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Pay electricity bill after being evicted on no contract? I moved into a house and started paying rent of $110 per week however I was unaware that none of the other tenants (and hence myself) were on a contract so we were essentially squatters. The electricity bill was also in the name of another tenant living there. After a while we were evicted by the landlord as we did not have a contract. This was a surprise and disappointment at the same time since I needed a place to live and study (I am a university student). Now 8 weeks after we were all evicted the tenant that had the electricity bill received the final bill and now expects me to pay part of it despite the fact that I wasn't even living there for 2/3 of the billing period (4 weeks of the period I was there, then got evicted and 8 weeks I was not there and the billing period is 3 months or 12 weeks). My name is not on any rent or utility contract so I'm not even sure if I am legally obliged to have to pay that money to him (it's about $50). What are my options?

I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.

You have mentioned that he has agreed to pay you to move out - in this case, he may wish you to sign a contract where you (both) agree that, in exchange for this sum of money you release and discharge each other from any obligations under the previous contract from a certain date onwards, and that from that date you both waive any right of claim, action or any other such proceedings that may be brought to exercise your rights to specific performance or damages as regards to this specific conduct in relation to the lease. This would likely protect both of you from adverse proceedings from each other, but only for this early discharge of the contract, but not in relation to other breaches of contract as might occur in the interim.

Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.

The law only addresses possible legal consequences, from which you could surmise what actually happens. If a person stops paying rent, the landlord institutes eviction proceedings, and may sue for the remainder of the rent for the term of the lease: they have an obligation to try to find a replacement tenant, to mitigate the damage. Some relief is available to the landlord in the deposit, from which the unpaid rent might be deducted, but let's assume that after that, the actual damage suffered is $5,000. When you sue a person in your home state, the court serves official notice that the defendant must appear to answer the charges, and the state has jurisdiction over the respondent because they are in that state. Giving notice and collecting on a judgment across jurisdictions can get complicated and expensive, so it would depend on what kind of treaties exist between the countries. There is the Hague Service Convention which may simplify the business of giving notice to parties, which works if the respondent fled to Norway or India but not if they fled to Somalia or Turkmenistan. Since it turns out the US is not party to any multinational treaty recognizing foreign judgments, that country is not obligated to care about a US judgment, so unless the person left assets in the US, you may not be able to collect. You could sue in the person's country (hire a local attorney to pursue the matter). The main legal question would be whether there is any conflict between the lease and local law: while the basic idea of a lease is universally recognized, there may be peculiar conditions or procedures applicable in that country. (Norway has some laws pertaining to "shared utilities" which don't exist in the US, which might put a US lease at odds with Norwegian law, and there are rent-raising rules that don't exist here). It might be necessary that you appear in court in that country to swear under oath that the lease was agreed to voluntarily, or the court may require a special form of 'notarization' not available in the US. None of that renders international litigation impossible, though a favorable judgment might be unlikely in some courts. The cost of litigation might be much higher than what would be awarded by a court.

Questions about being barred from entry into the UK 10 years down the road need to be asked some number of years in the future. Current practice is that the Home Secretary does not bar entry because of an unpaid debt, instead you have to do something egregiously bad or antisocial. Given Brexit, future matters of immigration are not set in stone. One consequence of walking away from a lease is that you are likely to be sued (in UK courts) for breach of contract, and the court may find that you owe the rest of the lease money. If that happens, you need to be concerned with whether the judgment can be enforced against you, even when you are in the US. The general answer is, yes, the landlord can petition the US courts to enforce a UK judgment against you. The specific details depend on the law of your state, but most states have a version of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act. In addition, the landlord could sue you in US courts (maybe not as convenient for him). There is no requirement that you have to be a US citizen to sue a US person, and a landlord can (would almost certainly) sue you via a US attorney who would represent him. An alternative to fleeing your obligation and saying "Go ahead and sue me!" is to negotiate a termination of the lease. The landlord would have a duty to mitigate his losses, so if the remainder of the lease has a value of $2,000 a month for 8 months, the landlord can't just do nothing -- he has to try to rent the unit out, so perhaps his actual losses would be only $4,000. Suing a person is expensive especially when you you are dealing in trans-national disputes, so he may be willing to accept some figure in exchange for terminating the lease. Your (UK) lawyer will give you good advice on how to proceed, if you opt to not get sued.

If I don't attend the hearing, can I get evicted? Yes. Never ignore a court hearing date. The Tribunal could otherwise impose an outcome without hearing your side of the story. If you ultimately paid the rent and the late fees, and the Tribunal didn't know that, you could be unjustly evicted if you don't present your side of the story. It could simply be a case, for example, where the landlord confused your non-payment with someone else's. But after the Tribunal rules, fixing that mistake is much more difficult than fixing it at a hearing. It could be that making two late payments that are cured later is still grounds for eviction under the lease, although I very much doubt it. In that case, it still pays to show up to make sure that the Tribunal has all of the facts favorable to you before it makes its decision.

When a contract states a thing that you get for a stated price, that means you should get the thing described, and you pay the stated price. If the landlord makes a mistake and wishes he had charged more, he can wait until the end of the lease period and then increase the price as he desires. He cannot raise the price until the end of the contract, and cannot retroactively charge that increase. (It's impossible to imagine there being contract language that allows that outcome, but we will assume there is no such clause). If the stated area is not as stated, especially if the area is actually smaller, the landlord is in breach of the contract, and could be sued for damages. It would depends on how different the areas are, when it comes to assigning damages. For example, 4 sqm in a unit with 800 sqm is not likely to result in any loss to the tenant. If the unit is bigger than stated, the prospects for damages are even less, perhaps a bit for added heating cost. Either way, if the size is incorrectly described, that is the landlord's fault, though probably not worth bothering with a lawsuit.

Under an assured shorthold tenancy, when the fixed term expires, it automatically becomes a periodic tenancy (also called a rolling or month-to-month tenancy) if no other action is taken. For periodic tenancies, the default requirement is: The notice you give must end on the first or last day of the period of a tenancy, except when your tenancy agreement says something different. The first day of a period of your tenancy is the anniversary date each week or month of when your tenancy began. This is often the same date that your rent is due, but not always. (the above taken from this Shelter guide.) The contract merely restates this. So in other words, yes, this is normal. In this instance, if you give notice on or before 25 Dec, you'll be required to pay rent up to 24 Jan. However, if the landlord finds a new tenant and their tenancy starts after you move out, but before 24 Jan, then you are only liable for rent up to the start of their tenancy.

Can a debt collection agency tell a half truth about who they are? I am in Washington state. Recently, I've been receiving calls from Conserve, a company that provides private and confidential services to private and public companies (as stated by the agent on the phone). This immediately made me suspicious, and when I asked for more information, they simply stated that they could not give me any more information. I told them that the person they were looking for was not available, and they stated that they would call back later. Before I could tell them not to, they had hung up. I looked up the company, and found that they are a debt collection agency, and on their website, it states that This communication is from a debt collector, and is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. As far as I am aware, if it is a debt collection agency calling, don't they have to inform of this, before I tell them any information? There is not automated message that states this, and it is from a different number each day. The reason I am certain that it is a debt collection agency calling, is because the person that they are looking for, has told me about debts that they have, and have received letters attempting to collect a debt. What steps can I take in this situation to either prevent them from calling, or have them at least let me know who they are?

They don't have to inform you that they are a debt collector. Because that can be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(2) by exposing that the person they are attempting to collect from has a debt. They are required to: identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(1) They also may not use any language indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(5) What they do not have the right to do is harass you. They can not attempt to contact you again 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3) unless they have reason to believe you lied. I would contact the company back and inform them that you wish to have your number removed from their calling list, and that future calls may be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3). Also, send them a notice in the mail. If they continue to attempt to contact you, report them to the FTC. You may also be entitled to monetary damages as well. See FTC The judge can require the debt collector to pay you up to $1,000, even if you can’t prove that you suffered actual damages. You also can be reimbursed for your attorney’s fees and court costs. To file a claim with the FTC, go to there online claim for debt collectors Its worth it to show that you won't joke with them. I had a "debt" with T-Mobile (really, I had a billing error in their favor, and they admitted to it, but would not stop the debt collectors) and they violated the rules. I tried to work with them, 6 months later, they damaged my credit. I contacted FTC about it and T-Mobile with in 3 days had the debt cleared and reversed on my credit. They also paid for my damages. All I wanted was the debt cleared. Note: for calls being recorded, always make sure you follow local laws and inform the other party that the call is recorded. If they have a right to record you, you have a right to record them. You must always infrom them as well.

I spent 26 years in Law Enforcement (two years in Fraud, Identity Theft, and Embezzlement) and here is the answer I would often give other people in this situation: By law, recipients are not required to do anything. It can be deleted without a second thought. There is no specific law requiring someone to report this as it doesn't rise to the level of a crime. Contacting the sender or intended recipient can be risky because the other person is unknown. Return addresses online may be masked by redirects or other traps. What is displayed may not be the full picture of the site where they want someone to go. Having information about someone, although private, is not a crime unless there is a specific intent to use that information for a crime: fraud, identity theft, theft, etc. Doctors, banks, and numerous other businesses have access to personal identifying information about people. Unless they were to use it illegally, just having the information is not a crime. Phishing attempts: As far as sending the information on to the intended recipient, that would be very noble; but there is no requirement to do so. This type of transaction is likened to having a stranger call looking for someone else. There are people around the world just hoping to get people to click on their site so they can download everything on the victim's computer. I once taught a class in Internet Safety to senior citizens. The message was simple: Don't put any information on-line that you wouldn't post on your front door. Advances on computer security have made it possible to securely handle more information but still be on-guard; Phishing still happens. Most reputable companies won't send you e-mails asking for personal information, passwords, or account numbers. Hackers, thieves, and criminals have access to personal information regularly. In today's society, it's just a part of life in a digital world. How does one protect themselves? Be diligent about all transactions. For instance: Check bank accounts, credit card purchases, and credit reports regularly. A TV show, Adam Ruins Everything - Adam Ruins Security, clearly outlines a lot of these facts. (Season 1, Episode 2 - First aired October 6, 2015) To recap: 1) Do nothing. 2) Stay vigilant. 3) Be wary. Common idiom - If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.

If you are in the habit of paying people just because they ask you to, then I say you owe me $500 - if you want to pay I'll send you my wire transfer details. This is a facetious way of making a very simple point: You don't owe people money just because they say you do. If someone claims to be owed money by you, the legal onus is for them to prove both their legal entitlement and the amount. Normally, people agree that they owe money and that's enough, however, if the debtor disputes the debt then the creditor has to prove that it is owed: the debtor does not have to prove that it isn't. Their legal basis must come from either a contract or the tort of trespass. For the former they must prove that a contract exists and that you breached a term of it. For the latter they must prove that you committed the tort. In both cases, they are only entitled to recover their costs (including loss of profit) that your actions caused. As they are not a government they have no right to punish you with a fine: if they are asking for more than damages then this is a penalty and void. I am unaware of the consumer protection laws in Canada but presuming they are similar to Australia - a disputed debt is not a debt. It only becomes a debt when the dispute is resolved, usually by agreement or a court. Only actual debts can have enforcement action taken including such things as being pursued by a collection agency or being recorded by a credit reporting agency. In short: this is a scam. In 2012 I went through a similar process. This is the letter I sent: We are the registered operator of motor vehicle XXXXX and have received your letter dated 6/6/2012 for payment of car parking penalty number XXXXX that you allege we incurred on 6/4/2011. To the extent that we entered into a contract with you, which is denied, please take this letter to constitute a written appeal in accordance with the appeal process described on your website and/or in your documentation. We dispute incurring the alleged debt and we dispute entering into any contract with you. We will defend any action brought against us. You must cease all efforts to collect this alleged debt whilst it remains in dispute, in compliance with National, ACCC and NSW laws and guidelines. Except as specifically outlined herein, we are requesting that you cease all contact with us about the alleged debt. Any further contact should be strictly in conformity with the ACCC Debt Collection Guidelines (refer http://tinyurl.com/parking-01). Your contact with us should be limited to: acknowledging our letter and providing us with any documentation that we have requested informing us that you have ceased collection efforts on the alleged debt stating that you are taking a specific action in relation to the debt such as commencing court proceedings (note that you can only threaten court proceedings if you intend to start them otherwise you are in breach of the guidelines - refer page 33 "you must not threaten legal action if the start of proceedings is not possible, or not under consideration, or you do not have instructions to start proceedings"). You must also advise any debt collectors or lawyers you have collecting this debt to stop. If you or your agents continue to attempt to collect this alleged debt, we will complain in writing to the ACCC, to NSW Fair Trading, and to the car park owner (and if we receive a further letter from your lawyers, we will complain to the Legal Services Commissioner in the lawyer's home state). Please send us within 7 days: Confirmation of whether or not you still hold us responsible for this alleged debt. If you still hold us responsible, we require you to properly articulate the facts and matters on which your claim is based. Please forward us the following particulars: A copy of the contract we are alleged to have entered into. Photographs of any signs that need to be read in conjunction with the alleged contract. Details of the actual offence you are claiming. e.g. failure to buy ticket, expired ticket, parking in no-standing etc. As well as the usual particulars of date, time, precise location with the car park and other facts and matters giving rise to the alleged breach of agreement. An itemised breakdown of the debt you are claiming and details on how it was calculated. Show separately legal costs, court costs, administration costs, costs associated with identifying us as the car owner, patrolling costs and a breakdown of any other costs not already mentioned. Pursuant to the Privacy Act, a copy of all photos you have of our car and/or us. Indicate the date each photo was taken and the name of the person who took the photo. And forward us any other data that you hold on us that the Privacy Act requires you to disclose. The basis on which you allege that we ware a party to the agreement alleged to exist; Proof that the alleged debt was incurred by us. The name(s) of any lawyers or solicitors who received payments pursuant to any clause in your terms and conditions. Please show the amounts and dates on which these costs were incurred, and the dates when these payments were made. Please itemise the work that such lawyers or solicitors performed for you, and indicate which clause in your terms and conditions allows you to hold us liable for such payments. A copy of any agreement that the car parking company has with the owner of the car park which covers the handling of disputes and appeals. Indicate the amount of money the car park company would have been paid had we entered into the alleged agreement with it, and if the alleged terms and conditions had been followed to the company's satisfaction. (In other words, how much money do you normally receive for a car to park in your car park for the period of time we are alleged to have parked there for). The contact name, postal address, and phone number of each of the following: the car park owner, the car park manager, and the car park operator. A copy of your Appeal handing procedure. As well as setting out what factors are taken into account, state who is the judge or arbitrator and whether they are independent and any other relevant factors to the Appeal. In addition, please give us disclosure of any arguments being put by yourselves on this matter in the Appeal so that we might reply to any new issues which are raised. If you decide to dismiss our appeal, please send us the full reasoning in relation to each of the specific points raised in our letter. The name and address of the person you allege was driving our car at the time you allege our car was parked in your car park. If you are alleging an agent authorised by us was driving our car, please confirm this in your response and forward us a copy of the agency agreement, along with the name and address of the agent. We put you on notice that should you continue this claim, we will issue an application, seeking orders that: Any request for a statutory declaration or request from you to prove in anyway that we do not owe this debt is misleading or deceptive conduct, because you are not a government agency and that the burden of proof rests with you as the person who claims the alleged debt. The amount claimed pursuant to the alleged contract amounts to a penalty and therefore void at common law. Alternatively, the amount claimed is claimed pursuant to a consumer contract within the meaning of the Australian Consumer Law and that the amount claimed is an unfair term within the meaning of section 23 of the ACL and, accordingly, is void. Finally, this debt remains in dispute until we advise you in writing that we owe this debt. I received one further piece of correspondence which didn't address any of the things I asked for and which I ignored and that was the end of the matter.

The two cases are very different. The first involves a debt collector entering onto property in connection with an allegedly overdue utility bill, which is something a debt collector ordinarily would not be permitted to do without a money judgment following a court proceeding and further court orders authorizing collection of the debt from tangible personal property on the premises. This is pretty much completely without justification and realistically is a criminal offense as well as a basis for a civil lawsuit, although the modest money damages involved may have made such a lawsuit ill advised for the resident impacted by the unlawful entry. Notably, in this case Scottish Power, "admitted the error, apologised and offered compensation." I doubt that an American utility company would have had the good sense and grace to act the same way. The story doesn't make entirely clear if these were Scottish Power employees or debt collection contractors hired by Scottish Power. The question implies that abusive utility company collection agents are a systemic problem in Scotland, although the article itself does not. The second involves a utility company, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), drilling a lock to enter onto property in order to check a utility meter, in a building where some other tenant at a different address was not paying an electric bill on a different meter, which presents a very different issue. The customer at the address drilled had reasonably documented the utility company's mistake, but the company, for some reason, didn't believe the customer and didn't make arrangements to visit consensually when the customer was home. Instead, while the customer was work on Wednesday two male SSE workers drilled through the lock to gain entry into the flat, and when they got in and looked at the meter, they realized that they were mistaken. The fact that the story describes the two men as a "warrant team" leaves open the possibility that a warrant for entry was received from a court based upon bad information from the utility company when it should have known better, although that issue isn't clarified in the story. The customer “lodged a formal complaint against SSE for unlawful entry and reported the incident to the police.” And an ombudsman elevated the issue. According to the utility company, it "offered to replace all the locks in her property and offered her a goodwill gesture payment of £500. Both were rejected by Ms Harvey who wanted compensation for further rental, hotel and new property costs which we were unable to agree to." Utility companies will generally have an easement or some similar legal right to enter onto a customer's property to read a utility meter or the deal with something broken on the premises that affects the larger utility system such as a short circuit that is bringing down the power of everyone on the block, without notice in cases of emergencies. So, in this case, the issue is not the absence of a right to enter somewhere, but the fact that the utility company went to the wrong place (where it may very well have had no right to enter because there may have been no utility meter to check at that location), which in and of itself, would be mere negligence if it hadn't received such clear communication from the customer and ignored it, and secondly, whether the method it used to gain access to the property in the good faith belief that it had a legal right to enter to gain access to the property was reasonable. Charitably, it could be that the utility company had a key allowing it to enter and read the meter at the proper address, but that key didn't work because they were at the wrong address and the utility official may have mistakenly believes that the lock was broken rather than that the address was wrong. In that case, the question would be whether it was reasonable to force entry in a non-emergency case like a meter readings, rather than trying to contact the owner to resolve the question, which it probably was not. It isn't quite as obvious that this would be a criminal trespass, because ordinarily entry onto property under a claim of right, even if mistaken in good faith, does not constitute criminal conduct, although a claim of good faith in a context where the company as a whole knew better even if the right hand may not have known what the left hand was doing, probably doesn't hold up under agency law that imputes the knowledge of any agent of the company to the company as a whole. But, while the company may have committed a crime, the two workmen detailed to do the work may have been acting in good faith personally, and may have even had a warrant. Certainly, the utility company should have liability to repair any damage that was done to the premises in order to gain entry that arose from its negligence in going to the wrong address and its unreasonable failure to confer with the customer about the problem in a non-emergency. SSE would probably be well advised to admit with good grace that it was in the wrong and to pay the still very modest amount that the customer claimed for an alternate rental, rather than fight this issue where its fumbling became not just rude but abusive.

Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.

This doesn't sound like fraud (against you, at least), but it does sound like an unfair or deceptive trade practice, which is outlawed by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and perhaps the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, both of which prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices. I don't know about Pennsylvania, but the FTC has on many occasions taken action against companies for engaging in just this kind of behavior. To find out whether you would be able to take action against the other company, you'd want to find a good competition lawyer in Pennsylvania. For some more basic background on the FTC's rules, check out this primer.

Wikipedia explains this well enough: Particular numbers can be trade secrets, and their reproduction and dissemination may be particularly proscribed, e.g., by the U.S. DCMA. As a coarse analogy: Your social security number is not "illegal." But if somebody entrusted with it shared it in violation of law or contract then their communication of the number in a context that allowed potential identity thieves to associate it with you would be illegal. To answer follow-up questions in the comments: Sure, "mere possession" of a number can land one in jail for all sorts of crimes, just like "mere possession" of stolen property can. For example, if you possess a bank account number, credit card number, or PIN, and you "conspire, confederate, or combine with another" person who actually commits fraud or theft using that number, then you can be convicted of the same crime. This is so common that a search for "conspiracy to commit wire fraud" or "credit card fraud" provides ample reading.

Look at the form letters from the consumer advice center, e.g. Lower Saxony. Keep in mind that the entity may be allowed/required to keep some of your data. Anything that impacts their taxes, for starters. And your information/deletion request might also have to go on file, to mirror their record of a before-due-date deletion.

In England and Wales, how can a plaintiff remain private and confidential? Suppose that a plaintiff wants to bring a lawsuit but keep his/her identity confidential, in either a criminal or a civil case. The plaintiff refuses to tell either the general public or the media who he/she is. When is this possible? Who decides this request for privacy? Does the plaintiff ever have to choose between appealing a case to a Supreme Court (example), and preserving anonymity? For example, the plaintiff may fear public general condemnation, reprisals, for his/her safety. I ask this for England and Wales, but please feel free to discuss other countries.

In general, court hearings are held in public; and anyone is free to make a fair and balanced report of the proceedings. It is important that justice is seen to be done. However, in some circumstances that is not true—the obvious example is if a child is involved. It is not sufficient though merely that "[the claimant] wants to keep his/her identity confidential". Have a look at the Civil Procedure Rules (part 39): 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public The general rule is that a hearing [including a trial] is to be in public. ... A hearing, or any part of it, may be in private if – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person’s estate; or (g) the court considers this to be necessary, in the interests of justice. The court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or witness. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part39#39.2 If you can satisfy the court that one of (a) to (g) apply, the court may make an order anonymizing proceedings (for instance, you would only be referred to as "AB" in reports and judgements) or it might hold the hearing in camera (in private). However the other party may well wish to oppose your application. Indeed, even a newspaper hearing of your case but unable to report it is entitled to object: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/1.html (In re Guardian News) Conclusion In these circumstances, when carrying out the ultimate test of balancing all the factors relating to both M's article 8 rights and the article 10 rights of the press, we have come to the conclusion that there is indeed a powerful general, public interest in identifying M in any report of these important proceedings which justifies curtailment, to that extent, of his, and his family's, article 8 Convention rights to respect for their private and family life. For all these reasons, we would set aside the anonymity order in respect of M. ... Therefore, A, K, M and HAY will be named here and in the judgments on the substantive appeals, as Mr Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mr Mohammed Azmir Khan, Mr Michael Marteen (formerly known as Mohammed Tunveer Ahmed) and Mr Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (or Hani al-Seba'i), respectively.

It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy.

I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.

How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released.

Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded;

Yes there has At common law you cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant. However, statute law can allow this - either intentionally or unintentionally. An example is Barbara Bagley v. Barbara Bagley, 2016 WL 6299507 (Utah 2016).

Because they are private Not private in the sense of confidential, although many are confidential (if agreed by the parties) and the arbitrator is always under a duty of confidence. Rather, private in the sense that they are conducted by private people and organisations who have no obligation to publish or publicise the results. Since most people pay on the decision, most arbitrations never go near a public court and therefore never get published.

1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him.

Is there a (preferably free) way to search small claims court records in the UK? I want to check up on a second hand car dealer in the UK to see if they've had any small claims court cases against them (and preferably the result of these cases). Is there any publicly available resource to see this kind of information?

This answer applies only to England and Wales. Unpaid County Court Judgments, and those that remained unpaid for thirty days after being handed down, are a matter of public record. They are held on the Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines by virtue of The Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines Regulations 2005. Judgments against individuals and corporations are both held. The register contains— the full name and address of the debtor in respect of whom the entry in the Register is to be made; if the entry is to be in respect of an individual, that individual’s date of birth (where known); the amount of the debt; the case number; the name of the court which made the judgment; and the date of the judgment. (abstracted from r10 of the Regulations). The registrar is currently Trust Online. The CCJ register can be searched for a fee of £4 per search. Registers for other parts of the UK are also held.

Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft.

Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal.

Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.

Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice.

Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989

We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately.

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

Why was the due process clause added to the 14th Amendment? The 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment both have due process clauses. The texts are almost identical: The Fifth Amendment: [N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . The Fourteenth Amendment: [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . From all I've read - including a comment by cpast - the two clauses are interpreted identically. So why was the clause added to the 14th Amendment? The one difference seems to be the use of "State" in the 14th Amendment - thus applying it not just on a federal level - but I would think that the Constitution would be automatically applicable in all state level cases.

Your assumption is incorrect -- the Bill of Rights proper does not apply to the states, and pre-14th Amendment only bound the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 US 243. States could do whatever they wanted, subject to federal legislation on the matters given to the federal government and subject to their own constitutions. After the Civil War, the federal government was much less OK with so-called "black codes," restricting the rights of freedmen based on explicitly racial distinctions, with not even a fig leaf of justification that it applied to all citizens. The federal government could prevent federal discrimination, but no tools existed to prevent state discrimination. Hence, the 14th Amendment, which bound the states to adopt certain standards in their lawmaking and let Congress take action against those that didn't.

There is a police power exception to the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to not taking property without due process of law and just compensation. In a similar case arising in Greenwood Village, Colorado, an innocent homeowner was denied any relief at trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, or on appeal to the 10th Circuit, after his house was trashed by SWAT teams trying to catch a guy accused of mere theft and fleeing police officers. (The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case sometime after the linked article was written.) But, there does appear to be a circuit split on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in a case appealed from a U.S. District Court decision in Texas reached a contrary conclusion in a case between Vicki Baker and the City of McKinney, Texas decided earlier this month in March of 2023 in which it affirmed a U.S. District Court ruling in favor of the homewoner. The fact that there is now a circuit split on the issue increases the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court would consider a Petition for Certiorari from the 5th Circuit decision in the Texas case, although it is far from a sure thing as only about 1% of Petitions for Certiorari presented to the U.S. Supreme Court (about 80 out of 7,000 to 8,000 per year) are granted. The key issue distinguishing these two rulings is the question of whether the police power exception to the eminent domain obligation of a government applies to cases in which the person whose property is taken is innocent of any wrongdoing and any legally relevant connection to a wrongdoer. Both circuits would agree that a government does not have eminent domain liability under the constitution if, for example, the property destroyed belongs to someone who committed a crime and has their house destroyed in the process of trying to arrest the criminal. Also, neither of the decisions disputes that police may, under the police power exception, destroy property in connection with efforts to apprehend a criminal or to prevent a crime, without seeking court approval in the usual situation where there are exigent circumstances that can't wait for the slow process of conducting a court hearing on the question. The question, instead, is whether an innocent property owner has a right to bring an "inverse condemnation" lawsuit to remedy the damage that the innocent property owner has experienced.

This would require an amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The process is specified in Article 5: Article. V. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. The "mode of ratification" has until now always been by state legislatures rather than by conventions. That's unlikely to be different in this case.

If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.

The relevant portion of the U.S. Constitution is the full faith and credit clause (which the Respect for Marriage act is primarily an implementation and enforcement of). This requires states to honor marriages and divorces entered into in different states (subject to limited public policy exceptions that the Respect for Marriage act further limited), and also, for example, paternity determinations and court judgments from other states. This was one argument among many used to argue that same sex marriages from other states should be recognized in other states. But the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), in which it established a right to same sex marriage in all U.S. states, relied instead mostly upon a substantive due process clause analysis similar to that of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause protects very little (mostly the right to interstate travel and the right for an out of state resident to be licensed in a profession in a state). The Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), in the late 19th century gave a very crabbed interpretation to the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, limited that only to rights arising from federal citizenship. The logic of the Slaughterhouse line of cases spilled over into the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause applies to rights specific to state citizenship to prevent those rights from being denied to out of state U.S. citizens. But those rights are few and far between, and court crafted exceptions have been carved out in cases where it does exist (hunting and fishing license fees and college tuition, for example).

Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the "Admissions Clause": New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not "this shall not be done", but rather "the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so".

Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.

Overview Generally speaking the Titles of Nobility clauses in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution, were aimed at barring hereditary grants of special privileges which is what it means by "Titles of Nobility". In particular, it was mostly aimed at preventing a monarchy from arising in the U.S. This said, there is extremely little case law directly interpreting the the Titles of Nobility clauses, mostly because neither the federal government in the United States, nor any state, has shown much inclination to grant titles of nobility. Most cases discuss the Titles of Nobility clauses in order to interpret other clauses of the constitution (usually in dissenting opinions as part of a parade of evils). A Titles of Nobility amendment to the U.S. Constitution was also proposed in 1810, but never adopted, although many conspiracy theories claim that it was adopted and is in force. This would have automatically revoked the citizenship of anyone awarded a title of nobility. As Wikipedia explains: It has been claimed that the Titles of Nobility Amendment became part of the Constitution. It was erroneously referred to as the Thirteenth Amendment in some early 19th century printings of the Constitution.2[9] Between 1819 and 1867 the statutory law code of Virginia included it as well.[10] The term "Thirteenthers" has sometimes been used in recent years to refer to those who mistakenly believe this amendment was ratified in the 1810s, and also for those who today wish to see this amendment adopted.2 This misconception has become significant because it is yoked with another misconception—that a lawyer's use of the word or abbreviation of "Esquire" after his name is a title of nobility acquired from a foreign power—and so some litigants and others have tried to assert that lawyers have lost their citizenship or are disqualified from public office. Consistent with the discussion below, the title "Esquire" for lawyers as used in the United States, is not a title of nobility because it cannot be passed on to the children of the people who hold it (in either English or American usage) and because it does not, in U.S. usage, at least, confer legal privileges on a hereditary basis. (In 19th century English usage, certain sons of nobles who do not have a noble title themselves were properly addressed "Esquire" and some minor privileges may go with that title, so in that context it may have historically been a Title of Nobility even though this has never been part of the American use of the term "Esquire.") Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "Nobility" as follows: In English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. These had anciently duties annexed to their respective honors. They are created either by writ, i.e. by royal summons to attend the house of peers, or by letters patent, i.e. by royal grant of any dignity and degree of peerage; and they enjoy many privileges, exclusive of their senatorial capacity. Letters patent still exist in both English and American law and primarily refer to document in the nature of a deed that transfers real estate from the sovereign to a private individual. The connection is that most (although not all) titles of nobility were personal rights incident to being the feudal owner of a parcel of land (the right to say who inherits land from an individual was originally entirely governed by law without the discretion of the owner to give it to someone else, but this was reformed gradually in the "early modern" period of English history and was fully reformed by the Victorian era except as to the titles of nobility historically associated with the land). Titles of Nobility are hereditary. An appointment to a position for life (the moral equivalent of a "Life Lord" in England or a Senator in the Canadian Parliament, or a federal judgeship in the U.S.) is not prohibited. But, no rights, other than citizenship or a right to an inheritance (in the absence of a will providing otherwise), that is hereditary may be granted. The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time when the Old World still tolerated in the shadow of ancient feudal traditions. As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth. See U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States"). Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 448 U.S. 448, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) dissenting opinion at Footnote 13 (overruled on other grounds). This case discusses citizenship issues. And similarly: Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth. Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes of the law. The Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 427 U.S. 495, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) dissenting opinion at footnote 3. This case discusses illegitimacy discrimination. Some state constitutions use the phrase "no title of nobility or hereditary emolument, shall be passed," which emphasizes the hereditary component. Titles of Nobility confer legal privileges. Titles of Nobility in U.K. law at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, among other things, conferred immunity to a trial by an ordinary jury and instead gave rise to a jury of one's peers (i.e. other nobles of the same rank or higher) if one was charged with a crime. This was enshrined in the Magna Carta of 1215 CE. This logic is still retained on a residual basis in U.S. courts-martial where a court martial proceeding of an officer can only be tried by other officers (who must be of equal or greater rank, if possible). 10 U.S.C. § 825. The historical link between the two concepts is that the British aristocracy derives mostly from grants of feudal rights to members of the conquering Norman army in 1066 CE proportionate to military rank and in accord with military hierarchy with modest modifications over time. The goal of the prohibition of Titles of Nobility was to prohibit titles of nobility that gave someone an unequal status in law in this fashion. So, a mere honorary recognition would be distinguished from a title that gave someone rank and privilege (on a hereditary basis). A dissent in the famous Dred Scott case, to which the birthright citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment enacted less than a decade later was a response, illustrates the concern: It is, in effect, whether the Constitution has empowered Congress to create privileged classes within the States, who alone can be entitled to the franchises and powers of citizenship of the United States. If it be admitted that the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what free persons, born within the several States, shall be citizens of the United States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the control of Congress, it must depend wholly on its discretion. For, certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found in the Constitution, which is wholly silent concerning it; and the necessary consequence is, that the Federal Government may select classes of persons within the several States who alone can be entitled to the political privileges of citizenship of the United States. If this power exists, what persons born within the States may be President or Vice President 60 U.S. 578 of the United States, or members of either House of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress. By virtue of it, though Congress can grant no title of nobility, they may create an oligarchy, in whose hands would be concentrated the entire power of the Federal Government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 15 L.Ed. 691, 60 U.S. 393, 577-578 (1857) dissenting opinion (majority opinion subsequently overruled and superseded by constitutional amendment). In this infamous case: The United States Supreme Court decided 7–2 against Scott, finding that neither he nor any other person of African ancestry could claim citizenship in the United States, and therefore Scott could not bring suit in federal court under diversity of citizenship rules. Moreover, Scott's temporary residence outside Missouri did not bring about his emancipation under the Missouri Compromise, which the court ruled unconstitutional as it would "improperly deprive Scott's owner of his legal property." The primary concern was that the United States not become a monarchy. In the debates of the Federal Convention Benjamin Franklin discusses his "apprehension" that the government of the States may "end in a Monarchy" and describes this possibility as "Catastrophe." See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (1927) at 53. John Dickenson, although noting the merits of limited monarchy, stated: "A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable." Id. at 56-57. Edmund Randolph noted that the "permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy," id. at 58, and argued against a single executive, regarding it "as the foetus of monarchy." Id. at 46. Conclusion Since a Kentucky Colonel, or a Prom King, or an Apple Butter Queen or what have you, are merely honorary without conferring legal rights and privileges, and are not hereditary, they do not constitute true Titles of Nobility in the constitutional sense. This is so even though a Kentucky Colonel is appointed by Letters Patent in a manner that apes the process by which Titles of Nobility were awarded in English law at the time that the Titles of Noblity Clause was enacted.

Why is Supreme Court seeking brief from Attorney General? It's a well-known concept that federal law preempts state law. Apparently, as per LA Times Op-Ed The case against Colorado's pot law, Nebraska and Oklahoma are suing Colorado to invalidate Colorado's recreational marijuana law, since the border cities of some border states have already collected far too many visitors from Colorado in their lock-up facilities. (Some towns/sheriffs even go as far as to claim that Colorado must share Colorado's revenues to allow the neighbouring states to prosecute such Colorado visitors!) The Op-Ed states that the situation is rather clear -- however outdated or incorrect it may be, federal Controlled Substances Act does preempt Colorado Amendment 64 (as well as the similar law of many other states where cannabis is not illegal), even if the previous attorney general, Eric H. Holder Jr., didn't feel like prosecuting anyone (but the office now has a new AG). But why is the Supreme Court asking the Attorney General for a brief? Isn't the law clear enough as it is? Can Colorado use the well-known evidence that the federal law is simply outdated and was never really correct to start with, contradicting medical advice since the start? Likewise, if some states do feel that prosecuting their own citizens who visit Colorado is a worthy pastime for their border cities, why don't they simply put their money where their mouth is, by raising the taxes on their own residents, to make sure their border cities have adequate lock-up facilities? Is the Supreme Court at all allowed to do something like the Jury Nullification here, to declare that the justice would not be served if the outdated federal law was to preempt the realities of the many states?

First off, a court in the United States does not care if the federal law was good policy or bad policy. Courts do not make those decisions. A court cannot strike down a law for being a stupid idea; it can only strike down the law for violating a more fundamental law (i.e. state and federal constitutions, including striking down state laws for going against federal laws). Courts are not in the business of evaluating whether marijuana is dangerous, because that determination was made by Congress. As long as the law itself does not violate the Constitution (and being stupid doesn't make it violate the Constitution), a court cannot strike it down. If a law is validly passed under the Constitution, a court likewise cannot decline to strike down a state law that contradicts it. Valid federal laws preempt state law. This is not seriously disputed by courts. The question before the court is whether or not the CSA forbids Colorado from involving itself in the marijuana business. This is a question about federal law. While the Supreme Court will make the ultimate decision themselves, the US government generally submits an amicus brief on just about every Supreme Court case involving federal laws, outlining its position. The purpose of the brief is to get more arguments, in order to provide more for the court to think about. It is not even a tiny bit unusual for non-parties to submit briefs, and it would be incredibly unusual for the US to not submit one here. The Supreme Court cannot do something like jury nullification*. That's not their role in the world. No Supreme Court decision can say "well, this is the law, and it's clear, but we don't like it and are doing it another way." Their duty is to apply the actual law, not what they want the law to be. What they can do, though, is stretch words and make arguments to fit what they think it should be. Often, in cases they don't want to handle, they end up finding some technical point to avoid setting broad precedent. But they don't get to simply not apply the law because they disagree. * Technically, if they do that, they can't be overturned; however, it's just something that is not done.

Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.

The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges.

This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.

While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.

This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.

Under Article VI of the US Constitution, the federal constitution and valid federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound to apply them regardless of anything in the laws or constitution of any state.* If a state legislature passes a law banning same-sex marriage, a state court is required under the federal constitution to instead apply the federal constitution (as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges) and rule as though same-sex marriage is legal. When it comes to a federal court, things are even easier: a state cannot command a federal court to do anything. A federal court’s authority is laid out in Article III of the federal constitution and in federal statute, which (per Article VI) is supreme over anything in the laws or constitution of any state. There have been times where states attempted to challenge federal supremacy. Normally, this is handled by going to federal court. Decisions in state courts can ultimately be appealed to the US Supreme Court, which can reverse them if they incorrectly applied federal law. Most of the time, that’s the end of matters: when a federal court rules, state officials comply. Occasionally, that’s not enough. If a state disobeys the orders of a federal court, they can be enforced by federal agents. If even that isn’t enough, the President can deploy the armed forces to uphold federal authority. * There are situations which are more complicated, like when something is a federal crime but not a state crime. I can do more research on that if you want, but for now I’m going to leave it at “it’s more complicated.”

What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.

Can a Texas landlord have the rental contract microscopic / unreadable? My landlord in Texas has the whole residential lease contract formatted for Legal paper, but, for whichever reason, they instead print the PDF as zoomed out on Letter, and the whole thing becomes unreadable small print with wide empty stripes left and right ("no text was cut", they proclaim). They claim their procedure was cleared with their legal dept. Is it in fact legal? For example, in California, Sec 1630, has the following provision for some types of contracts: (b) All the provisions of the contract are printed legibly in eight-point type or larger.

Generally, contract terms and conditions must be legible, especially when one is trying to enforce the contract. If the court cannot read the contract as written, it can create its own reasonable terms. According to JD Supra(this is not for a rental lease, but a business opportunity contract): In one instance, a Texas business opportunity contract must have certain information in ten point type, including: the terms of payment; a detailed description of the acts or services that the seller will perform for the purchaser; the seller’s principal business address; the name and address of the seller’s registered agent in Texas; the delivery date; and a description of the nature of the buy-back or security agreement, if there has been one represented by the seller. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 51.201.

Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.

Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary.

Is there any way I can persuade the new landlord to start renting apartment as close as possible to the end of 30-day period? If you already signed a contract with the "immediate move-in" clause, it is going to be difficult to persuade the new landlord. That is because the landlord would have no incentive to postpone his source of income and there is no statute or legal provision available to you on that. If you have not signed the contract, then you two can still negotiate until either party leaves or you reach an agreement. Under contract law, the latter is referred to as knowingly and willfully entering a contract.

Residency under Texas law is determined by various individual laws for different purposes: probate (in case you die), divorce, in-state tuition, voting, fishing licenses. Your question is in the realm of landlord-tenant law, which does apply to one or more rooms uses as a permanent residence, but there is no requirement that the tenant be a "resident" in any legal sense. So that law is applicable no matter when you arrived in Texas.

Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.

A typo in a contract does not ever void the contract. If the typo changes the meaning of the contract from what was actually intended, then it is up to a judge to interpret the contract and whether it is reasonable that a person would assume its intended meaning. In your example, it is obvious that the word "least" was meant to be there and not "lease" - as the alternate word makes no sense in context - so a judge would not void the contract or release you from your 30 day obligation (which is probably even granted to the landlord by local laws regardless of whether it was stated in the contract). Even misspellings of people's names or addresses on a lease do not void a contract if you have already paid or taken up residence. If any of these situations were brought to court, the judge would just amend the contract to a corrected version that would then serve as the contract between the two parties, replacing the version with the typo. This is known as contract reformation.

Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.

Is it legal to directly tie a campaign donation to how a US Congressman votes on a bill? If you had a connection to a congressman, and spoke to him directly, and said vote yes (or no) on a bill and I will give your upcoming campaign $1M dollars, would that be considered legal under US law?

That is quid pro quo corruption and/or bribery, and is a felony. See (inter alia) 18 U.S.C. §201, specifically (c)(1)(A), which imposes a fine or jail to anyone who: directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official

The bill was never passed. According to the list of all actions on Congress.gov, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce in April 2019. Evidently, that subcommittee never did anything further with it. The bill was never voted on by either the House or the Senate.

with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.

Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.

The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress.

No, this isn't legal. Had you authorized the purchase, then it would have been legal; this is similar to a store credit for returns without a receipt. But since you claim they charged you in error and you did not authorize the transaction, then they must refund the money directly to you (unless you agree to another method of compensation). In fact, a direct refund should have been the default unless they gained your permission to receive it in a different form. Why are you unable to contact the company? That seems like the simplest resolution so this.

Yes, money received from Kickstarter campaigns is usually considered taxable income. Who pays the taxes and how much (if any) they pay depends on how much the teenager makes, how old they are, and whether they are claimed as a dependant by someone else. For information about taxing children see IRS Pub. 929. As pointed out in the comments, certain campaign contributions could be considered nontaxable "gifts" by the IRS. There are also taxable gifts but the taxes are paid and reported by the gift giver. You will want to talk to a tax professional about these. It is worth noting that interest on gifts is taxable unearned income unless the gifts were set up under a UGMA trust, which has its own rules. You can deduct most expenses from income, as pointed out in the comments. This too is covered by Pub. 929.

Public Law ##-### is a reference to a slip law -- an actual bill, as passed by Congress and signed (or vetoed, if the veto was overridden) by the President. The first number is the number of the Congress that passed it, the second the number of the law in that Congress. (the "Public" is in contrast with private bills, which are things like "XYZ person, who is otherwise ineligible for citizenship, is a citizen" -- things that affect basically one person). The US Statutes at Large are a compilation of slip laws (both public and private). Each volume has all the slip laws from a session of Congress, at least these days (I'm not sure how it interacts with the first few Congresses before the Statutes at Large existed). Laws there are still often called PL such-and-such, because that just means "law as enacted." If that doesn't line up exactly with the enrolled bill as passed and signed, something has gone wrong that really shouldn't go wrong. If this happens, someone is getting fired. The slip law and Statutes at Large are both official, pretty much irrefutable evidence of any laws of the United States. Laws are passed by Congress, and they contain exactly what was passed. Logical. However, while they're logical, they're also a terrible research tool. If you want to find the law from them, you need to scan through every federal law ever passed. They aren't organized in any way having to do with topic. But there is another way: instead of just saying "everything the legislature has done is the law," you can rearrange those laws by topic and update them as the legislature does things. This is not easy: the legislature is passing things organized by what they're trying to do, and you need to put it all in an order that's based on what the laws actually regulate. There's a lot of editorial judgment involved. But it makes a better research tool to see what the law is. The US Code is the second attempt at that (the first attempt failed). It's made by the House of Representatives Office of Law Revision Counsel, and does not inherently form part of US law. By default, it's merely strong evidence for what US law is; it is not conclusive, and the Statutes at Large takes precedence. This is because codification is hard. However, some titles of the US Code have gone further: the House OLRC cleaned them up and Congress enacted them into law. With the titles where this happened, Congress then passes all laws about them with direct reference to sections of the US Code, the OLRC can't move things around by themselves. The title itself becomes US law. With these titles, the US Code is just like the Statutes at Large: it's identical to the law as passed, and if not then heads will roll. Also, in such cases, the US Code becomes just as official evidence as the Statutes at Large.

What would happen if copyright were extended (almost) indefinitely? In the past, copyright terms have been repeatedly extended, and some people have called for extensions that would effectively make copyright eternal, such as terms of 10.000 years or "forever minus one day". If a law were passed today in the United States extending copyright from its current term of "life of the author + 70 years" to "life of the author + 10.000 years", what exactly would happen? In particular: Would, say, Shakespeare's works (published before the introduction of copyright) leave the public domain? Would works previously under copyright whose original copyright term had already expired gain renewed copyright? If the answer to the second question is yes, what would happen to derivative works of those works?

See Golan v. Holder 565 U. S. ____ (2012). The question was whether Congress could pass a law that caused works in the public domain to regain copyright. The Supreme Court held that: The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application of copyright protection to works in the public domain. ... Historical practice corroborates the Court’s reading of the Copyright Clause to permit the protection of previously unprotected works. So, yes, works can come out of public domain and into Copyright protection. What about people who had been relying on the works not having copyright (i.e. people who had created derivative works, etc.)? That depends on how Congress intends the hypothetical law to apply to them. In the law in question in Golan v. Holder, Congress planned ahead for this, and included provisions for it in the law (quoting from Golan v. Holder): Reliance parties may continue to exploit a restored work until the owner of the restored copyright gives notice of intent to enforce—either by filing with the U. S. Copyright Office within two years of restoration, or by actually notifying the reliance party. After that, reliance parties may continue to exploit existing copies for a grace period of one year. Finally, anyone who, before the URAA’s enactment, created a “derivative work” based on a restored work may indefinitely exploit the derivation upon payment to the copyright holder of “reasonable compensation,” to be set by a district judge if the parties cannot agree. Last, could Congress extend copyright for 10,000 years? In principle, the Supreme Court has not said anything against this, but they have indicated that there is some line beyond which a copyright term would no longer be considered a "limited time" as required by the Constitution. In Golan v. Holder they mention in passing hypothetical successive re-applications of Copyright to a work after it expires, calling it "legislative misbehavior": the hypothetical legislative misbehavior petitioners posit is far afield from the case before us. And in Eldred v. Ashcroft, they mention in passing hypothetical unlimited successive extensions of copyright, each of limited time, again calling that "legislative misbehavior": Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. I could imagine a court holding that the "limited times" clause in the Constitution does not permit Congress to extend copyright for 10,000 years, which is longer than the existence of the U.S. or any countries or even civilizations that the founders were aware of at the time of the Constitution's writing.

The relevant concept is dedicating a work to the public domain, that is, saying in the work something like "This work is dedicated to the public domain". I understand that this isn't entirely reliable in European civil law. The preferred alternative is to license it to the public. However, you have to decide how "free" you want the work to be made. The normal state of affairs, where you do nothing and just rely on copyright law, is that you have the sole right to allow copies to be made and derivative works to be created. Thus if someone were to make a derivative work based on your composition, they would need your permission: but then they would have the right what they created (such as a translation). If you just abandon your property right to the work, you impose no obligation on others, and a person can freely create a translation (which is now their property). If you execute the right public license, you can allow people to use your work as long as they include that license in their versions. A fairly common public licensing scheme is the Creative Commons licenses. That article gives a decent summary of relevant rights and how particular licenses correspond to configurations of permissions. I would say that the most difficult thing to do is to figure out what you don't want to happen, and pick a license that matches that interest.

Regardless of whether the first copyright holder is the author (always a natural person) or an employer (natural or non-natural), the copyright under British law expires 70 years after the death of the author. British law makes a distinction between the author of a work and the owner of a copyright that is not present in U.S. copyright law. This gives the author of the work "moral rights" which are absent in U.S. copyright law and also changes the analysis of how long a copyright lasts. Under Section 9 of the law, the author of the work is always a natural person according to the rules set forth there, and if no natural person can be associated with the work, it is a work of unknown authorship. Section 11 governs who owns a work, not who its author is, so the fact that a work is made for hire under a corporation does not mean that the author of the work is the corporation. Indeed, by definition, the author of the work cannot be a corporation. If no individual can be associated with a corporate work it is simply a work by an unknown author. A work by an unknown author enters the public domain 70 years after it is created, or 70 years after publication if it is first published within 70 years after its creation, pursuant to Section 12. The authorship of a work is fixed under Section 9 at the moment of its creation, so neither the first owner of the copyright (under Section 11) nor an assignment of ownership of the copyright from the author or first copyright owner to someone else (in your scenario where an author transfers ownership of the copyright to a corporation) changes the author of work. Hence, neither the fact that a work is made for hire, nor the fact that the author transfers ownership of the copyright, changes the duration of the copyright.

Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright.

Publication after the author's death is still publication. As you can see in this excellent chart this work is copyrighted for 95 years after the publication date under US law. If it had never been published, it would be protected by copyright for 70 years after the death of Lovecraft, the author (a term which has now expired). However, statements of genealogy would be facts, and as such are not protected by copyright. limited quotes to support those facts would be appropriate in a work of non-fiction, and would normally be permitted as fair use under US law. Such quotes would probably not be appropriate in fiction in any case. The exact wording of the genealogy would probably be protected, but not the relationships (who is the parent of whom, etc).

Did the book have to get permissions and license from the copyright holders of all those creators? Probably not. This probably wouldn't have counted as a covered derivative work entitled to copyright protection and might have amounted to fair use with just mention in the text of a book Would the upcoming movie have had to get fresh licenses for its usage? Yes. It almost certainly did, probably at some considerable expense (although the producers may have already owned the rights to many of them) and there were probably some editorial changes in the characters made as a result of the negotiations to replace expensive licensor demands with less expensive characters. Also, keep in mind that contracts can be creative and often are in the financing of movies. The license was likely for a percentage of profits rather than a flat dollar amount, which was budgeted to be reasonable. No license means no inclusion in the movie and the loss of exposure if not included is an incentive to deal in addition to the license fee as exposure may increase the value of the licensed property if the movie is good.

Under Swedish copyright law, a work such as a movie is protected for 70 years after the death of the "creator". It is unclear who the copyright holder is, but it has not been 70 years since the film was made. Unless it was explicitly "released into the public domain", it is still protected, so you can get sued.

Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)

Advantage in being first to copyleft a new algorithm? Say I have created a new (DSP) algorithm. Will I have some advantage if I open source the algorithm under copyleft licence (GPL etc.)? From what I know about licensing this should lock people out from using the exactly same code as closed source, but would they be able to "rewrite" the algorithm as closed source? Note: I fear this may actually be two separate problems: open sourcing a known algorithm open sourcing a new algorithm I don't really know if the algorithm is new but it has not been released as open source yet. Since I am from the European Union do I need to look for software patents if I wanted to copyleft it?

Algorithms are not subject to copyright. A particular implementation can be copyrighted, but an algorithm itself can't be copyrighted. Someone re-implementing the algorithm with their own code has done nothing to give you copyright claims against their work, and is not bound by any software license you use. That's what patents are for.

In general, unless the license contains a clause which allows it to be modified at a later date through some defined means (publication, revocation of existing license etc) then you are free to continue to use the existing version of the software under the original license terms. So make sure you pin your versions! Look out for clauses such as exists in the GPL which allow the recipient of the distributed binary or code to choose what version of the GPL to apply if the original author does not state (GPLv2 Clause 9) as they then allow recipients to bind you, the distributor, to versions you might not agree with (eg the switch to GPLv3 with its patents clauses).

Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.

My opinion is that the copying of a single API endpoint, "run" that takes a function as an argument is not infringement. I can think of several lines of argument that get to this same conclusion: Originality: It doesn't exhibit the modicum of creativity required by the originality test. (Feist) Short phrases doctrine: It is a short word or phrase, which both the copyright office (Copyright Office Circular, 37 CFR 202.1) and courts (e.g. Hutchins v. Zoll) have declared ineligible for copyright. Merger: The merger doctrine allows reuse of an expression if it is one of only a very few number of ways of expressing an idea. I can't think of many other ways to express a function intended to run a function other than with the verb "run". Scènes à faire: It is not infringement to use an expression if it has become standard, stock, or common in a particular setting. Naming a function "run" is common in the programming community. Any one of these alone would be enough to rule out copyright infringement by taking this individual component of Excel's API. Note: Whether merger and scènes à faire are part of the originality/copyrightability analysis or part of the infringement analysis is not uniform across circuits. For example, the 6th circuit considers both merger and scènes à faire part of the copyrightability analysis. But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat them as part of the infringement analysis and in the 9th circuit, they are affirmative defenses.

There are now 2 works. An original, abandoned work, and a new, derivative work. The original creator owns the copyright over the original, and the new person owns copyright over the derivative he created. In your scenario, it will be the new creator, who will have the right to sue, if the gpl of the new work has been infringed

The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.

Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one.

Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression.

Is it legal to restrict employee restroom access? I went to the toilet at least 4 time a day on my last job. However my boss would restrict access to the bathrooms after 4PM, saying that we could easily hold it until work ends at 5PM. Is that legal?

It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.

The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.

I have the same line in a contract that was just sent to me. So I did some quick research into this. However, I AM NEW TO THE SYSTEM AND DO NOT KNOW IT WELL!!, so please do not act on this information without seeking further advice from the relevant professionals. From what I can gather, the "Arbeitszeitgesetz (ArbZG)" is the law that governs working hours in Germany. Here is a link: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/arbzg/gesamt.pdf I used Google Translate to translate this information and found that in §3 it states that "The default daily working time must not exceed eight hours. It can only be extended up to ten hours if within six calendar months or 24 weeks an average of eight hours working day is not exceeded." This would lead me to believe that even if overtime is not paid as extra on top of your salary, they must give you the time off at another time to keep the average working day to 8 hours. **However, as the working week is Monday - Sat, the average working hours per week may be calculated as 48 hours per week, and not 40! Once again, I am not fully sure of my information, so use at your own risk!!

I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws.

Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.

It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.

It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.

That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.

Am I obligated to sign contracts and fill out paperwork post termination? I was asked to resign from a startup then sometime down the line the company asked me sign the following documents Terms of Resignation Employee Invention Assignment and Confidentiality Agreement 2014 W9 form Some background: I was a contractor in 2013 briefly Has been a full-time employee since after the contracting period I did early exercise some stock options Not all of my stock has been vested If anyone has knowledge or experience on the matter, please enlighten me? For example, do I have any obligation to return these documents? If I do not, are there any negative side effects on my vested stock?

If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.

Contracts do not have to be written and signed on pieces of paper, except in a few cases specified by law. Writing style (ordinary style of talking vs. high-register formulaic language) does not affect the validity or a writing in contract law. You do have something in writing. What matters most is what he actually said (exact words, not your belief of what it must have meant), and how it relates to any existing contractual obligation. For example if the message says "You're fired, turn your badge in at the desk. I'll think about giving you two weeks pay", that's not an enforceable promise. But your existing contract might say "You get 2 weeks severance pay when we fire you", and that can't be walked by by saying "I'll thinking about it". And it also depends on whether there are any laws mandating severance pay (but California does not have any mandatory severance pay law).

could I claim that my product must be added asap? And is it reasonable to ask for compensation for the missed revenue due to pushing back the launch? Unfortunately, no. Your description reflects that you consciously treated as sufficient the limited knowledge you had at the formation of the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). There is no indication that (1) at the formation of the contract the company committed to a more specific timing, or (2) you would have declined the invitation had you known at the formation of the contract that the company would keep postponing the inclusion of your product in the way you describe. You were given the expected date only after you performed your duties pursuant to the contract, which defeats the notion that the company's timing was any relevant to your decision of entering the contract. The only way you could prevail is by proving that the company breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts. See Restatement at §205. Other than that, the lack of contract provisions to protect your interests give the company significant discretion.

This depends on your employment agreement, if any, with the organization, and on the company's contract with the organization. You can quit your job with the organization, giving whatever notice your contract provides. The company can end its contract on whatever terms that contract permits. Most service contracts specify a fixed term, with renewal possible or in some cases automatic if notice to end the contract is not given by some specified date before the renewal date. But many other arrangements are possible. If no term is specified in the contract, and there is no provision for how much notice is required, then the company should give "reasonable" notice, which will probably be in line with the norms and customs of the industry involved in the relevant country. The specific law of that country may or may not provide a required minimum notice period. The contract between the company and the organization might provide that they would not hire any employees or recent ex-employees of the organization without consent for some period, perhaps a year. If there is such a provision it must be complied with unless it is not enforceable under the law of the jurisdiction. Different jurisdictions have very different attitudes toward such contract provisions. If such a provision were violated, and it was enforceable in the jurisdiction, the company would be liable for damages if the organization choose to enforce its contract. The contract between you and the organization might include a provision that you not leave to become employed (within some time limit) by one of the organization's customers, or perhaps by one you had worked with. If there is such a provision, it might or might not be enforceable in your jurisdiction. If it is enforceable, you must comply or be liable for damages. Even if there are no contract provisions preventing such employment of you by the company, you must not without permission take with you and use for the company's benefit any confidential information that is the property of the organization and is not already known to the company through legitimate means. If you do, both you and the company might be liable for damages under trade secret law. In the absence of any enforceable contractual provisions, and if no confidential information is taken by you, there should be no legal problems. The moral issues I am in no position to offer an opinion on, and are off-topic here anyway. If you were to quit, and the company were to then seek to break its contract because, in your absence the organization could not provide proper service, and you were then to accept employment with they company, and if further the company had known of your plans, both you and the company might be liable for damages to the organization, depending non the details of the law in your jurisdiction. This could be a tort of "interference with a contractual relation" or something of the sort. You should be very careful in agreeing to any such procedure. If there is a question as to whether a provision of a contract between the organization and either you or the company in enforceable, or whether a provision prohibits you leaving the organization to be employed by the company, that would need to be addressed by a lawyer who knows this area of the law in your jurisdiction, and the specifics of the contract, or eventually by a court. It is out of scope for this forum. Nothing in this situation will be a problem if the organization agrees to whatever is done. All possible problems occur only if it does not agree, and claims to have a legal right to prevent it or seek damages.

It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders.

I'll assume you are salaried full time exempt in the U.S. in an at-will, right-to-work state and are covered by a standard "employee handbook". This has been developed by you, employee, to assist in doing your job, employment, for your company, employer, using time, materials and information belonging at least partially to your employer. Since creating it, you gave it to other employees and have accepted management directives to continue work on the software as part of your full-time job. This is the company's software now. Your best bet is to support it like crazy, make it a big deal and ride it as high as it will take you in the company. Ask for a raise, ask for a promotion, get references and put it as an accomplishment on your resume. But you can't sell it or take it away from your employer. That ship has sailed. You can still greatly benefit from your work (at your employer's discretion) and learn from it for next time.

If two parties agree to the terms of an exchange, then there exists an enforceable contract. A signature is not needed to create a contract. However, an intent to negotiate a contract is not, per se, a contract. Absent some specific and explicit measures (which for major deals may be codified in an MOU or LOI that itself contains contractual terms), if you can't reach an agreement on terms then there is no contract. It's up to the particulars of "the verbal agreement to start the hiring process" whether an agreement on exchange has been reached, or merely proposed. E.g., "You and I agree that I will pay you $X in exchange for Y due Z" is a contract. "You and I agree that we'd like to work together, and we'll hammer out the terms X, Y, and Z by the end of the week" is merely a proposal to contract, not an actual contract. Of course, this doesn't mean you're immune to liability for failing to reach a contract in this hypothetical: you can always be sued!

The eBay user agreement contains this clause: In our sole discretion, we may assign this User Agreement, by providing notice of such assignment in accordance with the Notices Section. The current PayPal agreement says: You may not transfer or assign any rights or obligations you have under this Agreement without PayPal's prior written consent. PayPal reserves the right to transfer or assign this Agreement or any right or obligation under this Agreement at any time. It's a good bet that every user agreement you ever clicked on had a similar clause. What do these clauses mean? They mean that when eBay spins off a new company, they can assign their rights, and your duties, under the contract to the new company. Your assumption that a new user agreement is required is incorrect.

Citations of the Declaration of Independence I know that the Declaration of Independence is generally not considered law, per se. But have its principles ever been cited in the reasoning for a ruling?

The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

Yes The case you want to know about is Cohen v. California: A young man was arrested for wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" and SCOTUS decided, that that was First Amendment-protected speech and the arrest illegal. The phrase מנא מנא תקל ופרסין is in Akkadian or Aramaic language but Hebrew script (as opposed to the Akkadian Cuneiform) and can be transcribed as Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin. It is also known in German as "Menetekel" or in English as the "Writing on the wall". It stems from the biblical episode of Belshazzar's feast. Literally, the text would be read as "counted, counted, weighed, distributed". Its meaning elaborated in Daniel 5 is generally understood as "Your days are numbered; Your days are numbered; You have been measured and found wanting; Your kingdom will fall and be divided". While stemming from religious texts, in the depicted situation it is more likely meant as political speech, and in that fashion indistinguishable from a flag. It also does not call for imminent lawless action - the so-called Brandenburg Test after Brandenburg v Ohio - and thus remains in the protected speech area. Remember, that even preaching genocide can be First amendment protected, as long as that line of imminent lawless action is not overstepped. As this phrase does neither, it is protected speech.

No, there is no obligation to repeal It is common for statutes held to be unconstitutional to be left on the books decades later, and for others which quite likely would be so held if anyone tried to enforce them to be similarly left for even longer periods. It is somewhat less common for state constitutional provisions, but it does happen, and as those commonly take more than a simple legislative act, there is even less motivation to go through the troublesome process in such cases. There are even a few provisions in the US constitution which have become obsolete, but not actually amended away. For example, the so-called 'three-fifths compromise', which counted slaves as worth 3/5ths of a person for computing representation, was effectively repealed by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, but was not formally removed. That section was actually formally replaced by the 14th.

The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant.

The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1869 that states may not unilaterally secede. The state litigant in the case was Texas. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_v._White

The earliest I know of is Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (N.C. Super. 1787), which dealt with a North Carolina statute that confiscated land held by British subjects and required the courts to dismiss any lawsuits attempting to reclaim confiscated property. The North Carolina Superior Court held that because the state constitution conferred a right to a jury on questions of property ownership, the legislature could not require the courts to dismiss lawsuits requesting such a resolution to property disputes: By the Constitution every citizen has a right to a decision in regard to his property by a trial by jury. The act of Assembly, therefore, of 1785, requiring the Court to dismiss on motion the suits brought by persons whose property had been confiscated against the purchasers, on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchasers from the commissioners of confiscated property, is unconstitutional and void. So the British subject was entitled to a trial, but the admission that he was a British subject meant that he was an alien and enemy of the government, and therefore not permitted to hold property.

This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.

The concept of law predates writing. "Law" refers not only to the system of rules, as your definition notes, but to the individual rules making up that system (for example, there is a law that prohibits theft). An act is, more generally than the definition you quote, a thing that is done (for example, someone who is discovered committing a crime can be said to have been "caught in the act.") This also does not depend on writing. In our literate times, however, when a legislature (or any body, such as a corporate board of directors), wants to achieve something, someone writes a description of a proposed result. When the body makes a formal decision to adopt the written document (by a vote, for example), it is deciding to do the thing described in the document; that is, it is deciding to act. Typically, for a legislature, the thing it's doing is to create, modify, or repeal a law. It's not very difficult to see how a document that describes a legislature's desire to act came to be called an act. In some contexts, however, it can also be called a law. So the word law can refer to the entire system (as in law school), to a particular act (as in the legislature passed a law today called the XYZ Act), or indeed to a particular rule or section of an act (as in the law in question is subparagraph 2(B)(ii)(b) of the XYZ Act). Law can also refer to case law, of course, or regulatory law, so we tend to use statutory law or statute to denote the laws created through the legislative process. In conclusion, the word "law" has several related meanings, so its use can be imprecise. When speaking about specific paragraphs, precision may be in order. In a case like this, where a paragraph create exceptions to rules laid out in a preceding paragraph, it doesn't make a lot of sense to describe each paragraph as a "law." The numbered items in statutory text can be called many things, and usually have different names depending on the level at which they are found. So I would not know whether these are sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, or something else. If I were unable to find the correct terminology for (in this case) India, would probably use a generic term like "items."

What if a person cannot find a lawyer willing to fight against a powerful party? Hereafter, for concision, I use the noun `leviathan' to mean a magisterial, mighty party that can retaliate against lawyers. I restrict this question to First World countries (e.g., the UK), which I assume can protect lawyers from such leviathans. Suppose: A commoner suffers an injustice at the hands of a leviathan, and wishes to take legal action. The threat posed by the leviathan, prevents the victim from finding a lawyer willing to represent his case. What can this victim do? Does the law offer or guarantee him any assistance?

There should be no more lawyers in an event such as that described by the OP. The Legal Profession, by its own constitution, exists to ensure that everybody can access our adversarial justice system through a diligent and competent advocate. For example, among the responsibilities stipulated by the American Bar Association: [A]ll lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. There are famous examples of lawyers, perhaps reluctantly and even at their personal peril, honoring their professional obligation to advocate in court on behalf of unpopular people and causes. One that comes to mind is John Adams defending the British soldiers who perpetrated the Boston Massacre. Of course, lawyers are people too so I wouldn't be surprised if there are counterexamples. But there shouldn't be any counterexamples unless every last lawyer in a jurisdiction resigned his professional membership and hung his head in shame.

france Yes, both for civil and criminal law, but in different ways. The general principle of civil law in France (and I believe every civil-legal-system jurisdiction) is that one is liable for any damage they cause through fault. Of course, details differ greatly between what is considered a damage, what are the standards to prove causation or fault, etc. Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 2, 18 janvier 2018, 16-28.392 specifically endorsed a lower court reasoning that distinguished between préjudice moral (moral damage) and préjudice psychologique (psychological damage). The latter is about quantifiable medical damage (even if mental rather than physical), while the former covers grave breaches of wellbeing. In the case at hand, a couple was assassinated when their child was two years old; the child later developed severe psychic disorders as a result of the trauma; it was found that a compensation for the préjudice moral of losing his parents at a young age did not foreclose a later suit for the préjudice psychologique of developing mental troubles (which became visible much later in his life). To be honest, I would be extremely surprised if any jurisdiction recognized no cause of action for any type of psychological damage. There might be issues of burden of proof etc. such that in practice suing for psychological damage is unviable, but a complete bar on any civil action predicated on psychic damage seems unthinkable. Regarding criminal law, many assault-type crimes are scaled by gravity. That gravity is evaluated by days of "complete inability to work" (search incapacité totale de travail through that section of the penal code). While the notion has been standardized by work law cases, it also applies outside a work context when the damage prevents one from doing basic life actions (children, retirees or the unemployed can be subject to a "complete inability to work"). Whether the damage that caused it was physical or mental is irrelevant. Two notes though: physical damage resulting from assault is more easily quantified by that scale than mental damage. If a mob boss breaks your bones, you spend one month in the hospital, and then you get out roughly healed; it’s easy to say that it cost you one month of your life. If the same mob boss kills your wife in a gruesome manner, you might be haunted for life, but still be able to work, feed yourself etc., past one or two days of shock. "Low-level", long-lasting damage is not well-measured that way. quantifying the duration of a "complete inability to work" depends on the victim’s active cooperation with the prosecution (such as going to see a doctor to get a certificate). That is possible because the civil and criminal causes of actions are usually joined in a single trial, during which the victim will try to prove injury. (It is possible for the victim to open a separate civil trial, but that’s usually not a good idea. The same exact remedies are available by joining in the criminal trial; usually the prosecutor has the same goals as you in proving the facts, so why not let them do it and save some lawyer fees?) It would probably not be reasonable in a common-law system with separate trials. It also breaks down in certain cases (e.g.: in a good fraction of spousal abuse cases, the victim refuses to testify against the accused).

Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).

You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel.

It's no fantastic legal source, and rules may vary in different countries, but from the Wikipedia article on Attorney client privilege: Lawyers may also breach the duty where they are defending themselves against disciplinary or legal proceedings. A client who initiates proceedings against a lawyer effectively waives rights to confidentiality. This is justified on grounds of procedural fairness—a lawyer unable to reveal information relating to the retainer would be unable to defend themselves against such action. In other words, if the client's lie is related to one of the lawyer's interests (for example, if the client sues the attorney for malpractice based on the advice he was given), the lawyer can break privilege on his own behalf, thus testifying that his client lied. As to the specific case you brought up, I would say that privilege wouldn't protect the client from the lawyer discussing things never brought up. In other words, we could force the attorney to testify, since one of two things is true: The attorney really did give him that advice, in which case the client has already voluntarily given up his right to confidentiality by describing what was said between them, or The lawyer never gave him that advice, and privilege wouldn't protect a conversation between the two that never transpired.

Good Samaritan laws are not applicable to the facts Good Samaritan laws give a person civil immunity if they render aid in good faith and that aid turns out to do harm. For example, in a person incorrectly performs CPR in a genuine effort to save a life, Good Samaritan laws prevent them for being sued if the cause damage or fail to save the life. The legal paradigm in your facts is self-defence The doctrine of self-defence extends to the protection of others and allows the use of reasonable force to do so. If a jury considers that the choke hold was a reasonable response to the situation and the maintenance of it to the point of death was also reasonable then the defendant will be not guilty. There would be a lot of evidence around this and it’s difficult to see how this would go. However, for a more straightforward situation, if the defendant verbally challenged the attacker, the attacker persisted in the attack, the defendant struck the attacker, the attacker fell and cracked their skull and died, this is likely to be self-defence. Self-defence does not prevent prosecution. It is a defence that can be raised. Of course, if it seems likely that self-defence will succeed, that may be enough to dissuade the police/prosecutor from proceeding anyway.

Lawyers may break confidentiality with client permission. You can also break your own confidentiality and talk to the prosecutor yourself. The prosecutor's response is up to the prosecutor; however, they tend to not be super excited about giving immunity to a witness for the defense if they might want to prosecute the witness later (and courts often are fine with that), so the more they suspect about your true role the less likely they are to grant it. No. If the feds later find truly independent evidence (they have the burden of showing it's truly independent), they can prosecute. Some states give transactional immunity to witnesses (you can't be prosecuted for crimes you testified about for any reason), but the Fifth Amendment doesn't require it and at least the feds aren't bound by state transactional immunity. It's hard to prosecute, but is possible if prosecutors play their cards right. Yes, it does allow civil liability. There is no right against self-incrimination in civil matters, only criminal liability. If the forced testimony leads to a lawsuit that bankrupts you, too bad.

I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.

Why do VISA and MasterCard comply with U.S. sanctions that erode their business? On what basis does the U.S. government prohibit American companies like VISA, MasterCard, PayPal, et al, from doing business on the Crimean Peninsula? Crimea is connected with, and backed by, the whole of Russia, which in turn is connected with China, with both being part of BRICS. The fact that Visa and MasterCard could not be used all across Russia would naturally make Russian banks start transitioning to more friendly payment processors like Sberbank's Pro100 and China's UnionPay. This, in turn, will simply erode the influence that American companies have across the whole of Russia (and also across the globe as more people switch to UnionPay, which is nowadays accepted in a whole lot of places including America), not simply the small area actually subject to the sanctions. Aren't all of these companies like VISA and MasterCard actually incorporated in the Bahamas, etc., anyways? Why do they comply with the request for sanctions? What would happen if they don't comply? What would they have to do to not be legally required to comply? See also: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-06/the-biggest-loser-from-russia-sanctions-visa The Chinese experience inspires Putin's advisers: UnionPay, whose cards are accepted in 135 countries, is now bigger than Mastercard and second only to Visa in processing volume.

Visa is incorporated in Delaware. So is MasterCard. In addition, both are headquartered in the US, have huge quantities of assets in the US, do lots and lots of business in the US in a highly regulated sector, and their very existence depends on their ability to interact with the US banking system. The US has the authority to regulate all of these things, under literally any definition of sovereignty. Therefore, they must comply with sanctions.

It’s legal under Ukrainian law for foreign nationals to join their defense forces Indeed, this is so common it may be considered the default position internationally: the US, UK, France, and Australia just to name a few all allow this. Generally, it’s usually legal for a citizen to join the army of a foreign state. It is usually not legal to fight for a non-state actor this is where fighters for ISIS are in trouble. Where issues arise is if they take up arms against the country of their citizenship. That’s called treason and it usually attracts the most severe punishment available: death or life imprisonment typically. So, as long as you aren’t Russian and are not from one of the few countries that prohibits foreign military service, there are no legal issues.

Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.

There is no provision allowing monopolization "for the good of the consumer", regardless of your standards for judging that. The law simply says Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. It is not clear what actually counts as a violation is the law: it's not the fact of being the only game in town, per se, it's what you do that might bring that about, it's doing so through improper means. The Dept. of Justice, which may prosecute a case, has guidance on what the law could mean, in particular, the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident As you describe it, this is a clear violation of the law. "Noble intentions" is not a valid defense to prosecution. However, prosecution is discretionary, so a favorable government could reach an agreement to not prosecute, as was the case with AT&T (before WWI, not the breakup). Further however, under 15 USC 15c a state attorney general can also bring a civil suit against a monopolizer, so you'd have to get a lot of agreement to not take legal action.

You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC.

The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.

Maybe this changes something, maybe not. But at first glance, yes, avoiding US-based vendors does help comply with Schrems II. They need not be EU-based. Definition of an international data transfer The GDPR unfortunately does not define what an international transfer is, and just explains when they may be lawful: Art 44: Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country […] shall take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward transfers of personal data from the third country […] to another third country […]. […] This has been interpreted, in particular by the official EU SCCs and by EDPB guidance, to imply two roles: the data exporter, and the data importer. Per those EDPB guidelines, a transfer occurs when three criteria are fulfilled together: The data exporter is subject to GDPR (e.g. as a controller via Art 3, or as a processor via an Art 28 data processing contract). The exporter discloses or makes available personal data to the importer. The importer is in a "third country" (for EU GDPR: anything outside the EU/EEA). Note that these importer/exporter aspects are independent from roles like "controller" or "processor". It also does not depend on where in the world the exporter is situated. Applying this to your scenario How does this apply to your scenario? I am assuming Alice Inc is subject to the GDPR (criterion #1). Now, Alice Inc can process personal data, and that's not an international transfer, even if Alice Inc is in the US (or any other third country). The general GDPR rules apply, such as the requirement to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of processing operations. If Alice Inc engages data processors to process personal data on Alice Inc's behalf, then this would fulfil criterion #2 (disclosure to a third party). For example, hosting providers generally act as data processors. Any other kind of data sharing (e.g. to other data processors) would also fall under this category. Tricky in an US context: while employees would be agents of Alice Inc and would not be separate recipients, contractors/freelancers would also be potential data importers. If those data importers are based in the EU/EEA, then criterion #3 is not fulfilled and there's no international transfer. For example, using an EU-based hosting providers would sidestep Chapter V of the GDPR completely. If those data importers are based outside of the EU/EEA, then criterion #3 is triggered and we have an international transfer. Lawfulness of international data transfers When there is an international transfer, it must be adequately protected. In order of decreasing priority: country has an EU adequacy decision appropriate safeguards for a group of companies: Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) Art 49 specific situations What SCCs and BCRs do is to translate enough of the GDPR from statutory law into a contract to ensure adequate protection. But to be effective, they must actually be enforceable, and the data importer must actually be able to comply with those rules. In Schrems II, the CJEU found that the US (at that time) did not offer an adequate level of data protection, and that SCCs are probably invalid as well since importers cannot comply with both the SCCs and with US surveillance laws. Before using SCCs, it is effectively necessary to perform a transfer impact assessment (TIA) analyzing, among other things, the legal context of the importer's country. It may be possible to defuse this, for example by using supplemental security measures like end-to-end that prevent unlawful use of the data even if it falls into the wrong hands. However, such measures also tend to prevent intended use, especially in a cloud context. In the DPC Ireland decision against Meta Ireland (PDF), the DPC finds: 7.202 In summary, therefore, I am satisfied (and I so find) that: (1) US law does not provide a level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that provided by EU law; (2) Neither the 2010 SCCs nor the 2021 SCCs can compensate for the inadequate protection provided by US law; and (3) Meta Ireland does not have in place any supplemental measures which would compensate for the inadequate protection provided by US law. 7.203 Accordingly, in making the Data Transfers, I find that, subject to the analysis contained at Section 8 below, Meta Ireland is infringing Article 46(1) GDPR. Implications of using non-US vendors As already mentioned, using EU-based data processors avoids the international transfer problem due to the way how international transfers are defined. Even if an international transfer occurs, that might not be a problem. Some countries have an EU adequacy decision, for example Canada, Israel, or South Korea. While there would nominally be an international data transfer that needs to be disclosed e.g. in a privacy notice, there is no additional bureaucracy required. In other countries, transfer tools like SCCs might work. A TIA might show that that the issues discussed in the Schrems II decision and the DPC decision wouldn't apply there. But isn't that a contradiction? You correctly point out a problem with the GDPR's approach to data transfers: This would however have little effect on the access to the data, in that if US law enforcement turned up at the offices of Alice Inc. they could be required to hand over the data and their access to the data will not be changed in any way by the location of the web hosting. Yes, this is arguably a loophole. However: If the US-based Alice Inc is a data processor in behalf of another controller, that controller would likely be violating the GDPR by transferring personal data to Alice. If Alice Inc is a data controller: while this might not be a violation of the Chapter V rules on international data transfers, such a scenario could be argued to be an Art 24 or Art 32 violation instead (requirement to ensure compliance and security). When Alice Inc transfers personal data to data importers, that is less visible to data subjects, and outside of their immediate control. However, when Alice Inc collects data on data subjects, that is more visible to data subjects, in particular through an Art 13 or Art 14 privacy notice. That notice must also contain the identity of the data controller, which would disclose that Alice is US-based, which may enable to data subjects to make more informed choices. This won't help Meta While moving to non-US data processors can be a sensible compliance approach for many companies, it is less useful for multinationals like Meta. In this context, Meta is an Irish data controller who engages platform and development services from an American company. Even if Meta Ireland tries to perform all GDPR-covered processing activities outside the US, it's actual corporate structure situates some processing activities such as administration tasks in the US and other third countries. If my above analysis is correct, it would have been easier for Meta to comply with GDPR if the US-based Meta company were the data controller.

The original order was recently extended: that order relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, U.S Code. The order does not specifically mention Huawei, but the inclusion of Huawei is a result of determinations by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies This is analogous to orders to not trade with Iran. If business X has absolutely no connection to the US, then an order for X to not do business with some other entity is effectively unenforceable. However, TSMC does do business in the US, for example is is listed on the NYSE, and it does business with many US companies. Jurisdiction exists when a government claims jurisdiction. Enforcement exists where a government can force its will on others, the US can’t enforce its will on China or Huawei but it can on companies operating or based in the US.

What is the state of intellectual property when the owner goes bankrupt? A company makes a great game called "AwesomeGame" that costs 20€. They sell thousands of copies of the game, but ultimately go bankrupt. What is the status of the game at that point? Do any intellection-property rights or protections of it still exist?

A bankrupt company's assets are transferred to its creditors. This includes intangible assets such as trademarks, copyrights, and other intellectual property. Whoever ends up with the rights to the game can continue to market and distribute it, or use legal means to prevent others from doing so.

Copyright is hard. The movie has a copyright, and so has its ship model. This is the original copyright. The boardgame has a token. That thing has its own copyright, no matter if it's a parody of another thing or not. The copyright holder might not be the boardgame maker, but it is under copyright. In any way, parody is fair use, so no harm here. The model has a copyright, but also infringes on the film's copyright as it is a derivative of the film. If the film copyright holder wants, they can have it taken down and sue the maker. In any way, this model is available under a specific license. The model license is clearly Non Commercial. The CC-A-NC license can't be changed to one that is commercial. You can only add more No categories. The questions: 1 - No. Your work is a derivative work of both the model AND the boardgame. You don't parody the boardgame. 2 - You need a license from not one but at least two sources: the model author and the boardgame copyright holder. You might even need a license from the original film company. 3 - YES. He made the model, he can license it as he wants, but the license might be ineffective: He might have coverage under an explicit fan license with the movie company to make the model (allowing sharing under such other license) or not (when it might be silent acceptance of fan works, am implicit license or just plain lack of knowledge of the infringing model) - determining if the company wants to pursue is not your legal battle. Your battle is more likely with the copyright holder (of movie and boardgame) anyway because you lack a valid license from them. "I used this infringing model and breached the license I got it under" is... a very precarious point in court. 4 - No. You used the other work, you can't get out of the CC-A-NC license by altering the item. It'll always be a derivative work of the model you put in. You only get copyright in the changes. The resulting item has shared copyright with the original model maker. He gave you a license to do that, but the unbreakable condition unless you get a different license is: You can't ever sell this, you HAVE to tell them that I was part of this design.

No. These companies seem to be saying that they are entitled to sell music under some sort of mandatory licensing agreement authorized by the law of the Ukraine, or by a licensing agreement specific to the Ukraine. Even if this were true, it would only give them the right to distribute the files in the Ukraine. If an American, sitting in the U.S., makes a digital copy of a file on a Ukrainian server by copying it to his or her U.S. hard drive, they have to have a license to do so issued either by the U.S. copyright holder or authorized by U.S. law. A license to distribute in the Ukraine doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. A Ukrainian statute doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. If the end user doesn't have that license, he or she is violating the copyright holder's rights and may be civilly or criminally liable. There is no scienter requirement for copyright infringement. In fact, it's not at all clear that any Ukrainian site is operating even under this dubious legal cover. This report on Ukrainian licensing agencies by an industry group claims that many Ukrainian licensing authorities are actually scams that have no rights to distribute music under any license--one of the "rogue licensing agencies" discussed is Avtor, referenced in your first example. There is some legal confusion over what group does have permission to license music and collect royalties in the Ukraine, but it's clear that Avtor doesn't, and it certainly doesn't have permission to distribute them in the U.S. If a guy came up to you on the street and told you he had written permission from Disney to videotape their latest movies with a camcorder and sell them to you for a dollar, are you violating the law if you buy it? The answer is yes, and it's the same for these Ukrainian sites.

Adding to what Martin Bonner said: If you are a startup, and your grand plan is to be bought by a big company for a lot of money, and that big company thinks your use of React makes it risky to buy you, then you will lose out. It doesn't matter whether there is a risk, what matters is whether a potential buyer believes there is a risk. And if that is your plan, then you need to re-read Martin's answer from the point of view of a bigger company. You may not have any valuable patents, but that bigger company might. If I have an LLC with no money, then I can say "I don't care if Facebook sues me for 100 millions, I'll just let the LLC go bankrupt and start another one". If the company is worth millions or more, then the risk is much higher.

The details of this specific matter are not clear because it appears that Mane6 relented in response to a cease and desist letter, rather than be dragged through court. Since we are not privy to the letter from Hasbro, the best we can do is guess based on the degrees of freedom that exist under the law. The claim that this game was a "parody" is an affirmative defense that Mane6 would have to raise in response to a copyright infringement claim (we don't know if there were also trademark infringement claims in the letter). Then the jury would look at the arguments of the two sides to determine whether this was really "fair use", performing the "balancing act" to see how much of the original work was copied, how transformative the derived work is, what the effect on market would be. The lines drawn for making these judgments are not bright. A quick scan of a successor product Them's Fightin' Herds suggest that someone thought the artwork was too substantially similar to the Hasbro product, that is, the fighting pony version was judged to not be transformative enough. Since it didn't go to court, we'll never know.

Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.

How much street space can restaurants occupy? In Paris, France, what define how much street space can a restaurant occupy?

According to the document Reglement des etalages et terrasses, page 15, such installations may not exceed 50% of the usable area of the sidewalk, and must leave a contiguous area of at least 1.6 meters in width for pedestrian traffic: Les installations peuvent être autorisées, soit d’un seul tenant, soit scindées, sans pouvoir excéder 50% de la largeur utile du trottoir. Une zone contiguë d’au moins 1,60 mètre de largeur doit être réservée à la circulation des piétons. If you are interested in looking directly at the laws concerned, these can be found at the beginning of the same document: Les dispositions du présent règlement sont établies en application des articles L.2122-1 à L.2122-3 du code général de la Propriété des personnes publiques, L.2512-13, L.2512-14 et L.2213-6 du code général des Collectivités territoriales et de l’article L.113-2 du code de la Voirie routière. Roughly translated, that means that the rules described in the present document are established by application of the articles L.2122-1 through L.2122-3 of the "general code of property of public persons", L.2512-13, L.2512-14 and L.2213-6 of the "general code of territorial collectivities" and of article L.113-2 of the highway code. More links: L.2122-1 L.2122-2 L.2122-3 L.2512-13 L.2512-14 L.2213-6 L.113-2

Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.

Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.

The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.

Reading those clauses, you can see that you can park in an emergency. You can park with your vehicle dies and you can't move it. You can park if it is specifically allowed (maybe a sign saying "unrestricted parking allowed here"). Otherwise, you may park on a parking lane (or roadway, or shoulder) but subject to conditions also listed: "unless there is a clear passage for other motor vehicles, and your vehicle can be seen for 60 metres (200 feet) along the roadway in both directions". Regardless of the name of the piece of road, you are allowed to park there but only if your car is clearly visible, and there is room to get around you.

In the US, courts have generally held that your property rights do not extend into the sky without limit. In UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY et ux. The Supreme Court ruled that the skies above a certain altitude were a public highway. The federal government currently holds that navigable airspace starts at 500 feet from the ground, so above that altitude the FAA gets to regulate how you use them. That would include any limitations on the use of autonomous drones. The situation is in flux though, and the proliferation of small inexpensive drones is putting the issue before the courts again.

Is it discrimination? Yes, because discrimination is a broad term that covers any situation where someone might reserve something under specific criteria. In this case, it sounds like the restaurant reserves tables for people who will be eating. If you'e only having coffee, they only allow you in a certain section. Unless you live in some city with a very strange law that prevents discrimination based on what you plan to order, there is nothing illegal about doing that. Discriminating based on your order is not a protected class by the federal government. If you're trying to claim that you were discriminated against based on race, you have to actually prove that happened somehow. Based on your summary of the situation, it doesn't sound like that is what happened. Simply being of another race does not automatically qualify it as racial discrimination. As an example, finding proof might involve asking or looking around to see if "tables are for people ordering food only" is an established restaurant policy that applies to everyone. If there's a sign up somewhere, then it's clear they were just following a policy.

In general, you don’t need an alternative defence. It is inherent in the common law that, unless the statute is explicitly retroactive (and legislators are reluctant to go there) it cannot make illegal that which was at the time of the act, legal. For example, assume the old sign had unlimited and the new sign reduces this to 2 hours. If you parked before the sign was changed you could leave your car there forever so long as you never move it. The NYC law give further rights - a period of grace where the owner can rely on the old restriction as a defense, even if they parked after the sign had been changed.

My company handed me a letter today telling me I owe them money because they overpaid me. Do I legally have to pay them? I work an hourly job. I got a letter today telling me that they overpaid me and I owe them money. My job pays minimum wage and I'm not sure how they "overpaid" me, their computers pay me per second that I work. I can view the hours I've worked in the past but they're on a website that my company owns so I'm not sure if they're 100% legitimate. The company is large, there's a few thousand stores nationwide, so it's not a mom-and-pop shop. I turned in my two weeks one week ago, so they most likely knew about this before but didn't tell me. They haven't taken any money out of my account yet and I put a block on direct withdraws. However, I'm worried they will just take it out of my last paycheck. My question is, do I actually owe them money?

Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck

Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.

UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good.

The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.

There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.

The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.

This answer is for the US (at least). You're assuming that if income is not in dollars or some other national currency, then it is not taxable. That is false. "Barter" income, in which you are paid in other property or services, is taxable just as if you were paid in cash, based on the "fair market value" (in dollars) of the property or services you received in exchange. See https://www.irs.gov/publications/p525/ar02.html#en_US_2016_publink1000229343. So the employees would be required to report the dollar value of their scrip as income. If they willfully failed to do so, or intentionally gave a dishonest estimate of its value, they could be prosecuted for tax evasion. Obligatory: https://xkcd.com/1494/ Dale M suggests, in a comment below, that the same rule applies in all other countries. This seems plausible, but to be certain, one would have to check them all, which I haven't done.

Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.

Are there any federal laws in the United States regulating non-digital billboards? Billboards can be quite a distraction to drivers, and some cities have banned digital billboards. However, I haven't been able to find any information on non-digital billboards, which don't seem to be significantly less distracting in many cases. Are there any federal laws regulating non-digital billboards to lessen distractions for drivers? I ask for federal laws because of applications to interstate highways. I don't know if any regulations would be applied by states or by the federal government, since billboards by the boundary of a state can distract drivers on both sides of the state line.

For interstate and federal highways at least, there are regulations. For example, the billboards in Times Square are illegal. But it turns out this billboard, and others plastering Times Square, may actually be illegal. Under a federal highway beautification law, the billboards are too big – the law states that [billboards] should not be larger than 1200 square feet. Last week, the city’s transportation commissioner said the billboards may have to be taken down, or New York could risk losing ten percent of its federal highway funds. The Highway Beautification Act and various amendments can be referenced here.

In April 2017, a US District court on Colorado ruled that a law prohibiting women from exposing their breasts in public was an unconstitutional discrimination against women. The law was ordinance 134 passed by Fort Collins, Colorado in May 2016. The group opposing it was led by the activist organization "Free the Nipple." This ruling is not binding in other states, however. See this Snopes report for more details. The case is being appealed to the Tenth Circuit. A similar ordinance has been taken to state court in New Hampshire on similar grounds as described in this AP story and this US News story A similar claim in Illinois in 2017 resulted in a law against 'public indecency" being upheld (in Tagami v. City of Chicago) at the Federal Appeals Court level, according to this Reason story A similar law in Ocean City, Maryland, was challenged in federal court in the summer oif 2018 according to this news story. in 1991 in United States v. Biocic the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a similar law against a similar challenge. This Munknee article lists states where a woman going topless is legal and illegal. According to a Time Article (which gives a similar list): The vast majority of states actually have laws on the books making clear that women can’t be arrested under state law solely for being topless in settings where it’s OK for men. But many local ordinances ban the practice anyway. In short, it is not yet fully settled if there is a US constitutional right for a woman to go topless, and state and local laws vary widely. Local laws do not always conform to the laws of the state, but would probably require a court challenge to enforce the state law. Laws in other countries will vary, but many places ban such exposure.

S88 Closing roads and public places: ...totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place... S91(1)(a) Power to give directions: direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency That is what "this Act otherwise provides"; S6 that you cited only works "unless": Unless this Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties, or powers of any person under the provisions of any enactment or any rule of law. Also, from another angle, "functions, duties, or powers" are not the same thing as "rights": the Act does not limit the former (unless provides otherwise), but nowhere does it say it does not limit the latter.

Short answer: tinted windows are banned in most of Mexico, and rolling down the windows (at least the front windows) should keep you out of trouble in >99% of cases. Long answer: First, the law (mirror) seems to say that tinted windows are forbidden in most (all?) Mexico: [In all] Mexico, tinted windows are prohibited. They are banned. Except some tinted windows made by manufacturers. http://forums.bajanomad.com/viewthread.php?tid=46637: This article says the Mexican federal highway police will now be confiscating cars with tinted windows so dark that they cannot see inside, until the owners remove the polarizing paper. This is in accordance with Article 13 of the federal tranportation rules. It does not say what will happen with cars with factory tinting, since that cannot be removed. Second, on the enforcement of this law, it is sometimes enforced: TIJUANA – Hundreds of drivers have been stopped in Tijuana and ordered to remove after-market tint from the windows of their vehicles this week after a new law intended to help reduce crime went into effect. More sources. The enforcement seems very random. I did witness it myself that it is still currently enforced, at least in Tijuana. Regarding the effectiveness of rolling down one's windows to avoid triggering the police, http://www.city-data.com/forum/san-diego/321508-warning-message-those-who-driving-their.html says: I talked with the Police at the Ocho Street station last week. When driving in Tijuana, rolling down your front windows is OK for a tourist. Do it as you approach the border and while in Tijuana. It is only a ban in Tijuana, Rosarito and south is OK. https://www.tripadvisor.ca/ShowTopic-g150774-i256-k1967450-Dark_window_tint_banned_in_Tijuana-Rosarito_Baja_California.html: I went to the 8th street Police station (Tijuana) to find out what was up. I was told that the ban applies to only the front side windows. Rear side and back are OK (as in California). NO tint (other than factory) is permitted, even my light tint. They told me that, as a tourist, when in Tijuana just keep the front windows down, no problem. It's what I do, and -- no problem. https://www.reddit.com/r/tijuana/comments/92grg1/tijuana_window_tint_info/ When I get lit up, I immediately roll down all four windows in the car and when I pull over, I turn on the interior lights for them if it's at night. In the very unlikely event one gets pulled over despite having rolled down one's windows, one can use this trick: And while I have not had to do this, several of my Amigos have had great luck with not speaking Spanish to the cop (whether or not they know Spanish) and then saying they don't understand the cop's accent or why they were pulled over - being polite the entire time - and say they are going to call 078 to get help translating (078 is the Baja California tourist help line - it is staffed by English speaking operators). Invariably, the cops all the sudden get a more important call and have to leave immediately and let you off with a verbal warning. https://www.bajanorte.com/en/assistance-078/ Note that, from the same source: if you have Cali plates, you are at a higher likelihood for being pulled over, regardless of tint or actions.

The Coroners and Justice Act of April 2009 (c. 2) created a new offence in England and Wales and Northern Ireland of possession of a prohibited image of a child. This act makes cartoon pornography depicting minors illegal in the UK. This Act did not replace the 1978 act, extended in 1994, since that covered "pseudo-photographs"—images that appear to be photographs. In 2008 it was further extended to cover tracings, and other works derived from photographs or pseudo-photographs. A prohibited cartoon image is one which involves a minor in situations which are pornographic and "grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character." Prior to this, although not explicitly in the statutes, the law was interpreted to apply to cartoon images, though only where the images are realistic and indistinguishable from photographs. The new law however covered images whether or not they are realistic. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_cartoon_pornography_depicting_minors The Wikipedia article includes a further list of footnotes and sources for this topic. The only reason I wrote this answer because I remembered reading about this in the newspaper around 4 years ago when the Netherlands outlawed such images and they referred to the UK having 'recently' banned such things as well rather than just the older acts mentioned by Flup.

Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is.

What legal problems might you run into? Well, you'd be violating 47 USC 301, which requires a license for anyone broadcasting in the United States. Penalties for that are given in 47 USC 501 (a fine of up to $10,000 and up to a year in prison), 47 USC 502 (an additional fine of $500 per day of violation), 47 USC 501(b)(2)(D) (forfeiture of up to $10,000 per day, with a maximum of $75,000), and 47 USC 510 (forfeiture of your equipment). "Just outside the FM band" on the low end (below 88 MHz) is television channel 6, while on the high end (above 108 MHz) are frequencies used for airplane navigation. If your transmission interferes with a licensed user of channel 6, you're also in violation of 47 USC 333, which carries much the same penalties as violating section 301, but without the forfeiture of equipment. If your transmission interferes with air navigation, you're in violation of 49 USC 46308, which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $5,000. Honestly, you'd be better off broadcasting inside the FM band: there, you can broadcast without a license under 47 CFR 15, which limits you to a broadcast power of 250 microvolts per meter at 3 meters (basically, you can broadcast to anyone in your house or maybe the next house over).

No, it is generally not legal. In most (maybe all) states, this would be vandalism. For example, see California Penal Code Section 594(1)(a): Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. (2) Damages. (3) Destroys. For another example, see Kansas Statutes 21-5813. In your hypothetical, the pedestrian absolutely hit the vehicle, not the other way around, so the "fine line" you mention doesn't effect this conclusion. The practicality of proving the case against the pedestrian is a separate matter but the law favours neither the pedestrian nor the driver. The standard is the same no matter who the charges are filed against: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Usage of a gun's design I am developing a game, and will be using guns in my game, I just am unsure of a few things. From what I understand, I need written permission to use the name of a gun due to the name being IP, but what about the gun's actual design? If I were to recreate a gun to give it the same 'Look', would infringing upon IP even be something to worry about? Edit: I am not looking for a way to rip-off someone's IP, just for information so that I can get some guns designed, I am not full of ideas for what they should look like, so I'd like to base the design off of real guns.

While a gun's appearance can have protection under "Trade Dress," in addition to having design patent protection, at least one video game has been found in court to have "fair use" protection for trade dress: See E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., et al.. However, to determine the legality of a specific use of intellectual property you would have to consult a competent lawyer.

The general idea of such an app is not subject to copyright protection. Ideas never are protected by copyright. So creating an app based on the functionality of a fictional app would not be a copyright violation. The logo might, if it is original enough, be protected by copyright. Any or all of the "name, the logo and the color scheme" might well be subject to trademark protection. (Names and other short phrases are not protected by copyright.) You would be wise not to use these identifying elements of the show, but instead create ones sufficiently different that no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that your app had been used on the show, or was sponsored, endorse, or approved by the show or its creators. An explicit disclaimer saying that you are in no way associated with the show or its creators, and your app is not approved by or endorsed by them would also be wise. Otherwise you might be accused of trying to pass off your work as affiliated with they show, or to trade on the show's reputation and fame. Whether you make your app an open source work is not in any way relevant to copyright or trademark claims. Whether you charge for your app is of only limited relevance to a copyright claim. Whether you sell or market your app, or use it to advertise some other product or service is relevant to a trademark claim, as trademarks are only protected against their use "in trade" which generally means commercially. However, non-commercial use of a trademark may constitute "dilution" of the mark, which may give rise to a cause of action against the person using it.

Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html

Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue.

Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you.

It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use".

Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.

Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.

Are limiting voting rights to residents of Puerto Rico unconstitutional? This is something that I have been thinking after the decision from Supreme Court legalizing same-sex marriages. The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that prohibiting same-sex marriages constitutes a violation of the 14th amendment, because rights were not granted to all US Citizens by equal. As many of you know, US citizens residing on Puerto Rico do not have the right to vote on federal elections, unless they move and becomes a resident of a state. This is because Puerto Rico is a territory, not a state, and federal voting rights are granted to states. This is true for both citizens that were born on Puerto Rico, and citizens that were born on a state, but decided to move to Puerto Rico. My point is, as US Citizens, we have the right to vote and choose the government that leads the nation. This is why I think this is a violation of the 14th amendment, because you are not granting "equal protection of the laws" to all of the US Citizens. My question is: is this can be considered unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment? I am not lawyer by any means, so maybe my premise is incorrect.

The constitution "does not confer the franchise [the right to vote for President] on "U.S. citizens" but on "Electors" who are to be "appoint[ed]" by each "State". (Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. P.R. 2005)) Thus, since no citizen has the right to vote for President, it isn't the case that Puerto Rico's citizens are being treated differently in this regard. It is just that Puerto Rico has no representatives in the Electoral College.

It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review.

There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.

Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.

Prior to the 14th and 15th amendments, the US Federal Constitution and the Federal laws passed under it neither allowed nor denied anyone the right to vote. The decisions on who would and would not be allowed to vote, including for members of Congress and for President, was wholly in the hands of the sates, and were regulated by the various state constitutions and laws. A few states permitted women to vote, and at least one permitted free blacks to vote, at least for a period of its history. The Federal government had nothing to say on the matter. In at lesat one case the US Supreme Court refused to consider such a question. That was the case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) which grew out of the Dorr Rebellion The state of Rhode Island, had retained its pre-revolutionary charter (dating from 1663) as its constitution, and required the ownership of a significant amount of landed property as a qualification to vote. The Wikipedia article on the rebellion (linked above) states: By 1829, 60% of the state's free white men were ineligible to vote (women and most non-white men were prohibited from voting). In 1841 a group led by Thomas Wilson Dorr held a convention to draft a new state Constitution, (known as the "People's Constitution"), and held ratifying votes on the draft. They declared that it had been approved by a majority of those qualified under the old laws as well as a majority of those voting and qualified under the new rules, and that it was therefore the valid constitution of the state. The old (charter) government said this was invalid and illegal. Attempts to establish the new government by force failed. However, a revised state constitution that greatly expanded voting rights was passed and took effect in 1843. Luther v. Borden was a case of trespass against members of the militia acting under the charter government, brought by a supporter of Dorr. The plaintiffs brought extensive evidence (over 150 pages) intended to establish that the Dorr or "People's" constitution had been validly ratified by a majority of voters, and that the old constitution had improperly restricted voting rights. The case went to the US Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Taney wrote in the majority opinion: The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the government which he supported, and although that government never was able to exercise any authority in the State nor to command obedience to its laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. ... The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it. And certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision. {emphasis added} Thus, until the passage and ratification of the 14th and 15th amendments, which forbid states to deny the vote based on race, national origin, and a few other grounds, the Federal Constitution had nothing to say on the point. States were required to grant the right to vote to women by the 19th amendment in 1920, and the 26th (1971) prohibited denial on the ground of age to anyone 18 or older. The 24th (1964) prohibited denial for failure to pay a poll tax or any other tax. The 14th amendment has been held to guarantee the equal weight of votes, in what was at first known as the "one man, one vote" rule (later "one person, one vote") and has been used to overturn individual and group denials of voting rights. But there were no federal voting rights in the years before 1865. I am not aware of any writings by any of the "founding fathers" (say the members of the Constitutional Convention) that seriously discuss the possibility of a female President. But they did consider and endorse the possibility of a person being elected president who might not be qualified to vote in some of the states. They declined to impose, or permit Congress to impose, a property, or other variable, qualification on the president, even though many of the original states had property qualifications for voters. Options for this were proposed and voted down in the Convention's drafting process.

US Constitutional law generally recognizes the right of freedom of movement, e.g. in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168. The more recent case Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 affirms the position that restricting the "right to travel violates the Equal Protection Clause absent a compelling governmental interest", and one of the specific rights subsumed under the right to travel is "the right to enter and leave another State". The "compelling governmental interest" is a reference to standard of judicial review known as strict scrutiny, where a law that restricts a fundamental right (the right to travel) is required for a "compelling state interest", is "narrowly tailored" to that purpose, and is the "least restrictive means". It is highly likely that each state has a statute that grants broad powers to the governor in case of a state of emergency. Such an order would then have to be scrutinized strictly, with respect to the narrow tailoring and least restrictive aspects of the question. We would then have to analyze the specifics of the case and order.

Regarding the second part of your question: The 7th Amendment does not apply in state court, so any right to a jury trial there would depend upon the constitution of the State of Texas (specifically Article I, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution). This is the case because the Bill of Rights applies by its terms only to the federal government. Under the Selective Incorporation doctrine, the 14th Amendment causes some of the Bill of Rights to apply in state court but not all of it. In particular, the 7th Amendment is one of the parts that does not apply in state court as determined in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) and Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). The 11th Amendment would probably bar a federal lawsuit over this matter, since the proper defendant would probably be the State of Texas which is immune from suit in federal court except by another state or the United States. You would still have a right to assert your substantive federal constitutional rights in any state court litigation, however.

Under Article VI of the US Constitution, the federal constitution and valid federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound to apply them regardless of anything in the laws or constitution of any state.* If a state legislature passes a law banning same-sex marriage, a state court is required under the federal constitution to instead apply the federal constitution (as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges) and rule as though same-sex marriage is legal. When it comes to a federal court, things are even easier: a state cannot command a federal court to do anything. A federal court’s authority is laid out in Article III of the federal constitution and in federal statute, which (per Article VI) is supreme over anything in the laws or constitution of any state. There have been times where states attempted to challenge federal supremacy. Normally, this is handled by going to federal court. Decisions in state courts can ultimately be appealed to the US Supreme Court, which can reverse them if they incorrectly applied federal law. Most of the time, that’s the end of matters: when a federal court rules, state officials comply. Occasionally, that’s not enough. If a state disobeys the orders of a federal court, they can be enforced by federal agents. If even that isn’t enough, the President can deploy the armed forces to uphold federal authority. * There are situations which are more complicated, like when something is a federal crime but not a state crime. I can do more research on that if you want, but for now I’m going to leave it at “it’s more complicated.”

StackOverflow logo change vs. user contributions and CC BY-SA 3.0 After the temporary LoveOverflow logo change, there has been a whole lot of fuss about SO and political matters, including a question on MSO claiming that displaying such a logo on a page with user contributions implies a connection between the contributing users and support for same-sex marriages, thus violating the terms of the CC BY-SA 3.0 license under which all user contributions are submitted. Whether or not this is true is heavily debated in the comments of the linked question, but (unsurprisingly) no-one on StackOverflow seems to be a lawyer, so I'm turning to you to ask: Does the recent StackOverflow logo change violate the terms of CC BY-SA 3.0 or not? Or could it be considered a borderline case? And if it does violate the license, would it be enough to include an additional footer notice along the lines of Contributing users are in no way connected to any political view of stack exchange inc or its staff. in order to comply with it?

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer 1 For the avoidance of doubt, the thrust of this debate is: By placing a logo associated with a certain political movement near my user profile, does StackExchange violate Section 4(c) of the CC BY-SA 3.0? Subscriber Content is Content that is contributed by StackExchange users. The relevant sections of CC BY-SA 3.0 (emphasis added) are: c. ... The credit required by this Section 4(c) may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. d. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the Original Author's honor or reputation... Does changing the logo on all pages imply an endorsement of the site/organisation by the user? It is likely, though not definite, that this positioning of the logo will imply that the user endorses the website. However, actions taken by the user - such as creating an account, accepting the Terms, contributing content - are likely to affirm this view. Does changing the logo imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view? Again, it is likely, not definite, that changing the logo will imply that the site/organisation supports a particular political view. Does changing the logo impute support of a political view to the user? In this case, however, it is highly unlikely that the change of logo would impute to the user support of the political view. In a case such as this, onus of proof is on the plaintiff - were this claim brought in court, it would need to be proven on the balance of probability (or, less likely, on the preponderance of evidence) that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality (and perhaps some other) agenda to the user. Reasonable person does not mean any particular person, nor does it mean, all people. Part of the imputation must come from the purpose that the user subscribes to the site. Perhaps if StackOverflow were a site that promoted marriage equality or judicial activism, this could support an opinion that the user supports this view. However, StackOverflow is about programming, and programming doesn't imply that kind of agenda. Perhaps if the icon had been changed to something that suggested support for object-oriented programming, the icon could be taken to suggest that the user supports this agenda. Neither does the user's content suggest support for this cause - if they constantly made off-hand remarks about it in their posts, then perhaps, again, a reasonable person may make that imputation. In any case, the damages awarded to the user would likely be compensatory rather than punitive - the user would need to therefore demonstrate actual suffering or loss as a result of the change of icon. If there were actual damages or loss, the way in which the user contributed to them - perhaps by posting a thread that would be likely to be inflammatory and attract attention to the user - may reduce an award of damages. In the case of no actual suffering or loss, the user could be awarded nominal damages. Injunctions that could be awarded would need to be proportionate to the breach of license - the court could require references to this user to be anonymised. This is easily done. It is unlikely that the court would require all contribution by the user to be removed - this is unlikely to pass a public interest test. In relation to placing a disclaimer in the footer, US courts have generally accepted disclaimers if they are positioned such that a reasonable user is likely to see it... In the footer? It's not a great place, and easily missed. It could be better than nothing, though, and may help with the likelihood of someone imputing such opinions to a user. Essentially - it's extremely unlikely that a reasonable person would impute support of the marriage equality agenda on a user based on a logo change, because the support is not sufficiently connected to the primary purpose of the site, or the user's activities on the site. Even if the user were successful in showing that this is the likely conclusion of a reasonable person, the remedies available to them would be limited to damages (which limited to actual losses, including suffering), and an injunction (which is likely to be anonymisation). A disclaimer may not, on its own, actually preserve the validity of the license, but it may be useful on determining the likelihood of a reasonable person imputing opinions to a user. 1. This is larger than normal, because I think it is more important than normal.

We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission.

This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.

I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).

It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.

I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.)

There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.

In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.

How does a layperson know whether to hire a Queen's Counsel? 1. A layperson may not know whether his/her case is complex enough to hire a Queen's Counsel. So how does a layperson decide, when deciding hiring a public access barrister? 2. Are barristers obligated to advise a client on such a question? To wit, will a Junior Counsel truly choose to lose business, by tell a prospective client to hire a QC instead? And vice versa? Barristers may not be the most scrupulous humans (insert chiding joke about lawyers here).

For question 2, there is a firm requirement on barristers to inform the client if different counsel would be called for. To quote the Bar Standards Board handbook: rC17 Your duty to act in the best interests of each client (CD2) includes a duty to consider whether the client’s best interests are served by different legal representation, and if so, to advise the client to that effect. The guidance specifically mentions that if something should be handled by more (or less) experienced counsel, there is an ethical duty to tell their client.

What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.

Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!

Is there a way to be legally represented in the UK without being a resident? Pretty much anyone, anywhere in the world, who can afford to hire a lawyer can be legally represented in the U.K. without being a resident. In order to seek most kinds of affirmative relief (other than disputing the jurisdiction of a particular court over a particular party in a particular case in the first instance), however, the non-resident must acknowledge (at least conditionally subject to a right to appeal a resolution of a jurisdictional issue), the jurisdiction of the court over the non-resident and submit to that court's jurisdiction. In one famous recent example, the King of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, who is obviously not a British resident, hired a British lawyer to represent him in a custody dispute with his then-wife Princess Haya, concerning the couple's two children. After two years of litigation, a British senior family court judge, Andrew McFarlane, ruled against him and granted sole custody to his wife in this case on March 24, 2022. And if yes, who is a reputable firm which can deal with banking related issues. Law.StackExchange is not an appropriate place to ask for recommendations to specific law firms or lawyers. More generally, however, the financial industry in the U.K., including its banking industry, is highly geographically concentrated in a financial district in London called the City of London (just "the City" to insiders) which has its own mayor and governing body called City of London Corporation. As a result, most legal professionals (barristers and solicitors alike) with specialized expertise in banking law in the U.K. have offices in or near this financial district.

Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.

The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.

Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff-

england-and-wales Admission of the confession is at the discretion of the court PACE s78 gives the court the discretion to decide on the admissibility of confessions obtained if it appears to the court that "having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." There is deliberately no case law guidance on this. Superior courts in the UK have been scrupulous in saying that each case turns on its merits. The “circumstances in which the evidence was obtained” are certainly suss and would not be permitted by a police officer who is required to warn the suspect and advise them of their right to silence. However, that is not sufficient to exclude the evidence. The court also needs to consider whether it would have “such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” If the confession is the only evidence then admitting it would clearly be unfair. However, if the Crown has mountains of other evidence, then the confession may only have a small probative value. There is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in the UK Far more likely is that the Crown would not even seek to introduce the confession. It would just slow the trial and give the defence grounds for an appeal. Instead, they would use the confession to inform their investigation and get other evidence to convict. Legal privilege In England and Wales, legal advice privilege only applies where there is a lawyer present. If Badal is a lawyer, then the privilege attaches; if he isn’t then it doesn’t, irrespective of what he led Naina to believe. The same would be true even if Badal believed he was a lawyer but, for some reason, was not licenced in E&W. Litigation privilege is a broader concept and covers all advice, including from non-lawyers, where litigation (including criminal prosecution) has commenced or is reasonably likely. Based on the description, Naina has been committed to stand trial so everything she said is covered by privilege and is inadmissible. Why bother doing this? Most criminals are not sophisticated and will often implicate themselves if you give them enough space without the police or others violating any rules. Anecdotally, I have a relative who was a psychologist for a remand prison - prisoners charged but not yet tried. At the start of every meeting with a prisoner they would say “I work for the state, nothing you say is confidential and it can be used against you” - they still had prisoners confess to crimes they weren’t charged with, name accomplices, and tell where the loot was hidden.

Do people generally have the right not to be photographed on private property? Assume that I and other people are patrons on private property, and that the owner/occupier of the property does not object to my activities. If I wish to take photographs of something on the property and I inadvertently include other people in the photograph, what are my legal rights and responsibilities with regard to the photos? Am I required to cease taking photographs at their request? Assume this is in Australia; New south Wales, specifically, but I am interested in answers for other states also. Re: the possible duplicate - this is concerned with an individual's specific request not to be photographed, where no such assertion is made in the suggested duplicate.

Let's put to bed the myth of privacy that is at the heart of your question: in R v Sotheren (2001) NSWSC 204 Justice Dowd said “A person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed" So they can ask you to stop; its bad manners if you don't but it is not illegal. If they are the controller of the property then they can stop you filming from their property but they cannot stop you filming into their property from outside (either public land or land where you do have permission). See How do laws affect photography of non-humans in public when people may be in the frame?

Farmer's Market is private property, which means that the owner gets to set the rule according to which you are allowed to enter and remain on their property. There is no fundamental right to be in a business, either under the US Constitution or California's. While you have a constitutional right to put a soapbox on the public sidewalk and denounce or extol whatever you like, there is no such right on another person's property. You also have a right to express racially and sexually abhorrent content on the street. Your right to express your viewpoint ends at the store's doors. The manager has a property right to withdraw the implicit permission to enter and remain that is implicit in running a publicly accessible store. Your constitutional right to say whatever you want has to do with government action,not private action. You have no right to compel individuals to listen to your viewpoint on private property. It is a business decision, well within the rights of the property owner, for him to find your conduct unacceptable and grounds for expulsion. You do have a recourse: shop somewhere that doesn't care what you say to their customers.

Copyright vests in the photographer that takes the photograph, or their employer. If the subject of a photograph does not own copyright over the photograph, then they can't bring a claim of copyright infringement against you. The DMCA safe harbors only protect you against copyright infringement claims. Further, personality rights are recognised at state level through statute or common law. On the matter of whether copyright and right of publicity are treated as the same, the seventh circuit has said in Toney v. L'OREAL USA, INC., 406 F. 3d 905 at [911]: ... the bottom line is that Toney's claim under the Illinois right of publicity statute is not preempted by federal copyright law.

It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down.

It depends, in part, what is meant (and what can be proven) by D's intent: no apparent motivation to harm V Revenge porn, or more accurately, "Disclosing, or threatening to disclose, private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress" contrary to section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which states: (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)the person discloses, or threatens to disclose, a private sexual photograph or film in which another individual (“the relevant individual”) appears, (b)by so doing, the person intends to cause distress to that individual, and (c)the disclosure is, or would be, made without the consent of that individual. If there is no intent, then the offence is not committed. If there is intent to cause distressto V, then setion 35 needs to be considered, especially subsection (2): Meaning of “private” and “sexual” (1)The following apply for the purposes of section 33. (2)A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3)A photograph or film is “sexual” if— (a)it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b)it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c)its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. I cannot find and caselaw or guidance on the particular issue - i.e. whether or not V's commercial sales of her own images would fall within this definition - and as D's intent is not clear, it would probably be a matter for a jury to decide.

The difference in their treatment is because of the asymmetry in the law. There are "wiretapping" laws pertaining to interception of voice communication, which do not include photographic recording. It is generally illegal to "intercept" an oral, wire or electronic communication (direct conversation, literal wire tap, or listening in on wireless speech): there is an exception that sound can be "intercepted" by a hearing aid or similar device to correct a person's less-than-normal hearing. Using a microphone or any other electronic device is thus "wiretapping". There is no law against taking a photo in public, even using a telephoto lens (however, trespassing to take a photo is illegal). It is true that when a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy, voice recording does not require consent of either party (in Texas). But simply "being in public" does not mean that there is no expectation of privacy – it depends on whether a reasonable person would know that they can easily be heard. In that context, there is still a reasonable expectation of privacy if you're 30 feet from the nearest person. It is hard to say exactly why the law is the way it is. I presume it is partially based on differences in "reasonable expectations of privacy" for sound versus light (sound dies out quickly, light does not). Wiretapping laws are, in the first place (Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968), a reaction to Supreme Court decisions that limited wiretapping on 4th Amendment grounds in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. Since the court did not say that the government taking a picture (without trespassing) is unconstitutional, the US government and states did not construct laws that prohibited that activity.

Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is.

It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)

What are the potential pitfalls of representing oneself pro se? Where do pros se litigants most often fail? Is it because of ignorance of legal protocols? Is it because they use overly aggressive tactics that most lawyers wouldn't use? Is it because they failed to prove their case, when a competent lawyer might have succeeded? This question was inspired by one of the the answers to another one.

Most pro se litigants fail in the court procedure area. There are many intricacies about what must be completed by when. Determining jurisdiction can take a very long time, especially personal jurisdiction. These things set back cases repeatedly. Additionally, many pro se litigants fail a 12(b)(6) motion. This means the other side files a motion saying that the opposing party failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Typically, a pro se litigant fails to state with specificity each element of a claim and how the parties met each element. If the litigant does not know how to remedy the situation, it will not succeed. Most judges in small claims overlook procedural deficiencies so long as they are not too burdensome on the opposing party. If one is unsure how to proceed, contact an attorney.

Another possible answer: The legal profession is a cartel, protected by laws. "Unlicensed/Unauthorized Practice of Law" is a big enough issue that its acronym (UPL) is well known among people who discuss law. Non-lawyers may decline to provide legal advice because they don't want to be charged with UPL. Likewise, as a matter of policy (at least in the U.S.) most government agencies and many employers in businesses that frequently receive requests for legal information instruct their employees to avoid giving anything that could be construed as legal advice. Which policy employees might cite to avoid helping with requests for even the most basic legal information.

Yes. Lawyers are generally subject to a malpractice lawsuit, essentially the same as doctors and other professions. A successful claim generally requires proof that the lawyer's services fell below the standard of care for attorneys, and that it resulted in some injury to you.

There are times when having a large law firm work on a case can be an advantage. It is rare for the number of lawyers working on a particular case to be more than three or four plus a few paralegals, even in a case where there are virtually unlimited resources at a party's disposal. In those cases, the primary benefit of having a large law firm at your disposal is that by paying top dollar for those attorneys, you may (but certainly don't always) get particularly competent attorneys at firms that have good systems in place. If you are willing to spend the money you can also have the attorney and paralegal team work exhaustively to leave no stone unturned in terms of legal research, style and proofreading, "wild goose chase" factual and legal research of matters like trial court arguments from other cases that the opposing counsel has participated in, and trial presentations with lavish presentation quality. For example, in one case where my firm was litigating against a large law firm in state supreme court arguments, the firm had seven law firm partners who had served as clerks in that court earlier in their careers participate in mock oral arguments to help the appellate lawyer who would be presented the case in oral arguments to the Colorado Supreme Court prepare (with four members of your core team and seven mock justices plus some paralegals participating this was a $5000+ per hour activity). A typical run of the mill appellate brief prepared competently might take 100 hours, while a large firm might devote 800 hours to the same task (both of these are hypothetical round numbers suggested just to get the point across). This incredibly intense working up of cases, moreover, often involves attorneys who aren't really starting from scratch as they has handled many similar cases before in their careers, while their smaller firm competition may have only encountered the issues presented for the first time. You are also paying for connections and experience. For example, a large law firm may have an easier time retaining the most decorated expert witnesses to argue on their behalf. These attorneys may also have handled numerous cases in front of the judge or judges who will be deciding the case (and if they haven't someone else in the large firm probably has) and thus can better predict what approach will be received best by that particular judge. The exception to the rule that the maximal economies of scale are reached with a quite small group of lawyers is that in addition to this core group of lawyers, some cases, such as class action lawsuits, or cases involving complex transactions (e.g. construction project disputes in a large project with hundreds of contractors) may require an immense amount of factual discovery in the trial court in the form of depositions of dozens or hundreds of people with relevant knowledge, and/or review of vast volumes of documents (e.g. I've had several cases with whole rooms stacked floor to ceiling with relevant documents in banker's boxes). In cases like those, you need an army of senior paralegals and junior attorneys to interview witnesses, take depositions and review and summarize documents to get to the bottom of the factual matters needed to prove a case. The down side of this approach, however, is that it is extremely expensive relative to the alternatives per task, and frequently impossible to recover your costs and attorney fees from the other party, perhaps because they aren't permitted to be awarded, perhaps because a judge would find some or all of your fees and costs to be unreasonable, or perhaps because the other side simply can't afford to pay them. So, using a firm like this really only makes sense if the stakes involved are very high, or if there are long term strategic reasons to litigate. Spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is a very expensive way to litigate a $100,000 one off dispute. But spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is perfectly sensible if there is $100,000,000 in controversy in the case at hand, or if a favorable outcome will influence the outcome of a large number of future disputed of the same type. The other dirty little secret is that lots of the work done by large law firms for which their clients pay an immense amount of money isn't done very well. One inherent down side of being large is that a large law firm is bureaucratic and prone to the kinds of mistakes that all large organizations have, for example, in diffusing responsibility for mistakes that can allow mistakes to fall through the cracks. Also, while the typical large law firm lawyer is typically more knowledgable than the typical small firm lawyer about the field at issue, this doesn't always happen. Sometimes junior attorneys get assigned too much responsibility on cases in areas where they have blind spots in their knowledge, and sometimes a large firm attorney ends up working a case due to personal connections with the client rather than because that attorney is the most qualified person in the firm to handle it. Also, while some very brilliant lawyers do indeed work at large law firms, technical competence isn' the only consideration in hiring. Successful large firm lawyers need to be team players, need to conform and function well in a large bureaucracy, and need to have the social capital to be comfortable on a day to day basis with the firm's other lawyers and their affluent and big business clients. Many large firm lawyers have those soft skills while having only competent rather than excellent legal acumen. Further, since most large law firm lawyers go straight from law school to a big firm (sometimes with a detour clerking for a judge for a couple of years), and large law firms handle mostly very big cases that are usually settled by lead attorneys before going to trial, most large law firm attorneys aren't particularly experienced at trial work. Some large law firms compensate for that by laterally hiring former prosecutors, former criminal defense lawyers and former high volume personal injury litigators to do that work, but often, large law firms have few lawyers in the courtroom with much trial experience relative to how many years they have practiced law. They may be very well prepared, but often there is no substitute for hands on trial experience. Still large law firms tend to fight extremely hard in trial, but tend to be pushovers in settlement discussions. This is driven by the reality that the client will incur huge amounts of attorneys fees and costs to go the distance, and by the fact that professionally, the worst thing that a large firm lawyer can do it to have an unexpected and unpredictable bad outcome at trial. So, large firm attorneys seek to give their clients low expectations about what is possible in litigation in order to make it possible to make cases with significant uncertainty go away with settlements larger than would really have been necessary to settle the case with a more total client litigation and settlement cost sensitive law firm.

Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.

Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.

How do websites (or apps) that use pictures or posters of movies not infringe on rights and still make a profit? Sites like IMDB as well as Rotten Tomatoes and countless other websites or mobile applications (such as flixter, etc.) all use movie posters and images from movies as part of their content which is more or less the selling point of their business (or maybe more accurately how they convince users to keep using). How do companies get away with using images or movie posters for free, does that mean movie posters and content are fair use for commerical use?

It would be an overgeneralization to conclude that movie posters are "fair use for commerical use". The uses you see imply that low resolution reproductions of movie posters have been judged by IMDB, Wikipedia, and others to be fair use for the purpose of identification alongside commentary (or in a transformative function like browsing). As an example case, see Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006), which held that it was fair use to reproduce thumbnail sized Grateful Dead concert posters in a book alongside a timeline.

This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard.

Unless the "old" movie is so old that its copyright has expired (prior to 1926 in the US currently, I believe, the precise rule varies by country) or it entered the public domain in some other way (unusual), it is protected by copyright. One may use part of a copyrighted work only with permission from the copyright owner, unless an exception to copyright applies. Exceptions to copyright vary significantly from country to country In the US, the primary exception is fair use. This answer describes fair use is some detail. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. Whether something is a fair use is a highly-fact-driven determination., There is no clear bright line. Several factors must be considered, including at least the four= statutory factors. A short except, used in a transformative way, that does not harm the market for the original will often qualify as fair use, but details will matter. There is no specific length that qualifies a sound excerpt as fair use. For text, in the well known case of Harper v. Nation an excerpt of less than 300 words from a 500 page book was judged not to be fair use, because it was held to be "the heart of the work" and because its publication significantly harmed the market for the original (a paying contract was canceled because of the use). In other situations, much larger excepts have been held to be fair use. In some countries there is an exception to copyright known as "fair dealing" which is somewhat similar to fair use, but rather narrower and more restricted. Other countries have a list of specific exceptions (the law of India has more than 20 different exceptions). News reporting, criticism, commentary, and classroom use are common exceptions. In many countries, sampling is not covered by any exception, and permission is required. If an exception does not apply, and permission is not obtained, then using copyrighted content is copyright infringement. This is, in most cases, a tort, meaning that the copyright owner may sue the infringer. Such a suit may be brought in any country where infringing works are crested or distributed, and possibly in other countries as well. If the plaintiff (owner) wins, damages will be awarded. The rules for determining damages vary widely between countries, and the specific facts of the case will matter. To get a reliable opinion on whether a specific use qualifies under an exception to copyright, or requires permission, one would do well to consult a lawyer with copyright expertise. Or one could simply ask for permission from the copyright holder. For a publicly released movie, finding the copyright owner should not usually be too hard. The owner may say yes or no, or ask for a fee or other conditions. If the owner simply ignores a request for permission, that must be taken as a "no". For this kind of use, an owner is free to reject or ignore requests for permission if it so chooses. (In the US, cover versions of songs are subject to a compulsory license under certain conditions.)

Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.

A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.

Your photos of their copyrighted sculpture would constitute "derivative works" or "copies" of their sculpture in a different form, thus infringing the copyright, absent a statutory exemption or a license. They have granted a license for certain limited uses. You would have the burden of proving a statutory exemption, such as "fair use", or compliance with their license, were you to be charged with infringement. Commercial sales of photos of someone else's art, displayed in public, are not "fair use". Similar issues are raised in https://photo.stackexchange.com/questions/4140/what-are-the-copyright-issues-when-selling-photos-of-public-art

According to this site in the UK apparently there are laws against calling something free if it was part of the entire package before or if was added later and the price went up Example of the latter: LG sold a TV. They then added a sound bar, increased the price and listed the TV as TV for $XXX + free sound bar. They ran afoul of the regulations Also adding something and calling the addition free is okay if the price didn't go up but you can only advertize it as free for 6 months. After 6 months the law considers it included by default and therefore no longer free.

Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.

What did Samuel Alito (SCOTUS) mean by "super-legislative" power? In Obergefell v. Hodges (the recent gay marriage ruling), Samuel Alito writes in his dissent (p. 73 of this PDF containing the electronic opinion): This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. What does he mean "super-legislative" power (as opposed to mere "legislative power")? Or is he engaging in mere rhetorical flourish?

Super-legislative refers to Alito's contention that the court is effectively legislating, i.e. creating new laws; and doing so by overriding the formal legislative bodies. It is implied by a belief that no existing laws or precedents recognize a right to marry. One common criticism of courts exercising legislative powers is that they are not constrained in the same way that formal legislatures are, such as through elections. One criticism of super-legislative powers is that they prevent future legislatures from any variation. As a (contrived) example, because of the specific ruling you mention, no future U.S. legislature can uphold a law prohibiting some same-sex couples from marrying, say those that don't plan on raising children together. The source of the United States Supreme Court's 'super' powers is based in the longstanding idea that it possesses the power of judicial review, by which the court can invalidate the laws of legislatures (or the actions of the executive branch). Interestingly, "super-legislative" as a phrase seems to have peaked in popularity, according to Google Ngram Viewer, in the 1930s and 1970s. An example from the Ocala Star-Banner article "'Super' Legislative Body", published on June 18th 1964: The Warren Court has gone off making its own laws again, usurping the legislative processes of this country.

"Seila Law" is a law firm, not a law. They were a party in a recent SCOTUS decision, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S ___, which involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Congress, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the structure of that law (regarding appoinntment and firing of the director) is unconstitutional: The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers. More specifically, Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s executive power generally includes the power to supervise — and, if necessary, remove — those who exercise the President’s authority on his behalf. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. The law in question addresses a single position, director of CFPB, not all government agencies. "Agency" is defined in 18 USC 6 as includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. "Department" is then defined as one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government. POTUS firing power is about the executive branch, not the judicial or legislative branches, so it depends on what you mean by "agency". You can infer possible outcomes based on this ruling, but what they literally said is that particular law is unconstitutional.

The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law.

Both Congress and the state legislatures are expressly forbidden by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder. That means neither can ever pass a law that names an individual and says "they are suspended." It is so important that it's one of the very few restrictions on government that the original Constitution (before any amendments) prohibited in bot state and federal governments. (Also, a "bill" is not a law. It's what a legislature is considering making a law.)

The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.

There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.

No. In order to practice law, one must establish an attorney-client relationship. Participation in Internet forums absolutely does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Everyone involved in law spends a disproportionate amount of time disclaiming this, so nobody inside the field will be confused on this point. I believe this is also directly stated in the Terms of Service. And as Jen notes, upvoting/downvoting is not even agreeing with the legal validity of the answer. Take the tour or read help pages for what voting means. It's perfectly conceivable for a psychic who knows how to sway people could write a better voted answer than three lawyers.

Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).

Do disclaimers need to be capitalized? Are disclaimers of warranty, liability, and the like legally required to be in all-caps? For example, the "disclaimer of warranty" section from the GNU GPL: THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION. On the other hand, Stack Exchange's disclaimer of warranty uses normal casing (well, normal for legal documents): Stack Exchange has no special relationship with or fiduciary duty to Subscriber. Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how...

Do they have to use all caps? Well, no. It's just that companies feel that's the easiest way to make the text "conspicuous" which is required by the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly in § 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. (2)Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." The term "conspicuous" is defined in § 1-201. General Definitions. "Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: (A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language. So you could make the text all bold and italic. You could make the font color purple. It's just that most companies use the caps lock key, whatever their individual reasons may be. I'll also note that this is a commercial code and these rules are found under Article 2 - Sales. So you'll only see this requirement taking effect in terms/disclaimers for companies which actually let end-users engage in commercial activity (they're actually selling something). Any site which doesn't facilitate commercial activity will likely be using a warranty disclaimer as a note of "hey, this is a free site, so no you don't get a warranty or legal expectation of service of any sort."

The software being free and open source has no impact on whether it infringes any patents or violates any copyrights. Copyrights attach to fixed representations of creative work in a tangible medium (e.g., the actual code and graphical elements of the software in question). As long as you aren't copying the copyrighted work of someone else, you should be in the clear. So, if you write your own code from scratch, or rely on code that you're allowed to use (e.g., "free" software with a permissive license that allows it to be used freely), you should be fine. On the other hand, if you copy a chunk of code that you aren't allowed to use, and then change the variable names so that it's superficially different, you're likely violating someone's copyright. Patents are a much more difficult question. To determine whether you would infringe any patents, you would have to read the independent claims of every patent that might be related. If you perform all the steps of any one of those claims, then you are infringing that claim (and therefore, the patent in which it is found). Unfortunately, this is much easier said than done. First, it may be difficult to search for all the potentially relevant patents, and once you've found them, there may be far too many to read. Second, claims are written in a type of language that is specific to patents, and someone without experience in patent law may not understand them correctly. Finally, the terms in the claims may not take on their plain English meaning, but rather may have been defined by the language in the rest of that patent, so it's possible that you might incorrectly think you were in the clear based on a misunderstanding arising from that. All that said, it may be best to go ahead with implementing an idea and then waiting to see what happens. Chances are that the implementation will arguably infringe some patent in some way, no matter what's done. But chances are also high that there will never be any worrisome enforcement action taken against it by a patent owner, simply due to the difficulty and expense associated with enforcing patent rights.

When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.

This is known as nominative fair use. The leading case in the US is New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). The International Trademark Association (ITA) summarizes: Nominative fair use generally is permissible as long as (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service and (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. The ITA uses iPhone cases as an example of allowable nominative use: Use of “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6. Here is an example of that by J.Crew.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.

The user gains the use of the software, the EULA issuer gains the limitations on how the user of the freeware will use it, that for example, prevent the freeware user from exploiting the issuer's labor by reusing it for profit. Consideration doesn't have to be monetary. As a practical matter, sometimes the business model is to give the software away as a loss leader and to have the issuer make their money with training and consulting on how to use it. Also, even in the absence of consideration, a promise upon which the person benefiting from the promise reasonably relies is enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Further, EULA stands for "end user license agreement" and there are many times that license agreements aren't full fledged contracts. They are merely limited grants of permission to use something, often not even amounting to a full fledged property right or contract right. For example, if I let my neighbor walk into my living room while we talk and have tea, the right of the neighbor to be in my living room is called a license, even though it is not a contract. A license can be embedded in a contract, but it doesn't have to be.

Using software generally does not entail any legal requirement to acknowledge the use of that software, and would only arise as a licensing condition. Google services, including Translate, are subject to certain terms of use especial the part about what they expect of you. They do not impose any requirement regarding acknowledgment, therefore they cannot later demand any royalties. If a translation program imposes any demands on your usage of the program, that has to be part of the original agreement whereby you were allowed to use the software at all.

Is there any remedy for unnecessary insult by police in the course of their lawful duties? Following up on Are there any remedies for abusive or insulting behavior by agents executing a search warrant? the more subtle question needs the following elaboration: My impression is that as far as the law is concerned there is no such tort as "maliciously making a mess" or "unnecessarily desecrating an individual or his property" in the course of a LEO's official duties. But to any individual subject to such abuse the difference between a respectful and malicious search may be life-shattering. To make it more salient let's consider a search warrant for some small amount of drugs issued on a residence. Suppose the owner of the residence claims to be a devout Muslim and keeps a Koran in a prominent place. He notes that the book is holy to him and asks the agents executing the warrant to don gloves before touching it. A respectful searcher would comply with the request, putting on gloves before inspecting the book, and replacing it when done. An indifferent searcher would rifle the book bare-handed and, perhaps, toss it aside hurriedly. A malicious searcher might say, "Muslim, huh? Well let me finish my bacon sandwich before I handle that." He smears the pages with bacon grease, then throws the book on the ground and goes out of his way to trample it every time he walks by. Is the law indifferent to the three scenarios? Update: Because religion might have special protection under the law, here is a non-religious example: I collect Legos and have spent thousands of hours building an enormous Lego city in my basement. Here are the three alternatives in this scenario: To inspect every concealable space the respectful searcher separates the structures to look inside, and then locks them back together. The indifferent searcher pulls apart every structure as much as necessary to expose their internal spaces. Because he exercises no exceptional care in how he breaks things it will take scores of hours to rebuild the city. The malicious searcher brings a hammer and begins smashing the Legos with glee. He frequently turns to the owner and asks things like, "So, you still don't want to tell me where the drugs are? This Lego airport is next!" The blocks are so broken that to restore the property the collector/builder would have to start from scratch. Meanwhile, the searcher shrugs off the destruction saying, "Something could have been concealed in those little dimples in each block, so I had to break them all to be sure." Update: The Lego example, third scenario, consists of destruction of property so might be more appropriate to the first question. Since the purpose of this question is to focus on the "insult" piece here is another example: A retired cop recently claimed that he observed fellow officers, "Pissing and shitting inside suspects homes during raids, on their beds and clothes." Obviously the property damage from that misbehavior is not worth suing over. But one would hope that there is some adequate remedy at law for such gratuitously abusive and insulting behavior. Further update: Andrew notes that this last example is just plain vandalism. So let's walk it back a bit into the grey area where police in particular seem to run unrestrained: Suppose the police throw all the resident's clothes on the floor, walk through some spilled staining agents, and then stomp through the clothes repeatedly. If they are called to account for it they say, "Oh, gee, sorry, we didn't notice the spilled dye, or the clothes on the floor. Our job is to search, not to take care of peoples' property."

The officers could incur liability under 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). This would probably be considered "loss of property" or a "wrongful act". It is very rare for cases to go forward for this because of the costs of litigation against an officer. "[I]t is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’" Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)). “Before any due process liability can be imposed for property damage occurring in a lawful search, it must be established that the police acted unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16. That actually means that the burden of proof is on the victim to show unreasonableness / maliciousness. It would probably be easier if the thing destroyed could not possibly have contained the item looked for. For instance, if they are looking for a 65" LED TV, they can't even look in a 64" dresser (or something smaller than the object that could not physically hold the object). This issue becomes moot when dealing with drugs.

There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).)

The Google search is not itself a crime or any other kind of offense. It could be used as circumstantial evidence that you did something intentionally or with pre-mediation, rather than accidentally, or not at all. If you can provide an alternative explanation for the search that is plausible, such as the one in the question, and there isn't a close proximity of time, a jury is unlikely to give the search much weight as circumstantial evidence. But ultimately, the weight to give any piece of evidence is for the jury to decide in the context of all of the evidence in the case combined.

I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).

It is unlikely that Bob's conduct would constitute disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace in the fact pattern you described and the police and the Mayor who ordered to police to act have probably violated Bob's constitutional rights. While governments may adopt reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on free speech, and the inquiry as to whether a time, place and manner restriction is reasonable is a fact specific inquiry, the facts presented in this question are in the heartland of free speech protections and so an arrest is likely to violate a clearly established constitutional right. Bob believes the mayor to be corrupt. The mayor is an ex police officer. So Bob decides to protest in front of city hall at noon with a sign and speaking loudly about his dislike for the mayor while walking back and forth on a public sidewalk. Bob is in a public place that has a long tradition of being a symbolic public forum for expressing grievances. He is articulating statements that he holds in good faith about a matter of public concern relating to a public figure. Noon is not a time at which there is a need to maintain quiet. There is no indication in the question of any special facts that would modify the usual considerations in this fact pattern (i.e. the building is not on fire requiring fire departments to keep people clear, there isn't a Presidential motorcade nearby, there is no indication that there is an ordinance on the books in advance that attempts to reasonably accommodate protesters in the interest of some important interest (e.g. not interfering with security lines)). Realistically, absent negative facts which are not mentioned, this looks like a strong case for a constitutional violation and a weak one for criminal liability.

I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state.

I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.

There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.

Can sharing YouTube links violate copyright laws? Suppose an app has a collection of links to YouTube videos about a particular topic (e.g., sports). Users can watch video by clicking on the Play video button. This will open up the YouTube video in the official YouTube app or browser if the user wishes to do so. Could this violate any copyright law, or the YouTube terms of service?

Copyright Law: Probably Not so long as you are not hosting anything other than a link. (This is a secondary source) Even if academics and technology enthusiasts prefer an absolute right to link on the Internet, the business world has an interest in regulating what information is shared.66 Businesses will protest free linking to their materials if it interferes with their sales or marketing messages.67 If a website operator *1090 desires to restrict certain content from being linked to or integrated in another site, the operator can require a password to view the site or can technically disable outside sites from in-line linking to images or media hosted by the site.68 Youtube ToS: You may have an issue with ToS 4. D. if you have ads on your webpage. Service here is defined as "by using or visiting the YouTube website or any YouTube products, software, data feeds, and services provided to you on, from, or through the YouTube website " But it does seem to allow you to use an embedded player in your site if you wanted. ToS 4. F.

The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant.

This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary.

No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs).

Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Probably not, because you should be in a position to rely on the Safe Harbor provision of the DMCA. Safe Harbor protects service providers who provide open, non-moderated spaces for users to directly contribute content. Safe Harbor means you do not need an army of moderators to inspect every message posted to the site or system. It is essential for sites like Twitter, Youtube or StackExchange to exist. You are not liable for that content if you provide a means for IP owners to report copyright violations, and promptly take down any content which an IP owner reports as violating. You don't need to get in the middle of whether that's really true; there's a mechanism for the user and IP owner to "duke it out" directly at no risk to you. However you must take the required steps. For instance you must register an agent, and respond timely to DMCA takedown notices, which means you must be reachable as per the law. Your designated agent address must be staffed 9-5. Note that the "Designated Agent" can be the same person as the "Registered Agent" that you already must have when you are an LLC or corporation. And you'll want to be an LLC or corporation by the time you get big enough to worry about copyright lawsuits.

Only a court can decide if use is fair. As Dale stated, we will know whether it was or was not legally fair when a court decides, and it ceased to be appealed. Unfortunately, there is no formula. Remember that fair use is an exception to rules that make copyright infringement illegal, so it occupies a narrow space practically by definition. Fortunately this was already decided (yes, I recognize that this is an old question) Judge Katherine B. Forrest decided in favor of your favorite YouTuber: The Court has held that the Klein video constitutes fair use, and further that the Klein video does not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. and further that: But even if this Court held the Klein video is not fair use, the Court would still dismiss Claim II because defendants clearly had a subjective “good faith belief” that their video did not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. Cf. Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153. It is undisputed that defendants understand the concept of fair use and have an established practice for ensuring their videos make fair use of copyrighted material. But that answer isn't entirely satisfying, is it? Let's get specific. Fair use seems to be something that should be clear to both parties: the copyright holders and the user of copyrighted content. While it is true that the percentage of original content may be of concern, there is no specific percentage nominated in Title 17 Chapter 1 Section 107 of the US Code. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. It takes vigilance on the part of both parties to cohabit this narrow law. Fortunately, YouTube has recently taken measures to ensure that use that should (presumably in their view) be judged as fair will remain live on their site while a dispute process is pursued. This procedure resolves cases outside of formal legal battles, which can be costly for both parties. However, YouTube has pledged to pay legal fees of content providers that are sued for copyright infringement, in special circumstances (esp. when the use was fair, and when a claimant is abusing, again presumably as determined by some legal counsel at YouTube). They discuss similar matters in their FAQ page. Why did YouTube let an abusive claimant remove my video? YouTube takes action to address cases of abuse and misuse in our copyright takedown processes. While we cannot comment on specific cases or our processes, we do look into abuse of our copyright tools and processes, and have a zero-tolerance policy for claimants we've deemed abusive. Misuse of the copyright process (for both takedowns and counter notifications) can result in termination of an account. And remember that courts love precedent Future cases will likely leverage the decisions made in the case you mention. And while the following does not have any real legal value, you may find comfort in knowing: there are many YouTubers out there that heavily leverage others' content, and their videos are still up. Again this is not strictly speaking a precedent, but you can safely assume that in cases where a high-profile YouTuber (say CinemaSins, for instance) uses content from many content owners, and uses a great deal of it, they will likely have come up against claims of unfair use, and have emerged with an intact channel. The aforementioned avenues that YouTube provides should be utilized wherever possible to stay out of court.

Probably not There have not been many cases in this area of the law, and those have mostly dealt with "deep linking", particularly cases where a person knowingly linked to a page bypassing a login or introductory page, when the site was so designed that ordinarily a visitor could only get to other pages by going through such a log-in or intro page. In cases where this deprives the site owner of income, or harms the site's reputation by bypassing disclaimers, this has been held to be actionable. See Nolo's page on Linking, Framing, and Inlining And the Wikipedia article on Deep linking In Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) deep linking was held to be contributory copyright infringement. See The Wikipedia article on the case In that case, the content being linked to had been posted without the authorization of the copyright holder, and no fair use issue was raised by the defense. In general, courts have found that publishing a page on the web invites others to visit it and link to it. In the Wikipedia article on "Deep linking" (linked above) it is said that: In a February 2006 ruling, the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court (Copenhagen) found systematic crawling, indexing and deep linking by portal site ofir.dk of real estate site Home.dk not to conflict with Danish law or the database directive of the European Union. The Court stated that search engines are desirable for the functioning of the Internet, and that, when publishing information on the Internet, one must assume—and accept—that search engines deep-link to individual pages of one's website. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) a US court held that links to copyrighted images as part of an image search were not copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit court of Appeals held that Google's display and caching of thumbnails was fair use, mainly because they were "highly transformative." In Craigslist vs 3Taps (see Jaxenter article) Cragslist objected to repeated scraping by PadMapper, sent a cease and desist order to PadMapper , and blocked its IP addresses. PadMapper used the services of 3Taps to bypass this block with a proxy. Craigslist sued and won. The court held that under the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Cease and Desist order and the IP block were sufficient notice of denial of access, and that further access was unauthorized and a violation of the act. The individual notice was considered essential to this holding. The case of Ryanair vs PR Aviation was brought in the European Court of Justice. There, Ryanair had argued that continued scraping was a violation of its TOS and a copyright infringement. The court held that the owners of publicly available databases were entitled to impose access restrictions. It further held that the applicability of a TOS was a matter for national courts to determine. See also this article on "Essential Legal Issues Associated With Web Scraping". There it is emphasized that much scraping is legal, except when copyright is infringed, or when specific access restrictions under the US CFAA (or similar laws) were violated. Individual facts, such as home prices and sizes, are not subject to copyright protection, although the selection and organization of such facts may be, and a database consisting of such facts may be protected. Pages posted on the web are being made publicly accessible unless specific steps are taken to make them private, such as password protection, requiring a login, or individual notice not to access. The ROBOTS.TXT file, while not technically enforced, is a widely accepted standard, and a visitor is probably entitled to assume that access in accord with the local robots file is authorized, in the absence of specific notice from the site owner to the contrary. Repeated access that negatively impacts the bandwidth or performance of the site might be a different matter.

Obergefell and its implications on other family rights Now that same sex marriage is legal in all 50 states, I was wondering what the impact of this decision would be on laws that limit the abilities of same-sex couples to adopt children and other benefits. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court did not set out the level of scrutiny to be used in determining discrimination against same-sex couples. How would the courts determine the level of scrutiny when deciding cases where same-sex couples are discriminated against? (e.g. the wedding cake issues?)

Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.

As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.

To the extent Constitutionally permitted or as further limited by the state’s own law Constitutionality, a suit may be brought (or a prosecution launched) when the state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. … a state court may only exert personal jurisdiction over an individual or entity with "sufficient minimal contacts" with the forum state such that the particular suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and justice.'" What constitutes sufficient "minimum contacts" has been delineated in numerous cases which followed the International Shoe decision. For example, in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court proclaimed the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the nature and quality of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." For the abortion bill, an organisation that provides funding to Texas residents probably has “minimum contacts”, an out-of-state doctor who treats all-comers probably doesn’t. For employment laws: if the employee is based and work takes place in the state, yes. There is a separate question of which state's law applies which is independent of which state's courts can hear the case. A California court can decide that it can hear a case according to Texas law for example although, in practice, if the California court felt that all of the issues were Texan, they would probably decide they lacked jurisdiction.

The case you identify is not unique. For example, the Unitarian church in Denver has done much the same thing. There is not a legal right to sanctuary in a church. But, as a manner of law enforcement discretion and public relations and customary traditions of law enforcement respect for churches that long predate the formation of the USA, law enforcement routinely acts as if there was a right to sanctuary in churches (in the absence, for example, of an active shooter situation or a hostage crisis or a kidnapping with a missing victim). I am not aware of any case in which immigration officials have taken push to shove and breached a claim of sanctuary by a church protecting an illegal immigrant in a church. In England, where there was an established church, the established Anglican Church historically did have a right to intervene in certain ways in the criminal justice process (e.g. the "privilege of clergy"). UPDATE (February 21, 2017): My original answer was not entirely correct so I am updating this post. It turns out that in 2011 that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement made what was previously a mere custom into an official policy, something I was not previously aware of. The answer, it turns out, is policy and tradition. A 2011 Immigration and Customs Enforcement policy defines churches, schools and hospitals as "sensitive places" where enforcement actions should be limited. And the tradition of sheltering those who need it goes back to the Middle Ages, said David Poundstone with the Mountain View Friends Meeting. The official policy is set forth here. The policy is in the public domain and given the interest this post has generated I post it in full below: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made available Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to supplement existing guidance concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations and clarify what types of locations are covered by these policies. The ICE and CBP sensitive locations policies, which remain in effect, provide that enforcement actions at sensitive locations should generally be avoided, and require either prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official or exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action. DHS is committed to ensuring that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so without fear or hesitation. Do the Department of Homeland Security's policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations remain in effect? U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have each issued and implemented policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. The ICE Sensitive Locations Policy and the CBP Sensitive Locations Policy remain in effect, and these FAQs are intended to clarify what types of locations are covered by those policies. What do the Department of Homeland Security policies require for enforcement actions to be carried out at sensitive locations? The policies provide that enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations such as schools, places of worship, and hospitals should generally be avoided, and that such actions may only take place when (a) prior approval is obtained from an appropriate supervisory official, or (b) there are exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action without supervisor approval. The policies are meant to ensure that ICE and CBP officers and agents exercise sound judgment when enforcing federal law at or focused on sensitive locations, to enhance the public understanding and trust, and to ensure that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so, without fear or hesitation. What does the Department of Homeland Security mean by the term “sensitive location”? Locations covered by these policies would include, but not be limited to: Schools, such as known and licensed daycares, pre-schools and other early learning programs; primary schools; secondary schools; post-secondary schools up to and including colleges and universities; as well as scholastic or education-related activities or events, and school bus stops that are marked and/or known to the officer, during periods when school children are present at the stop; Medical treatment and health care facilities, such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, accredited health clinics, and emergent or urgent care facilities; Places of worship, such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples; Religious or civil ceremonies or observances, such as funerals and weddings; and During public demonstration, such as a march, rally, or parade. What is an enforcement action? An enforcement action covered by this policy is any action taken by ICE or CBP to apprehend, arrest, interview, or search an individual, or to surveil an individual for enforcement purposes. Actions not covered by this policy include activities such as obtaining records, documents, and similar materials from officials or employees, providing notice to officials or employees, serving subpoenas, engaging in Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) compliance and certification visits, guarding or securing detainees, or participating in official functions or community meetings. Will enforcement actions ever occur at sensitive locations? Enforcement actions may occur at sensitive locations in limited circumstances, but will generally be avoided. ICE or CBP officers and agents may conduct an enforcement action at a sensitive location with prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official, or if the enforcement action involves exigent circumstances. When may an enforcement action be carried out at a sensitive location without prior approval? ICE and CBP officers may carry out an enforcement action at a sensitive location without prior approval from a supervisor in exigent circumstances related to national security, terrorism, or public safety, or where there is an imminent risk of destruction of evidence material to an ongoing criminal case. When proceeding with an enforcement action under exigent circumstances, officers and agents must conduct themselves as discreetly as possible, consistent with officer and public safety, and make every effort to limit the time at or focused on the sensitive location. Are sensitive locations located along the international border also protected? The sensitive locations policy does not apply to operations that are conducted within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including the functional equivalent of the border. However, when situations arise that call for enforcement actions at or near a sensitive location within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including its functional equivalent, agents and officers are expected to exercise sound judgment and common sense while taking appropriate action, consistent with the goals of this policy. Examples of operations within the immediate vicinity of the border are, but are not limited to, searches at ports of entry, activities undertaken where there is reasonable certainty that an individual just crossed the border, circumstances where DHS has maintained surveillance of a subject since crossing the border, and circumstances where DHS is operating in a location that is geographically further from the border but separated from the border by rugged and remote terrain. Are courthouses sensitive locations? Courthouses do not fall under ICE or CBP’s policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. Where should I report a DHS enforcement action that I believe may be inconsistent with these policies? There are a number of locations where an individual may lodge a complaint about a particular DHS enforcement action that may have taken place in violation of the sensitive locations policy. You may find information about these locations, and information about how to file a complaint, on the DHS, CBP, or ICE websites. You may contact ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) through the Detention Reporting and Information Line at (888)351-4024 or through the ERO information email address at [email protected], also available at https://www.ice.gov/webform/ero-contact-form. The Civil Liberties Division of the ICE Office of Diversity and Civil Rights may be contacted at (202) 732-0092 or [email protected]. You may contact the CBP Information Center to file a complaint or compliment via phone at 1 (877) 227-5511, or submit an email through the website at https://help.cbp.gov. The policy is drafted in a manner that it doesn't actually prohibit enforcement in a sanctuary, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, but it does call for a process to be followed if this is done, and discourages doing so without prohibiting this action.

The religious freedom argument has no legs following Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. With respect to the "involuntary servitude", this was dealt with in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The engagement of Federal power relied on the interstate commerce clause but the current case, as a state law matter, does not need to do this. Basically, by voluntarily providing the goods/service to the public, they agree that they will provide it in accordance with the law governing that kind of commerce. They are free to not provide it to anyone but if they choose to supply it they must supply it to everyone (subject ti normal rules of commerce like the customer actually paying etc.).

Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.

Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.

Federal law isn't yet settled on whether employers can discriminate based on sexual orientation (see the other answer), so instead let's take a look at Michigan state and local laws: Based on my reading of this Wikipedia page, it appears that the 1967 "Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act" (pdf) has, as of 2018, been interpreted by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. So, yes, if the company qualifies (looks like there are some exceptions for certain "private clubs" and religious organizations), it appears to be a violation of Michigan law to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation for hiring and/or employment decisions. I'd also encourage you to take a look at this list of Michigan cities/municipalities that have passed additional protections for gender orientation. If your business is any any of those areas, you might be subject to more restrictive laws. Regarding an employee who refuses to work with a gay coworker, I'd strongly recommend consulting with a local attorney; my suspicion is that taking action against the gay coworker would be illegal, firing or disciplining the complaining employee would not. (I'm not an attorney, this is not legal advice, I'm just a dude who knows how to read Wikipedia, don't taunt Happy Fun Ball, etc...)

Is it always permissible to republish the Metadata of a website? If you right click in this website and select "View page source", you can find between hundreds of lines of code the following: <meta name="twitter:card" content="summary"> <meta name="twitter:domain" content="law.stackexchange.com"/> <meta property="og:type" content="website" /> <meta property="og:image" itemprop="image primaryImageOfPage" content="http://cdn.sstatic.net/law/img/apple-touch-icon.png?v=ff6a1ab1aaef&a" /> <meta name="twitter:title" property="og:title" itemprop="title name" content="Ask a Question" /> <meta name="twitter:description" property="og:description" itemprop="description" content="Q&A for legal professionals, students, and others with experience or interest in law" /> This information is normally set in order to be found in web search engines or to share in social networks. For example, the meta property called "og:image" contains the link of an image that will be published if we copy/paste this url in Facebook. Or the "meta tags" (not available on this website) will allow some old fashioned search engines find your website. So as this information is meant to be public in order to get found, is there any problem if I copy this information and publish it in another website with attribution? What about the image?

Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)

I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing.

You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.

They are claiming copyright protection so you cannot copy it unless fair dealing exemptions apply. However, there is no copyright in facts - only in they way facts are presented. If you present them in a different way ...

Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either.

I drafted this answer many days ago but did not complete it. My intention is to define red flag notice. However, I'm hitting Submit because I think it's a good question and hope this will inspire other answers. It seems like your immediate question, regarding the DCMA notices which Google is forwarding, is not a legal question. It is a question that can only be answered by Google and is dependent on their practices. Frankly though, it seems to me that Google search results might not be important based on the purpose of your proxy service. However perhaps your user base has evolved. You are a service provider under 17 USC 512(k)(i). If you aren't we need to clear that up! As for the copyright holders, you haven't received notice complying with 17 USC 512 (c)(3)(A)(i-iv). As such you don't have notice. Even if these notices don't qualify then we argue about whether you have red flag notice - based on facts and circumstances. (See Grokster) EDIT TO ADD: 17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online is one of the sections created by the DMCA. It is sometimes referred to as the safe harbor. You can read about it on Wikipedia® page for the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. If you read that Wikipedia® page you will see a short section on Red Flags. They say it as well as I could: [In addition to notice from a copyright holder, the second way] that an OSP can be put on notice that its system contains infringing material, for purposes of section 512(d), is referred to the "red flag" test. The "red flag" test stems from the language in the statute that requires that an OSP not be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The "red flag" test contains both a subjective and an objective element. Subjectively, the OSP must have knowledge that the material resides on its system. Objectively, the "infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances." The reason that notice is important is that the safe harbor provided is only available if you do not know that infringing is happening. Plaintiff's prove knowledge through the letter or through red flags. I am glad that you asked about Grokster, because that was the wrong case! The case to look at is Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, (2nd Cir., 2012). The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement. In other words, you lose your safe harbor protection if you know of facts and circumstances that would lead an ordinary person to know that infringement is happening. So the question for you is - do the letters forwarded by Google mean that you have knowledge and are outside of the safe harbor? Well that's the question that lawyers fight about! In fact Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir., 2013) is all about that fight. If you read that case you will see that Fung was doing a bunch of shit that totally made it completely obvious that he was infringing. And he was earning money directly from it. He was screwed from the start. Now again, this does not really help you with the google blacklist problem, but it should help you understand what you need to do as a service provider to not be complicit in copryright infringement. You really should read the Fung case and 17 U.S.C. § 512 - they will go a long way to help you understand the analysis a court will apply. EDIT Regarding your legal exposure, I always assume that a cease and desist letter will precede a lawsuit. With that said, only you know how much infringing is coming across your server. Fung made his money directly from the infringement. He attracted website visitors specifically because of the infringement. He had emails and other documents proving this. Diebold is interesting because they attempted to use copyright to control the spread of their emails. First the court said no commercial harm and no diminishment of value of the works. Then the court found that the stuff wasn't even subject to copyright. This is obviously not a typical case. But it sounds like you see yourself as OPG in this case. I don't see how you can become a plaintiff against bona fide copyright holders who follow the links as far as your server. As I understand it, you are a reasonable target of the the notices, that's the result of running the proxy. However, I might be getting out of my technical depth here. As I intimated earlier, you might need to seek out some strategic advice regarding dealing with Google and the specific steps you might take to stay in the right side of their enforcement.

According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.

This is unlikely to be a problem. There are many companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an X or the name Xcom. That Twitter has changed to X branding does not substantially change this general situation. With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as X or x.com. Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that x.com could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour. It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp. The x.org domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the x.org domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both x.com and x.org were among the six single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while x.com has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, x.org has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004.

Legal Identity for Conjoined Twins Conjoined Twins are identical twins who share some physical connection. In particular, some share the same body, although both possess separate heads. As such, what are the legal ramifications for dicephalic twins, inasmuch as personhood, citizenship, and criminal prosecution are concerned?

Well they are two distinct people, as you reveal by using plural verbs throughout your question. I don't think anyone would endeavour to argue that two conjoined twins, each possessing his own head, mind and personality, are in fact one person (is that your question?). The difficulty is criminal prosecution. Of course the guilty twin can be proceeded against and tried, but he cannot be incarcerated without unlawfully abridging the freedom of his (innocent) twin. In many jurisdictions this is simply unacceptable. The only example I was able to track down was this headline: Judge Releases Siamese Twin To Avoid Jailing His Brother http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9503EFDC1630E03ABC4A52DFB6678382639EDE Unfortunately, it is behind a paywall. If it is somehow unclear which twin is responsible for a crime committed by one of them, then in any common law jurisdiction—absence proof that they acted together—they must be both be acquitted.

I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a "processing activity" and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the "original" is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.

Nope. 18 U.S. Code § 1028 - Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information (a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section— (1) knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document; [...] (c) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that— (1) the identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States or a sponsoring entity of an event designated as a special event of national significance or the document-making implement is designed or suited for making such an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document; So you're 1) producing a false identification document that 2) appears to be issued by the United States. Whether you'd actually be prosecuted for this is something that I'm not qualified to answer.

Quite possibly such hypothetical non-human intelligent beings would be treated as legal persons, but one cannot be sure in advance. If when humans first encountered such beings, they routinely treated them as persons, that might well influence any later legal treatment. If, on the other hand, humans initial treated such beings as "dumb animals". Eventually, there would no doubt have to be new law passed, or a court ruling on how existing law was to be applied to such beings, rt quite possibly both. One wouldhope that the law would treat such beings as fully human, but such past cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) make tyhst less assuted than one might wish.

The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime.

Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two.

Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.

Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not.

Process Service - Why the secretary of state? I understand from Wikipedia that many states in the US require that companies have a designated agent in each jurisdiction where they do business to accept service. It seems that at least in some states, such as New York, the secretary of state is required to be the agent on which process is served. (a) The secretary of state shall be the agent of every domestic limited liability company that has filed with the department of state articles of organization making such designation and every foreign limited liability company upon which process may be served pursuant to this chapter. (b) No domestic or foreign limited liability company may be formed or authorized to do business in this state under this chapter unless its articles of organization or application for authority designates the secretary of state as such agent. What I haven't been able to figure out is what this accomplishes, assuming the LLC itself is in New York - why can't I accept service at my business address, or my lawyer's address, etc? I find the situation rather confusing in light of the fact that in New York, personal service is required for some family law issues.

What does it accomplish? It guarantees that all corporations doing business in New York can be served. (A company's having an agent for the service of process does not prohibit people from serving the corporation directly. The secretary may be "the agent upon which process may be served" but is not "the sole agent upon which process must be served." And besides, process need not be served on an agent; it can be served on the company itself, at its office or on one of its officers.) With this requirement, New York makes it impossible for a company to avoid service of process by closing or moving its offices, by sending its officers and employees out of state, or by making itself unavailable by any means. No matter what steps a company might take to avoid service of process, the process server can always resort to serving the company's agent: the Secretary of State.

For service by US mail, they will attach a "proof of service" to the mailed document that contains a declaration by the person who placed it in the mail. (I think other jurisdictions may refer to this as an 'affidavit of mailing.') The e-mail notice is an informal preliminary, not the actual proof of service. As to the prohibition on party service, it's to discourage fraud and avoid direct confrontation. It's important to comply because if you don't the court lacks personal jurisdiction and any judgment or order issued is void. Here's a case on it: Caldwell v. Coppola 219 Cal. App. 3d 859 Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate Dist., 1st Div. 1990 The first Practice Act limited personal delivery of the summons to the sheriff of the county where the defendant may be found...Although the Practice Act was amended to permit private individuals to serve notice, the common law rule consistently prohibited an interested person from personal service on the opposing party...In 1872 the Legislature enacted section 410 limiting personal service to a nonparty or the sheriff of the county where the defendant is found...In prohibiting personal service of process by parties, the current section 414.10 continues the intent of section 410. The long-standing prohibition on personal service by the opposing party arises from the adversarial interest present in legal actions and the concern for discouraging fraudulent service. "The common law rule was that an interested party could not serve a summons, the policy behind the rule being that an interested party should not be put in a position whereby he might gain an advantage over his antagonist." (Com. (1929) 3 So.Cal.L.Rev. 129.) Although attorneys are competent to serve process, the prohibition on service by the opposing party is strictly enforced. (See Sheehan v. All Persons(1926) 80 Cal. App. 393 [252 P. 337].) When a party has served notice on the opposing party, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. (In re Marriage of Smith (1982) 135 Cal. App.3d 543 [185 Cal. Rptr. 411].) Personal service by a party renders any judgment or order arising from the proceeding void, despite the defendant's actual notice. (Sullivan v. Sullivan (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 301 [64 Cal. Rptr. 82].[10])

An employer doesn't have the authority to authorize its employees to violate the law. An employee who personally participates in a crime has both criminal and civil liability for the employee's actions. Private sector employers have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the actions of their employees taken in the scope of their duties. In other words, anything that an employee of a private sector employer is liable for, the employer is also liable for. Governmental employers do not have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the civil rights violations of the employees. Direct civil as opposed to vicarious civil liability, and criminal liability for an employer (governmental or private) is generally limited to acts carried out by employees of the entity at the direction of senior management or pursuant to a policy, explicit or implicit, of the employer. This said, it is the nature of large employers to break tasks into component parts spread over many employees in different parts of the employing entity. In some circumstances, an individual employee's role may be such that the employee lacks sufficient information about the overall course of action of the employer to know that their actions are part of an overall course of conduct by the employer that constitutes a crime or tort. For example, to retreat to an old school example, suppose that there is an employee who sits in front of a shredding machine all day and feeds paper into and clears paper jams, etc. whose job is to shred whatever documents are put in a bin next to his work station. This guy, who makes no decisions regarding what is to be shredded and has no real knowledge of why documents are being shredded, probably doesn't have criminal or civil liability if his labor is used to illegal destroy some documents. For all the shredder guy knows, he could simply be destroying redundant copies of documents to free up space in the filing cabinets while a single archival copy is retained. Typically, criminal laws require some level of mens rea (i.e. intent) which may be intent to do something in particular, it may be knowledge of certain facts, or what have you. An employee is generally only going to face criminal liability is the employee who carries out the wrongful act on behalf of the employer does so with the requisite knowledge and intent set forth in the criminal statute.

Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of "long arm jurisdiction." The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued "personally availed themselves" of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on "choice of law" require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld<1>, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. <1> The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states "this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts." A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the "dormant commerce clause", or the "full faith and credit clause", or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the "due process clause" of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the "privileges and immunities clause." The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.

You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so.

In the U.S.: To my knowledge all states and jurisdictions that with a "sales tax" technically have a "use" tax, which means the tax liability falls on the purchaser. However, they require "businesses" (whose exact definition varies by jurisdiction) to collect and remit that tax on behalf of "consumers" (which can also vary, e.g., to exclude businesses that resell). Historically consumers have avoided paying use taxes by purchasing from out-of-state businesses that are not subject to their home states' laws on withholding the use tax: while technically a violation of the tax law neither consumers nor states have had an interest in calculating or auditing use taxes owed, except in the case of very large and unusual transactions. There is a large effort underway by states and "brick-and-mortar" stores that lose business to this virtual "mail order tax exemption" to subject out-of-state businesses to the requirement of collecting use taxes on behalf of the state. A few online businesses (notably Amazon) have acquiesced to this demand. To answer your question: In the U.S., an individual who is not making a "business" of selling items or services is generally exempt from the requirement to collect sales tax. It is the purchaser who has the legal obligation to declare and pay tax on such transactions. But purchasers rarely do.

Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.

There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.

How can one go about amending the law? If one feels that the law is not clear enough, or might have loopholes that should be fixed, how would one go about starting a process to possibly amend it? For example, in Texas, a lot of landlords charge exuberant fees for residential lease re-assignment, even if the tenant goes about finding a new person to whom the lease would be reassigned all by themselves. E.g., not only would the new tenant still need to pay application and administrative fees (which often amount to 200 USD in Texas), but also the old tenant would still have to pay a non-trivial re-letting fee (which I've seen being anywhere from 200 USD to 85% of the monthly rent). This doesn't make much sense.

Call, write, or visit the office of your legislative representative. This page can help you figure out who that is. They have the ability to introduce a bill into the legislature that would change the law, and that's the best way to change a law like what you're trying to do here. Be sure to tell the legislator exactly what you think should be changed (e.g. "We should change section ABC of the Texas Property Code, < citation>, to say that 'no landlord can charge a fee of more than X for Y in Z conditions,' or something similar.") Then concisely summarize your reasons why. Consider consulting politics for more strategy on who and how to ask to increase the probability of success. Be sure to give some consideration to the reason why the landlords charge such fees and the costs they have to incur associated with lease assignments/changes. Try to craft a proposal that addresses those concerns, perhaps in some alternative way, and communicate the degree to which you think you understand and have addressed those opposing views. Also try to think about what new challenges or issues would arise if your proposal went into the law. The job of your representative and/or their staff includes listening to (a concise presentation of) your concerns and how you think the law should be changed, and representing those views in the legislature. S/he also has other constituents, including landlords, to answer to as well, and has to balance those potentially opposing interests before deciding what (if anything) to do. The degree to which you think the representative listens and represents your interests may determine whose campaign you support (including who you vote for and what you say to your friends/neighbors/family) in the next election. Another strategy is to negotiate with your next landlord to take those fees out of your lease agreement, and then the contract which governs your specific agreement might be changed to address this concern. If you want to change the law for everybody, you might have to convince a lot of people that it's a good idea. If you want to change the "law" for what affects you personally, you might only have to convince one person (your own landlord) that such a change is a good idea, at least in your case.

You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent.

Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble?

you cannot be compelled to accept a modified lease that you never agreed to, and that was not even shown to you when you discussed the issue. You should notify the management in writing at once that you reject this "offer" and do not plan to transfer under those terms.

First, you will need to look at your existing lease. Most leases automatically transfer to month-to-month after the initial term ends. It is quite probable that your landlord said "fine" to the month-to-month extension because it was already part of your existing lease. Second, you will need to look at your existing lease and see what notification was required for you to move out. Typically, a lease transitions to month-to-month and in your lease it probably already said that you needed to provide 30 days notice even if you were leaving at the end of the lease's original term. Third, yes, you are on the hook for rent until you give 30 days notice. Your "verbal agreement" is a contract and your landlord agreed to allow you to stay in the apartment as long as you gave him 30 days notice before moving out and paid your rent every month. Most of this is probably already spelled out in your current lease. Even if it isn't, you have indicated that you have a verbal contract with your landlord.

You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.

A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.

No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off.

Is it legal to share a script that scrapes a website and presents in a different format? Most news sites and tech blogs provide only a summary in their rss feeds. If I write a script that scrapes their website and extracts some useful data, can I share the script as open source. Does it depend on each and every website and needs prior permission? If scraping is not allowed without permission, who is guilty, the person who wrote the script or the one who used them? Note 1: I am not redistributing website's content, just sharing the script that helps to read the content in different form. I am specifically interested in Indian and US Law. Note 2: The script may be specific to particular website and may access data that is accessible only with user's login credentials. Note 3: script means a program or software application E.g nytimes offer subscription offer at $3.5 a week for web+smartphone access. But for tablet access, it is $5.00 a week. Can I sell an app for tablet that parses the page from the web interface and converts it to tablet friendly format. The app will use login credentials from the user to login using a virtual browser to download the content and format it such that it is better readable in tablet? Do I have to get permission from nytimes to sell the app? I don't care about this special case but in general can the provider legally restrict how the content is consumed by the end user.

Check the website's terms of service. Check to see if you're violating these terms, and check to see if the script you are making enables other people to violate them. Courts don't often look kindly on actions whose sole purpose is enabling someone else to do something that is prohibited. If you're making a script that helps people do something they're allowed to do, in a way that's better for at least somebody and makes nobody worse off, that's often a different story. Major websites will generally indicate whether or not you're allowed to do this. Some sites are fairly strict about prohibiting scraping (e.g. Craigslist, which at one point shut down Padmapper's alternative more-useful presentation of their content). Others, like Wikipedia, much more actively encourage reusing content from their sites as long as you meet certain conditions such as a link back to the original source.

The Right to Access is pretty absolute. However, there are some limitations: Is the service even the Data Controller for the data in question? Here, you're talking about notes of one user about another. Is the platform the controller for the notes, or would the note-taker be the controller? Or both, jointly? If the platform weren't a controller but merely a data processor for these notes, it would be illegal for them to disclose the information. Trish also correctly points out that the GDPR does not apply to processing for purely personal or household purposes, e.g. personal social media use. So GDPR would not provide a basis to compel a user to disclose their notes to the data subject, assuming that the note-taker is covered by this exception. Of course, this exception wouldn't apply if the notes are taken for other purposes, e.g. professional networking. Also, this exception doesn't affect the platform. There is an explicit limitation to the right of access in Art 15(4): The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. Disclosing user A's notes about user B to user B would likely violate the privacy rights of A. The notes are both A's and B's personal data. However, the correct balance depends on context. E.g. an employer probably can't refuse to provide access to a performance assessment merely because it was written by an identifiable manager. The UK ICO has provided detailed guidance on this aspect to the right of access. They propose a three-step test: Step one – Does the request require disclosing information that identifies another individual? For example, it might be possible to redact other people's information (but not in your Mastodon notes example). Step two – Has the other individual provided consent? Step three – Is it reasonable to disclose without consent? What is reasonable is highly context-dependent, but UK data protection law gives some concrete criteria to consider. The EU EDPB has draft guidance on the Right to Access. They note that the Art 15(4) can cover a wide range of rights, not just other people's privacy rights. But as in all things, the data controller is required to strike an appropriate balance between user A and B's conflicting rights. In the Mastodon user notes scenario, I think that the note author's rights to privacy should be considered more important than the data subject's right to access those notes, thus making it possible to reject that part of a DSAR under Art 15(4) GDPR. If we assume that the note-taker A is a (joint) controller for these notes, then it would also be necessary to consult them before making a decision about the access request.

The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.

From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.

Providing they meet the basic requirements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) then they are binding contracts. Consideration is not an issue: the site provides the content, the user provides eyeballs on it. Consent is the major stumbling block. Online Terms of Service are either presented as browsewrap or clickwrap or sign-up wrap. A browsewrap provides notice of the terms of service but there is no specific user assent to them. A clickwrap requires the user to check a box specifically about agreeing to the terms (with or without user registration). A sign-up wrap presents user registration with a "Sign up" and provides notice to the terms at the point of service but doesn't have a check button specifically for the terms. As an example, Stack Exchange provides two types of wrap. For the casual user, there is a Legal link at the bottom of the page - a browsewrap. If you sign-up, you go to a page that says "By clicking "Sign up", you agree to our terms of service, ..." - a sign-up wrap. Whether a Terms of Service is an enforcable contract depends on whether the user provided notice, whether the user gave consent and whether enforcing the agreement is conscionable. Clickwraps and sign-up wraps have the advantage over browsewraps in the first two of these. Assuming that the contract terms are unremarkable (i.e. they are within the range of "normal" for that type of contract) a clickwrap will normally create an enforcable contract - Forrest v Verizon and Motise v America Online being the relevant case law. Browsewraps are more problematic: Specht v Netscape said no contract but where the browsewrap is shown prominently and repeatedly they can form an enforceable contract - Hubbert v Dell and Cairo v CrossMedia Services. Zaltz v Jdate was a sign-up wrap and did create an enforceable contract. All of these turn on the facts of how the information was was presented to the user. For example, in Meyer v Kalanick the Second Circuit said: Where there is no evidence that the offeree had actual notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.[sic] So, in general, Terms of Service are enforcable as a contract if a reasonably prudent user could, on inquiry (e.g. by clicking a link), make themselves aware of the terms. This also explains why skrinkwraps (when software came on actual physical media in a shrink-wrapped box with the terms inside) were not enforcable - a reasonably prudent user could not inform themselves of the terms without unwrapping a product they didn't yet own.

Users grant StackExchange a licence: You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. That should be determinative, but there was also some question as to whether StackExchange users can be deemed to have agreed to these terms. For this reason, I'll also review some case law relating to what are known as "click-wrap" agreements where the terms are made available via a hyperlink. In my opinion, StackExchange's way of displaying links to their Terms of Service during registration meets the requirements that have in the past been sufficient for courts to deem the user to have read and agreed to those Terms of Service. See for example, Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F. 3d 110 (2012), especially the section titled "Notice" for reference to other cases: A person can assent to terms even if he or she does not actually read them, but the "offer [must nonetheless] make clear to [a reasonable] consumer" both that terms are being presented and that they can be adopted through the conduct that the offeror alleges constituted assent. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F. 3d 17 (2002)1 frames the notice test in terms of a "reasonably prudent offeree" and whether they would "have known of the existence of license terms". In Guadagno v. E Trade Bank*, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (2008), the court found that clicking on an acknowledgement icon near an underlined, highlighted link to an agreement was acceptance of that agreement: In the instant case, a highlighted, underlined link to the Agreement was directly above the acknowledgement box, along with notice that "The following contain important information about your account(s)." A reasonably prudent offeree would have noticed the link and reviewed the terms before clicking on the acknowledgment icon. I think the most similar case is Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 Dist. Court, SD New York (2012), although not at an appellate level. In order to have obtained a Facebook account, Fteja must have clicked the second "Sign Up" button. Accordingly, if the phrase that appears below that button is given effect, when Fteja clicked "Sign Up," he "indicat[ed] that [he] ha[d] read and agree[d] to the Terms of Policy." This is very similar to StackExchange's sign-up process: That court outlined a lot of case law and concluded that "Fteja assented to the Terms of Use and therefore to the forum selection clause therein". A DMCA takedown could be successful if submitted by somebody other than the StackExchange user where that other party asserts copyright ownership in the contributed material. This could happen if a StackExchange user infringed copyright by posting material that they didn't have the right to reproduce. 1. Opinion authored by now Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor.

Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.

Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site.

Do commission only employees need to be paid vacation pay? Note: I'm making this company as if it were located in Ontario, Canada. So all the proper rules and regulations of that region would apply to this company. I'm currently using the software Quickbooks to set up a mock company and figure out how to pay employees that are commission only. When I create a new employee in the company I select the commission-only option for payment which is what I want. But after selecting this option the employee's vacation pay policy becomes this: As a commission-only employee, John does not accrue vacation or sick time. Any vacation or sick time policies you've set up do not apply to John. I was under the impression that ALL employees have to be paid a minimum of 4% vacation pay. After looking on some of the government's website regarding vacation pay and commissions, I can't seem to find any mention of an exemption for commission only employees. Thus contradicting what the Quickbooks software is telling me. Therefore my question is: Do commission only employees need to be paid vacation pay?

I am not a lawyer. I am not your lawyer. The Labour Program has issued an interpretation on the definition of "wages", and specifically includes commission. In section 166: “wages” « salaire » “wages” includes every form of remuneration for work performed but does not include tips and other gratuities; and in Section 183: “vacation pay” « indemnité de congé annuel » “vacation pay” means four per cent or, after six consecutive years of employment by one employer, six per cent of the wages of an employee during the year of employment in respect of which the employee is entitled to the vacation; And assuming that the employer and employee are, in fact, in an employee-employer relationship, it is likely that he/she will be entitled to 4% of the wages during the year of employment, including commission.

No Via the FTC (emphasis added): The Cooling-Off Rule does not cover sales that are: ... made entirely online, or by mail or telephone;

The German law mandates minimum notice periods for work contracts. But there is no restriction on maximum notice periods, as long as the employee does not have a longer notice period than the employer (§622 BGB de|en). So yes, in theory you could negotiate that the company is not allowed to fire you in the first 4 years. But I would find it unlikely that they would agree to that. When the stock options are really your only reason why you want to avoid getting terminated in the first 4 years, then they are more likely to be open to negotiations about the stock option clause than about the termination clause.

No First, there does not appear to be unlawful discrimination: there is nothing to suggest that you are a member of a protected class and were terminated because of that. Second, you were given no reason for your dismissal so your employer is not claiming you were terminated for just cause. So, in BC, an employer "can end an employee's job by giving written working notice or pay" and this is perfectly legal. For someone who worked for "about 6 months", the notice/pay period is 1 week. So either they must give you 1 weeks work or pay you 1 weeks wages.

Anyone who is an employee as defined in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 USC 201 et seq.(or parallel state minimum wage laws) and is not within the scope of an exemption to the minimum wage law, must be paid minimum wage. The relevant question is whether or not the person is an employee who is not exempt from the minimum wage requirement as defined in the FLSA. The question is a mixed issue of fact and law in which the characterization given to the relationship by the company and the person doing the work is one factor, but not the only or the controlling factor, in determining employee status. The exact nature of the work governs whether the FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies or not. For example, "employee" is defined for puroses of the FLSA at 29 USC 203(e) to exclude "any individual employed by an employer engaged in agriculture if such individual is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of the employer’s immediate family" and certain kinds of volunteers. Piecework pay is allows under certain limited circumstances by 29 USC 207(g) when the usual result is that reasonable workers earn the minimum wage. Tipped employees (which is a form of revenue sharing) also receive special treatment. Most of the exemptions are found at 29 USC 213. Most relevant to your question is 29 USC 213(a)(1) which includes an exception for an "outside saleman" who is paid on a straight commission basis, and 29 USC 213(a)(5) and (a)(6) which contain exclusions for certain farming and fishing occupations. Straight commission compensation without regard to the minimum wage is generally not permitted with regard to an employee who is an "inside salesman" (e.g. someone who works at a retail store in a mall or at a phone bank for a telemarketing company), or for anyone other than an outside saleman in non-agricultural jobs. Independent contractor status generally depends upon the degree of control that the company has over the manner in which the work is performed, the assignability of the contract to do the work, and the extent to which the worker does work for many different companies on a contract basis while complying with employment related laws for the contactor's own employees (e.g. worker's compensation). The working for many different companies on a contract basis prong of the test is frequently controlling in practice. Six of the main factors considered by the Labor Department in determining independent contractor status are discussed in Fact Sheet #13. A true independent contractor may be paid on a revenue sharing basis without regard to minimum wage, although in practice, if this results in the independent contractor earning less than minimum wage, there will be strict scrutiny of the practice. Typical independent contractor arrangements that would be allowed would include an attorney working on a contingent fee basis, or an independent broker or realtor working on a straight commission bais. More often than not, a true independent contractor is someone you couldn't even imagine being an employee subject to minimum wage laws of the company in light of the overall relationship and often this will involve a business to business contract, rather than a business to a non-professional individual contract with only personal services involved. There are some safe harbor provisions that if met can insure independent contract status, but it is very common for someone who legally is an employee to be misclassified as an independent contractor in an attempt (often futile if the matter is pressed by regulatory or tax officials) to avoid compliance with laws incident to the employment relationship.

How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.

Without commenting on the relatively strange situation itself, it is still useful to actually read what was actually said than what was described in a letter from a third person, even if the relayed information is technically true. The supposed basis for the claim of a zero salary is from an email allegedly sent by the department head (appendix 15): In short, you are not teaching in 2022/2023 and you have not submitted the required outline of your research or other engagement. I am very sorry that we cannot establish that you will be doing any work expected of a faculty member. Thus we cannot pay you. Starting with the Fall semester, your pay will be reduced to zero and you will be placed on unpaid personal leave. Essentially, the professor is being put on an unpaid leave because allegedly he is not doing any work. Consequently, minimum wage laws are not engaged even if the professor is not exempt as teachers since he is not being required to do any work. In the U.S., employers generally can do this (unless a work contract provides otherwise); in many circumstances, it is called being laid off (though the term has attracted a permanent connotation in parts of North America) or being suspended. An indefinite unpaid leave can be considered constructive dismissal if the employer does not reasonably allow the employee to return to work. It may not be constructive dismissal if the unpaid leave is prescribed by binding employer policies or because the employee refuses to work (and the employer allows the employment relationship to continue). Even if it is constructive dismissal, it is not automatically wrongful.

What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.

Can a country start sending troops before declaring war? Can a country send invasion forces before an official declaration of war? So, if the US wants to invade France, can they, under international law, officially declare war by the time their aircraft carriers are already half way across the Atlantic, with clear orders to invade? Would it be different if they were going through their own territory, or a third country's, with permission?

This is a hard question, but a good question. The following relates to the issue from the perspective of the USA. You ask "...if the US wants to invade France, can they officially declare war by...", You have to make clear what you mean by "can". If you mean whether or not the US has the physical ability to do this, then of course they do. If you mean whether they are allowed, then this is another question. When you ask whether something is allowed, then you have to make reference to a moral code or a law that determines what is and what isn't allowed (legal). Normally each country will have laws that govern what is and what isn't legal for it's citizens to do. That hard part is how this applies to nations. There are two sides to the question. (1) What are the leaders allowed to do under their own laws, (the domestic laws) (2) what are countries as entities allowed to do? (the international laws) It sounds a bit like you are asking about the second thing. Here treaties govern what is and what isn't "legal". However, usually when someone breaks a law, other entities have the power to enforce that law and decide (judge) whether the person has broken the law. The question is: who decides whether a country has broken a treaty or an international law? And if a law is broken, what exactly can be done about it? This is hard to answer. Consider for example the conflict in Ukraine. Here many will argue that Russia has piratically invaded Ukraine. There should be war between the nations. But Russia denies this and other world powers have done little beyond imposing sanctions. This illustrates how hard it is to deal with this question. One question that comes up is what the purpose of international treaties are if a country can just violate them without much consequence. Pointing out two points about this. (1) If, for example, a president wants to convince his/her own congress that the country should engage in war, then it makes a stronger point if you can show how the country you want to engage has violated international trities. (2) After you have won a war, you might want to prosecute the leaders of the loosing power. Here you will stand stronger if you can make references to some international law that existed before the conflict started. This second point is illustrated in the Nuremberg principles. Here it was exactly stated that "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." According to the US constitution "Congress shall have power to ... declare War". That means that historically Congress has the power to decide where to wage war. The War Powers Resolution says, for example, that "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...". Note that this doesn't mean that the US has do formally declare war before going to war. Example: The Iraq War was authorized by Congress, but there never was a formal declaration of war. It is interesting that you ask about the timing for when the declaration should be given. The Japanese wanted to deliver their declaration of war just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because of issues with decrypting the message from Japan to the Japanese Embassy, the declaration wasn't delivered until after the attack. Remember also in all of this that the winning party to a conflict, usually decides what was and wasn't legal! One good reference for more on all of this is the report by the Congressional Research Service called "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications". Here you can see more on what I have tried (and failed?) to say above.

On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).

Yes. Arbitration is a private, voluntary process, so two parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any dispute. However, because it is voluntary, Country B generally has no obligation to participate in the process once you've inititated it.

This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law.

The Iran lawsuit depended on a statute directed against Iran, not applicable to the Chinese government. The Alien Tort Claims Act, which gives US federal courts original jurisdiction for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States", neither of which is likely to describe the allegation against the Chinese government. The Chinese government probably would not entertain such a suit, and US courts do not have jurisdiction. It is also unclear how much US property is owned by the government of the PRC which could be seized: reports simply talk about "owned by the Chinese" without distinguishing government vs. private ownership.

Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? Yes. Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself? It depends. Who is on board, where did they come from, what have they got in their pockets, etc. This may be helpful Notice 8: sailing your pleasure craft to and from the UK When arriving direct from a country outside the EU (the Channel Islands are regarded as outside the EU for this purpose), you must phone the National Yacht line on Telephone: 0845 723 1110. You will need to inform the Yachtline if any of the following apply: etc etc Since France is in the EU, whether you need to phone the NYL to report your departure from the UK depends on a complicated bunch of conditions you can read in the link above. Maybe the French have similar rules? The RYA say Some countries specify ports of entry (ports where one may lawfully enter a country), which should be used by a vessel arriving from abroad. It is often a requirement that you proceed directly to such a port of entry on entering territorial waters. A vessel arriving in a country from outside its customs territory should fly the Q flag until it has been given clearance from the authorities. Even once clearance has been given, some countries may ask to inspect the vessel’s papers periodically, for example at each port of call. and so on.

The constitution has the "Treaty Clause" (article II, section 2) which states that the president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur". There is no legal concept of "signing" a treaty in the US, and only ratification counts. It is unclear what limits there are to enforcement of treaties in lieu of statutory enactment. Medellín v. Texas held that While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on that basis This was a reversal of prior trends going back to Ware v. Hylton based on the Supremacy Clause, that all Treaties … which shall be made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby But Medellín doesn't mean "never": you have to "parse a treaty's text to determine if it is self-executing", which is a different ball of wax.

Sharing intelligence is an act of war inconsistent with neutrality However, so is supplying arms to a belligerent. A neutral State must never assist a party to the armed conflict, in particular it must not supply warships, ammunition or other war materials directly or indirectly to a belligerent power, but otherwise its trade with the belligerent States remains unaffected. However, it’s not a war crime.

Is it legal to restrict housing to certain occupations? I've spoken with a landowner in the rural area of Saratoga, California, who owns a single parcel with more land than he knows what to do with, and I asked him why doesn't he build an MDU or some such, to which he replied that the city will never allow to re-zone and/or split the parcel of the land he owns, and that neighbours and such will generally be against any such arrangements, because it'll increase crime and drive the property values down. However, what if said MDU had a restriction that only certain occupations could partake in it? Would it be possible to build a condo or an apartment complex, yet have some kind of restrictions such that you have to be an engineer or executive or some such, in order to either own or lease the condo / apartment? Or, perhaps, that each unit has to, (1), have at least a single occupant with an income much larger than what's normally considered adequate to service the rent, and, (2), no roommates from craigslist unrelated to the occupant? Could it be made that some such covenant has to survive all future sale/lease/rent of any unit?

Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy).

The actual law in BC, the Residential Tenancy Act, guaranteed a tenant's rights to the rental unit and the common areas, and restricts the landlord's right to enter the rental unit. Common areas are distinct from the rental unit. A common areas is "any part of residential property the use of which is shared by tenants, or by a landlord and one or more tenants", and a rental unit is a "living accommodation rented or intended to be rented to a tenant". In this case, that would be the room. There is no restriction at all on landlord's access to common areas, and there is no requirement that landlord access to common areas be for specific purposes. Access to the rental unit, on the other hand, must be for a reasonable purpose.

I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.

Firstly, your "apartment" doesn't prohibit anything; Your tenancy contract does. A terminology nitpick, but one that can shed some light on what is actually happening. TLDR: Your right to bear arms isn't being infringed, its being traded away. An unreasonable trade may be invalidated by the courts. Firearms restrictions are far less likely to be voided than speech content limitations. Yes, you have the right to bear arms(whatever exact meaning of that is). You also have the right to voluntarily agree to a binding agreement limiting that right, in exchange for a consideration. Compare a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). You have the right to freedom in your speech: you also have the right to agree to binding limits on your freedom of speech, in return for consideration (such as money or access to information). Every contract is structured in the same general way: Party A agrees to do or avoid doing certain things, in exchange for Party B agreeing to do or avoid doing certain things. So, in essence, what the apartment contract says is, that you agree to do or not do some things (including paying rent), in return for your landlord temporarily granting you some rights(such as the right to reside(generally exclusive), the right to control the space, etc. ), and imposing some obligations on themselves (which vary from place to place). In your case, one of the things that you are trading is a limitation on your right to bear arms(note that you can still bear arms, just not on the property in question). Now one thing to note is that courts have the power to enforce contracts; they also have the power to void contracts, in part or in full, if they are illegal or "unconscionable". In general, restricting (the content of) speech is not reasonable (e.g. having a general noise level restriction is reasonable), so is more likely to be struck down than one restricting firearms on the rented property.

Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area.

Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.

You have to take the General Notes part in its full context. The relevant clause says The term “Common Area” as used herein means all portions of the Project except the Units, and without limiting the generality of the forgoing, all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium, gas, water pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units)… The most proximal expression is "wires and other utility installations", so construing "outlets" as covering gas, water, sewers, ducts etc. would be contrary to the interpretive principle known as the Last Antecedent rule. Nothing in the context requires a broad-scope interpretation of the "outlet" exception. This being in the US, courts would use ordinary English usage to understand what an "outlet" is, that is, even if "you could argue" that something is an outlet, the term "outlet" is used in the context of buildings to refer to an electrical outlet. The way this works is that you would need to get an expert witness to testify as to the common meaning of "outlet" in this context. There are two approaches to doing that. One is to get testimony of a contractor, as to what they mean when they say "outlet". However, contractors speak a special language (and not consistently so), and it's dubious that either party of a contract could have understood "outlet" in a special way shared by contractors. So the other approach (exemplified by Heller) is to call on a language and usage expert. A DIY approach is to google things like "sewer outlet", "electrical outlet" and so on, to see if you get many hits. You do not have a sewer outlet in your unit. You might have a water outlet if you work on cars and brought one inside the unit, but clearly context dictates that that is not relevant. The way courts resolve these matters is to determine what the ordinary meaning of a term is, and set aside specilized and technical meanings. See for example Nix v. Hedden where SCOTUS ruled that a tomato is not a legal fruit, because scientific definitions notwithstanding, a tomato is clearly a vegetable in common usage. Note that I am specifically addressing the question you posed, about "outlets". IO believe that attention to "outlets" is misguided. Focus should be on the regulation about "the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage", which is what they are invoking. By your description, the hole in the pipe which constitutes the source of the leak was behind the wall. The problem is that "between units" can have two very different meanings, one being "from one unit to another", and the other is "which takes place in the area that exists between units". Since you do not own the area behind the walls (presumably: property descriptions can be less than totally clear), there was no leak from one unit to the other. There was a leak which took place in the space between units. The definitions for the project clearly indicate that such behind-the-wall stuff is "common area". If a breech in the drain pipe occurs outside the wall and leaked into the unit below, that would be a leak outside the common are, and would be a leak between units in the "from one to the other" sense, although the water would have to pass through the common area. But if it originated on the other side of the wall, it originated in the common area which is always present between units. Suppose, being devil's advocate, that you own not just the stuff inside the walls but also the stuff behind the walls, up to the next unit's walls. But if you apply that analysis of property boundaries, then the adjacent unit's property is the stuff inside his walls and between, up to your walls, so unless you are very special, you don't own the area between the walls. So to reiterate, "outlet" is a irrelevant. What matters is the interpretation of "leak between". Under neither interpretation of that expression is a leak behind the wall the responsibility of the person "upstairs".

No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.

Typo on Lease, Who is Responsible? The lease agreement for my rental home clearly says that the landlord is responsible for paying for garbage services. However, after asking why I hadn't received our garbage bins yet, the leasing company told me that there was a typo on the lease and that I am responsible for all utilities (citing advertisements for the house which said as much). Who is legally responsible for paying for the garbage utilities?

The advertisement is simply an invitation to treat. The lease was the contract offer, and your signature and payment were acceptance of that offer. The advertisement doesn't bind either party (other than as prohibited by deceptive advertising statutes), and you are allowed to negotiate an offer that differs from the invitation to treat.

The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).

The difference is that the person was originally invited to live there, so they do have a claim of residency. A tenant recently allowed someone to move into his apartment as his caregiver. This is the problem here, the person was invited to live in there in exchange for a service. This person now has a legal right to occupy the property and the eviction process must be followed. If the person broke into the house and occupied a room, that is trespassing since there was no original legal right to occupy the property. The trespasser cannot claim any legal right to the property and therefore is trespassing. Can it really be so that he is legally bound to allow these strangers to share his apartment with him because of a technicality that classifies them as "squatters"? Unfortunately yes. This should be a lesson to the tenant that they need to properly run background checks and have solid contracts with live-in caregivers/roommates. Unfortunately this is not only inconvenient, but will probably be an expensive lesson as well.

Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does.

I do not have anything official proving that I gave him the 2-months worth deposit What did you do, hand him a wad of cash? Pay by check, and put what it's for on the memo line. You've been there for nine months and there are several other people who can testify that you've been living there, so it would be difficult to claim that you aren't a renter. If you can show that the landlord is aware of your residence, that definitely helps even further, as does receiving mail there, registering to vote or with the DMV with that address, etc. Question 1 : what would be the best course of action to force the landlord to give me the requested lease agreement? You can't "force" someone to give you an agreement. That's kinda part of the definition of the word "agreement". If you find the conditions unacceptable, you can find another place to rent. When I asked the landlord about what he was planning to do regarding that, his answer was that it was not his business. It doesn't seem like it is. You could take the money you would have given to the other roommate, and give it to the power company instead. If paying for the utilities is part of the renters' responsibilities, and the renters are not paying for the utilities, then it's their choice to not have power. In California, landlords are required to make power available, but that just means that they can't interfere with you purchasing it from the power company, not that the landlord has to pay for it (if the landlord had agreed to pay for it, and isn't, then you can deduct the cost from the rent, but you can't simply withhold all rent, and your question indicates that the landlord hasn't agreed to pay for power anyway). Am I protected in any way, or can the landlord just come in my room and throw everything away, or worse just point me with a gun and force me to move? It would be difficult for the landlord to get rid of you, and would probably take several months to do legally. Performing an eviction himself, rather than getting the sheriff's department to do it, would expose him to serious charges, especially if a gun were used. Besides criminal charges, "If this or other unlawful methods, such as locking a tenant out or seizing his possessions before an eviction process has ended, are used to force a tenant to leave a property, a landlord may be subject to fees up to $100 per day of unlawful method use." http://homeguides.sfgate.com/tenants-rights-utility-billing-california-8073.html However, while the legal process will take a long time, at the end you will still be liable for back rent, and you will have an eviction on your record, which will make it harder to rent in the future.

The Supply of Goods and Services Act doesn't apply here. Section 1(1) says that the only contracts concerning goods covered by the Act are those 'under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods'. A lease doesn't transfer the cooker to you: it gives you exclusive possession of a dwelling containing the cooker. The cooker remains the property of the landlord. Assuming that your lease is for fewer than seven years, the statutory provision for a landlord's repair obligations is set out in s11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Unfortunately this does not help you: although the landlord is responsible for maintaining the gas and electricity supply equipment, the Act specifically excludes 'appliances for making use of the supply of ... gas or electricity'. The text of your lease may have specific provisions for the repair and upkeep of the cooker, so you should read it carefully and seek advice if you are unsure. Most landlords will leave copies of the instruction manuals for installed appliances. You should ask for a copy of the manual if one was not provided and can't be found in the flat. In practical terms, you should report the fault in writing to the landlord (or managing agent if you have one), saying that you are unable to use the cooker and that it is a potential danger given that you don't understand how it works. At the very least, you should ensure that the condition of the cooker is reflected correctly on your inventory.

Lying in itself ("of course you will get a wifi signal here") is not a crime. However, if you have proof that the lies were intended to benefit your landlord at your expense ("You won't sign the lease unless there's wifi? No problem") and that they actually did so ("You've signed the lease, it's too late to back out"), he may be guilty of fraud, which is a civil wrong and may be a crime. You would be well advised to consult a lawyer before going amy further, since there are probably ten people believing themselves to be victims of fraud for every one who actually is so in legal terms. The lawyer will also probably tell you that the best you can hope for is restoration to the state before the lies (in my example, the lease is cancelled and you get your deposit back), though the authorities will look at prosecuting the landlord.

This article basically says "it depends": If it is genuinely used to improve tenant safety then that is OK, but if it is used to track your private life then that is not acceptable. Cameras that cover communal areas used by several properties are generally acceptable, but cameras covering individual properties are much less so. It sounds like this falls into the latter category. Assuming you haven't got the camera yet, I suggest you write to the Landlord asking for a written justification of the cameras, and a policy for the use of the camera. E.g. it will only be viewed if an incident is reported. Once you have the justification you can then look for inconsistencies (e.g. if they aren't planning to snoop at random times, how are they going to notice someone up to no good? And how would they tell?) You could also just say "no". The installation of this camera probably counts as a material variation of the rental agreement. You could also propose a compromise: you will install the camera, but only provide footage as you see fit rather than allowing your landlord to view the camera at any time. CCTV installations are covered by the GDPR, so you should ask your landlord for the associated paperwork. Amongst other things they will need to state how long they want to keep the footage and provide a justification for that. "We might want to re-run it" is not a justification. Having all this stuff written down will help if you ever suspect he is abusing the footage. Edit Another thought: does the landlord own other properties? Are they having cameras installed too? If not, why not? They should have a policy about this.

In the case that multiple wills with conflicting terms are left, which one prevails? Suppose I die and, on the day before, I have signed two wills with conflicting terms. If, for some reason, it is not possible to determine which of these was signed first, which terms will prevail? How is this decided?

In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures.

Powers of Attorney die with the principal Once the subject dies, they are null and void. For a person who dies intestate, the next of kin can apply to the court for an Administrator (not an Executor) to be appointed. This may be a person all the beneficiaries agree on or it may be a government public trustee.

A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire.

Not necessarily The laws of each country will apply to the assets held in that country. In some jurisdictions, inheritance is mandated by law and there is no freedom for a testator to determine who inherits what: Pakistan is one such jurisdiction. In Pakistan, if the deceased is a Muslim, then inheritance proceeds according to Islamic law and the will is irrelevant. If they are not a Muslim, then the law of their domicile jurisdiction applies - so for a resident of say, California, Californian succession law applies including following a will if one exists. South African law recognises freedom of testation (subject to certain limits) so a foreign will will generally be followed.

It sort of depends on what the will says, for example if the will says "shall receive 1% of the value of my estate at the moment of my death", that answers your question. That's a bit unlikely, more probably it just says "shall receive 1% of my estate", in which case this refers to "the totality of what is left to disburse to beneficiaries", that is, after obligations have been discharged (debts, taxes, funeral expenses, expense of estate administration). You also have to disburse specific benefits first, for example "$10,000 to Aunt Luddy", "the car to cousin Billy". Thereafter, percentages (implied such as "equally" or explicit such as "2%") are then computed over the remainder. Ideally, you will know the current value of everything left and can do the math and transfer title all at once. This might be a bit impractical for an entire estate, but it is practical for an estate composed of a bunch of divisible assets. All of the securities can be transferred on one day; the house may be sold a month later and assets re-distributed according to the formula at that point. In other words, you don't need a fixed instant for computing and distributing the estate, you just need to distribute each asset according to the terms of the estate.

Bob's will leaves everything to Abby. Bob has a brokerage account solely in his name with no TOD on the account. Bob then dies. It is my understanding that for Abby to get the money, you have to go through probate. Am I right about that? Yes, this has to go through probate. I have been told that when you are leaving everything to a spouse you can skip probate. I am thinking that is wrong. You are correct. This said, in a very small dollar estate (e.g. $20,000, with the actual dollar amount varying state by state), some states allow you to transfer assets by affidavit rather than via the probate process, if the sold heir at all and will beneficiary are the same and there are no unpaid creditors with a claim against those funds. New Jersey has two sets of small estate procedures for estates under $50,000. The cutoff is sometimes $10,000, sometimes $20,000, and sometimes $50,000 depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the simplified process sought. It isn't clear to me that they apply in cases where the decedent has a will and therefore is not intestate. Small Estates General Summary: Small Estate laws were enacted in order to enable heirs to obtain property of the deceased without probate, or with shortened probate proceedings, provided certain conditions are met. Small estates can be administered with less time and cost. If the deceased had conveyed most property to a trust but there remains some property, small estate laws may also be available. Small Estate procedures may generally be used regardless of whether there was a Will. In general, the two forms of small estate procedures are recognized: Small Estate Affidavit -Some States allow an affidavit to be executed by the spouse and/or heirs of the deceased and present the affidavit to the holder of property such as a bank to obtain property of the deceased. Other states require that the affidavit be filed with the Court. The main requirement before you may use an affidavit is that the value of the personal and/or real property of the estate not exceed a certain value. Summary Administration -Some states allow a Summary administration. Some States recognize both the Small Estate affidavit and Summary Administration, basing the requirement of which one to use on the value of the estate. Example: If the estate value is 10,000 or less an affidavit is allowed but if the value is between 10,000 to 20,000 a summary administration is allowed. New Jersey Summary: Under New Jersey statute, where as estate is valued at less than $50,000, a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, may present an affidavit of a small estate before the Superior Court. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit, the surviving spouse shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. New Jersey: New Jersey requirements are set forth in the statutes below. TITLE 3B ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES–DECEDENTS AND OTHERS 3B:10-3. When spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner entitled to assets without administration. Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $50,000, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner upon the execution of an affidavit before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the assets are located, or before the Superior Court, shall be entitled absolutely to all the real and personal assets without administration, and the assets of the estate up to $10,000 shall be free from all debts of the intestate. Upon the execution and filing of the affidavit as provided in this section, the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner shall have all of the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate. The surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall state that the affiant is the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner of the intestate and that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $50,000, and shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, and specifically the nature, location and value of the intestate’s real and personal assets. The affidavit shall be filed and recorded in the office of such Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.1; 2004, c.132, s.77; 2005, c.331, s.24; 2015, c.232, s.1. 3B:10-4. When heirs entitled to assets without administration Where the total value of the real and personal assets of the estate of an intestate will not exceed $20,000 and the intestate leaves no surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner, and one of his heirs shall have obtained the consent in writing of the remaining heirs, if any, and shall have executed before the Surrogate of the county where the intestate resided at his death, or, if then nonresident in this State, where any of the intestate’s assets are located, or before the Superior Court, the affidavit herein provided for, shall be entitled to receive the assets of the intestate of the benefit of all the heirs and creditors without administration or entering into a bond. Upon executing the affidavit, and upon filing it and the consent, he shall have all the rights, powers and duties of an administrator duly appointed for the estate and may be sued and required to account as if he had been appointed administrator by the Surrogate or the Superior Court. The affidavit shall set forth the residence of the intestate at his death, the names, residences and relationships of all of the heirs and specifically the nature, location and value of the real and personal assets and also a statement that the value of the intestate’s real and personal assets will not exceed $20,000. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the Surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the Surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S.46:14-6.1 to take acknowledgments or proofs. amended 1983, c.246, s.2; 2004, c.132, s.78; 2005, c.331, s.25; 2015, c.232, s.2. The consent and the affidavit shall be filed and recorded, in the office of the surrogate or, if the proceeding is before the Superior Court, then in the office of the clerk of that court. Where the affiant is domiciled outside this State, the surrogate may authorize in writing that the affidavit be executed in the affiant’s domicile before any of the officers authorized by R.S. 46:14-7 and R.S. 46:14-8 to take acknowledgments or proofs.

The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin).

I think it is not possible to answer the question as is, but this document from the Indian courts lays out the relevant legal variables. A major split is between Sharers and Residuaries: a Sharers are all related by blood. A secondary split relates to testate vs. intestate succession (was there a will?). There are also special rules for West Bengal, Chennai and Bombay. A widow is generally entitled to a share of her husband's property, but if the husband dies before his father, the husband does not have his father's property. But then, if a Muslim marries under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, they are not treated legally as Muslim for purposes of inheritance. All told, it is most likely that the widow has no legal claim on the property, but still a person should engage an attorney who can assess the particulars of the case.

What prevents uber to draw up end user contracts? What prevents companies like Uber to draw up contracts, which both the riders and drivers have to sign / agree to if they want to use Uber? This is in light of recent events related to Uber drivers being ruled as employees by Californian Court. And also the ban of Uber in Delhi due to incidents of rape and sexual assault by the drivers on women riders. Would companies like Uber not benefit by drawing up contracts, stating that drivers are contractors, if a driver has a problem with that they may not sign up. Similarly can they also not draw contracts for riders stating a limited liability and again if the rider has an issue with that they may not use Uber. Can such contracts be voided by the courts, even if they are signed by both parties? If they can do it, and it would help, why aren't they doing it? Or are they, then why is it not working for them? P.S: I am not saying that Uber has no responsibility of doing a background check on drivers (and making sure that Uber rides are completely safe), so that the safety of women as well as men and children can be ensured. Also if we are coming to it, some sort of verification of the rider will encourage women cab drivers to also operate an Uber.

Contracts that violate local law are void in just about every jurisdiction, as are contracts against clearly defined public policy. In many cases, laws are specifically designed to restrict otherwise valid contracts; for instance, in the US, an employment contract that pays less than $7.25 an hour will normally be invalid, even if the company and the employee both agree to the reduced wage. In employment law, where contracts are fairly common, the laws would be virtually meaningless if contracts took precedence. In the case of independent contractor status vs. employee status, California law does not consider someone to be an independent contractor just because their contract says so. "Independent contractor" is defined in California law to be any person who renders service for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the control of his principal as to the result of his work only and not as to the means by which such result is accomplished. (California Labor Code, section 3353) If this definition isn't satisfied, it's irrelevant what the parties agree the status is; it's not an independent contractor status. According to the state department of labor, the test is that found in Borello v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (a California Supreme Court case), which lays out a multifactor test for contractor status and says that The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced. Likewise, with product liability, a country can generally have laws mandating liability for people providing a product or service; the extent to which this happens depends on the jurisdiction. For instance, India may not want a big company like Uber to be able to block liability claims by putting some legalese in front of average consumers who aren't able to make a detailed risk-benefit analysis. Alternatively, India could decide that Uber is better able to take the risk from bad drivers than average consumers are, so the right policy is to assign the risk to Uber. Whether Uber should be able to avoid liability is something that every country can decide for itself based on public policy considerations; the point is that if they do decide that Uber should be liable for damages, their law trumps Uber's contract. Uber actually tries to limit liability in their EULA, and to avoid an employer-employee relationship in their driver agreement. Their US EULA and driver agreement says they aren't a transportation provider and you aren't getting transportation from them, and even if you are they aren't liable for damages. However, if that provision violates the law in some state, the provision is invalid. Likewise, if they claim it's not an employment contract but it meets the "employee" definition in some state, it's an employment contract.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those?

There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one.

AA "requests" that you remove batteries from checked laptops and put them in carry-on luggage. You must, per their contract of carriage, "comply with airline safety rules", and they say that they can deny you boarding if you do not comply, which includes "Are uncooperative, abusive, harassing, or show the potential to be while on board". You might then hope to sue them because you didn't violate any safety policy of theirs but they denied you your seat, but there's nothing in the contract that states "The following is a complete list of policies". You should discuss this in more detail with your lawyer, but on the face of it there is no legal recourse, except of course a refund.

why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.

This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software.

Minors can negotiate and enter contracts. The idea they can’t is a myth - if they couldn’t, they wouldn’t be able to ride the bus or buy an ice cream as these are both contracts. However, unless the contract is for necessities, the minor can void it at any time while they remain a minor (and for a reasonable time after their majority) so they carry considerable risk for the adult party. Of course, a contract that has been completed can’t be voided. If a third person (like a guardian) is involved then either they are entering into the contract as well and would be (typically) jointly and severally liable with the minor or they would be standing as guarantor for the minor's performance of the contract and would be liable if the minor didn't perform - which it is will depend on the construction of the contract. However, the minor can still void the contract on their own behalf leaving the co-signer on the hook.

Authority to enforce a law after it expires in New York Recently, with the hubbub surrounding the expiration of the law authorizing rent control in New York City, Governor Cuomo issued a statement with this content, as quoted in the Daily News. The letter, obtained by the Daily News, states that despite any temporary lapses, the new rent laws once approved will be retroactive to June 15 — so “your legal obligations under existing leases and under the passage of the new rent stabilization program will not expire on that day.” The governor directed landlords to continue to follow the current law until a new law is enacted and any changes are fully understood. The legislative session is scheduled to end Wednesday and Cuomo has threatened to bring lawmakers back to Albany into special session every day if they adjourn without at least extending the existing law. So, how can a governor tell people that a law, which expired, will continue to be enforced (it's no longer current law), and how can the New York State legislature "backdate" a law, given Article 1, Section 10 of the US constitution?

There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News.

A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).

Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.

Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.

The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress.

You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal.

Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.

I skimmed the text of the act and didn't see anything about expiration, so that suggests that it doesn't expire. Normally such a provision would be prominent near the beginning or end.

Is there a copyright on a license agreement I need a license agreement for a product. Many similar products have their license agreement available online. I would like to take one of the better fitting ones and adapt it to my needs (adapt company name, product etc). Is there a copyright on a license agreement document? Would I be breaking it by doing such a derivative work? If the overall meaning is what I need, should I get a lawer to just rephrase it in order to avoid the copyright?

There are 2 conditions for a work to be protected under copyright: originated from the author involves the author's skill and labor (Note that "original" does not necessarily mean "creative". Also, the standard of "original" varies greatly between countries.) Under these conditions, it is fair to say that a legal document, such as a contract or license agreement, should be protected by copyright. Copyright, however, protects only the expression of the idea but not the idea itself. That is, while a document is protected under copyright, you can draft another document with different wordings which expresses the same idea. Merger doctrine Under the Merger doctrine, if there are only very few ways to express an idea, then the expression enjoys no copyright. This is because if that expression is protected, the protection would naturally extend to the idea itself. Therefore, common clauses in a contract or agreement are unlikely to be protected by copyright. Creative content If a legal document is sufficiently creative, it may also be protected under copyright. In American Family Life Insurance Co. of Columbus v. Assurant, Inc., American Family Life Insurance Co. of Columbus (AFLAC, plaintiff) has spent significant resources to draft an insurance policy which customers find easier to read. AFLAC sued the plaintiff (Assurant, Inc.) for copying statements in their policy. The court asserted that the narrative nature of AFLAC's policy was sufficiently different from "the words and expressions [that] are commonplace within the insurance field", thus entitled to protection as copyrighted work. Conclusion: contracts and agreements can be protected by copyright. However, it is unlikely that one which only contains common clauses is protected. Nevertheless, copying an entire document may not be a wise idea. If you have doubts in drafting one, you should consult a lawyer.

Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.

Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms.

You don't just want to ask, you are required to obtain a license (or in other terms: the OK of the author*). Your game is based on a book. That makes your game a derivate work. Under berne convention, any signer state has to make sure that the author* has the right to authorize any derivate. That includes translations, films, or games. Without a license, you violate copyright law. It doesn't matter if your game is free. To stay safe, you need to obtain a license. Quite some authors would be happy to cut a deal, license or guidelines for fan-projects. As an example, the late Sir Terry Pratchett OBE has specific guidelines on what is ok and what not. Ask your author* about these questions and consult a Lawyer! Only then make your fan project! * This means the author, their estate or whoever they assigned their rights in the work to. Some examples: For that teenage wizard in a private castle charter school that'd be a certain J.K. Rowling. For those hairy-halflings running all over the continent hunted by orcs that'd be the J.R.R. Tolkien-Estate. And for those space wizards using blades from solid light that'd be The Walt Disney Company or one of their subsidiaries.

It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202

You will need a license for any library that you are including in your product. Including libraries that you didn't really want to include, but which are needed by another library that you intentially include. And you will have to agree to all the licenses simultaneously, which may be difficult. If several libraries have conflicting licenses (that is you cannot possibly respect A's and B's license at the same time), then you must remove one of the libraries until no conflicts are left.

No. Only the company owns the copyright, not its shareholders. A company is a separate legal entity with its own capacity to own property. Copyright is property, not infection that can be spread onto whoever is close enough. Pretty much like shareholders can't just share the use of the company's tangible assets, they can't wet their beaks in the copyright. As a shareholder, what you could do is to appoint a director/CEO that will give you license to copy (or even transfer the copyright) — if you have enough shares to fire the current CEO and put yours. The CEO will get into legal trouble with other shareholders/creditors, but you'll still enjoy your right to copy.

Copyright law is not based on contracts, and does not require agreement. No one may distribute copies of a copyrighted work without permission from the copyright holder. For instance, in the US, both Persons A and F can be sued because Title 17, Section 501 of the US Code says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. (b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. Copyright infringement isn't an issue of violating terms you agreed to with a private entity. Your duty to not infringe copyright was imposed by your country's legislature, who does not require your personal agreement to do that.

USA: Does a user who has falsely stated that he/she has read an EULA or similiar agreement risk liability solely for the false statement? Many software products and Internet services require that users agree to an EULA or terms of service agreement before the product or service can be used. The user is often required to state that he/she has read and agrees to the terms. However, many users don't even read the terms and blindly agree to the contract. Does the user of the product or service risk liability solely because the user falsely claimed he/she read the agreement, even if the contract is never breached? Can the company providing the product or service take legal action on this cause alone?

The EULA is in most jurisdictions a legally binding contract; there is plenty of case law that supports this. You can only be liable under a contract for breaching its terms and only to the extent that the other party suffers harm from that breach. Clearly, if you haven't read the terms then you are greatly increasing the chance that you will inadvertently breach them but not reading them would not, of itself, be a breach and I can't see what harm could flow anyway.

The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.

What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction.

How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.

Signing as a witness will not generally make you liable on a contract. But, if you sign as a witness to something that you did not in fact witness, you could be liable for fraud or negligent misrepresentation is someone suffers harm as a result of you untrue statement that you witnessed the document being signed. Update: Usually you would be sued for whatever damages are caused plus pain and suffering plus punitive damages (the latter two limited in some states but not others in a variety of ways). It would probably be a crime as well if you had criminal intent, but it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to agree to prosecute an isolated case like this unless it was part of a larger criminal enterprise. A criminal sentence would usually depend on the amount of harm done and would often be a minor felony leading to a year or two in prison but states vary greatly on this.

Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).

A web site's Terms of Service are not a contract but, rather, a license. law.washington.edu has an interesting discussion of contracts vs. licenses and asks the question, "Does it matter?" In the case of a web site, the owner of the web site is granting you a license, subject to certain terms, to access the web site and use it. No consideration is required for a license. From the linked article, which discusses copyright, "In the context of copyright law, a 'license' is a permission to do an act that, without the permission, would be unlawful." In the case of a web site's terms and conditions, the owner is granting permission to you to access and use the web site subject to the terms of the license. Typically, such a license will require you to release any liability that may accrue because of your use of the site. The Stack Exchange license, in fact, grants certain permissions related to copyright, "Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content." The Stack Exchange license also places requirements on those who contribute to discussion including a requirement to "perpetually and irrevocably [license] to Stack Exchange" anything we post. In this case, by pressing the "Post Your Answer" question, I have agreed to license my creation, this answer, to Stack Exchange.

I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.

Is it possible for me to break a lease that is co-signed if my health suffers from staying at the apartment? Problem Overview I live in an apartment in Georgia and the tenant above me is smoking a lot of marijuana every day and has been doing so for the last three months. While inside the apartment, I continuously experience health issues because I seem to be more sensitive to the fumes than the average person. This evening, for example, my resting heart rate within the apartment has been consistently hovering over 100. I suffer under the symptoms even when the fumes are very weak and barely noticeable. The fumes are entering my apartment through the HVAC system even when the system is turned off, my windows are open, and two air purifiers are on. I spend virtually every day in my apartment for almost the entire day. Steps Taken and the Current Stage I'm 33% through my 12-month-lease that I signed with my roommate and my roommate refuses to break the lease even if I pay for the termination fees. Upon complaining to the smoker, the smoker denies everything. However, the fumes could be smelled from his windows when he used to have them open while smoking. Ever since I complained, the smoker has been shutting his windows. My roommate and I have complained to the management company in writing but it seems that they are afraid to do anything, possibly because of potential legal repercussions from the smoker. I have called the police twice, but they arrived 30-60 minutes after the smoking occurred and the smell had already faded. Data When the smoking occurs, I also notice several red bars appear on my air purifier air quality indicator. Many samples of my resting heart rate with a sensor reveal that it is 65-75bpm when outside the apartment and 80-110bpm when inside the apartment. My roommate smells the marijuana fumes too, but is not as sensitive to the fumes as I am and only experiences a subset of my above symptoms at a much milder level. The tenant above the smoker also notices the fumes, but only barely. Questions Is it possible for me to break the lease? Is it possible for me to sublease, even if my roommate disagrees with every person I choose for the sublease? (postponed for another question) What is the recommended action for me at this stage?

Short answer: Yes, you can get out. However, this will be harder than you may want it to be. You will need to check your lease agreement for an arbitration clause. If the lease mentions disagreements will be handled by arbitration (or an arbiter), you need to know that going into this. Arbitration clauses usually stipulate that the landlord picks the arbiter, who will almost always be predisposed to side with the landlord. This pamphlet sheds insight into the situation. Skip down to PDF page 22, section header "My neighbors are constantly playing loud music..." Summarized, you can get out but if other tenants are not as affected, it will be hard to prove it affects you differently. You do, however, have the benefit of knowing the particular situation is illegal (as compared to the pamphlet's example of playing music, which is only situationally illegal). First, get written, signed testimony from other tenants (your roommate, the one above the smoker, etc). Preferably, get these signatures notarized. The testimony should include an acknowledgement that the signer has smelled the marijuana and a statement about how often this occurs, along with the date of signature. Next, send a certified letter to your landlord. Keep a copy of this letter. In it, state your intention to move unless they fix the situation within thirty (30) days. Remind them you already have informed them of this situation. Inform them you have (hopefully notarized) testimony of the marijuana smoking from other tenants, remind them that this is illegal, and that this is affecting your health. You may also warn them that if they do not rectify the situation and you leave after thirty days, they cannot keep your deposit or charge you a termination fee- they have breached your lease contract through failure to maintain a safe and livable rental unit (a gentle reminder that you will seek legal action if they attempt to keep your deposit or charge you fees is appropriate). In the letter, request an immediate, written response with their intentions on the matter, and give a deadline (like 3 days from receipt). As a certified letter, you will know when they get it. The wording of this letter is important. You want to clearly state the facts without sounding self-righteous, angry, or vindictive. And proofread the heck out of it. If the landlord is faced with possible legal action for forcing an illegal tenant to follow the law, and certain legal action for trying to keep a legal tenant to remain in illegal, harmful circumstances, they may well decide to oust the smoker. If your scare tactic doesn't work, however, you should make good on the threat- really do leave after thirty days, and if they attempt to charge you for anything or withhold your deposit, you really should contact a lawyer. You should also, however, have the money saved to pay the termination fees, just in case. Because the smoke affects you differently, and there is no easy way to prove this, an unsympathetic court (or arbiter) may rule against you. (NOTE: I am not a lawyer, but I did have to break a lease and spent a good deal of time researching and discussing my situation with a lawyer. In the end I lost my deposit but did not have to pay any fees or missed rent.)

Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.

You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.

Whether it is legal to sleep in office space is generally determined under local zoning ordinances and wouldn't be uniform across an entire state. This said, the vast majority of localities would prohibit doing so under the relevant building and zoning ordinances of the municipality, or in unincorporated areas, the relevant building and zoning ordinances of the county. Typically, the penalty for doing so in violation of a local ordinance would be similar to the penalty for violating a minor to mid-grade misdemeanor, and each day you violate the ordinance would be a separate offense. Typically, the question under a local ordinance would be how the office space is being used. If the office space is being used for residential purposes, the building owner and/or tenant under a lease would be violating the ordinance. But, an isolated instance of falling asleep at your desk during the work day would not normally be considered to be a residential use of the property. If someone routinely spends the night at the office, not doing work, and has clothing and bedding and toiletries there, especially if the person doing so has no other residence, this would normally be treated as a residential use of the office building. This said, local code enforcement officials have great discretion to enforce such ordinances strictly, or to ignore arguable violations of them. A private citizen (perhaps a neighbor, for example) has no authority to compel the local government in question to enforce its ordinances as strictly as the law would permit.

This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.

In Germany, there is no statutory offense of “breaking in”. Instead, break-ins are (depending on the nature of the crime) prosecuted as trespassing (Hausfriedensbruch, § 123 StGB), criminal damage (Sachbeschädigung, § 303 StGB) and/or theft (Diebstahl, § 242 StGB). (Some cases may fit additonal statutory offenses, e. g. tampering with an electronic lock can be computer fraud (Computerbetrug, § 263a StGB) and hurting someone can be robbery (Raub, § 249 StGB) and/or personal injury (Körperverletzung, § 223 StGB).) This means: If your brother breaks the lock, then that's vandalism. If your brother walks in (without authorization), it's trespassing and if your brother steals your stuff, it's stealing. On top of that, since your brother is living in the same household as you, breaking into your room may also be considered domestic violence. The violence protection act (Gewaltschutzgesetz) is very harsh when it comes to domestic violence: The offender can be ordered by court to hand over their home to the victim and to stay away from the home. This means that if your brother breaks into your room, your brother may be removed from the house by court order. Non-compliance with a court order issued under the Gewaltschutzgesetz (e. g. your brother tries to show up at your house after he was ordered to stay away), can be prosecuted under civil and(!) penal law. You can read the English translation of the German penal code (STrafgesetzbuch, StGB) here (although I prefer to use German because all translations at gesetze-im-internet.de tend to be low quality): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html And the Violence protection act is here (unfortunately untranslated): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gewschg/BJNR351310001.html

Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days.

All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.

Software Packaging laws When Microsoft packaged Internet Explorer with Windows, they were sued for antitrust violations. However, today every operating system has its own built-in browser, including ones by the companies that complained about Microsoft (Google, Apple, Mozilla Corporation). What is the legal difference between what Microsoft did and what other companies are now doing today? Why do the courts target Microsoft when Apple was and still is taking advantage of its monopoly? Why can't Microsoft receive financial compensation for the damages Apple did to Microsoft?

From Baker, Donald I. "To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement." Cornell L. Rev. 63 (1977): 405: The Assistant Attorney General must ultimately decide whether to bring a criminal prosecution. He bases that choice in part upon articulated principles, in part upon intuition gained from experience, and ultimately upon the facts of the particular case. The choice to prosecute Microsoft and not Google, Apple, or Mozilla for (what you claim to be) ostensibly similar activities is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. My guess is that the Attorney General's office simply does not believe the actions of the other companies rise to the level of an antitrust violation. When they believe they do, they prosecute. (United States of America v. Apple Inc., et al., 12 Civ. 2862 (DLC)). Microsoft settled their case. No other party is responsible for Microsoft's decision to settle, even if they were doing the same thing, and even if they are later found to be guilty for or come to a settlement agreement regarding the same thing.

There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.

However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor.

In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages.

Warranty is company policy. It could be considered part of the contract of sale, but it would still be what the company stated it - at time of purchase - to be. Unless the warranty lists accidental damage as being covered, it looks like the company are following their policy and fulfilling the contract. If you were looking for legal redress since accidental damage resulted from using the product as intended, you'd have more chance of success looking at unsatisfactory quality or the product being unsuitable for the intended purpose under Part 1 chapter 2 sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It's worth sticking to objective details (for example that the port broke, and that you had used the device as intended). The company are not assuming you broke it (anyone or anything could have caused the accidental damage), and they are not refusing a warranty repair as it appears that accidental damage is not covered by their warranty policy, so this is not one.

Anyone can sue anyone for anything- you don't need a law that says "user39137 is allowed to sue Microsoft for restarting his PC". The question is whether you will succeed. You won't, for two reasons. Three if you count the fact that it's trivial to stop updates restarting your PC at inconvenient times. First, you probably agreed to this in the EULA. Updates. The softwareperiodically (sic) checks for system and app updates, and downloads and installs them for you. You may obtain updates only from Microsoft or authorized sources, and Microsoft may need to update your system to provide you with those updates. By accepting this agreement, you agree to receive these types of automatic updates without any additional notice. Windows 10 EULA This likely isn't the only bit where you accept this, but it's the best I could find by skimming with ctrl-f. Obviously if you were to start a lawsuit, you'd want to read the whole thing. Second, to sue someone you need to have suffered damages. "Being annoyed because the computer restarted in the middle of Among Us" isn't really worth anything.

What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem.

it would violate law? It would be very dependent of what your jurisdiction is and what the software does. I would expect most software that would be lawful to install at your home would be lawful to install at your company, but there may be exceptions. To put an hyperbolic example, if you work at the CIA and you install some remote access software that allows you to access your workstation from a non-secure PC through non-secure methods, I am pretty sure that would be illegal, even if you had the best of intentions. A recent scenario taken from real life involves some members an organization who are required to use official e-mail servers for FOIA purposes setting up their own private mail servers. Of course, YMMV. can I purchase it for myself, and then use at workplace Even if the software is legal it does not mean that it is ok to use it at the workplace. Most business have rules about what software may be installed in the PCs, who may install it and how to manage it. Your software could introduce security vulnerabilities that your IT team may need to be aware of, or incompatibilities with other software. It may introduce legal liabilities (you install a "home edition" licence in a corporate environment where that licence is invalid). Your company may discipline you if you breaking those guidelines and install software without authorization, even if there is no harm for them for this action. On top of that, if your actions cause some damage to the company, it can sue you to get you to pay for those damages. Before taking any action you should inquiry about your company's IT policy and, if your company does not have one or if the policy is not clear about allowing you to install the software, ask the people in charge (preferably in writting).

Does a boilerplate legal disclaimer protect authors of content on a website? Specifically, if the website itself has legal disclaimers to protect itself from litigation arising from legal advice provided on it, would a similar disclaimer claiming to disclaim authors of content on the website protect those authors?

A disclaimer claiming to disclaim authors of content on the website can/cannot protect those authors depending upon: Visibility of the Disclaimer on the website On whether it can be proved that the disclaimer was included intentionally to be brought into the user's notice. Location of the dispute. In United States many courts have ruled in favor of the disclaimers if the were strategically placed not to be missed by the user. In European Union on the other hand there is a directive which strikes down legal obligations which have been imposed and this would make disclaimers unenforceable. For more information, please refer This Link

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.

It depends upon how the service works. A "scrivner" is permitted, but "legal services" are not. If, for example, it asks you the questions on a state approved form and asks you to fill in answers and the compiles the answers into a complaint with the proper typesetting, this would be permissible. It could also have "educational materials" which you could read that could discuss small claims court. But, if it provides individualized assistance on a case by case basis on how to answer the questions, for example, prodding you to say something about each element of a cause of action if you fail to do so, this might very well constitute the practice of law and be illegal.

(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.

You may at your peril. The safe harbor provision in 17 USC 512 does not provide absolute immunity to service providers, that immunity is only available (c)(1) if the service provider—(A)...(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent Given your question, which reasonably assumes that the material is infringing, infringement is apparent. The DMCA provisions were written not to protect service providers, but to protect innocent service providers who are not aware of the infringing activities of their users. So it depends on what you know.

You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)

To answer part of your question, the takedown and restoration process of the DMCA is not required. It is a legal way a hosting site can stay in the clear for copyright infringement. Therefore, if the site didn't take down what you complained about, they're participating in copyright infringement (if that's what's happening). Since they did not take down the material (assuming your DMCA was in the right legal form), if you do sue over copyright infringement you can sue the site as well as whoever uploaded your stuff to the site. I don't think that linking to your stuff would itself be copyright infringement, so I'd suggest consulting a lawyer specializing in IP.

In UK: is it a requirement by the law to carry an ID What if I get stopped by immigration officers and I have no ID on me? I am a British citizen.

There is no general duty to carry your identity with you when inside the UK, nor to identify yourself to any official. Many UK citizens have no photographic proof of identity at all. (My parents did not for many years, until they obtained fresh passports.) I am confused where you could be stopped by immigration officers. If you appear at a UK Border without your passport, it is a real headache, but immigration can find your record on the computer and will, if you satisfy them you are a UK citizen, eventually admit you. (They have no power to deny entry to a British Citizen, and must be satisfied you are not a British citizen to deny you entry.) For clarity, in respect of some comments, I am not advising that anyone should do this, but I am saying in the worse case scenario if somehow you end up without documents you can still be looked up in the computer, and your identity can be checked at the UK Border without a passport. In general you are not required to identify yourself to a police officer, unless you are arrested. http://www.findlaw.co.uk/law/criminal/your_rights/500109.html If I am stopped and searched, do I have to give my name and address? Although the police will likely ask for your name and address, you are not required to give it unless the police arrest you or are reporting you for an offence. There are a small number of occasions when you may be required (by law) to identify yourself when you are simply going about your private business. If you are driving a vehicle the police may stop you and require you to identify yourself. If you do not have your driving licence, you may produce it at court at a later date; in the mean time the police can check your status by computer. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/part/VII/crossheading/powers-of-constables-and-other-authorised-persons/enacted?view=plain If you are travelling domestically inside the UK by air, the police can stop you and require photographic identification at or after the security check point under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7?view=plain) However, I travel within Great Britain by air several times a month and usually do not bring anything more than a credit card and a change of clothes, and I have never had any problems. Most airlines will "advise" you to bring photographic ID. If however you do travel between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, immigration staff are often interested in your status then. It is wise to have photographic ID on such a journey.

Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above]

Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.

I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.

Citizenship is essentially an imaginary label that sovereign states assign to people to say "this person is one of us". How those imaginary labels are granted, recorded, proved, maintained etc. is up to the sovereign state to decide. I assume that citizenship is any time period in which all officers of a given state would agree to issue identification documents for that human. Not accurate. Identification documents simply identify persons. They may or may not convey information about citizenship. Some (like driver's licences) do not. Other (like alien's passports) explicitly mean that the holder is not a citizen of the issuing sovereign state. Conversely, having troubles to get a passport does not necessarily mean that the person is not a citizen. In some circumstances it may be difficult to prove citizenship (e.g. emigrated as an infant with no birth record), and court proceedings may be needed to convince the authorities.

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).

In Massachusetts law it says the following: The term ''police officer'' as used in this section shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such police officer while attempting such arrest. So, showing a badge or ID card or possibly even an official business card would be sufficient under the law.

Regarding "Right to be Forgotten", what's the definition of a "search engine"? §§ — The decision by Europe's highest court allows people living in Europe to ask for links to "inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant" material to be removed from search results, although it will still be available on the original web page[.] Google Search might be unambiguously considered as a "search engine", but what about other websites like Blogger, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Quora, StackExchange, 4chan, Reddit, etc? Are news websites which store their own archives of old news considered a "search engine", or "original web page", or both? (Notice that material must be removed from search results yet is allowed to remain available on the original web page.) Let's assume that John Doe (either an imaginary student, salaryman, politician, etc) exercised his right to be forgotten. Then, : Does a blogger have the right to list links and prior search results of John Doe's past on his personal blog which is publicly available? If the blogger also writes about John Doe's past (i.e. the blogger creates original material), would the blogpost now be considered "original web page" and allowed to be available?

The judgment (Google Spain and Google (Judgment of the Court) [2014] EUECJ C-131/12) is definitive on this point at paragraph 41: ...the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference... In your example, the blogger would be unaffected by the decision as his links are presumably collected and sorted by hand. However, the blog itself may be removed from Google et al at the request of John Doe.

Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.

If a data controller fails to fulfil your data subject rights, lodge a complaint with your data protection authority. In Hamburg, the appropriate form is here. However, they are not required to investigate your complaint. Independently from a complaint, you could consider suing Wordpress for compliance – Automattic has a subsidiary in Ireland so this might actually be feasible. I'm not quite sure though that Automattic is indeed the data controller for wordpress.org, as opposed to the .com domain – the privacy policy isn't quite GDPR compliant. While your GDPR Art 17 Right to Erasure might not apply in this case, there's a definite GDPR violation because the data controller failed to respond to your request within a month as per Art 12(4). That your posts on the bugtracker were deleted doesn't look like an issue in this context, what does matter is that they didn't respond to emails to the addresses mentioned in their privacy policy. Whether you have a right to erasure depends on the legal basis for storing your data. In general, you have a right to erasure if: the data is no longer necessary; processing is based on consent (because you can always withdraw consent); or processing is based on a legitimate interest and they have no overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing despite your objection (Art 21). The data is still necessary to identify you for your actions on the bugtracker, but depending on your particular situation you may be able to object successfully and force them to anonymize your posts.

It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.

"Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public.

Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.

Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.

That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.

Origin/purpose of "Language" section in legal agreements I've noticed a number of legal documents recently (FastMail's ToS, Apple's Developer Agreement, etc.) which include a "Language" section containing more or less the following: It is the express will of the parties that this agreement and all related documents have been drawn up in English. C'est la volonté expresse des parties que la présente convention ainsi que les documents qui s'y rattachent soient rédigés en anglais. Whence did this practice originate and what is it for? Also, why state the same thing in English and French?

This language is almost certainly included in an attempt to make the agreement comply with the Charter of the French Language. The Charter is the legal document that sets French as the official language of the Canadian province of Quebec. Chapter 7, paragraph 55 of the Charter states that adhesion contracts, such as software licenses, must be in French, but "may be drawn up in another language as well at the express wish of the parties." Because the law seems to require a French version "as well" as the English version, it's not clear that the contracts in question are in compliance--but the language is straight out of the Charter, so it is clearly at least an attempted compliance with that law. The French is included presumably because otherwise a Francophone Quebecois end user might try to invalidate the license by claiming that his or her waiver was not well-informed.

That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.

No this is not a violation of discrimination law as there is no official language (de jure) in the United States at the Federal Level even though English, as the most common language is considered the National Language (de facto). Language is not a Federally recognized basis of discrimination for private business (your local state may require it though). Compared to Canada, where all services must be in English or French to comply with their Official Languages being English and French. It could be argued that, given America's very liberal Freedom of Speech laws, that requiring catering to a specific language by law could be challenged as a violation of your First Amendment Rights (after all, if you have freedom of speech, then you should have freedom of speech that others do not understand). Since there is nothing stopping an English Speaking American from learning the language you wish to do business in, nor is it confined to any race or religion (I, as a predominotly European descent, am perfectly capable of learning Arabic... or Japanese... or Navajo...). Where the confusion comes from is that in the United States, courts will often provide a linguistic interpreter for those who are not native English Speakers (even if they are conversational, given how technical legal terms can be, it may people who speak English as a Second Language will avail themselves of this service for the sake of making sure the nuance is properly translated).

As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.

That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.

Do newer contracts superceed prior ones? It depends on whether the contracts conflict with each other. That is why many contracts contain language akin to "This contract supersedes and replaces any previous or contemporaneous agreements between the parties". The parties would need to adapt such clause if the contracts are compatible and they intend to maintain them. I have seen many contracts saying tgis "this will happens unless agreed in writing to do something else".However many contracts do not have this in written. The main purpose of that language is to specify that any amendments to the contract shall be in writing. That precaution makes it easier to ascertain whose version of the contract is binding, such as where party A alleges an oral amendment and party B denies that such amendment was agreed upon. Your outline of the agreements between A and Z is incomplete. At the outset, the contracts are not necessarily incompatible: The first contract does not provide a deadline for payment; it is unclear when the 2nd contract will be in force; there is not enough information to discern whether the 2nd contract is an amendment of the 1st one, or an independent agreement involving unrelated considerations; there is no indication that the 2nd contract replaces and supersedes the 1st one; and if Z is the draftsman in both contracts, the doctrine of contra proferentem could favor A's legal position. Therefore, the matter of superseding contracts depends on various factors.

There are certain legal arrangements that are implied in law when a project or activity is carried out without forming a legal entity. The classification of the legal arrangements in question govern the legal rights of the parties. These arrangements are surveyed below. This is followed by a brief list, for contrast and completeness, of the main different kinds of entities that must be formed expressly and registered to come into existence. This overview is then applied to the specific questions asked. One is a trust. A trust arises by operation of law when a person (called a settlor) provides money or other property or legal rights to another person (the trustee) for the benefit of one or more persons (people who are called beneficiaries) and often for some purpose specified by the settlor. In the U.S. this was historically governed by case law from both courts of law and courts of equity. The concept of a trust and the broader concept of a fiduciary as a general concept are particular to common law systems and don't have a direct analog in civil law legal systems, although there are legal arrangements in civil law countries that have material differences from common law trusts that can be used in circumstances where trusts are used in common law countries. But, now, many states have adopted a statutory trust code that covers most issues of trust law fairly comprehensively. Guardians, conservators, and receivers, sometimes with rights arising by operation of law, or a private non-governmental appointment, but more often arising from a court order, are close cousins of trustees of trusts. Trustees, guardians, conservators, receivers, and agents are part of a group of kinds of people who are often collectively grouped in a larger category of people in charge of other people's property or rights called "fiduciaries." Most often, the enterprises and properties managed by fiduciaries are not considered to be entities, even though the arrangement is similar to an entity. Some jurisdictions require some kinds of fiduciaries to file some sort of registrations or public filings, but these statutes typical regulate people who are already fiduciaries by operation of law or a court order, rather than requiring registration for the legal arrangement to come into existence. A related form of entity, which requires government registration as an entity in some jurisdictions, and can be formed without registration or similar formalities in others, is a business trust which will often have transferrable beneficial interests, the most common examples of which is a real estate investment trust (REIT) or a mutual fund, both of which are sometimes, but not always, organized as business trusts. Most businesses organized as business trusts are subject to considerable government regulation as securities and under tax law, and also under other laws specific to those entity forms. Another related concept in common law countries is a "bailment" (holding the property of another for safekeeping) by a bailee for a bailor and an escrow arrangement. France has a similar set of concepts in its civil code translated into English as "deposits" meaning "bailments" and "sequestrations" meaning escrow arrangements and similar relationships in Articles 1915 to 1963 of its Civil Code. Another is a general partnership. A general partnership arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on business for the purpose of making a profit (whether or not they actually do), without forming some other entity. There is a uniform state law adopted in every state in some version or another, with minor state-specific variations, that governs general partnerships. A joint venture is almost indistinguishable from a general partnership. While codified now, in common law countries, general partnership law is a natural and organic outgrowth of the laws of trusts, fiduciaries and agency, that has evolved and been modified in the process of codification; while in civil law countries, general partnerships are just another kind of entity that isn't necessarily registered as an entity per se (although civil law countries generally have a category of registration-like regulation and accounting and banking rules that apply to all "merchants" whether or not they operate through entities). A third is an unincorporated association. An unincorporated association arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on an activity for purposes other than making a profit, without forming some other entity. In some jurisdictions this is governed by a statute pertaining to them, while in others (and in part, even in states that have a statute) it is governed by common-law case law (drawn historically from both courts of law and courts of equity). In France, the civil code provides for a similar kind of unregistered entity known in English translation as a "Partnership for Non-Commercial Purposes" in Articles 1845 to 1870 of its civil code. A fourth and related notion, which is somewhere between an unincorporated association and a simple contract – which is not a general partnership because it is not carried out for profit – is a domestic partnership or civil union which is sometimes just a subcategory of contract, but in other cases is treated as a special kind of arrangement subject to case law or statutory regulation. Many state and local governments, and some national governments outside the United States, adopted domestic partnership and/or civil union laws that vary widely in their details, before same sex marriage became legal in the United States, to address the needs of same sex couples and/or unmarried opposite sex cohabitants and/or domestic arrangements involving more than two people. Along the same lines, while all countries allow qualified opposite sex couples and sometimes qualified same sex adult couples to form a marriage with a license from the government or government registration, some jurisdictions recognize marriage-like relationships that can be formed without government registration such as common law marriage, putative marriage, and de facto relationships that have legal rights associated with them. France, for example, in Article 515 of its civil code, has "civil covenants of solidarity" (PACS) akin to a civil union in the U.S. which must be formally registered giving rise to formal rights that are significant but less so than those created by marriage. French civil code Article 515 also defines a different category of relationship translated as "concubinage", which is roughly equivalent to "cohabitation" in English which gives rise only to very limited legal rights, and may be (but need not be) governed by a custom drafted domestic partnership agreement called a "convention de concubinage" in French and can, but need not be, formally recognized in a "certificat de concubinage" or a "declaration sur l'honneur" which has only slight legal effect. The law of a "convention de concubinage" is somewhat akin to the kind of contract contemplated in the OP as it is an "atypical" contract that is not heavily regulated and not entered into primarily for the purpose of making a profit. A fifth is a contract. Sometimes a legal arrangement is contractually entered into and has the character of assigning people legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis each other without constituting an unincorporated entity or trust. A contract would typically involve less discretion than an unincorporated entity or a trust, although this isn't a hard and fast rule. In some respects, all entities are basically standardized and regulated contracts. Often, but not always, contractual rights are assignable. Corporations have their roots in the laws of trusts, contracts, and general partnerships, and eventually were given a statutory treatment not directly derived from those sources. This is governed mostly by case law. One kind of contract that bears similarity to what you describe in your example is called in economics a "dominant assurance contract" also known by the registered trademark specific provider of such arrangements known as "Kickstarter" contracts with a refund bonus, and similar in principle but without profit-making objectives, to a subscription agreement. It also bears similarity to a gift registry. Many leases create de facto partnerships and unincorporated associations, as do some real estate covenants. Another important (and heavily regulated) type of contract, which is often mistaken for an entity type since it is used in lieu of a parent-subsidiary relationship between a business headquarters and a particular location of a business, is a franchising agreement, in which the franchisor receives a share of gross profits and a fee from a franchisee who gets the right and the obligation to conduct business under a trademark in accordance with highly detailed central rules regarding how the business is conducted on a day to day basis, even though particular business locations are not enterprises owned by the franchisor. Legal multilevel marketing arrangements, and very similar illegal pyramid schemes are likewise typically organized on a contractual basis. There is also terminology for certain kind of contractual arrangements for non-business purposes, similar to those described in the question, in many civil law countries such as France (as opposed to countries with common law legal systems), but I am not familiar with all of this terminology itself (much of which lacks a direct and exact English language equivalent). A distinction is made procedurally, and in some formalities and requirements, between commercial contracts on one hand, and a category of contracts often translated as "non-commercial contracts" or "civil contract" on the other. For example, in France, arbitration clauses are usually not permitted in non-commercial contracts, and lawsuits to enforce non-commercial contracts must normally be brought at the defendant's domicile. Civil law countries also make a stronger distinction between "typical" contracts, which are spelled out in detail by statute and to which many default rules of law and mandatory rules apply, and "atypical contracts" which are treated with more skepticism by civil law courts and require more detailed express enumeration of the rights of the parties and of the reasons that the government should enforce those rights, than in common law country jurisprudence (although France eliminated this concept from its civil code in lieu of provisions enforcing substantive fairness in many cases, in an October 2016 overhaul of the contract law provisions of its civil code which had only been lightly amended before that since its original adoption in 1804). A sixth is co-ownership of property or other legal rights. Sometimes more than one person owns property and they have legal rights that arise from co-ownership of that property, even in the absence of any contract formation related to their co-ownership, in the absence of any imposition of a trust relationship on someone as a trustee for someone who is not the legal owner of property, and without an intent to carry out any particular enterprise or project with or without an intent to make a profit. This is mostly governed by case law but typically with modest statutory regulation of specific issues (like the right to bring a partition action if one party wants to end the co-ownership relationship). Sometimes co-owners also have a contract governing their respective rights (or a covenant, which is a contract that runs to successive owners of property, usually real estate). France recognizes along these lines "Agreements Relating To The Exercise of Undivided Rights" in Article 1873 of its Civil Code. A seventh is that when someone conducts business for the purpose of making a profit without working jointly with someone else, and without forming an entity, the enterprise is called a "sole proprietorship" (if business is actively conducted) or an "investment" (if profits arise mostly from passive ownership of property). Custom dictates that certain activities, like renting real estate, are considered investments, even when significant active management is involved, while other activities are usually considered to be sole proprietorships, even when they don't involve particularly pro-active conduct. The common law of agency and tax law are important to the operation and regulation of these businesses. In a related issue, a sole proprietorship or other entity (whether or not registered with the government) may often, either by formal registration or merely by dint of using it in the course of business, depending upon the jurisdiction, acquire legal rights in a trade name of an enterprise (also known as a "doing business as name" or "dba") and/or trademarks associated with goods or services sold by an enterprise or sole proprietorship. An eighth is that when someone engages in a project for purposes other than making a profit without working jointly with someone else, or with an intent to make a profit that is consistently not achieved most of the time for a statutory number and proportion of years, and without forming an entity, that has a character similar to conducting a business, the enterprise is called a "hobby" for tax law purposes. This isn't comprehensive, however. Some economic activity undertaken without involving someone else or forming an entity, and without an intent to make a profit, simply doesn't have any name other than "consumer spending" or a "personal and/or household activity." In contrast, entities formed by registration with the government, more or less exclusively, include corporations (both for profit and not for profit, including most corporations sole which are similar to trusts), limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, limited partnership associations, mutual companies, and cooperatives. Entity formation is typically cheap and easy, although some kinds of entities such as national banking associations require special regulatory permission. Municipal governments, local governments such as school districts and special districts, and many independent government agencies are also often organized as governmental corporations and governed by specific statutes that apply to them. Is this possible at all or do you automatically found some sort of legal entity the moment you do this? This is often, but not always, the case when more than one person is involved, as the list above illustrates. Does such a stock issue have to be registered with the country’s equivalent of the SEC or are they exempt? If the latter, do you have to apply for such an exemption or is it granted automatically? It depends. In the U.S., the threshold question is whether an interest in the project is a "security". There are many kinds of debt and equity investments that are automatically securities (even debt issued by a natural person, rather than an entity, which is transferrable and sold to members of the general public, could be a security). There is also a residual category called an "investment contract" which counts as a security if it meets a multi-factor legal test. There are various exemptions from the securities laws, and some are automatic, while others are not. But there are also some securities laws that apply to transactions involving securities even if the securities are exempt from formal registration with a government entity. The most notable of these is federal SEC regulation 10b-5 that imposes securities fraud liability when there is fraud within the meaning of the regulation in any transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security, even if that security is exempt from registration as such with a governmental entity. Some transferrable rights that are not necessarily securities but have some similarities to them are publicly traded commodities, security entitlements, negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts (particularly negotiable ones), and cryptocurrencies. In addition to regulation under state and federal securities laws, certain kinds of joint activities have other very specific regulations that apply to them (e.g. churches, or pooled investment funds, or cooperatives, or home owner's associations, or political parties, or election campaigns, or buyer's clubs, or timeshares) and there is really no way to know, in general, what those activities will be, without just learning about them from a general knowledge of a jurisdiction's laws. Is this regulated on a federal, state, or municipal level or does the issuer have to comply with the law on all levels? You have to comply with the laws on all levels. Normally, the legal rights of the parties primarily arise under state law in the U.S., and the disclosure requirements normally arise under both federal and state law. But no one level of government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate private activities and it isn't unprecedented, for example, for local governments to authorize certain kinds of private enterprises (e.g. neighborhood associations in places that don't have HOAs, or composting co-operatives). Many local governments require all businesses that operate in their territory to be registered or licensed with them, no matter how they are legally organized, and state and local governments also often require special licenses for all businesses (regardless of form of organization) which are obligated to collect particular taxes such as lodging taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, fuel taxes, alcohol or cigarette taxes, or "head taxes". Similarly, many occupations and professions require government licenses at one level of government or another, and sometimes, more than one level of government. Some licenses are mostly federal (e.g. investment advisors and securities brokers), some are primarily state level (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and some are primarily local (e.g. street vendors and many construction trades). Are there relevant court cases that show what the penalties are for getting this wrong? Yes. But the question is too broad and vague to meaningfully discuss them. These cases are usually particular to the specific type of transaction involved. Does it make a difference in practice if the market capitalization of the project is almost certainly always well below $1 million? This is relevant to the kind of securities law exemptions that apply when a transaction is deemed to be a security under federal and state securities regulations. There are many exemptions and most of them have dollar limitations attached (although some do not). The background is that I want to start an online platform to make this easier for people, but of course I don’t want to get into legal trouble and I don’t want my customers to get into trouble. You haven't even begun to scratch the surface of the myriad legal issues presented. Your example sounds more like some sort of transferrable contract right, rather than a security (although it could be both), since it appears to be purchased primarily for use rather than as a profit making investment. It bears a fair amount of similarity to certain kinds of timeshare rights (and might even qualify as a timeshare under the regulatory and consumer protection rules of some jurisdictions which define them broadly). You need to develop a far more specific idea of what you plan to do and then meet with a lawyer to discuss the entire concept start to finish to spot as many legal issues as possible. This is not something you should try to do without a lawyer.

There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both "English Law" and "English and Welsh Law", usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as "Welsh Law".

Does the European Commission have jurisdiction in the U.S.? When U.S. corporations want to merge or are subject to acquisitions (for example Oracle acquiring Sun Microsystems in 2009) it seems they must seek approval from the European Commission --- which is another jurisdiction. Questions: Why must U.S. companies get European Commission approval? What could happen if the U.S. firms chose to ignore the European Commission's decision? Are there other juridical bodies in other jurisdictions that can stop U.S. mergers?

Countries, and supranational governments like the EU, have jurisdiction over companies that do business in their jurisdictions. Oracle is technically not a U.S. corporation; it's a closely related group of California and Delaware corporations. Very few companies incorporate under U.S. federal law (I believe some banking corporations are required to, but don't quote me on that). Almost all companies are incorporated under state law. However, if Oracle does business in Texas, it still has to obey Texas law. And if it does business in the EU, it still has to obey EU law. Some laws make distinctions in some corporate matters between domestic corporations (incorporated under that state's laws) and foreign corporations (incorporated under another state's laws). But if you do business in a state, including an EU member state, you still need to obey that state's general laws, including antitrust law. Short version: if you visit another country, you can't go around shooting people, then say, "your laws don't apply to me, I'm an American." Neither can a company, no matter where it's incorporated. As for stopping the merger...any country where the merging companies do business can stop the merged company from doing business there if the merger violates local law. If this is a major, commercially important region like the EU, then failure to get EU approval will stop the merger. If it's a minor territory, the company will sometimes enter into an agreement to divest itself of local assets or entities. For example, if merging Oracle and Sun would create an antitrust problem in the minicomputer repair market in Laos, the merged entities would sell off either Oracle's or Sun's Laotian minicomputer repair division.

The relevant eu article is article 102 tfeu which forbids those who are in a dominant market position from abusing that position (e.g. price fixing, discriminatory practices as in this case when google made their products more likely to appear in a search than competitors). The case summary is http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/SUM/?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0236&qid=1498637439183#SM The statement of the commission declaring the fine is http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm

Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

There are no laws directly regulating merger of two companies. Instead, there are laws against "monopolizing" (and similar expressions). In the US, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the FTC Act providing the legal underpinning for the Department of Justice to prosecute a merger, or for a judge to prohibit a merger. The typical logical flow is that it is illegal to unfairly reduce competition, which might mean lowering prices when you have a substantial share of the market, privately agreeing on technical innovations with a competitor, or simply gaining a substantial share of the market via a merger. Section 7 of the Clayton Act (also Sect 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Sect. 5 of the FTC Act) forbid a merger or acquisition when the effect would be "substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly". The US government has issued guidelines that gives ballpark suggestions about that they would be looking for in deciding is a merger is forbidden. The Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act provides the legal framework for federal review where the government approves vs. blocks an acquisition action (you have to file paperwork so they know that you intend a potential violation of anti-trust law). There are thresholds involving how big the cmopanies are and whethr4e they affect US commerce. This blurb outlines the review process.

The general answer is "yes." Who ever said that only one set of laws applied? Jurisdiction isn't a matter of "one country's laws matter here, let's find out which one it is." All jurisdiction means is that your laws apply to the conduct, not that no one else's can as well. Broadly, there are a few sources of jurisdiction that are generally considered legitimate (to at least some degree) in international law: Territoriality: You have jurisdiction over actions performed in your territory. You also have jurisdiction over crimes where just one part of the crime happens in your jurisdiction (e.g. standing in country A and shooting someone in country B), or even if it just has a significant effect in your territory. Nationality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed by your citizens anywhere in the world, regardless of whether or not they were breaking the law of wherever they were. Passive personality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed against your citizens anywhere in the world. Protective: You have jurisdiction over crimes directly harming core state interests, like counterfeiting your passports or sabotaging your warship. Universal: A handful of crimes (like piracy or genocide) are so serious that every country in the world can exercise jurisdiction. If you catch a pirate, you can punish them. These are accepted to different degrees. Passive personality and protective jurisdiction tend to be iffier; territorial jurisdiction is unquestioned (although if it's just based on effects in your territory, it becomes a bit iffier as well). But any of them can be a basis for jurisdiction. If multiple countries have jurisdiction, whoever actually has the offender decides who will try them (jurisdiction to make an arrest is limited to the country in which the arrest is made). So: If you're located in a country, you have to comply with their laws, and they can regulate just about whatever they want, including what you're doing to foreign computers. The foreign country can also generally regulate what you're doing, because part of what you're doing is happening on their territory. Even if both you and the computer are in a foreign country, you may have to answer to the courts of your country of citizenship. Depending on what exactly you're doing, the protective principle may come into play. For instance, if you hack into a computer on a foreign military base, the foreign country could prosecute you for endangering their security. If you're coordinating a genocide, universality applies and anyone can prosecute you. If you hack the computer of a foreigner, passive personality may apply, although this tends to be controversial.

The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.

While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.

Is it legal to sell zero-day exploits? Can someone who discovered a zero-day exploit in a program sell the information, and does the applicable jurisdiction depend on his location, the buyer location, the location of the developed of the product that the exploit targets, or something else?

It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this.

There are a few ways that this could be illegal, but barring those, there is nothing per se illegal in doing what you describe. It could be a TOS/contact/licence violation to sniff the traffic: Use third-party software that intercepts, collects, reads, or "mines" information generated or stored by the Battle.net Client or the Game(s) The protocol could be protected by patent. (U.S. Patent 5,883,893) The use of the reverse engineered protocol could be illegal (fraudulently connecting to a company's server while posing as an authorized client).

There are vendors providing software to facilitate this sort of task. Avalara is perhaps the best known, but I don't have any experience with it and couldn't say whether it's actually any good or not. But the bottom line is that in a destination-based sourcing regime, sales taxes must be computed based on the address of the destination, not city or ZIP code associated with that address. As Avalara has noted, this is a giant hassle, but it's nonetheless the current state of the law. Of course, this assumes the seller has sufficient nexus with Louisiana to trigger a duty to collect sales taxes in the first place. From the question, it is not clear whether this is true.

You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.

Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.

In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.

As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.

When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.

When was judicial attire first specified in England (or the United Kingdom)? To many (if not most) of those not involved in legal matters, court dress may seem a bit absurd. Wigs, especially seem out of place in modern society. It is obvious that the judicial costume must date back quite some time. I've never quite understood when this happened. When was court dress first standardized in England (or the United Kingdom, depending on the era)?

The origins aren't known exactly, as it turns out. Court dress goes back quite some time. Edward III - living up to the example of Edward I, and his legal improvements - was not the first to mandate that judges wear appropriate attire, but it became established during his reign. Judges of importance wore robes lined with fur and silk. Their attire also included a hood and cowl, as well as a mantle. Colors varied, with violet being the color of choice in the winter green in the summer. In medieval times, the coif, a white cap, was used by monks. Skullcaps (in black) were adopted later on, but wigs became the head covering of choice in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, largely because they became part of the formal clothing worn at the time - not just inside courtrooms. References: Court and Tribunals Judiciary Wigs, Coifs, and Other Idiosyncrasies of English Judicial Attire

If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.

england-and-wales "Lead defendant" is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be "principal defendant" which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: "Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]"

Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989

Judicial appointments in England and Wales (plus courts that cover the whole of the UK) are made by the Judicial Appointments Commission. This was set up in 2006 to improve the separation of powers in the UK, removing the ability of a government to select sympathetic judges. The committee comprises ...the judiciary, the legal profession, non-legally qualified judicial office holders and the public. So it could be said that judges in the UK are to some extent self-selecting, but the commission responsible also has members who are not judges.

The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.

The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.

There are two legal jurisdictions in the Channel Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey. The law in Guernsey differs from the law in the UK partly because the Common Law developed differently (more Norman influence on Guernsey than on England) and partly because Guernsey and the UK have different legislatures and so pass different laws. Until recently the UK was a member of an organisation based in Belgium and Luxembourg called the European Union which has its own legal system and courts and which requires member states to enact identical legislation in certain matters including, in particular, employment law. Although the UK is no longer a member of the EU most of its employment laws remain as they were in the EU-era. By contrast Guernsey has never been a member of the EU. So this is an additional reason for differences in laws. Generally the parties to a contract can stipulate what law governs the contract and which country's courts have jurisdiction. For example a contract between a Guernsey company and an individual resident in England could be stipulated to be governed by the laws of France and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Barbados (this particular example is highly unlikely but I am just illustrating the principle). If the contract does not stipulate the law (or the contract is unwritten) then there are default rules which determine which jurisdiction's laws apply. However, that said, most countries, including England and Wales, have some "mandatory" employment laws. These are laws which apply to everyone employed in England (or Wales) even if England/Wales does not generally cover the contract of employment. Mandatory laws typically cover such things as minimum pay rates, rest periods, minimum paid holiday entitlement, protection from unfair dismissal etc. So some employment laws in England and Wales apply to everyone working in England and Wales whilst some other aspects of the employment relationship are governed by the law of the contract - which might be England and Wales or might be some other system of law.

Is the prohibition of narcotics mandated by an international treaty? Possession of narcotics is of course illegal in many jurisdictions. Recently there has been talk of relaxing or eliminating prohibitions on the sale and possession of drugs. Are there any international treaties or supranational legislation that would be breached if, say, the United Kingdom legalised narcotics? If so, which countries are similarly bound?

Yes, there are international treaties that the UK would breach if they legalised narcotics. Those are: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, and The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 The majority of UN members are bound by these treaties: 185 of 193 for the 1961 and 1971 treaties, and 189 of 193 for the 1988 treaty. For a full list of signatories and of parties to the treaties, click 'Status of Treaty Adherence' under each treaty. As to what specific breach the UK would commit if narcotics were legalised, the answer can be found in one of the articles of the 1961 convention: Article 4. General obligations The parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary: (a) To give effect to and carry out the provisions of this Convention within their own territories; (b) To co-operate with other States in the execution of the provisions of this Convention; and (c) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs. In other words, we are bound by this treaty to enact legislation to ensure that the use and possession of drugs is limited only to medical and scientific use.

To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').

It is not correct to say that drugs are, for example, broadly illegal in many western countries Some specific drugs, or specific categories of drugs, are illegal in certain circumstances, by specific statutes. Which ones vary by jurisdiction. So the analogy breaks down. As for the main question, if by "software cracking" is meant creating a modified version of the software that operates differently, for example by-passes authentication, or allows unlimited "lives", that would most probably be creatign a derivative work of the software. Creating a derivative work, even if it is never distributed, is copyright infringement under US law: 17 USC 106 (2) lists as one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder the right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This also covers the right to authorize preparation such works. So merely creating a "cracked" version of the software is technically infringement. However, infringement (of this sort) is not a crime, and no border officer or other government official will care about it in the slightest. It is up to the copyright owner to take legal action, normally by filing suit. If the modified software is never distributed nor advertised, it seems unlikely that the owner will ever even learn of it, and less likely that the owner will sue if s/he does learn of it. Damages in such a case, if the owner brought one, would probably be small, indeed not enough to make it worth the owner's time and trouble. If the cracker starts with an instance of the unmodified original software,m and edits it in place, never making a new copy, s/he is still preparing a derivative work, and (unless permission was obtained, or the work constitutes a fair use) it is still, copyright infringement If the modified software were posted online, the owner could send a takedown notice to the hosting site. If it were being sold, then a suit would be more likely. If what the cracker creates is not a modified version of the software, but instructions for modifying it, it is less clear that that would even be infringement. If the instructions are for evading an access control mechanism, that might be unlawful under 17 USC 1201 the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. But again it would be up to the owner to take legal action, the government will not care until and unless the owner takes action. (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. The above answer is specific to the united-states but on this point the laws of other North American and European countries are, i believe, similar, as is the Berne Copyright Convention, at least on the matter of derivative works.

You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.

But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter.

The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.

It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.

The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.

Is an English will valid if the testator dies while living in Scotland? If a testator makes a will while living in England, to what extent will it be valid if the testator— permanently moves to Scotland, and subsequently dies there without making a further will?

(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)

What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors.

A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. in Washington) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been "convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian", but such a person is not barred from inheriting property. There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will. Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.

The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.

No. As long as it is owned by him he is free to do as he likes. The wife / children do not have any claims as it is ancestral property and they can have a claim only after his demise. Until then, he is free to do as he likes legally.

Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

Powers of Attorney die with the principal Once the subject dies, they are null and void. For a person who dies intestate, the next of kin can apply to the court for an Administrator (not an Executor) to be appointed. This may be a person all the beneficiaries agree on or it may be a government public trustee.

How does changing a name FAIL to protect against a libel suit? In the answer to this question, someone convinced me that changing Paul dePodesta's name to "Peter Brand" in "Moneyball, was enough to signal a "disconnect" between Mr. dePodesta and "Billy Beane's assistant." Yet, this tactic didn't work in the Red Hat Club case. The author changed the name of Vicki Stewart to Susu and yet was found guilty of "libel." Apparently, part of the problem was the "backstories" (the story before the story) of Stewart and Susu were very similar, while the forward-going "stories" (fictitious and real) were wildly different. Was that because changing the name signals only a "slight" alteration of the facts, e.g. in "Moneyball" whereas the novel was a "major" alteration? Was it the lack of consistency between the (slight) alteration of backstories and the (major) alternation of the main stories? Or was something else at work?

The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way.

I am not aware of any cases with a fact pattern at all like this in which there has been an injunction against an individual publicizing accusations against a company. In each of the cases Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer; Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse; TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2004); Cleary Bldg. Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Colo. 2009)' Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.2000) an individual put up a "gripe sit usign teh trademark of the company or something close to it, as a URL. Courts held this was not trademark infringement adn ther was no reason to enjoin such sites. More recently "companySucks.com" sites have been created to host complaints about {company}. Atempts to shut these downishe bottom." using trademark law have largely been unsucceaful. See this page for more on this. The first amendment makes it hard to shut down such sites, as they are on "matters of public concern" the "actual malice" rule makes defamation cases tough.

I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.

Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!

Yes. There is no requirement that a company name be accurately descriptive. One could call such a company "Horror and Fury Brewing" if one chose to, or "Joe's Eats". Such a name might well reduce book sales, but there is no law against poor business decisions. As long as the name does not violate any existing trademarks, it should be OK unless there is some specific law in the local jurisdiction that regulates company names, which seems unlikely.

Yes Loss of income that is directly attributable to a loss of reputation can be part of the damages in a libel case. However, the plaintiff must prove the connection, must show that had the libel and the resulting loss of reputation not occurred, the income would have been received. This can be hard to establish. Testimony from specific people who say that they would have hired the plaintiff or done business with the plaintiff but for the libel is a common way to establish this kind of damage. Showing a sudden drop of income after the libel can also help such a case. And of course, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of libel: (in the US) a negative factual statement, communicated to others, the falsity of the statement, and a resulting loss of reputation.

If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations.

Generally, no matter where you are, the answer to your question(s) is largely going to be a fact dependent analysis. Just so we're clear, I want to be sure you're using the term pseudonym in the way that it's generally accepted or understood to mean, being a fictitious name typically used by an author (this could be book, blog, a paper – whatever); but not as an alias or a false identity used to mislead people about your qualifications or official position. Assuming you are using a pseudonym in the way it would typically be used: as a mechanism to write and publish under a name other than your own so as not to have credit, or discredit be given to your actual identity, than I cannot see this being a problem anywhere, nor could I find any laws that pertain to this. (You've not asked about copyright/trademark, which poses different legal issues but is also not insurmountable if done correctly.) Generally, if you are publishing something, you have the right to publish anonymously or use a nom de plume (aka:a pseudonym or pen name)...this has been done throughout history and throughout the world by many famous authors. Reasons differ and the examples for such are endless. I have heard of a famous "pulp" fiction writer having used one when writing a children's books; people do it to overcome biases and exposure associated with their name (both positive and negative); during WWII Jewish authors used them to avoid being discounted or arrested based on their name and lineage. In the 1700's (when the U.S. was coming into its infancy) many writers and journalists used pseudonyms, and while the use itself wasn't illegal, they did so to write controversial and often illegal articles, papers, and even letters to the editor, that criticized governments or monarchies and their practices. Some of the most famous pseudonyms were for that purpose. Ben Franklin used to almost exclusively write under a pen name and create elaborate characters to go along with them. Famous authors like Dean Koontz and Stephen King, both used pen names when trying out new genre's or to avoid over-exposure – especially when releasing at the same time. Many famous women authors, throughout history, used to write under male pen names because women couldn't be published or at least not as easily. Most famously was probably the Federalist (Federalist Papers), written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay (under the pseudonym Publius), who published 80 or so papers calling for the ratification of the United States Constitution. These were very dangerous writings for their time. When I read your question, however, I worry that you seem to be suggesting something other than simply a pseudonym for these various typical purposes. Maybe I'm wrong, but when you say hide behind, and you are talking about using Ph.D., or Dr., or some other title that would denote special education or training, you are treading into different territory if the purpose is to mislead or misinform people: not about who you are, but about what you know based on who you are. There is a big difference. So, for instance, Dr. Seuss (who actually began his career writing and drawing political parodies and cartoons) wrote children's books using Dr. as part of his nom du plume, which was his prerogative as nobody was mislead or harmed by the fact that he chose to put Dr. in front of his name. He was not posing as a doctor or giving advice about medical issues, so nobody detrimentally relied on his writings based on that fact. However, if someone wrote a non-fiction book about life saving holistic cures for cancer (I'm just pulling topics out of my head), and the author called himself Dr. Doe, or you write a book about prevention of suicide and you put Ph.D. after your name, and people who read the books detrimentally rely on the information because you've mislead them about your expertise – that is not just a pseudonym and it could definitely leave you vulnerable to legal problems. You cannot hide behind a title to exploit people by suggesting you're qualified to proffer information in which you have no training or expertise; this is not a nom du plume, it is a fraudulent misrepresentation. With regard to whether or not you have a right to hide behind a pseudonym on the internet? E.g., assuming I don't break any laws, can an internet host/provider publish my real name? that really depends on the site you post on. It is your responsibility to read their privacy disclosures to find out. Facebook, for example, has a "real name" policy, which disallows this practice. Other sites may allow you to create any screen name you want, but require a real name for registration purposes for a variety of reasons, one being if they need to have it for law enforcement purposes. Regardless of the policy of the web host, if you do break the law, or end up getting sued based on your writings, all it would take to reveal your identity is a subpoena arising out of a lawsuit. While using a pen name is seemingly legal in and of itself, pretty much anywhere, whether or not doing so could lead to criminal or civil liability, or whether your real identity could be exposed, is largely dependent on how you undertake to use your fake identity. Impersonating certain licensed professionals, or government officials can be a very slippery slope, and could be illegal or lead to liability, in an of itself. Personally, I would stay away from using any.

How does changing a name protect against a libel suit when "everyone" knows who he is? In the movie, "Moneyball," the name of Billy Beane's assistant was fictionalized to "Peter Brand." Yet anyone who has read Michael Lewis' book knows that his real name was Paul dePodesta. Mr. dePodesta withheld permission to use his real name because of several "shortcuts" the movie played with the facts, like the part about dropping in on a newly eligible player on Christmas Day. By doing so, he apparently "disassociated" himself from the movie. Given that the movie was "based on a true story," what does changing Paul dePodesta's name do? In the Sound of Music, which was "based on a true story," the Captain and Maria retained their real names and identities, but the seven children were fictionalized. Why might that be?

By changing the name, the filmmakers are signaling that the character in the movie is not acting the way the real-life person acted. It is not uncommon for historical fiction--which is basically what the "Moneyball" film is--to combine historical characters for narrative purposes, or to invent new characters to drive the plot. If you see a movie where Henry V stops to talk to Joe Welshman, a common soldier, before a battle, you assume that Henry V was at that battle, but you don't assume that the soldier is a historical person whose words with the king happened to be recorded on a nearby tape recorder. So, if you watch a movie where some characters have real people's names, like Billy Beane, and others have invented names, like Peter Brand, you don't necessarily assume that Brand represents a one-to-one correspondence with one real person. More likely, his part represents things that were done by multiple people, or were done in a different way that is not as narratively convenient. As you say, if you read the book, you will recognize the character--but you will also recognize the changes, and understand why the name was changed.

The Adelsaufhebungsgesetz removed “von” and other nobility-related honorifics from names, and made it illegal for Austrian citizens to use such honorifics as part of their own name. It is not illegal for other people to use such nobility indicators, even when addressing no-longer-noble Austrian citizens. Thus, it is not illegal for the English Wikipedia to use this name. Wikipedia also notes the full name without the “von” in the sidebar, although the intro text is arguably misleading. But from a Wikipedia editorial perspective, it would matter by which name he is generally known, even if it isn't the legal name.

In the U.S., you are not required to include your real name on a copyright registration: If you write under a pseudonym and do not want to have your identity revealed in the Copyright Office’s records, give your pseudonym and identify it as such on your application. You can leave blank the space for the name of the author. If an author’s name is given, it will become part of the Office’s online public records, which are accessible by Internet. [...] In no case should you omit the name of the copyright claimant. You can use a pseudonym for the claimant name. But be aware that if a copyright is held under a fictitious name, business dealings involving the copyrighted property may raise questions about its ownership. Consult an attorney for legal advice on this matter. Therefore, a pseudonym seems like a perfectly legitimate name for a copyright notice, considering that it is also a legally valid name for an official registration with the U.S. Copyright Office. As noted above, this may complicate your ability to prove your right to litigate against copyright infringement, but it does not actually diminish your right to do so if you can successfully validate your identity as the copyright holder.

Suppose you want to pay for your son's college tuition with cocaine sales proceeds. You hire your son as an actor in your miserable movie and pay him $90,000 for doing so. The movie is produced by a corporation that you don't have to 1099 when you give it money. The corporation treats the money in as a loan which isn't income to it and doesn't have to report the lender to anyone. The son has the money (after paying income tax on it) and can pay for college for the year. The movie company and son don't appear to be doing anything other than being incompetent movie producers and lousy overpaid actors unless you know the big picture. The money has effectively been spent in a way that conceals its illegal origins and makes it look legitimate. Ergo, money laundering.

There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.

The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun!

There is a general belief that a term being trademarked means that it's illegal to use the term without permission from the trademark holder, but that is false. It is illegal only if it is done in a manner that suggests endorsement by the trademark holder. For instance, selling a football as a "Super Bowl football" would be trademark infringement, as it implies NFL involvement in the production of the football. Simply talking about the Super Bowl, such as saying "Our construction company built the stadium the Super Bowl is being played in" is not trademark infringement. Simply using a trademarked term to discuss the thing it refers to, without implying endorsement, is known as "nominative use". However, even if one would be on solid legal footings and could win a lawsuit on the basis of nominative use, one might avoid using a trademark to avoid the hassle of being sued.

Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless.

What jurisdiction does an IP address fall under? What is an IP Address? An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a numerical label assigned to each device (e.g., computer, printer) participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. An IP address serves two principal functions: host or network interface identification and location addressing. Who manages IP Addresses? The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is a department of ICANN, a nonprofit private American corporation that oversees global IP address allocation, autonomous system number allocation, root zone management in the Domain Name System (DNS), media types, and other Internet Protocol-related symbols and numbers. What is a Regional Internet Registries? Regional Internet Registries are components of the Internet Number Registry System, which is described in IETF RFC 7020. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) delegates Internet resources to the RIRs who, in turn, follow their regional policies to delegate resources to their customers, which include Internet service providers and end-user organizations. Collectively, the RIRs participate in the Number Resource Organization (NRO), formed as a body to represent their collective interests, undertake joint activities, and coordinate their activities globally. The NRO has entered into an agreement with ICANN for the establishment of the Address Supporting Organisation (ASO), which undertakes coordination of global IP addressing policies within the ICANN framework. So IANA is a department of ICANN. On October 1, 2009 the U.S. Department of Commerce gave up its control of ICANN. In 2013, the NSA spying scandal has led to ICANN endorsing the Montevideo Statement. The Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation was released on 7 October 2013 by the leaders of a number of organizations involved in coordinating the Internet's global technical infrastructure. The statement was signed by the heads of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Architecture Board, the World Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Society, and the five regional Internet address registries (African Network Information Center, American Registry for Internet Numbers, Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre, Latin America and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry, and Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre). In large part, the statement is seen as a response to the ongoing NSA surveillance scandal. The leaders made four main points: They reinforced the importance of globally coherent Internet operations, and warned against Internet fragmentation at a national level. They expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance. They identified the need for ongoing effort to address Internet Governance challenges, and agreed to catalyze community-wide efforts towards the evolution of global multistakeholder Internet cooperation. They called for accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing. They also called for the transition to IPv6 to remain a top priority globally. In particular Internet content providers must serve content with both IPv4 and IPv6 services, in order to be fully reachable on the global Internet. What jurisdiction does an IP Address fall under if a crime is committed using it? EXAMPLE: Lets say that someone hosts a website similar to The Silk Road in the Principality of Sealand. They use TOR so they have obfuscated their location online and do not use any common TLD. What country would have jurisdiction to try and shut down the site? What if the location of the server hosting the website is in the cloud, similar to The Pirate Bay?

I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.

It is not an either–or. You may have certain rights under both CCPA and GDPR, but they have rather different mechanisms for determining their scope. When does the CCPA apply? CCPA applies to certain businesses and consumers. It covers any business (regardless of legal structure) that that does business in the State of California and has a certain scale. A consumer means a natural person who is a California resident. These aspects are not influenced by your current location. When you as a California resident travel to the EU, you still have all your CCPA rights against businesses that do business in California. You do not have any CCPA rights against businesses that don't do business in California, for example a national rail company in the EU you've bought a train ticket for. When does the GDPR apply? Whereas the location of the user/data subject can be a factor in the GDPR context, their residency or nationality does not. The GDPR applies to all processing activities by data controllers who are established in the EU, including any businesses, non-profits, and individuals. This includes processing activities in the context of an EU establishment of a non-EU company. For example, GDPR would apply with respect to processing of personal data by a hotel you're staying at in the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU data controllers in the context of (a) offering goods or services to people who are in the EU, or (b) monitoring behaviour of people who are in the EU. Here, “offering” does not mean “doing business”, but “targeting or marketing”. For example, you might have installed a smartphone app that assists with sightseeing while in Paris. If this app monitors your behaviour while you are in the EU (such as by tracking your GPS position to alert you to nearby points of interest), that would fall under the GDPR while you are in the EU. The app may also fall under the GDPR per case (a) if it is marketed to / targeted at people who are currently in Paris. That the GDPR applies in such cases comes from the offering/monitoring while you are in the EU, not from your continued presence in the EU. You would be able to exercise your GDPR rights relating to this processing even after leaving the EU. Note that some service or processing activity can fall under CCPA and GDPR simultaneously. For example, this app would also fall under CCPA if the company also does business in California, e.g. if it also provides sightseeing information for Los Angeles or San Francisco. And both CCPA and GDPR could apply when an EU company does business in California. Under which privacy law would a deletion request be dealt with? In practice, most companies don't have this sorted out properly and results are unpredictable. Ideally, a company would just comply with both laws simultaneously, thus making it unnecessary to determine which law applies. Information that is only required under on law can be provided with conditional statements, e.g. “If this processing activity is covered by GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority in your country”. As mentioned above, both laws can apply simultaneously. Whether GDPR applies and whether CCPA applies are independent questions. However, the answer to neither of these depends on your current location at the time of making the request. In this answer, any statement about the EU applies equivalently to the UK.

It is legal for a manufacturer to sell a device which is capable of being misused. For example, a wifi-capable router can be sold even if it is "open" by default. A Bluetooth device has a shorter range than wifi, but in principle can connect to any other device. An owner's legal liability is not different given wifi vs. Bluetooth. Whether or not there is criminal liability for a third person who connects to the device also does not specifically depend on whether the device uses Bluetooth technology, as opposed to some other technology. 18 USC 1030 is the general federal law prohibiting "unauthorized access". In the case of a bed, two legal question arise: is it a "computer", and is it "protected"? It is an electronic high speed data processing device which performs logical, arithmetic, storage and communications facilities, i.e. it is a computer (in the legal sense). It probably is not protected, because it is not "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication", that is, it is not connected to the internet (unless it is). State laws tend to be broader, not having the "interstate commerce" limitation, so accessing the bed would violate Washington's analog of the federal law. However, under Washington law, the access is probably not "without authorization". That term is defined as knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term "without the express or implied permission" does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term "circumvent technological access barriers" may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code. One question is whether there is any technological access barrier that the user circumvents (I don't know if it is possible to circumvent "hidden mode"). Since the term "may include ... allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code", and since playing music on speakers involves running code, then the remote user may be criminally liable. On the third hand, the language of that paragraph ("technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include ... circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer") clearly indicates a legislative intent to address deliberately overcoming active access barriers and not accidentally connecting to an unprotected, open system. Plus, the law also says that you are accessing the computer "in order to obtain information", but that is not the purpose of transmitting sound to speakers.

It is in this context important to recall what a data controller and a data processor is. The data controller is the person or entity responsible for the data processing. They determine the purposes and means of this processing. A data processor merely performs data processing on the controller's behalf. The processor must not process data for their own purposes, but can make low-level decisions about the means of processing. For example, a controller may specify the purpose of ensuring the security and integrity of the services, or the purpose of creating basic statistics. The processor might implement this in part through the means of keeping a logfile. Often, such purposes are agreed upon via a data processing agreement or the terms of service, leading to the legal fiction that the processor was instructed by the controller. In your scenario, the controller is presumably not subject to the GDPR1, and therefore does not need a clear purpose or a legal basis for their processing activities. However, the EU-based data processor is bound by the GDPR, and can only process data as instructed by the controller. The processor has to comply with the GDPR with respect to how they carry out the processing activities, but the processing activities themselves don't have to be GDPR-compliant. Thus, it might be perfectly fine for an EU-based hosting provider to keep logfiles with IP addresses, even if those logfiles wouldn't be GDPR-compliant. 1: Whether GDPR applies to a non-EU data controller depends not on whether processing occurs in the EU, but on whether the controller is offering goods or services to people in the EU, or observing behaviour of people in the EU – see Art 3(2) GDPR. The cited guidelines continue to enumerate which provisions of the GDPR would still apply to EU processors working on behalf of non-EU data controllers (pages 12–13). These requirements are about how the controller and processor work together and relate to internal compliance of the data processor, but they do not affect the processing activities themselves. You mention that you would link to the hosting provider's privacy policy and direct data subject requests to the hoster. This misunderstands the role of the data processor. The data controller is the single point of contact for data subjects. The data processor is not a data controller in this scenario. They cannot issue a privacy policy for the controller's processing activities, and cannot respond to data subject requests. Their only relationship is with the data controller. If the hosting provider were to post a privacy policy for these processing activities, they would act like a controller (possibly a joint controller) and could bring the processing activities within scope of the GDPR – not what you are intending. However, since GDPR does not apply to the processing activities in this scenario, the data subject rights in the GDPR do not apply. As far as GDPR is concerned, no privacy policy is needed and no data subject requests have to be answered. If the data processor receives such requests, their only obligation is to forward them to the controller, who can then handle them (possibly ignoring them).

The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site.

Yes More exactly, nations will not regard places outside of their physical limits as outside of their jurisdictions. Overview Traditionally, a nation has regarded any ship flying its flag as under its jurisdiction, and a place where it may enforce its laws. More recently, many nations will undertake to enforce laws in cases where their citizens are the victims, or in some cases the perpetrators of crimes even within other nations, and more freely on the high seas outside the physical limits or territorial waters of any country. Historically, all nations undertook to enforce laws against piracy wherever they might be committed. Several countries, including the UK and the US, now treat the UN Law of the Sea convention as part of their national law, which defines as piracy: "illegal acts of violence or detention ... against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft" This would include the situation described in the question. Therefore such actions could and quite likely would be prosecuted by any of several countries, depending on the registry of the vessel and the nationalities of those involved. Sources 18 U.S. Code § 7 provides that: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. ... (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. This US DOJ page says: Among the offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States are the crimes of murder, manslaughter, maiming, kidnapping, rape, assault, and robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) there is also jurisdiction over such offenses when they are committed on the high seas or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States that is out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. See JM 9-20.000 et seq. The page "Maritime Offenses" from the law offices of Trombley and Hanes says: The Federal government also exercises jurisdiction over certain maritime offenses. There is Federal jurisdiction for offenses committed on American vessels in the territorial waters, harbors and inland waterways of foreign nations. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). ... A number of Title 18 sections specifically declare certain conduct to be a Federal crime if committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” See, e.g., murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In some instances, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, is also applicable. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1175; 15 U.S.C. § 1243; 16 U.S.C. § 3372. 18 U.S. Code § 1111 (b) provides that: (b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. The Britannica Article on "Piracy" says: Because piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into port, to try the crew (regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if they are found guilty, to punish them and to confiscate the ship. The UN page on Piracy says: The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for the repression of piracy under international law, in particular in its articles 100 to 107 and 110. The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed “that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (‘The Convention’), sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities” (Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 November 2009). Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” The General Assembly has also repeatedly encouraged States to cooperate to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea. For example, in its resolution 64/71 of 4 December 2009, the General Assembly recognized “the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy”. The UK Piracy Act of 1837 defined as a crime: Whosoever, with intent to commit or at the time of or immediately before or immediately after committing the crime of piracy in respect of any ship or vessel, shall assault, with intent to murder, any person being on board of or belonging to such ship or vessel, or shall stab, cut, or wound any such person, or unlawfully do any act by which the life of such person may be endangered, shall be guilty of felony... The more modern UK law, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act of 1997 embodies the UN law of the Sea convention, including its article 101, which says: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed— (a) (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (a) (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

Nothing in 17 USC 512, which includes the DMCA Safe Harbor and Takedown procedures requires an online service provider to notify others who may have made copies of content (including archive sites) claimed to be infringing that a takedown notice has been received or that access to the content has been blocked or removed. A separate DMCA takedown could be sent to the archive site. The internet archive honors robots.txt files set to deny access to a particular site, page, or section of a site by removing from public view all archived versions of that content. This is often done when a new owner acquires a domain and it is repurposed or put up for sale. To the best of my understanding there is no legal requirement that an archive act in this way, but the IA at least does so.

Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS.

How do Creative Commons licences WITHOUT the Share-Alike attribute work? Can derivate works only be more restrictive, or what? I don't understand how CC licenses without the attribute Share-Alike are supposed to work. Ok, you can "share differently", but differently how? You can be more liberal? Doesn't make sense, as this would be equivalent to putting the work into public domain so there would be no point in having this license in the first place,. So you can only "add restrictions", keeping those already there?

From the legal code of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (emphasis in the original): 1.a Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. 1.b Adapter's License means the license You apply to Your Copyright and Similar Rights in Your contributions to Adapted Material in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Public License. 1.f Licensed Material means the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License. 2.a Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: 2.a.1.A reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and 2.a.1.B produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. 2.a.5.B You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. 3.a.4 If You Share Adapted Material You produce, the Adapter's License You apply must not prevent recipients of the Adapted Material from complying with this Public License. In short, if the original is CC-BY, you can license derivative works under whatever terms you want, so long as the license of the original work is not infringed by the new terms for the derived work. In particular, ordinary copyright (aka. "all rights reserved") is a perfectly acceptable copyright for a derivative of a CC-BY work (but the original credits should be included -and augmented- in order to also comply with the original CC-BY). Also note this doesn't restrict anybody's rights to use the original material under the original license. The other non-ShareAlike license that permits derivative works (Attribution-Noncommmercial) has a different version of clause 2.a.1.B: produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material for NonCommercial purposes only. so any license of a derivative work cannot permit commercial use of the original work. It may be possible to permit commercial use of those portions of the derivative that can be separated from the original; this gets into an extreme edge case of copyright law and you'll probably want to consult a lawyer if you find yourself in such a situation. Another way to consider this issue is by noting that you are only licensing your modifications. For example, if you add a mustache to a CC-BY portrait and use a CC-0 license, only your mustache is CC-0; you can't eliminate the original author's requirement of attribution this way. The derived work would still have to be used under a CC-BY license (or compatible).

When you license your creative work under one non-exclusive license such as CC-BY-SA, you are in no way prevented from also licensing your works under different non-exclusive licenses such as MIT. The other license doesn't even have to be an open source license – dual-licensing is a common business model. You are the sole copyright holder of the creative work. No one else can use your works. By offering licenses, you are giving permissions to other people. But you still retain all your rights. You are not required to comply with these licenses yourself – you are the licensor, not the licensee. Technically, the licensor of CC-BY-SA 4.0 material does give up some rights. For example, you waive the right to collect royalties when recipients exercise the permissions you gave them through this license (cf section 2.b.3). But that doesn't restrict you outside of that license.

Reproducing someone else's copyrighted material without permission is a violation of that copyright. This includes using it to promote your Twitter account. This is a violation of copyright law and of Twitter's TOS. There may be Fair Use exceptions- this question is arguably fair use. However, it's extremely unlikely your intended post counts. In the case of the image in question, royalty-free means you pay for a single licence for that image and can then use it as much as you want (according to that licence). You can post that image in as many of your tweets as you like- you don't have to pay each time. If you don't want to pay for images you use, use public domain images, images with licenses that allow you to use them, or create them yourself.

Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern.

Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.

Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain.

Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.

You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.

What kind of ownership do I have over articles I wrote? So, a few months ago I was working for a big blog and then I resigned because I didn't want to write any more articles for them. Some of the articles were original and a few were translations by me from other articles. Do I have any claim to ownership if the articles? I had no contract with them governing what I can do with the material I wrote, so would it be possible for me to ask the owner of the blog to take them down? Is there any law on this issue? In case you need to know I live in Greece, and the blog is based in Greece.

There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case.

Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.

I would imagine they are yours and were always yours. You bought them. You intended to either give them to the company as a gift, sell them to the company or sign them over to the company as part of your initial capital contribution. Without a company none of those can happen.

Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)

You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.

There is no IP in ideas Any code would by subject to copyright (who owns that copyright is itself a convoluted and separate question), however, if the 4 of you abandoned any existing code, notes and images and start over you would have no legal impediment.

You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.

This basically is about the legal responsibility a web-site owner has for user-created content that violate copyright or other laws (such as libel laws). In the USA, this situation is covered by the DMCA. In the EU, this situation is covered by the e-commerce directive. In other jurisdictions, other regulation may apply. The DMCA (USA) is the simplest of those regulations. It stipulates a protocol of Notice and takedown. A web-site owner that complies with this protocol is given Save Harbour. This means that a compliant web-site owner cannot be sued. This goes both for a web-site that is a registered business, and a site run by an individual. The owner of the IP may, however, take the individual who stole and published copyright protected work to court, and will do probably do so if the financial loss was substantial (e.g. a major motion picture was leaked before hitting the cinemas). In the EU, the law is much less explicit than in the USA. Basically, the Notice and takedown protocol works like in the USA, but since it is not part of the law, it is less formal. In the USA, you can safely not act on any complaint that does not strictly follow the protocol (you just have to give feedback so they can fix it). Not so in the EU. And as follows from Delfi AS vs. Estonia, you can be sued even if you take down stuff. In particular if you create an environment for anonymous postings that encourage transgressions and have no means of moderation in place. So if the web-site is located in the EU, the website owner need to exercise more caution when he lets friends publish content, than when a website owner in the USA.

Is there a legal reason why fictional shows use imitation brand names? Often, when I watch TV shows, I'll see or hear about an imitation of a real brand name. As an example, here is a parody of Walmart from The Simpsons The store in the picture is unambiguously supposed to represent Walmart. They're even using Walmart's Styling Is there any legal reason why they do this? and if there is, does it provide any actual legal protection?

In general, TV shows or other fictional works will use fictional brands to avoid infringing the brand's trademark. According to Wikipedia, this occurs more often when the brand is used in a potentially negative way. In your specific example, however, it's clear that (as commenters pointed out) the brand "Sprawlmart" was a parody intended to be humorous and was not for legal reasons.

Speaking from a U.S. perspective (which may or may not generalize elsewhere), trademarks can be used by different companies when they operate in different industries. An answer on Avvo by Kurt Van Thomme captures the important question when using an existing trade name in a new industry: The question in these kinds of circumstances is often whether the goods or services offered by the two companies are sufficiently related such that a consumer would be likely to think a company providing the first product or service would be reasonably likely to provide the second product or service also. Kurt's answer includes an example where the name "Pioneer" is used by a seed company and an electronics company. The two products are unlikely to be provided by the same company, so there is low risk of consumer confusion. In my layman opinion, it seems unlikely that J.K Rowling or Warner Brothers would use the trade name Voldemort to market a software development tool (as it seems unlikely they'd market a software development tool at all, unlike a complete video game, which would be a more likely product), so you could legally use the name insofar as it is not likely to cause customer confusion. Note that you still might attract negative legal attention if the trademark holder is particularly litigious, so when I say "you could legally use the name" I mean that you could probably win a lawsuit (at whatever legal fee costs) if one were filed against you. However, some marks are regarded as "famous" or "well-known" in some jurisdictions. In that case, the mark is afforded much broader protection, and your ability to use it in a different industry is greatly diminished: Famous marks are those that enjoy a high degree of consumer recognition in a particular jurisdiction or in a specific field of commerce or industry. However, few trademarks enjoy the status of “fame.” Examples of marks held to be famous in certain jurisdictions are COCA-COLA, KODAK, WIMBLEDON and VIAGRA. For example, you could not start a business selling automobiles under the brand name "Coca-Cola" even though it is tremendously unlikely that the Coca-Cola Company would branch out into selling cars. The mark's status as "famous" would still allow the Cola-Cola Company to succeed in stopping you from using that mark in commerce, even in a vastly different industry. If the trademark holder of the name Voldemort succeeded in persuading a court that the mark met the jurisdiction's standard for a famous mark, then you could not use the name even for your software development tool. Note also that because trademark is intended to reduce confusion over the source of a good or service, trademark holders can lose their trademark by failing to defend it from confusing uses. Therefore, some trademark holders aggressively pursue even borderline cases to ensure they don't endanger their trademark.

Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.

The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.

General Rules The rules on this vary somewhat by country. In some counties the is no trademark protection unless a mark is formally registers. In others use "in trade" offers a degree of protection even in the absence of registration. The US follows the second rule. Some of Europe follows the first. But in pretty much all countries trademarks (aka trade marks) are only protected when they are "used in commerce" and are only protected against other uses "in commerce". This mans that a phrase or design or other possible mark is only protected when it is functioning as a mark, that is it is used by the maker to identify or advertise a product or service (hereafter I use "product" to mean either or both). Moreover a mark is only protected when an alleged infringer uses the mark (or a similar mark) in such a way that people might reasonably be confused into thinking that the infringer's product comes from the same source as the products of the owner of the mark, or is approved, sponsored, or endorsed by the owner of the mark. A simple literary or pop-culture reference is normally not trademark infringement. This is both because a well-known phrase is not usually protectable as a mark at all, and because a reference to it is normally not infringement, even if the mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion is a very important concept in trademark cases. Examples The phrase "Elementary, my dear Watson" Is often used as a reference to the Sherlock Holmes stories and novels. But it was never used to brand or advertise those stories, so its use in a novel or video game now would not be infringement. Even if a game used that phrase as a title, it would not be infringement, because the phrase is not protected. All this would still be true even if the Sherlock Holmes stories were still being published. The tagline "In space, no one can here you scream" was used extensively to advertise the movie Alien. It had some protection as a mark (in the US), and might well have been registered for fuller protection (I haven't checked the US register of trademarks, or any other for this phrase). A game titled with this phrase might well be infringing. A game where a character speaks the phrase at some point probably will not be infringing. Caution All that said, exactly where the limits of infringement lie depend on the detailed factual situation. Before investing sizable amounts of money or time and effort on such a project, it might be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about trademark law in one's particular jurisdiction, and make sure that the risk of suit is not to great for one's tolerance.

Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.

Names cannot be copyrighted at all, in any country. They can, however, be protected as trademarks. The general idea is that if one uses a name to identify a product or service, or a creator of products or services, others cannot use the same or a similar name to identify their products or services in such a way that a reasonable person might be confused into thinking that the two came from the same source, or one was endorsed or approved by the other. Trademarks are limited in scope to a particular country, A name that is protected in Canada, say, will not be protected in the US unless steps have been taken to protect it there. In some countries a trademark must be officially registered to get any protection, In others, such as the United States, merely using the mark can give a degree of protection, although registration give more protection. Each country maintains a trademark registry which can be searched for existing marks. There are search firms that will do such searches for a client, and also search for marks in use but not registered, for a fee. Trademark protection is generally restricted by the type of product or service involved. An anti-virus program, say, called "Guard dog" would probably not interfere with a fantasy game called "Guardog". A private security service of the same name would pretty surely not interfere. The range of protection depends on how widely known the product is, but "software related" is a very wide area, and except for famous marks, a mark protected in connection with one area of software will not be protected in a very different area of software. Names that a purely invented, such as Kodak, are more strongly protected than descriptive marks such as "Best Pizza" Particularly famous names such as "Microsoft" get additional protection even outside their usual areas, so "Microsoft Pizza" might be a problem. Logos and other graphic marks can also be protected as trademarks, but that is not what the question asked about. The styling of a trademark, such as a particular font, choice of colors, and so on, can also be protected. This is called "trade dress". A disclaimer making it clear that a somewhat similar name is not related, and the is no affiliation can help avoid avoid an infringement suit. For example: Pear brand kites are in no way associated with, sponsored or approved by the makers of Pear smartphones. On this site we cannot give specific legal advise, so we cannot evaluate whether a specific proposed trademark would or would not infringe an existing mark. It might be well to consult an attorney with trademark experiences before finally choosing a name and doing marketing under it.

The trivial answer is yes, at least under certain circumstances, as the example you give shows. First, the concept of substrings is not particularly useful in trademark law. IF that were the case, then we wouldn't be able to have a company called "Gaudiest Clothing Brand" because it contains the substring audi. But, you might say, what about looking at words instead of characters, as with the example of "Linux" and "The Linux Foundation." In that case, I offer the example of "Target," which is a word found in literally thousands of US trademarks. You'll notice that the first item on this list where word mark is simply target, rather than a phrase containing that word, doesn't even belong to the well known chain of stores. This brings us to another important aspect of trademark protection, which is that the mark's purpose is to identify a producer of goods, a provider of services, or particular goods or services themselves. You could probably start a bookstore called McDonald's, unless you're near Redmond, Washington, but you certainly would not be able to use that name for a chain of hamburger-based fast food restaurants. Back to the subject of Linux, one possible explanation here is therefore that Linux is a trademark for an operating system, while The Linux Foundation is a trademark for a non-profit foundation that is concerned with the operating system. The trademarks don't represent competing entities. Consider, for example, the disclaimer on volkswagenownersclub.com: VolkswagenOwnersClub.com is an independent media publication. VolkswagenOwnersClub.com and its owners are not affiliated with or endorsed by Volkswagen AG or Volkswagen of America, Inc. Volkswagen is a registered trademark of Volkswagen AG. All rights reserved. All information Copyright 2006-2010 (Also consider, for example, the case of Apple Corps, Ltd. and Apple Computer, Inc..) As far as I can tell, however, "Volkswagen Owners' Club" is not directly relevant to this question, because it is not a registered trademark, and the question concerns two registered trademarks. I am not sure whether two such trademarks could coexist if there were an adversarial relationship between their owners. In this case, hwoever, the trademarks are used together because the owners have a collegial relationship. They work for a common goal, the promotion of the product identified by one of the trademarks. The foundation's use of the trademark is therefore undoubtedly with permission. In fact, the Linux foundation is Linus Torvalds' employer, and one of the foundation's purposes is to manage the Linux trademark that Torvalds owns. Now the question of derivative trademarks, such as My Linux is clouded by the fact that Linux is an open source operating system. In principle, you can't modify a product and then sell it using its original trademark unless you have permission. For example, I don't suppose I could rebottle Coca-Cola with some added salt and pepper and sell it as *Phoog's Coca-Cola" unless I had permission from the owner of the trademark. With Linux being an open-source project, however, the terms of the open source license probably explicitly permit people to use the trademark under certain restrictions if they offer, for example, a customized distribution of Linux

How is the theft of stolen property handled legally? Many definitions of "theft" include specific text regarding "the rightful owner" or a variant necessitating that the victim of theft owned the property. (emphasis mine) For example, The Free Dictionary defines theft as: A criminal act in which property belonging to another is taken without that person's consent. Merriam Webster defines it similarly: the act of stealing; specifically : the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it How do these definitions apply if the person being stolen from is not actually the rightful owner, and has in fact stolen the property himself? What criminal repercussions do thieves of stolen property face?

In England and Wales, theft is defined by s1 Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it It does not matter if the victim is not the rightful owner of the property, as the law only requires that the property belongs to another: the victim and owner can be two different people. As long as the other elements are present, the offence is committed. It's important when considering theft to look for dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive: borrowing something without permission with the intention to return it isn't theft, and nor is taking something by mistake. Theft is an 'either-way' offence (i.e. it can be tried summarily or by a jury), and in the latter case carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison (s7 TA 1968).

The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.

No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."

The government cannot seize property because a person residing at that property has a tax debt: the debtor has to have a legal interest in the property, which you say you don't have. The government can seize property under the practice of civil forfeiture, which is a legal dispute between law enforcement and property – the simplest way to put it is that the property itself has "done wrong" (is involved in illegal activity). That's not what tax debt is. It is possible for the state to seize property in error, so just because the state makes a mistake somehow does not mean that the state cannot file the paperwork and seize the property if the owners ignore the summons.

You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.

The pawn shop has the "use of property" of their own premises. The pawn shop has obviously the right to examine the gun to determine its value, for example, or to clean it if it needs cleaning to avoid damage, or to show it to a potential customer. And the pawn shop is allowed to let the police onto their own premises, even without a search warrant.

The word "dishonestly" is defined in the act (1)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b)if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c)(except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. (2)A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property. The prosecution thus must establish that defendant knows that he has no legal right, that is, it must be established that he knows that it is not a legal purchase. The simple act of purchasing in these circumstances provides no proof of the alleged dishonesty: the prosecution must add something else. For example, testimony that defendant declared "Crikey! This machine is giving me half-off on everything, those suckers! I wish I had bought more" might be sufficient to establish dishonesty. The "intent" of management in installing these machines is legally irrelevant, indeed management's intent is to reduce operating costs. It is management's responsibility to ascertain that the machines function the way they wish them to. It is not self-evident to the defendant that the machine is malfunctioning, but defendant could have actual knowledge that makes the transaction dishonest.

If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.

Which aspects of human-subjects research rules are actually laws rather than conventions? I'm aware that various laws exist regulating research on human subjects (Wikipedia summary here and in linked pages). However, I've had a tough time finding sources that clarify the boundary between legal restrictions and "guidelines". It's also not clear to me to what extent these laws apply to institutions (by governing what kinds of research they can fund/sanction) versus individuals (by governing what kinds of research activities can actually be performed). So what I'm interested in is: Are there laws that make it illegal for an individual to violate or blur the boundaries of human subjects ethics guidelines, even though what is actually done would not be illegal if it did not constitute research? For instance, stopping someone on the street to ask them a question is not in itself illegal; does it become illegal if an individual does it to a lot of people and writes about it as research, without having the sorts of safeguards that an institution's IRB would require? I'm talking here about cases where the acts themselves would not otherwise be in question (e.g., the research doesn't cause physical harm), but only become potentially problematic because they are part of research. If research conducted at an institution violates ethical guidelines, is that considered an illegal act by the IRB or the individual, or both (or conceivably neither, if the violation wasn't covered by an actual law)? For instance, if a researcher submits a research proposal and has it approved, and then someone claims the proposal violates human subjects research guidelines, is it the wholly the researcher's fault for doing it, or does the IRB bear culpability for not properly vetting the proposal and alerting the researcher to the problems? Is there a specific mechanism for determining what counts as "research" subject to these rules in the first place? That is, is there an accepted legal framework for distinguishing informal information-gathering, not subject to the rules, (e.g., "Hey all my Facebook friends, everybody take this latest web quiz and post your results in comments!"), from bona fide research that is subject to the rules? Are there legal distinctions between different subject areas of research? A lot of the stuff I read on the issue mentions motivating cases that involved medical research, like the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. However, it's not clear to me if medical research actually has different legal restrictions than other kinds of research (e.g., sociological interviews or psychological questionnaires). I'm mainly interested in the legal situation in the US, but would be interested to know about the law on this matter in other countries as well. Also, I'm aware that in practice it often doesn't matter where the line is between what's actually illegal and what's just disallowed by university guidelines or scholarly consensus, because a researcher's reputation, career, and funding are vulnerable regardless of whether actual laws were broken. (In other words, even if you didn't break any laws, a journal may refuse to publish your paper if it smells a rat.) I'm asking this question on this site because I'm specficially interested in which restrictions on research activity are actually a matter of law, not just convention or institutional self-regulation.

According to the NIH, there are in fact a number of laws in the US regulating human research, as opposed to codes and conventions (although the majority does consist of the latter). 1962 - Milestone: Kefauver-Harris amendments to the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, [Public Law 87-781; 76 Stat. 788-89] This amendment was important in establishing that human testing was necessary in drugs and therefore provided for the regulation of human testing, after the thalidomide scandal caused a number of preventable birth defects due to insufficient human testing. The FDA describes the law as (emphasis mine): ... The Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments also asked the Secretary to establish rules of investigation of new drugs, including a requirement for the informed consent of study subjects. The amendments also formalized good manufacturing practices, required that adverse events be reported, and transferred the regulation of prescription drug advertising from the Federal Trade Commission to the FDA. 1974 - Milestone: National Research Act The National Research Act legally justifies and grants the NIH the power to set up boards to regulate human medical research: SEC. 102. (a) Congress finds and declares that (1) the success and continued viability of the Federal biomedical and behavioral research effort depends on the availability of excellent scientists and a network of institutions of excellence capable of producing superior research personnel ; (2) direct support of the training of scientists for careers in biomedical and behavioral research is an appropriate and necessary role for the Federal Government ; and (3) graduate research assistance programs should be the key elements in the training programs of the institutes of the National Institutes of Health and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration. (b) It is the purpose of this title to increase the capability of the institutes of the National Institutes of Health and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration to carry out their responsibility of maintaining a superior national program of research into the physical and mental diseases and impairments of man.

The current version of copyright law in the PRC is here. Art. 10 states what is protected, which includes the standard rights of distribution, copying, modification and so on (which makes software cracking illegal). Article 22 gives the equivalent of the Fair Use limitation on copyright protection: a work may be exploited without the permission from, and without payment of remuneration to, the copyright owner, provided that the name of the author and the title of the work are mentioned and the other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner by virtue of this Law are not infringed upon for 12 specific reasons (translation into Braille or a minority national language, free public performances, quotation to make a point end so on), which includes some potentially applicable reasons (1) use of a published work for the purposes of the user's own private study, research or self-entertainment (6) translation or reproduction, in a small quality of copies, of a published work for use by teachers or scientific researchers in classroom teaching or scientific research, provided that the translation or reproduction is not published or distributed (7) use of a published work by a State organ within the reasonable scope for the purpose of fulfilling its official duties It is unclear what "State organ" refers to and it is unlikely that a university is a "State organ". It is unlikely that (1) and (6) are interpreted as an across-the-board "education exception" to copyright, but that could be an avenue for legality. The standard misconception of copyright law is that anything done for educational purposes is allowed, and the PRC law seems to have at least the seeds of such a misunderstanding. However... software protection is subject to separate regulation in Decree No.339 of the State Council, an English version being here. The regulations recapitulate the basics of copyright protection; software cracking is regulated under Art. 23, which says that anyone who commits any of the following acts of infringement shall, in light of the circumstances, bear civil liability by means of ceasing infringements, eliminating ill effects, making an apology, or compensating for losses:... (5)to alter or translate a piece of software without the authorization Art. 24 continues, saying that it is forbidden (3) to knowingly circumvent or sabotage technological measures used by the copyright owner for protecting the software copyright; (4) to knowingly remove or alter any electronic rights management information attached to a copy of a piece of software That covers cracking. Article 30 covers the situation of someone using pre-cracked software: A holder of copies of a piece of software that neither knows nor has reasonable grounds to know that such copies are infringing ones does not bear liability of compensation but shall cease the use of, and destroy, the infringing copies. Nevertheless, if the cease of use or the destruction of such copies is likely to cause heavy losses to him, the holder of such copies may, after paying reasonable remuneration to the software copyright owner, continue to use such copies. A mere user who is discovered simply has to stop, unless they should have known that the copy was illegal in which case they would be responsible for compensating the rights holder – I have no idea what the standards are for having reasonable grounds to know.

That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.

The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.

The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.

It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts.

This question shows a misconception of GDPR. GDPR creates an obligation not just towards the data subject but also towards the authorities of the relevant state(s). The data subject cannot waive your responsibility to safeguard data, document internal processes, etc. GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personally identifying information (PII). Informed consent is one of the ways to get permission to process and store this data. If your data subjects are prepared to give your sweeping permissions, ask for consent (informed, revocable, etc.), document the consent, and go from there. The data subject does not get to decide what classification data falls under. If you collect, say, medical data, then you are subject to increased restrictions and safeguards.

This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.

Do you need to obey an obstructed traffic sign? If a traffic sign is obstructed (for example, due to being overgrown by kudzu or because a telephone pole was placed in front of it) to the point of unreadability, do you still need to obey it? What if the sign is so obstructed that there is no longer any indication that the sign even exists?

No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.

Entering onto someone's land without lawful excuse is trespass Permission is lawful excuse. You don't have express permission. You have implied permission to enter in some circumstances, for example, to approach someone's front door or to reasonably recover your property. You would also have lawful excuse if you were a police, fire or ambulance officer discharging their duties or if you were in physical danger if you didn't enter - running from an assailant across someone else's property is not trespass. Among others. Whether the field is fenced or not or if that fence has an opening or gate does not give you permission although it can remove some implied permissions, not least that you do not have implied permission to enter over the fence. If its not your field, stay out of it.

Should this be taken to mean that a physical barrier (with out signage) does not deny entry? It seems that a physical barrier alone does not deny entry under subsection (b)(1). This entire section is defining when a person has committed criminal trespass. Apparently breaking through a fence with no sign does not constitute criminal trespass, unless one of the other sub-sections applies. But it may constitute simple trespass, and it may constitute some other offense, such as breaking and entering. Note also that subsection (b)(4) adss a person who: knowingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person's consent; to the list of those who commit criminal trespass. That might apply to a person who enters by damaging a fence. Also as a second question how does no trespass signage affect delivery people Section 2(g)(6)(B) exempts the owner's: (i) family member; (ii) invitee; (iii) employee; (iv) agent; or (v) independent contractor; I would think that a delivery person would be either an invitee or an independent contractor. Or perhaps some other provision applies. As for nearby provisions in the code, Section 35-43-2-1 defines "Burglary" in terms of breaking and entering with intent to commit theft or felony. Section 35-43-2-1.1.5 defines "residential entry" in terms of breaking and entering a dwelling. Section 35-43-2-1.3 deals with unauthorized computer access.

Reading those clauses, you can see that you can park in an emergency. You can park with your vehicle dies and you can't move it. You can park if it is specifically allowed (maybe a sign saying "unrestricted parking allowed here"). Otherwise, you may park on a parking lane (or roadway, or shoulder) but subject to conditions also listed: "unless there is a clear passage for other motor vehicles, and your vehicle can be seen for 60 metres (200 feet) along the roadway in both directions". Regardless of the name of the piece of road, you are allowed to park there but only if your car is clearly visible, and there is room to get around you.

If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.

Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.

Using two states as examples: In California, emergency vehicle operators are exempt from pretty much the entirety of the rules of the road (VC 21055). They can pass you on the right if they want to. Department policy might say no, but that depends on department policy and the details of their emergency vehicle operation course. However, California law requires all drivers to pull to the right when an emergency vehicle approaches (VC 21806). Even though an ambulance driver legally could pass you on the right, you are required to pull right. According to the BLM's emergency response policy for fire personnel in California, this means passing on the right is heavily disfavored: the emergency vehicle operator doesn't know that the driver (who is clearly not paying much attention) won't suddenly notice them and comply with the vehicle code, cutting them off or running into them. Other policies/things which seem to reflect policies say similar things, and all make it clear that operators need to be careful that the car they're passing won't drive into them. In Maryland, the law is a bit different. Section 21-405 of the Maryland Code obligates drivers to move to the edge of the roadway. This means either edge, so on a divided highway you might pull left. On a non-divided road, you obviously pull right. In this case, the vehicle may end up passing you on the right, but again: they are going to be careful about it, and would rather you get out of their way so they don't have to worry that you'll suddenly see them and drive into them.

You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.

Are there any restrictions on "Open Access" material? A video on Wikipedia claims that Open Access articles come with "full reuse rights" (sections 0:04 and 5:38). Are Open Access articles as open as public domain works? Is the definition of the rights of Open Access articles equivalent to that of the Public Domain? Would the implementation (e.g. manner of distribution) be a factor?

Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain.

Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote.

You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.

Wikipedia has two kinds of pictures: Reusable pictures, most of them stored at http://commons.wikimedia.org Copyrighted pictures under fair-use, stored on the local Wikipedia (in your case, the Russian Wikipedia) but not on Commons. To know what case it is, just click on the Wikipedia picture, click on the blue "Description" button, and see whether it redirects you to Commons or not. Pictures on Commons are reusable if you include the author and license (see the full requirements). Commercial use is OK. Fair-use pictures can not be reused. Unfortunately, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Tschedrovitsky.jpg is in the second case, so you can not reuse it, even in a non-commercial setting, unless you can justify that your usage qualifies as fair-use in your country. Hopefully one day someone will find a legally reusable picture of Shchedrovitski and upload it to Commons.

Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.

You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)

First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.

I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.

Flashbangs versus destruction of evidence If setting fire to a crime scene would be considered destruction of evidence and spray painting a crime scene would be considered destruction of evidence why is the use of flashbangs not considered destruction of evidence? As a pyrotechnic they have the capacity to start a fire. Short of starting a fire they will expel their products of combustion leaving a residue in their target area that could obscure or contaminate trace evidence.

Destruction of evidence always has to be weighed against dealing with an active situation. Taking a surviving victim to a hospital and treating them also destroys evidence; so does putting out an arson fire by knocking out walls. In all cases, there's an emergency situation and dealing with it is more important than preserving evidence. Flashbangs aren't used once the scene is secure, but rather when the need to end an active situation justifies their use.

It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet.

There isn't an automatic exclusion rule for all forms of improperly acquired evidence in the UK. I can't find the exact quote but there was a judgement from a senior court that said in terms: "it's not the court's job to discipline the police but to see that justice is done." However, judges have the discretion to disallow individual pieces of evidence if they think the interests of justice require it. Section 78 (1) of PACE (1984) has: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Senior judges have been reluctant to lay down general guidelines, holding the trial judge best placed to make these decisions (although of course, subject to appeal). The foundational principle is the accused's right to a fair trial, so in principle one could appeal to the ECtHR under Article 6. However it generally takes a similar line to courts in the UK: It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. PACE Section 78(2) is: Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. The general principle in 78 (1) does not override specific prohibitions: for instance, intercept evidence is never admissable under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.

“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.

The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech", so to the extent that such a definition serves to limit one's freedom of speech, it is unconstitutional. If would also be unconstitutional to reward "love speech" or any other viewpoint. Crimes, such as murder, arson, rape and so on, are not constitutionally protected. The government can therefore define various parameters of severity (various degrees of assault defined in terms of "wantonness"). Assault, arson and murder are not legal forms of "expression", so assault motivated by a viewpoint is not "protected speech" – it isn't speech at all.

There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.

It's not clear what you are asking ("How can this be legal?"), so I suppose it may mean that you don't understand the relationship between dismissal of a charge and admissibility of evidence. Or you think that physical evidence is required by law. You might try clarifying the question. A prosecution can be dismissed with prejudice or without prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice means that the charge cannot be pursued again, whereas dismissal without prejudice allows re-filing the charges, and is basically a temporary delay. Dismissal with prejudice can occur especially when the defendants fundamental rights were violated, for instance with illegally-obtained evidence. Dismissal without prejudice may arise because the prosecution needs to gather more evidence. The fact that a prosecution had started with an intent to use certain evidence does not mean that the evidence is itself now inaccessible. So in principle, any evidence that would have been used in an earlier prosecution can still be used. In the case of a felony, it does not legally matter how much time has elapsed since the alleged crime and the prosecution. So on the face of it, there is still a viable prosecution. Physical (forensic) evidence is not required to obtain a criminal conviction, all that is required is testimony that "fully satisfies or entirely convinces [the jury] of the defendant's guilt". That can be the testimony of two witnesses. While "hearsay" evidence is excluded, the definition of "hearsay" is complicated, since hearsay is what people generally think is hearsay but certain things are excluded from the definition of hearsay (therefore are admissible). FRE 803 spells out the exceptions: 803(4) is widely used to allow testimony by the in the case of sexual assault of children. This article surveys a number of relevant cases, and see also this article – the point is that testimony from a psychologist, social worker, parent or other person as to what the child said can be admissible.

How to parse 'notwithstanding ... forfeiture is avoided otherwise than by relief'? [Source:] The landlord argued that the tenant must pay the administration costs based on the covenant[,] given by the tenant in the lease which read as follows: “To pay all expenses (including Landlord’s solicitors’ costs and surveyors fees) incurred by the Landlord [,and] incidental to the preparation and service of notice under Section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 notwithstanding that forfeiture is avoided otherwise than by relief granted by the court.” What does the bolded mean? I wish to understand it in terms of the bolded sentence as written; so please don't just paraphrase it. For example, I'm confused by the combined use of notwithstanding (preposition), otherwise (adverb), and than (conjunction). Footnote: The quote concerns UK law, but similar diction is found in other juridsdictions.

One possible reading of this clause is: The tenant is required to pay for the preparation of a forfeiture notice, even if ("notwithstanding that") the forfeiture doesn't actually happen ("forfeiture is avoided")--but the tenant doesn't have to pay for the notice if the forfeiture doesn't happen for the following reason ("avoided otherwise than by"): because the court said so ("by relief granted by the court"). In other words: if the Court says the forfeiture notice is bogus, the tenant doesn't have to pay for it. Otherwise, he or she does.

Common Law Contracts Contracts do not have to be signed. They do not even have to be written down. In fact, the overwhelming majority of contracts entered into are not written – when did you last sign a contract to buy a cup of coffee? See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? A contract is an enforceable agreement. It exists from the moment that agreement was reached irrespective of who signed what. Putting a signature on a contract is evidence of the contract: it is not the contract. Real Estate Having said this, real estate law is an area where legislators can't leave the common law alone and is generally subject to specific regulation. For example, it is quite common that real estate contracts must be in writing and are unenforceable if they are not. However, while the contract may not be enforceable, the promise might be. Promissory Estoppel The common law as we know it today is actually derived from two different stands of English law: the actual common law as decided by the magistrates, and equity law as decided by the King/Queen in the courts of Chancellery. In the absence of a contract there is nothing the common law can enforce. However, principles of equity law are grounded in notions of fairness (or equity – see how that works?). If I were to make a promise to you (that was not a contract) and you took action on the strength of my promise that would be to your detriment and I knew you were doing that: promissory estoppel would prevent me from breaking my promise or allow you to recover damages (more or less – in practice a promissory estoppel suit is usually an act of desperation). Your lease When was the contract formed? If the agreement had been reached and the written lease simply documented that agreement without adding anything new, then the contract is already on foot and both Aaron and Bob are bound. If agreement has not been reached or there were additional terms in the document (which there almost certainly would be) then by putting forward the document Aaron is making an offer to Bob. By extending the offer, Aaron knows that he cannot lease the premises to someone else until the offer has been rejected or he withdraws the offer: this is true irrespective of whether Aaron has signed or not. If Bob accepts that offer without changing it, then the contract exists from the moment of Bob's acceptance irrespective of whether he has signed. If Bob makes changes (other than inconsequential ones) then he has made a counteroffer: the ball is now in Aaron's court and the original offer is dead. Promissory estoppel can arise if, for example, the negotiations ends with Bob saying, "I'm looking at several places but yours would be the one I want if you were to change the carpets," Aaron send Bob carpet samples, Bob picks one, Aaron makes the change, and Bob then walks away.

Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!

There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.

It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement.

Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law.

An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant.

Severability My understand [sic] of contract law in general, is that an illegal or unenforceable clause does not render the whole contract void, but rather that specific clause is essentially stricken out, as if it did not exist. This is not true. Or, at least, not necessarily true. The courts, when interpreting a contract, try to give effect to the parties intentions. Or, more precisely, what an impartial, reasonable person would conclude their intentions at the time were based on the evidence. A contract is a set of mutual promises - if one of those promises is unenforceable, was it the parties intention that: the remainder be enforced, or absent that promise, they would not have made a deal, or they would have made a different deal, say, at a different price? It’s hard to make general statements about severability because they turn on the particular facts of each case. However, the common law doctrine is that severance means severance - you can take words out, but you can’t add words in or change the meaning of words you left behind. If doing that leaves nonsense, then the clause can’t be severed, and the whole contract is void. Further, what’s left must still be a contract. If the severed portion leaves a remainder that does not meet the requirements of a contract (e.g. because the severance totally removed one party’s consideration), then the whole contract is void. Similarly, if the severed item is central to the purpose of the contract, then the whole contract is void. Finally, at least in Common Law countries, there is a difference between provisions that are unenforcable (e.g. unfair restraint of trade clauses) and those that are illegal (e.g. your murder before resignation clause). In most jurisdictions, if a provision is unenforcable at common law or through statute, severability is an option. However, if the provision is illegal, then responses differ. In England and Wales, a provision that requires criminality or the commission of a tort cannot be severed - the illegality 'infects' the entire contract and makes the whole thing void. However, in Australia, the degree of illegality matters - heinous illegality infects the entire contract, but incidental illegality may not. For example, see REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments PTY LTD [2017] NSWCA 269 [23 October 2017] - the NSW Court of Appeal ruled that a property sale that contained clauses designed (by both parties) to defraud the state of Stamp Duty was nevertheless enforceable against the vendor - this would likely have been decided the other way in England and Wales. Of course, many contracts make express provision for unenforcable terms in what are known as severability clauses. These can go further than mere severance and allow the court to add words or even redraft entire sections to preserve the contract. However, this is not a panacea because what you agreed to in your severability clause may not be what you thought you agreed to when the rubber hits the road. For example, when you are forced to sell your Picasso for the 1,000USD deposit only, and you can't get the 100,000,000,000 Iranian Rial balance due to US sanctions. Therefore, deliberately leaving unenforcable provisions in a contract is dangerous because you don't know what you are going to get. However, is it unlawful? Well, that depends. There is nothing wrong with making legally unenforceable agreements. You and I can agree to go to the movies this Thursday. That's an unenforcable social arrangement, not a contract. If you stand me up, I can't sue you even if I bought popcorn for you. Similarly, there is no prohibition on having unenforcable terms in an otherwise legally binding contract, particularly if everyone knows they are unenforcable. Indeed, many large contracts are accompanied by Memorandums of Understanding that are unenforcable statements about how various organisations intend to work together to give effect to the contract. However, if the term is included to be deceptive or misleading by one party against the other (intentionally or otherwise), there may be legal consequences. A person who was misled into entering a contract may be able to have that contract declared void. Also, many jurisdictions make misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce an offence.

What precautions are lawyers obligated to take with digital communication security? Given that various email providers have different levels of access to email, and that it shouldn't be considered private communication unless further encrypted, what steps do lawyers need to take to protect client's confidentiality? This question is also merited for things such as text and phone conversations as those conversations could fall under the same sort of arena. Are lawyers only required to inform clients that email, text, phone is unsafe communication with risks? Or are they in some cases risking a breach of client confidentiality even if they do?

What steps do lawyers need to take to protect client's confidentiality? Reasonable steps Are lawyers only required to inform clients that email, text, phone is unsafe communication with risks? Yes. Sort of. It's not a problem that these channels are unsafe, it's just the risk part. As was stated, US mail carries risk. Or are they in some cases risking a breach of client confidentiality even if they do? If they do... what? inform clients of risks? It is up to the lawyer to inform the client of the danger of using email. Certain cases warrant more precaution than others. The lawyer will need to weigh all of this. It is also possible that a heightened level of security makes communication too cumbersome or expensive. What if the client does not want to pay for the extra time it takes you to encrypt/decrypt? What if the client cannot figure out the software? No matter how sloppy the client is, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to protect communication. It's ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) that explains this for us. A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent... continuing to paragraph (c): (c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client. Comment 18 in part (relating to safeguarding information): unauthorized access...does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. continuing: Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). Comment 19 in part: *When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. Both instances require reasonable efforts - those an ordinary person would use. ABA Formal Opinion 1-459 tells us that A lawyer sending or receiving substantive communications with a client via e-mail or other electronic means ordinarily must warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving electronic communications using a computer or other device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk that a third party may gain access. This comment pertains to specific situations, like a client emailing a lawyer from the client's work-computer. It does not specifically apply to hacker-threat. And to muddy all of this up, it's not only communication and information that is at risk. Property is also at risk and the duty to protect property is higher than the duty over communication. Secret recipes, customer lists, strategic plans - these are all forms of property and lawyers have special duties to safeguard client property. Comment (1) to Rule 1.15 says that a lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. This is higher than the reasonableness requirement for protecting information. The fiduciary duty is the highest standard of care recognized by our legal system (the California rule calls on the lawyer to protect client secrets “at every peril to himself or herself” Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 3-100(A) (2013); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6068(e)(1) (2013)).

We're missing a lot of information that we'd need to offer a full answer. Here are some of the things that will probably drive the analysis: the type of counselor we're talking about; the types of information the counselor disclosed; the reason she disclosed it; the job functions of the people to whom she disclosed it; the reason the client is bothered by the disclosure. Generally speaking, a mental-health counselor has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient information, but my understanding is that in most cases, the counselor would be allowed to discuss a case with colleagues for the purposes of advancing the patient's treatment. So discussing the facts of a tough case with a supervisor is not going to be as problematic as idly gossiping about clients with custodial staff. Beyond the permitted disclosures, there are also situations in which counselors are required to disclose confidential information, including cases where the counselor suspects child or elder abuse or where the counselor believes the client poses a danger to herself or others. If the disclosure was truly not permitted, then it may be that the client has a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Georgia, proving that case requires evidence that: That the counselor had information relating to the client that she knew or should have known was confidential; That the counselor communicated the client’s confidential information to third parties; That the client did not give informed consent to the counselor’s conduct; That the confidential information was not a matter of general knowledge; and That the disclosure harmed the client. As you noted, the client could also file a complaint with the state licensing board. I don't know of any federal laws or regulations that would come into play in the situation you've described.

Under 45 CFR 164.402 a "breach" is the acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information. Disclosing PHI to random people is not permitted under subpart E. Then then allow that it can be deemed to not be a breach if they can "demonstrate[] that there is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of certain factors – there isn't any clear yes/no rule as to how you could say that disclosing PHI is not a breach. If they discover a breach, they must notify the affected individual. One ploy would be for them to stick their heads in the sand and be careful to not discover: but §164.404(2) says A covered entity shall be deemed to have knowledge of a breach if such breach is known, or by exercising reasonable diligence would have been known, to any person, other than the person committing the breach, who is a workforce member or agent of the covered entity So if, for example, they had been told that person X has moved, a reasonably diligent person would know that sending PHI to the old address will result in a breach. The Sec'y of HHS must also be notified of the breach, though this can go in the annual report if the breach involves fewer than 500 people. The affected individual can also file a complaint with HHS.

Based solely on what you've described, what the lawyer did is inappropriate if, in fact, it occurred without any prior permissions. However, since you are not the actual client, it may be that you lack pertinent info, because this would be exceedingly rare behavior. Lawyers are allowed to make procedural and "expert"/professional decisions about your case without your consent, and do so all the time. As a general rule: we decide who to depose, what expert(s) are necessary to prove your claim, what questions to ask in discovery, what to say and when to say it when attempting to settle, and what witnesses to call vs. not to call at panel or trial. All of that is in the purview of the attorney's general discretion and work product. However, attorneys cannot diminish, amend, or settle your claim without your permission, unless you've signed a limited representation agreement and/or a prior authorization to do these things with a waiver of consultation on issues relating to settlement. (It is not uncommon for a client to say, "My bottom line is X; hence, you have my permission to settle the case for anything over that amount.") A client may also, subsequently, give verbal consent, saying things like "just do your best and get what you can". Contingency and Total Award Strategies Since you aren't the one having entered into the contract, you may not be privy to the existence of these types of contingencies. Agreements like this are very common when an attorney takes a weaker med mal claim. It may be that the lawyer will only take the case to the extent that they will try to settle, and may even file the case, with the understanding that they will never try the case. It is a way to try to get you as much as possible when all facts come to light, without agreeing to the expense of a trial. This happens a lot. In these situations, when you are trying to settle a claim that ends up being much less valuable than the attorney thought when he took the case, the insurance carrier will often say, "We will pay X on the claim if Doctor Doe is dismissed out," or something like that. Often lawyers intentionally over-file, in hopes there are two carriers (the more insurance the more money to make you go away) that they can try to settle with. When it turns out both docs are covered under one insurance carrier, then the weaker claim will often get dismissed out. It is a strategic decision to add them, and to dismiss them – and this is very common. Proving malpractice against one doctor is hard enough; trying to prove that you are the victim of double malpractice, back to back, is nearly impossible. All of that said, even if a client has entered into these types of limited or decisional authority-granting agreements, the lawyer still has a duty to keep the client apprised of what's going on. The client may decide later they don't like how little the attorney is stating the claim is worth (despite being forewarned this may happen, it happens all the time that when it actually occurs the client is not happy). In that case, they have the right to find a new lawyer, but that will be very difficult to do for a few reasons: (1) the original attorney is entitled to get paid for the work done under a theory known as “quantum meruit,” so other attorneys will be hesitant to get involved; (2) they will put a lien on any recovery for the amount of time and expenses, to be paid from any settlements or awards (and they get paid first, before the client or the new lawyer); (3) if a client gets angry and says they want to just drop the case rather than have the lawyer make more than the client, even after a year or more of work, all of the costs will still be owed by the client; (4) the potential new attorney will call the one who has the case and ask about whether the client has unreasonable expectations, if their case has any value, etc. Keep mind, if an attorney is doing the things you've described, they probably would suffer no love loss if the case went away. Malpractice in Context It very often happens, especially in medical malpractice cases, that a client will come in and describe the case one way, and then when the medical records arrive and the attorney and/or the paralegal/nurse-para review them, and all the facts get flushed out, it turns out things occurred a bit (or a lot) differently than the client described or recalled in the first place. This is typically not a matter, 99% of the time, of the client lying to the attorney, but rather it is merely the phenomenon of memories being based on their perception of the events/their care, rather than verifiable fact and established medical standards. (This is why eye-witness testimony is so notably unreliable: 10 people can witness the same event and there will inevitably be 10 different descriptions.) One thing all clients should be told by their lawyer (and you should only hire an experienced medical malpractice lawyer for these cases) is that bad outcomes do not equal negligence. Lay people often think that if something bad occurred while under the care of a doctor, this is the case, but it is not the measure of malpractice. Sometimes, even when the doctor does everything according to their specialty/industry standard, bad outcomes happen. Malpractice/negligence only occurs when they have deviated from this standard of care - outcome notwithstanding. The inverse is also true, when it comes to a bad outcome. The doctor may have breached the standard of care, but this cannot be determined by the patient - the law requires expert testimony to establish this. Sometimes bad outcomes are just the risk of the procedure. This is why patients sign (but rarely read) the informed consent forms, that describe in detail, and state the patient is aware, of all the potential bad outcomes that may occur during the procedure. Negligence, or a "breach of the standard of care" occurs when the typical physician (not the best expert in the world, just the normal, typical doctor in that field) would have found the actions to be unreasonable and never acceptable given the totality of the circumstances. Once you prove that, you then still need to prove that is what caused your damages (not the disease, or the ailment itself). Unfortunately, even with the best physicians, bad outcomes happen all the time. It is very common, to the point of being almost predictable, that a medical malpractice claim's value will depart from the original ballpark estimate of value that an attorney tries to "best guess" at the outset. When your attorney tries to value a case, they roughly estimate your "special damages", which consists of medical bills, lost income, lost earning capacity, and other quantifiable sums. Then, they must try to assess the market rate award for pain and suffering for the type injury you've sustained. This is only guesswork, based on jury verdict reports, reported settlements, and the jurisdictional leanings toward large or small verdicts (comparatively). As the case evolves, as facts come to lights, as experts are consulted - this is when these estimates can largely deviate from the original guesstimate based on very limited information. Risks of Contingency Representation At any rate, when a lawyer takes a case on contingency (when they agreed to get paid only if they recover, and not until they recover, aside from out of pocket expenses), they do this because they've relied on the client's account of what happened, as well as their initial assessment of the records, usually prior to hiring an expert (if they even intended to hire one because they agreed to take the case all the way through trial). You must understand that attorneys don't like when a case loses value any more than the client; in fact, probably less as they are the ones who've invested often hundreds of hours in the case at that point. This is how they make their money. Thirty-three percent of a small amount is not the same as that of a large amount. And many, many hours go into these cases. An attorney can make far more than their hourly rate on a great case, but this is balanced by making far, far less on cases whose values plummet as facts come to light. When a case appears to lost much of it's initially estimated value, the attorney will still try to maximize recovery; however, it may not seem that way to the client because after they take their third, and then recoup their expenses (which is on top of the third and is the responsibility of the client win-or-lose), clients can end up with almost nothing. This is because the expense of these cases is enormous and it is the problem with that area of law and the system in general. It is not uncommon for a medical malpractice case to cost, out of pocket, $200,000 or more! This is why so few people are able to get a lawyer to take these cases, and often when they do, it's on the very limited basis I described. Med Malpractice Primer Med Mal cases are some of the hardest cases to win and they are by far some of the most expensive cases to try. This in not accidental. Depending on the state you live in, tort reform (a legislative effort to limit the amount of medical malpractice claims filed and tried overall, as well as limiting their total recovery) can range from limits on damages, to very short windows for statute of limitations, to the requirements (like where I practice) where you must literally try the case twice – once before a med mal screening panel, who hears all your witnesses just as a jury does, and then decides whether the case should (and in some cases can) go forward. In some states (I happen to practice in one) the findings are admissible in court (not the evidence but the finding). So, if the MMPT screening panel finds the doctor was not negligent, or was, but the damages were within the standard disclosed potential outcomes, so there was no causation, or myriad other things, if you decide (or in some states, if you even still get to go to court) the defense gets to say to the jury that the legislatively enacted Med Mal Pre-trial screening panel found X (no negligence, causation, or damages – or all three). These panels are usually comprised of a lawyer (75% defense lawyers) or a judge, and two doctors who are biased against these types of cases in the first place). Also, if your expert gets torn apart on an issue during panel phase, anything they admit can be used against them in the trial. I say all this to help you understand that these cases are made, by the legislature, to be very hard to even find a lawyer to take, very hard to win, and exceedingly expensive to litigate. This is based on the (fallacious) theory that medical malpractice claims should be limited to the most serious claims because this litigation is so costly, and so impactful on the rates all citizens pay for insurance, that the legislature has seen fit to make them very difficult to prosecute, thereby weeding out weak claims. Bottom Line If the client truly feels their lawyer did something they did not have permission (either explicitly in writing, or verbally) to do, they need to talk to the attorney, explain their discomfort with the situation, and figure out why it occurred and if it was truly in the best interest of the case and the client. If the lawyer cannot adequately answer those questions, they should get a second opinion. The client can demand that anything the attorney did be undone, if it was the type of thing that is in the client's control. One would need to see the engagement letter and retention agreement, and also be privy to the conversations. It is, unfortunately, not uncommon for a client to say they understand what the lawyer is proposing when they don't. If you find that's the case, you may have them ask that all determinations be put in writing, with an explanation as to why.

This very much depends on where you are. Different jurisdictions have wildly different laws about this. Some places are very permissive. You can record a conversation that you aren't even a party to so long as nobody has any reasonable expectation of privacy. In others, affirmative consent is required from every party to a conversation before it's legal to record it. The laws run the entire spectrum. Some places allow you to record anything you're a party to without permission, but you can't record others' conversations. Some places require you to disclose, but not obtain explicit permission. Some allow you to record but restrict who you can disclose it to. Some allow you to record or ban recording only under certain circumstances. It's a really wide gamut of laws. Since you don't say where you are, who you're recording, or why, there's no way to really answer the question. Here's a good rundown on the United States. This Wikipedia article covers lots of different countries, but only with regard to phone calls.

You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.

In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.

GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK.

What does "actual knowledge" mean in the context of DMCA safe harbors? According to 17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitations on liability relating to material online (emphasis mine): A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider— (A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; Is "actual knowledge" the same thing that's detailed in paragraph (3) "Elements of notification"? Or does it refer to something else? In either case, has the interpretation been tested in court?

The particulars of "actual knowledge" are addressed in Viacom v. YouTube. The ruling from the appeals court states (emphasis mine): Under § 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone does not disqualify the service provider; rather, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, the nature of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove... Thus, actual knowledge must be knowledge that is specific enough to allow a service provider to take action against specific infringing content. "General" knowledge of infringement is not specific enough to be actionable, so it cannot qualify as "actual knowledge". (e.g., The general knowledge, "In the past, about 5% of the videos uploaded to our site were infringing, and we expect that trend continues into the present, so some of our videos right now are probably infringing," is not actionable to specific videos, so it does not quality as "actual knowledge".) That ruling also clarifies the distinction between (i) and (ii), which are respectively termed the "actual knowledge" provision and "red flag" provision: In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or “subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvious to a reasonable person. Actual knowledge is different from a notification, which the service operator must respond to according to section (c)(1)(C) (whereas your quote is from (c)(1)(A)): (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. Expeditious removal is required in either event: the operator has actual knowledge of infringement, per (c)(1)(A)(i), or the operator gets a notification, per (c)(1)(C). Actual knowledge and notifications are different, but they impose similar responsibilities for the operator.

There is not necessarily a contradiction. Information that they may keep may be: Account information Subscriber information Information on breaches of the Terms of Service or Agreement So yes, they might certainly not keep any logs – although that claim is doubtful, since they almost certainly keep at least error-level logs of their services – but that doesn't mean that they have no information to disclose to law enforcement. It's also questionable what "logs" refers to – would aggregate statistics be considered a log, by law? Would your last known IP address be considered a log, provided they don't keep any other history?

NOTE: This answer assumes jurisdiction in the US. No. Length does not determine whether or not something is fair use or not. There was a court case (Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), all credit to Dawn) where it was determined that just a few paragraphs from a 300+ page biography were infringing content, due to them capturing the "heart of the work". As user6726 said, in your example the clips you mentioned are most likely licensed. Also, courts tend to look poorly on things that are simply "shared" claiming fair use against copyright claims. Now, if you were to use a short clip as an example of something you were explaining, teaching, or critiquing, that would be different and would more likely be fair use. It is important to note that there is (by design) not a clear cut line if something is or is not fair use. There is a set of guidelines, but determination is made on a case by case basis There are a couple of cases that it is out and out NOT fair use, but none for fair use. This is because fair use is an affirmative defense, which is to say, you admit to the offense, but claim an exception to the rule. Self-defense as a defense to charges of homocide, assault, etc. works in a similar manner.

I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.

The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.

Criminal copyright infringement is defined by 17 U.S. Code § 506 and by 18 U.S.C. § 2319. The latter section simply sets penalties, the provisions of 17 USC 506(a)(1) define the offense. It requires "willful infringement" for any offense. There are three sub-paragraphs which define forms of criminal copyright infringement. 17 USC 506(a)(1)(A) makes criminal any wilful infringement "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain". This need not mean that the infringer made an actual profit, merely that s/he hoped to do so. In United.States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297 (1987), the US Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: A conviction under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) does not require that a defendant actually realize either a commercial advantage or private financial gain. It is only necessary that the activity be for the purpose of financial gain or benefit. of financial gain or benefit. 17 USC 506(a)(1)(B) makes criminal any wilful infringement: by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180–day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000 17 USC 506(a)(1)(C) makes criminal any wilful infringement: by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. So 17 USC 506(a)(1)(B) would apply to a person who made copies, even at no charge, of works with sufficient retail value, and 17 USC 506(a)(1)(C) would apply to someone who "leaked" a manuscript that was being prepared for commercial publication to the internet or another public computer network. Either of these could be charged when a person had not made any money on the infringement, nor attempted to make any. They were both added to the law in 1997. by the "No Electronic Theft Act", in response to the case of Brian LaMacchia, who created an online service for exchanging unauthorized copies of commercial computer programs. Because he made no charge, the case against him was dismissed by the trial court. See United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (1994). I have not found any reported cases where there was a criminal conviction for a person who made no charges for infringing copies or acts. But most such cases are not reported in sources accessible to ordinary, free-of-charge search engines. Prof. James Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law writes in "Will You Go to Jail for Copyright Infringement?": But will an infringer actually go to jail for copyright infringement? Highly unlikely. While the percentage increase in convictions is significant, the absolute numbers are small. ..., there were fewer than two hundred criminal intellectual property convictions in 2010 (and some of those were trademark cases). In comparison, 1,984 civil copyright infringement lawsuits were filed in the same time period. A copyright infringer’s chances of being sued for damages or an injunction are therefore much greater than his or her chances of being charged criminally. Moreover, both criminal convictions and civil suits have been decreasing in number. Convictions peaked at 224 in 2007, and civil cases reached their high of 5,488 in 2006. ... Indeed, the main takeaway from these figures is that the chances that a copyright infringer will suffer any legal consequence – criminal or civil – are vanishingly small. (citations omitted) Trotter Hardy, Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Technology, College of William & Mary School of Law, in the December 2002 article Criminal Copyright Infringement in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal finds criminal copyright cases increasing from 22/year to 207/year over the period from 1980 to 2002, but none of the cases cited in that article other than the LaMacchia case seem to have been of a person who did not attemtp to make a profit on the alleged infringement. In short, the law, makes this very possible, but I have not found any evidence that it actually happens. I should mention that violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA (17 U.S. Code § 1201 (subsections (a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C)) is a crime, but none of these offenses are infringements of copyright.

united-states In US law this is covered by 17 USC 512 (c) which was added to the US copyright law by the Digital Millineum Copyright Act (DMCA) Under that law, the service provide is not liable if The service provider does not actually know that content posted is infringing; and The provider does not have good reason to belive that content is infringing; and The provider promptly removes or makes inaccessible infringing content once the provider knows or has reason to believe that content is infringing; and The provider complies with the DMCA take down procedure; and The provider has and publishes the contact info of a designated agent to receive complaints and takedown notices. (The above is a paraphrase of the actual text of the law, rewritten for clarity.) The above is all true no matter how short or long the videos or music selections may be. The length is not relevant, except as it may affect a claim fgor fair use, where length is only one of the factors to be considered. The above would also apply if the video, as opposed to the music, was a copyright infringement. Note that the individual poster can still be liable for copyright infringement, and the service provider may be required to respond to a subpoena for information identifying posters. Note also that a service provider must warn posters not to post content protected by copyright to which the poster has no rights, and must have some procedure in place to limit or cancel the access of posters who persistently post infringing content.

the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.

How do I read a U.S. case citation and find the text of the opinion? In something like this: "We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)". What is that cryptic thing after the quotation marks? How do I understand what it says? Is there somewhere I can go to read these cases, or read about them?

The author of the passage is telling you where the quotation comes from, using a formal case citation. Lawyers usually don't use footnotes, endnotes, or parentheses to set off these citations. Case citations are a sort of shorthand developed by lawyers and judges over the past few centuries. The goal is generally to identify the name of the case, where to locate it, when it was decided, and what court decided it. Although there are a few different styles for formal citations to cases, you don't need to learn much to cover the basics for common types of cases. How to Read It Case name Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Case names usually have a "v." in the middle. Most of the time, the plaintiff goes on the left and the defendant goes on the right. But United States Supreme Court cases are different. Almost always, the Supreme Court reviews decisions of lower courts. They do so in an unusual way: the loser in the lower court asks the Supreme Court to change the outcome. Because the loser, more formally called the "appellant," is the one initiating proceedings in the Supreme Court, they go on the left. (To learn more, look into "writ of certiorari.") Since Brown is a Supreme Court case, we can guess that Brown lost in the lower court; and indeed that's what happened in this case. There are some arcane rules about abbreviating case names. The full name of this case is "Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka." If you're a law student, especially if you're on the law review, you get to learn all about these rules. If you're not, thank your lucky stars and try not to worry about it. Volume, reporter, and page number 347 U.S. 483 This is the bit you want to copy and paste to find the case. It's a lot like a URL: the idea is to clearly identify and locate a case. If you just want to find the case on the Internet, you don't need to understand how it works, and you can skip to the next section. These three parts tell you where to find the beginning of the case in a good old-fashioned printed book. You know those yellow books in the background of lawyer advertisements? That's what we're talking about. They're called "reporters," because they originally contained somebody else's reports of what judges said in court. Now, of course, the judges write down their own decisions; but the name stuck. The middle part, here "U.S.", identifies what set of books the case is in. You can learn something about the court from this: U.S. -- United States Reports -- United States Supreme Court F., F.2d, F.3d -- Federal Reporter -- Federal Courts of Appeal F. Supp -- Federal Supplement -- Federal District Courts (trial courts) The first number is what volume the case is in. This is the number printed on the spine of the book. The second number is what page the case begins on. Pinpoint citation , 495 When somebody wants to refer to a specific place in a case, they just put the page number or range right after the case page number. Remember, "483" was the page the case starts on; "495" is the page where the court actually say what we're talking about. If you flip to page 495 of volume 347 of the U.S. Reports, you'll find the quoted sentence. Remember: usually when you see two numbers separated by a comma, like "483, 495", the first one is part of the citation to the case as a whole, and the second one says what page to look at. Date and court name (1954) This part varies a lot between the different formal styles. In "Bluebook" style, which most law journals use, the year the case was decided is enclosed in parentheses, along with anything necessary to identify the court. Here, there's no court name, because we already know from the "U.S." that it's a Supreme Court case. For lower appellate cases, this might be "(9th Cir. 2005)", meaning that it's a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from 2005. Dealing with short citations You may also see something like "Id. at 495". This is a short citation; "Id." means "the last thing I cited." Go back to the nearest previous citation and look that up, going to the page cited. How to Use It (aka "tl;dr") The key to actually finding a case on the Internet is to copy the three numbers in the middle--the volume, reporter name, and page number. Here, "347 U.S. 483". Don't include any pincite after a comma; Google and many search engines may be clever enough to figure out what you mean, but they may not. There are a bunch of free online services providing case texts. I prefer Google Scholar; just paste the citation in, being sure to select "case law". Other people like CourtListener, FindLaw, and Justia.com. Commercial databases like Westlaw or LexisNexis have a lot more than just the case; most importantly, they list citations to the case. Your local public law library might have a terminal for one of the services that you can walk in and use. Be sure you're reading the actual case, not a summary or "annotation." This is especially true if you're writing an answer here on Law.SE. Many case summaries, especially for famous cases, are written for first-year law students; some of them are probably written by first-year law students! They're often helpful, but they focus on what the student needs to know for class, which often isn't what the case actually said. If I find you quoting a case summary as if it's "the law," I will not be very nice to you.

The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.

Early in the history of the US, various states passed laws adopting the then extant common law and at least some of the statutory law of Great Britain (much of which was in origin the Law of England) as law in those states. Such laws would still be valid, unless later acts had amended or replaced particular provisions. Tracing which provisions had since been altered would be a massive task. Basic common law, particularly definitions of crimes such as fraud, theft, murder, and of torts such as conversion, slander, libel, and the like will probably be largely unchanged, with some modifications. Blackstone's Commentaries remained a significant legal text used in training lawyers and in legal practice in the US through much of the nineteenth century.

A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say "it is unclear" in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.

I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law.

It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment—specifically the ratio—that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)

Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897.

No Only the ratio decidendi of a case sets binding precedent. By definition, that has to be in the decision of the court’s majority because that’s what decided the case. If a minority decision disagrees with the majority on ratio, then the majority is the binding precedent. If the point is obiter, then it’s merely persuasive, not binding, irrespective of where it is.

Are the opinions of a United States superior court public knowledge? If I bring a case to a superior court and I lose, is that information public knowledge? What are the ramifications to me? For example, could it hurt my credit score?

If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public.

Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this.

In California, UPL has a flexible definition and is analyzed situationally, as is the formation of an attorney-client relationship. The shorthand definition for UPL is usually given as something like "doing what lawyers do." When your "help" goes beyond "studying law" and begins to deal with applying that law to a particular legal matter, you're definitely in the neighborhood. If you're encouraging people to compensate you monetarily, even on the sly (or perhaps especially on the sly) that's just going to make it shadier. There's no clear line that divides "assistance" from "advice" or "information" from "counsel." You're not going to find a statute or professional rule that helpfully explains just how close you can get to UPL through wink-wink-nudge-nudge "unofficial-but-maybe-you-should-still-pay-me" legal "information-but-not-advice" before liability attaches, which seems to be the drift of the question (although I understand it was edited). People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 209 P.363, 365 (1922) 'As the term is generally understood, the practice of the law is the doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity to the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured although such matter may or may not be depending in a court.' Quoting In the case of Eley v.Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836. Baron v. Los Angeles, 2 C.3d 535, 86 C.R. 673, 469 P.2d 353 (1970). "(T)he Legislature adopted the state bar act in 1927 and used the term 'practice law' without defining it. [FN7] The conclusion is obvious and inescapable that in so doing it accepted both the definition already judicially supplied for the term and the declaration of the Supreme Court (in 'Merchants') that it had a sufficiently definite meaning to need no further definition. The definition above quoted from People v. Merchants' Protective Corp. has been approved and accepted in the subsequent California decisions (citations), and must be regarded as definitely establishing, for the jurisprudence of this state, the meaning of the term 'practice law." (People v. Ring (1937) supra. 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 772, 70 P.2d 281, 283.) For comparison, the Texas Bar's UPL Committee has a digest of the applicable statutes and rules here (they also provide a few appellate decisions that might interest you). In terms of legitimately paid non-attorney help with preparing documents and the like, here's a long discussion on avoiding UPL from a Legal Document Assistant trade association site. Realistically, UPL is investigated in retrospect, mostly in response to complaints. The proper context to analyze this hypothetical is to envision the non-client furious at the non-lawyer after the case has been lost. If everything goes well the non-lawyer probably gets his "gift" and the State Bar is none the wiser. (Although I suppose there's the further wrinkle that if the non-client wins and doesn't provide the "gift" then the non-lawyer likely has no good remedy).

Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.

Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.

Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you.

The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.

In the small claims court cases I've been involved in the judge has dismissed all aspects of the claim related to time wasted, transportation costs, and attending court in the judgement amount itself. However the court costs one incurs should be a part of the amount that is judged in one's favour. Also the costs of enforcing any judgement (court bailiff fees) are usually considered recoverable. My thoughts are that if one is keen to ensure that the other party pays the full costs of time, collation of evidence, photocopying, phone calls, and anything else one believes they are responsible for, one will have much more luck if one is not self-representing. The predominant reason for self-representing is to keep costs, and thus one's financial risk from pursuing the case, minimal. disclaimer: this is only opinion, and not legal advice

Are websites legally obligated to provide a non-javascript login page? I have read a couple times now that Websites are obligated to provide an alternative login page when their login form uses Javascript. I have not been able to find much resources on the matter though. (Google likes to present me with websites that discuss legal information that happen to have a login feature.) Are there any legal requirements for a website to have an alternative to a Javascript login form? I'm interested in answers from all over the world.

In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages.

You could include a notice that the forms are not legal advice, and you make no guarantees on their effects in particular situations, and that readers should use them at their own risk, and that they are provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. You might also find websites that offer downloadable legal forms, or forms similar to the ones you intend to create, and see what disclaimers or waivers of liability such sites typically include. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice.

Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.

Under European rules (GDPR, ePrivacy), you only need consent here if you both access or store information on the user's device (such as cookies), and this access/storage is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. A session cookie is strictly necessary for providing a log-in functionality, so such cookies are unlikely to require consent. In contrast, cookies for measuring ad impressions are not strictly necessary for showing the website content. Necessity must always be thought from the user's perspective, not from the provider's economic needs. If you use one cookie for multiple purposes, you should analyze each purpose separately. Maybe setting a cookie does not require consent under one purpose, but accessing the same information for a different purpose could require consent. If you have to ask for consent, this consent must be in line with the GDPR's requirements in Art 7. Consent must be freely given, i.e. there must actually be a way to decline the consent without suffering detriment. Consent must be informed, i.e. the user must be told directly for what consent is being sought, without having to click through to a long privacy policy. Consent must be specific, so it must be possible to consent for one purpose while declining consent for another. An "I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy" checkbox cannot constitute valid GDPR consent because it fails all these criteria: I cannot use the service without agreeing, I'm not told essential information up front (you cannot expect users to actually read long privacy policies), and this is an all-or-nothing bundle that does not allow specific choices. If you do not have to ask for consent, you should still be transparent about your use of cookies, for example by providing a paragraph on this topic in your privacy notice. I think showing a cookie banner would be a bad idea in that scenario, since it could be confused with an invalid consent banner (no way to decline the cookies).

There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction.

Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.

When integrating third party plugins, it is important to determine whether that third party is your data processor or another controller. When they are your processor, you need a legal basis for the processing purpose and need to have a suitable contract with your processor. When they are a data controller, you need a legal basis for the processing purposes AND a legal basis for sharing this data with the third party. When using Facebook tools, you have to read the fine print in their Business Terms. I will assume that when integrating the Chat Plugin, you and Facebook would act as joint controllers. Facebook would not be your data processor. So you need a legal basis for sending data to Facebook. Some information will already be sent merely by loading the plugin in the visitor's browser – and this will happen whether or not the visitor is a Facebook member. Two legal bases seem especially interesting: you might have a legitimate interest for loading this plugin, or you might ask for consent. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test between your interests, and the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. The reasonable expectations of the data subject will likely be a factor as well. Here, I would suggest thinking about the reasonable expectations of a visitor who is not a Facebook member. In most cases, when you rely on a legitimate interest you must also give the opportunity to object to further processing, i.e. to opt-out. You can base almost any processing activity on consent. This gives you a lot of flexibility at least initially, but you can't use the data for any other purpose, and must make it easy to withdraw consent. Here, I think that your legitimate interest balancing test would lead you to the conclusion that consent would be the more appropriate legal basis. But this doesn't mean that you need to show a consent banner to every user. Instead, I would suggest the following procedure before loading any third party plugin or embed (whether a Facebook chat, a Tweet, or a Youtube video). The point is that users are given an informed choice: do not load the content by default as a placeholder for the content, or in a popup when the user interacts with the placeholder, show the following information: what the purpose of this content/plugin/embed is that a third party provides the content who the third party is what personal data will be disclosed to the third party, e.g. IP addresses if personal data will be transferred into a non-EU country: information about possible risks, e.g. the US does not provide an adequate level of data protection where visitors can find further information about the resulting processing by the third party (e.g. the FB privacy policy) a link to more information in your privacy notice how visitors can revoke consent later if the visitor clicks a button such as “start chat” or “load content”, treat this as consent store the consent for later visits, e.g. in a cookie make it easy to withdraw consent, e.g. with an easy to reach button that opens a consent management tool So instead of asking for consent when your page loads, ask for consent just in time before they're accessing something for which you need consent. Background: In the Fashion ID case, the ECJ has found that the provider of a website that loads Facebook social plugins such as the Like Button is a joint controller with Facebook. So the website provider is responsible for collecting and sending personal data to Facebook through this button, but they are not responsible for what Facebook later does with this data. At least in Germany, it has long been standard that social plugins are only loaded upon consent, e.g. with a toggle next to the network's logo (news report from 2011). The list of information to be shown in a popup was modelled after section 3.3.1 “Minimum content requirements for consent to be ‘informed’” in the EDPB guidelines on consent 05/2020. Providing information just-in-time (just before the user takes a relevant action) and in a layered manner (key information directly, details in a privacy notice) are best practices suggested in the WP29 guidelines on transparency which were later endorsed by the EDPB.

We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to.

Use of the RECAP browser extension when accessing PACER There are benefits to using the RECAP browser plugin when accessing information in PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records): not paying to access PACER documents that have been cached by RECAP you contribute to the Internet Archive in the process it improves the quality of the filenames files are stored under Are there downsides to the use of RECAP, and what are they and which audiences would be most impacted by them?

I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection.

The opera may be in the public domain, but unless the performance is from several decades ago, which I assume is not the case, the performance is not in the public domain. The video therefore has copyright protection of its own. The use to which you want to put the video does not sound like fair use to me, although as the other answer notes that's impossible to determine without knowing more than you've told us, but the fact that the composition being performed is in the public domain is not a particularly important consideration in the analysis.

OK, so you understand that clickwraps do create enforceable contracts. the person "agreeing" to the dialog can arbitrarily manipulate the contents of the agreement terms So what? I can do a similar thing with a pen and paper agreement. You send me an agreement, I tell you I accept but secretly I have changed it. Well, guess what, when this ends up in court the judge won't care if I wiped my ass with it - I communicated my acceptance of your terms; therefore that is what I accepted. Under the hood, Google can show what the HTML was that their server sent to you and the http response that you sent back. They said "Do you accept?" you sent back "yes", deal done. What you did with the html in your computer does not matter one iota; just like what you did with pen and ink terms would.

Maybe not. The ICO says that The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data. It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the existence of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a copy of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies. But in practice: The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try. A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

It's a typographic divider line dating back to the days of typewriting; there's a passing reference to the practice on the Typography for Lawyers website. Standards for formatting documents -- especially those being uploaded as text into online repositories -- are generally set by the local jurisdiction; some courts may specify exactly how and where to use this sort of spacer; others may not allow it at all. For example, this E-File Manual for the Ventura (Calif.) Superior Court specifies "There is NO blank line between the ' ---000--- ' and the caption," whereas the Typography for Lawyers sample document from the Supreme Court of Utah uses "----ooOoo----".

StackExchange probably has no obligation to continue to provide the content, however StackExchange probably cannot stop copies from continuing to be used, reproduced, etc. from the Terms of Service (click on Legal below): You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. Bold added by me. The content is licensed to SE, unlike some sites where you transfer ownership of content to the site. SE can continue to use your data, but you still own the copyright. They can't limit your use of your own content, because you remain the owner. SE cannot use your content in a way that violates the Creative Commons Share Alike License, but I don't see any limitations on how SE makes your work available, including to a limited audience. They could, for example, probably move to a paid model because there are no commercial exclusions (unlike the Creative Commons non-commercial variations of the license). You could post a copy of SE content elsewhere, as long as you adhere to the requirements: In the event that You post or otherwise use Subscriber Content outside of the Network or Services, with the exception of content entirely created by You, You agree that You will follow the attribution rules of the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license as follows: You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually displays or otherwise indicates the source of the Subscriber Content as coming from the Stack Exchange Network. This requirement is satisfied with a discreet text blurb, or some other unobtrusive but clear visual indication. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content includes a hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually display or otherwise clearly indicate the author names for every question and answer so used. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content Hyperlink each author name directly back to his or her user profile page on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/users/12345/username), directly to the Stack Exchange domain, in standard HTML (i.e. not through a Tinyurl or other such indirect hyperlink, form of obfuscation or redirection), without any “nofollow” command or any other such means of avoiding detection by search engines, and visible even with JavaScript disabled. Making a complete copy of SE would seem to be within the terms of the license, as long as all the requirements for attributing, linking, etc are met, so you could mitigate the risk of the SE material going away in that manner.

The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.

Is the judge allowed to nullify laws? If a jury disagrees with a law, it's allowed to exercise a right known as jury nullification. However, what about civil cases (e.g., in a Superior Court in California) that are presided by a judge alone, with neither plaintiff nor defendant selecting a jury trial? Is the judge allowed to nullify laws? For example, I recall that in unlawful detainer cases in California that arise out of defects in the premises, if a jury gives a verdict that defects are substantiated, the landlord basically loses the whole case entirely (I think it has to do with defendants being judgement-proof and simply not paying the rent), even though the defects might be rather minor compared to the overall issues at stake. However, the jury is specifically prohibited from being instructed about such stakes! However, knowing what he knows, can the judge still be objective, or would he have to recuse himself out of fear of showing prejudice? Can he require the litigants to have a proper jury, including the associated fees, even though the case is supposedly eligible for a judge-only trial, too? How would it affect a potential appeal? Likewise, California statutes require that a 3-day notice preceding the UD has to specify the exact amount of rent (e.g., cannot include random fees). Is the judge allowed to show prejudice against mistakes in said amount?

The concept of "jury nullification" is not really applicable to civil litigation, whether it's a bench or a jury trial. The short answer is: generally in the United States, civil judges, and civil juries, have to follow the law. If the jury doesn't follow the law, the judge can entertain and grant a JNOV motion on the basis that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict in question. If the judge doesn't follow the law, the aggrieved party can appeal the judgment as an abuse of discretion or on similar grounds. Jury nullification occurs when a criminal jury returns a verdict of "not guilty" although they feel the defendant was in fact guilty under the law. That is the only circumstance where no legal review can reverse the verdict. Civil "jury nullification" is not a particularly meaningful concept.

To what standard does the evidence need to be convincing so that the judge is satisfied that a jury could “reasonably convict” the defendant? The High Court expanded on the answer to this question in Mitchell, the decision you cited, at [32]: [In R v Kim [2010] NZCA 106] the Court of Appeal discussed the meaning of “insufficient to justify a trial” in the context of sufficiency of evidence: It is for the jury to determine whether the evidence is, or is not, sufficient to establish guilt. It is not for the Judge to predict what the jury will find. The test is whether the evidence, if accepted by the jury, is sufficient in law to prove the essential elements of the charge to the required standard. If so, the Judge should leave the case to the jury and not withdraw it on evidentiary grounds. Can circumstantial/cumulative evidence be sufficient? In 2015, Dr Chris Gallavin, Dean of Law at Canterbury University, wrote: Circumstantial evidence is the bedrock of inferential reasoning. As advocates, we are well aware that a case is not “weak” by virtue of it being based upon circumstantial evidence alone (a common misconception). Circumstantial evidence will often form the base of a strong case, again, in both the criminal and civil jurisdiction alike. Does this evidence meet the standard asked about above? Unfortunately this question is not allowed, because the rules state: Please don't ask questions seeking legal advice on a specific matter. These are off-topic for Law Stack Exchange. While users generally contribute answers in good faith, the answers are not legal advice, and contributors here are not your lawyer. The test of “insufficient to justify a trial” is somewhat Delphic because it calls for an evaluative judgment. That judgment can only be formed by a court with relevant jurisdiction.

None of the three factors you identify is correct. With respect to reason (1): The belief that a judge is likely to be landlord friendly on the merits, while a factor favoring a bench trial is actually a pretty minor one. Empirically, actual outcomes on the merits are far less different between jury trials and bench trials than you might expect. There aren't a lot of "moving parts" in a typical landlord-tenant case that afford the trier of fact much discretion. Usually there is evidence quantifying the amount of damage to the property in dollar terms and the amount of rent owed is usually just math. It isn't like a personal injury case where pain and suffering damages are highly subjective and even liability which hinges on a common sense assessment of what constitutes "reasonable case" is very vague. There may be some wiggle room in a landlord-tenant case to disagree on the credibility of witnesses and to differ in opinion regarding what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear", but the differences in litigation costs between a jury and bench trial will usually be greater in magnitude than the differences in outcomes on the merits between the two. Of course, in the rare case where the tenant is suing the landlord for a personal injury on the premises, the difference in outcome on the merits does matter quite a bit and a judge is much less likely to enter an extremely tenant favorable damages award than a jury is to do so. But, usually, lawyers for landlords aren't thinking about this scenario very much when they write a lease because it doesn't come up very often. With respect to reason (2): The landlord actually probably has a procedural advantage over the tenant in a jury trial where having a lawyer is more important than a bench trial, but this is pretty irrelevant, because landlords are overwhelmingly more likely to win than the tenant anyway. It isn't hard to prove that somebody didn't pay all of the rent that was owed, or that they damaged the premises. Landlords care more about litigation costs than they do about their odds of winning on the merits. With respect to reason (3): And, the judge interprets of rental agreement for the jury - the jury only decides the factual issues that are disputed with regard to the rental agreement as the judge explains what it means to them. So, confusion isn't a major concern either. Instead, the biggest factors are timing and litigation costs. A jury trial is longer, because it takes time to select a jury, to prepare jury instructions, to instruct the jury, and for the jury to deliberate. A landlord-tenant bench trial might be half a day or one day long, while a jury trial on the same matter might take two or three days. Selecting and charging a jury alone takes about half a day, and instructing a jury and having it deliberate takes another half-day at least. The longer duration of a jury trial means that it takes longer for a case before a jury to be scheduled than a bench trial, because there in any given time frame, there will be more slots available for short trials than long ones. A half day bench trial might be possible to schedule two or three months out, while a two or three day jury trial might not fit into a judge's calendar for five or six months. And, a lawsuit involving a jury trial is more expensive to conduct. It probably takes something on the order of 32 more hours of lawyer time to litigate a case that goes to a jury trial than a case set for a bench trial, which is on the order of $8,000 at $250 per hour. Generally, a tenant who is being evicted or owes rent is either judgment-proof, or at least hard to collect from, so the landlord has an interest in keeping litigation costs low. The out of pocket costs other than attorney's fees are also higher in a jury trial - there is typically a jury demand fee and a need to prepare a juror notebook for each juror. The need for better quality exhibits (e.g. exhibits may need to be blown up and put on an easel, or made into a powerpoint that can be see by all the jurors, rather than just photocopied and put in a single binder for a judge).

In any court, there will be situations where a judge has discretion to make some decision. The judge might have to decide "did X meet the burden of proof", and due to the situation two reasonable and competent judges could come to different conclusions. You couldn't blame either for the decision, even though they would make opposite decisions. On the other hand, a judge might make gross mistakes. The judge might decide "X met the burden of proof" when this is clearly a mistake. That's what the appellate court is interested in. An appellate court checks whether the judge made mistakes that a judge shouldn't make. So in this situation, the appellate court doesn't decide whether X met the burden of proof. The appellate judge decides "did the trial judge make a decision that a trial judge shouldn't have made". An appellate judge might think to himself or herself: "well, I would have decided differently, but this trial judge’s decision was one that a reasonable judge could have made", and if that is what he or she thinks, the original decision will stay intact.

A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law".

At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.

No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place.

Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare

If the police search my vehicle or house without my consent, and they don't find anything, what recourse is there? I understand that if the police perform an illegal search, then any evidence found during that search will be excluded from a trial, but what if they didn't find any evidence? If the police do an illegal search, and they don't find anything, is there anything I can do about it?

You can file a federal criminal complaint under 18 USC 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law, or (most commonly) a civil claim under 42 USC 1983 for the violation of your civil rights. There are usually state laws, from some form of harassment (usually a summary offense) to misdemeanors like the Official Oppression we have in Pennsylvania. Note that you can file these complaints even if they do find something incriminating. An illegal search is illegal regardless of its fruits.

No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that.

Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.

Police make arrests when they (or a judge) decides to Police have the legal power to make an arrest if: they witness a crime being committed. Indeed, anyone can make an arrest in this circumstance. they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed. they have a warrant from a judge. Some reasons why police can, but choose not to make an arrest are: they don’t believe a crime has taken place. Accusations are easy; convictions are hard. they are exercising the discretion they have under the law to not prosecute a crime where it would not be in the public interest. Factors at play include the seriousness of the crime, the availability and strength of the evidence, the police and court resources available, other matters they have before them etc. they do not have sufficient evidence now but will pursue investigations to get more. Arresting someone starts all sorts of legal clocks ticking and if they can’t bring their case in time the defendant will walk.

In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.

The Evidence Would be Admissible. Under the so-called "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule the evidence would probably be admitted over Bob's objections in both cases mentioned in the question. Recent US court decisions have limited the exclusionary rule when police officers reasonably but mistakenly believe that a valid warrant exists, and find evidence acting under such an apparent warrant. However, if there is good evidence of intentional falsification by the police, the exception will probably not apply. As to the second case, where Bob is home and protests that an error is being made, police are not required to, and often do not, accept much that suspects or subjects of warrants say in their own defense. If anyone could simply claim there was an error and delay a warrant, perhaps giving time to dispose of evidence, many problems would result. However, the "good faith" exception only applies where the police reasonably and honestly believe that the warrant is valid, or that probable cause exists. If Bob says something such as: This warrant is for 1020 Anne street, where Alice Crook lives. But I live at 1050 Albert street. See the house number is 1050 right here. There must be a mistake. then a reasonable officer would probably double check the warrant, and if the officer unreasonably fails to do so, the search might later be suppressed. But this is going to be a very fact-sensitive inquiry, and none of the cases that I know of on the "good faith exception" rule are exactly on point for this situation. I cannot be sure how a court might rule in such a case. Leon and Evans Cases In United States v. Leon 468 U. S. 897, the US Supreme Court created a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. In that case the Court held that when officers make an objectively reasonable, good faith decision to rely on a warrant later held to be invalid, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and evidence found during a search under such a warrant, or in the course of an arrest under such a warren, is admissible. The basic logic is that when the invalid warrant was the result of an honest mistake, suppressing the evidence would have no deterrent effect on future similar mistakes, as no one intended to make them in any case. In Arizona v. Evans 514 U. S. 1 (1995), this rule was extended to officer who rely in good faith on information mistakenly provided by Court employees. The underlying logic is much the same. Herring v. United States In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) this exception was further extended to officers who acted in good faith on the mistaken information of other officers. Evidence found in a search incident to an arrest, although there was no valid arrest warrant or other probable cause, was not suppressed. In this case a warrant had been issued but later recalled. however this recall was somehow not properly entered into the database of warrants maintained by a sheriff's office. When a nearby jurisdiction called to ask if there was an outstanding warrant on Herring, they were told that there was one. Herring was arrested, and drugs and an unlawful firearm found. Minutes later the officers were told that the arrest warrant was not valid. Herring was convicted based on the evidence from the search, and the US Supreme court upheld the conviction. The court wrote in Herring: When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 591 (2006), and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule. ... the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ... When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. 468 U. S., at 922 (Leon). We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance “good faith.” In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when a warrant was invalid because a judge forgot to make “clerical corrections” to it. ... in Evans, 514 U. S. 1, we applied this good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied on mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding. We held that a mistake made by a judicial employee could not give rise to exclusion for three reasons: The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and “most important, there [was] no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in [those] circumstances” would have any significant effect in deterring the errors ... the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional ... ... To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. ... In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), ... we held that police negligence in obtaining a warrant did not even rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, let alone meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule. ... We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon we held that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 468 U. S., at 922. The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant. If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. See the Wikipedia article on Herring and this Leagal Information Institute article on the case

As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out.

The central legal question would be whether the minor has the capacity and authority to consent to a search: in the context of search law, the police would have to have a reasonable belief that both are the case. It is not reasonable to believe that an 8 year old can consent to a police search, that is, a child will most likely acquiesce to a request from the authorities to conduct a search. It is as reasonable to believe that a 16 year old can give actual consent as it is to believe that an 18 year old can consent. The law leaves the matter open for those under 18, to be determined by circumstances. The other consideration, applicable to younger children, is whether the child is authorized to open the house to outsiders. So in People v. Hoxter, 75 Cal. App. 4th 406, a 16 year old child invited police in, whereupon polices obtained plain sight evidence of drug offenses by the child's father. The court found that "sufficient discretion certainly exists" by that age. There are similar results in Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952 involving a 15 year old. In contrast, in Davis v. State, 422 S.E.2d 546, a 10 year old child who was home alone called the police to report drugs in the house. The search was invalidated because although the child's mother had given him permission to call for emergency assistance if he needed help, the child had no right, absent an emergency, to invite anyone into the house while he was alone there, much less into his parents' bedroom See also People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757 involving an 11 year old, for extensive discussion of the question of "joint control" and authority to permit a search, citing US v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 there must be some objective evidence of joint control or access to the places or items to be searched which would indicate that the person authorizing the search has the authority to do so. The mutual use of the property must be such "that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched This article has a number of citations of relevant cases, which suggests a line for police searches somewhere around 13-14 years old. But also see Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 for a permitted case of consent given by a 9 year old to a guardian ad litem: the court found a 4th Amendment issue and and concluded that the search was reasonable, holding that minors can give third party consent. Fourth Amendment rights, unlike rights attendant to due process, do not guarantee a fair and impartial determination of truth; rather, they protect the interest of the citizen "to be let alone". Thus, the subject of a Fourth Amendment-violative search need not be aware of her right to refuse to give knowing and voluntary consent. However, the circumstances surrounding the consent must demonstrate that it was voluntarily given, free of duress or coercion.

Does a Creative Commons license allow me to record a cover of a song recording? If I find a musical sound recording that is licensed under a Creative Commons (CC) license, can I record and distribute my own cover of the song? (Assuming the particular CC license does not carry the No-Derivatives provision.) A derivatives-allowed CC license would allow me to redistribute and modify the recording itself, but making a new recording seems like a different category of action. My concern is that the sound recording is CC-licensed, but the musical work may not be. Does my license-granted right to prepare derivative works of the sound recording include the ability to record my own cover, even if the musical work has not been licensed to me? If U.S. law alone does not allow this, does the text of any Creative Commons license itself allow it?

There are two separately copyrightable elements to a sound recording, as you point out: the musical work, and the performance. If you want to record a cover version of a song, what matters is the license you hold, if any, to the underlying musical work. The license to the recording is not relevant unless you are sampling or duplicating the recording. The key, however, is that whoever you got the song from has the same issue. With this in mind, there are three basic scenarios: 1) The recording is released under a cc license, but the song is in the public domain. If the song is in the public domain, the recording license is irrelevant; you have the right to cover it. 2) The recording is released under a cc license, but someone other than the recording artist holds the rights to the musical work. In this case, the recording artist almost certainly does not have the right to distribute the recording under a cc license. Musical works are subject to a "mechanical license;" this means that you can record a cover version without permission, but only if you pay royalties to the composer. If you record a cover under these circumstances, both you and the person who attempted to release the item under a cc license will be liable. 3) The recording is released under a cc license by a recording artist who also holds the rights to the musical work--in other words, an original composition. In this case, the answer to your question will depend on the specific license language, and a court's interpretation of it. The CC license defines "Licensed Material" as "the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License." Some CC licenses permit the Licensed Material to be "translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor." Some don't. The CC web site lists litigation involving their licenses, and no litigation listed there seems to address the question of whether, when a CC license is applied to a sound recording, the "Licensed Material" includes the underlying musical work. It is therefore hard to predict what a court would do; you would need an opinion from an experienced intellectual property attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. Or, on a more practical note: if you aren't sure, ask the license holder. If they give you permission, that resolves the issue.

One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess.

Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book.

I know that classical music is public domain, so no-one can claim that they own classical music. That's not quite right, at least not under US law. First off, "classical music" is a style, and music in that style is not automatically in the public domain. The rule for if music is in the public domain depends on when it was written, not what style it's in. For instance, music written in the US after 1926 is likely to still be copyrighted. Second, that's about copyright in the composition. A recorded performance has its own copyright, separate from the copyright the composer has in the composition. Even if Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is public domain, a performance of it by the New York Philharmonic involves creative interpretation and belongs to the orchestra (assuming it was recorded). So unless the recording you used was public domain, it still is subject to copyright. In the US, copyright for recordings after 1972 mirrors normal copyright law; copyright for recordings before 1972 is complicated. Third, Youtube's system involves some amount of automation. It is possible that the Content ID claim involves an automated system incorrectly thinking your recording was a copyrighted one. That's why you can dispute a Content ID flag and ask the copyright holder to review it manually.

1. Is Bob's usage considered a derivative work under US copyright law? Possibly. Under US law, a derivative work is: … a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. Lee v. A.R.T. Co. - 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) is on point here. There the court held that originality was essential to a derivative work. The selection of a particular frame out of the many available is an editorial choice that possibly meets the threshold for originality and is, therefore, a derivative work. Or it isn't and it is merely an abridged reproduction of the original. It depends on the facts. These include how much editorial originality the selection of the particular frame requires (e.g. the choice of a single frame from a highly dynamic video like a fight sequence requires more originality than the choice of a frame from a pan across a static landscape) and the circumstances surrounding its use. 2. Is Bob's usage considered an "adaptation" under the CC-BY-ND license? Maybe. If it’s a derivative work under applicable work then it is ipso facto an adaptation because that’s how the licence defines adaptation. If it isn't, then it isn't.

"I understand that a transcript of a podcast or video is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorise creating a derivative work." You've answered your own question, at least for the US and Berne Convention (Wikipedia) signatories.

The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)?

In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it.

Are residential lease durations in Bay Area meaningless? The vacancy rates in Bay Area are the lowest in the nation, and the rent much so often gets increased much faster than the inflation. However, a lot of corporate complexes employ monthly pricing that's effectively set not on the number of total months you sign the contract for, but on the data mining and the moveout dates, e.g. both an 8-month and a 15-month contract might have the monthly rent be lower than an 11 or a 12-month one, and the total rate for X+1 months might as well be less than for X months, too! However, California state law mandates that landlord must mitigate damages if tenant wants to get out of the lease, but at the same time, tenant is still liable for the whole duration of the lease as per the contract. Yet if the tenant wants to move out early, what would be the chance that the landlord would advertise the newly empty unit below the present market rate? Unless the rent prices don't increase or the market isn't hot, doesn't it imply that a Bay Area tenant is pretty much guaranteed that their total expenses for premature contract termination with a corporate apartment complex (on-premises leasing office etc) will not be more than something like about 2 weeks worth of rent? I.e., that a corporate landlord with a 9-to-5 on-premises staff will pretty much never be able to prove in any Bay Area court that they've mitigated damages appropriately, past about 2 weeks of the unit being on the market? Doesn't it then imply that if you only need a place for 5 or 6 months, it'll likely always be cheaper to sign a contract for 8 or 15 months (whichever random number of months is the cheapest per month) instead? Doesn't this, in turn, make the whole contract term somewhat pointless?

No, for two reasons. First, your question seems to assume that the current level of (1) vacancy, and (2) rent, will continue unchanged for the indefinite future. A lot of people thought that in 1989, and 2000, and 2007, just before the last three Bay Area housing crashes. The purpose of a long-term lease is to create certainty for the lessor. As the lessee, you are on the hook for whatever damages you cause by breaking the lease. As you say, right now, the complex will probably be able to mitigate fairly easily. That will change next time the market crashes. If you break the lease, you're gambling that it's still 1987...but there's a chance it's 1989 instead. If it is, you are on the hook, because the landlord exchanged a lower rent for certainty. Second, you're thinking about what the landlord will be able to prove in court. This is almost never the most helpful thing to be thinking in a situation like this. If you get to the point where your lawyer is having to stand up in court and argue about the reasonableness of the landlord's efforts, you've already spent more than two weeks' rent (even at Bay Area prices) paying the lawyer. Realistically, if the landlord says it took six weeks to rent, and sends you a bill for six weeks, the cheapest thing for you to do will, probably, be to pay it.

If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).

In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.

In general, a person may appoint as many agents as s/he wishes for a particular purpose. The principal is responsible for the actions of all such agents, unless they exceeded their powers or instructions, and in some cases even then. In this particular case all such accesses would have to be "reasonable" taken together, and if the various agents fail to coordinate their requests for access, the result may be an unreasonable burden on the tenant. But as far as I can determine there is no formal process that a Kansas landlord must go through to appoint an agent, nor any specific limit on the number of agents appointed. The general law of agency is flexible on such matters. A tenant would be justified in asking for proof (or at least evidence) that a person is in fact acting as a landlord's agent, or in confirming with the landlord. The complex management is clearly the landlord's agent.

Financially, the landlord can take you to court and get a judgment against you where you have to pay that rent, so you won't save any money. If you hire an attorney to defend you in the lawsuit, that will cost you extra money, so you could be worse off than just paying rent and staying there. The lease might have late payment fees, and if you that would be additional money that you would owe. In addition, there could be some reputational damage to you that could affect your ability to secure a lease in the future (a black mark on your credit history). Also note that in Georgia, a landlord has no obligation to seek an alternative tenant, so he can let the unit sit empty for 4 months (though he cannot collect twice on the same unite).

Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.

she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants.

Can a business put whatever they want into a contract? No. There are some things a business cannot put into a contract. But I don't see anything stopping them from putting this into a contract. It's not reasonable to assume that you have to cancel before the 20th every month. It's not reasonable to assume that - except there's no assumption needed. The contract states it flat out. You are most likely stuck paying. Requiring cancellation about 10 days in advance of the month doesn't seem like it would be an unconscionable clause. (Requiring cancellation 10 months in advance would be a different story.) Michigan law does say the following is prohibited: Taking advantage of the consumer's inability reasonably to protect his or her interests by reason of disability, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement presented by the other party to the transaction who knows or reasonably should know of the consumer's inability. But I doubt that applies in your case. It also prohibits: Gross discrepancies between the oral representations of the seller and the written agreement covering the same transaction or failure of the other party to the transaction to provide the promised benefits. So if you were promised you could cancel at any time without notice or penalty, but you later found out the contract said differently, this law may apply.

What's the penalty for breaking a residential lease in NorCal? What's the penalty for breaking a residential lease? For example, in the Bay Area in Northern California.

By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable.

Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?

This violation of KRS 511.080, criminal trespass in the third degree, is a "violation", which results in a fine not more than $250. The fine shall not be imposed if he is indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31.

To put it as nicely as possible, you're not being very smart by threatening to make the house guest's predicament the worst mistake they ever made. Drawing up a notarized contract with a financial penalty is ludicrous and likely simply illegal in terms of contracting for something that is against the law. Beyond that, any threats you make to against house guest could be grounds for them to file a civil suit against you, either for eviction or physical harm, and you'll end up in court rather than simply getting the house guest to leave. An Unlawful Detainer applies if there is verbal or written lease, and as such you would have to go through the formal eviction process. But if this is a simple house guest issue, with no lease or rental agreement in the past, and they are not a family member with some legal right to be in the house, law enforcement is the way to deal with it. It's very simple: set a move out date and say you will call the police or county sheriff if they don't move out on that date. If they don't leave and you do call the police or sheriff, simply say you have a house guest who won't leave, i.e. a trespasser. Law enforcement will come out and you will explain the story; they will likely make the determination that you are the property owner and the guest is indeed not welcome. Law enforcement will tell the guest to leave or be arrested, as per Florida Law - Chapter 810. You can call the police or county sheriff ahead of the move out date and determine the appropriate laws; and get advice on what you might need to do on the actual move out day. If the house guest has property, law enforcement will stand by at that time while they retrieve their property, or make arrangements for them get it at a later date, with or without law enforcement.

Until it was found to be unconstitutional, Florida had a law against surcharges for using a credit card (the statute is still on the books, however). That was the only law against "convenience fees" related to making payments. Whether or not a business will accept a particular form of payment (check, credit card, money order, traveler's check, cash) is up to business. Apart from credit cards, there has been no law against charging for accepting a particular form of payment, but that charge would have to be part of the contract – the lease would have to specify in advance what the processing fee is for money orders vs. cash vs. credit card. The residential tenancies law of Florida does not prohibit incorporating fees into the terms of a lease (as some states do), so the lease can specify "$1500 for rent plus $10 for payment-processing, every month".

he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.

Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.

Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.

If A makes a potentially "defamatory" statement to C about B, does it matter if C knows B well? Suppose A tells C that "B is a total liar, nothing s/he says can be believed." And suppose C has known B since childhood. Would the statement be less defamatory since C is in a good position to judge whether or not B is a "total liar?" Suppose, instead, that the statement had been made to D, who "knows of," but doesn't "know," A. Would the statement to D be more defamatory, since D is starting tabula rasa?

(Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A.

If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.

"Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board.

Carl may not do this, as he would be prohibited from making this argument at trial. At trial, evidence must be relevant, meaning that it makes a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Because the trial is meant to determine whether Carl is or is not guilty, his promises of future philanthropy have no bearing on the matter. And even if they somehow did, Carl still would not be able to tell the jury about them because they would be blocked under Rule 403, which excludes evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its risk of biasing or confusing the jury. If Carl attempts to make these statements anyway, he risks a mistrial, which means he has to start over with with a new jury. In some jurisdictions, Carl may, however, be permitted to make this argument during the sentencing phase, where the court can properly consider the societal effects of whatever punishment it imposes. At this point, though, it's obviously a little late for Carl, as it presumes he has been convicted.

A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth.

When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.

Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment".

There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.

Requirements for Creative Commons Images Attribution - Website When I use a photo licensed under Creative Commons (from Flickr) on a website I make, what is the required way to give attribution? Assuming the license allows commercial use and changes with attribution could I include the title, creator, and a tinyurl to the flickr image in a corner of my modified image? Or would that leave something out that I need to include? If I need to include more information, are there more aesthetically pleasing ways to do this?

You aren't required to include the attribution on the image, you can include it somewhere else on the page, placing it directly below the image is preferred, but providing it at the end of a post is acceptable. Image Capture: Attributing Creative Commons Materials. CC BY 2.5 Australia. (↑ See what I did there?) For best practices for providing attribution, see the Wiki: Best practices for attribution.

The Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (and all versions) is explicitly "non-sublicensable". If you receive a copy of the work under that license, you cannot place the work under a new license. The license grants you only the rights to A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. When you give copies of someone else's CC-licensed work to downstream recipients, they do not receive a license grant for the original work from you; they receive it from the original author/licensor: Downstream recipients. A. Offer from the Licensor – Licensed Material. Every recipient of the Licensed Material automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this Public License. When you include someone else's CC-licensed work in an adaptation, you may license the adaptation under other terms, but the underlying CC-licensed work remains under its CC license. From the CC FAQ: If I derive or adapt material offered under a Creative Commons license, which CC license(s) can I use? If you make adaptations of material under a CC license (i.e. "remix"), the original CC license always applies to the material you are adapting even once adapted. The license you may choose for your own contribution (called your "adapter's license") depends on which license applies to the original material. Recipients of the adaptation must comply with both the CC license on the original and your adapter’s license. When sharing someone else's work, the original CC-licensed work always remains under its original license. By contrast, the "ShareAlike" condition means that your own work used in an adaptation of a CC-BY-SA work must be placed under CC-BY-SA terms as well. ShakeAlike does not refer to the requirement to preserve the license on existing CC-licensed material (which is always present), but rather it refers to the requirement to include it on new material.

You may find the ShareAlike interpretation on the creativecommons.org wiki helpful here. The Examples section says: ShareAlike photo being used unmodified in a larger work. Unless the larger work would be considered an adaptation of it, using a ShareAlike photo as a separate element within it does not require original materials in the larger work to be ShareAlike or compatible. The larger work may be licensed under any terms. This would suggest that simply displaying the image in your film would probably not require you to apply an SA licence to your film. I imagine you would still be expected to cite the source according to standard CC requirements. However note the disclaimer at the head and foot of the page that this is not legal advice.

Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center.

From the legal code of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (emphasis in the original): 1.a Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. 1.b Adapter's License means the license You apply to Your Copyright and Similar Rights in Your contributions to Adapted Material in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Public License. 1.f Licensed Material means the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License. 2.a Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: 2.a.1.A reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and 2.a.1.B produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. 2.a.5.B You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. 3.a.4 If You Share Adapted Material You produce, the Adapter's License You apply must not prevent recipients of the Adapted Material from complying with this Public License. In short, if the original is CC-BY, you can license derivative works under whatever terms you want, so long as the license of the original work is not infringed by the new terms for the derived work. In particular, ordinary copyright (aka. "all rights reserved") is a perfectly acceptable copyright for a derivative of a CC-BY work (but the original credits should be included -and augmented- in order to also comply with the original CC-BY). Also note this doesn't restrict anybody's rights to use the original material under the original license. The other non-ShareAlike license that permits derivative works (Attribution-Noncommmercial) has a different version of clause 2.a.1.B: produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material for NonCommercial purposes only. so any license of a derivative work cannot permit commercial use of the original work. It may be possible to permit commercial use of those portions of the derivative that can be separated from the original; this gets into an extreme edge case of copyright law and you'll probably want to consult a lawyer if you find yourself in such a situation. Another way to consider this issue is by noting that you are only licensing your modifications. For example, if you add a mustache to a CC-BY portrait and use a CC-0 license, only your mustache is CC-0; you can't eliminate the original author's requirement of attribution this way. The derived work would still have to be used under a CC-BY license (or compatible).

Wikipedia is the Licensor who are granting you the license, thus in the text you quoted: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor the manner specified by Wikipedia in the link you gave is the way you must attribute the work. When a person contributes content to a Wikimedia project, they agree to license it under the CC-BY-SA-3.0 license, but they also agree to be attributed "in any of the following fashions... i. [through] hyperlink (where possible) or URL to the article to which you contributed (since each article has a history page that lists all authors and editors)" (see Wikimedia Foundation, "Policy:Terms of Use — 7. Licensing of Content"). See section 1(f) of the License used for the definition of the Licensor

The web site appears to be interacting with a copy of the MIT-licensed code, which I will call "M". Neither the site nor the code that displays the site is a copy, but if a copy of M is on Bob's server, it might be considered to be a part of the code that supports or "powers" the site. In general, calling a separate program does not make that program part of the calling program. Bob must make sure that the local copy of M contains the required copyright notice and "as-is" notice. As Bob is "using" and not "distributing" M, that ends his obligations. It would be good practice and courteous of Bob to include on his web page where M can be invoked "Powered in part by M, written by {M-author}" or some similar notice, but the MIT license does not impose any such requirement. A license could impose such a requirement, but MIT does not.

You can take pictures of public buildings and use them in your game, if you want. You cannot copy pictures (of anything) taken by someone else without the copyright owner's permission, so you need Google's permission to copy their photographs. The public building exception is specifically about architectural works and does not include e.g. murals drawn on buildings, or billboards. In such a case, you would need permission from the copyright holder (the artist, or employer). You might hope for a fair use exception (again, assuming you took the pictures yourself), which has a better chance of succeeding if this is a free game.

Which jurisdiction applies in a vessel? Consider an aircraft registered in country A. On a flight operated by an airliner based in country B, it carries passengers on a flight from country X to country Y. The flight path overflies airspace of country C and international airspace. Assume that countries A, B, C, X and Y all have different legal drinking ages. What is the legal drinking age on this flight? Does the same apply on ships?

The short answer is, in absence of a treaty or convention governing travel, then the law of the country over which the plane is located governs for the time the plane is in overflight. Laws of a jurisdiction (a country, or a state) are generally taken to extend upward from their boundaries (and downward for the control of mineral rights, etc.). There are a number of jurisdictional cases where service of process (presenting a defendant with a copy of citation starting a civil suit) or an arrest has taken place on-board aircraft where the action had to take place over a given country or state to invoke jurisdiction. As mentioned in the first sentence, there is nothing to prevent countries for entering into a Treaty or agreement that would alter the basic scheme, but absent a treaty or convention, the basic scheme of boundary extension would apply.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.

The Justice Department prosecutes all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. federal government regardless of which agency has jurisdiction over that kind of regulatory activity. The Canadian government could prosecute for passport fraud or forgery. The offshore account country could prosecute for bank fraud or forgery. The U.S. federal government, the Canadian government, and the offshore jurisdiction could probably all prosecute for attempted money laundering or attempted tax evasion (or worse, such as attempted material support of terrorism). Realistically, none of this is terribly likely to happen if there is no harm, and even if there was an arrest and a conviction, the sentence would probably be mild for such a victimless white collar crime (probably probation and a fine or a few months in jail at most unless there were larger aggravating factors). But, harm is not required for a criminal prosecution. Or, more precisely, the violation of the criminal law per se is the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 states: Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. This statute clearly applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. passports. But, it isn't obvious that the crime would apply in this case, because the crime may have taken place outside the U.S. and with a target outside the U.S., one or the other must be true for the U.S. to enforce its criminal laws - U.S. citizenship isn't sufficient. The offense in this particular statute is making with the intent that some use it, using or attempting to use a passport. The crime was directed at the offshore location. But, it wouldn't be such a stretch to assume that if the fake passport was made or used by the defendant in a U.S. living room that it was used there even if only to send it over the Internet to a foreign country. On the other hand, if the fake passport were made or used in a hotel room in Montreal by a U.S. citizen and was directed at the Cayman Islands, the U.S. might lack criminal jurisdiction over the case. The maximum offense would be 10 years and a fine for a first or second offense, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would very likely call for a much milder recommended sentence, and any excess punishment over this recommendation would have to be justified by the judge.

The 4th amendment is irrelevant because you consented to being searched as a condition of passing through security - you don’t have to fly. You cannot revoke that consent once x-ray screening or metal detection has commenced i.e. once your bags are checked, your hand luggage is in the scanner or you have entered the metal detector. The relevant issue is whether there has been a violation of the 14th amendment requiring equal treatment. If the ethnicity of your name is the sole reason you were selected for advanced screening then that is clearly a violation of this. However, if it is only one factor among several then it isn’t. However, the problem is that TSA agents are not required to articulate their reasons for selecting you (or anyone else) and indeed, they do not have to have a reason. Therefore it is almost impossible to prove that this has happened. Several cases in the wider “policing” regime have suggested that even if statistically certain groups are disproportionately targeted then that is not evidence of such targeting in a particular case. Further it is not clear if you would even have standing to sue - to prevent this kind of discrimination you have to show that you personally at risk of harm in the future. Clearly this state of affairs is problematical - there is little doubt that airport screening, not just in the USA but worldwide is tainted by this sort of bias. The data shows it as well as plenty of anecdotal evidence - I’m 1st generation Australian with UK and Australian parents, my son’s girlfriend is 2nd generation but her grandparents were Thai: she gets stopped way more than I do. This is bad not just because it’s antithetical to human rights but also because it is demonstrably less effective than purely random screening - where there is bias, that bias can be gamed. This article from a TSA employee states "Behavior Detection Officers (the guys who walk around and watch to see if you look creepy) are useless, and there are widespread rumors within TSA that the BDO program won’t be around for much longer." "The guys" are people and, like all of us, are subject to overt and subconscious bias in deciding what "look[s] creepy". Notwithstanding, security is never “obliged” to “skip” a search even if the reason for that search is arguably illegitimate. You made the travel arrangements and you take the risk that you will not have enough time between flights for this or any other reason.

where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida.

You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too.

The issue is more likely that there is no law or regulation allowing the use of dogs to sniff passengers in the US for matters not related to crime, whereas Dubai, a monarchy, has a different political system. In general, you have the constitutional right to move about in the U and the right not to be unreasonably seized, a right which may not exist in some other jurisdictions. That right can be restricted in accordance with law, but there has to be some such law. It is not a crime to have covid, or to travel while infected (it is a crime to carry bombs and drugs on a plane). One area where there is some restriction is where there always has been a restriction, namely entry into the US. There is (was) covid screening at certain airports for flights from certain countries. This directive indicates the airport restrictions, but does not explain what screening will take place. The above DHS site says that "the passenger will be asked about their medical history, current condition, and asked for contact information for local health authorities. Passengers will then be given written guidance about COVID-19 and directed to their final destination, and immediately home-quarantine in accordance with CDC best practices". It is not clear whether a mandatory temperature check without even reasonable suspicion of a crime would constitute an unreasonable search (body searches are subject to higher standards than property searches, it seems), and constitutional law surrounding searches has emphasized the primacy of privacy in search law, not the fact of physically entering property of the body. Some airlines and airports offer voluntary temperature checking, so it might be possible if someone has a covid-sniffing dog to offer voluntary sniff testing, especially if it is offered by a private concern and does not have the appearance of government mandate (which would require a law).

What happens if the Indonesian Constitutional Court rules in favor of an executed person? Prior to the executions of drug smugglers in Indonesia earlier this year, Australian officials had pressed for a delay in the executions, due to a last-ditch appeal in the Constitutional Court of Indonesia. President Joko Widodo did not grant the detainees clemency, and so the executions proceeded. I do not know how the proceedings in that court went after the executions, but I would assume that the outcome was not in the favor of the (deceased) prisoners. What would have happened if the court had found in favor of the prisoners after the executions?

Virtually nothing. Just before posting the question, I found this article and became intrigued. Jakarta: Indonesia's Constitutional Court has no power to alter the death sentences of Bali nine organisers Myuran Sukumaran and Andrew Chan or make any ruling on their case, says Indonesian law expert Tim Lindsey. Instead, lawyers for the two men hope Indonesian President Joko Widodo will come under political pressure to reassess their pleas for mercy if the court rules that the constitution requires the president to properly consider clemency submissions. In other words, the only person who could make a difference was Widodo1. The only thing the lawyers could have gained would have been a delay in the executions, prompting time for further pleas to the president. This article makes things clearer: The case could have had an impact because it challenged the clemency procedures of the president, specifically in regard to foreigners, but the court could not have overturned the death sentences. Normally, its rulings are binding, but this was not so in this case. 1I don't mean to imply that this was all his fault; I apologize if it seems that I do.

Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

You cannot legally force police to wait to carry out the search. They can search even if you are not present. In fact, they are required to execute the warrant within a certain time frame, which precludes delaying the execution of the warrant. You can inspect the warrant to see if it is "proper" (has the judges name, correct address, is a search warrant and not a warrant of removal/deportation...). Calling a lawyer is always wise, but that does not stop the search.

No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt.

Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.

You can report that said clerk to the Monitoring Information System called SIWASMARI. Please don't bribe them as you will not change our criminal justice system. You can also send some mail to the Monitoring Court Body located in Kepala Badan Pengawasan MA RI Jl. Jend. Ahmad Yani Kav. 58 By Pass Cempaka Putih Timur Jakarta Pusat – 13011 You have to be active and keep contacting the clerk. Tell them that you will report them to the Monitoring Court Body.

Are US jurors always free to speak about the trial? In England and Wales, jurors are forbidden to speak to anyone about the trial or their deliberations, even after the trial is finished. In contrast, I've noticed that jurors in the US often give statements to the press or write books about their experience. Are there any circumstances where jurors in the US are placed under similar restrictions to those in the UK, or is their freedom to speak a general principle?

We have all see on TV the judge instruct jurors that during trial they are not to speak about the case with anyone, even other jurors, unless all jurors are present and they are deliberating. However, contrary to the example given about England, in the U.S., those restrictions evaporate at the end of the trial. After a trial concludes, the court has no continuing control over the jurors and could not impose lasting restrictions without it. The Constitution provides the guarantee of trial by a jury of ones peers. In the U.S. for all general civil cases and all criminal cases, we have public trials. (special courts and tribunals are created to deal with cases involving classified information and issues of national security, and the courts have mechanisms for handling trade secrets, etc. to insure that information is not presented to jurors) So in that sense, there is nothing a juror could be exposed to in during their service as jurors that would require any type of continuing restriction.

Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.

The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.

The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.

Short Answer This account would be a fairly extreme outlier relative to normal practice in jury selection, but it is certainly something that could possibly happen (except for one small detail that isn't very relevant to the core issues that it raises; this detail is discussed below in the last heading of this answer). The substantive points made in the Facebook post about what the facts recounted say about the state of women's conditions and attitudes about women in our society, and the poster's skepticism that a judge who made decisions like these really acted appropriately, are well founded, fair, and appropriate to raise. These concerns are within the heartland of what the case law on these kinds of issues discusses and struggles with, although because of the procedural posture of this issue, there isn't a lot of case law on this issue. Long Answer My Sources Of Knowledge I have participated in choosing perhaps half a dozen juries in which I was counsel, and I have observed the process in other cases one or twice and have previously been in a couple of jury pools myself (I've never been actually selected to serve). I'm also familiar with accounts of others practitioners regarding their experiences with jury selection, I know what I was taught in law school about the process, and I am familiar with the academic and practitioner oriented literature about the process. I am answering based upon U.S. law, because I don't have intimate familiarity with petite jury selection in other common law countries, although the broad outlines of the process are similar. As a caveat to this answer, however, recognize that judges have very broad discretion in the jury selection process and that not all judges adhere to "best practices". Further, in many states, judges are partisan elected officials who tend to end up in there positions because of, rather than in spite of, their extreme views and positions of legal issues over which they have discretion relative to the average lawyer or judges in places where the judicial selection process is less partisan. Your Questions How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? This usually happens in any case more serious than a simple traffic offense. It would be unusual to examine every single member separately in a separate room, but normally quite a few jurors a questioned separately on one point or another. This process is called voir dire (a situation in which U.S. legal terminology borrows from French rather than Latin). How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Jury members are usually dismissed in the presence of other members, but the specific juror responses to the reasons for doing so may or may not be discussed in the presence of the other jurors. Less sensitive questions (e.g., do you still live in this county, are you a U.S. citizen, do you speak English, do you have scheduled health procedures during the anticipated trial or a trip with a non-refundable ticket or similar issue, and a few other "categorical" exclusions) are usually discussed in the presence of other members, as are responses to general questions that are unlikely to be grounds by themselves for a dismissal for cause, but could inform peremptory challeges of jurors. The better and more common practice is for sensitive questions, such as a previous incident of being assaulted, to be discussed out of earshot from the other panel members, but in the hearing of the judge, at least one lawyer for each side and the court reporter who includes the bench conference in the trial transcript. Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Normally, jury pool members leave the courtroom and get on with their day once they are dismissed. But, if they choose to stick around, they will learn who is selected to serve on the jury, and who is eliminated from the jury pool. Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel? Terminology First of all, here and in your prior questions it is important to distinguish between the jury pool (a group of randomly chosen people who might end up being jurors) and the jury (a group of people ultimately selected to decide a case after challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are complete). The Voir Dire Process There is, in principle, no limit on the number of members of the jury pool who can be dismissed for cause, and if they run out, everyone goes home for the day and comes back the next day with a supplemental batch of jury pool members. In an obscure civil case or minor low profile felony case, the jury pool would typically be 30-60 potential jurors. In a death penalty case or case that has famous parties (e.g. a civil case involving Taylor Swift held in Denver recently), the jury pool would typically be several hundred people and the first round of voir dire would happen over the course of several days or even weeks. Any time that either party requests that a juror be dismissed for cause, the other party can choose to not object, or can object and argue that the juror should not be dismissed for cause. The judge doesn't have to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike the juror for cause and not infrequently will refuse to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike a juror for cause. This is because the judge has an institutional incentive to discourage jurors other than the one that a party has moved to dismiss from the jury pool from giving a lame excuse to try to get out of jury duty, even if the parties, who don't have that institutional concern, don't care about that. Why Might A Prosecutor Fail To Object? The downside of objecting to a request to dismiss a juror for cause is that it creates an almost automatic appellate issue for the party seeking to dismiss the juror if the juror is not dismissed. So, a prosecutor might not object to a questionable request to dismiss a juror for cause in order to reduce the likelihood that a conviction obtained by the prosecutor would be reversed on appeal. Giving the defense the jury it wants also makes it more likely that if the case starts going badly that the defendant will agree to a plea bargain mid-trial rather than risking a conviction by the jury, because any conviction obtained is more likely to hold up on appeal. A defendant may appeal a ruling denying a motion to dismiss a prospective juror that is denied after a conviction, if any, is entered. If the jury acquits the defendant (the unfavorable outcome the prosecutor would like to avoid by not having a juror dismissed for cause), the prosecutor can't appeal the case, and if the jury hears evidence, the case can't be dismissed without prejudice or retried unless there is a conviction that is reversed or there is a mistrial (the mistrial rules are bit complicated). So, if the prosecutor was really appalled by the dismissal for cause of so many women and felt that this would impair the prosecution's chance of obtaining a conviction materially, the prosecutor would have to dismiss the criminal charges so as to vacate the trial, before evidence was presented to the jury, and then refile the charges (assuming that this would be possible consistent with statutes of limitation and speedy trial requirements). But, this would be an extraordinary move with high stakes, because the prosecutor has a long term strategic interest in not pissing off a judge in any case because that could cause the judge to exercise the judge's discretion against the prosecutor in future cases. The judge and prosecutor may have to deal with each other in future cases for decades and will do so on a regular basis every few weeks or months. A judge is likely to be pissed off in this situation because dismissing a case ready to go to trial and scheduled for trial with a jury fully selected because the prosecutor was unhappy with the judge's rulings on motions to dismiss jurors for cause would not be appreciated by the judge who naturally believes that the rulings made on those motions were sound even if that belief is unreasonable. I strongly suspect that this was the reason that the prosecutor allowed all twelve women in the jury panel to be stricken for cause in the case that you describe (assuming, of course, that the Facebook account is factually accurate, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case – even if the gist of the account was accurate, it wouldn't be surprising if some technical details or nuances were incorrectly recounted). It Would Not Be Normal For A Prosecutor To Not Object In This Case Despite these procedural considerations, it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to not object to striking all twelve women on a jury panel for cause in these circumstances and it would be very unusual for a judge to agree to strike all twelve women on the jury panel for cause in these circumstances whether or not the prosecutor objected. Generally speaking, merely having had a prior experience of having been assaulted would not be sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause. Normally, the prosecutor and/or the judge would ask the prospective juror if this experience made it impossible for that particular juror to be impartial in this particular case, and normally most of the prospective jurors asked that question would say "no". Usually, in that situation, the judge would not agree to dismiss that prospective juror for cause. Most prosecutors would expect their objections to a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in this situation to be taken seriously by the judge and for only a few of these requests that cast the most doubt on the impartiality of a potential juror to be granted. And, most prosecutors would not consider the appellate risk involved in opposing a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in the typical scenario that I outlined above very troubling, because a judge has fairly broad discretion on dismissals of jurors for cause in the face of a marginal fact pattern. The fact that the judge allowed this also suggests that the prosecutor may know that the judge is very unenlightened and has misogynist leanings and that fighting the judge's ruling in this case would be a lost cause that is hard to appeal. (Of course, if any of the women had previously been assaulted by the defendant in this particular case and personally knew that defendant well, that would normally cause the potential juror to be dismissed for cause.) After Challenges For Cause Keep in mind also that after dismissals for cause are completed, a certain number of jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense combined plus the number of jurors who need to be left over to decide the case would be put in the second stage of narrower jury pool. In this second stage, during which the narrower jury pool is honed to the actual final panel of jurors who will hear the case, each side exercises their allocated number of peremptory challenges (normally alternating back one forth, one juror at a time). While peremptory challenges can generally be made without good cause, you can not make a peremptory challenge solely based upon a potential juror's race or sex. If a side dismisses all women, or all men from the jury pool, there is a presumption that this is what was done by the party striking the jurors that must be overcome with convincing reasons not based on race or sex. The same analysis, strictly speaking, doesn't apply to motions to dismiss jurors for cause because in those cases a non-discriminatory reason has been definition been advanced by the party seeking to dismiss the prospective juror and accepted by the judge as convincing based upon the voir dire evidence. One reason not to fight very hard to dismiss a juror for cause is that many of those jurors who seem most favorably inclined to your case, although not necessarily all of them, are likely to end up being dismissed in a peremptory challenge in any case. A Footnote on Ex Parte Proceedings Ex Parte Voir Dire Is Improper The author of the OP also clarified that: When I asked, "How often are jury members subject to separate examination […]?", I meant that only one party (or counsel for one party) is examining the jury at a time. E.g., first the judge and prosecution counsel examines the jury (without defense present) then the judge and defense counsel examines the jury at some other time. Normally, the judge asks boilerplate routine questions first, then one side asks questions, then the other side asks questions. But, it would be almost unheard of (and it would be improper and unethical) for this to happen without lawyers for both sides present to see what transpires during the other side's questioning, even if the prosecution wasn't planning to make challenges for cause, so as to gather up information needed for the preemptory challenge phase of jury selection. To have a proceeding without both sides having a lawyer present is called an ex parte communication with the judge which both the judge and the lawyer doing so have an "ethical" duty to avoid in this part of the jury selection process. An ethical duty means that the judge could be, in theory, kicked of the bench or temporary suspended or public reprimanded or require to take a judicial ethics class for doing so; and that the lawyer could similarly be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or publicly reprimanded or required to take a legal ethics class for doing so. Conducting the proceeding ex parte could also be grounds for a mistrial ruling that would not prevent the defendant from being retried (because it would have been done at the request of and for the benefit of the defense counsel), or for an appeal in the appropriate cases. (There are ex parte proceedings which are ethical and permitted such as applications for search warrants and arrest warrants, but juror selection is not a proceeding to which an exception to the general rule applies.) The Prosecution Could, In Theory, Waive The Right To Participate In principle, the prosecutor could waive the right to be present while the judge and defense lawyer examine prospective jurors, but this would be almost bizarre conduct that would only happen if someone was calling about an incredibly urgent development that threatened to shut down the courts or put the prosecutor or co-workers or family at immediate risk of physical harm happened. For example, a prosecutor might waive a right to be present if the prosecutor wasn't planning on objecting to any jurors for cause and was learning that the 9-11 attacks were underway, or that a mass shooting at the prosecutor's offices had happened or was in progress, or a prosecutor having a spouse who the person they stepped out to talk with was in a newly discovered hostage situation, or the prosecutor suddenly feeling an intense need to vomit or being on the verge of passing out or feeling like a heart attack might be in progress. Even then, however, it would be more common for a judge to call a recess for a little while in any of those circumstances. The Case Description Is Probably Incorrect Or Misleading On This Point The ex parte examination of prospective jurors, which was apparently described, would be so far outside the norm of typical jury selection conduct, that I suspect that this part of the account is inaccurate or was confusingly worded. For example, the post's wording arguably misleadingly implied that there was an ex parte proceeding as part of the jury selection process, but it wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with a scenario in which a prosecutor was already present with the female jurors "before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney." For example, it could be that what really happened was that a member of the prosecutors office was introduced to the in the jury assembly room, and led the prospective jurors to the correct courtroom without making any comments to them, and then they met the judge and defense counsel, which would be entirely proper and not unusual.

The right to trial by jury in criminal cases by a unanimous jury of twelve under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and some related rights are only partially incorporated to apply against states via the 14th Amendment due process clause. (The right to a jury trial in a civil case under the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the states.) As noted, the federal right to a jury trial in a criminal case applies only when more than six months of imprisonment are a possible sentence pursuant to Baldwin v. New York. (Proceeding to trial without a jury on a more serious charge is allowed so long as the actual sentence does not exceed six months.) In practice, many states establish a right to a jury trial in many criminal cases where the U.S. Constitution does not require them. Juries are not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The 6th Amendment right to a criminal jury trial does not apply to military justice either, although there are constitutional limitations that do apply to military justice. There are no jury trials in the territorial courts of American Samoa which is beyond the scope of 6th Amendment protection. A unanimous jury of six or more jurors is allowed (at least in non-death penalty cases). A state jury does not have to be unanimous (at least in non-death penalty cases). Ten of twelve is constitutionally sufficient for a twelve person jury; nine of twelve is not sufficient constitutionally. In practice, only one or two states permit non-unanimous jury verdicts. [Since this post was originally written, the precent implicitly referenced here was overturned and all criminal case juries must be unanimous. New York State, however, never allowed non-unanimous jury trials anyway.] There is not a federal constitutional right to waive a jury trial, although this exists in some states by state constitution or other forms of state law. The right to have felony charges screened by a grand jury also does not apply to the states. About half of U.S. states require grand juries to screen felony charges, mostly in the eastern U.S. I have the precedents in a criminal procedure text book and will update is I get a chance. See also the footnotes here. To some extent, the constitutional provision in NY State is designed to make clear that bench trials are allowed when a jury has been waived. It also authorizes bench trials where the U.S. Constitution and state law permits them.

united-states Witnesses are generally confined to giving testimony from their own personal memory; most of the time, they can't read a statement into the record or just tell the jury to go look at some other piece of evidence. But this creates problems when a witness knows an important fact but doesn't remember it when she takes the stand. Maybe she counted exactly how much money she stuffed in the robber's bag as she was doing it, and she wrote it down as soon as he fled, but a year later, she can't remember that it was $93,736.45. But the prosecutor isn't allowed to just give the witness a stack of evidence and let her go hunting through the documents to answer each question. Instead,he goes through the "Do you remember" colloquy to lay the necessary foundation to refresh the witness's memory, as contemplated by Rule 612, which then also triggers certain rights for the opposing party with respect to the document used to refresh the witness's memory.

I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control.

Legal definitions in the United States When trying to learn about and understand law, one of the most important aspects of it is the legal definition of a word. Is there a source in which the courts refer to when looking to define a word? If there is, what is it?

Courts look to primary authority first, and then to secondary authority if ambiguity remains. Primary Authority providing definition for the legal use of a word would be previous case opinions that give meaning to a word in a given context, how the word is actually defined in the statutes for the state, or, in the case of federal law, the federal statutes or Code of Federal Regulations. Within primary sources, you also consider whether a prior definition is binding on the court (i.e., the court has to follow it) or whether it is merely persuasive authority (that the court can choose to follow, but is not required to follow based on precedent – sometimes call Stare Decisis). Primary authority is binding on a court if the definition comes from a higher court in the direct appellate chain of the deciding court, it is persuasive otherwise. Secondary Authority is everything else. For example, Black's Law Dictionary, Whigmore on Evidence, or any other legal treatise would also be a secondary source. (All secondary authority is persuasive authority.) Courts, in absence of either, will look to how a word is commonly used in the context in which it is applied. All seek to give the proper meaning to a word or phrase in light of how it is being used.

(d) a place to which the public have access, whether as of right or not Be that broad or not, it applies to airport car parks. Would I be wasting my time trying to argue this in court? Pretty much.

That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.

1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.

"Codes" are usually collections of previously existing laws. The Code of Hammurabi and the Code of Justinian were both collections of laws, gathered for easy reference. In the US, the US Code (USC) is an almost comprehensive collection of current law, much of which was passed in separate statutes before it was codified. In this contest, to codify is to include a law in the code, altering formatting and numbering to make it consistent with the rest of the code. Laws in the US are normally passed and go into effect before they are codified. In modern usage "code" is not normally used for a single law. There is also the US Code of Federal Regulations or CFR which is a collection of regulations passed by various federal agencies to implement law. They are not laws, but in many respects thy have the force of law. I believe that several other legal systems use "code" or a word that might be translated as "code" in a similar way. In a wider sense, "code" can be used to refer to an entire system of law, as "the Mosaic code" or "the Anglo-American code". It can also be used for the precepts of a non-legsal system as "an ethical code" or "the architect's code of practice". A bill is a proposed law not yet passed by a legislature. In modern US usage, codes only include statutes passed by legislatures, not constitutions. This is because codes collect the work of legislatures, but written constitutions come from different and special sources. The term "act", in modern usage, is a synonym for "statute". In historic usage not all acts were statutes, only those important enough to be routinely quoted verbatim, not paraphrased.

You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.

In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act.

Jurisdiction the authority of a court or official organization to make decisions and judgments A body that acts within the scope of its jurisdiction can expect that its actions will be upheld by the courts - whether that body is the US Congress or a local softball club.

Are forum users who establish their identity more entitled to protection from libel? In an online forum or social network does a user who ties the identity of their presence there to their real world identity have more recourse open to them with regard to being libeled than a user who uses a pseudonym? Asked another way, is it possible to commit libel against an anonymous pseudonym?

There's really no difference. Quoting from here, What if I change the person's name? To state a defamation claim, the person claiming defamation need not be mentioned by name—the plaintiff only needs to be reasonably identifiable. So if you defame the "government executive who makes his home at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," it is still reasonably identifiable as the president. What does the whole thing depend on? It depends on how easy it is to identify the pseudonym-using plaintiff. They don't have more recourse, per se - nor do they have more protection under the law - but it may be harder for them to win the case. On the upside, the statement might not cause them as much harm when compared to a person using their actual name.

In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.

According to Julian Assange, CNN committed a crime violating § 135.60 of the New York criminal code "coercion". Reddit, while being a private company, is still considered a public forum. Anything said on these sites can be used against you if your actually identity is discovered.

Is the their username alone, without any attached profile (like their email address or real Name) still considered personal data that has to be deleted? For something to be ‘personal data’ it must information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly. In other words: If the natural person can be indirectly identified from the username, it is personal data. If he cannot, it is not personal data. This obviously depends on the circumstances. If the user used something very similar to his real name, or his email address or uses the same nickname on a lot of different systems, then it probably is personal data. If it is an unique pseudonym that is not used elsewhere, it is less likely. If you want to make sure you comply with the right to erasure, you may want to scrub your wiki database, replacing all the username of the deleted user with "anonymous" (or something like that). If you want to be able to treat these as separate users, your scrubbing process may use unique anonymous identifiers ("anon-1", "anon-2", and so on).

No, the truth of the statement is the defense. It is true that The New York Times reported that A did X, even if it is false that A did X. Your claim is about the NYT, not about A. If you just repeat the false allegation (republishing it), that is libel.

The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms.

Yes such a username would be personal data. It is information that relates to an identifiable person. In this context,a person isn't identifiable only if you can infer their real-world identity, but already if you can single out one person's records. Thus, your random IDs and any linked information would be personal data as well. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean that processing it is illegal. It just means you need a legal basis. That could be necessity for performing a contract with the data subject (like saving game progress), a legitimate interest, or consent. Taking into account GDPR principles like "data protection by design and by default", it could be sensible to hide a players stats from the leaderboard until they give consent. On the other hand, you may have a legitimate interest to provide leaderboard data for ranking/comparison, especially if the leaderboard entries are pseudonymized. In any case, it should be clear to the users which information is visible to others.

Any legal issues for writing about your parent(s)? No. Furthermore, the answer you got from the Free Legal Aid Clinic is wrong. There is no need for pseudonyms or ambiguities such as "a family member". As long as your statements of fact are truthful, identifying actual individuals in your narrative is lawful (this applies to US as well as Canada defamation law). A word of caution, though: Your post reflects deficiencies in how you explain yourself. This has more to do with your way of articulating ideas than the possibility that English might not be your first language. Although it is palpable from your post that you do not intend to defame someone, reading it raises some concern that you might inadvertently convey a defamatory falsehood when you talk about matters which are understandably sensitive. Knowing how to transmit your message clearly and accurately is far more important --and safer from a legal standpoint-- than avoiding ironic acronyms such as "A m o m f".

In Pennsylvania is there more legal protection in forming a LLC as opposed to operating as sole proprietor? In theory an LLC (Limited Liability Company) offers a level of protection for the owner if being sued. I want to buy houses and rent them out, I have some fear of being sued by tenants in the future (no particular concern, but I live in the USA (United Sue of All). What if any, greater protection does having an LLC being the owner of the houses have? I would own the LLC, the LLC would own the houses and collect the rent.

An LLC is a legally distinct entity from your person. Basically, if your LLC is sued, and you lose, you can lose only what you put into your LLC. Your personal assets are untouched. A very sophisticated plaintiff may try to get around this suing both your LLC and you personally. (I've done this myself.) Even so, if you are careful to keep the business of your LLC separate from your personal business (no commingling of assets, no use of your LLC to pay your bills, but only a salary), then the law will often absolve you of personal liability for the "actions" of your LLC. The reason I warn against "commingling" is because if you do this, you can lose the protection of the LLC as a separate entity, and become personally liable for what the LLC does. This is known as "piercing the corporate veil." If you have home rental operations in more than one state, you may want to establish LLC's for each state. That's because some states are more tenant- and other states are more landlord- friendly than others, meaning that you may want to defend yourself differently in one state versus another.

Possibly In most contracts, the parties sign in their capacity as people (or agents for other people). However, some contracts are signed in the capacity as the owner of a piece of land and the contract transfers with the land. The liability rests with the current owner and, if unpaid, creates a lien over the property. These are particularly common in contracts with utilities or where the contract involves the a structure on the land. Surprise, surprise, the situation you describe involves both. You need to refer back to your contract for the land as these types of contracts are usually disclosed (unless they are a function of local law because everyone just knows - I don't know anything about Pa. law on this) and the original contract with the gas company. Your settlement may have also involved you paying a figure to purchase the gas in the tank as at the date of settlement. For example, in new-south-wales, council rates and water rates attach to the land as a matter of law and the vendor pays the purchaser for any amount they have paid in advance (or vice-versa if they are in arrears). Electricity and piped gas don't; the vendor ends their account on or before settlement and the buyer opens a new account on or after settlement and each pays for their own use. Propane for portable bottles doesn't but for fixed installations does as a matter of contract with the gas company.

I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.

This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement.

A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.

Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.)

The fault lies with the people who vandalized your house. In general, whoever causes you damage is responsible (liable) for that damage. This is true whether or not you are selling your house, having guests over, letting a friend stay over for a night or a week, or whatever the circumstance is. Insurance is there to cover many such losses: if a friend trashes your house in a drunken rage, your insurance will cover the damage, but they will invoke the doctrine of subrogation whereby they get to go after the friend, and you have to cooperate. In a situation where nobody has a clue who did the damage, the only possible way that the agent has any responsibility is if they were negligent in their duty to take care of the house. For your specific case, you'd need to discuss the forensic facts with your attorney. But generally speaking, the issue would be whether the agent had breached his/her professional duty of care, which is best understood as comparing his actions (or lack) compares to actions of other professionals in the same circumstance. If a house has 3 or 4 sets of visitors simultaneously, it is really not possible for an agent to supervise all of them at once. So the question would be, was this the result of one concentrated vandalism attack, or serial vandalism. The former is more in the realm of "stuff happens", and the latter is indicative of an endemic lack of care. To repeat, the fault lies with the miscreants who vandalized your house. You, or your insurance company, may nevertheless have to bear the financial burden. Your insurance company will certainly have an interest in spreading responsibility to the realty firm, if warranted by the facts.

You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee.

Is it possible to legally prohibit someone from linking to specific pages on your website? By linking I meant to give exact instructions about how to find a specific page on the site, for a user with enough privilege. It can be a URL, or a demonstration of where you should click, etc. The site don't have to be open to everyone. But they had no informations about their user's real identity. Everything they could get is at most an "I agree" checkbox during registration. I'm not asking about whether they can remove the user posting or using the link, but is it possible to legally request removing the link itself (in other sites)? My first guess is no. I think it is not directly related to copyright as the user didn't post the content, and your terms of service cannot affect other sites. But then I feel there are some quite similar things seemed possible, and someone must be already trying to do this. So is it? If yes, what are those terms called (a part of the copyright license or terms of service, or something else)? @apsillers pointed out this may have something to do with the contract law. I think indeed this can be done between companies, or companies and employees. But (1) is it still effective if the site just let users to agree to the terms online? (2) If a user did it anyway, I think you can only remove the user in your site, or in theory you can let the user pay. But you still cannot remove things in other sites, because those sites didn't agree to the contract. Is that right? I'm thinking about a license like this: You can use the ideas in whatever way you want (they are not patented; or maybe they are, but the fact your site is describing them cannot be patented). You cannot copy the articles directly (there is copyright). You cannot refer to the explanations in this site in formal documents of a company, or prove this site has promoted this idea. Or a weaker term: you have to pay to do that. You can rewrite the whole things, or don't leave explanations, or whatever. This is indeed a bad idea which I thought it must be disallowed at first. But it seemed to be weaker than what a company can have with their employees.

No. You are correct in that this is not related to Copyright. Copyright is meant to protect expressions of an idea. An URL is simply an address, like a street address. Can you legally stop people referring to your home address? No. Can you legally stop people from passing by and looking at your house on the street? Also no. A famous case related to hyperlink is Ticketmaster v Tickets.com (2000). Tickets.com used information Ticketmaster's website and deep-linked to there. The ruling established that: use of information is not infringing hyperlinking cannot be copyright infringement because no copying is involved. deep linking is not unfair competition If you feel that it is necessary to avoid people linking to specific pages of your site, you may consider accomplishing this technically. UPDATE It does not matter whether your site is meant to be public or not. For example, an knowledge base meant to be shared internally in an organization, but accessible on the internet since staff are geographically distributed. Again, you may think of it like a street address. A private corporate building meant for employees only. An address, like Room C, 16/F, Example Corporate Complex, 4321 Lucky Avenue can be shared like any other address. You cannot demand people to never refer to your office address. You can, however, setup a security post at the entrance and only allow certain guests to visit you. In the case of a website, you may state in your terms that one cannot share access information to any external parties. This will include the sharing of any authentication data (e.g. password) which can be used to access content.

Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).

1) I saw that no where during registration you actually tell what your work does, you only fill up details, how exactly is it protecting you if you don't specify? For example I have a computer program/website that do something, how exactly the copyright protects you if you did not specify about it? A copyright protects a particular single expression of an idea and versions that are derived from that particular expression. When you copyright software you have to provide approximately 50 pages of printed code so as to make it possible to distinguish your code from someone else's and you generally deposit a full copy with the Library of Congress. The ideas in the computer program are not protected. You only protect the exact language of the code in the computer program and other programs that use that exact language as a starting point. If someone reverse engineers a way to achieve the same process or outcome with different code language (or even comes up with exactly the same code language without ever looking at the language used in your code) then their software does not infringe on your copyright. To protect the ideas in a computer program you need a patent. 2) If I am a non-us citizen, do I need to select in State "Non-US", or leave it blank on "Select"? Because it allows me to complete registration with either. State "Non-US" refers to where you are located, not to your citizenship. If you are located outside the U.S., then you select "Non-US" and if you are located in a U.S. state, but are a non-citizen, you select the state where you are located. The answer does not affect the validity of your copyright. It is used for economic statistics and to determine where the copyright office should locate its own offices to be maximally useful to the public.

What would be the legal validity of this behaviour? Your changes to the browser source of the website contract or license of Terms of Service (TOS) - essentially a "click-wrap" license - before agreeing to it means nothing in a legal sense, other than to void the contract. The other party (the website) can't possibly agree to those contract changes without them being submitted as contractual changes and agreeing to them, if they did agree to them. That's basic contract law. That website TOS probably has a clause that says that if you don't agree to the TOS in full, as written, without modifications, you can't use the website. And the TOS may also say that they reserve the right to prevent you from using the site by closing your account or even blocking your access. Your "witness" to the contract changes is meaningless, as your witness is not a party to the contract. And any witness to the fact that you have changed the terms of the TOS before agreeing to it would work against you in a civil proceeding as proof of your attempt at modifying the contract.

Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.

You have the right to request anything you want, but there is a very limited set of things that you can have a legal expectation of them doing. The service provider has no obligation to block a user. You can likewise request a report, and from a pirate site I would expect no response. There is no legal requirement that a pirate site block an offending user after a certain number of offenses. There is no direct way to compel a pirate site to ban a user. Indirectly you might accomplish that end if you take legal action against the site, which causes them to ban a user in order to protect themselves If a DMCA request was not "proper" (the correct legal form) they will not perform a takedown, and may not inform you that they won't. Make sure your takedown request is legally correct and actually delivered to the correct person. If they still ignore your request, they will have lost the "safe harbor" provisions, and you can theoretically sue them. Since the pirate site presumably only hosts a link to elsewhere, their making public such a link is not itself copyright infringement, so you need to be going after the ISPs who manage the actual host sites. The pirate site might still be a contributor to infringement, along MGM v. Grokster lines. A standard defense against infringement would be "We had no idea", and ignoring DMCA takedown notices is clear proof that they did have an idea. That's basically what DMCA takedown is about: saying what it takes to use the "We had no idea" defense.

It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere.

To answer part of your question, the takedown and restoration process of the DMCA is not required. It is a legal way a hosting site can stay in the clear for copyright infringement. Therefore, if the site didn't take down what you complained about, they're participating in copyright infringement (if that's what's happening). Since they did not take down the material (assuming your DMCA was in the right legal form), if you do sue over copyright infringement you can sue the site as well as whoever uploaded your stuff to the site. I don't think that linking to your stuff would itself be copyright infringement, so I'd suggest consulting a lawyer specializing in IP.

How is "defamation" defined? I have a recollection that late in the 20th century in the United States, A called B a "bastard." B sued A for defamation. The court ruled in favor of the defendant. Its first observation was that (at the time) one of out every four American children was born out of "wedlock," (the literal meaning of "bastard.") The judge also noted that "bastard" and similar swear words were in wide use at the time, and that people would take it as such, and not as an accusation that the circumstances of B's birth were compromised. My guess is that B's suit would have had a much better chance to succeed a century or two earlier, in the late nineteenth or eighteenth century. So what would be the standard for "defamation?" Would it be related to contemporary understanding or usage?

There are four criteria used today in the United States: The statement was false, but was claimed as true. The statement must have been made to a third, previously uninvolved party. The statement must have been made by the accused party. The statement caused harm. The first (and very important) criterion was discussed in New York Times v. Sullivan, where it was ruled that A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" -- that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Pp. 265-292. (c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved. Pp. 279-283. Quoting Wikipedia and Justice Black, The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice. In this context, the phrase refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than its ordinary meaning of malicious intent. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black explained that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment." New York Times v. Sullivan is regarded as one of the most - of not the most - important defamation cases of the century. It was argued in 1964. If the case you discuss - which I haven't been able to find - occurred after to the ruling, then it could have been dismissed, because A did not intend it as malicious in the sense of defamation (and did not claim it was true), though it was almost certainly meant as an insult. Had this case occurred prior to New York Times v. Sullivan, things might have been different. Non-public officials Things are different for private officials. Those who are not classified as public figures are considered private figures. To support a claim for defamation, in most states a private figure need only show negligence by the publisher, a much lower standard than "actual malice." Some states, however, impose a higher standard on private figures, especially if the statement concerns a matter of public importance. You should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information. Note: There are differences between defamation, libel, and slander; a quick overview is given here: "Generally speaking, defamation is the issuance of a false statement about another person, which causes that person to suffer harm. Slander involves the making of defamatory statements by a transitory (non-fixed) representation, usually an oral (spoken) representation. Libel involves the making of defamatory statements in a printed or fixed medium, such as a magazine or newspaper."

Harassment, alarm and distress are for the trier of fact to define That is, whether particular behaviour in a particular case amounts to harassment, alarm or distress is a question of fact, not law. That is, it is for the trier of fact (jury or judge as applicable) to consider the evidence and decide if the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt (another term they must define for themselves) the actions of the defendant amounted to harassment, alarm or distress within the context of the crime charged. The Crown Prosecution Service has this guide to help decide if charges should be brought. With reference to s5 of the Public Order Act (s4A is a more severe version of this crime): Disorderly behaviour does not require any element of violence, actual or threatened; and it includes conduct that is not necessarily threatening or abusive. It is not necessary to prove any feeling of insecurity, in an apprehensive sense, on the part of a member of the public (Chambers and Edwards v DPP [1995] Crim LR 896). There is a defence of reasonableness to these crimes and that, too, is for the trier of fact to determine using the legally objective test: Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin): It was open to justices to find that signs referring to homosexuality and lesbianism as immoral were “insulting” and, having taken into account the defendant’s rights under Articles 9 and 10, to find that his behaviour in displaying them was not reasonable Gough v DPP [2013] EWHC 3267 (The naked rambler case) The District Judge had been entitled to find that the defendant’s conduct in walking through a crowded street was “disorderly” and that prosecution was a proportionate response which did not violate his rights under Article 10. NB both the above cases were decided before the amendment to the Act which removed the “insulting” limb under section 5.

In the case of United States vs Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (a 6-2 decision), the Supreme Court wrote: [T]he real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. ... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. ... To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States. In short the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” excludes three and only three groups of people: Children born to foreign diplomats here on diplomatic business, who have diplomatic immunity to US Law; Children of members of an invading army that has occupied and controlled some part of US territory, born on that occupied area, who are obviously not subject to US Law (which has rarely happened in the US, although Guam was occupied during WWII, and parts of Alaska, and small parts of Maine during the War of 1812); and Members of Native American tribes, subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal governments, who do not pay US taxes. (This was true when the 14th amendment was passed, but it no longer is. See section below on the act that changed it in 1924.) Any other person born in the proper US or in incorporated US territory is a citizen, no matter who his or her parents are or were. (The case is less clear for unincorporated US territory.) See also the Wikipedia article on the case This view was confirmed in 1995 in an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel written by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, taking the position that this rule could not be changed by legislation, only by Constitutional Amendment, writing: My office grapples with many difficult and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestionably unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The unmistakable purpose of this provision was to constitutionalize the existing Anglo-American common law rule of jus soli or citizenship by place of birth and especially to extend it to persons of African descent and their descendants. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education to children in the United States illegally and a municipal school district's attempt to charge an annual $1,000 tuition fee for each student. The case upheld the same principle that the constitutional phrase "within the jurisdiction" applies to the children of people who had entered the US illegally. According to the Wikipedia article on the case: Texas officials had argued that illegal aliens were not "within the jurisdiction" of the state and thus could not claim protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court majority rejected this claim, finding instead that "no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident immigrants whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident immigrants whose entry was unlawful." The dissenting opinion also rejected this claim, agreeing with the Court that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to immigrants who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a state." Thus the question of whether such aliens were "within the jurisdiction" of the US was very much at issue in Plyler v. Doe EDIT: Since the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was passed, all Native Americans born within the US have been citizens by birth, and the third class of exceptions noted in the earlier cases non longer exists. Prior to this act Native Americans were in many ways treated as foreigners by the US. They were not citizens by birth, and their tribes had some but not all of the attributes of independent nations. The text of the law is: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (End edit on Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) Edit: On reading through the decision of the case of Wong Kim Ark I find one more small exclusion: persons born on board a foreign naval ship, even though present in US waters in time of peace, are not citizens of the US because of their birth location. This is apparently not a usual case, but is premised on the ground that a military vessel remains the territory of the nation it belongs to. Such persons might of course be citizens by inheritance if one or both parents are US citizens, and the statutory conditions are complied with. (The term "public ship" in the 1800s was used to mean a national ship, that is a military ship.) (End edit on naval ships) I just learned that some parts of the State of Maine were occupied by the British during the war of 1812. I do not know if anyone was born during that occupation whose citizenship might have been affected.

Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement.

Mongolia apparently has a list of banned words (list is NSFW) that websites can't use. And according to this State Department report: Additionally, the regulation requires Web sites with heavy traffic to use filtering software that makes the user Internet Protocol addresses of those commenting or sharing content publicly visible. The report also says: The law places the burden of proof on the defendant in libel and slander cases, and both defamation and insult are criminal charges. NGOs reported that these laws were used more frequently than in previous years to control the press. Canada is probably a better choice, even if it isn't perfect.

"Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board.

There are two common defenses to defamation (there are others): That what you said is true. That what you said cannot be reasonably interpreted as a factual claim. If after examining the totality of the circumstances, a fact-finder (judge or jury) sees your statement to be an expression of opinion rather than a factual claim about the subject, you would not be found to have defamed the subject. The opinion defence doesn't have a bright line rule. In your example, I think it is clearly on the side of opinion. However, if you were to say something like "Douglas Dunce, Apple's Chief Engineer, has an IQ of 76", that would be almost certainly be deemed a factual claim. The leading case here is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. The court held that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected". Other summaries of this defence: http://www.defamationlawblog.com/2009/01/fact-vs-opinion-setting-the-record-straight/ http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/opinion-defense-remains-str

The Brandenburg Test This is not a "general test" - it's the test that applies. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The first goes to mens rea; that the person intended by their speech to incite lawless action. This is a matter of fact based on conduct before, during and after the speech act. That is, intention can be established by what the speaker said and did before they spoke, while they were speaking and after their speech concluded. The second is based on the speech act itself. Here we have no precedent as to whether the incitement must be explicit (Lady McBeth or Iago) or implicit (Marc Antony): Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction. The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words of incitement are a necessary condition. No doubt, the Court was aware of Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Arguably, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recognized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.

Does the US Fifth Amendment only apply to criminal trials? Do any laws protect a person in civil court when testimony would implicate them in a crime? Suppose someone is accused of burglary. This person is asked to appear in civil court regarding an unrelated event that occurred at the same time as the burglary but in a different location. If the person is pleading the fifth in the criminal proceedings (or plans to), can this person decline to answer questions in the civil court about their whereabouts during the events? Can they answer questions selectively? Does their role in the civil proceedings (witness, defendant, etc.) affect the answer?

The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can & Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment

It is somewhat understated, because your silence can also be used against you. In Salinas v. Texas, defendant Salinas was "just talking" to police, not in custody, and his silence (as opposed to shock and outrage) at the question of whether shell casings found at the crime scene would match his shotgun. This "adoptive admission" was introduced as evidence against him. In order to prevent your silence from being used against you, you must invoke the 5th amendment. There are two exceptions to the rule that you must invoke the 5th to be protected by it. First, a criminal defendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at their own trial. Second, a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes their forfeiture of the privilege involuntary (Miranda). In lieu of coercion, you must preface your silence with an invocation of your 5th amendment rights.

Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.

That will amount to refusal to testify. The judge will warn you that, for a summoned witness, a refusal to testify means contempt of court and you will be asked that question again. After a second "No" you go to jail for contempt of court, and the trial will most likely be adjourned until you make up your mind to answer "Yes".

It does matter if you invoke your right to silence. First, if you do, that affects what police can do (they have to stop interrogating you). Second, it plays a role in "adoptive admissions". If the police are asking you questions (you are not under arrest) and they make some statement that implies that you committed a crime, your silence can be used against you: it can be taken to be a form of admitting that you committed the crime. The premise is that if they imply that you murdered X, such an accusation if false would be so outrageous to a reasonable, innocent person that they would protest, therefore your lack of protest (denial) is tantamount to a confession. However, you can protect yourself by preemptively invoking your right to silence. See Salinas v. Texas: a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it... the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” not an unqualified “right to remain silent.” Since any right can be waived, at any time, there is no magic expression that you can utter that nullifies a future waiver of a Constitutional right. The closest that you can come is asserting that you hereby exercise your right to an attorney and that you will not speak until you have consulted with your attorney (then you better shut up). Lawyering up only prevents them from further interrogating you. Don't hedge: say "I am asserting my right to silence and refuse to speak without a lawyer". "I think I should..." is not a definitive assertion of your rights. If you are (briefly) stopped, police may ask if they can search you or your property. If they have a warrant or probable cause, there's really no point in saying anything. In the case that consent is required, you just have to remember to not consent, and it would not be a bad idea to explicitly deny consent. Each and every time they ask. The same with their statement "It would really help us if you would come to the station to answer a few questions". If you are under arrest, then you have to go with them: ask "Am I free to go?". You can say "I do not consent to any search". Your proposed declaration of rights is pretty vague. Exactly what rights are you talking about? Your right to freedom of religion? Your right to bear arms? Your right to not have to quarter soldiers in your house? Your right to an education? Many detainee statements have been found by the courts to be ineffective because they were unclear. You could give it a shot and see if the Supreme Court accepts your "universal assertion of rights" as effectively invoking your specific 4th and 5th amendment rights. Unless you have something in mind (like, the 6th amendment), the most effective statement is a very specific one. Silence, lawyer, no search.

The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.

Different exclusionary rules have different reasons. Hearsay is frequently inadmissible because it's less reliable for the court to hear Alice saying "Bob told me that Carol hit him" than to hear Bob saying "Carol hit me." Another even more critical problem with hearsay testimony is that the defense cannot cross examine the person who made the statement in court. If Bob is there, the defense can ask questions such as "where did Carol hit you" and "did Carol use her right or left hand" to clarify the testimony or call its veracity into question. Alice, not having been a direct witness to the act, will not be able to respond to many of these questions. united-states Evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right is inadmissible because admitting it amounts to allowing police or prosecutors to violate people's constitutional rights in order to obtain convictions. Not only does an unconstitutional search itself violate the rights of the person being searched, but so does the use of evidence acquired in such a search. See Fruit of the poisonous tree at Wikipedia and the cases linked therein, especially Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States and Nardone v. United States.

In many jurisdictions, there is a "witness fee" that one is required to pay, as a token recognition of the value of a person's time. Fact witnesses can often be obligated to appear and testify, for minimal compensation, but not against themselves. In federal cases, Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to apply to ask the government to pay the witness fee if they cannot afford it and the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense. The other side of a case (in this example, the prosecutor) could try to impeach the witness's testimony (i.e. make him seem less credible in the eyes of the jury) by demonstrating that the witness is a "professional witness" (i.e. fees from saying things in court are a major part of the witness's regular income). That doesn't seem to apply to the facts you've listed, where the witness just happened to be in that place and time to observe what happened and (assuming for this question) accurately testified as to what he saw. Personally paying the police officer or judge for a favorable result is a different question with a different answer.

Drinking and Driving In the state of California, what is the limit of alcohol allowed in bloodstream to be prosecuted under drinking and driving case? And what are the procedures used for intoxication testing (other than breathalyzer) while being pulled over?

According to the California Vehicle Code, the thresholds for driving under the influence are: 0.04% BAC if driving a commercial vehicle 0.01% BAC if under a DUI probation 0.01% BAC if the driver is under the age of 21 0.08% BAC if none of the above cases apply California law permits the blood-alcohol content to be determined through a breath test, a blood test, or in limited circumstances, urinalysis.

California Vehicle Code 23100 asserts (a) Any person who throws any substance at a vehicle or any occupant thereof on a highway is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any person who with intent to do great bodily injury maliciously and willfully throws or projects any rock, brick, bottle, metal or other missile, or projects any other substance capable of doing serious bodily harm at such vehicle or occupant thereof is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. So at the minimum this is a misdemeanor offense. It could be a felony if the accused is found to have intended to do great bodily injury, and that an egg (or whatever else they threw) was capable of it. The basic rationale for the law is that any such act creates a distraction to drivers at the minimum, which creates danger (if someone is surprised by the impact they may suddenly swerve and collide with other vehicles or property; their vision may be obscured and can no longer drive as safely as they should; etc.). And this is just for the literal offense of "throwing something at a vehicle (on a highway = public road)". The act may create other offenses, such as violating littering statutes and creating a hazard. And if the act does result in grave bodily harm or damages, even if they did not intend it, the offender can expect to be held to account and liable for that as well. If anyone dies, they'll be on the line for some form of murder/manslaughter charges, for example.

Yes. This was most recently clarified in Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014). A seizure can be deemed reasonable based on an anonymous tip. The reasonableness analysis is the standard "totality of the circumstances" test and the anonymous tip would usually need to have indicia of reliability.

Generally yes, but it depends on both context and jurisdiction. For example, if you arrived from a different street segment at 4-way stop at the same time as another car, and give a flash to indicate "go ahead," that by itself is not likely to be sustained as sufficient to justify a stop. If you come up close behind another car and flash your high beams as part of aggressive driving (e.g. message "get out of my way") then that may form a key contribution to a justification for pulling you over for aggressive driving. Many states also prohibit use of high beams when other cars are around because they have a tendency to blind other drivers (and blinded drivers are more likely to be in an accident), so if the officer observes you committing that offense it would be probable cause to pull you over for that. Here's an example from NY State where flashing high beams, alone, did not provide probable cause for an officer to pull over a vehicle. NY's law about high beams blinding other drivers specifies that the high-beams have to interfere with the other driver's operation of the vehicle for it to be an offense. See also citations near the end of this decision, which says: The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v. Hines, 155 AD2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 NY2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc 2d 19, 20 [1994]). Also, if you are flashing the police car, the officer may think you are trying to get his/her attention for some reason and that you are initiating a traffic stop. However, do be careful. This driver in Texas flashed his high beams at another car (which turned out to be a police car) because he thought the other car had its high beams on (the officer says it was just a new car; at least two other drivers had apparently flashed the officer for the same reason). The officer then applied the same law that driver was concerned about, forbidding the use of high beams that blind others. The driver was tased, shot, and killed as the officer applied the instant death penalty for his offenses, and the penalty was ruled justified. A dead driver cannot practically contest that stop later on, even though the family might try. See also Headlight Flashing: Legality on Wikipedia.

Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.

england-and-wales In the UK, these are known as summary offences. In England & Wales, they are heard only in the magistrate's court, and they include: low level motoring offences minor criminal damage common assault being drunk and disorderly taking a motor vehicle without consent The Government maintains a spreadsheet with a detailed list of offences, which classifies them as indictable only, either way, summary non-motoring, and summary motoring. Of the summary non-motoring kind, the spreadsheet has 108 entries, though it appears that some of these entries cover multiple offences.

As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.

If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept.

Relicensing software under GPLv2+ without all contributors I have software licensed under GPLv2, which I would like to relicense under GPLv2+. Unfortunately, I an unable to contact some of the contributors. Can I proceed, or am I stuck?

Since licensing can only be done by the copyright holder, you generally need individual permission from each copyright holder to change the license of their code. (If the project is being re-licensed to the GPL from a compatible license, then no re-licensing from the copyright holder is necessary; however, versions 2 and 3 of the GPL are not compatible with one another.) Ways around this are: Remove or replace all code written by the unreachable contributors. Have contributors assign copyright to a person or legal entity that controls the project, so that there is exactly one copyright holder. (This is a preventive measure. If you have not done this already, it's too late when you cannot track down a contributor.) But if you can't do either of those things, what do you do? Historically, re-licensing of software without explicit approval from all contributors has been done before, under the advice of legal professionals. However, the legal mechanics of it are unclear and have never been tested in court. The two prominent examples appear to be: Mozilla relicensed from the MPL to a triple-licensed MPL/GPL/LGPL scheme The Dolphin emulator relicensed from GPLv2 to GPLv2+. The Dolphin project produced a report about the process, but it lacks any specifics about how the legal mechanics of the switch work. They say (emphasis mine): Out of all [200 contributors], we managed to contact all or take care of the code of all but 10 of those developers. Considering that many of those accounts are now dead and the people seemingly vanished from the Internet, finding the rest is akin to squeezing blood out of a stone. That's when research provided us some much needed relief when it seemed as though relicensing was an impossibility. In 2003, Free Software lawyers consulted for Mozilla's relicensing project and stated that relicensing with the permission of just 95% of contributors was fine, as long as there were no objections in the remaining 5%. [...] [...] Instead of simply asking all of our active developers and relicensing, we made a very strong effort to get a hold of every single developer. Despite this, it simply wasn't feasible to make contact with every single person who worked on Dolphin. [...] We definitely would love to hear support from those that we were unable to contact, and if there are any concerns we will gladly address them in a prompt fashion. That posts links to a post from Ciaran O'Riordan: Someone who works with many lawyers on free software copyright issues later told me that it is not necessary to get permission from 100% of the copyright holders. It would suffice if there was permission from the copyright holders of 95% of the source code and no objections from the holders of the other 5%. This, I’m told, is how Mozilla was able to relicense to the GPL in 2003 despite years of community contributions. There is no information available about why Mozilla's lawyers believed it was acceptable to re-license without each copyright holder's permission. It's also unclear if any factors apply to Mozilla specifically that might apply less strongly to anyone else in a similar situation. In sum, we know only that: You need the permission of every contributing copyright holder to re-license a work Mozilla's lawyers believed (for unspecified reasons) it would be acceptable for Mozilla to make a good-faith effort to contract all contributors and then re-license, even if 5% of the contributors were unreachable (and none of the contributors disapproved).

What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.

You can replace the software on the device The supplier does not have to help you to do so You are correct that because you own the device, you can do what you like with it. That means you can install whatever firmware or other software on it that you like. However, the supplier does not have to provide this to you or assist you in any other way.

It depends on the warranty itself. Here is one warranty, which only protects against manufacturing defects and excludes any software issues (whether pre-installed or user-installed). I'm a little surprised that a manufacturer is willing to include someone else's software under their warranty. This also excludes failure or damage resulting from misuse, abuse, accident, modification, unsuitable physical or operating environment, natural disasters, power surges, improper maintenance, or use not in accordance with product information materials failure of, or damage caused by, any third party products, including those that X may provide or integrate into the X product at your request This does not say "If you change the OS, you void the warranty". But, if you change the OS and that causes hardware damage, that voids the warranty. The next question is, what evidence do you have that the problem is a manufacturing problem rather than a consequence of changing the OS. They would have to answer the same question in court. It is legally absurd to claim that you have to prove that it is logically impossible that you contributed to the problem, you only have to prove by a preponderance of evidence, when you take them to court. The burden of proof rests on the person who makes a claim. You claim that the product was defective, now you must prove it. But you don't have to prove it to the standard of absolute ccertainty.

Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.

As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.

In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.

Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.

Do you have to obey English-only traffic signs in Toronto? Canada is bilingual, yet some major metros like the Greater Toronto Area have all of their traffic signs in English only, without a French duplicate. Is this legal or not? Do you have to respect such signs, e.g. no turn Mon-Fri, or are they effectively informational only? What if you don't even speak any French?

Edit: There is a forum that discusses the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, and this is apparently a question that gets asked a lot. To sum up the discussion, because of O.Reg 615 of the French Language Services Act, there is a possibility that you can challenge uniligual signs in French service regions like Toronto. The reality is, Toronto never adopted the option to make all traffic signs bilingual. Quoting someone who posted in the forum who tried to challenge a sign without french and lost the case: "...the prosecutor argued that City of Toronto never approval or adopted this bilingual option. He further mentioned that the City has appealed and won the case from the superior court." From the Highway Traffic Act: HTA OREG 615 52. A municipality situated in an area designated by the French Language Services Act is not required to comply with the sign requirements for such areas unless it (Municipality) has passed a by-law under section 14 of that Act. So the answer appears to be yes, you have to obey English-only signs in Toronto. You may be able to challenge signs in other areas of Ontario, but only if a municipality has passed a by-law under section 14 of the French Language Services Act. Yes, you have to obey all posted signs. Depending on the region, you could make an argument that the sign must be updated to include french, but it is unlikely you could argue that you were not required to obey it in most places. Canada is bilingual at the federal level, so all federal services must make their signs bilingual, but the provinces of Canada are not all bilingual. The laws will change from province to province, Quebec for example is technically unilingual French, so they are not required to put english on their signs, but regardless of which province you are in, you must obey all posted signs. There are a number of provinces that are unilingual English, I grew up in British Columbia, there aren't any French or bilingual signs out here except for in National Parks and on government buildings. I couldn't carry a conversation in French if my life depended on it, not many people out here could, and the ones that can mostly moved here from Quebec. Ontario has the French Language Services Act, which requires all government services (not just federal) to be offered in french if the francophone population meets a certain threshold. The areas in blue in the image below represent areas that provide french services, the dark blue indicates that the entire region is required to offer french services, the light blue indicate areas that have communities that offer french services. Toronto is a designated french services municipality, so technically, the sign probably should be bilingual, but the fact that it is not does not give you justification to break the law. Like I already said, you could file a complaint and have the city update the sign, but you're not likely to get away with a traffic violation based on the fact that the sign wasn't bilingual.

You did not state a jurisdiction, but this sign is of the style specified by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) which is used throughout the United States, so I will assume a jurisdiction which follows the MUTCD. The "Share the Road" sign is numbered W16-1P. (The MUTCD version just has the words and not the car/bike symbols; the latter might be a recent update or a local variation.) Its description reads: In situations where there is a need to warn drivers to watch for other slower forms of transportation traveling along the highway, such as bicycles, golf carts, horse-drawn vehicles, or farm machinery, a SHARE THE ROAD (W16-1P) plaque (see Figure 2C-12) may be used. So, as is generally the case for yellow warning signs, it does not have any effect on the laws which apply. (It is generally only white regulatory signs that do that.) Whether or not it is a "good idea" to share a lane, it is legal. Both cars and bikes are entitled to use the road, and if it's a road with only one lane in this direction of travel, then necessarily they must share it. Of course, they wouldn't typically travel side by side indefinitely, but they will be abreast briefly when a car passes a bike. California law, as an example, requires only that the car stay at least three feet away from the bicycle as it passes, when possible.

I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.

If we cut through all the entertaining colour commentary around Bob's experience then all that happened is TfL refused him permission to carry a specific item and according to the TfL Conditions of Carriage: 9.2 Staff can refuse permission for you to take any item onto our services. For example, you may be prevented from taking a bicycle on DLR services during the London Marathon. So the rules around the times when non-folding bikes are permitted on the Overground not withstanding there's a catch-all rule which allows them to refuse specific items on specific occasions for whatever reason they want. What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, Realistically - none. The refusal may be harsh - but there's plenty of room in the conditions of carriage to allow it. A supervisor concealing his identity may be annoying but it's not illegal, nor is being rude. the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? Probably nothing doing here either - the BTP aren't for what Bob's trying to use them for. I doubt they'd actually pursue Bob for wasting police time unless he makes a habit of doing it, but they've got a point. They're not the complaints department for TfL! It's like calling the police because McDonalds won't serve you at the drive through.

It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.

No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket.

First, what the law says about "right of way" is who has to yield (nobody "has the right of way"). Vehicles always must yield to pedestrians. One of the principles is that you are to yield to the guy who gets there first -- if the guy on your left gets to the intersection first, you must yield to him. If you arrive at the same time, the guy on the left yields (at least in the US). The rationale is that there has to be a convention for deciding who must wait when two people want to occupy the same space in the intersection. That isn't what you are describing. You can turn left and he can turn right at the same time, and no collision should result. The other general rule is that you can turn only when it is safe to do so. If you can't see traffic coming from the left or from the right, then you can't turn. If the guy on the right is blocking your view of the right and you are blocking his view of the left, you will have to find some other social means of deciding who gets out of the way, the law doesn't help you.

The NHTSA gives rules for the United States. Right of way goes to the first person to stop. So if a line of cars were at both stop signs, and all cars wanted to make the same conflicting turns, they would alternate. If the opposing cars stop at the same time then the one turning right has the right of way. (This is because a right turn falls under the "Straight Traffic Goes First" rule.)

Earliest Law Review In what year was the first student-edited law review published, and which institution was it published by? For this question consider a law review to be: "[a] periodic publication of most law schools containing lead articles on topical subjects by law professors, judges or attorneys, and case summaries by law review member-students." -- Black's Law Dictionary 887 (6th ed. 1990).

The first student-edited law review was The Albany Law School Journal - of Albany Law School - which was published for only one year, in 1875. The first student-edited law review was the Albany Law School Journal, which lasted only one year, through 1875. This law review contained articles, Moot Court arguments, and a calendar of law school events. The first issue included a student commentary that questioned whether after a lecture it was better for a student to read the cases discussed in the lecture or to read treatises on the topic discussed. The journal was eventually succeeded by The Albany Law Review (in 1936), which proudly trumpets its heritage: Albany Law School was the first institution to produce a student edited legal periodical. During the academic year of 1875—1876, a student run group, lead by then Editor-in-Chief Isaac Grant Thompson, published the Albany Law School Journal. Although closer to a legal newspaper than a traditional academic law review, the Albany Law School Journal has been hailed as a precursor to the first academic law review published by Harvard Law School in 1887. Editor-in-Chief Thompson described the journal as a “medium of conveying to the profession of the country the latest intelligence of interest on all subjects pertaining to the law,” and he solicited “brief contributions on legal topics, notes of decisions, and items of general legal news.” The Albany Law School Journal was published weekly and mainly consisted of law school updates, announcements, and news. There was, however, a substantive component to the Albany Law School Journal. Each publication contained brief summaries of important recent decisions of the New York courts. Also, the journal contained primitive versions of the student note, a major component of many modern law review publications. For example, one student discusses in detail recent arguments on the power of the states under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments “to cut off the right of suffrage of any person for certain reasons.”

The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes).

The general rule is that the author of the software owns the copyright, so that would be the student. This is regardless of whether the student writes the code for fun, or for a thesis. If a student is hired to write that code, then it kind of depends on the university rules, and who hires the student. In the case of a "work for hire", the employer owns the copyright. However, it is non-trivial to determine whether that principle is applicable in the case of a student hired by the university. In part, it depends on which country this is in because work for hire laws are not exactly the same everywhere, and in part it depends on the details of the employment my a university. In a typical US institution RA appointment, it would come down to university policy – some universities declare that copyright in all student-written software is retained by the student. You would need to look for something resembling an "IP Policy" – here is a sample, note that such policies are subject to revision.

Only in California. The First Amendment provides a student essentially no protection from discipline by a private university. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) ("The text and original meaning of those Amendments, as well as this Court's longstanding precedents, establish that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit private abridgment of speech."); Vaynberg v. Seton Hall Univ., No. CIV.A. 09-4999 FSH, 2010 WL 4510904, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2010) ("In order for the First Amendment to apply, the challenged conduct must be deemed 'state action.' Seton Hall is a private, Catholic university. ... Because there is no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Seton Hall's conduct relevant to this lawsuit was “state action,” Seton Hall is entitled to summary judgment.") Some states, however, have passed laws requiring private schools to provide some of the protections of the First Amendment. The most robust of these is California's Leonard Law, which essentially requires private schools to adhere to the First Amendment. Other states also recognize some measure of free-speech rights for students at private institutions. For instance, both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts have held that their state constitutions' free-speech clauses (which, unlike the First Amendment, say nothing about the government) protected peaceful protesters who distributed leaflets on the campuses of private colleges.

This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements.

The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.

Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study

In most countries, there is a standard format for citations. The guiding principle behind these is to make it easy to verify the law says what you claim it says. So you only need to give information needed to find the law you are citing. Usually, citations go the opposite of your example -- they start with the most general reference, and get more specific. Also, most citations only give information for sections that are numbered or lettered. Unless sentences are numbered or lettered, I would not cite them. For example, to find something in the US code, we need to know the: Title/Chapter/Section/subsection...and so on. For example, the federal law prohibiting the ownership of machine guns is in US Code, Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Ch 44 Firearms, § 922 Unlawful Acts subsection (o)(1). Since sections are numbered consecutively, we usually leave out the chapter: 18 USC § 922(o)(1). In Ukraine, it appears law is organized into Codes, Chapters, Articles and Sections. Since Articles are numbered consecutively, we can leave out the Chapters. Thus, the citation for the definition of murder would be Ukrainian Criminal Code, Art 115 § 1. Caveat: I am not an expert in Ukrainian law and may be wrong on some details, so you should look at some Ukrainian legal sources to double check.

Intra-community civil actions in the EU 'A' (in an EU member state) contracts with 'B' (in another member state) who then breaches the contract. Can 'A' sue 'B' under some harmonised community-wide procedure? If not, in which state does 'A' bring his action (if not stated in the contract)?

For the first question, assuming EU legislation being applicable here, EU regulation No 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006 on creating a European order for payment procedure may be relevant, foreseeing a unified procedure for payment claims. On the second one, the answer is likely to be found in EU regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. This regulation has in its Article 4 a general rule (persons domiciled in a Member State shall [..] be sued in the courts of that Member State) but of course also several exceptions to this rule. A relevant exception here is contained in Article 7: In matters relating to a contract, the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question are competent.

One of the conditions for a contract to be enforceable is that its undertakings must be legal. This would mean that you cannot, contractually, be indemnified for murder - at least, not in any jurisdiction where homicide is illegal.

If you dispute the assertion, yes At this point the company has made an unevidenced assertion. You can either accept that assertion or dispute it. The exact dispute resolution terms will matter if you do dispute it but, notwithstanding, they will all necessitate that each party provide some evidence to support their position. That will either convince the decision maker (you in a negotiation or mediation; someone else in an arbitration or court) or it won’t. In a determinative forum like an arbitration or court since they are relying on the assertion, they have the burden of proving it on the balance of probabilities. In this case, they would have to prove the transformer failed, that it failed because of the weather and that that event falls within the scope of the specific force majeure clause.

Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them.

I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B.

Did I lose possession of my goods? That seems unlikely. But enforcing it sounds complicated, at least from the standpoint of substantive law (the Code civil). I am not knowledgeable of French procedural law. The difficulty begins with identifying whether your claim is cognizable as unjust enrichment, or --per your subsequent oral agreement-- breach of contract. You might want to read sections "The French Law of Unjust Enrichment" and "Enrichissement sans Cause" in this post. Please note that the French Civil Code recently underwent significant reforms, whence references of its articles are likely outdated. Here I pointed out one example of statutory renumbering in the Code. In the second link, you will read that originally [...] the action in enrichissement sans cause would not be available to the claimant if he or she had any other cause of action, even if that cause of action was blocked for some reason. [...] [B]ut it is perhaps here that the law has relaxed most in recent cases. Thus, the subtleties of your matter can be decisive for identifying the type of claim that is applicable to your situation. Lastly, according to this treatise (on p.54), "[t]he French legal system does not have the principle of [reasonable] reliance as it exists in the American legal system" (brackets added). That makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove his claims under French law.

"There's no ... contract" - wrong! The emails are the contract, see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If you didn't agree on which laws will apply then that is a matter for the court to determine. In general, they will tend to look at where the bulk of the work was done - since you are being charged I assume the work was done in the UK so probably UK law applies, noting that the UK is actually 3 different jurisdictions (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). That said, many jurisdictions have non-excludable laws around contracts, particularly consumer contracts that apply irrespective of the substantial law applying to the contract. It is therefore possible that you apply English contract law subject to, for example, Australian Consumer Law. Usually any consumer protection law in the vendor's jurisdiction will also apply. General contract law dictates that where a price was not agreed a reasonable price must be paid. If its reasonable that the editing should have been included in the original price charged then you don't have to pay more but if it isn't then you have to pay a reasonable amount for it. There is generally no requirement for estimates or any other method of determining the price - you just have to do what's reasonable. However, consumer protection law generally imposes more obligations on a business than general contract law. It is likely that your contract is ambiguous - courts will endeavor to fill in any ambiguities to make the contract work. techniques include read in implied terms to give "business efficiency", from custom or business usage (e.g. if particular industries typically deal with particular issues in particular ways), from previous dealings (i.e. what the parties have done in the past), from statutes, whatever works to resolve uncertain, meaningless or ambiguous terms, from the express words used or from the nature of the contract or from the common intention of the parties (i.e. the court might ask you what you meant). "Breach of contract" is a very broad term - it simply means that one of the parties hasn't done what they were required to do and allows the other party to sue for damages.

NO (mostly). Servitude means that the employer, or owner of the indenture, or whatever, can use physical force to make the indentee carry out the work given. If the indentee runs away they can be arrested and forcibly returned. This is distinct from the law of contracts. If Alice agrees to provide labour for Bob and subsequently fails to fulfil the contract then Alice may have to pay damages, but that is all. Even in cases of crminial fraud where Alice never meant to provide the labour in the first place, the penalty is defined by law, and would not be the provision of the contracted labour. As the OP notes, military service is generally an indenture-style contract; desertion is a crime. However the other party in that case is the government acting under law rather than a third party acting in their own self-interest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits all forms of servitude.

The difference between libel and slander I've heard people use the terms libel and slander interchangeably, but I know that they are different in the eyes of the law. What are the defining characteristics of each?

From http://grammarist.com/usage/libel-slander/: (emphasis mine) Libel is the use of false, defamatory claims about someone in written or printed form. Slander likewise denotes false statements that damage a person’s reputation, but it is committed orally or in any other transient form So a false claim satisfying the definition of defamation would be libel if written (including on the Internet, per Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino), and slander if made in a transient form.

In practice, almost certainly not. A defamatory statement, in the context of a public figure, is a statement of fact about a person that tends to hurt their reputation, stated with an intent that the factual statement is to be understood by the audience as true, that the person making the statement knows to be false or makes with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. (This is the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard.) The case law of defamation, moreover, applies a sophisticated reading of the alleged defamatory statement that takes into account the subtleties of advanced ways of using language and not mere a crabbed or unduly literal reading of the allegedly defamatory statement. Pretty much every statement of fact made by the Babylon Bee, a satirical publication akin to the more familiar publication The Onion is not intended to be read as a non-fictional, fact checked account of actual facts. It is inherently a periodical that publishes fictional parodies. The context of the whole page which a comment indicates drives the question, also really has to be taken into account as a whole, in particular, is so patently absurd and obviously false, that the claim there the publication is sincerely making a statement about facts in real life is easily overcome. An image of the page is as follows: Taken as a whole, the actual intent of the series of posts is to make fun of Biden's political opponents who baselessly compare Biden to Hitler when the comparison is not warranted, and not to harm Biden's reputation at all, in a subtle diss of his histrionic conservative critics, not Biden himself. Also, comparisons to Hitler have a strong component of opinion to them in most cases, and the bar for finding that a public figure like the U.S. President, in the context of a politically commentary in satire form has been defamed is extremely high. While it might be possible to imagine some very specific fact pattern that could overcome this legal standard (especially if it hit upon the personal non-official conduct of the President in some way completely unrelated to his official duties, which it is hard to imagine a Hitler comparison being), in practice, it just wouldn't happen.

So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other.

Yes Loss of income that is directly attributable to a loss of reputation can be part of the damages in a libel case. However, the plaintiff must prove the connection, must show that had the libel and the resulting loss of reputation not occurred, the income would have been received. This can be hard to establish. Testimony from specific people who say that they would have hired the plaintiff or done business with the plaintiff but for the libel is a common way to establish this kind of damage. Showing a sudden drop of income after the libel can also help such a case. And of course, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of libel: (in the US) a negative factual statement, communicated to others, the falsity of the statement, and a resulting loss of reputation.

Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.

Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this.

There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.

Defamatory and offensive are not the same “He is a child molester” is defamatory and illegal (unless he is, of course). “She is a two-faced f___ing b___h with the morals of an alley cat and the integrity of a politician” is offensive and legal. Neither is a crime.

What rights do foreigners have when the CBP wants to search their laptop? Since laptop and other electronic device seizures at US borders became legal without a warrant (including making copies of data), 7% of ACTE's business travelers reported being subject to a seizure as far back as February 2008. Recently U.S. District Judge Amy B. Jackson has issued the government a long overdue smack-down in this regard. While her ruling is based on the particularly egregious circumstances of this case (waiting for someone to leave in order to get around a warrant, seizing the laptop without searching it and transporting it to be imaged and forensically analyzed, the flimsy tip, and the lack of any allegation of a current crime), she resoundingly rejects CBP’s assertion that it needs no suspicion to do whatever it wants at the border regarding digital devices. Americans can plead the Fourth Amendment, but what can foreigners do?

Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.

I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.

Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.

According to the ACLU, there are certain questions you have to answer when entering the US, and in some states you may have to identify yourself when stopped and told to identify yourself. Nonimmigrant non-citizen may be required to answer questions about immigrant status posed by an immigration officer. Otherwise, you are not required to answer questions by police. A judge can order you to answer questions, but the police cannot. Also, "obstruction of justice" covers things such as destroying evidence, assaulting a process server, communicating with a juror, and can cover investigative demands by prosecutors, but not being uncooperative with police.

As I read the hypothetical facts in the linked question Bob has not filed a suit against Big Co, because no law firm is willing and able to handle such a suit (which I find unlikely). BigCo has not filed a suit against Bob, perhaps because it does not want to draw attention to Bob's claims. So there is no suit in progress. If this is true, no court has jurisdiction of the case, indeed there is no case in a legal sense. No US Court will reach out to take a case that no one has filed, and if one attempted to do so, I strongly suspect this would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments, depending on whether it was a Federal or State court. If it were a Federal court, this would also violate the "Case or controversy" provision. I can't find any report of any US court that has tried to do anything of the sort, so there is no case law to cite about the outcome of such an attempt. If i have misunderstood the question, and either Bob or BigCo has in fact filed a suit, and some court has jurisdiction of it, then the situation is quite different. In that case a court can restrict publication of statements that might be likely to result in jury prejudice and deny one party's right to a fair trial. However such orders are strongly disfavored. A court must demonstrate by findings of fact in the gag order that impairment to a fair trial is likely, and that he proposed order is the narrowest possible means of ensuring a fair trial, and that less restrictive methods, such as change of venue, a sequestered jury, or careful examination of potential jurors, cannot achieve this goal. It must also show that the order is the least restrictive order that will achieve the goal. If such findings are not included with the order, they order may be overturned promptly by a higher court on motion of either party, or of any third party (such as a news organization) affected by it. The situation as described seems implausible.

Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.

You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

Under what circumstances am I obliged to show ID to a police officer? In the UK, if a police constable stops you on the street and asks for your ID, when are you required by law to give it to them? Must there be reasonable suspicion of a crime? What about if you're driving and get pulled over; are you obliged to show your driving licence and/or ID? Does it make a difference whether it's a random stop or if you were speeding, e.g.?

People in the UK (who are not subject to immigration control or other restrictions) do not have to carry any form of identification. This doesn't answer all parts of your question, but s164 Road Traffic Act 1988 is appropriate to the part about driving. a person driving a motor vehicle on a road ... must, on being so required by a constable or vehicle examiner, produce his licence and its counterpart1 for examination, so as to enable the constable or vehicle examiner to ascertain the name and address of the holder of the licence, the date of issue, and the authority by which they were issued. (s164(1)) So it makes no difference why you were stopped: a constable or traffic offiver can demand production of your licence if you were driving. The same power exists if you're suspected of having caused an accident or committed an offence, even if you're not driving at the time of the production demand. Non-production is an offence: If a person required under the preceding provisions of this section to produce a licence and its counterpart ... fails to do so he is, subject to subsections (7) to (8A) below, guilty of an offence. (s164(6)) However, it is a defence to produce the licence (or a receipt for a licence) within seven days of the demand (s164(7-8)). In practice, the officer will give you a 'producer' requiring you to present your licence at a police station within seven days, after which you will be guilty of the non-production offence. The implication of this is that it is not required that you carry your licence; merely that you have it available to produce within seven days. 1 Presumably the reference to 'counterpart' will go away when the counterpart is abolished on 8th June 2015.

No Besides this being clearly unworkable, the requirements for the state providing public defense attorneys include being in need (you will need to provide an affadavit or similar to the effect) and when the defendant is at risk of significant time of confinement. The 5 to 15 minutes of the traffic or Terry stop are not considered significant. Nor are the processing times of arresting you and taking you in. Trying to make the officer provide you with an attorney (or declaring you aren't doing anything without one) before complying with their orders may well result in your incarceration and subsequent assignment of a public defender.

There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around.

Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much.

Regarding being pulled over, the guidance at Learn to drive a car: step by step states (emphasis mine): If a police officer asks you to, you must be able to show: your driving licence a valid insurance certificate a valid MOT certificate (if your vehicle needs one) If you don’t have the documents with you at the time, you may be asked to take them to a police station within 7 days.

Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)

Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.

Is there any way to bring a criminal case before the grand jury without the support of the Prosecuting Attorney? Is there any way to present a case to the grand jury if the prosecuting attorney is unwilling to do so?

To answer the first question, the answer seems to be "generally not." In federal courts, this is explicitly not allowed -- rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the only people who can be present before a grand jury are government lawyers, the witness being questioned, interpreters, and a court reporter In state courts, the rules vary by state. However, again, private citizens are generally either completely not allowed to act as prosecutors, or are only allowed to act as prosecutors in a restricted set of situations and subject to the ultimate control of public prosecutors. For instance, in Virginia (which allows private prosecutors), the private prosecutor can't speak in front of a grand jury, initiate a criminal case, or participate in a decision to dismiss charges (page 23). In New Hampshire, private prosecution is limited to misdemeanors with no possibility of jail time, and again the state can dismiss charges (page 8). Rhode Island, like New Hampshire, allows private prosecution for misdemeanors but lets the state dismiss charges (page 11). The justification for allowing the state to dismiss charges is generally "prosecution is inherently a governmental task, so the government must retain ultimate control."

The plea is entered before the trial. The concession of guilt happens during trial: the lawyer acknowledges that the defendant did the crime, but argues that it should be overlooked in some way. For example, Nixon dealt with a death-penalty case where the lawyer's strategy was to admit during the trial that the defendant had killed the victim, but to use the trial to persuade them that the circumstances did not call for the death penalty. You don't get to make those arguments if you enter a guilty plea, which would then strip you of your right to a jury.

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

The rules of criminal procedure are going to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In US federal court, for example, a criminal trial in absentia can happen, but only in limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. A notable example of a defendant not appearing for a federal criminal case is the recent case, arising from the Mueller probe, against Concord Management and Consulting LLC (a Russian entity).

So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.

You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.

It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.

No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that.

How to prevent/protect my rights to content I write (US) I live in the US and do writing of my own in various forms ranging from blog posts to content for handouts and trainings I might want to resell at some point in the future. What steps I should take to legally protect the content I write so that it isn't taken and sold elsewhere later on? Are there additional things I should be thinking about before, during and after writing this content?

Internationally, according to the Berne Convention, "copyrights for creative works are automatically in force upon their creation without being asserted or declared" (Wikipedia). However, in the United States, you can register your work with the US Copyright Office to receive additional protection and benefits, such as (if you promptly register) being granted statutory damages and attorney’s fees in case of infringement.

Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.

In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.

Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always

I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!

I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it.

Yes. For example, corporations can own copyright. They may own copyright after assignment (this is true across much of the commonwealth and in the U.S.). In some jurisdictions, when a work is made for hire, the employer may be deemed the author and initial owner (e.g. U.S.) or just the initial owner (e.g. Canada).

If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal.