failing to have good triage policies, as opposed to holding the paramedic responsible and assigning vicarious liability to the employer of the paramedic, would be very difficult, although not necessarily impossible if the ER had official policies that fell far below the standard of care for emergency room triage. It would be very uncommon for an ER to have bad policies of this type. Typically, ERs are only held directly liable for bad triage policies when, for example, they have a policy of not evaluating at all someone who does not have health insurance, which is a practice expressly prohibited by federal law. If the paramedic's employer was a government entity such as a fire department or a government owned hospital, the paramedic would be entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless an exception applied. Usually there is an express exception to absolute immunity for medical malpractice liability by a medical doctor who has established a doctor-patient relationship with a patient, when the medical doctor is employed by a state or local government, usually there isn't when the doctor is employed by the federal government. But these laws differ from state to state in fine details that matter in a case like this one regarding whether the exception to immunity from liability is limited to medical doctors or applies also to paramedics. Causation would also be an important factual issue for trial. There is liability only to the extent that taking a non-negligent action could have prevented the harm. If you are infected with COVID, one common consequence is a stroke, and if someone had a stroke while infected with COVID, the case that taking them to the ER would have prevented the stroke from doing serious damage in the long run is weaker. On the other hand, guessing that a stroke was really something else, might or might not be reasonable. The injured person would also have to prove that the EMS response occurred at a time within the roughly 1-2 hours after the start of a stroke when it is possible to take medical action that could do something about a stroke. If the stroke had already happened an hour and a half later and it was rush hour and would have taken half an hour to get to the nearest hospital, causation might be absent and there would be no liability. There would be a legitimate question of fact over whether there was an actual diagnosis and treatment, or whether there was a refusal to get treatment. The reasonable care test is a balancing test. It takes into consideration not just the potential benefits of taking action, but also the cost that would be incurred if action was taken, and the downside risks of a proposed action. The paramedic's concerns about getting a COVID infection at the ER when the person responded to didn't appear to have it at the time would make the cost of a false positive diagnosis higher and would thus influence what would constitute reasonable care in this situation as the jury applies the relevant legal test. Liability would be evaluated based upon what the paramedic reasonable understood he was being told. This would be a question of fact for the jury. It is likely that different people who were present understood what was being said differently. Even if bystanders understood what was being said and meant, what matters is what the paramedic reasonably understood was being said and meant. Given the communication difficulties involved, that question could go either way.

I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances.

Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her.

It is my understanding that he was charged under 18 USC § 1001 which gives a maximum sentence of 5 years under most circumstances. This is the absolute maximum; the judge is not allowed to give more than the law allows. Here are the federal sentencing guidelines. If you look in the guidelines, you'll see that the base offense level for this crime is 14. If there was a "substantial" interference with justice, the offense is increased by 3 levels. My guess is that they won't find this to be the case. There are several other adjustments that likely don't apply. Under the "Adjustments" section of the guidelines, it says: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels. (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. It seems that the first one applies. The second one cannot apply in this particular case since the offense level was not 16 or greater. So the offense level would be reduced from 14 to 12. If you look at the Sentencing Table, you can see that an offense level of 12 has a recommended sentence of 10-16 months for someone with no prior criminal history. Also, this is in Zone C, meaning: the minimum term may be satisfied by... a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. so it seems he would go to prison for at least half of that. But if the offense level was dropped just one more level, he would be in zone B, where probation with home confinement would be an acceptable sentence. But there's one more thing to consider: He's cooperating with investigations into other people. This allows a departure from the ordinary guidelines. Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: (1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. I have no idea where the Guardian got 6 months from. It's certainly possible that's part of the plea deal (although nothing says the judge has to impose the sentence that the prosecutor recommends as part of the deal), and maybe there are adjustments I'm not taking into account that would reduce the offense level further. I just now found a copy of the plea agreement. It specifies that the parties agree he will be sentenced under guideline §2B1.1(a)(2). This ordinarily is for offenses such as theft, property damage, forgery, or fraud. As far as I can tell, the government is just using this to get the sentence down, because there's no real relation to the crime he's accused of. Under that guideline, the base offense level is 6. The two level decrease for accepting responsibility puts it at an offense level of 4, with a possibility of a downward departure for cooperation. Regardless of whether or not there's a downward departure, this would have a 0-6 month sentence recommendation, which is the lowest available in the guidelines. This is also in Zone A of the sentencing table, meaning a sentence of just probation with no imprisonment or home confinement is possible.

In American criminal law, do prosecutors who seek to prosecute a defendant need to have evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Would the judge in a criminal trial consider a prosecutor's statement that some evidence is representative of a defendant's guilt is a false statement by seeking the evidence to be inferred as conclusive without being thoroughly tested?

united-states The ethical standard for U.S. prosecutions, under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (ethical rules have parallel numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction and there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for this part of this ethical rule) is to refrain from prosecuting a charge that is not supported by probable cause. Probable cause is also the standard used by a grand jury, and in an adversarial pre-trial hearing, to screen charges before they go to trial. It is also the standard for issuing an arrest warrant. The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard for convicting a defendant at a trial on the merits of the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is not the standard for bringing a criminal charge in the first place. The job of the prosecutor at trial is to convince the trier of fact (usually a jury, but sometimes a judge in a bench trial) that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case was thin on evidence when commenced, this may require law enforcement and the prosecutor's office to develop evidence after the criminal charges are brought. As a practical matter, a prosecutor wants to prosecute cases that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and will usually try to do that. But a belief that a case can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is not an ethical requirement for prosecutors and is not a ground for imposing sanctions against a prosecutor. Of course, individual prosecuting attorneys' offices are free to establish their own standards that are more rigorous as an internal policy for bringing criminal cases.

It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by "corrupted" and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother". Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church". The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking "they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue". The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy.

The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.

Is there such a phrase in jurisprudential or legal thought? In those instances it is common to say that the evidence is inconclusive. Accordingly, it is unavailing because that evidence does not prove the party's allegation.

If the act and the evidence is sufficient, they will all be convicted. It would not be necessary, for example, to prove that it was Brutus's stab that killed the victim. It is not guaranteed that all of the participants committed the act knowed as 1st degree homicide (picking Washington law), some may be guilty of conspiracy to murder. Liability for a crime can extend to others besides the person who "did it": (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she: (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it

canada A person is deemed to not be guilty unless convicted In Canada, by s. 6 of the Criminal Code, "a person shall be deemed to not be guilty of the offence until he is convicted." This is also bolstered by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." There is always a chance that the tier of fact is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt The accused (and therefore their lawyer) cannot be sure that the evidence will leave the trier of fact (judge or jury) with no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Thus, the accused and their lawyer can only "know" the accused is guilty in the colloquial sense (in that they did the things that could be found to be a crime). However, they cannot know that they will be guilty in law. There is always a chance that the trier of fact is not convinced. Ways that the Crown's case can fall apart at trial: what appeared to be convincing to the parties just isn't convincing to the trier of fact a key witness or evidence becomes unavailable it turns out critical evidence was obtained contrary to constitutional principles a key witness's credibility or reliability crumbles on cross examination the prosecution is complacent in diligently moving the trial forward and the trial drags on to the point that a stay of proceedings is warranted (e.g. in jurisdictions with strict rights to timely trials) The interest in truth-seeking is not the only component of a fair trial Fair trials should seek the truth, but they should also be timely (Jordan), and they should also not rely on evidence obtained contrary to the Charter (Grant). Fair trials are not only about securing convictions when a person did the things that could constitute an offence if proven. At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be confused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused's point of view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 SCR 562, at para 45 The lawyer's duty Tuckiar v. R [1934] HCA 49: He had a plain duty, both to his client and to the Court, to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise to in favour of complete acquittal or conviction of manslaughter only. No doubt he was satisfied that through [an interpreter] he obtained the uncoloured product of his client's mind, although misgiving on this point would have been pardonable; but, even if the result was that the correctness of [another witness]'s version was conceded, it was by no means a hopeless contention of fact that the homicide should be found to amount only to manslaughter. Whether he be in fact guilty or not, a prisoner is, in point of law, entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he committed, and it is not incumbent on his counsel by abandoning his defence to deprive him of the benefit of such rational arguments as fairly arise on the proofs submitted. The subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosure. No doubt he was actuated by a desire to remove any imputation on Constable McColl. But he was not entitled to divulge what he had learnt from the prisoner as his counsel. Our system of administering justice necessarily imposes upon those who practice advocacy duties which have no analogies, and the system cannot dispense with their strict observance. A laywer's obligation is to put forward on behalf of their client their best efforts. Whether they "know" their client is guilty of the offence charged or not, to do otherwise amounts to a dereliction of duty and weakens the protections afforded all of us who believe in the rule of law: Arthur Maloney, Q.C., "The Role of the Lawyer in Society" (1979) 9 Manitoba Law Journal 351.

Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

If a parent withdraws a minor student from school, or prevents them from attending, is that a criminal violation of a mandatory attendance law? Both of my parents signed an agreement with my high school to permit me to complete my high school graduation requirements in college. They both also signed a college enrollment form that specifically gave me permission as a minor and their dependent child to attend the college. My (high) school district is paying for the classes and a bus pass. My father has stated his intent to renege on the agreement. Since I am a minor, have not graduated from high school, and the grades from those 16 college classes and 2 labs were agreed to be accepted by the district as the graduation requirements for high school, isn't either withdrawing me from class, or preventing me from attending so that I fail, without enrolling me at another high school, or submitting a state mandated "intent to homeschool form" a violation of my state's compulsory attendance law that requires that all minors who have not yet graduated from high school attend school or show proof they are being homeschooled?

Washington has such laws. RCW 28A.225.010 states the exceptions to the compulsory attendance requirement, which includes: is attending private school or extension program, receiving home schooling, unable to attend including is in jail, religion, over 16 full-time employed and with parental consent. Also, also has GDE or has already satisfied graduation requirements. It isn't clear what graduation requirements have not been satisfied, I assume that you still must complete 1 credit of Calculus to satisfy the requirements. Therefore, you must take attend school, even if you don't take that class. If you don't attend classes at the high school, the high school is required by RCW 28A.225.020 to provide written notice to the parents. Steps are taken to assure compliance with state law, i.e. phone calls and conferences with the parents, etc. It would be the responsibility of the school district to monitor the college's scheme that allows you to take high school classes at college. The primary legal mandate is imposed on the parent: All parents in this state of any child eight years of age and under eighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the public school of the district in which the child resides and such child shall have the responsibility to and therefore shall attend for the full time when such school may be in session As described, the hypothetical child is not exempt, therefore the parents must compel the child to attend school, until the child becomes exempt. There is vast leeway in how that requirement can be satisfied, but it must be somehow satisfied.

Education in India falls under the concurrent list -- i.e. both state and union laws apply. However, there do not appear to be any codified "student rights". The relevant national body for "technical education" is the AICTE, which does have a mechanism for grievance redressal, this is often used as the primary source of complaints against ragging. You can submit a grievance here. The 2004 Guidelines for Grievance Processes require a sub-30-day resolution of complaints. In fact, all accredited technical institutions in India are required to have a local Grievance Redressal Cell and Ombudsman as per this 2012 notification. Finally, you could contact AICTE directly Students may also file grievances at the UGC (University Grants Commission). The UGC is a statutory body in charge of "coordination, determination and maintenance of standards of higher education". In 1987, they released "Guidelines for Student Entitlement". See sections 2.5, 2.6 regarding fairness in evaluation and section 5 which deals with discriminatory treatment. At a state-level, you could try Rajasthan Sampark, which only applies to government institutions. As others have stated, you need to ensure that you have documented and clear proof to support your accusation, and that you should not back down in fear of reprisal. The process of collecting evidence may help you determine if you truly have a valid complaint, or are perceiving bias that does not exist. To the best of my knowledge, in answer to your second question, no, Indian jurisprudence does not have a similar concept of student rights as the United States and some of Europe. While reading the links for the other answers and searching for policies for this post, the one thing that becomes clear is a worrying lack of depth in policies and transparently available policies and data. If you choose to take this forward, I hope that you will document and publish your efforts.

This generally requires a court order (everything depends on jurisdiction: this is a state matter, not a federal matter). As a minor, the courts could allow your parents to change from Dweezil to William without involving you, until you are old enough that the judge thinks you might be able to have reasonable input into the matter. Once you're over 18, your parents can't change your name – you would have to do that, at least if you are mentally competent. In Washington, the courts juggle the wishes of the child, the wishes of the parents, how long the child has had the name, and the social advantages or disadvantages of the name change, and permission from the minor is required if over 14 (child input would be solicited for a child over 7). Since this involves a court order, in principle this information is available to the child. In cases involving domestic violence, the records could be sealed. A name can be changed by changing the birth certificate which means filling out a form and paying a fee, and if the child is under 1 year old, it just requires the signatures of the parents (or, a court order). This "under 1" paperwork approach seems to be widespread (Colorado, New York, others). Also bear in mind that the initial filing of a birth certificate may well not have a child's name, which may not be supplied until the parents make up their minds. Changes to the birth certificate are knowable (they don't erase anything), but can only be revealed to the subject of the record, or in case of court order. Thus a change should be discernible, if other states are like Washington.

Entrapment is when a law-enforcement organization, or other parts of a government working with an LEO, entice a person to violate a law, and then prosecute the person for that violation, usually arresting the person first. Note that this definition of "entrapment" is US-specific, and does not apply in all other countries, perhaps not in any other county. But then, the question is tagged for California. As the school presumably does not intend any criminal prosecution, these actions are not legally entrapment, even if they are morally similar. Entrapment is not itself illegal even when it leads to criminal charges. That is to say, the police and prosecutor cannot be charged criminally for engaging in entrapment, nor sued for money damages by the person entrapped. However, entrapment can be a defense. If a person charged with crime can show that the crime only occurred because of entrapment, that will generally be grounds for acquittal. In addition, many people consider entrapment to be morally and ethically wrong. Generally, for a situation to be entrapment legally, a person must not only have an opportunity to break a law, but must be actively persuaded or enticed to do so, and the idea must come from the entrapper. However, the question says that the school "has a strict policy against using social media during school time". If the students retain the laptops outside of school hours (as they may well do) it might be fine with the school to use social media during those times, so perhaps school authorities don't think a blocker is needed. In any case there is no legal requirement for the school to install a social media blocking program, even if use of the school-issued laptops to access social media is against school rules at all times. A parent could install a blocker, unless school rules for use of the laptops prohibit doing so. Of course, in later life, people will almost surely encounter situations where they could do something unlawful or forbidden, but should not. An employer might provide access to computers, but forbid using them to access porn, even though no blocking software is in place. It is also not a bad idea to check school-issued laptops for possible privacy violations. There have been cases where school IT departments or contractors routinely activated built-in web-cams, ostensibly as an anti-theft measure, but in fact observing private situations, including inside the student's home.

I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.

No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender).

Setting aside kidnapping, child-endangerment, etc., there are a host of laws requiring the bus and the driver to have special licenses (ie, a commercial drivers license), inspections (including a physical and regular drug tests), training, insurance and so on. Breaking any of these laws is a crime. In most states, these crimes are treated as misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors, so the largest penalty will be something like a year in jail and/or $5,000 fine. In other words: Even before the prosecutor gets to the serious stuff, the driver is in trouble. For those of you who want to dig into the details, this page breaks out what you need to do to become a school bus driver in CA. This page links to the manuals for drivers and buses in WA, along with a list of all of the specific laws and administrative codes involved.

I guess you are interpreting the answer of the officer the wrong way. Minors do have rights. Plenty of them. But using a phone to contact people their legal guardian does not approve, or to consume media their legal guardian does not approve, is usually not a right minors have. And to make those restrictions stick, your mother took your phone away. Ask for it on your 18th birthday. But when one of you has called the police on a family situation like this, both of you have a problem that goes way beyond property rights. Do you have an adult you can talk to? A teacher? An uncle or aunt? A coach? Try talking to them. If they all side with your mother, consider that she might be right and you are wrong. But often both sides talk themselves into a corner, and a neutral viewpoint helps. If you are truly desperate about your situation, call Child Protective Services. But that could backfire if they believe your mother, and make the family situation worse. Taking a phone away is not neglect or abuse.

GDPR and privacy policy compliance for software used internally by customer company We are developing software that are sold to and used by other companies. In the software, certain types of personal data, like name, email and phone number, can be stored when a user registers. The data is stored on a server owned by our customer. Our customer owns all the data. Our software shows this data in certain places within our software itself, but does not share it with any other third parties, or store it on our own servers, or use it in any other way. What are our requirements when it comes to providing a privacy policy for our software, to be compliant with GDPR? Will our software only be considered a tool used by our customer in which they collect personal data, and hence not require us to have our own privacy policy accepted by the users in addition, or will we have to have a privacy policy explaining what personal data which our customer is able to collect through our software? All users of the software will be employees of our customer, if that makes a difference. They will therefore have their own privacy policy agreement with our customer (their employer) already.

Alice's business sells database management software. Organisations buy or licence the software, deploy it on hardware they control and use the software to help store and, process and analyse 'personal data' within the meaning of GDPR. Alice's business has no access whatsoever to the personal data being stored and processed by those organisations. In respect of that personal data, GDPR is not engaged by Alice's business. The business is neither a 'controller' nor 'processor' of that personal data. Who does the data protection law apply to? - European Commission Who does the UK GDPR apply to? - Information Commissioner's Office

The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack.

The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.

It is absolutely not the case that Providers are not allowed to keep PII without consent. Article 6 of the GDPR identifies six possible lawful bases for processing personal information. These are: (a) the data subject has given consent ... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. If a person requests services from an online service provider, basis (b) will apply, at least to some information. If there is evidence of criminal activity, basis (c) may well apply, as it also will for much routine record keeping. Any in many such cases, basis (e) or (f) will also apply. In short, article 6 does not create a "haven for online criminals/hackers". In a comment on another answer the OP writes: The offender has the right to not be identifiable and he can't be denied this right That is simply not correct. Nothing in the GDPR says anything of the sort. It is true that consent may not be forced, but if a user requests a service that service may require the user to identify him- or herself. For example, one cannot order physical goods without giving a name and a shipping address. And the provider may retain PI and even PII when it has a "legitimate interest" in doing so, although if challenged it must justify that legitimate interest.

Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!

The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel?

As stated by GDPR article 3 you are required to follow it under the following circumstance: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. You can read the recourse better at What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?, but in short the US will allow the EU court to press it's rulings due to wanting to keep its trades, treaties and other similar things in place.

It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that.

Is it legal for companies to pay salaries or bonuses as lootboxes? The South Korean branch of video game publisher Nexon made headlines online when it gave out a small bonus to its employees in the form of lootboxes. A monthly bonus coupon was given in August 2020 to employees. The employees would type a keyword in a chatbot to activate the coupon, which would add a random amount between 2000 and 100000 points to one's balance. Is giving out bonuses as lootboxes or any other way that relies on pure luck rather than my achievements in work legal in other jurisdictions? Would the legality be different if it were salaries and not bonuses that were given out this way?

germany Is it legal for companies to pay salaries or bonuses as lootboxes? The German "Gewerbeordnung" says: § 107 Berechnung und Zahlung des Arbeitsentgelts Das Arbeitsentgelt ist in Euro zu berechnen und auszuzahlen. Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer können Sachbezüge als Teil des Arbeitsentgelts vereinbaren, wenn dies dem Interesse des Arbeitnehmers oder der Eigenart des Arbeitsverhältnisses entspricht. Der Arbeitgeber darf dem Arbeitnehmer keine Waren auf Kredit überlassen. Er darf ihm nach Vereinbarung Waren in Anrechnung auf das Arbeitsentgelt überlassen, wenn die Anrechnung zu den durchschnittlichen Selbstkosten erfolgt. Die geleisteten Gegenstände müssen mittlerer Art und Güte sein, soweit nicht ausdrücklich eine andere Vereinbarung getroffen worden ist. Der Wert der vereinbarten Sachbezüge oder die Anrechnung der überlassenen Waren auf das Arbeitsentgelt darf die Höhe des pfändbaren Teils des Arbeitsentgelts nicht übersteigen. Die Zahlung eines regelmäßigen Arbeitsentgelts kann nicht für die Fälle ausgeschlossen werden, in denen der Arbeitnehmer für seine Tätigkeit von Dritten ein Trinkgeld erhält. Trinkgeld ist ein Geldbetrag, den ein Dritter ohne rechtliche Verpflichtung dem Arbeitnehmer zusätzlich zu einer dem Arbeitgeber geschuldeten Leistung zahlt. Source Translation: § 107 Calculation and payment of remuneration Remuneration shall be calculated and paid in euros. Employer and employee may agree on benefits in kind as part of the remuneration if this is in the interest of the employee or in accordance with the nature of the employment relationship. The employer may not provide the employee with goods on credit. The employer may, by agreement, provide the employee with goods as a credit against the employee's remuneration, provided that the goods are provided at the average cost price. The goods provided must be of average type and quality unless expressly agreed otherwise. The value of the agreed benefits in kind or the crediting of the goods provided against the remuneration may not exceed the amount of the attachable part of the remuneration. The payment of regular remuneration may not be excluded in cases where the employee receives a tip from a third party for his work. A tip is an amount of money paid by a third party to the employee without a legal obligation in addition to a service owed to the employer. What does that mean? The base Salary can never be paid in anything but Euros. Makes sense, how would you determine whether 2 apples, an egg and a parttime timeshare of a camel each month are above or below the minimum wage? How would the employee pay their own costs from that, even it it were worth more? Taxes would be a nightmare. Good luck to the Ex-Wife and kid, getting half an apple and a stinky camel timeshare for a day as alimony. No, money is there for a reason. Benefits like bonuses or additional agreements on top of your basic salary can be goods of other kinds. Loot boxes for example. Please note that the employee has to explicitely agree on that. I will assume getting an additional lootbox on top for free is something an employee can agree on without a second thought. Getting parts of your salary normally paid in Euros or bonus normally paid in Euros as Lootboxes would be something the employee would have to explicitely agree to, otherwise it must be Euros. You cannot "force" an employee to accept anything but Euros. Note the sentence that the employer can give the employee goods instead of Euros not for their made up "sale" price, but for the cost of making them. So for no profit. You could pay someone partially in loot boxes, but since a loot box costs about 0,01€ to make (electricity, database maintenance, the developer who has to press the button once a month), that would be a lot of loot boxes to pay a part of the salary. And yes, even "goods" will be taxed. They are part of your income. So if you get a "lootbox", be preprared to pay taxes on that. If you don't play the game, paying taxes on something you don't use might not be worth it after all. It is well known that companies have employee-only pricing schemes. For example you will find that employees of automobile manufacturers will drive their brands cars, because getting a good price on a car is a big deal. Some companies allow private use of company cars for the employees that work "in the field". But it is very rare that employees get actual goods monthly as part of their salary in Germany. But there is no mention of "luck" anywhere in the law. Assuming the employee knows about the "luck" factor and explicitely agrees to have that as part of their remuneration, then everything is fine.

A company generally cannot compel an employee to agree to a non-compete, but they have a wide variety of alternatives for inducing employees to do so. Most obviously, they may threaten to fire employees who refuse, whether immediately or at the end of their current term, as another answer observes. Indeed, if Big Company makes an NC a condition of employment then they are likely to insist on the same for employees they obtain from Original Employer. Firing employees for refusing to sign does, of course, put them in the job market as potential competitors, but the company may well find it acceptable to do that on their own terms. In particular, Big Company can ensure that those who won't sign go out the door with minimal knowledge of Big Company's clients, trade secrets, etc. other than those obtained from Original Employer. And that leads into other forms of inducement. Big Company can do some or all of the following things, depending on the particular employment situation: offer bonus compensation for signing promote those who sign and / or demote / reassign those who don't change job duties for those who refuse to sign do all manner of nastier things to be unfriendly to employees who refuse to sign Some of those fit directly into Big Company's perceived interest in avoiding employees using Big Company internal information to jump ship and compete with them, and others could fit into Big Company policy about which jobs require an NC. Some are just pressure tactics, but that does not necessarily make them unlawful (nor are all variations on the others necessarily lawful).

There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.

Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

Your interpretation seems to be correct. A furloughed employee is defined by Acas to be one who is "temporarily sent home because there's no work". This could in principle be through unpaid leave. The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme is a government scheme to compensate employers for the wage bills of their staff during the furlough, so that the furloughed staff can continue to receive some income. An employee would have no direct dealings with the scheme and would continue to be paid via their employer. Your company seems to be offering to match the terms offered to employees under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme of 80% of salary, presumably out of their own funds. A kind gesture, it seems!

It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.

Presumably Blue Team are all employees of some company ("the employer"), so the software is a work for hire and copyright is owned by the employer. However in the UK and some other countries (but not in the US) authors also have "moral rights" over their work, including attribution, integrity, and association of an author to the work. This article (by Canadian lawyer Mark H. Evans) discusses the question of moral rights in works for hire: For example, if a former employee wrote a blog to promote a company’s services that was published on the company’s website under that author’s name, the company might find itself being sued for breach of the author’s moral rights if it were to delete the author’s name and replace it with the name of an employee who wasn’t the author but is still with the company. On the face of it John would be in a similar position to the blog author in the quote. So for the employer (including Jane, as an employee) to remove John's name would be a violation of his moral rights to attribution. In this case the source code is public. However in most commercial settings it would be secret: The secrecy of the code would make it harder for John to find out his name had been removed. However lets suppose that a friend still in Blue Team were to tell him. I'm not sure about discovery rules in various countries, but presumably a serious lawsuit could get confirmation. The secrecy of the source code also means that fewer people would see John's name there than if it were generally published. This would lessen the damages, but not eliminate them. John would probably be able to get an injunction ordering that his name be restored. Many programs are published with a credit list, and John would certainly have a moral right to appear on such a list with the same prominence as other team members. From later in the same article: While moral rights are personal and can’t be assigned, they can be waived. This is an important solution to navigating moral rights in works generated by employees and contractors. And because any assignment of copyright is not an automatic waiver of moral rights, the waiver must be express. So it depends on the contract between John and the employer. If John has explicitly waived his right to attribution then the employer is in the clear.

What is the place of birth of a child born in the embassy? If someone living at an embassy abroad gave birth to a child on the embassy grounds, then what country and what place will be indicated on the birth certificate? To clarify the question, let's assume that we mean the US embassy in another country. But I'm also interested in how a similar situation will occur in the embassies of other countries. I saw a similar question but it is related to citizenship, but I only ask about birth certificate

The place of birth on the birth certificate is where the child was actually born. Indeed, usually it will be more specific than city and state or province and will also identify a hospital or residence or other place where the birth happened. So, for example, if a child is born to U.S. diplomats in Paris, France (in or out of the embassy grounds), the birth certificate will say that the child was born in Paris, France at Charles de Gaulle Hospital. But, that child will still be a U.S. citizen in all likelihood, because that child's mother, and/or married father or unmarried father who acknowledges paternity, is a U.S. citizen (in all likelihood) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The child may or may not be a French dual citizen depending upon the citizenship law of France. In the case of a French diplomat who has a child born physically in Washington D.C. (inside or outside the French embassy) the birth certificate will likewise state that the child was born in Washington D.C. The French diplomat's child, however, will not be a U.S. citizen since Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's first sentence (which is also found in 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)) states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. But a French diplomat's child is not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States, so the French diplomat's child does not gain U.S. citizenship at birth (assuming for simplicity's sake that both of the child's parents are French citizens and are not U.S. citizens) despite the fact that the child was born in the United States.

That is happening all the time. Accusations of historic child abuse are often made, often investigated, and often punished. Where the victim is from doesn't make a difference in most countries. Most crimes are prosecuted in the country where they happen. Some crimes, especially sexual abuse of children, will often also be prosecuted in the country that the offender is a citizen of, especially if the country where it happened is hesitant to prosecute. In your example, if the abuse happened in Switzerland, Switzerland will try to get the offender extradited from Italy, and will ask witnesses to come to Switzerland to make statements in court. Italy might prosecute the alleged offender if he is Italian, they might even prosecute an Italian resident, but I don't know their laws.

When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.

Minor children can, in theory, sue their parents, in many countries, as long as they can prove a cognizable harm. The simplest case is where a parent commits a crime against the child, such as rape; this would also include embezzlement. "Abuse" is a term used in laws, for example RCW 26.44.020 (Washington state), but that sense of "abuse" doesn't include e.g. "overbearing behavior" or "obnoxious politics". If a child is disabled and the parents taunt the child for that disability, it is possible that the child could sue to terminate parental rights. The case is even clearer if the parent fails in their parental obligations to the child. Lgbtqia child rights are less well-defined. The background assumption is that the parent has the exclusive right to determine the child's upbringing, which includes things such as political beliefs, religion, and matters touching no family and sex. Norway is one of those countries with relatively few restrictions on "how you live your life", and they are considering a law against "conversion therapy", but there is presently no law prohibiting a parent from denouncing their child's lifestyle. It is possible that Barnevernet (child protective services) could intervene in a particular case, but they would not sue a parent on behalf of the child unless the parents actually violated the law.

[C]ould that person, in the future, provide another I-134 for a different person who's trying to immigrate to the US? According to the Instructions for Form I-134 (PDF, 371.05 KB) If you are sponsoring more than one foreign national, you must submit a separate Form I-134 for each foreign national. There is no mention, that I can see, prohibiting future applications.

She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that.

The Czech Consulate General in New York has a page about this. Presumably a similar situation would prevail at other Czech consulates, so this answer should help even if you do not reside in its territory. The page notes that if you are not "a relative" you can "enclose an explanation letter why do you need the duplicate of the birth [or marriage] certificate." So it's possible that they'd give you a copy anyway, but, to increase your chances, you might want to include a letter explaining that you need the document to demonstrate your own Czech nationality. You can also include a copy of your birth certificate as evidence of your relationship. The page links to the forms you have to submit with the request for the certificate. They reflect the same possibility, slightly more specifically. The birth certificate application says 6. V případě, že nejste v tabulce, uveďte vztah k dítěti nebo jiný právní zájem: 6. In case you are not the person in a table, relation must be stated or any other legal interest: As far as I can tell "the person in a table" means "a person in the list of birth certificates being requested with this form." That is, you don't need to explain yourself if you are the child whose birth certificate it is, nor if you are one of the parents shown on the certificate. The marriage certificate form similarly says 6. V případě, že nejste osobou uvedenou v tabulce, uveďte vztah k osobám nebo jiný právní zájem (If the applicant is not listed in the table below as the Husband or Wife, please provide an explanation of the relationship or legal interest which authorizes this submission.): This last sentence hints at the one thing that I unfortunately do not know, which is the criteria for judging whether a given explanation is legally sufficient to authorize the release of the certificate to the person who submitted the application. I guess your case is as good as it gets, but it's possible that the law prevents the certificates to be issued to you while your parents are still alive.

Gaining UK citizenship at birth would not count, the law stipulates "after having attained the age of 18 years", so it is explicitly ruled out. (Also, gaining UK citizenship at birth involves no formal declaration.) The scout promise would not count. It doesn't involve swearing allegiance to the Queen, only promising to "do your duty to the Queen"; and an American could argue they have no duty to the Queen. (Also, you might well not have repeated it after 18.) On the face of it, the Oath of Allegiance for the OTC would count - it looks pretty much exactly what the law-makers had in mind. On the other hand, the oath is almost exactly the same as that taken by Members of Parliament, and Boris Johnson took it first in 2001 - but didn't renounce his American citizenship until 2017. (Perhaps it wasn't until 2017 that he finally drew the American authorities attention to the fact he had taken the oath.)

Landlord claims I missed a rent payment from over a year ago, I don't have easy way to confirm a payment from that far back. What are my obligations? I'm renting a room from a person, not a large organization; it's a monthly rental. He claims he just saw I had missed my monthly rent payment from April of last year. I don't have an easy way to check back more then a year ago to see if I made the payment. Now realistically I don't see this going to court one way or another; I have every intent to figure things out and if I really did miss a payment pay it now. However it makes me curious what is the legal obligation in such a case? Is my inability to definitively prove I gave him money a year ago make me responsible if he says he doesn't show the electronic payment on his end? Or is there some sort of statue of limitations on his being able to claim a missed payment? I live in Maryland.

If you want to be argumentative about it, the burden of proof is on the person making the accusation. This also means the burden of production is, too. Underlying the whole matter is a claim that you've engaged in "breach of contract," namely failing to pay rent. Your legal obligation is to not engage in contract fraud nor breach of contract. You are to exercise due diligence in resolving any breach of contract. You may ask the lessor to provide evidence in support of the claim while admitting that you have difficulty looking that far back into the issue. The idea here is to "work with" the lessor rather than immediately taking an adversarial stance. Normal people become very disgruntled by those taking an immediate adversarial approach rather than seeking to work with the other person to resolve the dispute.

It is hard to tell what the statement in the OP that "95% of the contract disputes are won/lost directly by the contract itself" was intended to mean. It isn't literally true. A breach of contract claim requires a showing in every case of (1) the existence of a contract giving rise to a contractual duty, (2) an unjustified breach of one or more of its valid terms, and (3) to recover more than nominal damages, a showing of the amount of damages caused by the breach. In the simplest of breach of contract cases, say, a promissory note default case, proof of the existence of a signed original promissory note, and business records regarding the defendant's payment history establish all of these elements, and establish a prima facie case that the defendant is unable to seriously contest. One possible intended meaning of the statement that you are paraphrasing is that usually the existence or non-existence of acts allegedly giving rise to a breach of the contract are undisputed and that the litigation primarily boils down to what the contract required in the fact of undisputed extrinsic evidence of breach of contract. This is not my experience. The overwhelming majority of contract lawsuits are basically collection actions for non-payment of an invoice, for foreclosure of a lien, or for eviction for non-payment of rent, in very simple transactions, where the party with a payment obligation has undisputedly failed to perform and the performance by the party to whom payment is due is not seriously disputed either. Probably 90%+ of contract cases have this character and are resolved by default judgment. A majority of the remaining < 10% of contract cases settle with the plaintiff getting some payment or acknowledgment of debt from the defendant, usually with payment plans reached primarily based on considerations mostly related to ability to pay (which isn't legally relevant but is as a practical matter critical in the subsequent collection stage), even if there are minor or unlikely to succeed disputes over liability and damages issues on the merits. Somewhere on the order of about 0.4%-4% of contract lawsuits involve cases where there are bona fide dispute regarding whether payment was made, or whether there was a legally recognized justification for non-payment such as the failure of the party to whom payment is owed to fully perform their obligations under the contract. The interesting cases usually involve disputes over whether someone earned the amount that they sought or instead failed to perform as agreed in some manner other than payment. When there is a written contract, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the validity and terms of the written contract are undisputed, and efforts to argue that there were any side agreements or subsequent modifications of the original written contract are very challenging to prevail upon. Disputes over breach and justification for breach are more common than disputes over the terms or meaning of a written contract, even though these are certainly disputed sometimes. And, of course, there are frequently disputes over whether there was a contract, and if so, what its terms were, in the case of express oral contracts, and contracts that are implied-in-fact or inferred from the course of dealings of the parties. Another possible interpretation of the paraphrased sentiment is that usually the language of the contract determines what your rights are in a case. Certainly, the rights of the parties usually do boil down to what the language of the contracts requires. Some Statistics The Colorado state courts publish an annual report with statistical data every year. The annual report for the year 2017 was typical. In District Courts (the courts of general jurisdiction) there were 247 civil bench trials (about a quarter of which are tort cases), and 218 civil jury trials in civil cases (about three-quarters of which are tort cases), which consist mostly of contract cases, but with a minority of tort cases and property rights case and cases involving statutory rights (it excludes evidentiary hearings in domestic relations or mental health or probate cases, or pre-trial evidentiary hearings such as hearings on preliminary injunction requests, eviction hearings, non-judicial foreclosure summary hearings, and criminal or quasi-criminal trials, hearings and cases) out of 89,632 civil cases filed. About 12,000 of these are contract lawsuits (52,000 are pro forma tax lien filings). Thus, there are about 240 contract case trials out of about 12,000 contact lawsuits, with about 2% of contract cases going to trial (about three-quarters of the time before judges instead of juries) (this excludes a very small number of disputed contract claims adjudicated within probate cases each year). In County Courts (the courts of limited jurisdiction for claims under $15,000 in 2017), there were 801 civil bench trials, 14 civil jury trials, out of 140,462 civil cases filed (the vast majority of which are breach of contract cases and 98%+ of which are decided by judges usually in trials of one day or less, instead of juries), with about 0.6% of contract cases going to trial. This counts evictions as well as straight out contractual debt collection lawsuits as contract cases. There were and 1,657 small claims court trials (always before a judge rathe than a jury and limited to disputes of $7,500 or less with limitations on lawyer involvement) out of 7,118 small claims cases filed, but the mix of cases is very diverse so mapping that to resolution method isn't really workable, even though more than half would be contract cases. Essentially all of the small claims cases that don't go to trial are default judgments and day of trial settlements. By comparison, there were about 460 federal court contract cases filed in Colorado in 2016 (about 0.3% of all contract cases filed in Colorado in any given year). These cases go to trial at a rate similar to the 2% rate for state court of general jurisdiction contract cases (perhaps 7 bench trials and 2 jury trials a year) (this figure excludes bankruptcy court cases which each have multiple disputed or undisputed contract claims within them). Certainly, it would be safe to say that less than 1-2% of contract lawsuits filed in Colorado go to trial. In all cases that don't go to trial, there was a default judgment (most common), settlement (next most common), or resolution in pre-trial motion practice (least common but more common than contract cases going to trial, let alone a jury trial).

"an agreement by email for the cost of rent and damage deposit etc." may well constitute a lease. If it doesn't specify a term or ending method, it is probably a month to month lease. If nothing is specified about notice to leave, you probably should gt 30 days notice. The law in BC is the Residential Tenancy Act. However, many localities have laws that modify or supplement the provincial law. You probably need legal assitance beyond the scope of this forum. a Tenant Resource Advisory Center (Trac) might be able to help. Their web sitre also provides links to various other resources, including legal referrals. The Tennant Survival Guide offers pointers to legal aid. This site offers additional resources. So does the BC Law institute Note, even if you have certain legal rights in theory, the person from whom you are renting may not respect these. Consult legal or community sources to determine your best approach. This question is really beyond the scope of this forum.

You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.

Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.

The law only addresses possible legal consequences, from which you could surmise what actually happens. If a person stops paying rent, the landlord institutes eviction proceedings, and may sue for the remainder of the rent for the term of the lease: they have an obligation to try to find a replacement tenant, to mitigate the damage. Some relief is available to the landlord in the deposit, from which the unpaid rent might be deducted, but let's assume that after that, the actual damage suffered is $5,000. When you sue a person in your home state, the court serves official notice that the defendant must appear to answer the charges, and the state has jurisdiction over the respondent because they are in that state. Giving notice and collecting on a judgment across jurisdictions can get complicated and expensive, so it would depend on what kind of treaties exist between the countries. There is the Hague Service Convention which may simplify the business of giving notice to parties, which works if the respondent fled to Norway or India but not if they fled to Somalia or Turkmenistan. Since it turns out the US is not party to any multinational treaty recognizing foreign judgments, that country is not obligated to care about a US judgment, so unless the person left assets in the US, you may not be able to collect. You could sue in the person's country (hire a local attorney to pursue the matter). The main legal question would be whether there is any conflict between the lease and local law: while the basic idea of a lease is universally recognized, there may be peculiar conditions or procedures applicable in that country. (Norway has some laws pertaining to "shared utilities" which don't exist in the US, which might put a US lease at odds with Norwegian law, and there are rent-raising rules that don't exist here). It might be necessary that you appear in court in that country to swear under oath that the lease was agreed to voluntarily, or the court may require a special form of 'notarization' not available in the US. None of that renders international litigation impossible, though a favorable judgment might be unlikely in some courts. The cost of litigation might be much higher than what would be awarded by a court.

What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.

Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.

Does copyright law prevent the destruction of works? Does copyright law, in any jurisdiction, prevent the owner of a physical instance of a copyrighted work from destroying it? Are there other laws that allow the creator to prevent destruction of artworks by their owners?

You own it In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law. It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to. Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright.

The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.

It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately.

A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question.

"The Holy See owns all copyrights in the works published under its name or created on its commission (art. 5)." Since this painting was commissioned by the Vatican for the Sistine Chapel, they own the copyright to it. The first sentence just says the Vatican owns all copyrights that exist, it doesn't speak to whether any copyrights exist in the first place. Earlier in that article, it says "The law provides for copyright 70 years after the death of the author, or 70 years after publication for works with no named author." I don't know off-hand when Michelangelo died, but I'm pretty sure that it was more than 70 years ago. So if there is a copyright, it has long since expired, and who owns it is a moot point. The painting is well in the public domain. If there were a valid copyright, a sculpture would be a derivative work and would require a license.

The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause".

The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.

You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.

What is the origin of the term “court” as a reference to the judicial institution? Does the legal usage of the word court as in a court of law derive from the idea of a royal court, as an expression of the idea that the original courts of law were ultimately simple vehicles for the exercise or discharge of royal authority on behalf of the royal sovereign? If not, then what is the origin of the use of the word court to denote the judicial institutions that we call courts of law?

Does the legal usage of the word court as in a court of law derive from the idea of a royal court, as an expression of the idea that the original courts of law were ultimately simple vehicles for the exercise or discharge of royal authority on behalf of the royal sovereign? Yes: The meaning of a judicial assembly is first attested in the 12th century, and derives from the earlier usage to designate a sovereign and his entourage, which met to adjudicate disputes....

A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law".

As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.

No they are not the same statement. Who has jurisdiction? Let's disentangle a few things: A jurisdiction is an entity that has sovereignty to make, interpret and enforce its own laws. Each country in the world is a jurisdiction. Sub-national entities like states, provinces and municipalities may be a jurisdiction depending on the operation of law in the country they are part of. Some supra-national bodies like the EU and the UN are jurisdictions. To some extent, even companies, clubs and similar bodies are jurisdictions to the extent that they can make, interpret and enforce its own rules. A jurisdiction can decide that it has jurisdiction based on a whole raft of matters including: where the event took place where the party(s) are resident where the party(s) are citizens registration of things like planes, trains and automobiles if money passed through their financial system etc. A court or tribunal has jurisdiction if the jurisdiction has jurisdiction and it is the correct body within its jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. Which laws apply? Once a court or tribunal has decided that it does have jurisdiction it then needs to know what law to apply. This may be the law of their jurisdiction or another jurisdiction or both. Example For example, imagine there is a company in New York, USA that sells a product to a consumer in New South Wales, Australia. Further suppose that the contract says it will be governed by the laws of Ontario, Canada (don't ask me why). In the event of dispute, let's say the consumer begins proceedings in the Local Court in New South Wales. The New York company petitions the court to say that the correct forum is the court in Ontario, or New York, or Mexico where the product shipped from but certainly not New South Wales. The court in New South Wales will consider the jurisdictional arguments and decide if it does or does not have jurisdiction. If it decides that it doesn't then the customer would have to bring an action somewhere else (where the process repeats). Worth noting that the New York company would be precluded from arguing in that forum that New South Wales was the right jurisdiction because they can't have their cake ... If it decides that it does have jurisdiction then it would consider what law applies. Its quite probable that they would accept that the contract is governed by Quebec law. However, Australian law, most specifically the Australian Consumer Law would also apply. If there was a claim on a tortuous basis this might be New South Wales or New York law. They would then proceed to decide the case on the applicable law including working out how to reconcile any incompatibilities.

Jurist (in the American sense) means a lawyer, judge, or other expert in law. From Google Search:

You are confusing a few concepts. One is the distinction between what are known as "common law" jurisdictions derived from the English legal system, and "civil law" jurisdictions derived from one of the continental European legal systems that is ultimately derived from Roman law. Another is the distinction between determining the meaning of ambiguous legislation, which all courts do by definition, and the power of judicial review, which overturns legislation which is invalid for some reason rather than merely trying to interpret an ambiguous provision. Ambiguous means "unclear" or "capable of being interpreted in more than one way" and every time every court encounters unclear legislation it must decide what it means, even if it is not invalidated. In contrast, some judiciaries that have the power of judicial review and those that do not. Judiciaries that can declare a law to be invalid have the power of judicial review. Judiciaries that cannot declare a law to be invalid do not have the power of judicial review. Every state and federal U.S. Court at every level (not just the U.S. Supreme Court) has the power and obligation to declare that a law violated the U.S. Constitution. In many countries, no court, or only a "constitutional court" has the power to make declare legislation to be invalid by exercising judicial review. Every time that a legislature passes a statute on a subject covered by common law (i.e. judge-made law derived from case decisions that serve as precedents), it shrinks the scope of common law relative to statutes. And, in principle, almost all of the common law could be replaced by statutes without all that much difficulty. But, in civil law countries, statutes are frequently comprehensive and are the sole source of legal authority about their subject matter superseding all case law, while in common law countries, statutes are often piecemeal tweaks to a common law background that is assumed by the statute. For example, every civil law country would have a comprehensive statute setting forth the principles of contract law, while a typical common law jurisdiction might have a statute that declares that certain contracts must be in writing but does not comprehensively set forth the law of contracts in all circumstances. There are some features of civil law countries, such as the absence of jury trials, which cannot be constitutionally changed to the civil law system, even in jurisdictions such a Puerto Rico and Louisiana in the United States which have civil law roots prior to joining the U.S. (at least in criminal cases and in the federal courts). The power of judicial review (i.e. the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional and void) is also inherent in the U.S. Constitutional system of government and could not be removed without a constitutional amendment. There are common law countries, e.g., England, which did not historically have the power of judicial review, which was an innovation for a common law countries such as the United States when it was first invoked. (For what it is worth, India goes one step further; its Supreme Court asserts and exercises the right to declare portions of its own constitution to be unconstitutional.) There are other aspects of civil law legal systems which would probably also be declared unconstitutional in the United States as well, such as the lack of a prohibition on the introduction of hearsay evidence in criminal trials which violates a provision of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights known as the "confrontation clause." It is unclear to me whether the principle that case law precedents have binding legal effect in future cases, which is part of the common law system that is absent in the civil law system, has a constitutional dimension or could be displaced by law. But, most aspects of a civil law legal system could be adopted in the United States if the relevant legislatures so desired. Indeed, many aspects of the U.S. legal system have moved in that direction. For example, only a handful of U.S. states now recognize the concept of a "common law crime". Almost all states now only allow criminal sanctions for crimes codified by statute, which was not the case at the time of the American Revolution, when few crimes were codified. Obviously, with a constitutional amendment, almost any change to the U.S. legal system is possible.

Here is a substantial collection of interpretive canons; this article discusses rules vs. canons. This article discusses contract interpretation from both the perspectives of drafting and litigating. These are all from the perspective of common law systems. This article (in English) and this chapter (English, paywall) reminds us that French contract law is different, to which I would add this which focuses on the French subjective theory of contracts – starkly distinct from the common law theory. This page (en français) will probably be of most interest to you. The 2016 modification to the civil code added art. 1190 (and other articles) which says Dans le doute, le contrat de gré à gré s'interprète contre le créancier et en faveur du débiteur, et le contrat d'adhésion contre celui qui l'a proposé which is contra proferentem. The Latin name is not officially assigned to this law, and being a new addition to French law, it's too early to tell if it will be so named in French legal practice.

The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want.

What's the default copyright transfer for a magazine article, in absence of a written contract? Suppose an author sells an article to a magazine in the United States, but without a written contract and without any oral discussion of what rights were being sold. The magazine comes out containing the article, and everyone is happy. Now, many years later, the magazine wants to include the article in a new bound volume of the magazine's contents, without further permission from or payment to the author. Can the author object? In light of 17 USC sec. 204(a), I assume the burden of proof would be on the publisher to show a written agreement to transfer more than the right to publish the article once. And since there is no written agreement, the publisher would lose if the author took it to court. So, it seems like a simple answer. But in the law I'm always amazed to discover different angles and factors I hadn't thought of. Hence this post.

None Transfer of copyrights or exploitation rights always requires a written contract. Licensing does not require a written contract. HOWEVER.... "An author sells an article to a magazine" is a special situation: that is acceptance of the written terms of sale that were in place when the article was sold. That is a written contract, and typically they buy the article with very specific rights. And... things really can get murky for really old publications like Weird Tales

In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.

Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.

In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.

There is a good chance that the letter in question is in the public domain. Prior to 1978, the copyright laws were very different. Also, if it was published in 1963 or earlier and there was an initial claim of copyright but the copyright was not renewed, it would also be in the public domain. A convenient table summarizing when various pertinent categories of works enter the public domain can be found here. It might be possible to construe depositing the work with the Library of Congress as either a "publication" of the work (which if it happened before 1964 would put it in the public domain), or as a relinquishment of the copyright to the public domain, although I am not a specialist familiar with the legal effect of different forms of donations to the Library of Congress and it could depend upon the facts and circumstances of that particular donation to the Library of Congress. If worse came to worse, I imagine it might be possible to seek a declaratory judgment that your use was a fair use with substituted service on the heirs, and seek a default judgment, although that would not be optimal. The general problem that you face is that the work in question is what is called an "orphan work". Many other countries have special procedures to allow the use of orphan works, but the U.S. has resisted such legislation except for a narrow exception applicable only to libraries and archives at 17 U.S.C. § 108.

Under the Berne Convention, a copyright notice is not required at all, although using one is good practice. Using one usually eliminates the claimed status of "innocent infringement", which, if found true by a court, greatly reduces damage awards. It is usual to place such notices at or near the start of a work. That is where people tend to look for them, and I don't see any good reason not to follow this practice. The book tradition is the the copyright page comes before any part of the actual work, including the table of contents, sometimes with a continuation at the end of the work, if there is more than one page of notices. But that is not now a legal requirement, if it ever was. In short, there are no rigid rules on this, but putting a copyright notice at or quite near the start is good practice, and I would suggest sticking to it.

This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue.

Probably not I think this question represents a misunderstanding of the linked article, and in any case of the specifically US doctrine of fair use. Fair use is always based on a part of a copyrighted work copied without authorization. If there was authorization, there would be no need to resort to the defense of fair use. The article discusses the commercial use of short sections of musical works used for commercial purposes. It points out that the idea that any use of an excerpt of less than 30 seconds is permitted is a myth. In this it is correct. While the amount of a copyrighted work used is one of the four factors to be considered in deciding wither a use is a fair use, it is not the only one, and no specific amount is always permitted. In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) The US Supreme Court held that quotes amounting to about 3-400 words from a 500-page book were an infringement, and were not a fair use, because they were the "heart of the book". The linked article says that one should ask "Was the work obtained from a legal source, in a lawful manner?" and asserts that "taking a copy from an unapproved source invalidates fair use." Nothing in 17 USC 107 says this, and I don't know of any authoritative source for such a statement. The article also says that "Commercial, for-profit use is not fair use, while commentary or criticism may be." This is simply incorrect. While a commercial purpose tends to weigh against fair use, it does not preclude it, and commercial use has been held to be fair use in some cases. Even in the case of Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises linked above, fair use was seriously considered, and was not denied simply because the use was commercial. No one o0f the four fair use factors is final taken alone. I do not think the linked article is a reliable guide to US copyright law. In the case described by the question, an unreleased game has been distributed without authorization over the internet, and reviews written based on that unauthorized copy. Whoever copied the game committed copyright infringement, but a suit might not provide substantial damages unless actual economic harm could be demonstrated. (And, of course, the identity of the infringer would need to be proved.) But a review based on such a leaked copy would not necessarily be an infringement. If the review described the game, but did not quote any of its dialog or other text, and did not reproduce any sounds or images from the game, there would be no infringement. If the review did quote from the unauthorized copy, the usual fair use analysis would apply. The fact that the copy had been unauthorized would not determine the outcome. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. This provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Note that criticism is one of the specified purposes for which fair use is designed, and an unpublished work is still subject to fair use. If the review quoted so much of the game that the potential market for it was harmed, that would weigh against fair use, but it is hard for me to see how a mere review could do that to an interactive game. (17 USC 107(4)) is normally applied when an infringing copy serves as a replacement for the authorized version, and sales are lost as a result. I suppose it might be argued that a bad review that was a direct result of an infringement came under this provision, but it is a strech at best, and US First Amendment considerations would tend to prevent such a ruling. In short, it seems unlikely that any normal review would be an infringement, and that the game was leaked would not make it one.

Why are some sections of the US Code formatted so weirdly? There are actually two questions here. First, why are sections not in order? You have 28 USC §1 through §6, which talk about the Supreme Court, then you have §41 to §49 (appeals courts), then §81 to §144 (district courts) immediately afterwards. Why is this? Does Congress do this sort of thing to emphasize the "separation" between the types of definitions, or is it just the case that they're "reserving" numbers in case they need to add something (like §40 before §41)? Other examples of this: 17 USC §101 through §122, followed immediately by §201 to §205; 22 USC § 1 through §136, followed immediately by §141 to §183; 18 USC § 2381 through § 2391, followed immediately by § 2421 to § 2429. 51 USC § 10101 followed by § 20101, "implying" they skipped 10,100 sections (except they didn't). Second, why do certain portions of the US Code look like, well, these oddly listed names? Did Congress just run out of numbers or were they trying to "squeeze an entirely new section" in but couldn't quite make it? 16 USC §470x-6, § 470aaa, § 590z-11, §668ss 15 USC §77bbbb, 79z-6, 80b-21 22 USC §2799aa-2 42 USC §300mm-62, 1397mm, 2000aa-5, 2000bb-4, 2000gg-6 To me the US Code looks like, well, spaghetti code. And I know lawyers are the ones who look at it and I think they probably couldn't care less about how it looks as long as the law is there, but I'm just curious as to why they opted for the approach of sticking random letters on some of the numbers.

Many of the titles in the U.S. Code are not positive codifications. Instead they are consolidations, classifications, and editorial codifications made by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel. Title 42 (noted in phoog's answer) is not a positive codification. This means Congress did not choose its numbering scheme. Only the titles with an asterisk on this page have been enacted as positive law. Instead, the law codified into Title 42 are the various public statutes passed by Congress over the years that the Law Revision Counsel has included in Title 42. It is the public statutes that have the force of law. See e.g. Pub. L. 98-183, whose elements the Law Revision Counsel put in Chapter 20A of Title 42. The Law Revision Counsel says: Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, is a non-positive law title. Title 42 is comprised of many individually enacted Federal statutes––such as the Public Health Service Act and the Social Security Act––that have been editorially compiled and organized into the title, but the title itself has not been enacted. Whether a provision of a public statute is included in the U.S. Code and where it will be included is determined by the Law Revision Counsel, although placement may be obvious when a statute amends an already codified statute. As for the cramped numbering (contrary to the comment of Weather Vane, which says that insertions would require renumbering of subsequent clauses), the Law Revision Counsel says: Chapters based on statutes that have been amended many times may have cumbersome numbering schemes with section numbers such as 16 U.S.C. 460zzz-7 and 42 U.S.C. 300ff-111. Where the U.S. Code skips over large portions of section numbers this could be an intentional decision to leave room for growth, especially in a title that has undergone positive codification process through Congress, or it could be the result of previous sections that have been removed after repeal. For more background, see the detailed guide from the Law Revision Counsel.

In the example given, both elements must be established. This is the most common meaning of the word "and" in a statute or rule or contract or other writing, but there are times when "and" does not have that meaning. One must always determine the meaning from context on a case by case basis. Words do not have a single universal meaning in all contexts for legal purposes. This variation by context in the meaning of words for legal purposes is especially frequent in countries with common law legal systems based upon the English legal system such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and India to have situations where a word often means one thing in one legal context and another thing in different legal contexts. This is because the governing statutes and case law are written on a piecemeal basis by many different people with no one in charge of maintaining stylistic uniformity, over a very long period of time (often centuries). In countries like those of Continental Europe, Latin America and much of Asia and Africa, which have what are called "civil law" systems, that are based on European civil codes, there are comprehensive codifications of the basic laws of the land that are drafted by experts all at the same time, and amended only with great deliberation and care, and these codes tend to use a word more consistently in most contexts than common law legislatures and judges do, although even then, this principle is not absolute.

Certain elements of the flag's design are specified by statute, namely 4 USC 1-2: §1 The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field. §2 On the admission of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of the flag; and such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next succeeding such admission. The rest of the design is specified by executive order (EO 10834, to be precise). I won't quote the whole thing here, because it's rather heavy on detail, but it includes a couple of tables and a detailed diagram specifying the dimensions of the flag and the arrangement of the stars. The president can change anything that has been specified by executive order, and can specify additional details that haven't been specified, as long as nothing in the president's order contradicts the statute. Congress can add additional details to the statutory specifications, in which case the president's orders might have to be modified to comply.

It stands for section. As in "section 8 article b" or whatever.

See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).

As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.

The answer by Dale M is basically correct but has some details wrong. US Courts of Appeal Recall that in the US Federal system the circuit courts are the "Courts of Appeal", that is the middle level of the system, above the district courts, but below the Supreme Court. In the early days of the US, each Justice of the Supreme Court was assigned to one circuit, usually consisting of several adjacent states. The Justice spent roughly half of each year "riding circuit". The Justice would stop at two to four places in the circuit, where Federal district courts were located.The justice would sit together with one of the district court judges in those places, in the courthouse that would be otherwise used for the district court. That Two-judge panel would constitute the session of the Circuit Court. The places where the circuit court was held were usually state capitols or other large towns or cities. The Justice would not stop at every small town along the way. (I recently read The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-1835, Which describes the practice in detail. Travel was quite wearing on the Justices. During the actual Supreme Court term, they lived in a boardinghouse in Washington DC, usually the same house for all the Justices. Cases were often discussed after hours at these boardinghouses. The Chief Justice often made arrangements for the coming year's accommodation. The Justices' wives did not normally join them in Washington nor on circuit.) This practice persisted until 1912, but had ceased by the early twentieth century. It stopped in some Circuits sooner than others. There are now permanent judges assigned to the Courts of Appeal, which is now their proper formal name, but the areas over which they have jurisdiction are still known as circuits, and the courts are informally still called the Circuit courts. In fact the judges of the Courts of appeal are often where Presidents look when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Each circuit still has a supervising Justice assigned to it. That Justice handles certain "emergency" appeals from the circuit court, either ruling on them at once, or relaying them to the full Supreme Court. English Assize Circuits In England, before the US existed, judges rode circuit. These assize circuits were defined by statute in 1293, and remained in use until they were replaced by the Crown Court in 1972 under the Courts Act 1971 Western US In the West and Mid-west of the US during the nineteenth century, some state courts (not federal courts) rode circuit in areas where the population was not dense enough to support a full time stationary court. The Judge was often accompanied by a group of lawyers, whom would take on the various cases that awaited the judge. However, these courts are not what is usually meant by "circuit courts" in US usage. These judges did often stop at a relatively large number of small towns, often county seats or comparable locations, where a county courthouse might exist. This practice stopped at different times in different areas, but it was obsolete by the early twentieth century.

The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.

Can teachers search our dorms without our explicit consent if they have "suspicion"? I am a girl attending a boarding high school in the US. In June, some students who returned to the dorm early saw some male teachers exiting their rooms. They reportedly ran back to the school building without answering any questions when they saw the students. That night, multiple students shared that their drawers were seemingly searched and in some cases underwear and other things were missing. In the monthly school meeting the search became the main topic. Eventually a high-ranking teacher attempted to clarify what happened. He claimed that they "had suspicion" that someone was hiding illegal firearms in their room, but they could not narrow it down so they had to search all the rooms, both the boys' and the girls'. They declined to explain any further on the reasoning behind the suspicion and merely added they reported it to the police and received permission. The session was then dismissed much earlier than usual. The speaker was visibly shaking so I doubted that was the real reason. The distrust only grew when we contacted the local police and an officer told us that they never received such report from our school. The rhetoric has changed ever since. Here is a non-exhaustive list of excuses they came up to cover up the situation. Local police authorized search due to firearm suspicions - debunked, never alerted the police A majority of all students agreed to the search - debunked, no school-wide poll The student council unanimously agreed to the search - debunked, no such topic was discussed A majority of all parents agreed to the search - debunked, no such notice to parents A majority of parents in the school board agreed to the search - debunked, never happened The teachers were substituting dorm workers on vacation to fix dorm equipment - debunked, workers were present The list goes on and on and I find it pathetic that they are still not apologizing even though two months have passed and we are in vacation. I wonder, had at least one of the excuses listed above been true, would that have validated male teachers from intruding our private space? If our parents or our student representatives agree, can they really enter our rooms even though we were never asked nor notified about it?

A private school in the US is not bound by the 4th Amendment requirement for searches to be "reasonable", just as parents do not need a search warrant to search your room. Instead, limitations would arise from contract law. This typically means that per the contract whereby you can go to that school, you agree to certain things (as do they). This may or may not include the power for a teacher to conduct a surprise inspection. It just depends on what is said in the contract regarding dorm room searches. Typically, adjudication of this type of matter is left to parental outrage rather than courts, unless there is a clear violation of the contract terms.

You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes.

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.

In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job.

There is a state law that requires you to obey the police: ORC 2917.13, which says you may not Fail to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind. If you do, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to persons or property, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the first degree. You also cannot Hamper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer, firefighter, rescuer, medical person, emergency medical services person, or other authorized person, engaged in the person's duties at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind "Hamper" is not defined statutorily, but the plain meaning of "hamper" is not the same as "fail to assist". We have not established that the order is lawful, however, which is crucial. The police cannot just freely search a residence without permission. If they have permission from the occupant, they can search and seize. If they have probable cause to believe that a crime exists and the circumstances make a warrant impractical, they can search and seize. I don't know what you mean by "wellness check", but that seems plainly to be unlawful entry. However, if the resident calls 911 and reports that he is having an issue, that is sufficient consent for entry. In the case of a fire alarm, the fire code authorizes a fire department official in charge of an actual emergency response incident to order the evacuation of a building, and occupants are required to comply. If we suppose that the smoke detector in a room has gone off, the fire department is authorized to inspect for fire, and there is a provision under the law about failure to obey a lawful command (to open the door so that they can look for fire). Problem: you cannot know whether the order is lawful. The officer doesn't decide what is lawful, the courts do (after the fact), and typically a command is found to be lawful unless it is clearly unlawful. The order from your supervisor is not "enforceable" in the sense that you cannot be arrested, imprisoned, or fined for disobeying your boss. However, there is a potential club they can use against you, namely firing you for disobeying the order. Normally, you can be fired for wearing the wrong shirt. But there are laws about employers doing illegal things, such as ORC 4113.52, which provides recourse when the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety etc. In which case you report this to the supervisor, they have 24 hours after getting the report to correct the situation, and after that you would report the situation to the county prosecutor. (Read all of the details in the linked law, don't just skip steps: this is an executive summary). Having done this, you are protected from being fired, demoted. reassigned etc. The employer will be strongly motivated to not incur the penalties for violating the whistle blower statute. Additionally, you can sue the employer if they fire you for refusing to violate the law (termination in violation of public policy).

If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.

I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.

Can a company demand employees use part of their paycheck to buy their services? A retail chain my friend worked for wanted to boost sales of a membership that included benefits like free shipping and preferred pricing. They gave each employee a small bonus on 1 paycheck equal to the price of the membership and employees were told the bonus was to be used to buy a membership for themselves. Apparently, they believed it would help employees sell the membership if they experienced the benefits themselves. From the company's perspective, sales of the membership at POS were an important metric for the company; there were long-term company goals for membership sales. Presumably they gave employees money for the membership instead of the membership itself so they could transact more sales and claim to be closer to hitting their total sales goal. Was it legal for the company to make this additional payment while requiring it be used to buy their own service?

If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.

This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about).

In the U.S. a board member would not be an employee just by virtue of being a board member, even if they were compensated for attending board meetings. The CEO, an employee, might or might not also be a board member. Employees can be fired by their manager. A board member can't be fired from the board but, typically, only removed by a vote of shareholders. They are not assigned tasks by managers of the company. This is 100% clear in CA under employment code 622 (a) “Employee” does not include a director of a corporation or association performing services in his or her capacity as a director. I was a CEO of a private company I co-founded I was a board member as a result of voting myself on the board via my stock ownership. The majority of the board could fire me as CEO but I would still be a board member. If outside board members did get compensation, it would be as a consultant, paid with a 1099. The CA code does say that a board member could take on actual work, like auditing financial information, that might fall under the activities of an employee.

It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.

Not likely The company decided to pay the bonus on a certain date. They most likely announced that everybody that is part of the company on a certain date in 2021/2022 [and who has worked at it for a certain duration] will get a bonus. If you are able to get the bonus is dependent on the exact wording of the document that promised the bonus.

There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.

The answer would vary considerably. Consumer protection laws in some jurisdictions would find such a scheme to be an actionable deceptive trade practice, while consumer protection laws in other jurisdictions would find that it was not an actionable deceptive trade practice. One of the trickier points is quantifying the injury. How are you harmed if you buy a good at 20% off when it is really 20% off? How are you harmed if you don't buy a good at 20% off and then later buy the same good at 20% off when you were expecting it to be full price? Some consumer protection laws require that you show injury, and in those cases, it probably wouldn't be actionable. But, other consumer protection laws make false statements actionable, even if there is no reliance upon the statement or harm caused, in which case statutory damages might be recoverable.

am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.

How can I ensure I am contacted when a specific relative dies or is hospitalised? I have an Uncle in declining years that lives a state or two away. Is there any protocol for having local emergency services call my cell should my Uncle be taken to hospital, becomes unconscious, passes away? I have spoken with him, know his wishes, and call weekly, but circumstances may arise. How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal?

How would I receive a call if he is not able to call me or communicate with emergency personal? There is no ironclad method. The law does not specify how authorities should determine contact information for next of kin. As a practical matter some of the better methods (few people use all of them) are: Create an "emergency contact" business card and put it that person's wallet and/or purse. Put another such card in a prominent place in their home like taped to the wall next to their phone charger or under a magnet on the refrigerator or on a cork board in the house. Make sure that the person has their own ID and medical insurance card and a card containing any medical alert information (e.g. drug allergies and blood type and religious objections to any particular sort of treatment) there as well. A "wallet biopsy" is standard operating procedure for first responders when the identity of a person suffering an emergency is unknown. Enter your name as an "in case of emergency" (ICE) number on that person's cell phone. You can also set up their cell phone to authorize you to locate it with an app. More crudely, you can put a sticker that says "emergency contact" with your name and phone number physically on the outside of the person's phone. The mechanics of putting emergency information in a phone can be found at this insurance company website. If they have a medical alert or home security system or medic alter bracelet, have them put you as an emergency contact for that. Put a medical power of attorney naming you as an agent (if the person is willing to execute one) together with your contact information in the patient file of all of the person's medical providers such as a treating primary care physician, home health care person, etc. Keep the number for these providers on hand so that you can call them to ask if there is any news or appointments have been missed. Have the person list you as an emergency contact in places that keep records of one such as an employer, membership based gym, a college or educational institution where the person is taking some classes, and their nursing home or assisted living center (if any). Provide your contact information to (and get contact information from) neighbors, landlords, financial advisors, accountants, lawyers, and family members of the person who are likely to be contacted and ask that they let you know if something happens. Spend at least a little time with as many of them as possible in person, when you are in town, to the fullest extent possible. Become friends with them on social media and interact with them every once and a while in that context. Put them on your Christmas letter list. Share your excess tomatoes and strawberries with them. Send them little thank you notes and gifts when you learn that they did something nice for the person like helping them shovel snow or trimming the shrubs on their shared property line. Little courtesies create a moral impetus on their part to take the trivial effort of calling you to let you know that something is up when it happens. Have a local contact you can have look into the situation if you are unable to reach the person at the usual times, ideally someone with a spare key and security codes to the house and/or apartment building or gated community. If there is no one who can do that, local law enforcement can be asked to do a "welfare check" on the person. Have a copy of a will, power of attorney, or HIPPA release that allows a third party to corroborate your connection to the person and be in a position to tell someone local where the original will is located. It is also good to keep a log or journal of your contacts with the person so that you can demonstrate that when they go missing that it really is an unusual and concerning event and to demonstrate that you are in regular contact with the person. For example, I have a client who died this week while his emergency contact person was visiting family in another country. When she was unable to reach him, she checked with his doctor, learned that he had failed to show up for a medical appointment scheduled for earlier that day, and then had her son who was still in town use a spare key she had given him to check in on my client, where her son had the misfortune of discovering the deceased client.

Children own their personal property Although legal guardians may place limits on access or use. Unless the aunt is a legal guardian she has no right to retain them. Ask for their return. If she refuses, sue for their return.

Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else.

Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well.

What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her.

You are 500km away and you neither intend to do her harm, nor are you personally doing her harm. You are not an accomplice by any means. You may, appropriately, feel a moral obligation to do as much as you can to help, but not doing everything that you wish you could does not make you an accomplice.

Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission.

You are asking the wrong question: it is up to you to decide how to deal with your injury. The employer's role, if any, is limited to after-the-fact compensation. In Texas, workman's compensation coverage is not mandatory, so that is a variable affecting the details. If the employer has workman's comp, they are protected from various legal actions against time, but they also don't get a "vote" in compensation, which is provided by the insurance company. Assuming that the employer is a non-subscriber (as they are called), then the question of employer liability is resolved either by negotiation or lawsuit. You can read a breakdown of the legal essentials here. When you go to court, you would have to prove that the employer was at fault. Let's assume that you've proven that, then the remaining question is whether that loss is reasonably related to the injury that the employer was responsible for. There are multiple kinds of medical transportation available, ranging from patient self-transportation on the bus to calling 911. The laws regarding 911 calls are a matter of local jurisdiction, but the general rule is that you only call 911 for genuine emergencies. However, there isn't a clear, practical standard that distinguishes between an emergency vs. "something that you need to deal with eventually". Given your description of the injury, I will work on the assumption that this qualifies as a true medical emergency in your town. Now, typically, 911 EMTs make a professional judgment whether you need ordinary ambulance transportation vs. "Medic One" style transportation – this isn't decided by the employer. The one area where an employer could have a say in the matter is in accessing his personal or work phone, in order to call 911. Your description of the circumstances is not exactly clear: do you have a phone, or access to a phone? You do not have to have employer permission to make an emergency call on your phone. So to continue looking for ways to make this a problem for the employer, I will assume that you had no access to a phone of your own or any other employee, and the employer refused to let you use his personal phone or company phone to call 911, but would let you use his phone to call home (this is an entirely rhetorical assumption, but I have no evidence that the situation is otherwise). Now the question is whether the employer has a legal obligation to provide access to a work or personal phone in order to make an emergency call. Now we have a specific Texas law, Penal Code §42.062 which says in part that it is a crime when one knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual's ability to place an emergency call or to request assistance, including a request for assistance using an electronic communications device, in an emergency from a law enforcement agency, medical facility, or other agency or entity the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of individuals Here is a lawyer's talk-through of this law, which does not address to $64,000 question whether the law creates a "duty to assist" rather than a "duty to not interfere". The answer is tied to the basic lawsuit question of whether the employer is at fault. Under the common law, if a party has created a harmful situation, they have a duty to assist in mitigating that situation. So if you were horsing around on the job and you're at fault for the injury, then the employer is not liable and you have to shoulder the burden for treatment. If they are at fault, they also have to assist you in seeking emergency medical treatment. I doubt that the courts would find it to be a crime to refuse to call 911, but the employer could be civilly liable.

Can I use my browser to change the prices of things I buy online? I can use Chrome's inspector tools to modify my local copy of the html on websites I visit. After changing the prices on a page in this way, for some websites I believe I can actually proceed through a checkout process, and buy items at whatever new altered price I want. What kind of trouble can I get into for this - if any?

You can get arrested for theft and/or fraud. This is not some new way to steal items; changing price tags started approximately the day after price tags were invented. Some state laws handle it explicitly, some implicitly; for instance, Maryland defines "deception" in its theft statute to include "(vi) remove or alter a label or price tag;" theft is committed if, among other possibilities, (b) Unauthorized control over property - By deception.- A person may not obtain control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; In other states, caselaw says that switching price tags is deception, and doing it for gain is fraud. See this California case in which switching price tags and buying the item is completed generic "theft by false pretenses" if the cashier didn't know you had switched the tags and relied on the new ones (in that case, the cashier knew so it was just attempted theft); see also this Nebraska case. Notably, the deception there is not tied to a statute saying "switching physical price tags is deception;" rather, it's deception because it involves knowingly making a false representation of a material fact (i.e. the true price of the goods) with intent to fool the store into thinking the real price is the lower one. As a general rule, many criminal laws handle new technology by looking at how you're using it. If what you're doing would be flagrantly illegal if not done on a computer, it will likely be illegal if you use a computer. Because you used the Internet, you might theoretically face further charges. If this is considered to be deception, you could in theory be on the hook for wire fraud. This is a federal felony offense. While small-scale offenses would more likely be prosecuted at the state level (and if you are federally prosecuted for one small fraud you'll probably face 0-6 months in jail instead of the 20-year maximum sentence for wire fraud), it is in fact a federal crime to commit wire fraud.

The European laws have specific sections regarding digital goods. The following two passages are relevant to you: From Returning unwanted goods: Warning! Please note that you may not use goods that you have received before deciding to withdraw from the purchase. The right to withdraw exists to allow you to examine the product in the same way as you would in a shop, not to give you 14 days free use. Be aware also that more specific rules apply to digital content (e.g. downloading or streaming music or video). From Shopping online: Digital content Specific information requirements apply when you buy digital content online, e.g. when downloading or streaming music or video. Before you make the purchase, you must also be informed how the content operates with relevant hardware/software (interoperability) and about its functionality, including whether any geographical restrictions apply to the use of the content and if private copies are allowed. You also enjoy the right of withdrawal within 14 days from concluding the contract for online digital content. However, once you start downloading or streaming the content you may no longer withdraw from the purchase, provided that the trader has complied with his obligations. Specifically, the trader must first obtain your explicit agreement to the immediate download or streaming, and you must explicitly acknowledge that you lose your right to withdraw once the performance has started. So yes, the law specifically allows you to waive that right when purchasing digital goods. So long as Steam has correctly advertised the product's system requirements and other key details, you lose your right to withdraw from the purchase the moment you start downloading it to your system.

You are granted the free trial as part of a trial, not to permanently use the program. When the user downloaded the trial version of the program, he probably had to accept T&C granting a one-time only say 3‑month trial period. It is a mere breach of contract if you’re circumventing this, but you might still be liable to damages. Circumventing technological protection measures is forbidden, § 95a UrhG. However, these protection measures must be considered effective. Now, lawyers are usually no computer gurus, so they might arrive at completely different conclusions, but I guess/hope editing a plain text file, substituting a plaintext ISO 8601 date, will not be deemed “effective”. (I presume the same effect could be achieved by resetting the computer’s RTC.) Having said that, since you intend to “publish a guide […] detailing how to use this exploit” I suspect it might not be that trivial and thus, from a lawyer’s POV, be considered an “effective” technological protection measure. If it is considered an effective technological protection measure, you might be punishable via § 108b UrhG, but I’m not sure about that. The wording is terribly complex.

It sounds like you may be conflating ownership and control. It's very common for an affiliate to have a contract with the parent company. These terms can be very detailed - it may give the parent company the right to sell the affiliates widgets, but not sprockets (as those are sold by another parent company). As such, you can't really measure "control" as a simple percentage. So, when the parent is selling widgets, it can reasonably claim control over its affiliate. The buyer does not need to know the exact terms governing the relation between parent and affiliate.

No. CSP is a suggestion to browsers to implement some security checks. Bypassing CSP is no more illegal than using a browser that doesn't support it.

You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.

In common law contract law, the price tag or posted price is only an invitation to treat. The offer and acceptance of the offer happen at the cash register. You are free to back out of the deal when you become aware of the higher price at the register. Barring a consumer protection law that forces vendors to honour listed prices, common law contract law applies. It is hard to prove a negative and I have limited exposure to UK law, but these two articles lead me to believe that the UK doesn't have a law requiring vendors to honour posted prices: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/money-saving-tips/10602641/Price-glitches-Do-retailers-have-to-honour-pricing-mistakes.html If an item is priced incorrectly on the shelf, or scans at the wrong price at the till, retailers are under no obligation to honour it, under the Sale of Goods Act. http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/sep/10/does-shop-honour-price-shelf price tag is not a contract. It is an "invitation to treat" ie it is inviting the customer to make an offer to purchase and the retailer doesn't have to accept that offer. A contract is only formed when the shop accepts a payment

In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages.

Does any state legislature explicitly prohibit the use of playing cards in school? I am a Math teacher in a private school in the US. A majority of students consider probability and statistics a very boring topic and tend to focus significantly less compared to other topics. So last semester I reworked the curriculum and started playing games with decks of playing cards. I encouraged students to calculate probabilities, expected values, etc then come up with strategies to improve their odds of winning. I saw a meaningful boost in both engagement and grades. I shared this teaching method in a message group. Some public school teachers liked the idea but had reservations about the legality of the content. They were worried about playing cards' connection to gambling, which could "raise the eyebrows of school boards and other authorities". As far as I know minors playing card games is fine as long as there is no money or other things that have monetary value on the line. Of course school districts could decide to ban such content if they considered it undesirable, but is there any education-related legislation in any state that explicitly states that "material that incites or resembles real-life gambling" cannot be used in schools, blocking them from being introduced to the classroom in the first place?

england Quite the opposite; although playing cards are not specifically mentioned, gambling education is actively encouraged in schools: but through the support of charities and the voluntary sector - not by statute. The key players are: PSHE Association (standing forPersonal, Social, Health and Economic) who, in partnership with BeGambleAware have a host of educational material, including the: Gambling prevention education handbook GamCare alongside YGAM and Fast Forward (from Scotland) and in line with PSHE Association guidance launched the Gambling Education Framework, that: provides a set of evidence-based principles to deliver effective gambling education for anyone who works with young people (aged 7 to 24) in a paid or voluntary capacity across a variety of formal and informal settings, including schools in England. Although tagged united-states, I have answered according to the LawSE Help Centre: "we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"

The answer is a clear maybe. The school has a set of rules and by not attending you have broken those rules. The rules may (probably do) allow for consideration of extenuating circumstances but, in general, it doesn't have to. There is probably an appeals process, you need to investigate this. That said, if there are no provisions for extenuating circumstances and/or no appeals process then this may make the contract "unconscionable"; in many jurisdictions this makes the contract void. That doesn't mean you get the marks; it means you get your money back. The circumstances of your court appearance matter: the school may grant special consideration if you are called as a juror or witness; they might not if you are a defendant. Ultimately you had a choice, to follow the rules of the court or the school; there are consequences either way.

Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money.

I wouldn't say that it "trumps state law". Indeed, the State of Georgia, either expressly by statute or through the common law, establishes that teachers and school administrators have the authority to create rules and regulations governing the conduct of students that are not themselves unconstitutional as applied to students, although, in general these consequences can't resort to criminal punishments. Instead, typical punishments include detention, suspension (in school or out of school), expulsion, and adjustment of grades for an assignment or a course. Marks in one's disciplinary record and public shaming, forfeiture of eligibility to participate in school sponsored extra-curricular activities or honors (including marching at graduation), refusing to release transcripts, and historically (but much less so in recent years) corporal punishments such as spanking, have been options for schools to enforce their punishments. A prohibition on recording in a syllabus certainly wouldn't result in criminal punishments, and probably wouldn't even give rise to civil liability. Depending upon the purpose for which the recording was being used, it is even conceivable that the school's right to punish someone for violating a school rule could be estopped by First Amendment and whistle blower protection law considerations (e.g. if it was used to document harassment and discriminatory conduct for use in sharing with the school board or law enforcement or publishing on radio or TV or an Internet news source). But, the mere fact that conduct is legal outside a school setting does not mean that a school cannot prohibit and punish that conduct in its own rules. The closer case, upon which there is more division of legal authority, is under what circumstances a school can legitimately punish conduct away from school, for example, uploading rap lyrics about a teacher to YouTube from home without using any school resources to do so.

Yes, this is gambling. The coupons have a value; gambling is the wagering of something of value. As to if it is illegal gambling, that would depend on the law in the jurisdiction where it takes place: for an internet transaction this could be the jurisdiction of the website owner or the user or both. As an example: in Australia, the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 is administered by the Department of Communication and the Arts, it provides: Any game of chance, including games of mixed chance and skill played over the internet, is prohibited under the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 if it’s provided to someone who is physically in Australia. The Act defines a gambling service as: gambling service means: (a) a service for the placing, making, receiving or acceptance of bets; or (b) a service the sole or dominant purpose of which is to introduce individuals who wish to make or place bets to individuals who are willing to receive or accept those bets; or (c) a service for the conduct of a lottery; or (d) a service for the supply of lottery tickets; or (e) a service for the conduct of a game, where: (i) the game is played for money or anything else of value; and (ii) the game is a game of chance or of mixed chance and skill; and (iii) a customer of the service gives or agrees to give consideration to play or enter the game; or (f) a gambling service (within the ordinary meaning of that expression) that is not covered by any of the above paragraphs. The Act provides exemptions, however, based on the small amount of information in your question its hard to tell if any would apply. Broadly, the exemptions allow for certain types of gaming to be licensed/regulated. The Act applies to any service that may be accessed by people in Australia irrespective of where it is in the world.

Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.

Copyright law regulates copying of protected material. In the US, there are no laws that specifically prohibit reading anything. It may be illegal to be in possession of something (classified material), but if it is legal to be in possession, it is legal to read. (Do not confuse "read" with "read aloud to an audience" a.k.a. perform, which is a separate copyright protection). It is not illegal to be in possession of material that was copied without permission.

Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to.

Theoretical vs. Actual Speed Limit One of the peculiarities of Texas is that it's normal for people to drive 5-10 MPH over the speed limit while on the interstate. Provided they're not doing a speed trap, the police generally don't care. Another of Texas's peculiarities is that most drivers don't respect reduced speed limits for construction zones unless there's a speed trap or it's dangerous to go normal speeds. As a result, if you drive the speed limit, you can conceivably end up driving 15 mph slower than everybody else in construction zones. This is unsafe for you and everybody else on the surrounding road. Say that you're going the speed limit, and someone hits you because you're going 15 mph slower than the prevailing traffic conditions. Are you liable? You're following the speed limit, but by doing so you made yourself a danger to those around you.

The situation in Texas is complicated. Driving faster than the posted maximum speed limit is not in and of itself a crime; rather, per Texas Transportation Code 545.352(a), it is prima facie evidence that the speed is a violation of 545.351(a): "An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing". It is theoretically possible to defeat a speeding ticket by demonstrating that the speed was, in fact, reasonable and prudent. Texas also has a law regarding minimum speed, 545.363(a): "An operator may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law". Since the speed limit is not a hard limit, the "compliance with law" clause does not protect you. If you get rear-ended while driving slower than the flow of traffic, your best defense is probably 545.351(b)(2): "An operator...shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle that is on or entering the highway in compliance with law and the duty of each person to use due care". The question in court becomes your claim that driving slowly constituted "due care" versus the other driver's claim that their speed was "reasonable and prudent". It's likely that you'll win, but it's not the slam-dunk case that it would be in a state where posted speed limits were hard restrictions.

No they didn't break any British traffic regulations. As can be seen in the video, the road is closed to regular traffic. This is done by British police motorcycles according to British traffic laws. On this temporarily closed road regular traffic regulations no longer apply. Bidens motorcade can use whatever light they feel like. This is the same principle that happens in say a political demonstration. Police block the road for regular traffic. Afterwards trucks with all kinds of decorations are allowed to drive inside a crowd of walking people. This would not be legal according to British traffic regulations but it is fine in this situation because the road is blocked for regular traffic.

Yes A police officer (or other emergency service driver) will turn their lights and siren on as soon as they have a need to do so. This may be in response to something they've seen or in response to an emergency call. Since you can't see and hear what they can see and hear this may seem sudden or arbitrary to you. Your obligations, as spelled out in the 2019 California Drivers Handbook (p. 74) are: Emergency Vehicles You must yield the right-of-way to any police vehicle, fire engine, ambulance, or other emergency vehicle using a siren and red lights. Drive to the right edge of the road and stop until the emergency vehicle(s) have passed. However, never stop in an intersection. If you are in an intersection when you see an emergency vehicle, continue through the intersection and then, drive to the right as soon as it is safe and stop. ... You have to get out of their way. However, they are still obliged to drive safely subject to the circumstances (e.g. that they are on the wrong side of the road traveling fast) and, in the event of a collision, you may not necessarily be at fault.

In most Australian states, it is an offence to drive "abnormally slowly" in a way that unreasonably obstructs drivers or pedestrians. For example, in New South Wales: A driver must not unreasonably obstruct the path of another driver or a pedestrian For this rule, a driver does not unreasonably obstruct the path of another driver or a pedestrian only because: b. the driver is driving more slowly than other vehicles (unless the driver is driving abnormally slowly in the circumstances). Example of a driver driving abnormally slowly : A driver driving at a speed of 20 kilometres per hour on a length of road to which a speed limit of 80 kilometres per hour applies when there is no reason for the driver to drive at that speed on the length of road.

One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies

The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.

One issue is whether that left-turn (that's what it's normally for, not a u-turn) has a sign that allows u-turns. If it isn't marked, then I think these rules would control: U-turns are prohibited in these locations (from Oregon's DMV): Intersections controlled by a traffic signal, unless a sign permits the turn. Between intersections in a city. Any location within city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 500 feet. Any location outside city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 1,000 feet. At or on a railroad crossing. Any location where U-turns are prohibited by official signs or markings. I find them a little contradictory, but that may be because my state, California, is more permissive with u-turns. I also live in an area that's too crowded so it's easier to get the space and time to make a u-turn 'between intersections.'

Close to zero. The police typically don't dole out traffic or parking tickets for infractions they haven't personally witnessed.

Is it illegal to take pictures of the police in public in Germany? I visited Cologne last year. I was taking a selfie with my phone's inner camera in front of a monument. I was unaware that my phone's outer camera was facing police officers conducting checks. One of them noticed it and approached me. He saw the picture of me with the monument instead of them, apologized for his misunderstanding then went back to work. Is it an offense to photograph the police in Germany? I searched multiple websites but people gave very different answers and opinions, even on the same forum. I've never been charged for such offense anywhere in the EU but Germany is well known for its strict privacy laws and I do not wish to break any laws. If it is indeed illegal and I get fined for it, will my past record add extra burden every time I visit Germany such as extra checks or questioning? Or is it something I can brush off since I live in Schengen anyway?

No, but... It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. However you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem but you have no right to publish the photo. To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. Publication without a release (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons is a punishable offense, which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from Art. 2 GG, §22, §23 and §33 Kunsturhebergesetz. Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned in this question. Do note that such photography can also be a crime under §201a StGB, especially if your photography shows someone as vulnerable. Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons.

There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page, under the heading "How we use personal data": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras, CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP

You could do that online, this website will help you with that: http://www.online-strafanzeige.de/ Also, just go to the police... They must accept your complaint and will check it. Also they can tell you wether it is likely that the complaint will lead to a lawsuit or not.

In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?

From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info.

What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.

Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules".

It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.

What, if any, is the tolerance built into speed limits in India? Jurisdiction: India Legislation: Central Motor Vehicles Act Sub-jurisdiction: Maharashtra Legislation: Mumbai Motor Vehicles Act Speed limits in India are according to the referenced article below. In many nations, there is actually a grace of +5km/hr, or similar value so that any inadvertent gain (e.g. slope of carriageway, downwind) does not result in a fine. Is there any similar grace/speed tolerance in India? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_limits_in_India

What, if any, is the tolerance built into speed limits in India? None in statute (that I can find), but the police may have an informal policy1 to allow for other factors like inaccuracies in one's speedometer and misreading the needle due to parallax. 1The one I am aware of is "10% +2" where, say, anyone going over 35mph on a 30mph road gets a ticket etc

Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed.

Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed.

As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.

It wouldn’t Motor vehicle designs and modifications have to meet certain safety standards - so called “street legal”. These don’t. Play with them all you like on a private track but they won’t get on the road

In Germany, the noise of playing children is defined as not noise according to §22 BImSchG. Normal industrial/commercial limits do not apply. This aims mostly at playgrounds, kindergartens, etc. The noise of cars, stereos, etc. is not unlimited even before 22:00, but it is considerably harder to get the police to intervene during daytime. You might consult with a lawyer to find out if they are unreasonably noisy, you are unreasonably thin-skinned, or both. Similarly, the driving you describe may be violating traffic regulations, but proving that will be difficult. As to actual damages to your premises, what happens depends on the age of the children and if they had proper supervision by their guardians. Proper supervision does not require the guardians to stand next to the children around the clock. If you have a specific case, and if the "perpetrator" was over 7 years old, you can ask for repayment and then sue if they refuse. This is most likely more hassle than the damage is worth, even if you do get a judgement against a minor, but it could change the tone of the relationship with your neighbours. They would have to explain in court what they did to supervise their children ...

Art. 25 of the Indian Constitution says (in part) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. But, Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The preamble does also declare that India is a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic, but this is not a clearly-enforceable article. There is no legal requirement that government action be entirely devoid of consideration for religion. What the law says is that the government must respect the rights of individuals to practice their own religion, but that does not preclude favoring a particular religion, e.g. using Hindu texts in official contexts. So far, the courts have not rules that government action must be entirely devoid of religious reference (for example the various Hindu family laws vs. Muslim family laws are not unconstitutional).

When a pedestrian is in a clearly marked crosswalk, and didn't suddenly leap out in front of an oncoming car, the vehicle operator is legally obligated to stop. Stop, not merely slow down, see for example RCW 46.61.235 The operator of an approaching vehicle shall stop and remain stopped to allow a pedestrian or bicycle to cross the roadway within an unmarked or marked crosswalk when the pedestrian or bicycle is upon or within one lane of the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling or onto which it is turning. For purposes of this section "half of the roadway" means all traffic lanes carrying traffic in one direction of travel, and includes the entire width of a one-way roadway It is legal to stop and ask "Excuse me, can I pass?", or words to that effect, in case a pedestrian gets stalled. There is no defense whereby you don't have to stop if it is dark, or you are free to ignore pedestrians in the crosswalk if there is a bright light. The burden is on the driver to see the pedestrian that he is about to hit. It is also not a defense that the guy in the right lane did not previously cream the pedestrian. The pedestrian is not invisible, although perhaps because of the light it was not possible to see the pedestrian until the car is maybe 20 feet away. If the driver had slowed down in a manner appropriate to the circumstances (as is required by law), he could have easily stopped before the crosswalk. It is not a defense that "this street is posted for 30, I was doing 30", because you are never allowed to drive faster than is safe for existing conditions.

In France, can the insurance not apply if my motorcycle has racing parts? I have a motorcycle in France that is insured. For clarification, I do ride on road and not on a circuit. Doing some maintenance, I changed the air filter to a racing one that says to increase air flow (and therefore performances). In the description of the filter is written "Competition use on closed circuit only." and the filter has a different color to clearly indicate it's a racing one. For precision, there is a similar air filter said to be for "performance" that does not contain the "Competition use on closed circuit only." line in the description nor the special color and with smaller indicated air flow. In case of an accident (responsible or not), can my "all-risks" insurance not apply because of this ?

Racing parts generally lack EWG certification and thus roadworthiness certificates A part needs to have an EWG registration number matching to the type of vehicle to be allowed to be used on a street-legal motorcycle. If a part has non street-legal parts, its whole registration usually is void. Driving a vehicle without a valid registration is illegal and generally not insured. Please check the regulator or the general information of insurance companies about what replacement parts have to comply with. Your insurance agency usually can help you too.

You can sue anyone you want. But if you are talking about suing VW because they are one of the thousands of entities that contribute to the overall degeneration of our atmospheric quality, then you would lose. You'd have to be able to show that VW itself caused your respiratory problem to either exist or that their diesel cars exacerbated a pre-existing condition. The type of testimony this would require would be expert testimony, and you would have the burden of showing that VW was the root cause. This would be impossible. You could show negligence (maybe even gross negligence or intentional misrepresentation), but you could never show causation and likely not even damage (attributable to them). These are the three elements you would need to prove. I would wager you could not even hire an expert that would testify to this, because they would lose all credibility in their field if they said that one car manufacturer had a measurable/quantifiable negative effect on your health. Even if you could, the judge would probably not certify the testimony as expert as it's likely junk science, or, the expert would just be disbelieved. There is no way to accurately measure their complicity in having their cars automatically pass emissions tests. It may be that their cars were still low E, just not to the extent they claimed.

I cannot see any criminal offence with Bob losing a bike. It is, as far as I can see, purely contractual. According to TfL Santander Cycles Lost, stolen or faulty page: If your cycle is lost or stolen, call the Contact Centre on 0343 222 6666 (call charges may apply). We're open every day of the year. And: Charges for missing/damaged cycles You may be charged if the bike is not returned or is damaged by you or an additional user. Not returned: up to a maximum charge of £300 Damage: up to a maximum charge of £300 Similarly, purely losing a hire car is not a criminal offence. It would be a matter for the insurance provider to deal with. If Bob was complicit in theft, then that would require a different (and off-topic) answer.

There is nothing illegal about selling used bikes online. Importing goods is subject to legal regulation such as customs duties. These goods might even be subject to punitive steel and aluminum tariffs since bike metal could easily be converted to metal for other purposes. And, if the bikes have fake trademarks, they might be interdicted, although the "first sale rule" makes import of bikes with real trademarks legal. There is nothing remotely related to copyright at issue in your proposal.

In general, anyone can buy potentially dangerous chemicals. My local service station sells petrol, my local liquor store sells alcohol, my local supermarket sells ammonia, my local pool shop sells chlorine, my local hardware store sells poisons and my local chemist sells drugs. The world is full of dangerous stuff and all of it is for sale. Certain governments may regulate the sale of certain products. Such regulations may cover packaging, storage, quantities, reporting and limits on who can be a buyer or seller. For example, who can be a buyer of Uranium is pretty strictly limited. The decision about what and how to regulate is a political one, not a legal one. In general, governments apply a cost/benefit approach (including political costs/benefits). The fact that one (or a small number) of people use something inappropriately must be balanced with the cost that regulation imposed on government and legitimate users. Also, in most parts of the developed world people are allowed to take risks with their own bodies - climbing mountains, surfing, parachuting and, yes, injecting themselves with foreign substances. It’s unwise but it’s not illegal. I am unable to assist you with who would be responsible for regulating such matters in France but I can suggest that neither the FDA nor the EPA would be relevant in the USA because its neither a food nor a drug (FDA) nor is it being sole in quantities that are likely to adversely affect the environment (EPA).

No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.

An insurer can’t find anyone at fault An insurance company cannot find you or anyone else at fault - they don't have the power. They are alleging that you are at fault and, presumably, demanding damages. Whether you are at fault or not is a matter for you to concede (by paying them) or a court to determine based on the evidence when they sue you (or you sue them for your damages). The other driver’s insurer only knows what they have been told and it’s likely the other driver genuinely believes they were not at fault and, based on what you say happened, they may very well be right, or at the very least, that both drivers were at fault. For example, it’s not clear if you turned from the left most lane into the left most lane as you are required to do or if you changed lanes during the turn. Notwithstanding, it sounds like you drove into them (that is, the front of your car was behind the front of their car) and the fundamental rule of driving is don’t drive into things - failing to avoid a collision is a go to offense in all driving rules.

Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car.

Is there a bright line for witness, prosecutor & judge intimidation? ABC News reports: Trump on Friday afternoon had posted a message to his social media platform, Truth Social, saying, "IF YOU GO AFTER ME, I'M COMING AFTER YOU!" I am curious as to how the legal community will process the tweet. I'd like to understand if there is a "bright line" so as to determine if it has been crossed.

The only bright line regards the First Amendment. 18 USC 1512 articulates a line that is not to be crossed, but it is not clear where the line is as regards speech (subsection (a)(1) sets forth a bright line, viz "kills or attempts to kill", irrelevant to the present question). Otherwise, the remaining categories fall into three subtypes: (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to.. (c) Whoever corruptly— (d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from— These laws address communications addressed to witnesses, w.r.t. testimony. Case law e.g. US v. DiSalvo, US v. Murray all indicates that the forbidden threat must be addressed to an individual who might be a witness, whereas the above statement is not addressed, it is merely uttered (there is no clearly-intended recipient of the utterance). Similarly, 18 USC 1503 forbids "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ing] to influence, intimidate, or impede" a judicial officer, but this requires there to be a threat made to a specific judicial officer.

It is unlikely that the US, or any government, would condone any kind of crime. The reason for this is that the law must be seen to be impartial and applied fairly to all those subject to it. What happens if tomorrow, the government decides they don't like you? It is possible that this type of activity, or activity amounting to it, would be sanctioned in specific, authorised cases. But the government throwing a lynch mob at anyone is a bad idea for order and a peaceful society.

There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity.

I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law.

The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.

It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.

There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.

This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.

Is it generally legally allowed for UK police to lie to people in the regular course of discharging their policing duties? Generally speaking can one count on the words coming out of a British police officer in uniforms mouth as truthful? Under what circumstances is it permitted not to be? Is there any special circumstances or authorizations that are required for them to be permitted to lie? If so, what are these?

It seems to not be allowed for a UK police to lie. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes it illegal for the police to mislead a suspect in order to make them believe that the police have evidence which they do not or that the evidence they have is stronger than it is, or that there is a possibility of leniency (for example in return for ‘cooperation’) where none exists. Realistically, there is no reason that a police officer might lie to a suspect during interview. Also see from innocenceproject.org: The law does not allow lying to suspects, under any circumstances.

Yes Yes, telling lies is generally not unlawful, much less criminal, as long as you did not intend to profit by them, and there is no specific law violated (for example it is a crime to lie to a law enforcement officer about matters materiel to an ongoing investigation). Attempting to get the scammer to send you money on false pretenses, however morally justified some would consider it, is likely to constitute fraud.

I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to: What is the law here? SHORT ANSWER It's not a crime to answer a police question with "I would like to speak to my lawyer"? But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice. What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence. LONG ANSWER A police officer is an examining officer, and under paragraph 2 Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000: (1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). section 40(1)(b) says: (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Under Paragraph 5: A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— (a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests; (b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity; (c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer; (d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer. BUT, under paragraph 5A (1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply— (a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule, (b) on a prosecution for perjury, or (c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1). Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under paragraph 18 (1) A person commits an offence if he— (a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, (b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or (c) wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule. Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under section 58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.

There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.

Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.

When does a cogeneration plant feed power to the net, according to the german KWK-G 2015? §7 (1) of the current german KWK-G (Law concerning co-generation plants) makes a huge difference for power fed into the grid, or not. Say an installation consumes 150-200 kW contiually, and operates a 100kW el CHP - so there's never any net backfeed into the net. This describes a typical sewage gas CHP at a wastewater plant. Is this cogeneration plant feeding into the net according to §7 (1)? The relevant wording is "Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird, beträgt: ..."

(1) Der Zuschlag für KWK-Strom, der in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist wird und auf den die §§ 61e bis 61g und 104 Absatz 4 des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes in der am 31. Dezember 2022 geltenden Fassung nicht anzuwenden sind, beträgt... The german is - unlike Ohwilleke complains with the english translation - quite clear: Electric energy to qualify under this paragraph needs to: [be produced] by implication get put into a network for public consumption [in ein Netz der allgemeinen Versorgung eingespeist] needs to not be regulated under §§ 61e to 61g or 104 (4) EEG (law partaining renewable energy) §61 was repealed and removed in the 2023 version, a §104 does no longer exist either. Old versions of §61 EEG and §104 EEG are archived. The various §61a to g regulated which type of producer got which percentage and §104 regulated who gets money for produced energy. Among those regulations, which make the meaning of §7(1) KWKG very clear is §61e EEG (2022) (1) Der Anspruch nach § 61 Absatz 1 verringert sich auf null Prozent der EEG-Umlage für Strom aus Bestandsanlagen, wenn der Letztverbraucher die Stromerzeugungsanlage als Eigenerzeuger betreibt, (1) The entitlement pursuant to Section 61 subsection 1 is reduced to zero percent of the EEG surcharge for electricity from existing systems, if the end consumer operates the power generation system as a self-producer, Under the old law, you need to actually produce more than your own requirement to be entitled to a payout, as producing less was meaning you are only an Eigenerzeuger. Even under the new requirement, Einspeisung is a standing term in Germany: It is only Einspeisung if the electrical energy is actually put into the public energy network ("Zufuhr von Strom in das öffentliche Versorgungsnetz").

I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!

The EU-wide 48 hour limit and the German Arbeitszeitgesetz only apply to employees, not to self-employed persons or freelancers. Thus, it would in principle be legal to have a full-time job and do any amount of freelancing on the side. I'm not sure whether your PhD student position factors into this since it is unpaid. If you have multiple employers, the sum of working time matters – this is one reason why you have to notify your employers about additional jobs. One employer cannot check your time with another employer, so you should inform them when your shifts change (while employers can assign you shifts, they must consider your personal circumstances). But self-employment is not employment. If you take this offer, you would act as a German business, perform work in Germany, pay taxes in Germany, but have an UK client. (Assuming your work would be done remotely rather than travelling to the UK to perform your work there). Freelancing would also mean that you'll meet the wonderful world of German bureaucracy, including registering with the Finanzamt, writing invoices, doing accounting, filing taxes, dealing with VAT, and trying to navigate a no-deal Brexit. At least your work likely counts as freiberuflich rather than gewerblich, which would free you from a Gewerbeanmeldung. Your don't have to seek permission from your employer when taking up a side job, but you must notify them. They can object if your side job would impact your work. This would clearly be the case when working for a competitor, or when your side job would bring you over the working time limit. Since you work in the public sector, there may be additional rules (parts of Beamtenrecht apply to your employment relationship). While the working time limit does not apply to freelancing, this might still impact your job if you get too little rest, or if you would become unavailable for your main job during normal working hours. Taking up a side job despite an objection could be cause for immediate termination. Note also that you cannot generally use vacation days to work a side job since vacation is intended for recuperation. To summarize: you would not work an UK job, but be employed in Germany and be self-employed in Germany the working time limit only relates to employed work, not self-employed work your employer may nevertheless be able to object to you taking up another job if it would affect your work

Is this charge legal in Georgia? No. It seems unlawful. First, it appears that the landlord was negligent and failed to mitigate damages. Since in general utilities are billed monthly, it is unreasonable for the landlord to have waited this long for a $2 charge that occurred on the first day of your tenancy. Second, legislation typically sets a deadline for a landlord to send a former tenant an itemized bill to cover for damages other than normal tear and wear. According to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-34(a), that deadline in Georgia is 30 days. Whereas the $2 charge is right (at least from a moral standpoint, as you mention), the $50 surcharge is devoid of merit.

Under federal law, it is illegal the minute you have any marijuana or marijuana seeds. Likewise under NJ law, except if authorized by state law, for medical marijuana production. Under NJ's medical marijuana law, "alternative treatment centers" grow and dispense medical marijuana, and there is no provision for mass-production growers (who don't distribute). Such a center is "an organization approved by the department [of Health and Senior Services] to perform activities necessary to provide registered qualifying patients with usable marijuana and related paraphernalia in accordance with the provisions of this act". The department accepts applications to operate such a center, and "shall seek to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of alternative treatment centers throughout the State, pursuant to need, including at least two each in the northern, central, and southern regions of the State" (they have to find a need for another center in a location, in order for one to get authorized; this is evaluated every 2 years). There are criminal background checks for those involved with a treatment center. According to this article, there are a maximum of 6 centers to be opened, in Montclair, Egg Harbor Township, Woodbridge, Bellmawr, and Cranbury (existing), and Secaucus (under review). The article implies that 6 is the statutory maximum, but that is the statutory minimum, though probably the regulatory maximum (i.e. the state will not authorize any further centers). It also says that the centers must be non-profit, though the law only requires the first two to be non-profit (though it could be a de facto requirement via the regulatory power of the Dept. of Health). Since they don't seem to be eager to expand availability, there isn't any information on what other requirements there are for operating such a center, though the application form is here. The 2016 annual report gives information on production at the 5 existing centers, which is in the range of 400-800 lbs annually.

germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.

The chief legal problem might be (depending on how you build and operate the thing) the amount of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) that you're causing. You are not exempt from FCC regulations, but § 15.23 Home-built devices. (a) Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use. (b) It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of §15.5 apply to this equipment. Since the question assumes "the builder knows what he's doing", we may assume the FCC demand "the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices" is met. But that also would assume that the builder knew about EMI in the first place.

The crucial phrase is "in ihrer Eigenschaft als Mitglieder". This restricts the prohibition on receiving benefits from the gGmbH to benefits you'd receive because you are a partner. It is common to have more than one legal relationship with a (g)GmbH, and being a CEO or otherwise employed by one is a typical situation. The snippet from the law does not restrict what benefits you may receive in your CEO role, just those in your partner role. The distinction is also relevant for regular GmbHs: If you are the CEO of a GmbH as well as a partner, then your salary as CEO is taxed differently than your share of the profits. But typically the tax on salary will be higher than the tax on profits, so there is little incentive here to overpay yourself.

Is the District of Columbia a "territory"? Within the boundaries of the United States there were at various times "organized incorporated territories", that were not a part of any of the states and whose governments were organized by acts of Congress rather than by a state constitution drafted by statesmen within the state and enacted by the voters of the state, and that, unlike the states, had no voting representatives or senators in Congress. (Somewhat like the three territories of northern Canada today, I think?) Is the District of Columbia simply an instance of that phenomenon, or is there some essential difference?

Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 states that "The Congress shall have Power" To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings which then happened in 1 Stat. 130 (1790). It is there referred to as "a district of territory" but more often simply as a "district". Unlike territories, its existence for its actual purpose as seat of government is specifically enabled by the Constitution. Then via 2 Stat 103 (1801), DC was politically brought within the control of Congress, so that residents were no longer residents of Maryland or Virginia. In this act it is consistently termed a "district".

I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law.

A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.

A US state's constitution cannot "put restrictions on" the Federal constitution, or any of the rights guaranteed by it, if by that is meant limiting the rights Federally guaranteed. The so called "Supremacy clause" of Article VI says: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. (The above was more relevant before the question was edited to remove the 'put restrictions on" language. But it is still accurate and somewhat relevant.) Similarly, and because of the Supremacy clause, the content of a US State's constitution cannot change the interpretation of the federal constitution, in either state or federal courts, including the presence or absence of rights similar to those protected by the Federal Constitution. However, a number of state constitutions have guarantees which parallel the federal First Amendment, particularly its freedom of speech and freedom of religion aspects. This is particularly true of state constitutions written prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. At that time, the Federal Bill of Rights only restricted the federal government, and so when similar restrictions were wanted against a state government, they had to be in the state constitutions. See Barron vs Baltimore for the limitation of the bill of rights to restricting the federal government at this time. Such provisions did not usually reference the Federal First Amendment explicitly, they simply had more or less similar language. Since the passage of the 14th, and the incorporation of the various provisions of the Federal bill of rights against the states (largely starting in the 1920s) most court cases have refereed to the Federal provision rather than any similar state provision, unless, as is sometimes the case, the state provision offers greater rights or wider scope than the federal one does.

The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners.

Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion.

Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

Are Technological Standards bodies required to be approved by the government? In the interest of cross vendor compatibility, the method by which different technologies interoperate is often standardized. This means that a non binding agreement is made between multiple parties to abide by rules set forth in a documented standard. Examples of this include The USB Device Working Group, Jedec, The C++ Standards Committee, and PCI-SIG. While presumably in the public's interest, these groups appear to be a fragrant violation of antitrust laws. Do they require a special license to operate? If so, what would such a license look like and what agency would issue it?

Standards-setting by industry groups is not inherently anti-competitive and these groups do not require a licence from the government to operate. They are a prototypical example of "private ordering" (see David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, "Standards Setting and Antitrust" (2003) 87 Minn. L.R. 1913, p. 1987). What can be anti-competitive is when a corporation advocates for an element to be included in a standard for reasons other than technical considerations. See e.g. the International Standards Organization's "Competition Law Guidelines." An example violation is the behaviour of Rambus, Inc.: According to the FTC complaint, Rambus nonetheless participated in JEDEC’s DRAM standard-setting activities for more than four years without disclosing to JEDEC or its members that it was actively working to develop, and possessed, a patent and several pending patent applications that involved specific technologies ultimately adopted in the standards. ... In its liability opinion dated July 31, 2006, the Commission found that, “Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets.” In another example, Dell Computer Corporation was alleged to have voted to approve the VL-bus standard and certified that the standard did not infringe its intellectual property. After the standard became very successful, Dell asserted an earlier-issued patent against several computer manufacturers using the standard. The FTC entered a consent agreement with Dell: prohibiting Dell from enforcing its patent against those who wanted to use the VL-bus standard. The FTC's order also prohibited Dell from enforcing patent rights in the future when it intentionally failed to disclose those rights upon request of a standards-setting organization.

The FCC has clarified their stance on this: ... were we mandating wholesale blocking of Open Source firmware modifications? We were not, but we agree that the guidance we provide to manufacturers must be crystal-clear to avoid confusion. So, today we released a revision to that guidance to clarify that our instructions were narrowly-focused on modifications that would take a device out of compliance. The revised guidance now more accurately reflects our intent in both the U-NII rules as well as our current rulemaking, and we hope it serves as a guidepost for the rules as we move from proposal to adoption. Essentially, Open Source firmware modifications are allowed, the modifications are disallowed are things like excessively increasing signal strength.

I see no reason to doubt your conclusion; since it's not allowed by the license it's forbidden by copyright. As you figured it, you gain the right to use these tools by obtaining one of those 3 Visual Studio licenses. A Visual Studio Code license is free, so it makes business sense that it doesn't include a license for Microsoft C++ Build Tools. I.e. you can't claim it's an "obvious oversight", as there's a justifiable business reason.

IANAL, but a EULA is a Contract of Adhesion https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_contract_of_adhesion and restrictions against publishing benchmarking data about products is fairly common https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas A contract is a contract, even a click-through, and is legally binding; there is plenty supporting case law. You sign when you click: http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-operations/contracts-and-electronic-signatures.html Basically, VMware has lots more money than you do. If they are annoyed at your posting of benchmarks that don't make their products look as good as they feel they should, they can at very least send a DMCA to the site that posts the benchmarks. Whether that works could depend on where the website is hosted. At most, they could take you to civil court, if you are in their jurisdiction. What happens, if you refuse to take your unapproved benchmark down? Can they sue you? Yes. (In civil, not criminal court). How much leg does a clause like this stand on the courts? In the United States? A contract is a contract. And VMware and you (I assume) are in the US, so the contract is enforceable. In the rest of the world? Outside of the US, enforceability is variable; that is searchable in law databases for each country and agreements between countries. Consider your motives for posting benchmarks against VMware's EULA. Do you have good points to make? Or are you simply complaining about the product? Who has more money to spend defending or fighting the EULA? You or them? If you're seriously concerned about this, talk to a lawyer and don't take legal advice from the general public.

If the details of your implementation are not disclosed by the previous patent, and more generally, if they are novel and non-obvious in light of the entire body of prior art (including the previous patent), then you could obtain a patent whose claims are limited to implementations that include (some of) those details. That said, your patent would not exclude the coverage of the previous patent—it is possible for something to be covered by the claims of multiple patents, even patents with different owners. If your implementation is a method that includes every step of a claim of the previous patent, then performing your implementation would still infringe that patent (regardless of the existence of your own patent or patent application). Analogously, if it is a device that includes all of the elements of a claim of the previous patent, it would infringe. Of course, the other patent may not be valid, and so you could seek to invalidate it if desired (but this can involve lengthy & expensive legal proceedings).

The MIT license is non-exclusive. If S is the sole copyright holder, S can issue any other non-exclusive license in parallel, and can also stop offering the software under the MIT license. However, open source licenses such the MIT license are generally understood to be irrevocable, so S cannot prevent other people from using the software who already received it under the MIT license terms. But: only if S is the sole copyright holder. There is no particular reason to believe that S would be the sole copyright holder. One does not gain a copyright ownership just by supervising other people, although an employer might gain copyright ownership over works created by employees (e.g. the US “work for hire” doctrine). That the copyright notices only mention S's name is an indication that S might be a copyright holder, but that's neither sufficient nor necessary for showing that S holds sole or joint copyright in the software. This leaves three relevant scenarios: S might be the sole copyright holder, in which case, yes, S can effectively discard the MIT license. This might be the case e.g. if there was some other copyright assignment, outside of the MIT license. What copyright transfers or assignments are valid depends on the local laws, e.g. some jurisdiction do not recognize copyright as transferable and at most allow the assignment of economic aspects of copyright. S might not be the sole copyright holder, but have additional permissions to the work. For example, there might have been extra licensing agreements, outside of the MIT license. Or S might have special rights for a work of joint authorship, if and only if the jurisdiction recognizes such additional rights. S might not be the sole copyright holder and not have any agreements outside of the MIT license. Then S has no additional rights, and is bound by the terms of the MIT license. This doesn't have to be a problem: S can still pretty much do whatever S wants with the code, as long as S fulfils the license terms. These are pretty simple: just keep a copy of the copyright+license notice with any copies of the software the students created.

Software cannot be patented although it does have copyright. Hardware can be the subject of a patent, however, that would not cover any software aspects such as the programming built into a PROM. While it is possible to render any software into an integrated circuit, practically, anything simple enough to make this feasible is probably too simple to patent.

Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.

Can privacy regulations prevent my alma mater from sharing the fact that I graduated there? I graduated from some private high school a long time ago. During my years there, I have experienced and witnessed a variety of dubious practices that violate students' rights. I always wanted to leave but never had the necessary resources nor support to execute my plan. Due to this I never associate myself with my school, not even in my resumés. Recently I received an honorable mention in an invention competition. I was so proud of myself until I searched the name of the competition on Google. On page 1 a familiar name popped up. It was my school's name. When I clicked on it, I saw my name in a school blog post. John Doe's remarkable feat in Blah Blah Invention Competition John Doe, Class of 2000 has won an honorable mention in ... I was so surprised that they heard the news in the first place, considering the fact that I cut off all contact with the school admin and peers after I became an adult. I didn't want my name on that page, especially given the fact that some alumni have started to come out about what they suffered in school in recent years. Can I prevent them from using the fact that I graduated their school on their website by citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act(FERPA) or others? Or is this fair game per first amendment grounds and am I out of luck?

The privacy rule is spelled out here. Subpart D addresses disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records, saying when consent is required vs. not required (there being 16 conditions under which consent is not required). Mostly this refers to "required by law" exceptions, or "for school-internal use", but also includes "directory information". Information may be disclosed if the student (as an adult) or a parent (of a minor) has consented to disclosure. Under the legal definition of "record", that simply means "tangible information" (not "conversations"). An education record is one that is "directly related to a student; and maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency or institution", possibly including the information that you cite – providing that the information is maintained and disclosed by the school. In addition, though, certain information can be freely disclosed, namely "directory information" which is: Directory information includes, but is not limited to, the student's name; address; telephone listing; electronic mail address; photograph; date and place of birth; major field of study; grade level; enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time or part-time); dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees, honors, and awards received; and the most recent educational agency or institution attended. The regulation explains that this is information that "would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed". Privacy standards have changed since the law was passed – but it is allowed by the existing law.

FERPA protects the privacy of students' records, irrespective of their age or grade level. Age is generally only relevant in determining who can assert those privacy rights. When you enter school at age 5 or whatever, your parents make your privacy decisions for you. When you turn 18, you become an "eligible student," i.e., eligible to assert or waive your privacy rights without parental oversight.

Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person, whether that information is public or not. The student website is definitely processing personal data of faculty. Any website is also necessarily processing personal data of visitors due to technical reasons, even though hosting has been outsourced to a third party. There's always a server, you just might not be managing it yourself. Thus, GDPR applies. Just because it processes personal data doesn't mean that the student website would be illegal. It just means the students are responsible for GDPR compliance of that website. Since the website is controlled by students and not by the university, the university DPO has no say here and the university can't demand the website to be hosted in a particular manner. Nevertheless, the DPO's suggestions might be quite sensible. Typical GDPR compliance steps include: having a clear purpose for which the personal data is being processed having a legal basis for that processing (here, probably a “legitimate interest” which will require a balancing test), see Art 6 providing transparent information to the data subjects providing a privacy notice to website visitors, see Art 13 notifying faculty per the requirements in Art 14 GDPR preparing to fulfill data subject rights such as access, rectification, and erasure when using a legitimate interest, there's also a right to “object” (opt-out) implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure security and compliance of your processing activities, see Art 24+32 making sure that third parties to which you outsource processing activities are contractually bound as “data processors” to only use the data as instructed by you, see Art 28 if you transfer data to non-European countries, having appropriate safeguards in place Does this sound complicated? It can be complicated. The point is that the internet is no longer the lawless Wild West. Just because you can easily publish a site with personal data, doesn't mean that you should. The GDPR is about requiring data controllers to find an appropriate balance with the rights and interests of the affected persons. Of course there are countries with less regulation, but there are also countries with fewer taxes and that isn't necessarily good for society. The easiest way to avoid these responsibilities will be to stop publishing the site as students – and instead taking up the university DPO's offer to have the university run the site. Which is less fun, of course, but the adult thing to do. If this motivates you further: note that the data controller (the people responsible for the site) must publish their contact information in the privacy notice, typically name + email + street address. The GDPR contains no exceptions that would help here. There is an exception for purely personal or household activities. But if the website would be available to the general public, it would be difficult to argue that this is purely personal. There's also case law such as the Lindqvist case requiring a narrow interpretation of that exception. In Art 9, the GDPR does mention that some restrictions are lifted if the data subject made the information public themselves. But that isn't relevant here, because Art 9 is only about extra-protected sensitive data, e.g. health information, union membership, or sexual orientation.

You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.

As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.

We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.

A mnemonic like CRAAP is not protected by copyright. The Copyright office says "Copyright does not protect names, titles, slogans, or short phrases", so you do not run afoul of copyright law using that or any other abbreviation. There is a registry of copyright-registered works, maintained by the copyright office, where authors may register their works, but legal protection exists regardless of registering. Some abbreviations are protected under trademark law, which you can search here. There are 50 registrations that include "AAA" and three that are just "AAA", also you'll find WTF and LOL. Trademark protection doesn't forbid all uses of an registered abbreviation. It turns out that "CRAAP" is not a registered trademark, but it could be the registered trademark of a manufacturer of crab traps, so you would not likewise call your crab trap company CRAAP, but it would be okay for plumbing supplies (trademark is relative to business uses, which are described in the registration). The only other imaginable scenario that would impede your plan is a non-disclosure agreement. For that to be relevant, there would have to be a valid contract between you and the teacher which specifically prohibits disclosure of the acronyms. The chances that there is a contract between you and the teacher is so low that it is hardly worth considering, but let's explore that for a moment. A contract is an agreement between parties where each party promises to do something that they are not already obligated to do, in exchange for getting something that they do not already have a right to. You had a contract with the college, not with the teacher. The college clearly would not prohibit "using any information gained in the course of study here", and the courts would not enforce any such "don't use" wording in a contract as unconscionable (why else do you go to college?). Your contract with the college allows you to take classes and use the knowledge that you gain. The teacher's contract with the college requires her to teach some content, and probably allows her to set certain rules of class conduct. She might have been able to toss you out of class for disseminating her methods, but at this point she has no legal recourse. NDA enforcement is generally limited to protecting "trade secrets", which are defined in terms of information with independent economic value deriving from the fact that the information is non-obvious". Also, an NDA will have a time limit associated with it except in the case of highly-sensitive personal information (social security numbers), so the courts will not enforce language saying "you can never make use of this information, or these names".

What legal designation status does the Ukrainian flag possess, and what recent changes has it had to its status? Under the town and country planning act, flags have three possible designations. What is the designation of the Ukrainian flag, and what has been its most recent changes of status?

The flag of Ukraine is a "Class H" advertisement under Schedule 1 of the The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007, secondary to the Town and Country Planning Act. Schedule 1 of the regulation lists under Class H Any country’s national flag and it has included this since its inception in 2007.

I am not from Denver, so it may be different there, but I would think most people would take that to mean the appliance meets UL standards or other safety standards and has been certified. Each governing body, be it a town, county, state, or country, gets to decide who can certify an appliance.

Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.

Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: "hate speech" based on race, religion, disability and "homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation" was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime ("to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt" based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination.

The main treaty here is the Outer Space Treaty and its implementation in US law. For your purposes, the relevant sections of the treaty are Article II: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article VI: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities...The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty... and Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel thereof... Article II means that setting up your colony doesn't give you ownership over the land it sits on (and Article XII permits anyone to stop by for a visit at any time), but it doesn't outlaw setting up a permanent base. And I hope your "all the resources" includes a small army of lawyers. Between them, Article VI and Article VIII make the United States government responsible for anything you do in space, so there's a lot of paperwork involved in getting permission to do anything above the Karman line.

General case - legal or not? It is hard to prove a negative - however, as far as I can see: It is not illegal to state your opinion that the existence of the state of Israel is unjustified, or that the state should be dissolved. Such a position would be considered outrageous by most Germans, in particular it is against the stated position of pretty much all political parties, except for the extreme right or left, and of most other organizations. It is not, however, illegal. In general, the dissolution of a state is not in itself illegal according to national or international law, as long as it happens voluntarily. There are some precedents: For example, during the German Reunification of 1989, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) under the (old) Article 23 of the Grundgesetz. One could argue that the German Democratic Republic effectively dissolved itself by that accession. What would probably be illegal would be to call for a violent end of the state of Israel, or even for a war. The relevant laws: §130 Strafgesetzbuch -- Volksverhetzung (incitement to hatred) §13 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) and, only applicable to the state: Art. 26 Grundgesetz -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) Special case - civil servants Civil servants are citizens, too, so mostly the same laws apply to them. However, for civil servants specifically there are higher requirements when it comes to respect for the German constitution, specifically for the "freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung" (literally: "basic free and democratic order"). That means that opinions which are "extremist" but not illegal may not be tolerated. Applicable laws/regulations: §7 Beamtenstatusgesetz §9 Richtergesetz §3 of the Tarifvertrag der Länder (TV-L) As far as I can see, the rules for whether something violates these rules would be similar as above. Note that there are even some Israelis who think that the state of Israel should not exist, at least not in its present form, so such a position is not totally unthinkable. The Wikipedia articles Right to exist and Existenzrecht Israels (German) give a good overview.

Not before the transition period ends (31 December 2020): During this period, the UK will remain in both the EU customs union and single market. That means, until the transition ends, most things will stay the same. This includes: Travelling to and from the EU (including the rules around driving licences and pet passports) Freedom of movement (the right to live and work in the EU and vice versa)

The only one I can find so far relates to a Brazilian citizen getting married abroad, called a: Consular Declaration of Civil Status These are issued by the Consular Authority to: Brazilian citizens who intend to marry before a foreign authority within their jurisdiction. The document is issued in English. Source: gov.br (I have yet to find if a comparable certificate is available in-country, for marriage or otherwise, but none of the official guidance sites I have trawled though mention it)

whether entitled to reward or not Tam lost his wireless airpods in the campus. He advertised online and near the campus, a reward of $50 to who returns the lost earphones. Sania found them and went to return it. But next day she saw the advertisement and claim the reward. Advise Tam.

Sania is entitled to a reward of 7,50€. germany In Germany, to reward honest finders, the finder of an item is entitled to 5% of a lost item's value of up to 500€ under § 971 BGB. Airpods cost about 150 €, so Sania is entitled to a Fider's reward of 7,50 €. Anything more would be at the discretion of Tam, accepting less is at Sania's discretion. Do note, that denial of the finder's reward at the moment that Sania hands over the item means, that they also deny their entitlement to the reward. In fact, it is upon Sania to demand the reward, and unless they do so, it is presumed that they do not want a finder's reward. However in making her entitlement to the reward known, Sania may not cross the line into coercion or blackmail (§§ 240, 253 StGB). Should Sania say, without explanation "I demand a payment of 100 € for the airpods", that could be coercion, as she is not entitled to that. If she however says "I am entitled to finder's reward of 7,50 €, and had expenses of 2.50 € to get the phone to you, therefore you owe me 10 €" the picture is different - that is exactly the amount that the law says she would be owed. This is because atop the actual reward Sania can reclaim reasonable fees, such as the bus fare to get the phone to Tam under § 970 BGB. Under § 972 BGB, Sania does not have to relinquish the item till the reward and expenses have been paid but also does not become the owner of the item. The Fundbüro To evade a possible claim for "Unterschlagung von Fundsachen" (~conversion by not reporting a found item), the Fundbüro (Found item's office) exists when the owner can't be made out rapidly. Not only does it calculate the required finder's reward, but also handing it over to the office fulfills the requirement to report a found item that is worth more than 10 € under § 965 BGB. It is customary to store the lost items at the Fundbüro, but that is not required. To gain the item from the Fundbüro, Tam will have to pay any required handling fees to the office but also gets notice of how much he should pay to Sania as well as her contact details. Sania will get contact details of Tam in return, together with a notice that she has a claim to a reward of such value. Should Sania not have given her details, it is presumed that she did not want the finder's reward. If Sania retained the item, the Fundbüro will inform Tam of the estimated finder's reward and contact details for Sania, so Tam can reclaim the item.

It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money.

Yes. Technically, it would probably not be a claim for lost wages (which are usually awarded when someone injures you in a way that leaves you unable to work) but rather a claim for breach of contract. In that case, you would seek damages equal to the wages that you would have reasonably expected to earn. Keep in mind, though, that before making an award of contract damages, a court may expect to see proof that you've attempted to mitigate your damages, meaning that you tried to find work to replace the work that was promised. If you were promised a $100,000 apprenticeship, for instance, and you found a $75,000 apprenticeship, you would be eligible for the difference: $25,000 in damages. If you make reasonable efforts to find work but are unsuccessful, you'd be eligible for the full $100,000. If you make no efforts to mitigate, a court may deny damages altogether, or award "nominal" damages, which usually means $1.

A charge of Theft by Finding is unlikely to succeed, as by posting details of found property on the website Heathrow Airport have made a good faith attempt to find the owner. There might be some comedy value in suggesting Blackmail, but not much more than that. (You knew that one was tenuous.) There appear to be some grounds for arguing the "control" aspect of Criminal Conversion, and if you were to do that they may release your lost baggage to you in person or to your appointed agent. The problem is what would happen next. Heathrow Airport would have grounds for arguing that they had made a good faith attempt to return your baggage, that you had used their system to determine they had your baggage, but that you had chosen to avoid a nominal charge (less than £20, according to the website) to use that system. This would give them grounds to seek to recover the actual cost of storing, locating the owner, and handing the baggage over to them (likely to be more than £20), plus legal fees for recovery of cost (likely to be a lot more than £20). Their argument would be that they had incurred costs in attempting to return your baggage to you, and that it was your responsibility that you had refused an amount that is likely to be considered a reasonable fee for this activity. Short answer : It looks like there's nothing preventing you from pointing out a potential conflict, and it's a nice question for academic debate. But I wouldn't do it. Edit : If you've used the link to missingx.com from the heathrow.com website, you could also have been deemed to have accepted the charge ("if you want to reclaim your item") at point 4.

Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1.

A cease and desist letter is basically a formal way of them saying, "stop what you are doing, and please don't do it again." It is not proof of tortious conduct by you, nor is it proof of illegal conduct by you. It does not open up an avenue for the university to sue you, nor does it open up an avenue for the university to have you committed to a mental institution. Your behaviour after receiving such a letter does matter however. What is most likely their next step should you continue emailing members of the university, is to apply for an injunction. It is possible that should the injunction be granted, you may be liable to pay fees. Breaching an injunction can have serious consequences, including jail. I would recommend against writing a letter apologizing. You are doing the very thing they asked you not to do. If you do feel in inclined to apologize, you should write the letter to the general counsel and ask them to forward it along. They probably won't. Obviously you have to be quite careful with the content of the letter. You are almost certainly within your rights to continue to email their general counsel. In addition, they almost certainly cannot stop you from communicating with the state agency responsible for the university.

Do the police have to pay to fix your front door? If they took a year to analyse a mobile phone, can you claim due to the excessive amount of time it took? What if the device is returned broken, or wiped? What court costs can you recover? Can you recover loss of income? You've asked a few questions; I'll attempt to deal with them all, and I'll refer to each item as I do so. Damage to property This could apply to damage to property (items 1 and 3, which are more or less the same thing). The answer? The police may pay damages. Here's a recent example from 2008: Police in Britain paid out more than half a million pounds last year to repair doors, ceilings and even mantelpiece ornaments smashed in raids that were based on wrong information. ... The Home Office said that compensation policy was decided at force level but most police authorities draw tight legal lines round repayments. A spokesman for the Gwent force said: "The critical factor is simply whether forced entry is legal, proportionate and reasonable given the circumstances." Items seized as evidence In general, you are not entitled to compensation for an item that is seized for an extended duration of time (2). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) ("PACE") states: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. If it's just the data on your phone they want, then they would be required by PACE to copy it and then return the device. Legal costs A successful defendant (4) is entitled to compensation in some cases, including costs incurred for expert witnesses. Schedule 7, para. 3 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 inserts additional provisions to the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985: (3)Condition A is that the accused is an individual and the order is made under— (a)section 16(1), (b)section 16(3), or (c)section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d). (4)Condition B is that the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below which were— (a)proceedings in a magistrates’ court, or (b)proceedings on an appeal to the Crown Court under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence). (5)Condition C is that the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court. (10)In this section— “legal costs” means fees, charges, disbursements and other amounts payable in respect of advocacy services or litigation services including, in particular, expert witness costs; “advocacy services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right of audience in relation to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide; “expert witness costs” means amounts payable in respect of the services of an expert witness, including amounts payable in connection with attendance by the witness at court or elsewhere; “litigation services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right to conduct litigation in relation to proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide.” Basically, you can include the legal costs noted above: where the accused is an individual and the order is made under section 16(1), 16(3), or section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d) of the POA; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below, which were either proceedings in a Magistrates Court, or proceedings on appeal to the Crown Court under Section 108 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence); or where the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in relevant Crown court proceedings, as defined in POA s6A(11), and the Director of Legal Aid Casework has made a determination of financial ineligibility in relation to the accused and those proceedings (POA s16A(5A)). Compensation for loss of employment Loss of a job in and of itself is not generally grounds for compensation. What if you were arrested for some highly sought-after skill - say, computer vulnerability testing - and were acquitted by means of an affirmative defense? You might end up with a job that pays more. You are not entitled to any statutory relief. But, let's say it's something unflattering, and the police continued to broadcast your arrest and charges even though they were aware it was false. There's precedent for aggravated damages, as per Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 645. In this case, the Claimant was stopped and searched upon entry to the UK. After being denied entry, the Claimant appealed the decision... the primary judge found that the immigration officers had falsified information pertaining to the Claimant's suitability to enter. Although this was appealed, I haven't been able to find the subsequent ruling; it's possible it was settled outside of court. However, this shows that judgement can - and has - been made against a defendant who causes pecuniary loss through malicious and contumelious conduct. I think I've covered everything, but it's hard to be sure. Consider your question into several separate questions in future :)

You did not commit any crime, but that does not mean you cannot be charged with a crime. Up to the point where you take the item back out of your pocket, a police officer would have probable cause to believe you were attempting to steal the merchandise, and probable cause is all he would need to charge you. At trial, the government would have the burden of proving that you intended to actually steal the item, but it can satisfy that burden merely by showing that your actions were consistent with such an intention. You would have the option of testifying that you planned to pay for the item. From there, it would be up to a jury to decide whether it believes you. If so, you should be acquitted. If not, you would likely be convicted, and your conviction would likely be affirmed on appeal.

Can students transfer to a new high school purely on their will? My high school life was subpar at the very least. I was constantly bullied and never received the necessary protection from school staff. This coupled with dwindling grades created a negative feedback loop. My health was degrading both mentally and physically so I consulted the school counselor. She was unwilling to provide any help let alone documents needed for a transfer. My custodial parent wasn't any more supportive either, so I gave up on the idea and kept going to school, barely meeting the requirements for graduation. It's been almost two decades since I graduated and left NYC, but bad memories still haunt me to this day. From time to time I wonder whether I might have been able to switch schools without the school's nor my custodial parent's consent, had I known better. Can students struggling like me submit transfer applications on their own to move to another school unsponsored? Does the availability of such choices vary by state?

The primary question is whether the target school can/must accept you. A private school is not compelled to accept you, a public school might be. Because of the law compelling you (as a minor) to go to school, some public school will have to accept you as a student. However, as a minor, your preference is low on the list of legal priorities. The primary controlling factor is the school district where you live, and their policy. They may demand that you attend the school "in the area where you live", or it can be an urging of various strengths. It is conceivable that you can attend school in an entirely different district (we have some cross-district migration possibilities, but that is rare). If district policy allows for a student to go to a school outside their home zone, then the question of discretion comes up: it is highly unlikely that a district would allow a problem student to "impose" himself on a foreign school, so the school intended to receive the student probably has some say in the matter. Parental consent will be essential, so if the parent(s) oppose moving the student, the district is unlikely to allow the transfer. The student might also be consulted. In other words, no, student desire alone will not enable the student to transfer schools. The school that you are assigned to by default has even less direct say in the matter, but indirectly it could influence the recipient school's willingness to allow the transfer. For NYC, here is a preliminary page regarding transfers. Safety and accessibility concerns are easy, also moving within the city etc. but academic and social concerns are "a possibility", one to be determined on a case by case basis.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.

Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.

We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.

The exact procedure varies from one district to the next, but generally speaking, it is essentially by lottery. The procedure is typically spelled out in the court's local rules. Jump to page 105 of SDNY's local rules for an example. The lottery system is not entirely random, though. Frequently it is weighted to make it more likely that a case is assigned to a judge from the district's courthouse nearest to the parties, or to make it less likely to be assigned to the chief judge or a judge on senior status. There are then various other rules governing assignments of cases to new judges or visiting judges, but those typically don't happen when a case is originally filed.

Students too have freedom of information and expression. The school has no right to interfere with the student's activities outside of school. But is this activity outside of school? If the newspaper is created as part of a student council or a school-supported project group, supervision by a teacher might be appropriate. If the newspaper wants to distribute copies on school grounds, it will need the school's consent. If the name of the newspaper suggests an affiliation with the school, this could affect the reputation of the school which could lead to legal problems down the line (e.g. claims of defamation). Private schools are likely allowed to impose more restrictive rules. While there are legitimate reasons why the school would have to be (or wants to be) involved, it is ultimately not possible for a headmaster to restrict the student's freedoms. There is no legal basis for installing a censor. But a newspaper by students is not necessarily a “student newspaper”. Of course, any newspaper will have to comply with applicable press laws. Ultimately, the exact rules depend on press law and education law in that particular state. Bavaria provides a good online summary of the rules in that state, and Wikipedia summarizes the situation across a few states. Note that some press laws might require the senior editor to have a certain age if there isn't a special privilege for student newspapers.

This situation is unlikely to come about in practice. If you were born into such extreme poverty, your parents would considered guilty of child neglect, and CPS/social services would take you into foster services where you would be given clothes. If you previously had clothes, but recently became poor, it is very unlikely that any creditors would repossess your last shirt off your back. It would probably be illegal for them to leave you in that situation, and a used shirt wouldn't be worth much. For the same reason, it's unlikely you would sell your last shirt to, eg. pay for food: Who would buy it? For how much? In many countries, there are extensive welfare systems and private charities that private food, free clothing and other resources to the very poor. Even before you lost your last clothes, you could go to these for assistance. So again you are unlikely to involuntarily end up in this position. Also, technically the amount of clothes you are required to wear is usually very small. I believe you are usually only required to cover the groin and breasts if female. In theory you could easily collect a discarded plastic bag, piece of paper, scrap fabric, cardboard box or some other trash to fashion a crude loincloth. Lastly, when the police do show up and arrest you, you will likely have the opportunity to explain to them your situation. They would probably try to get you some basic clothing and other assistance. But if they do end up pressing charges, you would be able to either convince the judge to let you off or challenge the law itself for failing to consider poor people like you. Generally, laws are designed such that there is always an option to follow them and nobody would be "too poor" to comply, failing to do this could make a politician extremely unpopular. Many laws with significant cost burden offer alternatives to the poor. Courts will also tend to be sympathetic to cases such as this. But as I said, the situation is very unlikely to come about.

Are surveillance laws in EU member states necessary and proportionate? On the 10th of July the EU Commission adopted a new adequacy decision, as a successor to the failed Safe Harbour and Privacy Shield agreements, to allow data transfers from the EU to the USA. The two areas this covers are legal redress if data is wrongly handled, and the question if the surveillance laws that allow the US government to collect data are "necessary and proportionate". As a citizen of a EU member state I am happy that these questions are addressed. What I do wonder is if we (as in "we, the EU") ask more from others than we are prepared to deliver ourselves, because of course every EU member state has their own surveillance laws and agencies, and constitutional protections only apply to their own nationals, and the GDPR applies only to EU residents. It does not seem like we offer any protection e.g. to the data of US nationals that is processed in the EU (I might be wrong here, but such laws are certainly not broadly discussed if they exist). I am also not sure if national laws are always particularly proportional - e.g. in my native Germany, the Bundesnachrichtendienst has a right by law to listen in to telecommunication world wide; while it says that complete surveillance is unlawful, the constraint is that they have to restrict themselves to not tap into more than 30% of global telecommunication networks at the same time. If your constraint exceeds your actual capabilities, then for practical purposes you do not have a constraint at all. So, would surveillance in the EU pass muster under the GDPR, or does the EU ask for protections for its citizens that it is not willing to grant to foreigners? I am not asking for a line-by-line discussion of specific laws, that would be impractical, but I am curious if if this has been discussed as a part of the process that resulted in the GDPR or the adequacy decisions, and if so, if the discussion had any influence on the proceedings.

These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine.

Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.

GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland.

As I understand it, the GDPR does not permit sending of personal information (which includes the IP address) without prior consent by the user. That's not exactly true, consent is merely one of six possible legal basis for processing (article 6). For example, processing of personal data can also be lawful if it necessary to perform a contract, legally mandatory, or in the public interest. The court decision acknowledges that but rules out another basis in this case because it considers that it is possible to serve fonts without relying on a third-party ([…] der Einsatz der Schriftarten auch möglich ist, ohne dass eine Verbindung von Besuchern zu externen Servern hergestellt werden muss). Confusingly, it only refers to article 6(1)(f) when it seems to me that (b) would also be plausible but maybe this wasn't raised during the proceedings? If the data controller cannot invoke any other basis for the lawfulness of the processing then yes, the only thing left is asking for consent, i.e. invoking article 6(1)(a). But that doesn't mean that you should expect to be asked for consent each and every time your personal information is being used. The consent form on the site also implicitly assumes consent, which I thought was also a violation. Yes, implying consent doesn't really make sense under the GDPR definition (article 4, see also article 7): ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action European data protection authorities have issued guidelines that detail what that means and clearly reject “bundling” different data processing. The regulation also makes it clear that data subjects should be able to withdraw consent at any time, which does not seem possible with the fonts on golem.de My reading of all this is that assuming consent because you are using a service (or even created an account or checked a box at some point) simply isn't valid consent. Either you don't need consent at all in the first place or what you need is freely given, specific consent and “implying” consent or bundling it with a registration process achieves exactly nothing. But this is still extremely common and it might take some time before enforcement and case law definitively settle this question. Smart data controllers trying to avoid collecting consent (like Meta) have abandoned any claim that signing up to the their services would constitute consent (because that's transparently not the case) and try to bypass the issue entirely using another basis like contractual necessity. This is also being litigated. I know that a EU regulation can be implemented and interpreted differently from country to country, and that a single court ruling in Germany doesn't even mean that the national law was correctly applied. From what I've read, I get the impression that this particular ruling was not unlikely to be overturned by a higher instance, if it came down to it. So my question probably both pertains to German law specifically and the EU regulation itself. That sounds more like the way EU directives work. Regulations are supposed to be immediately applicable (no implementation in national law necessary) with minimal differences between countries (except when they explicitely provide for that). Of course, enforcement would still mostly be in the hands of national court systems and (in Germany) provincial data protection authorities but there are mechanisms to ensure consistency (the European Data Protection Board, prejudicial questions to the CJEU, infringement proceedings from the European Commission…).

The GDPR's right to erasure is not absolute. Simplifying things a bit, you only have this right if the legal basis for processing was consent, because consent can be revoked freely; or the legal basis for processing was legitimate interest and the controller does not have an overwhelming legitimate interest in keeping the data. Legitimate interest always requires that the controller's legitimate interest and the data subject's rights and interests are balanced. A request for erasure shifts this balance but does not decide it. In practice, a request for erasure may be denied if the controller has legal obligations to keep this data, for example financial records; or the continued processing of this data is necessary for performance of a contract; or the controller has an overriding legitimate interest in continued process of the data. Note that contracts may have effects that survive termination of the contract. Note also that a contract might not involve the data subject as a party to the contract, the classic example being a postal delivery contract that necessarily requires processing of the recipient's personal data. In your specific example it seems that the legal basis was legitimate interest and that the data controller has an overwhelming legitimate interest to hold on to parts of your data for the purpose of fraud prevention. If you feel like the continued processing of the data is illegal, for example because the legitimate interest balancing was done incorrectly, or because the legal basis was consent, then you have the following remedies: You can lodge a complaint with the responsible supervisory authority. You can sue the controller before a responsible court for compliance, and for the (actual) damages that you suffered as a result from illegal processing. I'll point out that neither of these approaches is likely to work for you, because abuse/fraud prevention appears like a pretty standard case of overwhelming legitimate interest.

Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people.

Whether GDPR applies does not depend on the country of residence. Instead, GDPR applies to a non-EU site or service if the data controller offers products or services to people in the EU (see Art 3(2) GDPR). This depends solely on the behaviour and intent of the data controller / the provider of the website – compare also the discussion of the “targeting criterion” in EDPB guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR. While your proposed measures might not be entirely ineffective (in that they document an intent to not serve people in the EU), they are both unnecessarily restrictive and overly lax. For example, they would unnecessarily prevent EU tourists in the US from registering but would nevertheless allow US tourists in the EU. For the targeting criterion, it matters whether the data subject is in the EU at the time of the offer, not at all what their residency is. Even if a person who is currently in the EU registers with your service, that doesn't necessarily mean that you are targeting people in the EU. Instead of implementing signup restrictions, a better strategy might be to clarify in the copy on your website that you are only targeting the domestic US market, not the European market with your services. I have discussed this in more detail in an answer to “How can you block GDPR users from US based sites?” If you have a site where GDPR doesn't apply, and you receive a GDPR data subject request, you shouldn't deny it on the basis that the user must have lied – instead you can deny it on the basis that GDPR just doesn't apply to you.

european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data.

Citizenship of a US State (or German Land, or Canadian province, or US/Canadian territory) Does any of the US states or aforementioned entities maintain a legal status comparable to that of citizenship/nationality, specific to people who are for example born in that state or have acquired that citizenship by rules fixed by the state? Something like that would include, for example, specific protection abroad (= out of the state, incl in another US state) by the state's government, additional rights within the state as opposed to those only having the federal citizenship, or the state for example trying to impede or decide how is conducted a federal suit within its boundaries on people having their citizenship... I think this is somewhat the case for Indian reservations, which are more independant with the federal government than the states are.

germany German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits. You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc. Some places in Germany differentiate their services between "locals" and "others", for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be "tourists" 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a "the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free" approach. Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy.

No. As a superior sovereign, the United States can sue states in federal court without restriction. I’m not sure if that would apply in state court, but the federal government doesn’t generally file cases in state court to begin with. States can also sue each other in federal court, having waived their immunity to lawsuits brought by other states when they agreed to Article III of the Constitution (although Congress has said that these lawsuits must be filed directly in the Supreme Court).

Does this person have witnesses to his existence? Particularly before the age of five? Under 8 U.S. Code § 1401, native-born citizens include a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States; If he appears out of nowhere, he is likely to be suspect of illegal immigration. Age may be a factor there, too.

with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.

The most commonly used definition for statehood is the declaratory theory, codified by the Montevideo Convention. This says that statehood doesn't depend on recognition by other states; it merely requires four things: A defined territory A permanent population An effective government The capacity to enter into relations with other states. You immediately run into issues around the defined territory (you don't really have one) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. But let's ignore those for a second. Meeting these requirements in some abstract world doesn't mean you get treated like a state. If no one else agrees with your claim to statehood and they act inconsistently with it, you have little recourse. You might get them not caring enough to do anything about it, but if they decide you're not a country you're out of luck. You have some misconceptions about statehood as well. A country is allowed to forbid trade with any foreign country, even ones it recognizes as sovereign states. See: US embargo on Cuba. It is also entitled to deny foreign ships access to its ports. Ships flying the flag of a sovereign state are entitled to innocent passage through territorial waters of another state, but not to the use of that state's ports. A country can certainly allow people to be killed and still be a country. See: the US, which has the death penalty for certain crimes. But if you're killing nationals of a foreign country, that foreign country is likely to take a keen interest in your activities. If the killings are judicially-ordered executions based on violations of your penal laws, that's one thing -- Australia might consider it awful that an Australian citizen was shot by Indonesia for drug smuggling, but they recognize that Indonesia is a real country with its own laws that it has a right to apply. If it's just lawless there, the keen interest might culminate in a travel warning. But in more extreme cases, or where the killings are of people who didn't willingly enter your territory, you're looking at potential military action.

Reservations aren't of or for a single tribe (meaning roughly "ethnic group"), they are for a particular Nation (whether or not that term is used in a specific case -- it could be "Confederation" or "Band"). In Washington state, the Yakama Nation is a confederation of people who are Klikitat, Palouse, Walla Walla, Wanapum, Wenatchee, Wishram, and Yakama; the Tulalip Tribes covers the northern Lushootseed tribes made up of the Duwamish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Skagit, Suiattle, Samish, and Stillaguamish. Only 2/3 of the recognized tribes have reservations. The key legal concept is not exactly being "of a certain tribe", it is "being enrolled". Ancestry relates to enrollment (and disenrollment) via individual rules about membership. Federal Indian law is encoded in Title 25. Let's just say that a question about what that title says is way to broad to ever answer. Generally speaking, there are two types of reservation land, trust land and fee land. The US government holds trust land in trust, which has various restrictions on transfer, and is exempt from taxation: transfers require higher approval (tribe, BIA). Fee land is land that the individual(s) own outright. In the case of fee land, anyone can purchase that land. The land that would be of interest for this question is trust land. The Yakama reservation, for instance, has open and closed areas, the latter being mostly trust land with use restricted to enrolled members. On fee land located within a reservation, that does not mean that one is completely free of tribal rules. After all, off the reservation, you are still subject to the local government's land use rules (zoning restrictions, for example). The ruling of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 is very complex and says "yes and no". Tribes do not have authority to zone fee land on the reservation owned by non-members, but they do have authority to generally zone fee land on closed areas of the reservation. (Very roughly speaking, fee land is subject to general government-planning type restrictions on land use that we are all subject to; but there are limits on how discriminatory those rules can be. Above all, fee land is in fact owned by the individual, and a tribe cannot claw the land back, though they can buy it back). A Nation can set rules for membership which would be patently illegal in the general context of US law. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, the situation was that the rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo nation said that the children of a Pueblo woman who married outside the tribe (e.g. to a Navaho) may be denied tribal membership, but did not exclude children of a Pueblo man who married outside the tribe. The consequence is that the children of a woman lose the right to reside on that land after the mother dies (also can't vote, etc.) The short version is that SCOTUS held that this is legal. Indian nations enjoy sovereign immunity, so you can't sue them.

Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.

People often use "passport" as a metonym of "citizenship," but that should not lead one to mistake the two. Notably, many US citizens live their entire lives without having a passport. A fairly brief search didn't turn up an explicit statement from an official government source that passport revocation does not affect US citizenship, but that is quite clearly the case if one reads between the lines of the fairly sizeable statutory and regulatory provisions governing both. Nationality law is codified at 8 USC 1401 and following, with the sections governing loss of nationality beginning at 8 USC 1481. The regulations concerning nationality generally are found at 8 CFR 301 and following, but there are not many regulations concerning loss of nationality. Passport law is found in an entirely different title of the US Code, and titles are the highest level of division in the code. It is in 22 USC 411 and following. There are provisions that restrict eligibility for a passport scattered around in there without any section applying specifically to passport revocation. That is found in the related regulations. Passport regulations are codified at 22 CFR Part 51, with revocation being the subject of Subpart E, which is 51.60 and following. There may be an explicit statement in the regulations that passport revocation does not affect citizenship. I did not look very thoroughly. But a bit of logical reasoning shows why it must be so: The conditions for loss of US nationality are very well defined. They are also fairly tightly circumscribed by several decisions of the US supreme court in the decades following the second world war. The conditions for revocation of a passport are much less strict; as an example, a passport may be revoked under 22 CFR 51.62 and 51.60 if the bearer "is the subject of an outstanding Federal warrant of arrest for a felony, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act (18 U.S.C. 1073)." US nationality is required to hold a US passport, but US nationals do not need to have a US passport. Therefore, a US passport may be revoked for a reason that cannot lead to loss of US nationality, and, when that happens, US nationality is retained. The condition mentioned in point 2 is clearly insufficient for depriving someone of US nationality, not least because the subject of an arrest warrant is only suspected of having committed a crime. Depriving a suspect of their liberty is acceptable to the extent necessary to bring that person to trial, but further deprivations beyond that end would violate the constitution's guarantee of due process. A word on "nationality" and "citizenship" in US law is in order, lest the use of the two terms seem inconsistent or arbitrary. US nationality is broader than US citizenship. All US citizens are US nationals, so loss of US nationality implies loss of US citizenship. However, there are some people who are US nationals without being US citizens, so it is more precise to speak of "loss of nationality" than "loss of citizenship," and indeed that is the term used in US nationality law.

Does the right to a speedy trial extend to the prosecution? The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to a speedy trial. In comments related to Donald Trump's latest arraignment, his lawyer suggested that Donald Trump doesn't want a speedy trial. Has a ruling ever held that the right to a speedy trial extends to the prosecution, or that the defendant cannot waive this right? The unlimited ability to delay the trial by the defendant would open the door to all sorts of abuses.

The Sixth Amendment is very specific: "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy[...] trial." There is no such constitutional right given to the prosecution, and such a right would not serve the public interest. Defendants very often waive their right to a speedy trial in order to have more time to prepare a defense. Conversely, however, the defendant does not have the right to draw out the proceedings indefinitely. When the right to a speedy trial is waived, it falls to the court (that is, the judge) to schedule the proceedings at its discretion. It may choose to take into account the wishes of the prosecution or the defense or both, but is not required to do so.

Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).

The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can & Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment

I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.

The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees assistance of counsel for the accused in all criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being forced to self-incriminate. Taken together, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that police cannot continue interrogation after you have requested an attorney. Laughter is actually not a violation of your rights, the violation would come from continuing to interrogate you, or in prohibiting you from contacting your attorney or not providing an attorney if you cannot afford one (via the public defender's office).

This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.

We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf

For example, Stephen Odzer is a recipient of a "conditional pardon". Mr Odzer is a convicted fraudster and received an 18-month sentence and a restitution order. However, he has already been released from prison. The pardon requires Mr Odzer to pay the remainder of his restitution order. But the pardon does restore civil rights to Mr Odzer, such as voting rights, posession of a firearm or allow him to be considered for jobs that require a position of trust. If Mr Odzer breaks this condition then the pardon is void and he would lose those rights. The pardon is now granted and is effective unless Mr Odzer breaks the conditions. Biden can't reverse it.

Does the First Amendment shield the previous president from the August 2023 D.C. Indictments? The former president is charged with: Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) Count 2: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Conspiracy to Obstruct an Official Proceeding) Count 3: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding) Count 4: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) As I understand it, the charges are based on what was said by Donald Trump. Is there a standard / caselaw that provides a speech litmus test to determine whether any of said counts are violated?

The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them. There is literally a U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) This statute states that: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally. At noted here: Fraud and Perjury While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for false or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements fall outside its protection. The government generally can impose liability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make factual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material benefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly giving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional. This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant. Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is United States v. Rafoi, 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023). This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States. The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional. Also pertinent is a much older U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924): [F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario: “It also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the "Stolen Valor Act" in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A law review article from 2015 attempts to clarify the scope of Alvarez, distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and "lies that must be protected for their own sake". The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, "High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment," 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015). It is notable that in Alvarez every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the "Stolen Valor Act", over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012. It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form DD214, which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well. Another issue which influenced swing votes in the Alvarez case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful. One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of Rickert v Washington, is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, "the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech." This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign. An August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service, the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above. This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same) Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that: Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The foundation for this ruling is longstanding: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949), the Supreme Court held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money is not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of lawbreaking remains protected speech. There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same. In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws. Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. U.S. v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944). This also comes within the "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above. FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be "death qualified" in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump. As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes.

@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.

A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.

Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of "the tranquility to which the nation has been restored" by "the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States" (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled "prospective pardon" after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a "pardons FAQ", the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't.

Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president.

It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions).

...the public is susceptible to misinformation by bad actors in the financial system and therefore are protected by the SEC... The SEC governs fixed laws about financial transfers, disclosures, etc., and investigates illegal acts regarding those laws where there are quantitative facts, i.e. who moved how much money to where, who engaged in information for insider trading, and other situations based on hard evidence. Bad actors are deterred by the fact that can be prosecuted for their crimes by the SEC and other authorities. Shouldn't... political campaigns be audited for truthfulness? There is no government authority that audits or regulates political ads and/or claims; such authority or laws would clearly violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution - Wikipedia as to the government regulating or attempting to control or manipulate free speech. In a non-partisan fashion, government authorities can and do routinely supply publicly available documents that can be used by the public, fact checkers and the press. False political claims are investigated by the press and various non-profits, also under the same 1st Amendment protections so that the press can operate free of government intrusion. See https://www.google.com/search?q=political+fact+checking for different political NGOs and media outlets which do fact checking. Such resources themselves can be fact challenged and partisan themselves, of course; news outlets can be under the editorial control of a political agenda, and a "fact checking" website or NGO can be funded by partisans. ...why shouldn't the same be done in the political system? Within a political system such as the US, people are responsible for their own thoughts and actions; and they are responsible for assessments of what may or may not be factual, and for what they believe (which, of course, can be removed from a factual basis). The idea that a government should be involved in auditing or otherwise having control over political speech is a political question, not a legal question.

If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that.

Restriction of freedom of expression in the case of sympathy for terrorist organisations There is a number of organisations which are listed by the US government as terrorist organisations - Wikipedia What are the legal implications of this in relation to the 1st Amendment? If, for example, there is somebody who is non-violently expressing sympathy for the goals of an organisation declared as terrorist by the US government, is that illegal in the US?

The U.S. Department of State maintains the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and along with other government departments are charged with the process of making said designations. Under U.S. Law, it is illegal to provide material support to any FTO with Material support being defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as: currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets except medicine or religious materials. Note that the list exempts religious materials, such as holy books or documents speaking of ideology that may motivate the group. This would serve to make clear that the law is not against expression of sympathy for the ideology, but is targeting the means by which the FTO can use violence in support of their belief. It should also be noted that the law bars entry to the United States by aliens who are known members or representatives of an FTO, but this is a higher level of Material Support as it implies that such people are actively engaged in an FTO's activities. Finally, the law states that financial institutions that operate in the U.S. that become aware of accounts belonging to FTOs should take control of the accounts and value within it and immediately report to the treasury. An FTO is by definition any organization that participates in activities that meet the legal definition of terrorism, which is neutral towards the beliefs motivating such activities and instead focuses on illegal actions.

What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information".

The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem.

The First Amendment is absolutely relevant to the question (in a public school which is subject to the First Amendment, because it is a governmental entity), although it isn't the end of the story. Generally speaking, a school can establish reasonable rules and regulations for its students and punish those violations with punishments such as detentions, suspensions, expulsions, changes in grades on assignments or in classes, denial of eligibility to participate in extra-curricular activities or to receive school honors, and similar sanctions. Generally speaking, violations of school rules cannot result in criminal punishments or civil liability not authorized by other laws, and profanity is something that cannot be prohibited – at least in cases involving adults. Minors have First Amendment rights to express opinions, although they are diminished in a school setting, and while literally speaking profanity is part of the content of speech, it is often analyzed as a permissible "time, place or manner" restriction instead, especially when minors are present. Profanity also covers a range of conduct. Schools have the greatest authority to regulate speech when it is disruptive to the orderly operations of the school, or threatening. Profanity used to provoke or threaten someone, such as the use of a racial slur or an offensive statement about someone's family, could potentially be punished severely based not simply on what was said but because it is part of a larger context of aggression. In contrast, schools might potentially exceed their legal authority to prohibit profanity defined in such a way as to prevent students from a particularly ethnicity from speaking in ordinary non-provocative terms to each other. The N-word directed at an African-American student in a predominantly Hispanic school by someone reputed to be a gang leader with an intent to provoke or threaten the African-American students would be well within the school's right to prohibit and punish severely. But punishing two African-American students who are friends for using the same word in a friendly context like "Hey, N- how you doing?" "I'm doing better than fine, N-" might even be construed as discriminatory if punished, and deemed to be beyond the authority of the school to prohibit at all, or with anything more than the most minimal sanction. Limitations on profanity are also more suspect from a First Amendment perspective when used in connection with conduct that is intended to be expressive, such as an art project, or a monologue chosen for a drama class from published stage plays, novels and poems, or when used in connection with protests and political activity. Often the standard by which school officials are judged in court when a school punishment for some conduct or another is challenged, is whether the school officials abused their discretion and part of that analysis is proportionality. A school official can be comfortable that issuing a detention to a student, or assigning the student to some undesirable task like picking up litter from a school yard during recess for saying something like "shit" or "fuck" will not be judged to be an abuse of discretion. But, a court might very well overturn a school's exercise of its discretion to punish a student if a student were expelled for saying something like that in a manner that was not part of a more pervasive pattern of disregard for authority and disruptive behavior. Another factor that influences whether a rule like a ban on profanity is an abuse of discretion to punish in a particular manner is the extent to which there was advanced notice that this was prohibited. If the school has a clear rule that is familiar to everyone in the student body stating in advance what is prohibited and what punishments are authorized under particular circumstances, that rule is more likely to be held not to constitute an abuse of discretion, than a severe punishment of a student who has no real advanced warning that the conduct is not allowed. Similarly, the intent of the student is relevant. If a student uses profanity or an offensive term (e.g. "fag") not knowing that it is considered profane or offensive, either out of ignorance perhaps because other students misled him or her about what a word meant, anything more than a minimal punishment would be an abuse of discretion, while even relatively minor use of profanity, calculated and intended to have great negative effects in the context in which it was used, resulting in a severe punishment, might not be an abuse of discretion. In between, and perhaps justifying only an intermediate punishment, at most, without constituting an abuse of discretion, would be a use of profanity that isn't naive or innocent, but isn't calculated for maximum negative effect either, and just "pops out" based upon what is normal in a student's home life or previous experience even though it is contrary to the norms of this particular school and the student would have realized that upon further reflection. Is there detailed case law or a statute that spells this out, in great detail? No. Some of this is embedded in custom and social norms that are familiar to judges (usually in the context of what was historically known as a "certiorari petition" arising from a local government quasi-judicial decision). But, I do think that this answer relatively accurately captures how a seemingly vague "abuse of discretion" review standard for school disciplinary actions for students would be likely to play out in real life, and those expectations absolutely do influence how school administrators and teachers impose discipline, in practice.

Mockery is allowed; hate speech isn’t While freedom of speech is guaranteed under French law it does have limits. Since 2004, these limits have applied to gender and sexuality. Mockery is contemptuous or insulting speech; hate speech or vilification incites hatred, serious contempt or ridicule. The boundary between them must be established on a case-by-case basis including both content and context (“I’m going to get you” can be a serious threat but it can also be what a father says to his child when chasing them in the park) but in France, as in other liberal democracies, the benefit of the doubt goes to speech being considered lawful.

That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.

...the public is susceptible to misinformation by bad actors in the financial system and therefore are protected by the SEC... The SEC governs fixed laws about financial transfers, disclosures, etc., and investigates illegal acts regarding those laws where there are quantitative facts, i.e. who moved how much money to where, who engaged in information for insider trading, and other situations based on hard evidence. Bad actors are deterred by the fact that can be prosecuted for their crimes by the SEC and other authorities. Shouldn't... political campaigns be audited for truthfulness? There is no government authority that audits or regulates political ads and/or claims; such authority or laws would clearly violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution - Wikipedia as to the government regulating or attempting to control or manipulate free speech. In a non-partisan fashion, government authorities can and do routinely supply publicly available documents that can be used by the public, fact checkers and the press. False political claims are investigated by the press and various non-profits, also under the same 1st Amendment protections so that the press can operate free of government intrusion. See https://www.google.com/search?q=political+fact+checking for different political NGOs and media outlets which do fact checking. Such resources themselves can be fact challenged and partisan themselves, of course; news outlets can be under the editorial control of a political agenda, and a "fact checking" website or NGO can be funded by partisans. ...why shouldn't the same be done in the political system? Within a political system such as the US, people are responsible for their own thoughts and actions; and they are responsible for assessments of what may or may not be factual, and for what they believe (which, of course, can be removed from a factual basis). The idea that a government should be involved in auditing or otherwise having control over political speech is a political question, not a legal question.

Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws.

What is the judicial rationale for introducing the grainger test to qualify beliefs? Section 10 Equality Act 2010 seems very clear that “belief means any religious or philosophical belief”. (Emphasis added) Yet, the employment tribunal in Grainger set down a five limb test which functions to exclude certain philosophical beliefs from protection of the act. But how can that be read to exclude “any” beliefs from protection, however frivolous, or however unsavourily transphobic or fascist they may be? More to the point, how did the tribunal account in this for the word “any”? (Note: I am referring mainly to the judicially set down “grainger test”.)

As revised, I think this question is really asking why the judge in Grainger plc v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311 laid down the test that he did, when the statutory provision at hand used more general words. In summary, the reason why the Grainger test does not protect every belief is that the European Convention on Human Rights doesn't either. The judge's conclusions on the ECHR's notion of "belief" are mainly taken from the analysis in a House of Lords case (Williamson, cited below), which is binding precedent on the tribunal on that point. The new thing was drawing the line between "belief" in ECHR jurisprudence, and "belief" in the employment equality regulations, which was justified for two reasons: one, that Parliament demonstrably was trying to make the alignment; and two, that it would be incoherent with the Convention obligations to do otherwise. Note that the definitions in the Equality Act 2010 are carried forward from the 2003 regulations which were at issue in Grainger, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, so we have to look at this text instead. In 2(1) it said, following amendments in 2006 not shown in the online text: In these Regulations – i. "religion" means any religion, ii. "belief" means any religious or philosophical belief, iii. a reference to religion includes a reference to lack of religion, and iv. a reference to belief includes a reference to lack of belief. This regulation was introduced in order to bring EU Directive 2000/78/EC into UK law. Although the text in the 2010 Act is not identical, it does carry forward the same effect of the Directive, and so the decision still makes sense to apply. Also, Brexit has happened, but that does not displace the reasoning. In interpreting the provision: Because it derives from EU law, which is meant to mean the same thing in other member states, the domestic regulation should be read consistently with the directive. The court can look to EU authorities to find out what the directive ought to mean, although there was not much to look at in this instance. The respondent said that "belief" should be read consistently with the language in the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning religion, belief and discrimination - principally Articles 9(1) and 14. The court was still bound to read the domestic legislation in a way that is at least compatible with the Convention rights, even if the scope of "belief" is not absolutely identical (see paragraph 19 of the judgement), but the most obvious way to make the ideas compatible is if they are the same. The parliamentary history of the amending statute shows indications that it was made in awareness of ECHR case law about "belief". Courts can sometimes use this kind of information to resolve genuine textual ambiguities. The judge looked to domestic precedent, in particular a decision of the House of Lords (R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15) which looked at the same provisions of the ECHR in the context of a claimed philosophical belief in favour of corporal punishment in schools. This in turn drew on extensive case law, including even an English ecclesiastical case from 1866, as well as many more recent sources from around the world. The thrust of all of this is that not every single possible propositional belief is protected by the ECHR; when it talks about belief it does not mean "a statement which somebody somewhere believes to be true", but rather refers to certain kinds of philosophical conviction. The application of this idea to employment discrimination is new in Grainger, hence "the Grainger test", but wrangling over the scope of "belief" is not new. The test itself, set out in paragraph 24, is really a collation of quotations from the various relevant past judgements. I won't try to figure out the exact provenance of all of the words since that is actually already set out in the judgement. But for example, (iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. comes from paragraph 36 of Campbell and Cosans v UK [1982] 4 EHRR 293, ... the applicants' views relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour ... Similarly, (v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others is there because of Article 17 of the ECHR, as interpreted in Campbell (citations omitted in this quotation), the expression "philosophical convictions" in the present context denotes, in the Court's opinion, such convictions as are worthy of respect in a "democratic society" and are not incompatible with human dignity; in addition, they must not conflict with the fundamental right of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 (P1-2) being dominated by its first sentence This of course raises the question of why the ECHR's scope is what it is. That is somewhat more of a policy question than a legal one, in that the treaty reflects what its parties felt comfortable with agreeing. What matters in legal terms is that the Convention is binding on the UK, and the words that it uses must be interpreted according to what Convention authority (the Strasbourg court) says that they mean.

I was initially going to vote to close this as a political rather than a legal question, however, I think there is scope for separating out the two dimensions. Our society makes a distinction between children and adults by giving them different legal rights, obligations and protections. If you think about it, there are a lot of things beyond sexual activity where the law does this: voting, drinking, military service, compulsory schooling, legal culpability etc. What things are subject to legal restriction is a political distinction. Now, there is no reason politically why these laws could not have been drafted to say "children can do this, adults can do that" and leave it to the courts to decide who is a "child" and who is an "adult". Biologically and emotionally people reach maturity at different ages so this is perfectly sensible. It might even be more just. However, justice is only one thing that we require of our legal system. Among the others are certainty and efficiency. Providing a bright line based on birth date gives certainty. Not requiring the court to deal with this on a case-by-case basis increases efficiency - justice is not free. This is why jurisdictions use age as a proxy for adulthood. As to why they choose any particular age, that is a political question.

Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful.

There is a rather elaborate three step analysis that is done in civil rights cases under U.S. precedents. Circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination (which is less frequently available to plaintiffs), is analyzed under a three-part test created by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). STEP 1/prima facie case (burden on plaintiff) They belong to a protected class (or the person taking the action thought that they did and alleged acted on that basis) They were qualified for the job and performing in accordance with the expectations of their employer Employer terminated their employment The employer replaced plaintiff with an individual who was comparably qualified to the plaintiff, but not in the protected class. STEP 2 (burden on defendant) Employer must produce evidence that its actions were the result of legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons STEP 3 (burden on plaintiff) Employee must prove that the non-discriminatory reason(s) offered by the employer in Step 2 were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination based on age. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-7 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Also, Reeves allows the trier of fact to consider the evidence used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (first prong of McDonnell Douglas) when they are deciding the final prong of McDonnell Douglas framework. Notably, the Supreme Court later held that “[t]he reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, (2003) (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n. 17 (1957)). The "quote" above adapts and closely paraphrases this source. A jury doesn't have to believe the testimony of the employer and discovery through depositions and written communications and historical hiring and firing patterns can all be used to provide evidence that the claimed reason is pretextual. There are more than a dozen tactics for proving that a claimed reason is really a pretext for an invalid reason at trial.

The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist "progressive" trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be "just". In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to "encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law". This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to.

This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.

The phrase "reasonable doubt" was formed hundreds of years ago, and does not hold any mathematical or probabilistic meaning. It is for each individual juror to decide for themselves what constitutes "reasonable doubt", and whether the evidence presented to them has crossed that threshold. EDIT for extra clarity: As stated above, the definition of "reasonable doubt" is intentionally vague*, and left to be decided by each juror for themselves on a case by case basis; as such there is no single rule that can be applied to jurors (also note barring accepting a bribe, a juror cannot be legally sanctioned for their conduct as a juror, nor their vote, regardless of the evidence before them). So one juror might judge by P(A|B), another might judge by the defendant's appearance, another might judge by the majority of their peers (so that they can go to a ball game that evening, such as in the film 12 Angry Men), another might disagree with the law (see: jury nullification) and so vote not guilty on that basis, and another might bow to social pressure and convict despite overwhelming evidence that the defendant is not guilty (for example, at the end of To Kill A Mockingbird). A prosecutor cares about convincing the entire jury that the defendant is guilty(outside of Oregon and Louisiana, where only 10/12 vote is needed to convict, so the prosecutor only cares convincing 10 jurors). The defense only cares about convincing a single juror (or three in LA or OR), although more can be useful to prevent a mistrial. The defense (in theory) should not care whether or not the defendant is guilty. *The origin of reasonable doubt was in Britain, where certain jurors would refuse to convict, despite any evidence, due to religious prohibitions of "Judge not, less ye be judged".

In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.

What is jury nullification? What is jury nullification and what are its origins and history? What actions by a juror would be considered nullification?

Quoting from here, Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding. In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted. One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws. Zenger was the first case in America; in 1670, it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of "illegal assembly" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released. Interestingly enough, according to The New York Times In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial. The Times also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.

An alibi is a particular kind of defense strategy bearing on the burden of proof: here is the alibi jury instruction for California. The defendant contends (he/she) did not commit (this/these) crime[s] and that (he/she) was somewhere else when the crime[s] (was/were) committed. The People must prove that the defendant was present and committed the crime[s] with which (he/she) is charged. The defendant does not need to prove (he/she) was elsewhere at the time of the crime. "I had put the gun down" is not an alibi defense, "I was not in my right mind at the time" is not an alibi defense. The alibi defense is essentially a formality that clarifies the logic of "reasonable doubt" for the jury. If the defendant could not have committed the crime because they weren't there, then that is the end of the discussion. The prosecution will introduce various facts that suggest that the defendant may have committed the crime. The "reasonable doubt" instruction is widely interpreted by jurors to involve a defense obligation to disprove that evidence, which is a reason why a number of jurisdictions have adopted a different instruction based on "being firmly convinced". Reasons to doubt prosecution evidence can be weak and highly speculative, and the courts have struggled for years to find a good way to convey exactly what "reasonable doubt" is. An alibi goes way beyond merely detracting from the prosecution's case. An alibi is not an affirmative defense where you have to prove the claim by a preponderance of evidence. If you can establish that you were somewhere else when the crime happened, had no opportunity to have committed the crime and could not have committed the crime by another means, you have defended yourself against the charge (assuming that the prosecution does not successfully challenge the credibility of the alibi witness). And in California, you have to give notice that you intend to use the alibi defense.

The term doesn’t come up Because, AFAIK, there are no circumstances where being ignorant of the law allow a person to escape culpability. There are, however, laws that allow ignorance of the facts to be an excuse. For example, a person who receives stolen goods where it is reasonable to believe that they aren’t is not guilty of the crime (although the still don’t own the goods).

"The purpose of the statute making the NTSB's reports of accidents inadmissible in actions arising out of such accidents is to exclude reports that express agency views as to the probable cause of the accident because that is a finding in the province of the jury or fact finder." Britton v. Dall. Airmotive, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00547-EJL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163211, at *5-6 (D. Idaho May 20, 2011) (citations omitted). "The legislative history of this statute demonstrates that the purpose of this exclusionary rule is to prevent a usurpation of the jury's role as fact finder." McLeod v. ERA Aviation, No. 93-294, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3204, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 1996) (citations omitted). "This limitation on the admissibility of the NTSB report, however, applies to the official conclusions of the NTSB, not to the factual accident reports of the investigators." Britton, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163211, at *6 (citation omitted); accord 49 C.F.R. § 835.2. By its terms, the statute applies only to civil actions, but the report would be subject to the ordinary hearsay rules if offered in a criminal case. See Fed. R. Evid. 801; United States v. PG&E, 178 F. Supp. 3d 927, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that.

While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.

Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.).

Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization".

Property and Intestacy when married What happens to property without a will while it is in probate? An IRA with a named beneficiary is exempt from probate. A house in joint tenancy does not pass through probate. However, say a car is titled in only one spouse's name. What would actually happen with the registration, title, etc? The car can not be used by the living spouse? The auto itself goes into probate?

Any property of a decedent which does not evade probate because of a transfer on death deed is subject to probate. It turns out that this probate avoidance in New York can include one automobile within a family, here is the main form and a companion form. But let's say that the car is worth more than the limit (and you don't want to pay the estate the excess), then it might have to go through the longer process. That does not mean that the spouse cannot use the vehicle, as long as the spouse takes reasonable action to transfer the vehicle (waiting 5 years is not reasonable).

If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.

Normal ways of owning a house don't allow this In common law jurisdictions (so, be careful if you set this in Louisiana which has mixed civil/common law) the normal ways that residential property is owned would either require the agreement of all parties to sell or one party could sell their share but they could not force the other party to do so. However, there are lots of ways that property can be abnormally owned. First, there is the transitional period where the property is legally owned by the Estate of the deceased for the benefit of the beneficiaries and administered by the executor of the will or the administrator if there is no will. If the house was bequeathed specifically to the beneficiaries then the executor must arrange for the legal transfer. However, if there is no will or the will just bequeaths assets without identifying them then the executor/administrator has discretion on whether to transfer the house or to sell it and distribute the proceeds. If this is shortly after the death and the sister was the administrator, she could decide to sell. The house could be owned by a company. If so, the director(s) would be able to dispose of it. The director(s) are appointed by the shareholders and if the sister had more than 50% of the shares, well. This is not a particularly common way of owning residential property because it has tax disadvantages but it is a common ownership method for industrial or commercial property: many companies own the land where they do business. Perhaps the house is a small part of a large factory complex? The property could be inside a trust with the brother and sister as beneficiaries but the sister as trustee. Trusts can be discretionary (i.e. the trustee decides who gets what) or unit trusts (like having shares in a company - you get it in proportion to your holding). The latter is the way publicly traded property trusts work. While the trustee has to operate in line with the trust deed and for the benefit of all the beneficiaries, the sister may, reasonably or unreasonably, decide that selling the house is in those interests.

Residency under Texas law is determined by various individual laws for different purposes: probate (in case you die), divorce, in-state tuition, voting, fishing licenses. Your question is in the realm of landlord-tenant law, which does apply to one or more rooms uses as a permanent residence, but there is no requirement that the tenant be a "resident" in any legal sense. So that law is applicable no matter when you arrived in Texas.

A lien is used to prevent sale of a property until a debt is paid. This has nothing to do with priority over a mortgage. The HOA agreed to release the lien for some payment. The negotiation of that payment doesn't matter to the new buyer. Once the lien is released, then it is no longer listed with the county on the property, so the property can now be sold. The former lienholder cannot now apply a new lien to the property because the new owner is not a debtor to the former lienholder. This would be a terrible way to manage property sales, and no mortgage company would allow a mortgage for a property that could not be sold in case of foreclosure, which is likely why the mortgage holder was a private individual. It is possible for a new owner to take on existing liens, but this would be clearly spelled out in purchase documents. There should be a statement on the title search results that no liens exist.

In the general case, when a company is dissolved any assets still belonging to it becomes bona vacantia under Section 1012 of the Companies Act 2006 which means that it belongs to the Crown. The Crown can then choose to disclaim its rights to the asset under Section 1013, and typically will do this where there are risks involved (e.g. leasehold land). The effect of dislaimer, per Sections 1014 and 1015 is that the "property is deemed not to have vested in the Crown" and it terminates "the rights, interests and liabilities of the company in or in respect of the property disclaimed". In the case of freehold land that is disclaimed, it escheats (transfers) to the Crown Estate and the freehold interest is extinguished. According to Practical Law (paywall): Note, if the land is registered, the registered title will remain and the Land Registrar may enter a notice on the Land Registry title if notified (rule 173, Land Registration Rules 2003). The notice will recite the fact of the liquidator's disclaimer or Crown disclaimer but will not otherwise specify that the land has passed by escheat. The Crown Estate then becomes entitled (but not obliged) to take possession of it. The Crown Estate will not assume any liabilities as owner of the land unless it does take possession or exercises control over the property. The result of this is that the only action the Crown Estate will generally take as regards escheated land is to sell the whole of the land to a suitable buyer who approaches the Crown Estate. You can read more about how the Crown Estate subsequently deals with such property (including if and how it sells the property) in their FAQs.

Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).

This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state.

Conditions of a signed lease I've been renting a house for about 7 years now. For the first year we had a signed lease. After that, its never been renewed. I just pay rent every month. No problems. My question ... do the condition of that signed lease apply now? For example, the lease contained a late fee of $50 if the rent was more than 4 days late. Would that still apply?

You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.

The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion".

No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?

There don't appear to be any Santa Clara-specific laws on the matter, so California law (including this) would govern this situation. A landlord generally has an obligation to maintain the premise in habitable condition (can't stick you with the bill for repairing the water main), and has to fulfill the obligations of the lease (if the lease says that a working washing machine is part of the premise, the landlord has to fix it if it breaks). An AC is not part of what makes a unit "habitable" in the legal sense. You should have to scrutinize exactly what the lease says about the AC, but saying that it is provided "as is" indicates that the landlord is disclaiming any obligation to fix it if it breaks. You are allowed to use it, but if it breaks, he won't fix it. The fact that he has no obligation to fix it does not relieve you of your duty to care for his property (irrespective of the fact that it was abandoned by a prior tenant – there's a notification procedure regarding abandoned real property, which I assume the landlord followed so it is his AC). Your obligation to compensate the landlord for damaging his property is not triggered by his legal obligation to maintain the property, it is triggered by the fact that it is his property. So you are legally on the hook: under §1929, "The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care". However, the size of the hook is not clear: the cost of replacement or repair could be vastly higher than the actual value of the unit. There is a legal concept of "unjust enrichment" that could be applicable, if the landlord plans to bill you $500 for a new AC which he got for free, but you'd probably need to hire a lawyer to make a solid legal argument in court.

Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.

At common law you do not need to sign a contract for it to be legally enforceable; it doesn't even have to be written down. Local real estate law may require a lease to be in writing (and possibly even signed). Putting that aside generally, the purpose of signing a contract is to: Show the intention to be legally bound. This is superfluous: they have sent you the lease, you have moved in - it is clear you both intend to be legally bound. Avoid future disputes over what the terms of the lease are. Signing it provides evidence that the document has not been altered subsequently. A written rather than a scanned signature is better for this simply because anyone with reasonably low computer skills can take a scanned image and apply it to another document. Better than both is a secure electronic signature that is invalidated if the document is changed. Unless you or your landlord are willing to commit fraud to win a dispute over a lease, it probably doesn't matter either way.

If there is a contract, Bob is entitled to damages There probably is a contract in this case - the landlord (through their agent) has made an unambiguous offer which Bob has accepted by signing the lease. The contract comes into effect with Bob’s acceptance irrespective of if the landlord has (or ever does) sign it. If the agent has acted without the landlord’s authority that is a matter between them - the landlord is in a binding contract with Bob by virtue of the agency doctrine.

Is it possible to break my lease without a penalty due to this? No. A reminder to the landlord or reporting with the authorities the violation is most likely to dissuade the landlord from incurring nuisances earlier than 7AM. The landlord might be mindful enough to ensure that work done between 6AM to 7AM does not disturb tenants. Even if the landlord insisted on causing disturbances earlier than 7AM, the situation is very unlikely to justify tenants' breach of the lease. That is because the annoyance from 6AM to 7AM does not render (or is not what renders) a unit unlivable. The landlord's violation could be actionable if it causes to the tenant(s) an provable loss.

Can one use a personal injury lawyer when the police won't act? Based on a true story: Bob's car is parked in the street. Ted is driving down the street recklessly with Alan as a passenger. Ted sideswipes Bob's car doing quite a lot of damage, but takes off. Next day, Alan shows up at Bob's doorstep saying, "You wanna get the guy who sideswiped your car last night? I was the passenger in that car and I was scared witless and I banged my head hard when he hit your car." Bob says, "Heck yes" and Alan takes him to Ted's house where Ted's vehicle is parked. Bob gets pictures of Ted's vehicle showing the damage and paint scrapings from Bob's car. He's got this evidence plus Alan as a witness. Bob calls the Austin Police Department and after a couple minutes the cop says, "You know, we're not going to do anything about this." "Why not?" "Because we're losing 40 cops per month, and we can't hire more. We have only 3 cops for all of downtown Austin just not. Our response time for an active shooter is 18 minutes. We don't have the manpower for this." Bob is lamenting about this to one of his friends. The friend says, "Why don't you engage The Hammer?" (The Hammer is a personal injury lawyer who has billboards all over Austin and commercials that run every 2 minutes on daytime TV.) He goes on: "Give the The Hammer all your evidence and let him treat it as a civil case. He can get to the court system, sue the pants off of Ted and you don't have to go through the police." So my question is: Is Bob's friend on to something? If cops won't act in a criminal case, is possible and sensible to hire The Hammer to get restitution? Additional information: Bob's car was a project car, and wasn't registered, licensed, or insured at the time.

Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.

First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.

The officers could incur liability under 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). This would probably be considered "loss of property" or a "wrongful act". It is very rare for cases to go forward for this because of the costs of litigation against an officer. "[I]t is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’" Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)). “Before any due process liability can be imposed for property damage occurring in a lawful search, it must be established that the police acted unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16. That actually means that the burden of proof is on the victim to show unreasonableness / maliciousness. It would probably be easier if the thing destroyed could not possibly have contained the item looked for. For instance, if they are looking for a 65" LED TV, they can't even look in a 64" dresser (or something smaller than the object that could not physically hold the object). This issue becomes moot when dealing with drugs.

Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.

Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed.

If he is a professional engineer, then he is almost certainly (supposed to be) licensed and insured. You could probably recover damages simply by reporting them to his insurer. Also, some states have insurance pools that provide for claims against professionals that they license.

The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions.

I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.

Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars? I have been wondering that since a train company owns its locomotives and train cars, then I am assuming that this means that they own any graffiti that has been painted on their locomotives and train cars. I have recently read that it is illegal for someone to put graffiti on any train company equipment, since it is an act of vandalism, so this makes me think that that any graffiti artist(s) who created graffiti on train equipment cannot get a copyright(s) on the graffiti that they put on train equipment. If the graffiti thus belongs to the train company, then I am assuming that this means that the train company automatically owns the copyright(s) to this graffiti, and they would thus be free to take photographs of this graffiti and could display and/or sell these photographs to the general public, if they wanted to do so. Is it legal for a train company to create an art gallery using photographs of the graffiti on their locomotives and train cars?

Copyright law doesn't say the art isn't copyrighted if it was made unlawfully. It seems the art can be copyrighted and the act of making it can be a criminal offence. I'm not aware of any such copyright cases that have gone to trial. A fairly well known case that settled out of court is that of Jason “Revok” Williams and H&M. Williams noticed his art in a photograph used in an H&M marketing campaign. His lawyer sent a cease-and-desist letter to H&M. In response, H&M applied for a court order stating that the product of an unlawful act could not be copyrighted. Following some bad publicity H&M relented and settled with Williams. H&M stopped using the photograph and withdrew the application for the court order. (News source) ... The debate over street artists’ copyright privileges has entered courtrooms quite a bit over the past few years, according to Philippa Loengard, deputy director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts. ... The [H&M] claim wasn’t surprising, Loengard said, but it also doesn’t hold up. At its core, a copyright requires only two things: that the work is original and that it is a tangible medium of expression. [Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.” Another case settled out of court is that of Joseph "Rime" Tierney and Moschino. Tierney sued Moschino for using his art on its designs. One day before the court was notified of the intention to settle, Moschino sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that unlawfully made art could not be copyrighted. (News source) "As a matter of public policy and basic logic, it would make no sense to grant legal protection to work that is created entirely illegally."

YES, if you can get an image of it, you can use it A work that old is not under copyright protection in any country in the world. Under US law any work published in 1924 or before (as of 2019) is in the public domain. Unpublished works may be protected for up to 120 years after creation under US law. But no work that is over 600 years old has any copyright protection. In any case, merely owning the physical work does not mean owning the copyright. In the case of a work sufficiently recent that it is under copyright, say from the 1970s, the copyright initially belongs to the artist. If the artist sells or gives the painting to a museum (or anyone else), the artist retains the copyright unless that is explicitly included in the deal, in a written agreement. If the artist dies, the copyright is inherited, just as any other property that the artist leaves, as directed by will or law. If a museum owns a painting that is out of copyright, it can restrict access to it and prevent people from photographing or copying it, because it can restrict what people do on its property. But if an exact copy (known as a "slavish copy") gets out, the museum has no copyright in it, because making a slavish copy does not create an original, copyrightable work under US law. See the case of Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The law may be different in non-US countries, but the reasoning of the Bridgeman case has bene followed elsewhere. A "slavish" copy is one that attempts to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, without adding or removing or changing anything. A photo of a painting in a frame on a stand with people standing beside it is not a slavish copy. The images of art one sees in books on art are usually slavish copies. So are the images one sees on museum web sites, as a rule. The term implies that the copyist had no more freedom than a slave in making the copy. At least that is the metaphor. Slavish copies do not get separate copyrights because they are not original works. Photos of 3D works such as sculptures require choice of angle, lighting, etc, sufficient t make them original works -- no two photographers will produce quite the same image of a sculpture. But some courts have ruled that wire-frame models of 3D works of art are slavish copies and not protected by copyright.

You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.

Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.

Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them).

It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)

The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.

Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details.

In an opposite-sex sexual assault case, is "I'm homosexual" a valid defense? Let's say Alice is sexually assaulted by a man, and circumstantial evidence pinpoints Bob as the attacker. Can Bob claim that, because he is homosexual/asexual, he does not find Alice sexually desirable and so cannot be the attacker? I'm unable to find anything on this via Google. The closest is the gay panic defense which is still not what this question is about.

This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation).

I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).

In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).

This is, in effect a defense of mistaken identity, and an assertion that the person on trial is not in fact the person who committed the crime. It is not legally significantly different from a case where the defendant claims that a witness has identified the wrong person. Exactly how the defense would be conducted would depend on what evidence establishes that "Herschel Greenbaum" committed the crime, and what evidence establishes (or disproves) that the defendant on trial is that same Herschel Greenbaum. The purpose of a trial is to establish or fail to establish the guilt of the person actually on trial, normally the person present in the courtroom. (trials do not establish innocence in the US). "The defendant" is the person actually on trial, even if an incorrect name has been used in bringing the charge. In such a case people would need to be careful about evidence that applies to a person named "Herschel Greenbaum" but might not apply to the defendant actually on trial.

It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving.

Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.

Can Musk threaten X11? Twitter, recently changed hands and became owned by Elon Musk, who decided to change its name to "X". There's the FOSS X11 desktop environment being developed for various Unix and Unix-like systems, and is hosted at x.org. Many operating systems provide X11 GUI packages under the "umbrella" name of xorg (which means installing this package will automatically install other dependencies on those systems) Q: Is it possible, that some kind of trademark dispute can lead to X11 losing its x.org domain name, and/or other formed/formless assets?

This is unlikely to be a problem. There are many companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an X or the name Xcom. That Twitter has changed to X branding does not substantially change this general situation. With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as X or x.com. Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that x.com could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour. It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp. The x.org domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the x.org domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both x.com and x.org were among the six single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while x.com has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, x.org has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004.

Yes, you can. To be precise, I claim that one can take BSD-licensed code and distribute it under the combined terms of both the BSD and the GPL licences. We know that, if I receive someone else's code under a BSD licence, I may redistribute it to you under those same terms. This is common practice, and not (I hope) in any way contentious. We also know that I may not redistribute it to you without the conditions that the BSD licence imposes; that is, I may not place less onerous conditions on you than BSD requires (that is, requiring the inclusion of the original copyright notice, the disclaimer, this list of conditions, and a prohibition on claiming the original author's endorsement on any modified version). So the question becomes whether I can distribute that code whilst adding more onerous terms than the BSD licence itself imposes. It is clear that I can. As the question notes, Microsoft is known to have taken code which it received under a BSD licence and used it in proprietary products. These come with very onerous conditions on the the use, modification, and redistribution of the derived code (usually, they permit one instance of it to be run, and no modifications nor redistributions of any kind). For clarity: if I were to seek from Microsoft permission to modify and/or redistribute the derived code, and they were to grant it, they would not be able to free me from the BSD requirements as they applied to the derived code; I would still need to comply with those. But they are perfectly capable of applying new, onerous requirements of their own. The GPL imposes conditions on redistribution that are more onerous than BSD's, but less onerous than those of most proprietary licences. I am therefore perfectly entitled to receive code under a BSD licence, and - with or without making modifications of my own - redistribute it, adding in the GPL's requirements, if I choose to. If I haven't modified the code, those added requirements are probably pointless; if you don't wish to be bound by them, you will go and get the code from the original author, who presumably will happily distribute it to you under the BSD licence. But if I have modified the code, and you wish to use those modifications, then you will need to abide by the requirements of both the BSD and the GPL licences, since both will apply to this new, combined work (the original code + my changes).

It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain.

You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.

You have a false premise: "it offers the same conditions", and "MIT license is functionally equivalent to CC-BY". These premises are not true. CC-BY: applies to more than just software; it applies to artistic or literary work, databases, other material disclaims endorsement explicitly withholds moral rights explicitly does not license patent rights (MIT license gives anyone who obtains a copy of the software the right to use it, a patent right) prescribes the acceptable forms of attribution Those are just some of the differences.

No. Twitter is traditionally a platform, not a distributor or a publisher. Blocking linking is not editorializing like in a publisher. They don't act as an editor in mounting warnings or deleting posts, they enforce their rights under the Communications Decency Act, Section 230 (emphasis mine): No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.

As far as I know, the Arial files that come pre-installed with your operating system are only licensed to you through your Windows license. You aren't authorized to distribute them. On the other hand, about 75% of people use Windows, which usually comes with Arial pre-installed, so you could just reference the system fonts and not worry about that. If you're determined to support OS X and Linux, anyone can get Arial for free through Microsoft's core fonts for the web, but their EULA says you can't redistribute them. So you could encourage your users to locate and download that package. You could buy an app license from myfonts.com (just search for it there), but that's pricey. But now let me speak to you as a typography fanboy rather than a licensing nerd. I suggest you not use Arial. It is an already bland font made even more bland by overuse. Font choice is just as important as any other design element in a video game: would Candy Crush Saga (King, iOS/Android/Windows Phone/Browser, 2012) make as effective a message without this "delicious" chunky script font? Arial cannot aid the atmosphere of your game unless you are making a game about the history of typography. Think carefully about your choice of typeface and whether one that actively encourages neutrality is your goal. But if you must, there is a simple solution: Arimo. It is metrically compatible with Arial, meaning every character in Arimo has the same width as its counterpart in Arial, so that documents typeset in both fonts will have the same layout.

It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.

Under what legislation has former U.S. President Trump been indicted for "conspiracy to defraud the US"? It's reported by BBC News that Mr Trump is charged with four counts, including: conspiracy to defraud the US tampering with a witness conspiracy against the rights of citizens Focusing on the first bullet point to avoid asking multiple questions1: What legislation introduces and/or covers the offence of defrauding the US? 1Although I would be interested in knowing more on the underlying legislation for a charge of conspiracy against the rights of citizens which I might post as a follow-up question

Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud United States) Here the indictment's introduction alleges that Trump perpetrated: A conspiracy to to defraud the United States by using dishonesty, fraud, and deceit to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful federal government function by which the results of the presidential election are collected, counted, and certified by the federal government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. temporary link to indictment pdf pending finding a better version: https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2023/08/trump-indictment.pdf 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute): If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.

No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction.

There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake.

He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".

Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.

The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.

There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.

There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.

Can somebody be charged for having another person physically assault someone for them? For example, if a friend asked her father to physically assault me, and her father did it, can the friend who asked her father to assault me also be charged with assault?

Yes. The charge in that case is solicitation of assault. Usually, solicitation of a crime carries the same punishment as the underlying crime. On the other hand, if a daughter tells her father what you did to her and he unilaterally decides to assault you, out of defense of his family's honor and outrage, the daughter has not committed a crime.

Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered).

The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter."

They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.

This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't

Is it the case that Police in the US are unable to proceed with a charge if a victim declines to "press charges" and if so, how are murder charges or even more pertinently, domestic violence charges, brought to court? First of all, it is prosecutors and not police officers who actually bring criminal charges in the legal systems in the vast majority of U.S. states (although not quite all, minor offenses in Rhode Island, for example, are an exception). Second, a prosecutor does have the right to bring criminal charges even if the victim or someone affiliated with the victim does not "press charges". Indeed, a prosecutor can almost always bring criminal charges over the objections of a victim, although "victim's rights" protections in some U.S. states require a prosecutor to confer with a victim before doing so. This said, law enforcement and a prosecutor cannot prosecute a criminal case if they have no knowledge that a crime was committed, so if no one brings a crime to the attention of authorities it is unlikely to be prosecuted. And, law enforcement and prosecutors will defer to the wishes of a victim that charges not be pressed in the legal system against an offender in many kinds of cases (although that discretion is limited in many states in domestic violence cases by statute).

The means and motivation by which you intentionally harass people are no defense. There is no material difference whether you harass someone yourself, ask someone else to harass, use a drone or trained/tamed animals. Whether you harass because the target may subjectively deserve so also makes no difference. The legal repercussions stay the same: charge, trial, conviction, sentence.

The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence.

In the US, if I chose to let someone die purely because I have the right to use my body however I choose, would I be charged with murder? I'll elaborate on the title: Someone asked me the question: Do you believe people should be forced to allow the use of their organs without consent? And in order to respond, I wondered what a court of law in the US would rule in the following scenario: One day I find myself in the theoretical situation where someone is hanging off the edge of a building and wants to live, and I know with 99.9% surety (lets assume this number is accurate and I admit that I somehow knew this beyond a doubt, for the sake of the theoretical scenario) that if I hold onto them until help arrives, my life won't be at risk, I'll simply have to strain my muscles for an hour until help arrives and they're safe. But I choose to let the person fall to their death, purely and solely because I believe I have the right to decline to use my body in any way I choose not to use it. I do not fear that saving the person puts me in any danger, and I admit this on record - furthermore it's reasonable to believe that that risk assessment is accurate. Also, it would likely be very painful for me to hold onto the person for the hour until help arrives. Now, in the eyes of a US court, am I a murderer? Furthermore, if the answer is that I would be considered a murder in the eye of the law, what if we change one detail of the premise: Rather than knowing I have a 99.9% chance of saving the person's life while avoiding any physical or mental damage, that number becomes 90%. Or 80%. Is there any language within the law that specifically defines a threshold beyond which it's reasonable to fear for my health and allow the person to die in order to protect my health? I realize the answer could vary from state to state, and if you need to use an example state, let's randomly say I'm in California.

You have no reponsibility to save someone (unless you put them in that position / were responsible for his safety, this is called owing a "duty of care", e.g doctor to patient, road user to road user etc) Legally you are not a murderer. But morally, your actions are reprehensible.

No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412

With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.'

You don't specify what country's law you're interested in, but as you mention precedent, I'll assume you're interested in common-law jurisdictions such as the United States. The short answer is: you won't find any successful lawsuits such as you describe, at least not without some significant additional facts. In order to be subject to liability, a person needs to commit a breach of some duty. In a civil suit, this needs to be a duty to the plaintiff. In order for it to be actionable for the doctor to not answer the phone, the doctor would have to have somehow assumed a duty to answer the phone at that particular time. Giving someone your phone number is not, in and of itself, a promise that you will never take a shower, or go to a movie, or let your battery run down, or for any other reason be unwilling or unable to answer your phone at a moment's notice. In addition, the patient would have to demonstrate that the doctor, by failing to answer the phone, caused some sort of harm. If the patient is having a medical emergency of some sort, the doctor's advice will almost certainly be: "Hang up and dial 911." This is something the patient can do without the doctor's help. Without some more significant and compelling facts, no court is going to impose a duty on a doctor to sit by the phone waiting for a patient's call.

I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.

It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.

The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable.

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

Hypothetical POTUS divorce If the spouse of the President of the United States filed for divorce, would the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody, etc.), would all the proceedings be fully held in private, could the President be compelled to take the stand and what would happen if the President refused to do so?

If the spouse of the US president filed for divorce, would a) the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody etc.), The President could claim it, but the President wouldn't win. Notably, a number of state governors and mayors have divorced while in office, and other foreign heads of state have been divorced while in office. For example, a U.K. court recently handled the divorce of a UAE monarch (over his objections to jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds), applying the same common law principles of head of state and sovereign immunities that exist in U.S. law and concluded that it had the authority to move forward with the case. Also, any Presidential divorce would take place in state court, not in federal court. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce and custody cases (under the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction), so the civil action could not be removed to federal court, unlike federal criminal cases involving the official duties of the President and unlike civil cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. b) would all the proceedings be fully held in private, This would be in the reasonable discretion of the judge. It would not be a matter of right, but it is quite plausible that a judge might close the proceedings, especially if minor children were involved. c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and Yes. A party to a lawsuit may always be compelled to take the stand, at least if no other person can provide a full substitute for the party's testimony. In ordinary civil lawsuits against the President, a President is usually compelled to testify only if an underling involved in the same matter cannot provide equivalent testimony. In many civil cases naming the President in his official capacity, the President has no personal knowledge of the facts and so can't be compelled to testify. But that would rarely be true in a divorce case, and would never be true in a divorce case where custody was an issue. This said, a state divorce court judge would almost certainly be very deferential to the scheduling concerns of the President for that testimony, and might allow that testimony to be provided remotely via videoconference so as to minimize the interruption this would pose to affairs of state and to address the security concerns of the Secret Service (i.e. the President's official bodyguards). d) what would happen if the President refused to do so? The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration. But a more likely outcome, tailored to minimize interference with government business, is that the Court would sanction a President who defied an order to testify by assuming as a matter of law that any testimony from the President would have been unfavorable to the President and make a conclusive adverse inference on the evidentiary issues about which the President was asked to testify against the President.

Privilege May Be Irrelevant In Your Case In a criminal case in the U.S., a criminal prosecution is moot and dismissed if the criminal defendant dies (or even if the criminal defendant is convicted and the case is still on appeal). (Pending divorce cases also abate upon the death of a spouse, but most other civil cases do not.) Caveat: Your Mileage May Vary Privilege law is established on a state by state basis and at the federal level based upon federal law, so it can vary. Confidential Communications v. The Testimonial Privilege There are really two privileges. The privilege for confidential communications between a husband and wife survives the marriage (although it does not impose a duty on a spouse not to disclose confidential communications outside court testimony) and may be asserted by either party to the communication. The testimonial privilege allows someone facing criminal charges or a civil claim in court to prevent a current spouse from testifying against them whether or not the current spouse wishes to testify. Exceptons To Spousal Privilege Both privileges generally exclude criminal and civil claims between the spouses and sometimes certain other crimes, and often also ongoing crimes and an intent to commit a future crime. In Colorado, the privilege extends to crimes allegedly committed against children, however, although this would not be true in all states. The detailed example of the Colorado statute on this point is set forth below. The 5th Amendment Alternative To The Testimonial Privilege Note that even when the testimonial privilege does not apply because a marriage has ended due to death, divorce or annulment, the former spouse may still be able to claim a 5th Amendment privilege out of concerns about prosecution, for example, for aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or accessory liability, if the witness is not given immunity (which is usually available only in criminal cases, not in civil cases brought by a private party who does not have authority to grant immunity). Spousal Immunity Contrasted With Spousal Privilege Spousal immunity is a very different concept from spousal privilege. Historically, you were immune from criminal liability for most crimes committed against your spouse (except murder), and had immunity from civil liability from all civil lawsuits brought by or on behalf of a spouse against the other spouse (e.g. breach of contract, personal injury, property disputes), except a suit for dissolution or annulment of a marriage or legal separation. If you have immunity from criminal or civil liability, testimony is irrelevant. You can't be found guilty period. The criminal liability immunities were lifted for all crimes other than rape long ago, and relatively recently for marital non-consent rape (there is still generally immunity from statutory rape or person in position of trust rape committed during the marriage). The civil liabilities were mostly eliminated many decades ago. The Example Of Colorado's Spousal Privilege Statute In Colorado, the spousal privilege statute reads as follows (later parts of the statute apply to other privileges): Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-90-107. Who may not testify without consent - definitions (1) There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: (a)(I) Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-310(4), C.R.S., a husband shall not be examined for or against his wife without her consent nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor during the marriage or afterward shall either be examined without the consent of the other as to any communications made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, or a criminal action or proceeding against one or both spouses when the alleged offense occurred prior to the date of the parties' marriage. However, this exception shall not attach if the otherwise privileged information is communicated after the marriage. (II) The privilege described in this paragraph (a) does not apply to class 1, 2, or 3 felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401(1) (a) (IV) and (1) (a) (V), C.R.S., or to level 1 or 2 drug felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401.5(2) (a), C.R.S. In this instance, during the marriage or afterward, a husband shall not be examined for or against his wife as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other during the marriage without his consent, and a wife shall not be examined for or against her husband as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other without her consent. (III) Communications between a husband and wife are not privileged pursuant to this paragraph (a) if such communications are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime. (IV) The burden of proving the existence of a marriage for the purposes of this paragraph (a) shall be on the party asserting the claim. (V) Notice of the assertion of the marital privilege shall be given as soon as practicable but not less than ten days prior to assertion at any hearing. (a.5)(I) Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-310(5), C.R.S., a partner in a civil union shall not be examined for or against the other partner in the civil union without the other partner's consent, nor during the civil union or afterward shall either be examined without the consent of the other as to any communications made by one to the other during the civil union; except that this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, or a criminal action or proceeding against one or both partners when the alleged offense occurred prior to the date of the parties' certification of the civil union. However, this exception shall not attach if the otherwise privileged information is communicated after the certification of the civil union. (II) The privilege described in this paragraph (a.5) does not apply to class 1, 2, or 3 felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401(1) (a) (IV) and (1) (a) (V), C.R.S., or to level 1 or 2 drug felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401.5(2) (a), C.R.S. In this instance, during the civil union or afterward, a partner in a civil union shall not be examined for or against the other partner in the civil union as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other during the civil union without the other partner's consent. (III) Communications between partners in a civil union are not privileged pursuant to this paragraph (a.5) if such communications are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime. (IV) The burden of proving the existence of a civil union for the purposes of this paragraph (a.5) shall be on the party asserting the claim. (V) Notice of the assertion of the privilege described in this paragraph (a.5) shall be given as soon as practicable but not less than ten days prior to assertion at any hearing. (VI) For the purposes of this paragraph (a.5), "partner in a civil union" means a person who has entered into a civil union established in accordance with the requirements of article 15 of title 14, C.R.S. The reference to C.R.S. § 14-13-310(4) is to the section on child-custody hearings. How Serious Are The Crimes To Which Testimonial Privilege Does Not Apply In Colorado? Class 1, 2 or 3 felonies to which the confidential communication husband-wife privilege applies but not the testimonial husband-wife privilege apply in Colorado are quite serious offenses. Class 1 felonies in Colorado have a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole (or life with possibility of parole after 40 years if the offender is a minor). Class 1 felonies include first degree murder for which the death penalty is available in some cases and aggravated kidnapping where death is presumed because the victim has not be released alive. Class 2 felonies in Colorado are punishable by eight to thirty-six years in person (eight to twenty-four years if non-violent, sixteen to thirty-six if violent). Class 2 felonies would include second degree murder, kidnapping involving the rape or robbery of the victim, gang rape, rape committed with a deadly weapon, rape causing serious bodily injury, theft of more than $1,000,000, and attempted Class 1 felonies. Class 3 felonies are punishable by four to eighteen years in prison (four to twelve if non-violent, eight to eighteen years if violent). Class 3 felonies would include heat of passion murder, aggravated armed robbery, aggravated armed burglary, aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury or disfigurement or a permanent disability (and not in the heat of passion), human trafficking for involuntary servitude or sexual servitude (including keeping slaves), kidnapping for ransom or with a deadly weapon, forcible rape, rape committed by incapacitating someone with drugs, or rape caused by a credible threat of "imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone", arson of a building, and theft of $100,000 or more but less than $1,000,000. A class 1 drug felony is punishable by eight to thirty-two years in prison. A class 2 drug felony is punishable by four to eight years in prison. These involve drug dealing of large amounts of drugs and/or drug dealing to children. Among the crimes to which the marital privilege would be still apply would be manslaughter, assault not causing serious bodily injury, theft of less than $100,000, unarmed burglary, unarmed robbery, kidnapping without a weapon and without asking for ransom, drug dealing in moderate amounts to adults, statutory rape, rape by a person in a position of trust, rape without consent but without use of physical force (e.g. by blackmail not involving physical violence threats), or arson of property other than a building. Of course, by charging a serious crime, one may cause the privilege to evaporate even if it is unlikely to result in a conviction for that crime.

A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.

The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.

The powers of the President are contained in Article II of the constitution; this is a fair summary. The power to make executive orders stems from Section 1 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When the Supreme Court considers the legality of an executive order (which only happens when someone brings a case that the court agrees to hear) they use Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952). The first amendment specifically forbids congress from making laws about these matters. Therefore the express will of congress (as the amendment required a 2/3 majority of Congress) is that there shall be no law about these matters. Since the President would be acting against the express will of Congress he would drop to the third limb of Jackson's test: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Since, this is not a power that the President is given by the constitution it is likely that the Court would decide that he doesn't have such power.

The closest the Supreme Court has gotten to criminal liability for official acts seems to be Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). There it addressed civil liability and held that the U.S. President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." It's unclear how the Justices would decide criminal liability for official acts. (Though some might argue that non-precedential logic in Fitzgerald suggests the Court could extend immunity to the criminal context as well.) As to homicide, murder and manslaughter are federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112. The latter involves the commission "of a lawful act which might produce death" "without due caution and circumspection."

Bob should certainly expect to be impeached by whichever side his testimony injures. Their attorney will confront him with the transcript of his previous testimony, and likely read it out loud for the jury to hear, and force him to acknowledge that he said something different before. This is pretty standard trial tactics. Bob would not be treated as formally admitting that he committed perjury, though I think it's fair to say that he has effectively made that admission. One side will treat him as having lied the first time; the other will treat him as lying now. It's possible that he will have some explanation for the discrepancy -- he was high, he has memory problems, he misunderstood the question -- but in your hypothetical, the explanation would have to be pretty amazing to justify such a complete reversal.

How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge.

Equal Protection and Samoan Credit Law In American Samoa, a person of Samoan descent and a person of other descent are treated differently under bankruptcy law. Per A.S.C.A. § 43.1528(a): No real property of a Samoan may be subject to sale under a writ of a court to satisfy any judgment other than a judgment foreclosing a valid mortgage. “Samoan” includes American Samoans of at least one-half Samoan blood and persons born on other islands in the Pacific Ocean who are of at least one-half Polynesian, Melanesian or Micronesian blood and who reside in American Samoa. It was my understanding that the 14th amendment provided equal protection of the law, and that laws with an explicit race test have been deemed unconstitutional. What exception allows this law to be considered constitutional?

This is a law of American Samoa. American Samoa is not a state of the US. American Samoans are not automatic citizens under the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment says "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws".

18 U.S. Code § 611 is the relevant law. (a) It shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, unless— (1) the election is held partly for some other purpose; (2) aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under a State constitution or statute or a local ordinance; and (3) voting for such other purpose is conducted independently of voting for a candidate for such Federal offices, in such a manner that an alien has the opportunity to vote for such other purpose, but not an opportunity to vote for a candidate for any one or more of such Federal offices. This is not the most straightforward of law on the books. It says "you can't vote unless..." three things. It has to be locally legal to vote for something other than a federal office, the election has to include something other than voting for federal office, and it cannot be possible to vote for a federal office at the same time. Given that, it is impossible for any alien (even documented) to vote for president. Extant alien-voting laws are no higher than municipality, most being in Maryland. Violation of the law is a crime. Because non-citizens are not allowed to vote in state-wide elections, the theory is that they literally cannot vote, so they will not receive a ballot, which comes from the state. Here are the election laws for Maryland. There isn't a provision for "disqualifying" a vote, instead a person is prevented from voting in the first place if they are successfully challenged, because they can't prove who they are or the person they claim to be is not registered to vote (a non-citizen will never be registered with the state to vote, assuming no fraudulent documentation). Takoma Park non-citizen residents can vote in city elections and they register with the local gov't, not the state.

Every court in the United States from municipal traffic court to a state court to a U.S. District Court has both the right and the obligation to consider claims of unconstitutionality just like any other legal question that a case presents. Contrary to popular misconception, constitutional law issues are not the exclusive province of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, constitutional issues are only ruled upon in the first instance in the U.S. Supreme Court (or even in a direct appeal from a trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court) in rare and isolated cases. Usually, at least one trial court judge and at least three appellate court judges, and often more appellate court judges, have ruled upon a constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme Court considers it. This is just as true in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which have legal systems based upon the civil law legal system, as it is in other U.S. jurisdictions, which have a common law legal system. There is usually only one difference between a case in which the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and one in which it is not. When the constitutionality of a statute is called into question, many state and federal rules of civil procedure require or permit the attorney general of the state whose statute's constitutionality (or the U.S. attorney general when a federal law's constitutionality is at issue) to be joined as a party for the purpose of litigating that issue. This allows the court to receive arguments on the constitutional issue from the public's perspective as well as the perspectives of the parties. A few states also provide that appeals from trial court decisions finding that a statute is unconstitutional are directly to the state supreme court, rather than to the intermediate court of appeals as they would usually be in those states. Notably, the distinct treatment of constitutional issues in many civil law systems is not inherently a part of the civil law system. Constitutional courts are mostly a post-World War II constitutional innovation in the countries where they are found. For example, the "law-screen" doctrine and the existence of a constitutional court in France, is much younger than core of the rest of the civil law system in France, which invented the civil law system in its modern form more than two hundred years ago. Neither France, at the time Louisiana adopted its civil law legal system through the time of the Louisiana Purchase, nor Spain at the time that Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war, had constitutional courts. Footnote Regarding Treaties Also, it is worth remarking that in Europe and much of the rest of the world, the function of protecting individual rights against government authority in a way that is entrenched so that it is not easily overcome by domestic legislation of a current political regime is accomplished through international treaties, rather than only through entrenched rights in a constitution as they are in the United States. Although even then, in many European countries, ordinary courts apply only domestic law and the country in question has to adopt domestic law to conform to the treaties. This treaty mechanism is not very effective in the U.S., because in the U.S., unlike most countries, an ordinary domestic law can override an earlier adopted and ratified international treaty.

In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far.

The classificational scheme "White; black or African American; American Indian and Alaska Native; Asian; and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander" was instituted on May 12, 1977 through Office of Management and Budget Directive 15, which articulates "standard classifications for record keeping, collection, and presentation of data on race and ethnicity in Federal program administrative reporting and statistical activities". In the case of Mostafa Hefny, his classification as white would be a consequence of being from North Africa (Egypt), and the fact that "white" is defined as "A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East". A possible point of contention is that he is not from North Africa: the directive does not say where North Africa (as opposed to unmodified Africa) is. Discussion was published in the Federal Register, August 28, 1995, about these standards, and to make a really long story short, there's a problem, and no solution. The October 30, 1997 decision states the current law. This is what you should consult for the current situation: a propos the case of Nubians, the conflict still remains regarding the definition of "white" as "A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa", and "black" as "person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa" (Nubians fall into both categories: a black racial group of Northern Africa). In non-immigration cases, racial and ethnic data are based on self-reporting. There is no strict rule, but "self-identification is the preferred means of obtaining information about an individual's race and ethnicity" (not possible in some instances, such as birth and death records). The set of categories which the census makes available is somewhat changeable. They currently report that they comply with the 1997 standards, but this report indicates that they had intended to drop "some other race" for 2010, but did not because of a Congressional mandate. The government does not "recognize" individuals racially, instead they "report" them in a particular manner, so that counts can be made for whatever purposes (usually Civil Rights Act compliance). The rules apply to new and revised records, and not to existing records. One would have to look at the record of Hefny's suit, but it is likely that lack of standing and failure to state a legal claim figured prominently in the dismissal, if the case was dismissed.

The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses).

What that church is doing is legal. There is a statutory exception in the Fair Housing Act for religious and non-profit organizations. 42 U.S. Code § 3607 - Religious organization or private club exemption Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this subchapter prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members.

Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? One of the Youtube channels I'm following is running a series of videos about an ongoing lawsuit (within reason, of course). The latest video has an interesting point that got me wondering. Suppose the lawsuit is about events that took place about a long time ago (in the case above it's in 1999, that's over 23 years now). The lawyers of one side are questioning a witness from the other side. The questions are carefully crafted, but in the end they manage to get a statement of the witness that they are sure of some fact X. They even ask them several times, just to be sure. Then the questioning lawyer produces a photo that clearly shows fact X to be wrong. Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? As for jurisdiction: the above case is in the USA, but since I'm myself from Latvia, I'm interested in generic answers for various jurisdictions (or maybe it's the same everywhere?)

Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?"

I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation).

This is pretty much the entire purpose of a redirect, and almost always permissible. If your witness has given an unhelpfully incomplete answer, it is not just "advisable" to ask those follow-up questions, but perhaps mandatory as an ethical matter.

Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is.

Your confessions, to anyone, can be used against you. If A admits to B that A stole the car, B can testify to what A said. In fact, if B accuses A of a crime and A says nothing (and C witnesses this), C can testify as to what B and A said (or didn't say) – this is known as an adoptive admission, and it is up to the jury to decide if they think the silence is significant. Recordings are likewise admissible. All evidence is in principle defeasible, so if there is a video of "you" committing a crime, you can make the case that it wasn't really you, and the jury will weigh the evidence to see if they are firmly convinced that you did commit the crime (at least in New Jersey... long story about 'burden of proof').

As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.

This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.

One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant.

What would you be charged with for covering up a rightful death? I'm referring to a specific situation that occurred in the TV show 24. Due to previous complex circumstances, a man (call him "Bob") destroys a van that is the scene of a murder and hides 2 bodies. Initially Bob had committed no crime; victim 1 was stabbed by victim 2, victim 2 was then shot by Bob in self-defense. I'm wondering what, if anything, could Bob be guilty of for not reporting the deaths? Edit: I'm just curious about the legality and consequences of covering up the deaths so just assume that there is evidence the shooting was in self defence.

Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.

There was a case like that in 2010 in germany tl;dr synopsis of the German article: The police raided the private home of an alleged member of a criminal gang. This was performed as a no-knock raid. The police officers did not announce themselves as such when they started to break open the door. The suspect had reason to believe that a rival gang was planning an attempt on his life. So the suspect believed that the people trying to break into his home were actually members of said gang trying to murder him. The suspect used a firearm to shoot at the intruders through the door, lethally injuring a police officer. When the police officers then identified themselves as such, the suspect surrendered immediately. A court later ruled that killing the police officer was self-defense, because they were reasonably convinced that the defendant was unaware that he was dealing with police officers, believed to be in a situation where his life was in danger and where lethal violence was the only way to save his life. Here is the verdict. [In German, of course]

Laws on self-defense vary greatly from nation to nation. Generally, one cannot hunt down a hypothetical threat but one can defend against an actual threat or even a mistakenly assumed actual threat where no actual threat exists. Alice set it up so that Bob would feel threatened. In many jurisdictions, the self-defense defense for homicide rests on the state of the mind of the suspect, insofar as it can be determined, and failing that on a "reasonable person" standard. Presumably Bob genuinely felt threatened by Charlie and says so afterwards. "I thought he/it/whatever was trying to harm me. I didn't know it was a harmless actor." Just how much harm Bob needs to make self-defense stick varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It could be fear of imminent, serious bodily harm, or fear of being victimized in any sort of crime (stand your ground laws). As the comment by user6726 points out, just protraying a zombie or whatever isn't enough, there has to be threat to Bob. Bob cannot hunt Charlie down because Charlie "is" an evil lich or whatever. Bob can defend himself against attacks by Charlie and (in some jurisdictions) against intrusions by Charlie in his property. So it makes a difference if Bob hunts in his own backyard or further afield. The well-documented and extensive efforts by Alice and Darren to fool Bob should support Bob's statement. Say the court/jury believes that it was reasonable (or at least "not entirely unreasonable") for Bob to be afraid. Since the perceived self-defense would apply even if Bob thought the attacker was human, thinking that it was non-human should make little difference. Except that it would further showcase the degree to which Bob was fooled to see a threat. If the whole endeavor by Alice and Darren broke laws, the death might fall into felony homicide in some jurisdictions. This one could come to technicalities because Bob wasn't their accomplice. Otherwise, Darren's track record might prevent the two from being charged for negligent homicide. Consider the well-publicized cases where either the police or civilians shot unarmed people, and say that they thought the victim was armed and a threat to them. If doesn't matter if the victim drew a gun or a wallet, it matters if the shooter can make his or her fears plausible enough.

tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky.

england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia

Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible.

Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her.

The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.

What does it take to be sentenced to a medium-security prison (US)? It is a trope that when powerful/rich people are sentenced, they are sent to cushy, low-security prisons (think The Wolf of Wall Street). However, in my book, I'd like a certain character to be sent to a medium-security prison. The only problem is, they're the kind of person that the aforementioned trope applies to. They're a wealthy politician with a lot of influence, and they would certainly do everything in their power to rather wind up in a low-security prison. That gives the context for my question; what circumstances could lead to a powerful person not being able to weasel their way into a low-security prison?

united-states Short Answer They're a wealthy politician with a lot of influence, and they would certainly do everything in their power to rather wind up in a low-security prison. The easiest way to do it would be to have a sentence of more than twenty but less than thirty years imposed because of a very large dollar amount fraud involving a great many victims (e.g. a large Ponzi scheme). Espionage is another plausible charge that could have the same sort of sentence length. This would send them to a medium-security prison despite a lack of "points" from offense severity, a prior criminal record, or a history of violence, lack of gang involvement, or an absence of a prior escape attempt. Long answer Each U.S. state has its own system. In the U.S. federal criminal justice system, a convicted felon's assignment to a particular prison is a decision made by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, after the defendant has been sentenced by a federal judge for a particular sentence length for a particular crime. The FBP states that: The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment, and shall, subject to bed availability, the prisoner's security designation, the prisoner's programmatic needs, the prisoner's mental and medical health needs, any request made by the prisoner related to faith- based needs, recommendations of the sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of Prisons, place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner's primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence. It is quite an involved process and set of rules. And, there is necessarily flexibility in the system to reflect the availability of prison space at the time of assignment. The overall context is as follows, according to a source writing as of November 2017 (the same source has at times had an online calculator helping people to predict an assignment): The Federal Bureau of Prisons confines 184,855 people. About 83% of those people, or 154,844 inmates, serve their time inside Bureau of Prisons facilities. The other people serve their time in privately managed prisons or other types of facilities. Males make up more than 93% of the federal prison population. Those people serve sentences in the following types of security levels: Minimum-security Federal Prison Camps: 32,189 people, or about 17% of the population Low-security Federal Correctional Institutions: 69,437 people, or about 37% of the population Medium-security Federal Correctional Institutions: 55,377 or about 30% of the population High-security United States Penitentiaries: 21,524 people, or about 12% of the population Unclassified: 6,980 people, or about 4% of the population The full federal BOP policy is here which notes that: The review process to assign a custody level based on an inmate’s criminal history, instant offense, and institutional adjustment. A custody level (i.e., COMMUNITY, OUT, IN, and MAXIMUM) dictates the degree of staff supervision required for an individual inmate. The key table in the rules is below. It is somewhat hard to interpret without the larger context, but is the closest thing to an overall assignment key that exists in the rules. Basically, the left column lists a point score, which provides a default assignment, and each box has exceptions to the usual point score rules: Medium security inmates either have 0-15 points with a prior serious escape attempt or a sentence of 20 years or more remaining, or 16-23 points. But they have less than 24 points, less than 30 years of their sentence remaining, are not part of a disruptive group (read hard core gang member) and have not been involved in a prison disturbance. The circumstances that gets someone to 16-23 points are not simple to describe succinctly. Another source explains the factors involved (PSR is the pre-sentencing report presented to the judge before ruling on a sentence in the case): Voluntary surrender to custody. Where a court permits a defendant to voluntarily surrender to BOP custody for service of an initial term of confinement (not supervised release violation), three points are subtracted from the security point total. Severity of current offense. Appendix A to Program Statement 5100.08 contains a scale of various offense behaviors, and the Designation Manual provides a corresponding point assignment for assessed severity. When evaluating offense severity, staff consider the most severe documented behavior, as set forth in the PSR, not necessarily the offense of conviction. This ranges from 0-7. The key for assigning this score starts at page 97 of the pdf linked. Criminal history score. Points are assigned based on an offender’s criminal history points, taken from the judgment’s statement of reasons or, if not found there, from the PSR. Scoring does not factor in whether the court found a defendant’s points over – or underrepresent criminal history. This ranges from 0-10 based upon the criminal history score assigned at sentencing. If it is absent the BOP will (per the rule linked above): (a)Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month; (b)Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a); (c)Add 1 point for each prior conviction not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this item; and, (d)Add 2 points if the instant offense is a revocation accompanied by a new state or federal conviction, or if the instant offense occurred while under federal supervision including incarceration, probation, parole or supervised release. This together with the severity of the crime are major factors. History of violence. In assessing the violent nature of prior documented findings of guilt (convictions and supervised release violations), policy distinguishes between “serious” and “minor” incidents as well as time relative to when the case is being reviewed. This category does not factor in the instant offense and can change over time based on an offender’s institutional adjustment (i.e., violence in the BOP can result in assignment of points). The rule provides with regard to this factor: History of escape or attempts. Acts for which there are documented findings of guilt, including absconding from community supervision or failing to appear for a criminal case, will be scored. Detainers. Points are scored for detainers, including both those actually lodged and where law enforcement indicates a firm intent to lodge one. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainers are not scored. Age. Given the correlation between age (youth) and negative institutional adjustment, points are assigned, with inmates under 24 years old receiving eight points and inmates over 55 receiving none. Education level. Where the PSR verifies a high school degree or GED, no points are assigned. Where neither is verified, two points are assessed. Drug/alcohol abuse. Where the PSR documents a defendant’s drug or alcohol abuse within the past five years, one point is assessed. If there is no known abuse or abuse more than five years old, no points are added. An inmate’s security point total corresponds to a security level from which staff determine facility placement. However, security point total is not dispositive. The application of a public safety factor (PSF) or a management variable can impact the placement decision. The application of a PSF, which is not confined to evidence of convictions, is intended to address information suggesting a need for greater security precautions. Examples include sentence length, removable alien status, sex offender status, and threat to a government official. Management variables are grounded in the “professional judgment of bureau staff” and are used to effectuate an inmate’s placement at a facility inconsistent with the inmate’s scored security level. This most commonly occurs when an inmate poses either a greater or lesser security risk than his or her assigned security level denotes or to facilitate program participation (e.g., permit completion of residential drug treatment despite a drop in security level). It is also worth noting that the federal criminal justice system, generally speaking, deals disproportionately with lower risk felons committing white collar crimes and immigration offenses, while state criminal justice systems generally deals with higher risk felons who have mostly committed "blue collar" crimes, often violent ones.

They still have the power They generally don’t because: Most activities of a criminal nature no matter how novel can be shoehorned as a new instance of an existing crime. Parliament is much more pro-active in its legislative agenda. The judicial system moves much more slowly.

Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).

I think you're being confused by two separate definitions of "police power." The police power under the 10th Amendment has nothing to do with "the police," i.e. people with guns and badges and uniforms who make arrests. It refers to the authority of a government to make rules for the general welfare. Police power is almost always exercised by the legislature, and when the executive exercises it (e.g. by issuing regulations) it's typically operating under conditions set by the legislature. The United States has police power in a few situations: DC, federal property and territories, US-flagged ships on the high seas, etc. Outside of those situations, the United States instead has enumerated powers. Congress has a power to tax and spend to promote the general welfare, but otherwise it can only legislate to achieve one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Now, courts have read Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce very broadly, but there does need to be some relation to enumerated powers. You're asking about the Capitol Police, but they don't have "police power" in the 10th Amendment sense. They have the power to carry guns and to arrest people for crimes committed against the United States. This power is limited based on geography and/or the nature of their task; for instance, they have nationwide arrest powers "[i]n the performance of their protective duties," but not when they're traveling outside DC on other official duties (e.g. to attend training). While there's no litigation I can dig up that's directly on point, courts have repeatedly ruled that Congress has the power to do some not-entirely-legislative tasks in order to protect its own functions. For instance, in Anderson v. Dunn (1821), the Supreme Court upheld an inherent power of the House to hold private citizens in contempt of Congress for disobeying its subpoenas and for the Sergeant at Arms to arrest them and bring them before the House. It seems likely Congress would also have the authority to protect its own members from physical violence. The GAO did an analysis when it was analyzing whether there was a constitutional problem with making Capitol Police IG personnel into special deputy US marshals, and it concluded that there was no issue with congressional employees exercising arrest powers in order to physically protect the legislative branch.

Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law.

I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.

The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months).

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

Annoying the TSA, Part II: Fake Contraband Part I: Can you legally have an (unloaded) black powder revolver in your carry-on luggage? Say that a hypothetical person ("Juan Morales") has a large clear plastic bag of talcum powder in his checked luggage. Within the talcum powder is several thousands of dollars' worth of delicate jewelry, which it is cushioning and protecting from moisture. Due to a set of bizarre coincidences, the bag of mysterious white powder has been: In front of a (legal) machine gun during a lengthy range day Liberally misted with Lanacane On a dying nursing home patient's nightstand while she took nebulized morphine In a friend's bathroom while he (the friend) was hotboxing marijuana in a state where it's legal In the same bathroom while a recently imprisoned former friend was hotboxing crack cocaine (Mr. Morales did not participate) As a result, it sets off every alarm possible, causing the TSA to arrest him and confiscate his stuff. Can Mr. Morales sue them for anything? After all, he was arrested despite technically not doing anything wrong, and has lost the legally-owned jewelry that the talcum powder was keeping dry and protected. EDIT: I forgot to mention that the reason he was going on the flight was to deliver the jewelry to a client (he's a jeweler). As a result of the delay, he lost the client's business. Note: If any of the bizarre coincidences are illegal, ignore them. My point is that there's a false-positive for contraband that causes the TSA to wrongfully arrest him and confiscate $K of his property DISCLAIMER: In case you didn't figure it out already from the ridiculousness of the scenario, I have absolutely no intention of ever doing this. This is purely a hypothetical "what-if" question.

he was arrested despite technically not doing anything wrong He was arrested because there was probable cause to believe that he was involved in the commission of a felony. The arrest was legal even if he was innocent. He has no basis for a successful lawsuit.

He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.

If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.

When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.

This article surveys the law, as of 2014. The answer is "yes or no, depending on which circuit". In US v. Chafin 423 F. App’x 342, the court decided that although the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms, it does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding right to sell a firearm drawing an analogy to US v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 "the protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others". Likewise the 9th weighs in, in Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975: Heller said nothing about extending Second Amendment protection to firearm manufacturers or dealers. If anything, Heller recognized that firearms manufacturers and dealers are properly subject to regulation Contrarily, in the Northern Illinois district in Illinois Association of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, the court finds in response to a ban on the sale of firearms in the city that. the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment. This right must also include the right to acquire a firearm...the ordinances are declared unconstitutional The same court in Kole v. Village of Norridge determined that the would-be operator of a gun store, thus has derivative standing to assert the subsidiary right to acquire arms on behalf of his customers both decisions relying on Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, where the city sought indirect means to encumber the exercise 2nd of Amendment rights (banning shooting ranges). The final answer will have to be made by SCOTUS, and so far there is nothing on the docket that could decide the matter. Instead, the question will be answered based on level of scrutiny for firearms regulations and whether " the government can establish that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood"; and if it is not outside the scope of the 2nd Amendment, "then there must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights".

Many times. See pages 4 and onward here. The 11th circuit (which includes FL) recognizes sentencing manipulation but not sentencing entrapment. The one example from the 11th circuit in that document (US v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264) was an unsuccessful claim of sentence manipulation, but it shows the analysis that goes into deciding these types of claims. They say: While our Circuit does not recognize sentencing entrapment as a viable defense, we do recognize the outrageous government conduct defense, and we have considered sentencing manipulation as a viable defense. ... Ciszkowski, however, has not met his burden of establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation. Government-created reverse sting operations are recognized and useful methods of law enforcement investigation. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The fact that law enforcement may provide drugs or guns essential to a willing and predisposed offender does not necessarily constitute misconduct. We have previously declined to find that the government engaged in prohibited sentencing factor manipulation in other similar contexts.

Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.

Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination.

Can you make the police department pay for damage done to your property if you get swatted? For purposes of conjecture, say some nameless online troll decides that they hate you. Perhaps you said you don't worship the members of a K-Pop band they like. As a result, they do some research and find your address. They then proceed to call your local police department, reporting a (fictional) hostage situation / homicide in progress / etc. at your address. The police department's SWAT team busts down your door and trashes your house. This is a "prank" called swatting. As is the troll's intention, it causes a lot of damage to your property, damage you can't afford to get repaired. Is there any way to get the police department to pay for the damage? After all, they did just come and trash your house despite you having done nothing wrong (besides the horrendous crime of not worshiping the troll's favorite band).

There is a police power exception to the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to not taking property without due process of law and just compensation. In a similar case arising in Greenwood Village, Colorado, an innocent homeowner was denied any relief at trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, or on appeal to the 10th Circuit, after his house was trashed by SWAT teams trying to catch a guy accused of mere theft and fleeing police officers. (The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case sometime after the linked article was written.) But, there does appear to be a circuit split on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in a case appealed from a U.S. District Court decision in Texas reached a contrary conclusion in a case between Vicki Baker and the City of McKinney, Texas decided earlier this month in March of 2023 in which it affirmed a U.S. District Court ruling in favor of the homewoner. The fact that there is now a circuit split on the issue increases the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court would consider a Petition for Certiorari from the 5th Circuit decision in the Texas case, although it is far from a sure thing as only about 1% of Petitions for Certiorari presented to the U.S. Supreme Court (about 80 out of 7,000 to 8,000 per year) are granted. The key issue distinguishing these two rulings is the question of whether the police power exception to the eminent domain obligation of a government applies to cases in which the person whose property is taken is innocent of any wrongdoing and any legally relevant connection to a wrongdoer. Both circuits would agree that a government does not have eminent domain liability under the constitution if, for example, the property destroyed belongs to someone who committed a crime and has their house destroyed in the process of trying to arrest the criminal. Also, neither of the decisions disputes that police may, under the police power exception, destroy property in connection with efforts to apprehend a criminal or to prevent a crime, without seeking court approval in the usual situation where there are exigent circumstances that can't wait for the slow process of conducting a court hearing on the question. The question, instead, is whether an innocent property owner has a right to bring an "inverse condemnation" lawsuit to remedy the damage that the innocent property owner has experienced.

You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.

The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.

If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.

There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.

That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.

The police are never permitted to break the law. However, the law that gives them their powers may make other laws not applicable to them in the course of their duties. If a law is not applicable to them; how can they break it?

There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).

Can you legally have an (unloaded) black powder revolver in your carry-on luggage? Part I of "Annoying the TSA" For good reason, U.S. law forbids people from carrying firearms on planes. However, last I checked, black powder "antique weapons" (such as cap-and-ball revolvers) aren't considered firearms. With that in mind, would it be legal to carry an unloaded (since you aren't allowed to have black powder or primers) cap-and-ball revolver on a plane? Note: I'm not asking for legal advice, nor do I plan to actually do so if it's legal; this is just a random "what-if" thought that's been bugging me for the last few months.

The relevant regulations in 49 CFR 1540 refer to weapons, not firearms, and unless you are specifically permitted, you cannot carry a weapon in your carry-on luggage. The interpretation of "weapon" is given here, which says Weapons are objects that may be used to attack another. TSA considers an item to be a weapon under 49 CFR 1540.111 if it is created for use as a weapon or is so similar to an item created as a weapon that it appears to be, or is easily used as, a weapon. Weapons include firearms, as well as realistic replicas of firearms that may reasonably be thought to be actual weapons. Such realistic replicas are prohibited because their similarity in appearance to real weapons may allow them to be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew. The screener has the discretion to determine when a replica is so realistic that it should be prohibited. Other toy weapons will be allowed in the sterile areas and cabin. Partial weapons and parts of weapons also are prohibited because they may be carried separately by collaborators for assembly subsequent to entry or boarding. In addition, partial weapons may appear to be operative and could be used to intimidate passengers and flight crew.

Short answer: It depends. It is lawful if one has a lawful reason, such as it's needed for work, or it's a folding pocketknife (e.g. a Swiss Army Knife) with a blade less than 3 inches. Long answer: The primary legislation is s.139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which makes it unlawful to have in a public place: (2) ... any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed except a folding pocketknife. (3) .... [this includes] a folding pocketknife if the cutting edge of its blade exceeds 3 inches. Subsection (4) gives the "good reason or lawful authority" general defence for possessing such an article which is complemented and supplemented by: (5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. This site gives some more information and identifies certain knives that are banned, and this site, under "legislation", lists semi-related offences. .

ORS 166.220 suggests this would be illegal - specifically its "unlawful use of a weapon" if a person (emphasis mine): Intentionally discharges a firearm, blowgun, bow and arrow, crossbow or explosive device within the city limits of any city or within residential areas within urban growth boundaries at or in the direction of any person, building, structure or vehicle within the range of the weapon without having legal authority for such discharge. So what's "within range"? With a homemade bow of unknown construction, draw weight, and unknown arrows I'd say it's pretty much going to be something you find out when an arrow goes that far. I wouldn't expect it to match the range of high-end bows and arrows (I've seen 40lb recurves cover ~250 yards) but 100 yards plus doesn't sound ridiculous - more if it's got some elevation to it. The point is you really don't want to find out the hard way when a shot goes astray giving your neighbours the old King Harold treatment.

Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing.

It is their property, so keeping it without permission could well be seen as theft. I think you are obliged to make reasonable attempts to notify them you have their property before using it or selling it. Just like if someone left the item at your house after a party. If they want it back, however, it is at their cost, you should not be out of pocket for their failure to deliver within a reasonable time-frame; you may find they've already claimed the cost of the product from the courier and don't want it back. You are well within your rights to offer to buy it from them, and them to accept or reject that offer, this is a separate contract to the original sale.

AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund.

It is almost certainly fine as long has you have a "good reason". The police website give a list of examples when carrying a knife would have a "good reason" (like a chef getting a set of knives out of her car, for example). Likewise, a plastic knife isn't considered a weapon as long as you don't start threatening people with it. As long as you don't start swinging it around, you should be fine.

While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.

Does an illegal mode of creation or fixation remove a work from copyrightability? Does an illegal mode of creation or fixation (such as vandalism by graffiti) mean that the work is not the subject of copyright?

The Copyright Act provides that (17 U.S.C. § 102): Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed1 in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. It also says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. There is no explicit requirement that the work be legally produced, and there is no exception for copyright protection if the work is illegally produced. See also Celia Lerman, "Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law" (2013) 2 N.Y.U. J. Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law 295: there are several examples outside of graffiti where copyright protects right-infringing works. Copyright still attaches to photographs taken that violate privacy rights: a paparazzi photographer has obtained copyright protection over a picture that he took of a celebrity while violating her rights to privacy, and a camp counsellor obtained copyright over a picture of a minor, taken without her parent's permission. A journalist has received copyright protection over an article that reveals state secrets. A student may obtain copyright protection for a painting of a minor killing a policeman, even though the work could constitute an illegal threat under criminal law. Copyright protection is denied to a work only if the work itself violates copyright. ... If U.S. copyright law included a general "illegality clause," then copyright would not protect works that offend any other body of law. Such clauses are contained in other copyright and trademark laws around the world. U.S. copyright law does not include such a provision. ... [a vandal's] work can still be protected under copyright, because vandalism does not preclude copyright protection. 1. § 101: "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."

Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment.

What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.

Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.

There is no such thing as "alter it by X amount and it's legal". If the original can be determined at all, it would fall under derivative work and be an infringement. https://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/copyright_myths -- See #6 and #7 And Stanford: http://fairuse.stanford.edu/2014/12/22/much-photo-need-alter-avoid-copyright-infringement-hint-cheshire-cat/ Kienitz v Sconnie Nation And the well known Shepard Fairy/Hope poster case: http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/shephard-fairey-is-fined-and-sentenced-to-probation-in-hope-poster-case/?_r=0

Presumably by "is illegal" you mean "violates copyright law". Copyright infringement is simply "copying / distributing without authorization", which refers to the original work and not some other work. The act of originally writing a book is not "copying" (likewise "taking a picture", etc), so the act of writing a book using pirated software is also not copying and not infringement. Nevertheless, the scope of remedies for the original infringement is not limited to just the cost of the infringed work. Under 17 USC 504(b), The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This is sufficiently open-ended that profits from the sale of an original work created using infringed software could be attributable to the infringement.

Depends if the artist is a contractor or an employee Let's say I am the person who created Spiderman, but my artist came up with the design of the costume and everything Well, it certainly looks like you didn’t create Spider-Man - the artist did. If they are your employee then you, as their employer, own the copyright. If they are a contractor, then they own the copyright which can be transferred to you under the terms of the contract or otherwise. What if the design was written in paper and then the concept artist represented the written design graphically, does that make any difference? Not really. Here the artist has created a derivative work but since they did so with your permission, that’s fine. The derivative work is a seperate work with its own copyright owned as stated above. How can you make sure you don't face this problem if you hire an artist for your work? You set out in the contract who owns the copyright.

Copyrights, in general, relate to the right of copying or reproduction. Another’s copyright may be substantially violated and causing harm even if one doesn’t monetize on it: A free access to the work of art may mean that anyone who would otherwise pay for a copy or any sort of license will not pay. This is the reason why in most countries torrenting is illegal. The last question is rather difficult to answer in a meaningful way: If one doesn’t get caught ever then one doesn’t get caught; if one does, then he does. I haven’t found the channel through which such unauthorized copies would enter “the public domain” and therefore it is hard to even make a guess on the probabilities of such infringement to be discovered and one getting sought damages on. There are exemptions under “fair use” rights mostly in common law jurisdictions, and there are examples of non-enforcement or decriminalization in certain other jurisdictions under certain conditions. (See also: Is it illegal to infringe copyright if your boss or your client ordered you to do it?)

At what point is it punishable to support a "criminal organisation"? A friend said to me the other day that she was worried that she had supported the the "Last Generation" ("Letzte Generation") organization financially. The Last Generation often blocks the streets of Berlin and other large cities in Germany to encourage politicians to focus more on climate change. In the past, it has been possible to support the organization through donations to help them afford the legal costs they face after their actions. The background to this is that in Germany the Last Generation organization as a criminal organization because of its activities. As a criminal organization because of its activities. Now my friend is of the opinion that if that were to happen, she would have committed a retroactive offence. Because supporting a criminal organization in Germany is a punishable offence. According to my legal understanding, I would say that an organization that has been retroactively classified as a criminal organisation does not does not mean that it has committed a criminal offence. So that it has nothing to fear here. Am I right?

england-and-wales Short Answer: Paying legal fees for a criminal organisation is not (by my reading of the law) an offence. But if it is, retrospective legislation is prohibited in all but a few situations. Long Answer: There are two issues here: Support for an organised crime group This is an offence contrary to section 45 Serious Crime Act 2015: (1) A person who participates in the criminal activities of an organised crime group commits an offence. (2) For this purpose, a person participates in the criminal activities of an organised crime group if the person takes part in any activities that the person knows or reasonably suspects— (a) are criminal activities of an organised crime group, or (b) will help an organised crime group to carry on criminal activities HOWEVER it seems unlikely that "donations to help them afford the legal costs they face after their actions" would meet the emboldened requirements at subsection 2(b) as it does not appear to be supporting "criminal activities." That said, each case will be considered on its own merits. Retrospective legislation Generally, this is prohibited under the European Convention on Human Rights, enacted under Article 7 Human Rights Act 1988: No punishment without law 1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2 This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. However, paragraph 2 does allow for retrospective legislation if the need arises. For example the War Crimes Act 1991 retrospectively criminalises murder etc committed in Germany or its occupied territories during the second world war. Although tagged germany, I have answered according to the LawSE Help Centre: "we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"

Lèse majesté is not prosecuted in the UK While it is still technically illegal to advocate the abolition of the monarchy under the Treason Felony Act of 1848, more recent freedom of speech laws means that it is not possible to bring a successful prosecution. The only reason it hasn’t been abolished is that Parliament has better things to do and, since the government doesn’t bring charges under it, the courts can’t quash it. So, the Monarch has the same legal protections as anyone else.

Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds.

Under Article 223-6 of the Criminal Code Anyone who, being able to prevent by immediate action a felony or a misdemeanour against the bodily integrity of a person, without risk to himself or to third parties, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000. The same penalties apply to anyone who wilfully fails to offer assistance to a person in danger which he could himself provide without risk to himself or to third parties, or by initiating rescue operations. Pocket-picking is a special case of theft that violates "bodily integrity"; so this article does seem to create a conditional legal duty to intervene. There does not appear to be a specific law creating a duty to report crimes to the police, but that might be implied by the duty to initiate rescue operations.

This article is from an official Emirates news agency, which confirms the change (Federal Law 12/2016). This is a change to Federal Law 5/2012, replacing Article 9 (the translation into English is odd because the verb phrase goes first). The level of the penalty has increased (minimum 150K → minimum 500K; maximum 500K → 2M). Incarceration is changed from "imprisonment" to "temporary imprisonment", which might mean that previously the term was life. In either case, they have an "and" problem that the punishment is "(temporary) imprisonment and a fine ... or either of these two penalties". Presumably the Arabic version is dispositive. Apart from that, the new version of the law identifies the offender as Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery whereas the old law only said whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery. Thus the meaning of "computer network protocol address" is defined as being equivalent to "IP address". In other words, there is no substantive change beyond the stiffer penalty. There does not seem to any provision allowing one to ask for exceptions. Article 30 of the underlying law strongly suggests that there is no exception and you should not ask. On a separate note, only Etisalat and Du are authorized to provide telecommunications services, pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 3/2003. This article from August 24, 2015 also links to a number of related articles indicating that everything is illegal.

There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account".

The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer.

In Germany, had the store not called the police (or paramedics), they would have been charged for not doing so under Section 323c. Other jurisdictions will no doubt have similar laws. On arrival, being informed that you ran away - but thankfully paid with a credit card - the police will try to find you. They are not allowed to make a determination that you are just being foolish, but must assume you are a danger to yourself. At some point in the extensive bureaucratic matter, they will probably come to the conclusion that you have acted in a negligent manner. Once that has been done, you will be made liable for all entailed costs to the taxpayer. So your fear of being charged for threatening to commit suicide is the least of your problems. Your claim against the store is probably justified (the listed price is in most jurisdictions binding). Your reaction to that is not. Section 323c Failure to render assistance; obstruction of persons rendering assistance (1) Whoever does not render assistance in the case of an accident or a common danger or emergency although it is necessary and can reasonably be expected under the circumstances, in particular if it is possible without substantial danger to that person and without breaching other important duties, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine. (2) Whoever obstructs a person who is rendering or wishes to render assistance to another person in such a situation incurs the same penalty. Sources: Section 323c - German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB)

Artist liability for illegal art? Have any graffiti artists, in the process of asserting their copyright claim in court over illegally placed works of art, and in doing to by proving themselves to the the creator of the works, been subsequently found financially liable for the cost of removing or painting over their own work? (either as part of the proceedings, or in a later counter-suit?) And/or have are there cases where revenue from the copyright infringer's use of the art was funneled towards cleanup costs instead of the artist?

Graffiti artists are routinely found financially liable for their work, but assertions of copyright infringement by graffiti artists are vanishingly rare, so I don't know if that has ever happened in that context. In many jurisdictions, filing a lawsuit against someone waives any statute of limitations defense you may have against counterclaims filed by the person you are suing in any related matter. So, if that rule applies, a counterclaim for financial loss from graffiti could be brought in a copyright infringement lawsuit, even though the statute of limitations on the damages claim would otherwise have run. But, I don't know if such a rule applies to copyright infringement claims filed in federal court.

No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.

Seems unlikely that it will "forestall copyright infringement suits". Some jurisdictions, e.g the USA, say that "Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable". On the face of it, in such a jurisdiction copyright can't exist in a randomly generated work. Which the TED talk doesn't mention. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtm0MoOgiU Let's imagine a case in a jurisdiction where copyright can exist in such a work. There is a dispute between two artists or labels. The plaintiff produced a well known tune and accuses the defendant of copying this work. The defendant says the plaintiff didn't have copyright in that work because it wasn't original in the first place, there is a 1200GB TAR file (compressed file) on GitHub that contains all possible single octave, 8-note, 12-beat melody combos, which were produced before the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff says, "like the majority of the population I never heard of GitHub, let alone downloaded, uncompressed a 1200GB file and listened to every melody." That's all aside from plaintiffs or lawyers deciding they have a case or believing the mere threat of civil proceedings will cause the alleged infringer to acquiesce to their demands. I think they are making a point about the law rather than a realistic means of thwarting copyright disputes. It's reasonable of the creators to say there is a finite set of melodies and the likelihood of inadvertently 'creating' the same melody as someone else may be smaller than we think, maybe copyright law has led to some unjust outcomes and led to a chilling effect on music-making.

Plagiarism only marginally intersects copyright infringement. If I take an article published by Jones in an obscure journal and publish it to another journal under my name, with some light paraphrasing, that is both plagiarism and copyright infringement. If I publish that article under Jones' name, that is copyright infringement and not plagiarism. If I completely rewrite the ideas of the article and publish under my name (not crediting the original author, that is plagiarism and not copyright infringement). The essence of plagiarism is taking the ideas of another without giving credit. The essence of copyright infringement is copying without permission. So there is no legal penalty to taking credit for someone else's ideas. As for your economic question, an infringer may be liable for compensatory damages. Therefore, an author whose work would garner $50,000 in royalties would not seek the minimal statutory damages, he would go for the $50,000 in lost revenue.

One principle of copyright law is that if you can prove independent authorship, there cannot be liability no matter how similar your work is to the prior work. "If by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Urn,' he would be an 'author,' and if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." (Sheldon v. MGM Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)). Now, of course, the challenge is proving that you've never heard a given piece of music, or never read a particular work of fiction. If you have, even unconscious copying exposes to liability. And if the plaintiff can prove that you had access (such as the scriptwriter who sent a copy to a movie studio), they will have an even easier time proving the copying. If there is no proof of copying or not-copying, the copying can be proved circumstantially either through expert testimony or the jury's evaluation. The expert might testify something like "There is an identical tonal progression in these two songs, even though they were written in different keys. There were a million different ways the songs could have been written, but they are identical in this respect." The jury can consider that information and find the defendant liable. Or, the judge may simply tell the jury, "You may listen to these two songs, and find the defendant liable if you find them to be substantially similar to the extent that it is more likely than not that the defendant copied the plaintiff." TL;DR: The process can be conclusive, but if it isn't, then the output will be the evidence that the jury will consider.

"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.

This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.

This overstates the case. A company must pursue infringements, arguably even when it isn't economically sensible in isolation to do so, to prevent its trademark from being diluted. But, that isn't the case "when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement." There is no benefit from pursuing cases that aren't even colorable infringements. The notion is similar to adverse possession. If you let someone openly use your real property without your permission, eventually, the squatter becomes its legal owner. Also, as in the case of adverse possession, an alternative to suing someone for infringing is to make their permission non-infringing by writing them a letter expressly authorizing them to use your mark. Permissive, licensed use does not dilute a trademark.

Is a Prenuptial Agreement a "living document"? I had a "Property (Contracting Out) Agreement" (Prenup) drawn about the time I got married many years ago. Recent life events require that I revisit my financial affairs (not related to my Marriage), and my Lawyer advised that a Prenup is a "Living Document" and should be reviewed. He persisted with this view - possibly for reasons I don't grasp - even when I advised him I really do not want to review the Prenup "and that it is what it is" (because it will put unnecessary stress on my relationship, and because I can't see what revisiting it achieves and it would be a point of pain in my relationship). My lawyers advice about it being a living document sounds wrong and feels like the lawyer is just trying to up their billables at my expense without having my interests forefront - which would be a concerning development. Is his advice that a Prenup is a living document correct? (I live in New Zealand - not sure if that makes any difference)

Sounds like you aren't sharing the same definition of living document A prenup is simply a contract, and most contracts are "fixed" at the time of their formation: the rights and obligations of each party are defined for all time (or for as long as the contract lasts). This is not what I and I suspect you, would understand to be a living document. However, some contracts contain terms that allow their terms to be varied - either by agreement or unilaterally. That sort of contract would be a living document. Notwithstanding, any contract can be varied or replaced with a new contract until by agreement of all parties as long as the contract is still on foot. Your lawyer may be thinking of the prenup in this way, and, at a stretch, that would make it a living document. Your lawyer's advice is sound - your circumstances have changed, and you should at least look at the prenup to decide if you are still happy with its terms in light of your new circumstances. That's a review. It most definitely "is what it is", but if "what it is" doesn't suit your relationship's current status, you can, with the agreement of your partner, change "what it is". Without reviewing it, you can't make an informed decision if the current agreement even makes sense in the light of the present. It may be that you're perfectly happy with "what it is", or that you're unhappy but trying to change it would make you more unhappy, or that discussing it like adults with your partner and deciding to change or not change is a good or bad idea. But you can't know unless you do the review first.

I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.

To add to Nij's answer: You write I have not signed any paper document. You seem to assume that a binding contract can only be entered into in writing. This is wrong. In most countries (certainly in Germany), a binding contract generally does not require a written document. A contract can be entered into orally, or even silently ("Schlüssiges Handeln", "Implied-in-fact contract"). All that is required for a contract is that one party made a proposal, and the other party indicated their agreement, implicitly or explicitly ("Willenserklärung"). Clicking "yes" on a website can mean entering into a contract if you could reasonably be expected to understand that you were accepting certain obligations (such as that of paying a fee). So in your case, you probably entered into a valid contract, and will have to fulfill your obligation under it, which means paying. From a practical point of view: If you choose not to pay, the organizers will probably either drop the claim (if you are lucky), or they will pursue it. In that case, they can send you a "Mahnbescheid" for their claim. At that point you either pay within 14 days, or respond that you reject the claim, then there will be a trial, which you will probably lose, and pay a lot more than 40€. If you do not respond to the Mahnbescheid, you will receive a "Vollstreckungsbescheid", and then a visit by a Gerichtsvollzieher (officer of the court). My advice would be to pay and learn to properly cancel registrations.

In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!

As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation.

A piece of paper with writing on it is NOT a contract! A contract is the terms and conditions that the parties agree that they will be bound to. A written contract merely serves as evidence (really good evidence) of what those terms and conditions were. For this to matter, it would have to be part of a dispute about the contract. If the parties looking at the term know and agree on what it means then that is what it means. If there is a dispute about this term then a 3rd party (e.g. judge, arbitrator) will look at the term and the context of the contract (both the written contract and the actions of the parties in giving effect to the contract) and decide what they think the parties meant. For the example given, I don't think there is any room for dispute about what is meant and it would be disingenuous of either party to claim that there could be. "Time is of the essence" is a commonly used legal phrase with a well understood meaning - it explicitly makes time a condition of the contract; generally, time is a warranty. A condition is a term for which termination of the contract is a possible remedy; you cannot terminate for breach of a warranty. "Time of the essence" is either a typo or, if deliberate, is clearly trying to get across the same concept. TL;DR 100% enforceable.

If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will.").

I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.

Can an auto-reply be considered assent/agreement? The CEO of a certain company set multiple important public email accounts to autoreply to all messages with the poop emoji. Importantly, there is no indication that it's an autoreply. Someone had the funny idea to send the account an email with a contract to sell the company for a small (but not unreasonable) amount along with "If you agree, reply with the poop emoji". And the account replied as expected. Practically, I'm sure this won't work. But, what is the legal explanation for why not? Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Fun follow-up: Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? (assuming US laws)

Why is this reply not considered an agreement to sell the company? Because a sender's opportunism regarding the bizarre contents of the autoreply preclude a finding that there is a meeting of the minds. Could someone get out of a contract by proving that their email agreeing to it (e.g., "Yes, I agree to the contract") was an autoreply? It mostly depends on the element of authorization to set up the autoreply that way. If the person who wrote the autoreply was authorized by the user of the email account to set it up that way, the contract binds the user. This form of blind and reckless formation of contracts is an extreme scenario of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). The contract might be null and void as unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and/or on other grounds. But a wide range of scenarios would fall short of warranting a nullification of the contract. (Disclaimer: I am affiliated with the linked site.)

When someone registers at your website, they enter a contract with you. You need an email address, because you need to be able to contact them (at least for the password recovery). You probably want to verify the email address, otherwise you might not be able to contact them in the future. So the email verification is required as part of the performance of the contract. But also anti-spam laws might require you to use confirmed opt-in before you are allowed to send automatic emails. So at least Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract) would apply, but for the confirmed opt-in also Art. 6(1)(c) (compliance with a legal obligation) might apply. That means sending the verification mail is lawful. However you probably want to write this down in the privacy policy as Greendrake commented. Note that there must not be an option for users to agree with the privacy policy, it is just a statement which you make.

How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.

Thus how ought these advertisements be rectified? What's more correct to write than "no contract"? Words don't mean the same thing in every context. In the world of cell phone contracts, the well accepted meaning of "no contract" is that you are getting cell phone service on a month to month basis and may cancel at the end of any given month with no penalty, in contrast to the previous norm in the industry that you needed to continue service for a period of one or more years before you could cancel or you would pay a penalty for discontinuing it early. This usage has spread to Internet service as well. There is no need to correct or rectify this. Nobody believes that there is no agreement governing the cell phone company-customer relationship. They aren't confused or misled. McKendrick is simply using a different sense of the word than CanNet. In the same way, the word "company" can mean a legal entity, but can also mean, the people whom you have with you at a given time, even though they have the same root meaning. Likewise, sometimes "sex" means "male or female" and sometimes it means something you do for enjoyment and procreation. But people manage to keep the two senses of the word, which are related to each other, straight, even in statutes. Context prevents confusion. There is no need for words to have only one meaning in all contexts and even within the law, many words mean different things in different situations. This is especially true in common law systems where words are given definitions in a piecemeal case by case manner, rather than due to a single person or committee making a top down decision on what a word's legal meaning should be in all contexts.

Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.

You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.

No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to.

The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.

Does distributing compiled code with "no reverse engineering" notice amount to pre-patent publication? If I made an invention of a patentable computer algorithm, and then implemented it, compiled and published a program online, while retaining the copyright notice like "reverse engineering is strictly prohibited" (which makes it protected from reverse engineering by law, at least European law afaik), would it amount to a pre-patent publication of the invention? Technically if nobody is legally allowed to study the program, they wouldn't have the means to derive at the invention? Of course they could study it "quietly" and possibly come up with their own algorithm, but my question is about whether the patent court would say that I've published it which makes it impossible for me to patent it (I do know about a 6-month post-publication period that still allows me to patent in some jurisdictions). As a follow-up question, would the same case of pre-patent publication of compiled code help me to claim the prior art if somebody else then went on to patent it themselves?

This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure. However, in the US there is a famous case In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law. The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere. One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read.

You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs.

In the most likely case No, but you can make it happen! First - almost every patent is rejected - at first. Then you respond to the office action rejection by arguing and/or amending and - guess what - you are likely to get a final rejection. That means the rejection is final until you pay them more money to file a Request for Continued Examination and get two more go-arounds with them. Can you keep doing this? Yes. A previous director of the USPTO tried to make a rule that limited the number of RCEs - the courts knocked it down. If you give up and let it go abandoned by not responding to an office action within the statutory limit (6 months) then the process of that application is over. If you have not filed a co-pending application before the initial application went abandoned then you are really starting over if you file a new application. The original application can be used against any new application on a similar subject matter if it has been published. But it might not have published. The law (35 USC 102) contains - (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151 , or in an application for >patent published or deemed published under section 122(b) , in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Your application may or may not have been published. Then it is neither published or issued and does not fall under prior art under 102 or 103. Applications are automatically published by the USPTO at the 18 month point unless you requested non-publication. In that case if your application never issues it is never public and can't be used against you or anyone else as prior art. You could even decide to keep it a trade secret. Before the publication process came into being as part of TRIPS, an applicant could wait until they saw the claims that had been allowed and the patent was ready to go. If they didn't feel the claims were valuable enough they can chose to explicitly abandon and keep it secret.

Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern.

You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.

Yes, you can fork it - but you can’t use it GitHub explain what’s a public deposit with no licence means here. If you find software that doesn’t have a license, that generally means you have no permission from the creators of the software to use, modify, or share the software. Although a code host such as GitHub may allow you to view and fork the code, this does not imply that you are permitted to use, modify, or share the software for any purpose. Your options: Ask the maintainers nicely to add a license. Unless the software includes strong indications to the contrary, lack of a license is probably an oversight. If the software is hosted on a site like GitHub, open an issue requesting a license and include a link to this site. If you’re bold and it’s fairly obvious what license is most appropriate, open a pull request to add a license – see “suggest this license” in the sidebar of the page for each license on this site (e.g., MIT). Don’t use the software. Find or create an alternative that is under an open source license. Negotiate a private license. Bring your lawyer.

If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.

Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose?

Is it legal to place difficult-to-remove deliberately-annoying alarms in a building without permission to do so? In the UK, a group of unaffiliated people went to a banquet by Just Stop Oil, a climate change activist group, and released electronic alarms tied to balloons. The banquet took place in a building with high ceilings, so even with a ladder, no one could reach the balloons or alarms to disable them. Was placing the balloons illegal? Although the banquet was secular, it took place in a church building. Does this make a difference? Starting at 8:10: https://youtu.be/y6flblkVh1I

australia There are likely several offences under the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901. Under s4 it is unlawful to enter into inclosed lands (which includes all buildings) without the consent of the owner or controller. The balloon releasers did not have explicit permission and entering with the intent to disrupt means they cannot rely upon implied permission. s4B makes this an aggravated offence if the intention for entering is to disrupt any business or undertaking taking place on the inclosed lands. Because there were 3 or more people involved, the maximum penalty is 200 penalty units (currently $22,000) or 3 years. In addition, the occupiers could seek damages under the torts of trespass or nuisance.

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

'Is it legal?' could mean one of two things. Does it break the criminal law; could I be arrested? There is no law criminalising photography or filming in a private place (assuming you're not doing something amounting to harrassment, or making something inherently illegal like child pornography). The act of filming per se is therefore not illegal in a criminal sense. However, the proprietor of a private place can ask you to stop filming or demand that you leave; if you fail to comply then you will be trespassing. Trespass is not a criminal offence (although the police will undoubtedly remove you if called). However, if your intent was to intimidate, obstruct or disrupt activity within the premises, you could be charged with Aggravated Trespass under s68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Could the owner, or someone else, have a civil claim against me? This is more difficult to answer. Trespass is a tort, so the owner could in theory have a claim against you if you were filming against his wishes. However, he would have to prove some measurable amount of damage, and this is why few trespass cases come to court. The occupants of the premises may be able to sue if you breach their right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR, incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998); however, a court will balance this against your Article 10 right to freedom of expression. A court will consider all circumstances: for example, if you were filming in the toilets of a nightclub, the occupants' right to privacy may well outweigh your right to freedom of expression. A copyright owner may have a claim against you if you include their work in your film; for example, if you film inside a nightclub and substantial parts of songs are captured on your film, this may give rise to a claim. I am not a lawyer. Don't rely on free advice from strangers on the Internet.

There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal.

Because people inevitably come into conflict exercising different aspects of their rights. For example, the 1st amendment says that congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. Someone who runs a sound truck around a residential neighborhood at 3am extolling the candidate of their choice would be exercising their right of free speech but it would be a significant negative impact on all the folks in that neighborhood trying to sleep. Governments and the courts have to balance the free speech rights of the person running the sound truck versus the rights of other citizens to go about their lives. In this case the compromise is that cities and states can pass noise ordinances that restrict the hours when amplified sound systems can be used, but such restrictions have to be content neutral.

What most of your quotes are based on is this general consensus reached by the federal and state governments on how to proceed. The actually legal implementation happens on the state level in form of decrees. Therefore, the quoted texts are not to be taken as legal text, but human-readable¹. In particular they are not to be taken painstakingly literal, but context and common sense may be applied². The actual decrees are much more specific and clear. For example, let’s take the decree for Northrhine-Westphalia (translation mine): § 11 Veranstaltungen, Versammlungen, Gottesdienste, Beerdigungen (1) Veranstaltungen und Versammlungen sind untersagt. Ausgenommen sind […] § 12 Ansammlungen, Aufenthalt im öffentlichen Raum (1) Zusammenkünfte und Ansammlungen in der Öffentlichkeit von mehr als 2 Personen sind untersagt. Ausgenommen sind […] § 11 Events, gatherings, religious services, funerals (1) Events and gatherings are forbidden. Exempt are […] § 12 Gatherings and presence in public space (1) Congregations and gatherings of more than two persons in public are forbidden. Exempt from this are […] Most of this is clearly about in-person meetings. The only exception is the term “Veranstaltung” (event), which could be construed to cover online events. However, in other laws using this term, it clearly refers to in-person events. For example parts of this law governing the number of toilets available at an event do not make any sense for online events. I see nothing in the decree that would forbid online celebrations. In fact celebrations are not mentioned at all (and are covered by more general terms in the degree, as far as they are in-person). ¹ To be fair, the actual legal texts are not that bad in terms in human readability either. ² Mind that I do not wish to accuse you of lacking common sense here. After all the consensus dissonating with your common sense made you ask this question.

We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".

The premise about couches is true in terms of popular beliefs, but false in terms of law. Taking the property of another person without permission, with the intention to keep it, is theft. However, taking it with permission is allowed. W.r.t. a couch, your belief works because you generally have implicit permission. A sign saying "free" is good evidence, in lieu of a personal interaction with the owner, that you have such permission. There are scenarios where a person is moving a couch into their house, leaves it outside for a break, and some prankster puts a "free" sign on the couch. You nab and leave, 911 is called, you get arrested (more likely there will be an interaction of the type "give him back his couch") and you defend yourself against a charge of theft on the grounds that you reasonably believed you had permission to take the couch. At present, a reasonable person would know that a scooter left by the side of the road is not actually "there for the taking", therefore you know (or should know) that you are committing a crime. Additionally, there are more stringent law regarding theft of vehicles as opposed to theft of couches, which expands the concept of "theft" to include "take in order to just temporarily use", thus "keeping" is not a requirement of vehicle theft laws. Rentascooter is generally and obviously locked in some way, which is further evidence that the item was not abandoned (this goes to your state of mind in taking the object), supporting the wrongfulness of this taking.

Could SCOTUS ban the pointing of guns at jurors? With the Rittenhouse fiasco were a prosecutor pointed an assault rifle at jurors. Could SCOTUS give guidance as to how the issue of fire arms in the court room should be handled? And more specifically could SCOTUS regulate in what manner in which firearms are pointed. (Specifically not at jurors) Would SCOTUS be able to govern such an issue or does that fall outside it's jurisdiction? I would be interested in what manner SCOTUS has influence on issues of a more practical nature in regards to lower courts.

The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.

I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.

There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.

Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.

I wouldn't say that it "trumps state law". Indeed, the State of Georgia, either expressly by statute or through the common law, establishes that teachers and school administrators have the authority to create rules and regulations governing the conduct of students that are not themselves unconstitutional as applied to students, although, in general these consequences can't resort to criminal punishments. Instead, typical punishments include detention, suspension (in school or out of school), expulsion, and adjustment of grades for an assignment or a course. Marks in one's disciplinary record and public shaming, forfeiture of eligibility to participate in school sponsored extra-curricular activities or honors (including marching at graduation), refusing to release transcripts, and historically (but much less so in recent years) corporal punishments such as spanking, have been options for schools to enforce their punishments. A prohibition on recording in a syllabus certainly wouldn't result in criminal punishments, and probably wouldn't even give rise to civil liability. Depending upon the purpose for which the recording was being used, it is even conceivable that the school's right to punish someone for violating a school rule could be estopped by First Amendment and whistle blower protection law considerations (e.g. if it was used to document harassment and discriminatory conduct for use in sharing with the school board or law enforcement or publishing on radio or TV or an Internet news source). But, the mere fact that conduct is legal outside a school setting does not mean that a school cannot prohibit and punish that conduct in its own rules. The closer case, upon which there is more division of legal authority, is under what circumstances a school can legitimately punish conduct away from school, for example, uploading rap lyrics about a teacher to YouTube from home without using any school resources to do so.

The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.

The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is.

The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).

Can legal/ pre-action correspondence with a business be subject to a SAR? Bob has been harmed by a business ACME inc. He sends them a letter before claiming damages as under the pre action protocol. They send him a reply. Bob loses his copy of both of these articles of correspondence, but would like to refer back to them. Can he request them from ACME Inc. Under the DPA 2018?

Maybe not. The ICO says that The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data. It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the existence of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a copy of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies. But in practice: The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try. A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.

In most jurisdictions a message sent by email is now legally the same as one sent on paper by, say, postal mail, and a name typed at the end, or other indication of source is the legal equivalent of a physical signature. You are probably in the same legal position yu would have been in if you had written, signed, and sent by post a letter of acceptance.

Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.

Focusing on the legal question, the obstruction of correspondence statute would not be applicable to UPS package deliveries. To repeat 18 USC 1702, Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Private package delivery services deliver to the porch (pr similar), not to an authorized depository (such as a mailbox). They are not "mail", and they have not been in the custody of the postal service (unless they have, where USPS actually makes the delivery). Such deliveries constitute unsolicited goods / unordered merchandise, since they were not things that you requested. There are state and federal rules to the effect that you may accept such goods as gifts, and you have no obligation to return the goods. Here is the Washington state law for example, and here is what the FTC says about it at the federal level. The intended recipient cannot impose an obligation on you to store and guard his possessions, nor can a delivery service impose an obligation to safeguard property that they are responsible for.

The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.

Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company.

You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.

No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").

Can I legally give someone the right to cannibalize me? Let say I and a friend are stranded somewhere, starving, and confident rescue will not come until we both have starved. Realizing that it makes more sense for one to live then both of us to starve we draw straws and I draw poorly. I give my friend permission to both kill me and eat my body to survive. I've agreed to this plan, perhaps we even record me on video giving him permission, saying I'm of sane mind and why I made the decision etc. My friend gets home afterwards and tells everyone how great I tasted. For some reason people get upset and call the police. My question, is my friend guilty of a crime? Has my permission, and the necessity of the situation, made his actions legal?

germany In Germany this is a solved matter: Killing on request is illegal. Killing someone to consume them can be Mord. Eating human remains is illegal, even with consent of the dead. Why do we know this? Because Armin Meiwes did exactly that: he was involved in killing Bernd-Jürgen Armando Brandes, who wanted to die, and ate the remains of him. He currently is incarcerated for life due to the conviction of Mord. This is because he was found to have killed for his own sexual gratification - one of the factors that can turn an unlawful killing/Totschlag (§ 212 StGB) (~manslaughter) into Mord (§ 211 StGB) (~murder 1st degree) under german law. Consuming the remains of a human body is, as the courts found, Störung der Totenruhe under § 168 StgB (disturbing the rest of human remains). It is not possible to consent to being eaten, as you can not give your body to anything but research or medical education legally and you have to be buried in a designated graveyard.

The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).

(I'm taking for granted that the question is about the application of poison to food, and I'm answering the general question about liability for poisoning food expected to be stolen. Whether application of a particular hot sauce meets that assumption is outside the scope of my answer.) The facts right now are: theft is foreseeable injury is foreseeable If you poison the food in a situation where a reasonable person would foresee theft and subsequent injury, then you are liable for at least the tort of negligence if the thief is in fact injured. Simply adding a note saying "don't steal" doesn't disclose the danger. Do you have a duty of care to other people with access to your food? (That is the remaining element of negligence.) Yes. (See http://premisesliability.uslegal.com/duty-owed-trespassers/). You have a duty to not willfully or wontonly trap or otherwise prepare harm for would-be tresspassers, and I believe that extends to lunchroom thieves. But, the simple answer is don't poison food!

The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.

(Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account)

I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances.

This situation is unlikely to come about in practice. If you were born into such extreme poverty, your parents would considered guilty of child neglect, and CPS/social services would take you into foster services where you would be given clothes. If you previously had clothes, but recently became poor, it is very unlikely that any creditors would repossess your last shirt off your back. It would probably be illegal for them to leave you in that situation, and a used shirt wouldn't be worth much. For the same reason, it's unlikely you would sell your last shirt to, eg. pay for food: Who would buy it? For how much? In many countries, there are extensive welfare systems and private charities that private food, free clothing and other resources to the very poor. Even before you lost your last clothes, you could go to these for assistance. So again you are unlikely to involuntarily end up in this position. Also, technically the amount of clothes you are required to wear is usually very small. I believe you are usually only required to cover the groin and breasts if female. In theory you could easily collect a discarded plastic bag, piece of paper, scrap fabric, cardboard box or some other trash to fashion a crude loincloth. Lastly, when the police do show up and arrest you, you will likely have the opportunity to explain to them your situation. They would probably try to get you some basic clothing and other assistance. But if they do end up pressing charges, you would be able to either convince the judge to let you off or challenge the law itself for failing to consider poor people like you. Generally, laws are designed such that there is always an option to follow them and nobody would be "too poor" to comply, failing to do this could make a politician extremely unpopular. Many laws with significant cost burden offer alternatives to the poor. Courts will also tend to be sympathetic to cases such as this. But as I said, the situation is very unlikely to come about.

england-and-wales Yes it is legal. There is no law prohibiting such behaviour. A restaurant menu invites people to ask for items on the menu. People are free to make other offers too, e.g. "no cheese" or "will you add an egg?" or "will you accept £10 for the burger, it's all I have?" The customer is free to make an offer and the restauranteur is free to accept or refuse the offer. "No I don't want to sell you a burger patty on its own for £3." Unfair contract terms seem irrelevant because there is no contract at the stage when the customer asks the restauranteur for a food item.

What is “private law”? Section 156 of the Equality Act 2010 says: A failure in respect of a performance of a duty imposed by or under this Chapter does not confer a cause of action at private law. What does the phrase at private law mean?

As @James K indicated in a comment: Private law involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts and torts, (as it is called in the common law), and the law of obligations (as it is called in civil legal systems). It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between both natural and artificial persons (i.e., organizations) and the state, including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that affects the public order. In general terms, private law involves interactions between private individuals, whereas public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population. Source: Wikipedia The effect of section 156 is that anyone adversely affected by a public authority's failings under Part 11, Chapter 1 cannot sue: any redress is by way of judicial review. The Explanatory Note to section 156 offers this example: A local council fails to give due regard to the requirements of the public sector equality duty when deciding to stop funding a local women’s refuge. An individual would not be able to sue the local council as a result and claim compensation. She would need to consider whether to pursue judicial review proceedings.

No Parliament is sovereign: Parliamentary sovereignty is a principle of the UK constitution. It makes Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important part of the UK constitution.

Law SE is not for direct legal advice. You're in the middle of a contract dispute that has turned acrimonious and need to find legal help. Google for free or low cost legal aid in your area. If this "point person" has mentioned a lawyer or made legal threats, you do need legal help.

Choice of law (also called conflict of laws) arises when a legal dispute occurs across legal boundaries. For example, suppose I live in New York, and sign a contract to buy computers from you, a company headquartered in California. If we have a dispute about the contract, we need to decide which state's law and which courts (and juries) will be used to resolve the dispute. The law that applies to our dispute is called the applicable or governing law. In many cases, it doesn’t matter which law or court we use. But in some cases, it matters a lot. For example, the California law may be friendlier to customers, or a jury in New York may be friendlier to me than to a California companies. Since we know that the choice of law and court may matter, we may specify in the contract which laws and courts will be used to resolve any disputes. (These may not be the same. The contract could say that our case will be heard in the SDNY using CA law.) The clause that says which laws apply, and which courts will apply them, is called a governing or applicable law clause. Here’s an example many of us have used, probably without realizing it: APPLICABLE LAW By using any Amazon Service, you agree that the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Amazon.

This is a very straightforward point of constitutional law. Chapter and verse from the Constitution, art 224: (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process For grievances between private parties, they can agree to resolve them through arbitration. For breaches of public law (like GDPR) the state is the one against whom the offence is committed. Arbitration is not available to resolve these matters - resolution is through the courts or administrative tribunals.

Firstly, we need to correct some of the terminology in your question. While you are right that what you have linked to is "statutory guidance", that is not the same as "new legislations". Legislation means law passed by Parliament, while guidance can be issued by any body authorised to do so by legislation. Guidance may or may not be legally binding depending on what the underlying legislation says. In this case, the guidance is made under Section 551A(1) of the Education Act 1996. Section 551A(3) provides: "The appropriate authority of a relevant school must have regard to guidance issued under this section when developing and implementing a school uniform policy for the school." This means that the guidance is not legally binding in the sense that the school authority is not obliged to do what the guidance says. However, the authority is legally obliged to "have regard" to it. This means they must consider it and take it into account when reaching a decision. They can depart from the guidance but in that case they should be able to explain and justify their reasons for doing so. A challenge would need to be by way of judicial review and you would need to establish that they failed to have regard to the guidance. A strongly worded letter pointing out their legal obligation under the Act, together with a threat of judicial review proceedings, may be enough for them to take you seriously without actually needing to go to court.

There are none. Damages against B’s clinic? A does not have a contract with B’s clinic. No duties nor rights without a contract. Damages against B? A does not have a contract with B. If there was a contract, we need details about it. Tort, § 823 Ⅰ BGB? No. B was neither negligent nor did he/she deliberately incur damage. Report B as criminal? A and B had consensual sexual intercourse. This consent (necessarily) comprises the risk of transmission. You cannot give “consent to facts” though. Yet here B had no knowledge of his/her contagiousness. He/she definitely did not deliberately infect A. Negligence is out of question, because there is no general expectation to get regularly tested before having sex with anyone.

Do schools have permission to use pictures containing my face taken inside school forever if I agreed to it? On day one of my first year in high school me and basically every other students were given a few documents to sign. One of them included a clause that allowed the school to publish pictures of us doing activities on the school website. Back then I was not that privacy-conscious and my homeroom teacher pressured us to quickly sign all of them so I did. I don't remember anyone questioning the reasoning behind the clause. After more than a decade past graduation, the school website appeared in my search results so I took a look. I found some pictures of me and some of them were embarrassing and/or really cringe. I would rather have them removed so I contacted the school and politely asked for the removal of about a dozen photos. They declined, citing the document that everyone signs. Does the school really have rights to the photos for eternity? Does the CCPA or COPPA provide any protection for me in this case? Had I been an EU resident, could I have invoked GDPR and have the photos removed without hassle?

There are not enough facts to draw a conclusion First, it’s not clear that the document you signed amounts to a contract. For example, what consideration did the school give you in return for the permission you gave them? Providing you with an education doesn’t count - they were legally obliged to do that already. If it is a contract then whether and how it can be revoked would depend on the terms of that contract witch I’m guessing you don’t have a copy of. Notwithstanding, as a minor, you have the right to void the contract until a reasonable time after you turn 18. Even if it is now many years since that happened, it might be reasonable since you only just discovered the website. If it isn’t a contract, then it would be revocable at any time. Practicalities Make a fuss and they may take the photos down even if they are not obliged to. They presumably have plenty of photos of kids who aren’t you and aren’t complaining and if you make it so it’s easier to change the website than to deal with you, thy’ll change the website. I suspect their inertia is because they once paid a web developer to create the site, it has never since been updated, they don’t know how to do it, and they don’t want to have to pay someone to find out. Otherwise, why would they have photos of ex-students rather than current students? If so, an offer by you to cover the costs, might solve your problem.

School districts / states do generally have the power to set the curriculum including the viewpoint that will be officially conveyed. One well-known major restriction on such viewpoint restrictions is that the schools cannot restrict the free exercise of a religion, and cannot take a position on a religion. Apart from the religion third-rail, schools have pretty free reign in setting the curriculum, see Evans-Marshall v. Tipp City for one instantiation. In this case, the teacher assigned various books, including Heather Has Two Mommies, one of the books that prompted an outcry. The upshot of that case is that a teacher cannot invoke the First Amendment to override policy. This article (draft version, easier to handle) (published version, annoying footnote structure) reviews the topic, and section III covers prior cases. It notes that the cases of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell do not address the constitutionality of these education laws, though the reasoning in the prior cases might be applicable if there were a suit over curriculum. There is an implication that some of these rules have been enforced in the past, but most of the evidence is in the form of news stories (Beall v. London City School BOE is not available in the open). The article does engage in a somewhat deeper study of enforcement in Utah, where it was enforced (until it was repealed). Enforcement is necessarily indirect. The law require school districts to have a particular curriculum; violation would come when an individual teacher taught contrary to the prescribed curriculum. Those laws do not contain any provision like "a teacher who violates these rules gets fired", instead, punishment is via the general rule that you have to teach what is in the state-mandated curriculum. Rather than officially terminating a teacher for violating this curricular guideline, districts use vague reasons for non-renewal such as "due to problems with communication and teamwork" (from Evans-Marshall).

This is more than a comment (too long), but not a definitive answer (since I am unfamiliar with the laws regarding this kind of thing). Please forgive me. First, there are some technical misunderstandings. They are not disabling SSL/TLS. Instead, they are inserting themselves in between these connections so they can make sure you aren't accessing material you are not allowed to access. They may actually be required to do this by law. Here is how it works. Typically when you connect to, say Google.com, you are given a certificate from Google.com that has a trusted chain all the way up to some trusted root. That trusted root is explicitly trusted by your web browser manufacturer. In order to be able to inspect these sorts of connections, security appliances will actually replace the certificate provided by Google.com with one that the appliance provides. It has to pretend to be Google.com so your browser doesn't freak out. The problem is, this certificate is no longer has a trusted chain to something that the browser manufacturer trusts. It is provided by the security appliance. So often, the appliance will have a root certificate that the administrators of the system must install on every machine they control. Then the browsers on these machines will not complain that the certificate is invalid. Obviously, you are getting the error on your own machine because you have not allowed the administrator to install these certificates on your machine. Nor should you. You should definitely not allow your school's network administrator to install these certificates on your personal computer. You say that "leaves people's private data being transferred over the school network (such as private e-mail, logins) unsecured and open to packet sniffing". This is not true. Any HTTPS website you visit is encrypted between your computer and the security monitoring appliance using the pretend certificate I mentioned above. Typically then, the traffic is decrypted and inspected by the appliance. Then it is re-encrypted using the real certificate, before being pushed out onto the internet. So, only at the security appliance is data turned back into the clear, only to be protected again before going out to the internet. So, is this illegal? Well, I think you would agree that definitely on the computers that your school owns, they can do anything they want with them. The computers belong to them. Furthermore, the network belongs to them. Likely you signed an agreement (or agree to it each time you connect) that they are allowed to monitor your usage of their computers and their network. This includes when connecting your personal machine to their network.

The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.

how could these ordinary people sue somebody for taking their pictures without permission, when there are tabloid journalists who do this every day to celebrities ? (And obviously they get away with it.) Tabloid journalists only get away with it when the pictures are taken in public, where there is no expectation of privacy. No permission is required in this case. Conversely, the IT guy apparently took photos of the laptop users when they were at home etc. where privacy is pretty much expected and therefore permission is required.

How can I truly say that I 'consent' to data collection and processing when I am coerced, so to speak, by the threat of failing my courses if I do not use this novel software? There is no need for you to "consent". Consent is just one of the reasons that allows a data processor to collect your data. There are other reasons that allows the data processor to capture your data. In this case, it seems of application the "legitimate interest clause", as it is in your university's legitimate interest to capture your activity in order to evaluate you. Of course, that covers only the data collected that is relevant to that interest. They will certainly capture your identity and your answers, they may log your sessions and may try to gather some data to detect if you are somehow cheating, but they would not be allowed to check which are your favorite pornhub videos because that is not relevant for the university's legitimate interest. Art. 6 of the GDPR states: Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. This page also provides some in-depth analysis

I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it.

Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.

Where do lawyers keep themselves updated with some specific laws? Laws don't update often, unlike software, but we do see some of them update for many reasons. Let's say someone asked questions here, or someone visited this site, found a pretty good answers with certain laws cited. Now as someone who is not a lawyer, but would like to keep themselves updated with some specific laws. So they would be better informed with new laws in place. Is there some kinds of service where people can subscribe to for free? Thank you.

Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.

You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee.

The issue is more one of what an attorney is ethically authorized to disclose pursuant to professional ethics rules (Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 as enacted locally) more than one of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege governs what someone can or cannot be compelled to disclose without their consent (usually by subpoena). Attorney confidentiality, in contrast, governs what an attorney can disclosed when not compelled to do so by something like a subpoena. Generally, disclosure of confidential client information is allowed if it is in furtherance of the representation or authorized by the client (there are also other exceptions but those aren't really any different in a two lawyer v. one lawyer situation). Often when two attorneys represent the same person (and the disclosure won't waive the privileged nature of the information vis-a-vis third-parties under a joint defense theory), disclosures from one attorney for a person to another attorney for a person will do that. In practice, however, the analysis could be quite fact specific and there isn't really a bright line rule governing when it would or would not be allowed.

There are no free legal copies online. They are accessible online through LexisAdvance, HeinOnline and Westlaw: this provides access, but not a downloadable copy.

It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.

Public Law ##-### is a reference to a slip law -- an actual bill, as passed by Congress and signed (or vetoed, if the veto was overridden) by the President. The first number is the number of the Congress that passed it, the second the number of the law in that Congress. (the "Public" is in contrast with private bills, which are things like "XYZ person, who is otherwise ineligible for citizenship, is a citizen" -- things that affect basically one person). The US Statutes at Large are a compilation of slip laws (both public and private). Each volume has all the slip laws from a session of Congress, at least these days (I'm not sure how it interacts with the first few Congresses before the Statutes at Large existed). Laws there are still often called PL such-and-such, because that just means "law as enacted." If that doesn't line up exactly with the enrolled bill as passed and signed, something has gone wrong that really shouldn't go wrong. If this happens, someone is getting fired. The slip law and Statutes at Large are both official, pretty much irrefutable evidence of any laws of the United States. Laws are passed by Congress, and they contain exactly what was passed. Logical. However, while they're logical, they're also a terrible research tool. If you want to find the law from them, you need to scan through every federal law ever passed. They aren't organized in any way having to do with topic. But there is another way: instead of just saying "everything the legislature has done is the law," you can rearrange those laws by topic and update them as the legislature does things. This is not easy: the legislature is passing things organized by what they're trying to do, and you need to put it all in an order that's based on what the laws actually regulate. There's a lot of editorial judgment involved. But it makes a better research tool to see what the law is. The US Code is the second attempt at that (the first attempt failed). It's made by the House of Representatives Office of Law Revision Counsel, and does not inherently form part of US law. By default, it's merely strong evidence for what US law is; it is not conclusive, and the Statutes at Large takes precedence. This is because codification is hard. However, some titles of the US Code have gone further: the House OLRC cleaned them up and Congress enacted them into law. With the titles where this happened, Congress then passes all laws about them with direct reference to sections of the US Code, the OLRC can't move things around by themselves. The title itself becomes US law. With these titles, the US Code is just like the Statutes at Large: it's identical to the law as passed, and if not then heads will roll. Also, in such cases, the US Code becomes just as official evidence as the Statutes at Large.

Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.

The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date.

Does replacing the operating system on my laptop void my warranty? I purchased a typical mid-range laptop in late March this year. It came with Windows preinstalled. As soon as I unpacked the computer I removed Windows and installed Linux. I have been using it without any problems until two weeks ago. The system kept crashing whenever I was upgrading a dozen programs or more at once. I ran various diagnostic commands and concluded that the cooling system was failing. I visited the nearest offline customer service with my laptop and logs of the troubleshooters I ran. The technician quickly noticed that I was using a non-stock operating system. He claimed that the manufacturer does not guarantee the machine will run properly in any os other than the preinstalled one, and that my warranty had been invalidated by the swapping of the os. I argued that replacing the stock software with a verified alternative does not pose any danger to the underlying hardware and my warranty is still intact because I never tore the laptop open. Then he said that it is my job to prove that there is a 0% chance Linux harmed the hardware in any way. I found this argument as absurd as his initial one but he didn't back down so I had to return home. Is the technician correct? Can warranties expire just by installing software even though hardware was left untouched? Or is he just trying to deny the defect in the laptop and deny the free repair I deserve? Is the burden of proof on the seller or the consumer that the warranty is valid/invalid?

It depends on the warranty itself. Here is one warranty, which only protects against manufacturing defects and excludes any software issues (whether pre-installed or user-installed). I'm a little surprised that a manufacturer is willing to include someone else's software under their warranty. This also excludes failure or damage resulting from misuse, abuse, accident, modification, unsuitable physical or operating environment, natural disasters, power surges, improper maintenance, or use not in accordance with product information materials failure of, or damage caused by, any third party products, including those that X may provide or integrate into the X product at your request This does not say "If you change the OS, you void the warranty". But, if you change the OS and that causes hardware damage, that voids the warranty. The next question is, what evidence do you have that the problem is a manufacturing problem rather than a consequence of changing the OS. They would have to answer the same question in court. It is legally absurd to claim that you have to prove that it is logically impossible that you contributed to the problem, you only have to prove by a preponderance of evidence, when you take them to court. The burden of proof rests on the person who makes a claim. You claim that the product was defective, now you must prove it. But you don't have to prove it to the standard of absolute ccertainty.

What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.

You almost certainly can't (successfully) sue Apple because the license agreement that is part of the product you purchased almost surely gives it permission to do so. A tech support based solution would be a better alternative to litigation.

Unfortunately, no. Apple does not have any legal obligation to make the program available in Moldavia. The reason why Apple opened the battery replacement service was to limit the bad press after the BatteryGate had hit the press. So, to answer your question, you cannot sue on these grounds. However, you could theoretically sue Apple on the grounds of planned obsolescence, if such behavior is incriminated in Moldavia. I wouldn't advise on it, however -- it would be extremely expensive and quite a long procedure, for minimal result. A solution I could have to your problem, would be to get your phone sent & repaired by a store in a country were the program was made available by Apple -- even if you'll have to pay for the shipping costs... Hope it helps!

Generally, this question is not a singular inquiry as its wording may suggest on its face. What typically tends to come up as the subject of dispute is rooted in the urban legend that one cannot obtain a patent (utility) on software. This is substantially incorrect, and any patent attorney asserting to the veracity of this makes a substantially false conclusory statement of law knowingly and willfully controverting the actual state of law in, at least, all Western jurisdictions as it omits to assert to the fact that one is not barred to obtain a patent on any system that comprises of non-obvious software, and hardware to run on is entitled to a patent — except in the U.S. where one must also comply with the Alice decision requiring that at least one hardware component in addition to the hardware of a generic computer be necessary for the utility of the system. However, in the U.S., one may obtain a software-centered patent through a (i) method or (ii) a computer program product in addition to (iii) systems or apparatuses which are available avenues for patents everywhere else. When disputes around IP and software come up, this is typically at the crux of the debate: May one obtain a software patent? The answer is: One is not barred merely because the non-obvious aspect of an invention is software. For example, if one uses hardware that are prior art, in fact, patented to someone else, but by the use of software a system, method and/or computer program product achieves a different objective (since utility patents, axiomatically, must have a utility objective) one may obtain a patent, and a layman may very well consider their invention of the system as that particular component that appears to them as having required any inventive steps, encompasses the inventive novelty (understandably) which, in many cases may be software. So the advice from a patent attorney that “you can’t patent software” is simply malicious (or wide and far disbarringly incompetent). One may patent software so long as it is an invention, and the administrative (or at times judicial) process requirements are complied with. Nevertheless, since the question inquired about “IP”, below is the answer to other avenues of intellectual property. Copyrights The software code written to make this operable could be the subject of copyright as long as it is not substantially identical with another solution (or such to give reasons to believe it to be a derivative thereof) that also put buttons in the four corners. The visual design may possibly also enjoy copyright protection, but that is less plausible to imagine since not only the copyrighted work of art is protected, but anything that may objectively be deemed a derivative work (regardless of whether the “re-author” actually knew about the copyrighted material that it may be deemed the derivate of). Design patents It is possible that one could get design patents for the actual graphical design of the layout provided there isn’t something substantially similar already out there protected by a design patent. Utility patents This would most certainly not overcome obviousness, that is, the requirement for one to obtain a patent which needs that a presented invention not be obvious for anyone “with ordinary skill in the art” (an ordinarily knowledgable person in the field of the specific area of tech). Trademark I have a hard time stretching my imagination to see how this could be applicable.

The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement.

In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today.

The companies really need to speak to an IP lawyer as this question is seeking specific advice which this site is loathe to give out for fear of compouding issues. The answer would depend on the license agreements and enforceability in various jurisdictions. According to https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0368d7ee-0eb3-4e3e-a143-4410969a15bb/eula-for-vs2010?forum=vssetup Microsoft says you cant rent out the software - but this applies to the "Pro" version - I could not find anything on the "Premium" version - so most likely Microsoft to have some clam. The flipside is how enforceable this EULA is - and this would probably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be a very, very good idea to speak to a lawyer before letting Microsoft come onto the premises - as "inviting them" to do this is almost certainly not going to improve the Asians company's case and will allow Microsoft to go fishing further and make it easier for them to expand on and collect evidence should they decide to pursue the matter.

Why was 36 Edward III c. 1 in French while 25 Edward I c. 1 was in Latin? These laws were only passed about 65 years apart. Was there a shift from Latin into French during this period?

According to the Law Bod's Blog, Law French – When Law and Language Collide: ... After 1066 French became the language of the elite. During the reign of Edward I the first statute was written in French and Law was professionalised1. This led to the development of a weird little dialect called law French. As you can see from the image below law French is a bizarre mix of French, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and whatever other languages happened to be hanging around. ... Continental French was originally being used in courts but during the reign of Henry III and Edward I Anglo-French was used to create an entirely new legal vocabulary ‘giving special meanings to ordinary words ... Above from the second result returned from a web search for "why was french used for English law". The first result, a Wikipedia article about law French, is also informative.

It is certainly true that different states who share a Head of State can have different succession rules. Thus William IV of the United Kingdom was also King of Hannover. The UK allowed female succession, so Victoria was Queen of the United Kingdom; Hannover didn't, so he was succeeded by Ernest Augustus there. At the moment, all the Commonwealth Realms of which Elizabeth is Head of State have the same rules of succession. They all changed the rules regarding whether a first-born girl would be heir apparent together. They could decide to have different rules of succession, but they probably won't.

In the US, the common law rule is that a year of age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of one's birth. Here are some citations from cases that relied on this rule: "Full age in male or female is 21 years, which age is completed on the day preceding the 21st anniversary of a person's birth." State in Interest of FW 130 N.J. Super. 513 (1974) (citing Blackstone) "The common law rule for computing age is that one is deemed to have reached a given age at the earliest moment of the day preceding an anniversary of birth." Fisher v. Smith, 319 F. Supp. 855 (D. Wash. 1970) "The appellant did, then, reach the age of nineteen years on the day before the nineteenth anniversary of his birth" Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104 (D. Alaska 1969) This is codified in some statutes and regulations. For example, CFR 404.102: For the purpose of this subpart [...] You reach a particular age on the day before your birthday. For example, if your sixty-second birthday is on July 1, 1979, you became age 62 on June 30, 1979. In Virginia, the Attorney General has confirmed that the common law rule is in effect: a person attains his/her next year of age on the day prior to his/her birthday In your example, barring a modification by state law, or an idiosyncratic treatment under a particular statute, the person would be deemed 18 years of age at the earliest moment of December 31, 2017. For a bit of comparative law, contrast with the treatment in British Columbia: A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the start of the relevant anniversary of his or her date of birth. (Interpretation Act s. 25)

The phrase "of chaste life" appears in a bill passed on June 25, 1886: Whoever induces any person under the age of eighteen years of chaste life and conversation to have unlawful sexual intercourse shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, common jail, or house of correction not exceeding three years or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by both fine and imprisonment in the jail or house of correction. Note that this language is substantially similar to the language that is currently in effect; the main changes are that the penalty was changed a little, and that the phrase "chaste life and conversation"1 was replaced with "chaste life". Combined with the 1836 law found by user6726, this narrows it down to a range of about 50 years. 1 "Conversation" in the above context appears to be an archaic sense of the word meaning one's "manner of conducting oneself in the world or in society; behaviour, mode or course of life."

On Growth and Form by D'arcy Thompson is a somewhat tricky case. (The last word of the title is "Form" not "Forms" by the way.) The first edition was published in 1917, and is therefore out of copyright in the US. The expanded edition ws published in 1942, and will be in copyright IN THE US until 2037, unless the copyright holder failed to renew the copyright in 1970 (after the initial 28 year term). Actually the renewal could have been anywhere in the period 1969-71, as a 1 year margin plus or minus was allowed. Assuming that the renewal was done properly, any images included in the first edition are free for anyone to use. Any added in the 1942 edition are not. If Wikipedia lists the image you want as public domain, check the detailed reason that they give. For the image of figs 517 & 518 from the 1942 ed The original publication date is listed as 1917, which implies that the image was in the first edition. Wikipedia is pretty good at copyright, but has been known to get things wrong. In fact I have been involved in correcting a few errors of this sort. In this case verification is not excessively hard. I would suggest that you find a copy of the first edition, and check if the image you wan to use is included there. If it is, you should feel free to use it. if it isn't they you are are not free without permission unless the renewal was not made. Verifying copyright renewals is a bit arduous, but it can be done. On a further look it seems that the version on the internet archive linked in the question is a copy of the first edition. It carries a 1917 date, and I see no indication of a revision or 'second edition" or a 1942 date. The IA metadata says "Publication date 1917 " If this is correct, this version and any orall of its contents are in the public domain for anyone to use in any way at all. Note that if the book had been first published in 1942, the answer would have been different. And the answer would be different again under UK law, which now uses a life+70 term, placing the 1942 edition out of copyright. The same would be true in many other countries which use life+70 or life+50. (The US uses life+70, but only for works published after 1977. The 1978 copyright act came into effect 1 Jan 1978.) Note that in countries which use a term longer than life+70, and there are a few, this work would not yet be out of copyright.

You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court.

The text of an ancient manuscript would indeed not be covered by copyright. A translation into a modern language normally would be protected by copyright. (Unless it is purely a machine or algorithmic translation.) The formatting of a publication could ber protected by copyright, but only if it includes some significantly original element. (In the US, and in many but not all other countries, only original works or original aspects of works may be protected by copyright. Thus where the copyright is for format the format must include an original element or elements.) If the format was a normal one for the type of publication, ther would be no original content to protect, and so no copyright at all. A work alleged to infringe a copyright on the format would need to be shown to have copied an original element or elements of the prior publication's format.

It is Latin - "through". It means that someone is signing on behalf of the company, and is not generally required but can be printed explicitly as evidence that the person signing purports to be authorised to do so.

Can a judge or prosecutor be compelled to testify in a criminal trial in which they officiated? Without considering why a party in a criminal trial might want to do so, are there any obstacles to subpoenaing and examining any of the following people as witnesses during the trial? ETA: Not as eye-witnesses to the alleged crime, but rather as witnesses to the criminal process. A judge who has acted in some capacity in the case on trial, but who is not presiding. For example: (A) the judge who arraigned the defendant. (B) a judge who recused himself from the case. A lawyer working in the prosecutor's office that is prosecuting the defendant. If context is necessary, one reason I can imagine a defense might want to examine these people before the jury is to call into question the motives and methods driving the prosecution of the defendant.

The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.

In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17).

Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.

It is possible that you could be required to testify in a coroner's inquest, or in a criminal trial (if it were later determined that a crime was committed despite first impressions to the contrary). You could also conceivably be called to testify in a civil trial concerning, for example, insurance payment eligibility. But, it is also quite likely that none of these proceedings will happen and that your initial statement to police on the scene will be sufficient for all purposes in the future. The coroner may be satisfied that he needs no further information. Law enforcement may decide that no crime was committed. And, the death certificate's cause of death and date of death may be found to be sufficient in any future civil dispute.

Possibly. I wonder if you mean "convicted" rather than "arrested"? There is no way that he will be "arrested" because you don't accompany him ("arrested" is when he taken by the police before a trial). On the other hand, if he plans to call you as a witness for the defence, then your absence may mean he is convicted at his trial when otherwise he would be found innocent. The final possibility is that you might act as a character witness after conviction, and your absence may mean he is sent to jail rather than fined. It may be possible for you to write a witness statement describing what happened, and to have this notarized. On the other hand, the prosecution may well want to cross examine you. I am pretty sure you can write a character witness statement (saying, if true, that it's a first offence and that you have forgiven him, etc) and get it notarized. That might persuade a court to be lenient. I think you (as a couple) need to talk to his lawyer.

If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.

It seems like the officer should have to present at least some kind of evidence that the alleged crime occurred. Testimony is evidence. Officers can and do abuse this, but courts tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, so they typically attribute greater weight and credibility to a police officer's testimony than to that of a defendant.

united-states Procedures differ on such things. The closest I know of to an outcome of "not enough evidence" is the classic "scotch verdict" of "Not Proven. In the US, the prosecutor can wait to proceed with a criminal case while s/he does (or has done) as much investigation as s/he thinks is advisable. But once the trial starts, it normally proceeds to a conclusion. If there is not enough evidence to convict, the result should be "not guilty" and that will bar any future trial of the same person for the same offense under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. Circumstantial evidence, as described in the question, can be enough to convict, if the jury (or judge in a bench trial) is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Exactly how much evidence it takes to convince a Jury varies, and there is not a clear standard other than the phrase " beyond a reasonable doubt". The judge, or a later appeals court, can set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, but only by finding that no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence pre3sented, taking it in the light most favorable to conviction. Judges are reluctant to set aside jury verdicts unless they appear badly wrong. If further evidence is found during the trial, which tends to show the accused is not guilty, the prosecutor can request that the trial be halted. This may or may not bar a future re-trial of the same defendant, depending on whether the dismissal is 'without prejudice", a decision the Judge makes. But once evidence has been started to be presented, dismissals are usually "with prejudice" meaning that double jeopardy applies. The defense can also request a dismissal, most often at the end of the prosecution case. In rare circumstances the Judge may dismiss without a request from either prosecution or defense. These will most often be "with prejudice" It is possible for the trial to be recessed while new evidence is evaluated or sought, but this is rare and usually only for a short time -- a day or two, perhaps. In general a prosecutor is not supposed to schedule a trial if there is any reasonable chance of additional evidence coming to light. It can and does happen, but the system tries to avoid it, and does not easily accept that it has happened. This answer is US-Specific, and different answers may apply in other places.

Is “your honour” the proper address for all U.S. judges rather than just the more senior ones? Is “your honour” the proper address for all U.S. judges rather than just the more senior ones? In the UK this address is reserved for the more senior ones but it seems that in U.S. films and TV series judges are always called for honour in court. What judges are called this in the us and what other addresses are designated for judges?

Yes An American would spell it as “your honor,” but yes, this is how we refer to all judges. This is simply a custom that shows respect. There is no law or concrete fact I could cite that requires this; it is more of a “tradition.” But I have seen plenty of court proceedings (mostly on TV), and I can confirm that all judges, ranging from small claims court to the Supreme Court, are called “Your honor.” (The chief justice of the Supreme Court is sometimes addressed as “Chief Justice.”) Googling articles about courtroom etiquette also mostly leads to people who agree with this. Apparently, there are some countries where it is customary to say “my honor,” or even something else altogether. Sometimes people from these countries immigrate to the US and continue using their local terminology in a US court. Although every judge is different, my perception is that most judges try to be inclusive of other cultures, and if whatever term they use is intended as a sign of respect, most judges will usually just interpret it as it was intended.

If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.

Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party.

As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years).

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

Judge Judy is not a real judge; it's a TV show where the "litigants" sign contracts to enter into arbitration (Wikipedia) on the show in the format of court proceedings. The participants' travel expenses are paid by the show, as are the monetary settlements. The papers that can't be removed could be anything: their contracts for the show, the settlement agreements, NDAs, etc. The fact that they can't take the paperwork is outlined in the contracts they sign to be on the show.

First, the proper immediate action is to - while not leaving the judicial branch - appeal up to the next higher court. In federal courts, the lowest levels are district courts, which issues decisions appealable to the circuit courts, whose decisions are sometimes able to make their way to the Supreme Court by submitting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Then the Supreme Court meets and decides which appeals it will hear for the year ahead. This works similarly on a state level, except the levels of the courts may have different names (for example, Washington, DC’s trial level court is not the District Court, but the Superior Court. In Virginia, one trial court is the General District Court, which hears claims up to $25,000 and another trial court is the Virginia Circuit Court which hears other claims, and some felonies while also serving as an appellate court for the General District Court). Assuming those options have been exhausted, the reality is yeah, sometimes there are judges who will act that way. Sometimes they will get away with it because they are maintaining enough discretion, they are powerful enough, or because someone else is corrupt, too. A number of options and variables may come into play at this point. What, if any, laws exist to prevent the behavior in question? What ethics standard does the jurisdiction have (this would likely be developed by the local bar association)? Are there any other organizations he or she is affiliated with professionally? Who else knows about it, how serious is it, will anyone else speak up, etc...? Each of those variables - and likely a number of others not mentioned here - may play into the outcome. They each can serve to make one’s actions more or less easy or desirable to perform, whether by exposing and embarrassing an actor, reminding him or her of the potential legal liability associated with such actions, etc. All that said, there are limits on what a judge may or may not do. For example, in federal criminal cases, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rules assembled by the US Sentencing Commission that are, of course, non-binding, set a floor and ceiling on the years in prison one should be sentenced to in various circumstances with a formula used to make the calculation. It is rare (and sometimes controversial and subject to scrutiny) if a judge grossly or unreasonable deviates from the Guidelines. The intent of the Guidelines is to remove judicial bias from the doling out of prison sentences. Results have arguably been mixed. Finally, I’d be remiss not to mention that in general judicial discretion in many aspects of litigation is a desirable and useful occurrence, whether it manifests itself in the dismissal of a frivolous case or appointing counsel to an indigent defendant.

Almost none of this is written down anywhere in official court rules but there are some widely adopted standards for this practice. Most courts require that only one lawyer be in charge of speaking at any given stage of the trial. But, it wouldn't be unusual, for example, for one lawyer to question most of the witnesses and for a different lawyer who is more familiar with the specialized subject matter in question (e.g. electrical specifications), usually a junior lawyer, to question the expert witnesses in a case. Also, if the usually designated lawyer is absent for some reason (stuck in traffic, sick, etc.), the "second chair" lawyer can (and is often required to) take over the case for the client until the "first chair" lawyer is available again. Mostly, second chair lawyers (I've spent plenty of time over the years in this role) do the following (a non-exclusive list): take notes, pay attention to how the judge and jury are reacting to testimony, provide input into jury selection decisions, reminds the primary lawyer of points that still need to be covered in the examination of a witness, reminds the primary lawyer of exhibits that still need to be formally offered into evidence, scrambles to find rebuttal or impeachment evidence for unanticipated testimony, prompts the primary lawyer to make objections if the primary lawyer was paying attention to something else, identifies and has at the ready exhibits needs to present (or to follow the other side's examination), looks up points of law that are relevant or will need to be referenced that come up during trial, handles logistics for witnesses who are not on the stand (keeping them in the hallway if the witness is sequestered, trying to obtain the appearance of no show witnesses or reshuffling their order, saying thank you to witnesses who are no longer on the stand, etc.), carries some of the litigation team's stuff into and out of the court room, provides informed commentary and suggestions during breaks and working lunches, etc. Also, in addition to the usual "first chair" and "second chair" roles, often supplemented by a paralegal or legal assistant, there is a different kind of arrangement in which different lawyers for the same person can fully participate. This far less common arrangement happens when the person showing up in court is wearing "more than one hat" and has a different lawyer in different capacities. For example, suppose that someone is the President of a corporation and both the corporation and the President individually are both sued. There might be one primary lawyer for the corporation and one for the President personally, and both lawyers might participate fully.

Indiana governor's pardon powers Can the governor of Indiana issue preemptive pardons like the POTUS can? If so, what is the source of law that expressly confirms this, or at least leaves little doubt that this is within the governor's authority (e.g. judicial interpretation, statute, commentary etc.); have there been any instances in the past of it happening; and is the scope of such pardons limited in any way? Thanks in advance for any answers.

The Indiana constitution is phrased differently to the US constitution in such a way to exclude pre-emptive pardons: (Indiana) The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment (US constitution) he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. (my emphasis) The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons after conviction and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons before conviction. By contrast, the Supreme court has judged that the President may issue pardons after commission, that is after the offence has been committed, and potentially before the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. They can't issue pardons for crimes not yet committed. The scope of pardons issued by the Governor is limited; this power is subject to regulation by law issued by the Legislature, and (if there is no regulation giving sole power of pardon to the president) the Legislature may form a council to review pardons. The council's advice and consent must be sought. In fact, the Legislature appoints the Parole Board to this role. So the Parole Board gives advice and consent to pardons issued by the Governor. In practice, therefore, the Parole Board makes these decisions, as Governors rarely refuse pardons recommended by the Board. Generally, though, pardons are rare, Mike Pence granted only three during his tenure as Governor. References: Constituion of Indiana Guide to pardons in Indiana

All ex post facto laws are unconstitutional in the United States. But, not all retroactive laws are unconstitutional in the United States. An ex post facto law is basically a law that retroactively makes conduct illegal or punishes it more severely than it was punished at the time if it was already illegal. By way of example, tax legislation is often constitutionally retroactive, and laws that retroactively make the punishments for acts that are crimes at the time more lenient (or retroactively grant amnesty for previously illegal conduct) are legal. I strongly suspect, but do not know for certain, that India's constitutional law makes the same distinction that U.S. constitutional law does in this regard.

In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).

There are 2 separate issues here: what happens to such a President and what happens to the person who has been pardoned. What happens to the person who has been pardoned? While at least one attempt at reversing a pardon has been discussed in recent history (Clinton's pardon of Mark Rich), there is no case of a pardon that has been reversed without the wishes of the person who was to be pardoned. There were 2 SCOTUS cases which decided that a pardon is a form of clemency rather than an act of overturning a judgement. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) established that if a person does not accept a conditional pardon, then it is not in effect. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) decided that if a person does not accept an unconditional pardon, then the pardon is not in effect. Burdick specifically did not want to accept the pardon because his contention was that accepting it would be tantamount to admitting guilt and would strip him of his 5th amendment right to not incriminate himself. There is very little case law surrounding the understanding of the power to pardon, so it may help to simply list the relevant instances of considerations and available opinions. Both (fmr President) Nixon and (fmr Sec of Defense) Weinberger were pardoned without ever being tried for the crimes for which they were pardoned. Even after Burdick v US, the issue of whether a pardon does amount to a formal admission of guilt remains controversial (i.e., not fully settled legally). In Nixon v US (not to be confused with the more famous US v Nixon), the court referred to Black's Law dictionary, rather than to the previous 2 opinions, to state that a pardon does not overturn a "guilty" judgement but rather provides a clemency. It is established that all punishments (jail time or fines), that one would receive for the crime, would not be applied if the person is pardoned. However, it is not established, for example, if the the presumption of guilt that goes with the accepting of a pardon counts as a "strike" for the purposes of "3 strike" laws (because of no precedent); would result in a requirement to continue registering as a sex offender in case the crime was a sex crime (because of no precedent). The current DOJ FAQ states that a pardon removes "civil disabilities" such as restrictions on the right to vote hold state or local office sit on a jury It is widely claimed that a President cannot pardon anyone for state crimes. However, as far as I know, it's never been attempted. The current interpretation of the US Constitution's Supremacy Clause is that states cannot interfere with the proceedings of the Federal government. So should a President attempt to pardon anyone for a state crime, it would (almost certainly) result in a court challenge. Any claims, that the outcome of such a challenge would result one way or another, are (by definition) nothing but a speculation. Further, if a pardon does remove the civil disability of not being able to hold a state office, then it does remove punitive consequences of some states' laws. Which may potentially bolster the claim that a President may pardon a state crime. But again, this is a pure speculation and there are plenty of good arguments to be made against such a possibility. What happens to the President who has taken a bribe? That having been said, no official act performed by a President is automatically reversed if the act is found to have been done corruptly (in exchange for a bribe or any other personal consideration contravening his oath of office). However, the Congress has the enumerated power to impeach a President and remove him from the office if he is found to have taken a bribe. Removing him from the office does not, in itself, reverse any of his official actions (including the ones performed corruptly). The Congress, however, does not have the power to reverse pardons. Nor can it create such a power with a legislature. For Congress to gain such a power would require a constitutional amendment.

Can Congress essentially pardon a violation of law through legislation? Yes. Congress has the power to retroactivity reduce the sentence for a crime for which someone has been sentenced. This was done most recently in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that reduced excessive penalties for crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. In the same way, when the death penalty is legislatively repealed in a state, the death sentences of the handful of people on death row at the time is often commuted legislatively. While Congress cannot impose criminal penalties on someone legislatively, which is a Bill of Attainder and constitutionally prohibited, it can single out people for special treatment in a private bill, which is a constitutional exercise of legislative power at the federal level (not every state allows private bills to be enacted due to Progressive era reforms to state constitutions). For example, private bills often eliminate the collateral effects of a criminal conviction upon a person, there is even a standard procedure for doing so, which is functionally equivalent to a Presidential pardon of the crime for that purposes (the vast majority of Presidential pardons are issued after the person convicted has served the sentence for the crime). A private bill cannot impair contract or property rights, which would be a prohibited ex post facto law. But no one other than the federal government has a legally protected interest in keeping someone incarcerated or otherwise punishing them for a crime. Crimes are prosecuted in the name of the People and victims of crimes do not have legal rights in those proceedings except as created by statute. So, this would not be an ex post facto bill or a taking governed by the Fifth Amendment for takings of property interests. And, Congress may, by legislation, determine what the federal government will do in essentially all cases where it is not expressly prohibited from doing so (some argue that there is a minimum of federal authority vested exclusively in the President in the area of foreign affairs and military affairs, but that exclusivity of power does not extend to domestic criminal justice). Basically, anything that Congress could do for everyone via a public bill, it can do for someone in particular via a private bill, unless a specific constitutional prohibition applies, and there is no such prohibition when it comes to relieving someone from a sentence or the collateral effects of a criminal conviction prospectively via a private bill. This isn't exactly equivalent to a Presidential pardon or commutation, but it is very close to one in practical effect. For a fuller, but somewhat outdated treatment of the issue, you can read this 1939 article in the California Law Review which acknowledged that legislative pardons were possible under existing law. This said, government prosecutors routinely fervently oppose any retroactive criminal legislation that reduces punishment, particularly via private laws (although some countries, such as France, have constitutional requirements to retroactively reduce the sentences of anyone currently serving time for a crime whose punishment is legislatively reduced prospectively). Private bills that constitute legislative pardons are very rare. A 2011 law review article recounts how the tool of the legislative pardon (in parallel with the executive pardon which is also used much less frequency) has fallen into disuse. Part of the decline is due to the adoption of the right to appeal from a trial court criminal convictions which did not exist in the federal system until the 1890s. Until then, the only judicial relief available from a federal criminal conviction was via a writ of habeas corpus, and that was available only on very limited grounds such as a lack of jurisdiction to conduct the trial, or the non-existence of the crime of conviction. Conviction by a jury in a court with jurisdiction of a constitutionally permissible crime was an absolute defense to the extent of the sentence imposed to a habeas corpus petition at that time. (As a footnote, the term "private bill" can be confusing. In many governments with a parliamentary system, a "private bill" means one sponsored by an individual legislator rather than the prime minister and his or her cabinet. But, in U.S. terminology, a "private bill" refers to a bill with an effect limited to one person or a small number of persons who are either identified by name or by a very narrowly defined situation.)

Yes, they can be sued civilly Or, for that matter, be prosecuted by another jurisdiction- pardons only work within the jurisdiction that issued them. In a common law jurisdiction, the pardon cannot be used as evidence Nor, for that matter, can a criminal conviction. This is partly because the elements that need to be proved for the civil wrong won’t correspond to the elements of the crime. But mostly, because it just isn’t allowed.

States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).

Yes, here is an example. Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon: Now, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States, pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9,1974. But he was not charged with anything.