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(Declaratory Relief) 110. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 109 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 111. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Belifusa.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Belifusa.com, which LG owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 112. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, LG Household and Health Care America, Inc., controls and operates Belifusa.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Belifusa.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to learn about the Defendant’s unique skincare products, learn about the ingredients, read reviews, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Belifusa.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with LG on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to learn about the different skincare products and make purchases; and (c) learning about the products and their ingredients, read reviews, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of LG’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Belifusa.com. Due to LG’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Belifusa.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to LG, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Belifusa.com. 29. LG denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Belifusa.com by preventing them from freely navigating Belifusa.com. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Belifusa.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Belifusa.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 33. Furthermore, Belifusa.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Belifusa.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Belifusa.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Belifusa.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Belifusa.com. 36. Due to Belifusa.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Belifusa.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Belifusa.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Belifusa.com. 38. Plaintiff, Linda Slade, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Belifusa.com, most recently on November 23, 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Belifusa.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase “The True Cream – Aqua Bomb.” 39. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Belifusa.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 40. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Belifusa.com. 41. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 42. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Belifusa.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Belifusa.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 45. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Belifusa.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Belifusa.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 46. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 48. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Belifusa.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Belifusa.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Belifusa.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Belifusa.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 49. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims LG has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Belifusa.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 51. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 52. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 53. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 54. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 55. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 57. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Belifusa.com. 58. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 60. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 62. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of LG who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Belifusa.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Belifusa.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 66. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 69 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 71. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 72. Belifusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 73. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Belifusa.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 74. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Belifusa.com, causing Belifusa.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 77. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Belifusa.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 82. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 84 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 87. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 89. Belifusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 90. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Belifusa.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Belifusa.com, causing Belifusa.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 94. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 95. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 97. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 98. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 97 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.

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12. Plaintiff brings these claims on behalf of the following class pursuant to Rule 1708 of Pennsylvania Civil Procedure. The Class consists of all individuals to whom Defendant enrolled in automatic payment schemes without their prior authorization or consent in an attempt to collect upon any debt. 13. Excluded from the class is Defendant HH&L as well as their past and present officers, employees, agents or affiliates, any judge who presides over this action, and any attorneys who enter their appearance in this action. 14. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand, limit, modify, or amend the class definitions, including the addition of one or more subclasses, in connection with his motion for class certification, or at any other time, based on, among other things, changing circumstances and new facts obtained during discovery. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of a well- defined public interest in this litigation: 17. Numerosity – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, the members of Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all class members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons where Defendant has utilized the abovementioned false, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable means in an attempt to collect a debt. 18. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those individuals to whom Defendant has enrolled in automatic payment schemes without their prior knowledge, consent, or authorization. 19. Commonality – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2). This action involves questions of law and fact that are common to the class members. Such common questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant’s actions of enrolling Plaintiff in an automatic payment scheme without their prior knowledge, authorization or consent constituted a false and deceptive means in an attempt to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA. 21. Adequacy of Representation – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the other class members Plaintiff seeks to represent; Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation; Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously; and Plaintiff’s counsel has adequate financial means to vigorously pursue this action and ensure the interests of the classes will not be harmed. Furthermore, the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected and represented by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel. 22. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs, above, as if fully set forth at length herein. 23. There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy. 15 U.S.C. 1692(a). 24. The purpose of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 25. Jimmie Hilliard is a “consumer” as defined by § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 26. HH&L is a “debt collector” as defined by § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA. 28. The Third Circuit has held that the FDCPA is to be enforced by private attorney generals. Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 345 (3d. Cir. 2004). 29. Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: … (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA. 30. On August 5, 2019, September 10, 2019, September 24, 2019, October 30, 2019, December 10, 2019, and January 8, 2020, HH&L, Mr. Hilliard made $30.00 payments to HH&L in order to settle the abovementioned debt. See Exhibit “B”. 31. On January 16, 2020, Jimmie Hilliard discovered that HH&L had enrolled him in an automatic payment scheme without Mr. Hilliard’s prior knowledge, authorization or consent. 33. Section 1692d of the FDCPA provides, in relevant part: “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 34. Here, the only natural consequence of HH&L’s acts of willfully communicating credit information which was known to be false was to harass, oppress, and abuse Jimmie Hilliard. 35. As such, HH&L’s conduct, as set forth above, violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d of the 38. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs, above, as if fully set forth at length herein. 40. The party need not establish either irreparable harm or immediate relief and a court “may issue a final injunction if such relief is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is no adequate redress at law.” Berwick Twp. v. O’Brien, 148 A.3d 872, 891 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) citing Buffalo Twp. at 663. 41. A party must also show greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. Berwick Twp. v. O'Brien, 148 A.3d 872, 891 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 42. In the case at hand, Plaintiff possesses clear rights to relief through §§ 1692d, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692k of the FDCPA. 43. HH&L affirmatively employed false and misleading representations in clear violation of the FDCPA by enrolling Mr. Hilliard in an autopayment scheme without his prior knowledge, authorization or consent. 44. This course of conduct constituted a false and misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt thus violating §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692d of the FDCPA. 45. In the case at hand, a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent the legal wrongdoing of HH&L. 5. On July 17, 2019, Midland Funding, through HH&L, filed a Civil Complaint against Jimmie Hilliard in Magisterial District Court at Docket Number: MJ-38125-CV-0000114- 2019. A true and correct copy of the Docket is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked as Exhibit “A”. 6. On September 5, 2019, a Civil Action Hearing was held before the Honorable James Gallagher, Magisterial District Judge. See Exhibit “A”. 7. On September 10, 2019, at the conclusion of the Civil Action hearing, Judge Gallagher granted a JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF in favor of Capital One Bank and against Jimmie Hilliard. See Exhibit “A”. 8. On September 24, 2019, Jimmie Hilliard began making monthly payments to HH&L in order to settle the abovementioned alleged objection. A true and correct copy of Jimmie Hilliard’s online banking statement is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and marked as Exhibit PERMANENT INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE LAW OFFICES OF HAYT, HAYT, OF LANDAU FROM CREATING FALSE AUTOPAYMENT ARRANGEMENT VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

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17. Sterling is among the largest of the nation’s employment background screening companies, i.e., those that provide “consumer reports,” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B), to prospective employers and employers. 18. Sterling investigates and reviews public records and private databases and assembles and/or maintains consumer files which contain information concerning, among other things, the alleged criminal, credit and employment history of individuals. 19. From its files, Sterling sells background consumer reports to potential employers (such as Defendants State Street, HMG, and HCL) wishing to screen applicants for employment. According to its website, Sterling “is the world’s largest company focused entirely on background checks.” http://www.sterlingbackcheck.com/About /Company-Profile.aspx. 21. State Street, HMG, and/or HCL use Sterling’s screening services to conduct background checks on applicants for employment. The background reports resulting from these services are delivered directly to State Street. Upon information and belief, State Street, HMG, and/or HCL use Sterling’s scoring services. 22. Sterling is also a “user” of consumer reports, in that it obtains consumer reports from other consumer reporting agencies, such as Trans Union, LLC, and incorporates them into its background checks which it uses to adjudicate candidates for employment. See Goode v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 532, 542-43 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (consumer reporting agency can be liable as user of consumer reports). 23. Under the FCRA, a “user” of a consumer report, such as Sterling, State Street, HMG, and HCL may not lawfully obtain any background consumer report on any prospective job applicant, or “consumer” as used in the FCRA, unless “a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis supplied). 25. Each Defendant knew or should have known that its failure to provide a stand-alone disclosure was a violation of the FCRA because the statutory language of section 1681b(b)(2)(A) was pellucidly clear that no one may procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless “a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely1 of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis supplied). 27. Numerous courts interpreting the FCRA have found FTC opinion letters persuasive. See, e.g., Owner–Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. USIS Commercial, 537 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008); Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2006). See also, Gager v. Dell Financial Services, LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271-72 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (affording some deference to Federal Communication Commission analysis and finding it persuasive in interpreting Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 28. Further, a “user” of a consumer report, such as State Street, HMG, HCL, and Sterling who intends to take any “adverse action” against a job applicant “based in whole or in part” on information obtained from the consumer report must provide notice of that fact to the consumer job applicant, and must include with the notice a copy of the consumer report and a notice of the consumer’s dispute rights under the FCRA, before taking the adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 29. State Street, HMG, HCL, and Sterling each systematically fail to send any notice, copy of a consumer report, or a notice of consumers’ FCRA rights before taking adverse employment action on the basis of consumer reports. 31. A primary reason that Congress required that a person intending to take an adverse action based on information in a consumer report provide the report to the consumer before taking the adverse action is so the consumer has time to review the report and dispute information that may be inaccurate, or discuss the report with the prospective employer before adverse action is taken. See Federal Trade Commission letter dated December 18, 1997 to Harold R. Hawkey, Esq. (“[T]he clear purpose of the provision to allow consumers to discuss reports with employers or otherwise respond before adverse action is taken.”). 32. Numerous courts interpreting the FCRA have found FTC opinion letters persuasive. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. USIS Commercial, 537 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008); Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271-72 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (affording some deference to Federal Communication Commission analysis and finding it persuasive in interpreting Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 34. The reasons for the “pre-adverse action notice” requirement with regard to employment situations are to alert the consumer job applicant that he or she is about to experience an adverse action, such as a rejection, based on a report’s contents, and to provide him or her an opportunity to challenge the accuracy, completeness or relevancy of the information with the consumer reporting agency or the user before that job prospect or job is lost. The Facts Pertaining to Class Representative Plaintiff Andres Abreu 35. Plaintiff Andres Abreu applied for employment with State Street through HMG and HCL as a desktop support engineer in early September 2014, and was interviewed via a video conference call. 36. In connection with the onboarding process, Defendant State Street required Mr. Abreu to sign a separate “Consent to Request Consumer Report & Investigative Consumer Report Information” form that is not the stand-alone disclosure required by FCRA section 1681b(b)(2). The background check application form appears to be one provided by Sterling to some of its customers. 38. The background check application form that Defendant State Street required Mr. Abreu to sign was not the “clear and conspicuous disclosure … in a document that consists solely of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes” as required by section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA. 39. Neither HMG nor Sterling obtained Mr. Abreu’s consent to obtain a consumer report for employment purposes using any written document at all. 40. On or about September 5, 2014, “State Street via Sterling Infosystems” obtained a consumer report about Plaintiff from Trans Union, LLC for employment purposes. 41. On or about September 5, 2014, Sterling used Plaintiff’s Trans Union report to generated its own report, which scored Plaintiff as “DISQUALIFIED” for employment. 42. On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff was sent an offer letter by HMG for the desktop support engineer position, which Mr. Abreu accepted in writing the following day, on September 10, 2014. 44. At no point did State Street, HCL, HMG, or Sterling provide Mr. Abreu with a pre- adverse action notice or a copy of his Sterling or Trans Union reports or a statement of FCRA rights as required by FCRA section 1681b(b)(3). 45. Shortly after September 9, 2014, a representative of HMG contacted Mr. Abreu via telephone and informed him that the job offer with State Street was rescinded because of “credit information.” Mr. Abreu did not have a copy of the Sterling or Trans Union reports that were the source(s) of this information, or an opportunity to dispute this determination. 46. As a direct result of Defendants unlawfully obtaining and using the Sterling and Trans Union background reports, Mr. Abreu lost the job opportunity at State Street and suffered actual damages, including wage and other pecuniary loss, humiliation, embarrassment and emotional distress. 48. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes based on discovery or legal developments. 49. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendants obtain signed standardized background check application forms for background reports and procure and use hundreds if not thousands of consumer reports on applicants for employment each year, and those persons’ names and addresses are identifiable through documents maintained by Defendants. 51. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member. Plaintiff has the same claims for statutory, actual and punitive damages that he seeks for absent class members. 52. Adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes. His interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Classes he seeks to represent. He has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and he intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Classes. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 55. Plaintiff is a “consumer,” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 56. Defendants State Street, HMG, and Sterling are each “persons” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b). 57. The Sterling background reports ordered by Defendants State Street and HMG are “consumer reports” used for “employment purposes” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d) and 1681a(h). 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 60. The FCRA provides that any person “using a consumer report for employment purposes” who intends to take any “adverse action based in whole or in part on the report,” must provide the consumer with a copy of the report and a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA, as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission, before taking such adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 61. For purposes of this requirement, an “adverse action” includes “any . . . decision . . . that adversely affects any current or prospective employee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii). 62. The FCRA requires Defendants State Street, HMG, HCL, and Sterling, as users of consumer reports for employment purposes, to provide notice and certain documents to the applicant before taking adverse action based in whole or in part on the report. Those mandatory disclosures include a copy of the consumer’s report and a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), (ii). Background: Defendants’ Use of Sterling’s Background Screening Reports Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (Plaintif and Classes v. State Street, HMG, HCL, and Sterling) Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) (Plaintiff and Classes v. State Street, HMG, and Sterling)

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Class) (Ohio Overtime Violations) 10. Defendant’s hourly employees included Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class. 11. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 3 Hourly Employees’ Compensation 12. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class are current or former hourly employees of Defendant. 13. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA. 14. Plaintiff, the Opt-Ins and the Ohio Class were not paid all of the overtime compensation they earned. 15. Pursuant to Defendant’s uniform companywide policy, Defendant impermissibly docks its employees’ pay. 16. Pursuant to Defendant’s uniform companywide policy, Defendant rounds its employees’ clock-in time in a manner in which an employee always loses credit for time actually worked. 17. For example, on September 11, 2017, Plaintiff worked from 6:57 A.M. until 3:44 P.M. But, rather than rounding to the nearest quarter hour, Defendant rounded Plaintiff’s clock- in time to 7:00 A.M. and rounded her clock-out time down to 3:30 P.M., which resulted in Plaintiff being docked 17 minutes of pay. 18. Accordingly, on August 24, 2016, although Plaintiff worked 8 hours and 17 minutes (excluding a 30-minute lunch break), she was only paid for 8 hours of work. This resulted in Plaintiff being paid for 17 minutes less than she actually worked. 19. This impermissible docking and rounding occurred daily. 20. Defendant’s practice of improperly rounding time always in its favor, which resulted in its employees always losing time worked, results and has resulted in Defendant’s employees, including Plaintiff, being underpaid for overtime hours worked on a daily basis. This, 4 in turn, results and has resulted in Defendant’s employees, including Plaintiff, being underpaid overtime hours worked on a weekly basis. 21. Plaintiff, and each Opt-In and the members of the Ohio Class have each worked a substantial number of uncompensated hours during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, which has resulted in significant unpaid overtime. 22. Plaintiff, Opt-Ins, and members of the Ohio Class were full time employees regularly scheduled to work 40 hours a week or more. Thus, by failing to pay Plaintiff, members of the Ohio Class, and the Opt-Ins for work performed before and after their scheduled shift, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff, members of the Ohio Class, and the Opt-Ins for all of their overtime in nearly every week in which they worked. 23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 24. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability” prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 25. The Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 26. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, all were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s 5 unlawful practice of failing to pay its employees for all hours worked, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 27. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 28. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 30. Plaintiff also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and other members of the Ohio Class, defined as: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant during the period two years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks. 31. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but avers, upon information and belief, that it consists of over 40 people. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to 6 maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 32. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other class members for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek; Whether Defendant’s rounding and docking practices are lawful; and, Whether Defendant kept adequate records of the hours worked by Plaintiff and the other class members. 33. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 34. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 35. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 36. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and 7 demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 38. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of herself and the Opt-Ins who have joined this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) has been filed or will be filed with the Court. 39. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate for every hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 40. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 41. Instead, Defendant has a companywide policy of failing to pay its employees for all time worked in that its rounding and pay docking practices routinely resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins working hours for which they were not compensated. 42. Defendant’s practices resulted in Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins receiving less overtime compensation than they were owed. 43. By engaging in these practices, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 8 44. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 46. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of herself and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 47. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 48. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff and the Ohio Class. 49. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Ohio Class for all time worked. 50. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 9 51. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” 9. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Defendant’s Status as an “Employer”

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12. Subway’s unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time, invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. 14. In sending the unsolicited text messages at issue, Subway, or a third party acting on its behalf, utilized an automatic telephone dialing system; hardware and/or software with the capacity to store or produce cellular telephone number to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the text messages, including the ability to trigger an automated response by replying “HELP” or “STOP,” the text messages’ commercial and generic content, that substantively identical texts were sent to multiple recipients, and that they were sent from a short code, which is consistent with the use of an automatic telephone dialing system to send text messages. 15. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (2) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Subway, (3) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (4) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of Subway products, and from whom (5) Subway (a) does not allege to have consent, or (b) alleges to have obtained consent in the same manner it alleges to have obtained consent from Plaintiff. 17. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 18. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained the same damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct. 19. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system; c) Whether Defendant’s text messages were sent for the purpose of marketing Defendant’s services; d) Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and e) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. 21. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 22. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this case. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 20 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. 24. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 25. These solicitation text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 26. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), and as a result, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. 27. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class. 8. Subway is one of the largest fast food restaurant franchises in the world, with more than 44,000 locations. 9. As part of its national marketing plan, Subway sends consumers text messages promoting Subway’s sandwiches and other menu offerings.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.NYOFFICESUITES.COM, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical location. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to: find information about the physical locations, the ability to get pricing and schedule a tour of the spaces, details such as virtual offices, meetings rooms and private offices, create an account and log into the client portal, read testimonials and frequently asked questions, access contact form and schedule a tour of the spaces, participate in other social interactive experiences and to learn about other important information. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about the Defendant’s rental space locations, the ability to get pricing and schedule a tour of the spaces, details such as virtual offices, meetings rooms and private offices, create an account and log into the client portal, read testimonials and frequently asked questions, access contact form and schedule a tour of the spaces, participate in other social interactive experiences and to learn about other important information. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting or returning to Defendant’s physical locations and Website, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical locations on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting or returning to the locations and Website to purchase items and to view the items. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s rental space locations, book tours and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 49. Defendant’s rental spaces are a place of public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s rental spaces. The Website is a service that is integrated with this location. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s physical location is located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. Defendant’s New York State physical location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it advertises, owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it advertises, owns and operates its physical location and its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 86. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 90. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 96. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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44. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through forty-three (43) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 45. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 46. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in New York who received telephonic messages from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the telephone call was placed to a the consumer's home or similar party seeking payment of a consumer debt by leaving a message for the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiff asserts that the telephone message was in violation 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692e(11), and 1692f. 47. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form telephonic messages are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. -10- B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such telephonic messages, (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of the Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 48. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 49. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. -11- 50. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 51. The Defendant’s actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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27. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all those who purchased Marvell’s securities between November 20, 2014 and September 10, 2015, inclusive (the “Class Period”) and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 33. The market for Marvell’s securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, Marvell’s securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired Marvell’s securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to Marvell, and have been damaged thereby. 34. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of Marvell’s securities, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. Said statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about Marvell’s business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 45. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Marvell’s securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 55. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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(Failure to compensate for work performed “off the clock”) (Unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA) 17. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE, files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 19. Plaintiff, ANTONIO COLE, seeks to represent only those members of the above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt into this action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 20. Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Plaintiff’s class”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue will be filed with the Court. 21. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE contends that this action is appropriate for collective action status because Defendant herein has acted in the same manner with regard to all members of the Plaintiff’s class. V. 22. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 201 et.seq. 23. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. 24. Defendant h a s employed Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE since 2010 as a Property Claims Adjuster. Defendant’s headquarters is located in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant has locations throughout the United States. 26. During his employment and in the routine performance of his day-to-day job duties, Plaintiff has performed non-exempt work, during a significant period of most days, as classified by the Act, because the performance of Plaintiff’s job required it and because Defendant’s management required the performance of those non-exempted job duties, as a condition of Plaintiff’s continued employment. 27. Specifically, Plaintiff worked as a Property Claims Adjuster for Defendant’s insurance business. Plaintiff’s duties included, but are not limited to: inspecting homes, businesses and other properties that might have damage; interviewing claimants and witnesses; speaking with policy holders; performing research related to the claims. Plaintiff earns an annual salary of $57,000. 28. Plaintiff’s regular work week schedule was supposed to be Monday through Friday from 8:00 o’clock A.M. until 4:30 o’clock P.M. Plaintiff, however, has been forced to work 3 to 4 more hours per day during the week and is also forced to work 8 to 10 hour weekends. 29. During Plaintiff’s employment, while working for the Defendants, Plaintiff was required to work overtime hours in excess of 40 hours worked during many seven-day workweeks. 30. Further, during these hours worked, Plaintiff has performed the function of his job, which included the performance duties typically performed by “hourly” paid non-exempt employees because the job required it and the Defendant’s management required it, as a condition of Plaintiff’s continued employment. 32. Plaintiff and others like him were routinely required to perform work “off the clock.” Defendant demanded that Plaintiff and others like him perform off the clock work as a condition of their employment. 33. Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform all necessary work to include the performance of those duties otherwise typically performed by “hourly” employees which routinely required Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to work “overtime” hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the Act. 34. Defendant failed to pay statutory overtime as required by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. VI. 35. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully written herein. 36. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE, and all others similarly situated are considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. 37. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE, and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven- day workweek. 39. Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees “overtime” pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 40. Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA, and has willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal statute. 41. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 42. No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week. 43. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated. 44. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. 56. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE, and all others similarly situated is considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. 57. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay for all hours they worked in a workweek. 58. Defendant failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA, and have willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal statute. 59. Defendant failed to maintain a complete, accurate, and contemporaneous record of the number of hours worked per workweek by Plaintiff and by all other similarly situated employees, as required by law. 60. Defendant engaged in wage theft by not compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for work they were required to perform for Defendant as part of their regular job duties by not paying Plaintiff and others similarly situated work done outside of the regular hours worked. 62. No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid in a workweek 63. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid. 64. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. 65. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. IX. 66. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re- alleged as if fully written herein. 67. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendant that is in violation of the FLSA. 68. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers. 70. Accordingly, Defendant’s pattern and practice of failing to compensate employees for work performed, but not recorded or paid, as required by the FLSA results from the Defendant’s general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the members class. 71. Plaintiff ANTONIO COLE’s, experience is typical of the experience of the member’s class as it pertains to compensation. 72. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. 73. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, are similarly situated. 74. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who were the victims of the wage theft scheme engaged in by the Defendant, are similarly situated 75. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 76. All current and former employees of Defendant’s insurance business, who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment who were denied compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. X.

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15. Defendant manages and/or operates many hotels throughout the United States. 16. As part of these operations, Defendant provides its customers transportation services, including, but not limited to, complimentary shuttle services. 17. Within the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff called the Holiday Inn and was told by an agent of Defendant that the Holiday Inn provides a complimentary shuttle service for guests. 18. Plaintiff was told that the complimentary shuttle service was not wheelchair accessible and was told that Defendant would not provide an alternative transportation service. 19. An investigation performed on Plaintiff’s behalf confirmed the allegations made by Plaintiff above. 20. The investigation performed on behalf of Plaintiff further confirmed that, in addition to the Holiday Inn, Defendant manages and/or operates a substantial number of other hotels in the United States that offer transportation services to their guests, but do not offer equivalent transportation services to guests who use wheelchairs or scooters. 23. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure and on behalf of herself and the following class: “All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned and/or operated by Defendant because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at those hotels.” 24. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court, and will facilitate judicial economy. 25. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 27. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 28. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation herein. 30. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the class. 31. Plaintiff is an individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 32. Defendant, a hospitality business, is public accommodation under the ADA. 42 Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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18. Vical was incorporated in 1987 to research and develop proprietary lipid chemistry. The Company’s founders were initially focused on developing liposomes for extended release of AZT, a treatment for patients with AIDS. In 1989, experiments and evaluations of lipid-based delivery of DNA led to Vical’s DNA delivery patents, which form the basis of the Company’s current products. 19. Vical completed its initial public offering of 2 million shares of stock in 1993, and since its inception, the Company has raised total net proceeds of approximately $370 million from the sale of equity securities. 58. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the Class, consisting of all who purchased or otherwise acquired Vical publicly traded securities during the Class Period. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 65. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 69. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Vical within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By virtue of their positions with the Company, and ownership of Vical stock, the Individual Defendants had the power and authority to cause Vical to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. Vical controlled the Individual Defendants and all of its employees. By reason of such conduct, Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act. X. For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants For Violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Violations) 10. Nepomuceno received the September 14, 2013 Statement. 11. The September 14, 2013 Statement contained many items of information including: MCM Account #: xxxxxxx455 Original Account #: XXXXXXXXXXXXX917 41. This action is brought and may properly proceed as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks certification of a Class initially defined as follows: All New Jersey consumers to whom Defendants sent, within the appropriate statutory period, a communication the same as Exhibit A or a substantially similar communication in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (FDCPA). 42. Plaintiff seeks to recover statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs on behalf of all class members under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 44. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that predominate over questions affecting only individuals, including but not limited to: A. Whether Defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA; B. Whether Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(6) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(12); C. Whether MCM’s use of the phrase “Due Date” is deceptive and/or would cause the least sophisticated consumer to become confused; D. Whether Midland Funding or MCM is required to possess a license in order for MCM to attempt collection of interest from Plaintiff and those similarly situated; E. Whether the communications sent by Defendants were deceptive or would cause the least sophisticated consumer to become confused; and F. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages. 45. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. The FDCPA statutory scheme provides for statutory damages payable to each class member. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the claims of the Class and will foster economies of time, effort and expense. 46. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. 48. Plaintiff does not have interests antagonistic to those of the Class. 49. The Class, of which Plaintiff is a member, is readily identifiable. 50. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer litigation. Proposed Class Counsel have investigated and identified potential claims in the action; have a great deal of experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in this action. 51. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would run the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants in this action or the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk that adjudications with respect to individual members of the class would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 54. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. of the FDCPA in connection with its communications sent to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 55. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 56. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with its communications sent to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 57. Defendant’s “Statement” would cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused as to whether MCM was collecting for a creditor which would not be covered by the FDCPA. 58. Defendant’s use of the phrase “Due Date” violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 60. Defendant’s use of the phrase “Due Date” with a specific date violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 61. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of any alleged debt in its collection letters to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 62. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(B) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the compensation which may be lawfully received in its collection letters to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 63. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(6) of the FDCPA by falsely representing and/or implying that a sale or other transfer of any interest in the alleged debts caused Plaintiff and others similarly situated to lose any claim or defense to payment. 65. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(12) of the FDCPA by falsely representing and/or implying that the debts it was attempting to collect from Plaintiff and others similarly situated had been turned over to innocent purchasers for value. 7. Defendant sent a communication to Nepomuceno dated September 14, 2013 attempting to collect an amount allegedly due to Midland Funding, LLC (the “alleged debt”). 8. The September 14, 2013 communication was identified as a “Statement.”

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21. The Collective Action Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number is dependent, are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are hundreds of potential members of the Collective Action Class during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys or knowledge of their claims. 22. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Class and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of wage and hour law and class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interest that is contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 23. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual members of the Collective Action Class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 25. Plaintiffs know no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 26. Plaintiff, Shannese Greenaway and KarelPowery sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class under Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. 29. The claims of Plaintiffs, Shannese Greenaway and KarelPoweryare typical of the claims of the Class and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy—particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resource to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a defendant. 30. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. Plaintiffs, Shannese Greenaway and KarelPowery are committed to pursuing this action and have retained competent counsel experience in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 32. Plaintiffs, Shannese Greenaway and KarelPoweryhave the same interests in this matter as all other members of this Class and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Class. 34. The FLSA provides that, with certain exceptions, employers must pay employees minimum wages for all compensable hours worked and overtime of at least one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any hours over forty worked in a week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207(a)(1). The Act exempts certain employees from the minimum wage and overtime requirements. However, an "employer who claims an exemption from the FLSA has the burden of showing that the exemption applies" see Donovan v. Nekton, Inc., 703 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1983). 36. Although the FLSA provides for certain exemptions to the mandates of paying minimum wages and overtime compensation, no exemption applies in the instant matter. 37. Defendantsdo business throughout New York as a franchisee of Applebee’s, operating approximately 33 Applebee’s within the five boroughs, Westchester and Rockland Counties. 38. Plaintiff, Shannese Greenawaywas employed by Defendants from approximately 2009 until May 2011 as a hostess. Plaintiff was stationed in Long Island, NY. 39. Plaintiff,KarelPowery, was employed by Defendants from approximately 2010 until December 2011 as a Server. 40. Plaintiffs worked extensive hours without a break for years. According to Labor Law Section 162, employees must be granted a 30 minute lunch break if they work for six (6) consecutive hours, including the time period between 11am and 2pm. Further, if an employee begins work prior to 11am and continues until 7pm, he/she is entitled for another 20 minute break between 5pm and 7pm. 42. Plaintiffs were not compensated for any additional or side work. Plaintiffs would work anywhere between an hour and two hours preparing for the day. This was not accounted for in Plaintiffs’ hours and therefore did not receive compensation for time spent preparing for the work day. 43. Plaintiff, Shannese Greenaway, principle duties included but were not limited to: opening doors for guests, answering the phone, seating guests, bussing tables, occasional food runs, and cleaning the bathroom. 44. Plaintiff, KarelPowery, principle duties included but not limited to: serve customers, take orders, wash dishes, host, prepare food, roll silverware, and stock the fridge. 45. Plaintiffs’ duties did not include the hiring and firing of employees and had no input into hiring or firing decisions. 46. Plaintiffs’ work was performed for the benefit of the Defendants, in the normal course of the Defendants’ business, and was integrated into the business of the Defendants. 47. The work performed by Plaintiffs required little skill and no capital investment. Their duties did not principally include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent judgment. 49. Upon information belief, throughout the Collective Action Period and Class Period continuing until today, Defendants have likewise employed other individuals, like the Plaintiffs (members of the Collective Action Class and the Class) in similar positions that require little skill and no capital investment and their duties and responsibilities do not principally include any managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent judgment. They do not have the authority to hire or fire other employees, and they are not responsible for making hiring and firing recommendations. 50. Such individuals may have worked in excess of 40 hours a week, yet Defendants have likewise willfully failed to pay them for all hours worked as well as overtime compensation of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay in violation of the FLSA and, in the case of New York employees, the New York Labor Law. As stated, the exact number of such individuals is presently unknown, but within the sole knowledge of Defendants, and can be ascertained through appropriate discovery. 51. Upon information and belief, throughout all relevant time periods, while Defendants employed Plaintiffs, the Collective Action Members, and Class Members, Defendants failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time records. 53. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiffs, and employed or continue to employ, each of the members of the Collective Action Class within the meaning of the 61. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by referencing paragraphs 1 through 19 and 26-51 as if they were set forth again herein. 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class were employed by Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law § § 2 and 651. 63. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ rights and the rights of the Class, by failing to pay them for all hours worked, as well as for overtime compensation at rates no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek in violation of the New York Labor Law and its regulations. 64. Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations have caused Plaintiffs and the Class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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1. Accutrace Reports Inaccurate, Antiquated and Sealed Information 13. At all times pertinent hereto, Accutrace was a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) as defined by section 1681a(f) of the FCRA, and a “person” as defined by section 1681a(b). 14. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was a “consumer” as that term is defined by section 1681a(c) of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k (Individual Claim) 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (Class Claim) 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (Class Claim) 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (Class Claim) 15. Among other things, the FCRA regulates the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of consumer reports by CRAs, including public record information. 16. Accutrace investigates and reviews public record databases and maintains consumer files which contain public record information concerning, among other things, the alleged criminal record history of individuals. 18. When a CRA produces a copy of a consumer's report to the consumer or a third party, the CRA is required to exclude adverse items of information, including records of arrest, which antedate the consumer report by more than seven years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5). 19. Adverse items of information, such as records of arrest which antedate the consumer report by more than seven years, may be included in a consumer report, but only for consumer reports used in connection with the employment of any individual at an annual salary which equals, or which may be reasonably expected to equal $75,000, or more. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3). 2. Accutrace Takes Adverse Action Against Consumers Before Providing Notice 20. A CRA is also prohibited from disclosing records of offenses that have been ordered sealed by a court. 21. Despite these clear and unambiguous requirements of the FCRA, Accutrace sells adverse items of information, including records of arrest, which predate the consumer report by more than seven years, before Accutrace knows or would have any reason to know that the consumer credit report is being used in connection with the employment of an individual who meets the FCRA salary threshold requirement of an annual salary of $75,000 or more. 22. Based on a common policy and practice, Accutrace regularly and unlawfully reports outdated criminal records. 23. Accutrace also reports records of offenses, such as juvenile offenses, that have been sealed by court order. 25. Despite its duties to refrain from reporting outdated, sealed and adverse information, Accutrace has nonetheless deliberately, willfully, intentionally, recklessly and negligently adopted a policy and practice that disregards these duties, in violation of the FCRA. 26. In addition to providing background reports, on information and belief, Accutrace also provides to its employment screening customers an additional service called “adjudication.” Under this service, Accutrace scores an applicant eligible or ineligible for employment based upon an adjudication “matrix” that the customer developed with Accutrace using its hiring criteria. Reports are then adjudicated by Accutrace as either meeting or not meeting the customer’s requirements. 27. The adjudication service is attractive to Accutrace’s customers who are constantly hiring and promoting in large volumes because it provides the customer with a remote, outsourced tool to make its employment decisions rapidly. 28. Once Accutrace adjudicates an applicant as ineligible for employment on a background report (because that applicant purportedly has a criminal court record, for example) that adjudication removes an applicant from hiring consideration. 29. Employers will, in effect, adopt Accutrace’s adjudication as their own, without any further process given to the job applicant, and take adverse action based upon that adjudication. 31. Under the FCRA, any “person” using a consumer report, such as Defendant, who intends to take an “adverse action” on a job application “based in whole or in part” on information obtained from the consumer report, must provide notice of that fact to the consumer-applicant and must include with the notice a copy of the consumer report and a notice of the consumer’s dispute rights under the FCRA, before taking the adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A); see also Goode v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics, 848 F. Supp. 2d 532, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (more than one business can be a user of a single background report; “Under the FCRA, ‘person’ means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity. § 1681a(b). Thus, defendant is a person and must comply with § 1681b(b)(3)(A).”). 32. A primary reason that Congress required that a person intending to take an adverse action based on information in a consumer report provide the report to the consumer before taking the adverse action is so the consumer has time to review the report and dispute information that may be inaccurate or discuss the report with the prospective employer before adverse action is taken. See Federal Trade Commission letter dated December 18, 1997 to Harold R. Hawkey, Esq. (“[T]he clear purpose of the provision to allow consumers to discuss reports with employers or otherwise respond before adverse action is taken.”). 34. Consistent with that purpose, federal courts have held that consumers must be provided with the report “a sufficient amount of time before … adverse action [is taken] so that the consumer may rectify any inaccuracies in the report.” Williams v. Telespectrum, Inc., 2006 WL 7067107 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2006); Beverly v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 149032 (E.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2008) (quoting Williams). In Reardon v. Closetmaid Corp., 2011 WL 1628041 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2011), the court certified a class action for prospective employees who did not receive a copy of their consumer report at least five days before being notified that the employer might take adverse action. 35. The reasons for the “pre-adverse action notice” requirement with regard to employment situations are to alert the job applicant that she is about to experience an adverse action, such as a rejection, based on the content of a report, and to provide her an opportunity to challenge the accuracy or relevancy of the information with the consumer reporting agency or the user before that job prospect or job is lost. 36. Accutrace typically does not provide job applicants with a copy of their consumer reports or a statement of their FCRA rights before taking adverse action against them based upon the information in such reports, despite being required to do so by section 1681b(b)(3)(A) of the 67. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes based on discovery or legal developments. 68. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. Upon information and belief, Accutrace sells hundreds if not thousands of consumer reports each year, and those persons’ names and addresses are identifiable through documents maintained by Accutrace. 70. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member. Plaintiff has the same claims for statutory and punitive damages as Class members, arising out of Accutrace’s common course of conduct. 71. Adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes. Her interests are aligned with and not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Classes she seeks to represent, she has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes. 73. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 74. At all times pertinent hereto, Accutrace was a “person” and a “consumer reporting agency” as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) and (f). 75. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff was a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 76. At all times pertinent hereto, the above-mentioned background report was a “consumer report” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 77. Accutrace violated the FCRA by engaging in the following conduct in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5): a. Failing to maintain strict procedures to assure that the adverse information being reported is not out of date; and b. Failing to exclude outdated adverse information in its consumer reports. 79. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 80. At all times pertinent hereto, Accutrace was a “person” and “consumer reporting agency” as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) and (f). 81. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff was a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 82. At all times pertinent hereto, the above-mentioned background report was a “consumer report” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 83. Accutrace violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) as to Plaintiff, the 1681e(b) Sealed Record Class and the 1681e(b) Juvenile Record Class by willfully and negligently failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation and sale of consumer reports about Plaintiff and other consumers which contained public records or criminal records that had been expunged, vacated, sealed or dismissed prior to their sale and/or dissemination, or which contained records of juvenile offenses. 84. The violations by Accutrace were willful and negligent, rendering Defendant liable for statutory damages, punitive damages, and actual damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 86. At all times pertinent hereto, Accutrace was a “person” and “consumer reporting agency” as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) and (f). 87. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff was a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 88. At all times pertinent hereto, the above-mentioned background report was a “consumer report” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 89. The FCRA provides that any person “using a consumer report for employment purposes” who intends to take any “adverse action based in whole or in part on the report,” must provide the consumer with a copy of the report and a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA, as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission, before taking such adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 90. For purposes of this requirement, an “adverse action” includes “any . . . decision . . . that adversely affects any current or prospective employee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii). 91. Accutrace is a “person” that regularly uses background reports for employment purposes. 92. The FCRA requires Defendant, as a user of consumer reports for employment purposes, before taking adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, to provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, a copy of the report and a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), (ii). 94. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 95. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o, Accutrace is liable for failing to failing to notify Plaintiff Doe that it was reporting public record information about her at the time it furnished such information to the Staffing Companies, and failing to maintain strict procedures to insure that the public record information it was reporting was complete and up to date, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681k. A. Accutrace’s Practices As A Consumer Reporting Agency And Furnisher Of Consumer Information For Employment Purposes

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VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq. 10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Franklin sent an initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. that failed to properly identify and name the current creditor to whom the debt is allegedly owed; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect and/or has purchased debts. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff 4 Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor counsel have 5 any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 20. On a date better known to Defendant, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to non-party DirectTV. 21. The alleged DirectTV obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 22. This alleged debt arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically non-payment for personal credit card purchases. 6 23. Upon information and belief, DirectTV contracted with Franklin to collect the alleged debt. 24. Franklin collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of themselves or other creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – November 23, 2020 Letter 25. On or about November 23, 2020, Defendant Franklin sent Plaintiff an initial debt collection letter (the “Letter”), a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit A. 26. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication, provide the consumer with a written validation notice, known as a “G- Notice”, which must include the following information: a. the amount of the debt; b. the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; c. a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; d. a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and e. a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address 7 of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 27. While the November 23, 2020 Letter contains the requisite “G-Notice” language, it is deficient in that it fails to identify the current creditor to whom the debt is owed. 28. The Letter’s only reference to the debt is the heading as follows: 29. The Plaintiff has no way of knowing who the current creditor is from the Letter, the Letter is unclear if the reference to DirectTV is as the current creditor or if DirectTV was the original creditor of the debt in that it was previously “owed to” DirectTV and Defendant Franklin is the current creditor collecting on its own behalf. 30. The Letter does not make any other reference to DirectTV, and does not refer to them as their client or state that they are collecting on DirectTV’s behalf. 31. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g Franklin was required to provide the name of the current creditor. 32. Franklin failed to accurately do so. 33. Mere illusions are not enough, but the Letter must specifically and clearly state who the creditor is. 34. Plaintiff was therefore confused as to which debt this letter refers. 35. Plaintiff was further confused as to which current creditor she should make payment, if she chose to do so. 36. Plaintiff suffered emotional harm from this confusion. 8 37. Plaintiff was also forced to expend time dealing with Franklin’ deceptive collection practices. 38. Plaintiff was likewise forced to hire counsel to protect her rights. 39. Plaintiff was unfairly denied her right to properly address the debt due to Defendant’s deceptive debt collection efforts. 40. As a result of all of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading, and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 41. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 42. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 43. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 44. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (10) by improperly identifying the current creditor and violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e (2) by falsely representing the character of the debt. 45. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 46. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 9 47. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 48. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 49. Defendant violated this section by improperly stating who the alleged debt is currently owed to. 50. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 51. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 52. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 53. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall… send the consumer a written notice containing … (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed… 54. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by failing to the properly name the creditor to whom the debt is allegedly owed. 55. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 10 VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692f et seq.

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 14. On information and belief, on or about January 4, 2016, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 15. On information and belief, all three Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and all three Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 16. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 17. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 18. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 19. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 21. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 23. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. 24. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 26. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 28. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 29. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 32. The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about January 4, 2016, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation or that Defendants had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 34. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 35. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 36. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ products, goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful.

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21. Under § 403(d) of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 343(d)), a food shall be deemed to be misbranded “[i]f its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading.” 23. The food labeling laws and regulations of New York impose requirements which mirror federal law. 24. New York Agm. Law § 201 specifically provides that “[f]ood shall be deemed to be misbranded … If its container is so made, formed, colored or filled as to be misleading.” Moreover, Part 259.1 of Title 1 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (1 NYCRR § 259.1), incorporates by reference the regulatory requirements for food labeling under the FDCA: “For the purpose of the enforcement of article 17 of the Agriculture and Markets Law, and except where in conflict with the statutes of this State or with rules and regulations promulgated by the commissioner, the commissioner hereby adopts the current regulations as they appear in title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (revised as of April 1, 2013) … in the area of food packaging and labeling as follows: … (2) Part 100 of title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations [21 C.F.R. 100 et seq.], containing Federal definitions and standards for food packaging and labeling General at pages 5-10….” 1 NYCRR § 259.1(a)(2). 25. Courts have noted the incorporation of FDA regulations into New York law in evaluating claims brought under NY GBL § 349. See Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. CV-09- 0395 (JG) (RML), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73156, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010) (“New York's Agriculture and Marketing law similarly provides in relevant part that food shall be deemed misbranded ‘[i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular,’ and incorporates the FDCA's labeling provisions”); Izquierdo v. Mondelez Int'l, Inc., No. 16-cv-04697 (CM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149795, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) (“Here [in a slack-fill case brought under NY GBL § 349], New York law expressly incorporates the standard imposed by the 60. Plaintiff MORRISON brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following Class: All persons or entities in the United States who made retail purchases of the Product during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the Nationwide Class”). 61. In the alternative, Plaintiff MORRISON seeks to represent: All persons who made retail purchases of the Product in New York during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the New York Class”). 62. The proposed Classes exclude current and former officers and directors of Defendant, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 63. Class members are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through the appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of members in the proposed Classes. Other members of the Classes may be identified from records maintained by Defendant and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, or by advertisement, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in class actions such as this. 65. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to them. Plaintiff has retained experienced and competent counsel. 66. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages sustained by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the Class members to individually seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. 68. The membership of the Classes is readily definable, and prosecution of this action as a class action will reduce the possibility of repetitious litigation. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 69. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual Class member are too small to make it economically feasible for an individual Class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will prevent the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 70. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 72. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interest of all Class members, although certain Class members are not parties to such actions. 73. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Classes as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Classes as a whole. As such, Defendant’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. 74. Plaintiff MORRISON realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 75. Plaintiff MORRISON brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law, General Business Law (“NY GBL”) § 349. 76. NY GBL § 349 provides that “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are . . . unlawful.” 78. The practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertised, promoted, marketed and sold its Product in packaging containing non-functional slack-fill are unfair, deceptive and misleading and are in violation of the NY GBL § 349. Moreover, New York State law broadly prohibits the misbranding of foods in language identical to that found in regulations promulgated pursuant to the FDCA § 403 (21 U.S.C. 343(d)). Under New York Agm. Law § 201, “[f]ood shall be deemed to be misbranded . . . If its container is so made, formed, colored or filled as to be misleading.” 79. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 80. Defendant should be enjoined from packaging its Product with non-functional slack-fill, as described above, pursuant to NY GBL § 349. 81. Plaintiff is at risk of several types of future injury, each of which justifies the imposition of an injunction. Absent an injunction, Plaintiff MORRISON is at risk of continued injury because she is no longer able to rely on Defendant’s representations, regardless of whether they are true or false. Plaintiff may hesitate to purchase Defendant’s Product even if it ceases its unlawfully labeling the Product by packaging them with misleading slack-fill. Plaintiff may hesitate to purchase Defendant’s Product even if it begins manufacturing the Product without any slack-fill. If the Product is no longer sold with the false packaging representations, Plaintiff MORRISON could not uninhibitedly take advantage of that Product because she has been misled to believe that they contain slack-fill. 83. The Court should follow the lead of California Federal Courts and recognize that a plaintiff may be injured after she learns of a manufacturer’s deception, even though she is unlikely to fall victim to the exactly the same scheme again in exactly the same manner. To hold otherwise would immunize manufacturers and render injunctive relief impossible in consumer fraud class action lawsuits – if learning of a deception removed a Plaintiff’s standing to seek an injunction, then wrongdoers could violate the law with impunity, defeating the purpose of consumer protection statutes. 85. Plaintiff MORRISON realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 86. Plaintiff MORRISON brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 87. Any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of NY GBL § 349 may bring an action in her own name to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices, an action to recover her actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 88. By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts and practices by misbranding its Product so that they appear to contain more in the packaging than is actually included. 89. The practices employed by Defendant, whereby Defendant advertised, promoted, marketed and sold its Product in packages containing non-functional slack-fill are unfair, deceptive and misleading and are in violation of the NY GBL § 349, New York Agm. Law § 201 and the FDCA (21 U.S.C. § 343(d)) in that said Product are misbranded. 91. Plaintiff MORRISON and the other Class members suffered a loss as a result of Defendant’s deceptive and unfair trade practices. Specifically, as a result of Defendant’s deceptive and unfair acts and practices, Plaintiff MORRISON and the other Class members suffered monetary losses from the purchase of Product, i.e., receiving less than the capacity of the packaging due to non-functional slack-fill in the Product. In order for Plaintiff MORRISON and Class members to be made whole, they must receive a refund of the purchase price of the Product equal to the percentage of non-functional slack-fill in it. 92. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiff MORRISON and members of the Class against Defendant. 93. Plaintiff MORRISON realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 94. Defendant has been and/or is engaged in the “conduct of . . . business, trade or commerce” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 96. Pursuant to the FDCA as implemented through 21 C.F.R. § 100.100, package size is an affirmative representation of quantity. Thus, the non-functional slack-fill in Defendant’s Product constituted false advertising as to the quantity of chips contained therein. Defendant caused this false advertising to be made and disseminated throughout New York and the United States. Defendant’s false advertising was known, or through the exercise of reasonable care should have been known, by Defendant to be deceptive and misleading to consumers. 97. Defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations were material and substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Consumers purchasing the Product were, and continue to be, exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations. 98. Defendant has violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 because its misrepresentations and/or omissions regarding the Product, as set forth above, were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection law of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection law of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) Identical Federal and State Law Prohibit Misbranded Foods with Non-Functional Slack- Fill VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §§ 350 AND 350-a(1) (FALSE ADVERTISING) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection law of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class)

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14. Defendant SessionCam develops a software of the same name that provides marketing analytics. 15. One of SessionCam’s features is called “Session Replay.” 16. SessionCam tells prospective clients that they can “[u]se session replay to see the website experience you actually deliver to your customers across desktop, mobile and tablet devices.” 17. Session Replay “records an exact version of the page as seen by the user at the time of use; including the HTML, CSS and all images.” The recording allows companies to “see mouse movements, clicks/taps, masked form input, page scrolling and mobile gestures like pinch, zoom, tap, double tap, swipe, tilt and screen resizing.” 18. Session replay technologies work by using “embedded snippets of code … [that] watch and record a visitor’s every move on a website, in real time.”2 20. Indeed, SessionCam’s promotional video touts that Session Replay “let[s] you record live user sessions, looking over the shoulder of your real-life customers.” The highlighted mouse in the promotion video shows the Session Replay software tracking a mock user’s mouse movements in real-time: 22. SessionCam’s business model involves entering into voluntary partnerships with various companies and providing their software to their partners. 23. One of SessionCam’s partners is Defendant Foot Locker. 24. Foot Locker utilizes SessionCam’s software on the Website. 25. Foot Locker knows that SessionCam’s software captures the keystrokes, mouse clicks and other communications of visitors to its website, and pays SessionCam to supply that information. 26. Pursuant to an agreement with SessionCam, Foot Locker enables SessionCam’s software by voluntarily embedding SessionCam’s software code on the Website. 27. As currently deployed, SessionCam’s software, as employed by Foot Locker, functions as a wiretap. II. Defendants Wiretapped Plaintiff’s Electronic Communications 28. In December 2020, Mr. Jacobo III visited Foot Locker.com and made a purchase. 29. During that visit, and upon information and belief, the Session Replay feature in SessionCam’s software created a video capturing each of Plaintiff’s keystrokes and mouse clicks on the website. The SessionCam wiretap also captured the date and time of the visit, the duration of the visit, Plaintiff’s IP address, his location at the time of the visit, his browser type, and the operating system on his device. 31. When users access the Website and make a purchase, they enter their PII. SessionCam’s software captures these electronic communications throughout each step of the process. Even if a user does not make a purchase, the SessionCam nonetheless captures users’ electronic communications throughout his or her visit on the Website. 32. SessionCam’s software captures, among other things: (a) The user’s mouse clicks; (b) The user’s keystrokes; (c) The user’s payment card information, including card number, expiration date, and CVV code; (d) The user’s IP address; (e) The user’s their location at the time of the visit; and (f) The user’s browser type and the operating system on their devices 33. Crucially, Defendant Foot Locker does not ask users, including Plaintiff, whether they consent to being wiretapped by SessionCam. Users are never actively told that their electronic communications are being wiretapped by SessionCam. 34. Further, as the 2017 Princeton University study researchers recognized, “the extent of data collected by these services far exceeds user expectations; text typed into forms is collected before the user submits the form, and precise mouse movements are saved, all without any visual indication to the user. This data can’t reasonably be expected to be kept anonymous.” 35. Therefore, users like Plaintiff never consent to being wiretapped by SessionCam when they access the Website. 37. Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. On information and belief, members of the Class number in the thousands. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendants. 38. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, whether Defendants have violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 631 and 635, and invaded Plaintiff’s privacy rights in violation of the California Constitution; and whether class members are entitled to actual and/or statutory damages for the aforementioned violations. 39. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class because the named Plaintiff, like all other class members, visited the Website and had his electronic communications intercepted and disclosed to SessionCam through the use of SessionCam’s wiretaps. 41. The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Class members. Each individual Class member may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendants’ liability. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendants’ liability. Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for consistent adjudication of the liability issues. 42. Plaintiff brings all claims in this action individually and on behalf of members of the Class against Defendants. 43. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 44. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. 46. Section 631(a) is not limited to phone lines, but also applies to “new technologies” such as computers, the Internet, and email. See Matera v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 8200619, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (CIPA applies to “new technologies” and must be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose of protecting privacy); Bradley v. Google, Inc., 2006 WL 3798134, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (CIPA governs “electronic communications”); In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing dismissal of CIPA and common law privacy claims based on Facebook’s collection of consumers’ Internet browsing history). 48. At all relevant times, by using SessionCam’s technology, Defendants intentionally tapped, electrically or otherwise, the lines of internet communication between Plaintiff and Class Members on the one hand, and Foot Locker’s Website on the other hand. 49. At all relevant times, by using SessionCam’s technology, Defendants willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, read or attempted to read or learn the contents or meaning of electronic communications of Plaintiff and putative class members, while the electronic communications were in transit or passing over any wire, line or cable or were being sent from or received at any place within California. 50. As SessionCam notes on its website, “When an end user session is recorded by the SessionCam script, SessionCam starts by recording event data locally in the browser. Every few seconds, this local event data is packaged up and sent to SessionCam recording servers in the form of bundles.” Such local recording is plainly occurring in real-time, and is, at worst, “transitory electronic storage” that is “part of the overall transmission process,” which has been held to constitute communications “in transit.” 51. Indeed, SessionCam offers website operators the ability to “Go Live” with currently active website sessions (i.e., users still have the website open on their browser), which would not be possible if SessionCam was not recording users in real time. 52. Defendants aided, agreed with, and conspired with each other to implement SessionCam’s technology and to accomplish the wrongful conduct at issue here. In addition, Foot Locker employed SessionCam to accomplish the wrongful conduct at issue here. 54. The violation of section 631(a) constitutes an invasion of privacy sufficient to confer Article III standing. 55. Unless enjoined, Defendants will continue to commit the illegal acts alleged here. Plaintiff continues to be at risk because he frequently uses the internet for shopping, and he continues to desire to use the internet for that purpose. Defendant SessionCam provides its software, including the Session Replay feature, to many other website operators who offer a wide array of services. For many websites that Plaintiff may or is likely to visit in the future, he has no practical way to know if his website communications will be monitored or recorded by SessionCam. 56. Plaintiff and Class Members seek all relief available under Cal. Penal Code § 637.2, including injunctive relief and statutory damages of $5,000 per violation. 57. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. 61. At all relevant times, by implementing SessionCam’s wiretaps, each Defendant intentionally manufactured, assembled, sold, offered for sale, advertised for sale, possessed, transported, imported, and/or furnished a wiretap device that is primarily or exclusively designed or intended for eavesdropping upon the communication of another. 62. SessionCam’s code is a “device” that is “primarily or exclusively designed” for eavesdropping. That is, the SessionCam’s code is designed to gather PII, including keystrokes, mouse clicks, and other electronic communications. 63. Plaintiff and Class Members did not consent to any of Defendants’ actions in implementing SessionCam’s wiretaps. 64. Unless enjoined, Defendants will continue to commit the illegal acts alleged here. Plaintiff continues to be at risk because he frequently uses the internet for shopping, and he continues to desire to use the internet for that purpose. Defendant SessionCam provides its software, including the Session Replay feature, to many other website operators who offer a wide array of services. For many websites that Plaintiff may or is likely to visit in the future, he has no practical way to know if his website communications will be monitored or recorded by SessionCam. 66. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. 69. Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in: (1) precluding the dissemination and/or misuse of their sensitive, confidential PII; and (2) making personal decisions and/or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion or interference, including, but not limited to, the right to visit and interact with various Internet sites without being subjected to wiretaps without Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ knowledge or consent. 70. At all relevant times, by implementing SessionCam’s wiretaps on Foot Locker’s Websites, each Defendant intentionally invaded Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ privacy rights under the California Constitution, and procured the other Defendant to do so. 71. Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation that their PII and other data would remain confidential and that Defendants would not install wiretaps on the Website. 72. Plaintiff and Class Members did not consent to any of Defendants’ actions in implementing SessionCam’s wiretaps on the Website. 73. This invasion of privacy is serious in nature, scope and impact. 75. Plaintiff and Class Members seek all relief available for invasion of privacy claims under California’s Constitution. I. Overview Of The Wiretaps Invasion Of Privacy Under California’s Constitution Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 631 Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 635

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1. Plaintiff Holt Healthcare Management Services, Inc., brings this action to secure redress for the actions of Defendant Gaither Technologies STC, LLC (“Gaither Technologies”), in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Gaither Technologies STC, LLC is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 12. Gaither Technologies, as the entity who products or services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 13. Gaither Technologies either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 14. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 15. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 16. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 17. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 18. The TCPA provides for affirmative defenses of consent or an established business relationship. Both defenses are conditioned on the provision of an opt out notice that complies with the TCPA. Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2013). 19. On information and belief, defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 3 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source 1 and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 21. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 22. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 23. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 24. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 4 25. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 26. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 27. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 36. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 37. Defendant engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 7 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 38. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 39. Defendant engaged in an unfair practice by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 40. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 41. Defendant engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 42. Defendant’s conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave Defendant an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 43. Defendant’s shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, Defendant’s conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 44. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 8 52. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 53. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, Defendant 10 converted to its own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 54. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 55. By sending the unsolicited faxes, Defendant appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Defendant knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 57. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 58. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 66. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 67. Defendant’s sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes was an unreasonable invasion of the property of plaintiff and the class members and constitutes a private nuisance. 68. Congress determined, in enacting the TCPA, that the prohibited conduct was a “nuisance.” Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Automotive Network, Inc., 401 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2005). 69. Defendant acted either intentionally or negligently in creating the nuisance. 70. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 71. Defendant should be enjoined from continuing its nuisance. 13 79. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 80. Plaintiff and the class members were entitled to possession of the equipment they used to receive faxes. 15 81. Defendant’s sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes interfered with their use of the receiving equipment and constitutes a trespass to such equipment. Chair King v. Houston Cellular, 95cv1066, 1995 WL 1693093 at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1995) (denying a motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's trespass to chattels claim for unsolicited faxes), vacated on jurisdictional grounds 131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997). 82. Defendant acted either intentionally or negligently in engaging in such conduct. 83. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 84. Defendant should be enjoined from continuing trespasses. 85. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Gaither Technologies STC, LLC, promoting its goods or services for sale (d) which did not contain a compliant opt out notice. By “compliant opt out notice” is meant one (i) on the first page of the fax (ii) that states that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine (iii) that states that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as determined by the Federal Communications Commission, is unlawful; (iv) that provides instructions on how to submit an opt out request and (v) that includes a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number and a cost-free mechanism for the recipient to transmit such a request to the sender that permit a request to be made at any time on any day of the week. 16 86. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 87. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. Whether Defendant thereby committed a trespass to chattels. 88. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 89. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 9. On January 11, 2017, Holt Healthcare Management Services, Inc., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 2 90. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 91. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against Defendant for: 17 a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. /s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Dulijaza Clark INTRODUCTION

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!Violat ion o(tbc New York Lab or Law! 21. Defendants SA TINDER SHARMA and A.J!T BAINS hire emp loyees to work as manage rs and supervisors lo participate in the day-to-day operation of each of the Brick Lane restaurants. 24. Although defendants SATINDER SHARMA and AJIT BAlNS provide managers and supervisors with some authority to effectively rw1 the day-to-day operations of the Corporate Defendants, including hiring and firing employees, defendants SA TINDER SHARMA and AJIT BAINS must approve all crucial business decisions, including decisions concerning the number of hours employees work, the amount of pay that employees are entitled to receive, the manner and method by which employees are to be paid, and whether employees are entitled to a pay raise and, if so, the amount of the increase. 25. In or about November 2014, defendant GAURANG GANDHI, through autl1ority granted to him by defendants SA TINDER SHARMA and AJIT BAINS, hired Plaintiff to work as a non-exempt dishwasher, porter, food preparer/kitchen helper, and food deliver worker at Defendants' Indian restaurant known as Brick Lane Cuny House, located at 1664 Third Avenue, New York, New York. 26. Defendants occasionally instructed Plaintiff to work at their Indian restaurant, known as Brick Lane Cuny House, located at 235 East 53'd Street, New York, New York. 27. Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in those capacities until approximately on or about June 20, 2015. 29. Throughout the entirety of his emp loyment, Plaintiff worked six (6) days per week, and his work schedu le consisted of twelve (12) hours per day on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday, from 11 :00 a.m. until I I :00 p.m.; and seven (7) hours per day on Sunday. from 4:00 p.m. until 11 :00 p.m. Plaintiff normally received one( !) sixty (60) minute meal break per day, except on Sundays. 30. From the beginning of his employment and continuing through approximate ly February 2015, Plaintiff was not paid proper minimum wages or overtime compensation. During this period, Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $350 per week straight time for all hours worked , and worked sixty-two (62) hours per week (for a regular rate of pay of $5.65 per hour). Work performed above forty ( 40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time a11d one-ha lf as required by state and federa l law. 31. Beginning iu or about April 2015 and continuing through the remainder of his emp loyment on or about June 20, 2015, Plaintiff was not paid proper minimum wages or overtime compe nsation. During this period, Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $320 per week straight time for aJI hours worked, and worked sixty-two (62) hours per week (for a regular rat.e of pay of $5.16 per hour). Work performed above forty (40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half as required by state and federa l law. 32. If Plaintiff missed a day of work, Defendan ts deducted money from his weekly ,,,1ages. 34. Tbe Corporate Defendants ai·e engaged in related activities performed by the Defendants for a common business purpose. 35. The Corporate Defendants utilized Plaintiff and other similarly situated emp loyees in a fungible and interchangeable manner as workers in the businesses operated by the Defendants. 36. The Corporate Defendants each engage in related activities, namely, providing restaurant services to the general public for profit. 37. The Corporate Defendants shared Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, act in the interest of each other with respec t to employees, pay their employees by the same method, share control over the employees , and are themselves under common control. 39. Plaintiff's job performance and respons ibilities, as well as the responsibilities of other similarly situated employees, was controlled by one person or group of perso ns, corpora tions, or other organizational units acting 10gether. 40. An arrangement existed between the Corpo rate Defendants, whereby each entity agreed to share the services of Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees . 41. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 42. Defendants lrnowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plain tiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of lime and one- hall), in direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 43. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employee s "spread of hours" premium for each day that they work a shift in excess of ten ( 10) hours, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 45. Plaintiff brings this action individua lly and as class representative . on behalf of himself and all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants since June 29, 20 12 (the "Co llective Action Period"), and who were compensated al rates less than the statutory minimum wage and/or less than time and one-ha lf for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek (the "Collective Action Members"). 46. Upon infom1ation and belief, the collect ive. action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently withfo the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) Collective Action Members who worked for the Defendants during the Collective Action Per iod, most of whom would not be likely to file individual sttits because they lack adequate financial resources. access to attorneys , or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 2 l6(b). 47. Plaintiff w ill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is exper ienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 49. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and eftfoient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all membe rs is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and bltrden of individua l litigation make it virtually imposs ible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collect ive act ion. 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement conta ined in paragrap hs " I" through "62" of this Complai nt as if fully set forth herein. 64. Al all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employe r engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production or goods for coorn1erce within the meaning of the fLSA , 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and the Col.lective Action Members are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a) . 66. Upon information and beliet: at all relevant times. each of the Corporate Defendants has had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 67. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members worked hours for which they were not paid the statutory minimum wage. 68. Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy and practice of refusing LO pay the statuto1y minimum wage to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for hours worked. 69. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members minimum wages in the lawful amount tor hours worked. 70. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were entitled to be paid at the rate of lime and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 71. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation in the la1vful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 72. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing Lo pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one- half LO Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess or forty ( 40) hours per work week. which violated and continues to violate the fLSA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 20 I, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)( I) and 21 S(a). 74. As a result of the Defendants' failure to properly record, report, cred it and/or c-ompensa te its employees, including Plaint iff and the Colleclive Action Membe rs, the Defendants have failed to make. keep and preserve records with respect to each of it~ employees sufficient to determine the wages , hours and other conditions and practic es of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.A.§§ 20 1, et seq., includin g 29 U.S.C. §§ 2 1 l{c) and 2 l5(a). 75. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Collective Action Mem bers of their rights under the FLSA . 76. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants ' violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA. 77. Due to the reckless, willfu l and unlawful acts of the Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members suffere d damages in an amount not presently ascertainab le of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid over time compensatio n, an equal amount as liqu idated damages. and prejudgment interest thereon . 78. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Memb ers are entitled to an award of their reasonabl e attorneys' fees, cos ts and expenses, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2 16(b). 80. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning oJ'New York La bor Law§§ 2 and 651. 81. Defendants knowingly and willfu lly viola ted the rights of Plaintiff and members of the Class by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 82. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class membe rs by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class members overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of fo1ty ( 40) hours in a workweek. 83. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (I) additiona l hour's pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6. 84. Defendants knowingly and willfully v.iolated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class mem bers by foiling to pay "spread of hours" premium to Plaintiff and the Class members for each day they worked in excess of ten ( I 0) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 85. Detendants foiled to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Class members of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 87. Defendan ts fai led to keep true aod accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other sim.ilar information in contrave ntion of New York Labor Law § 661. 88. Defondants foiled to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payro ll records show ing the hours worke d, gross wages , deduct i.ons, and net wages for each employee, in cont ravention of lhe New York Labo r Law § I 94( 4), and New York State Department of Labor Regu lations § 146-2.1. 89. At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notif'y Plaintiff and the Class members of their rates of pay and their regu larly designate d payday , in cont ravention of New York Labor Law§ 195( I). 90. Due to the Dele ndants' New York Labor Law violations , Pla intiff and the Class membe rs are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensatio n, and unpaid "sp read of hours" prem ium, reasonable attorneys ' l'ees, and cos ts and disburseme nts of this action , pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 663( I), 198. I Violation of the Fair Labor Sta ndards Act]

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25. On April 12, 2018, Defendant, using an automated text-messaging platform, caused a text message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 0087 (“0087 Number”). An accurate copy of the text message is included below: 26. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing/advertising because it promotes Defendant’s business, goods, services and CoolSculpting® procedure. 27. The text messages originated from telephone number 800-234-3325, a number which is owned and operated by Defendant. 29. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 30. Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 31. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 32. Plaintiff is the subscriber and user of the 0087 Number. 33. The generic nature of Defendant’s text messages establishes that Defendant utilized an ATDS to transmit the messages. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. 36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, advertising Defendant’s goods or services, without the recipients’ prior express written consent. 38. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 42. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-46 above, as if fully set forth herein. 48. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 50. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and/or to dial such numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 51. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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11. On or about January 8, 2020, Defendants began using Plaintiff’s cellular telephone (501-XXX-X856)2 for the purposes of sending Plaintiff political messages via mobile messaging services and sent a text message again on January 9, 2020, and January 10, 2020. 12. On or about January 13, 2020, Plaintiff texted “STOP” to 866-201-1348. 13. On or about February 17, 2020, Plaintiff received a text from 833-676-4569 with the words “FIFTH AND FINAL NOTICE: Your deadline to support President Trump has been extended to 11:59PM and you are ELIGIBLE for 5x-matched support. http://bit.ly/Fifth5X.” 14. Plaintiff received at least four (4) texts from Defendants, with at least one text being sent to her after she texted “STOP” to the January 10, 2020 text message. Those texts are attached as Exhibit A to this complaint. 15. The text messages were sent from phone numbers 1-(866) 201-1348 and 1-(833) 676-4599. 16. When dialing back the number above, one is greeted with an automated voice that states “the number you’ve dialed cannot be completed as dialed.” The call is then automatically disconnected. Such an automated response is indicative of technology that constitutes an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 18. The text messages placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. The telephone number that Defendants, or its agent messaged was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 20. These text messages constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 21. As of January 8, 2020, Plaintiff did not provide Defendants or its agents with prior express consent to receive unsolicited text messages, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 22. These messages by Defendants, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 23. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ careless, negligent, intentional and reckless conduct, as described more fully herein, Defendants are directly and affirmatively liable for the serious and permanently disabling injuries suffered by the Plaintiff, for which she seeks compensation in excess of the amount required for federal diversity jurisdiction. VI. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated in (“the Class”). 25. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited text messages and/or any other unsolicited text messages from Defendants without prior express consent. 27. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants, either directly or through their agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an unsolicited text message, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges, reduced battery life, or reduced cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 28. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 29. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records or Defendants’ agents’ records. 31. As a person that received at least one unsolicited text message without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 32. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrong conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 33. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 35. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 39. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 41. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 42. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. IX. 51. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 52. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 53. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 54. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 55. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 9. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Arkansas. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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14. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid minimum wage, overtime compensation, and liquidated damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on his own behalf as well as those in the following collective action: 5 Current and former employees of Defendants who, during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as non-managerial employees who give consent to file a claim to recover damages for: (1) overtime compensation that is legally due to them for the time worked in excess of forty hours per week; and/or (2) minimum wages that are legally due to them for the time worked in excess of forty hours per week (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 15. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; were subject to the same laws and regulations; were paid in the same or similar manner; were required to work in excess of forty hours each workweek; were not permitted to record all of their hours worked; were not paid at an amount equal to the minimum hourly required rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty for every week worked; and were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 16. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the minimum hourly required rate of pay per hour for all hours worked, as well as the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposefully and willfully chose not to do so. 17. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty, or at the minimum wage rate for each hour worked. 6 18. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those who are similarly-situated who, during the applicable statutory period, Defendants subjected to violations of the NYLL and 29. Defendant Zarboutis controls, owns, operates, and makes all managerial decisions, including the manner of compensating employees and the hours that the Defendants require their employees to work. 30. Defendant Zarboutis has final say over all managerial decisions and exercises that authority on a daily basis with respect to Defendant Diner. 31. Defendant Diner is a diner located at 4420 Sunrise Highway, Massapequa, New York 11758. 32. Plaintiff’s employment at Defendant Diner spanned from in or around May 1981 until in or around September 2012, when Defendants terminated Plaintiff. 33. Plaintiff was sixty-two years old at the time Defendants terminated him. 10 34. Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a busboy, kitchen helper, and dishwasher, with his principal responsibilities being to perform manual labor, cleaning, kitchen, and busboy duties for Defendants. 35. Throughout Plaintiff’s entire period of employment, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did in fact work, sixty hours each week, all for Defendants’ benefit. 36. Throughout Plaintiff’s entire employment with Defendants, Defendants paid Plaintiff an amount totaling between approximately $420 to $470 per week for the first forty hours that he worked each week, which amounts to regular rates of pay between approximately $10.50 and $11.75. Defendants did not pay to Plaintiff any compensation for hours worked above forty each workweek. 37. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis with part of his compensation in cash and the other part by check. 38. Defendants did not record and did not permit Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs to record their hours worked. 39. Defendants acted in this reckless manner in an effort to maximize their profits and minimize labor costs. 40. On the occasions when Defendants paid Plaintiff, Defendants intentionally did not furnish Plaintiff with statements that accurately listed all of the following: Defendants’ telephone number(s); Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay; Plaintiff’s overtime rate of pay; the number of hours Plaintiff worked; and the basis for computing Plaintiff’s rates of pay. 41. Defendants intentionally did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of hire or on an annual basis containing all of the following information: Plaintiff’s rate or rates of pay and basis thereof; whether Plaintiff was paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, 11 commission, or other; whether any allowances are claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by Defendants; the name and physical address(es) of Defendants; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; and Defendants’ mailing address(es) and telephone number(s). 42. Defendants temporarily closed their business on or about September 2012 for renovations and reopened on or about December 2012. 43. Plaintiff had been an employee at the time of that the renovations commenced. 44. Upon completion of the renovations, Defendant Zarboutis, on behalf of Defendant Diner, terminated Plaintiff because of his age, informing him at the time of the termination that Plaintiff was “too old” and “must be tired” due to his age. 45. Plaintiff was and is fully capable of performing the duties of the position. 46. Defendants replaced Plaintiff with an individual almost twenty-five years younger than him. 47. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 49. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 12 50. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours each week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 51. The Defendants’ actions were in willful violation of the FLSA. 52. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to their overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 53. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs for the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 54. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) prescribes a minimum wage that employers must pay to their employees for each hour worked. Minimum wage under the FLSA during all relevant times ranged from $5.85 to $7.25 per hour. 56. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 57. As also described above, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs at the minimum hourly rate required by the FLSA for all hours worked. 58. Defendants’ actions were willful violations of the FLSA. 59. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to payment at the minimum wage for every hour they worked for Defendants pursuant to the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 13 60. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. 61. Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 62. NYLL § 160 and the executing provisions of 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 63. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL, while Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL. 64. As also described above, Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours each week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in accordance with the NYLL’s and NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. 65. The Defendants’ actions were in willful violation of the NYLL and NYCCRR. 66. Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 67. Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs for the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL’s and NYCCRR’s overtime provisions. Minimum Wage Violations of the FLSA Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA Unpaid Overtime under the NYLL and NYCCRR

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6.12 Plaintiff and the Class Members are subject to a single policy and pay plan that they were/are misclassified as exempt and paid the same amount no matter how many hours they worked. Defendant had a plan/policy in place which applied to Plaintiff and the Class Members that they were not to be compensated overtime compensation for any hours worked over forty (40) hours per week. 6.11 As Field Service Technicians, Plaintiff and Class Members regularly work/worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek. Neither he nor any of the other Class Members had authority to (nor did they): manage an enterprise, hire or fire other employees, set the pay rates of other employees, create policies or procedures to govern Defendant’s employees, handle employee grievances, determine the type of equipment or materials that Defendant could use in its operations, enter into contracts on behalf of Defendant or otherwise have operational control over Defendant’s business operations and practices. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not perform office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Defendant or its customers, nor did they exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the conduct of Defendant’s business. In fact, Plaintiff and the class members spent much of their time performing manual labor. 6.16 Throughout Plaintiff’s tenure working for Defendant, Field Service Technicians were subject to the same pay policy/plan described herein, work/worked overtime hours, and were/are not compensated in accordance with the FLSA by Defendant. Over the past three (3) years there have been other Field Service Technicians who were subject to the same policy and plan as described herein. Plaintiff is aware of other individuals who worked/currently work as Field Service Technicians and were/are not compensated in accordance with the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. 6.1 Plaintiff worked as a Field Service Technician for Defendant Rosen in Houston, Texas. He was misclassified by Defendant as exempt from overtime compensation however, he was expected to work over forty (40) hours per work week. He reported to and was supervised by Defendant’s Operations/Field Services Manager (Joe Coleman and Phillip Colborn). Other individuals who work/worked with Plaintiff, performed the same or similar job duties, were/are paid the same and were/are titled Field Service Technician. 6.13 Plaintiff and the Class Members were at all times “non-exempt” employees and eligible to receive overtime pay pursuant to Section 207 of the FLSA. 6.14 Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt from receiving overtime compensation. Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and the Class Members were/are working over forty (40) hours per work week. 6.2 As a Field Service Technician, Plaintiff’s primary duties included but were not limited to, loading trailers, strapping down all the equipment on the trailer, filling out forms with the start and stop times for the inspections, unloading the trailer to get the equipment in the pipeline and driving or transporting the tool used to do the inspection in the pipeline. All Field Service Technicians employed by Defendant performed these job duties or substantially similar job duties. 6.3 Plaintiff and the Class Members were not required to have a degree or any specific certifications to perform their job other than certificates of completion received after completing some training provided by Defendant. Plaintiff and the Class Members were not required to have a CDL license. When driving 6.5 During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant there were about forty (40) Field Service Technicians working out of the Houston, Texas office. 6.6 Defendant dictated what hours Plaintiff worked, provided the tools for him to do his job, told him what work he was required to complete and the specifications on how the work was to be completed. Throughout the duration of his employment Plaintiff worked over forty (40) hours per work week. The overtime Plaintiff worked was necessary to meet the demands of the job. On average, Plaintiff and the Class Members work/worked approximately 12-15 hours per day (sometimes more), 6 days per week. 6.7 Defendant controlled all the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendant determined Plaintiff’s pay rate, the schedule he worked, and the policies and procedures Plaintiff and the other Class Members are/were required to follow. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also subject to the same pay policy where they were misclassified as exempt and paid a biweekly salary. 6.8 In order to perform their job duties, Plaintiff and the Class Members follow procedures that are outlined in Defendant’s manuals and checklists. Any deviation from such procedures, if necessary, must first be approved by the Field Service Manager/Supervisor(s). Plaintiff and the Class Members are not allowed to make unilateral decisions about the tasks assigned or the manner in which such tasks are completed without the approval of their supervisor/Field Service Manager. 6.9 Plaintiff and the Class Members do/did not have the authority to make unilateral decisions regarding the work assigned by Defendant. 7. 7.1 Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 7.2 Plaintiff brings this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of himself and all other persons employed by Defendant as Field Service Technicians within three (3) years from the filing of this suit who, like Plaintiff, (1) have not been compensated for all hours worked and/or (2) have not been compensated at one and a half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work week. 7.3 Defendant classified/classifies and paid/pays all of its Field Service Technicians in the manner described herein. Defendant maintained a common pay practice or policy and the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 7.5 The damages for each individual can easily be calculated using the same methodology and formula although the exact amount of the damages may vary. 7.6 Defendant possesses the names and addresses of Class Members in its records. The Class Members should be allowed to receive notice about this lawsuit and given an opportunity to join. Like Plaintiff, these similarly situated workers are entitled to recover their unpaid wages, overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and other damages. Therefore, notice is appropriately sent to the following class: All Field Service Technicians that worked for Defendant at any time during the three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit to the present that worked over forty (40) hours in any workweek. 7.7 Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt from receiving overtime compensation, failed to pay them wages for all hours worked and failed to pay them overtime wages required by the FLSA for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per work week. 7.8 Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and the Class Members in accordance with the FLSA was willful as that term is defined by Section 255(a) and was not based on a good faith belief that its conduct complied with the FLSA. Therefore, the three (3) years statute of limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ damages in this case. 8.

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(AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR FAILING TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL CONTROLS) 103. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the preceding and subsequent paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 104. As alleged herein, each of the Individual Defendants has a fiduciary duty to, among other things exercise good faith in their roles as directors of the Company and to act in the interests of the Company’s shareholders. For the reasons described above, the Individual Defendants have failed to act in the interests of the Company’s shareholders by failing to implement necessary internal controls to ensure the Company disseminates accurate and complete information to the Company’s shareholders and the broader investment community, including ahead of shareholder votes to elect Board members. 105. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants’ failure to perform their fiduciary obligations, AMD has sustained significant damages, not only monetarily, but also to its corporate image and goodwill. 106. As a result of the misconduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants are liable to the Company. 107. Plaintiff, on behalf of AMD, has no adequate remedy at law. (AGAINST ALL THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR ABUSE OF CONTROL) 114. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 115. The Individual Defendants’ misconduct alleged herein constituted an abuse of their ability to control and influence AMD, for which they are legally responsible. In particular, the Individual Defendants abused their positions of authority by failing to implement internal controls necessary to the proper running of the Board in the interests of all the Company’s shareholders. 116. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants’ abuse of control, AMD has sustained significant damages. 117. As a result of the misconduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants are liable to the Company. 118. Plaintiff, on behalf of AMD, has no adequate remedy at law. (DERIVATIVE CLAIM ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY AGAINST ALL INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF 14(a) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND SEC REGULATIONS) 37. According to AMD’s latest annual report filed with the SEC on or about February 19, 2015 (the “2015 Annual Report”), the Company is a global semiconductor company offering primarily two products within the semiconductor industry; (1)‘x86 microprocessors’, used as standalone devices or incorporated as an accelerated processing unit (“APU”), chipsets, discrete graphics processing units (“GPUs”) and professional graphics; and (2) server and embedded processors, dense servers, semi-custom System-on-Chip (“SoC”) products and technology for game consoles. 38. Semiconductors are components used in a variety of electronic products and systems. An integrated circuit (“IC”) is a semiconductor device that consists of many interconnected transistors on a single chip. According to the 2015 Annual Report, since the invention of the transistor in 1948, improvements in IC process and design technologies have led to the development of smaller, more complex and more reliable ICs at a lower cost-per-function. The 2015 Annual Report states that a microprocessor is an IC that serves as the central processing unit (“CPU”) of a computer, generally consisting of hundreds of millions or billions of transistors that process data and control other devices in the system, acting as the “brain” of the computer. 91. Plaintiff brings this action derivatively in the right and for the benefit of AMD to redress injuries suffered, and to be suffered, by AMD as a direct result of the breaches of fiduciary duty, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets and unjust enrichment, as well as the aiding and abetting thereof, by the Individual Defendants. AMD is named as a nominal defendant solely in a derivative capacity. This is not a collusive action to confer jurisdiction in this Court that it would not otherwise have. 92. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent the interests of AMD and its shareholders in enforcing and prosecuting its rights. 93. Plaintiff is the owner of AMD common stock and was the owner of AMD common stock at all times relevant to the Individual Defendants’ wrongful course of conduct alleged herein. 94. At the time that this action was commenced, the Board consisted of the Individual Defendants. 96. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as though they were set forth in full herein. 97. This claim is brought under Section 14 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9. 98. Section 14 of the Exchange Act prohibits the solicitation of any proxy in contravention to the rules promulgated thereunder. COMPANY BACKGROUND

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13. Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation is a private gaming corporation that owns and operates casinos, hotels, and golf courses under several brands. The company, based in Nevada, is the largest gaming company in the world, with yearly revenues of approximately 10.8 billion. Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation owns and operates the following casinos in Atlantic City: Bally’s Atlantic City, Caesars Atlantic City, Harrah’s Atlantic City and Showboat. 14. Defendant Bally’s Park, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc., which is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation. 16. At all times mentioned in this Complaint, Defendants were engaged in the business of legalized gambling; in connection with such business, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce by drawing patrons from outside the state of New Jersey, purchasing gambling equipment and other gambling paraphernalia from outside the state of New Jersey, and conducting other such activities outside the state of New Jersey. 17. Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK and all non-exempt casino employees of Defendants were required to perform various tasks for the benefit of Defendants without compensation, including attending meetings called “Buzz Sessions,” which were held pre-shift, during lunch breaks or post-shift. 18. During the relevant time period, Defendants enforced policies that required Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK and others similarly situated to work off-the-clock for which they were not compensated in violation of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a et seq. Defendants also employed Plaintiff, and members of the proposed class for many work weeks longer than forty (40) hours and knowingly and willfully failed and refused to compensate each individual for such work week in excess of forty (40) hours at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rates at which they were employed, contrary to provisions of N.J.S.A. 34:56a4. 20. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following class: All non-exempt casino employees of Defendants who, at any time during the statutory period, were not compensated for all time worked and/or all overtime worked. 21. Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK is a member of the Class she seeks to represent. 22. Numerosity. The potential members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. The precise number of potential class members has not been determined, but there are at 7,000 employees currently employed by Defendant Bally’s Park Place, Inc. with an unknown number of others who have been employed by Defendant Caesars Entertainment Corporation at its Atlantic City casinos within the applicable liability period, and who have had their rights violated by Defendants’ unlawful scheme. 24. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK are typical of the claims of the Class she seeks to represent. The illegal practices that have denied Plaintiff of her rights under New Jersey law are the same practices that have and will continue to deny the rights of Class members. Plaintiff will seek the same types of damages, restitution and other relief as the Class members. 25. Adequacy of Class Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. 26. Adequacy of Class Counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions and have prosecuted labor and employment cases involving similar issues. 28. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 27 are incorporated herein by reference. 29. Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK brings this claim on behalf of herself and the members of the Class for relief against Defendants pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a for payment of their full earned wages and all wages earned to them and on behalf of herself and members of the Class. 30. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4, Plaintiff and the proposed Class were entitled to the payment of their full wages for each hour or portion thereof that they worked in the amount promised by their contract of employment and were entitled to the full payment of any wages required by any statute or regulation. 31. Additionally, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4, Plaintiff and the proposed Class were entitled to the payment of not less than 1 ½ times their regular hourly rate for each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week. 32. Further, Defendants were required by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a20 to establish and maintain records of the hours worked and the wages paid to each employee. 34. Plaintiff ROSEMARY CLARK on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, demands judgment against Defendants for unpaid wages, overtime wages, compensatory damages along with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and such other statutorily and other relief as the Court deems proper and just. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, as set forth herein below. VIOLATIONS OF NEW JERSEY WAGE AND HOUR LAWS (By Plaintiff Rosemary Clark Against All Defendants)

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39. “Defined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today.” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 255 (2008). In the private sector, such plans have largely replaced the defined benefit pension plans that were America’s retirement system when ERISA was enacted in 1974. The consulting firm Towers Watson studied Fortune 100 companies from 1985 to 2012, and found that the type of retirement plan offered by the companies has essentially flipped over the last 3 decades. Whereas in 1985, 89 of the Fortune 100 companies offered a traditional DB plan, in 2012, only 11 of the Fortune 100 companies offered defined benefit plans to newly hired employees. Thus, defined contribution plans have become America’s retirement system. 40. A fundamental difference between traditional pension plans and defined contribution plans is that in the former the employer’s assets are at risk. In a defined contribution plan, it is the employees and retirees’ funds at risk. 42. Most of the fees assessed to participants in a defined contribution plan are attributable to two general categories of services: plan administration (including recordkeeping), and investment management. Since the early 2000s, managed account services make up a third category of fees assessed to participants. These expenses “can sometimes significantly reduce the value of an account in a defined- contribution plan.” Id. 43. The plan’s fiduciaries have control over these expenses. The fiduciaries are responsible for hiring administrative service providers, such as recordkeepers, and negotiating and approving those service providers’ compensation. The fiduciaries also have exclusive control over the menu of investment options to which participants may direct the assets in their accounts. Those selections each have their own fees which are deducted from the returns that participants receive on their investments. The fiduciaries are responsible for hiring managed account providers and negotiating and approving those service providers’ compensation. 45. The entities that provide services to defined contribution plans have an incentive to maximize their fees by putting their own higher-cost funds in plans, collecting the highest amount possible for recordkeeping and managed account services, rolling Plan participants’ money out of the Plan and into proprietary IRAs, soliciting the purchase of wealth management services, credits cards and other retail financial products, and maximizing the number of non-Plan products sold to participants. For each additional dollar in fees paid to a service provider, participants’ retirement savings are directly reduced by the same amount, and participants lose the potential for those lost assets to grow over the remainder of their careers. Accordingly, participants’ retirement security is directly affected by the diligence used by plan fiduciaries to control, negotiate, reduce the plan’s fees, and safeguard plan assets. 47. Defined contribution fiduciaries determine the available investment options in a plan. Each investment option is typically a pooled investment product, such as a mutual fund, and invests in a diversified portfolio of securities in a broad asset class such as fixed income, bonds, or equities. 48. Defendants select investment options into which participants’ investments are directed. Defendants also select those investment options that are removed from the Plan. These investments are designated by Shell Defendants as designated investment alternatives offered under the Plan. 51. A fiduciary “has a continuing duty to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent ones.” Tibble, 135 S. Ct. at 1828. Defined contribution plan fund selections must be the result of a detailed due diligence process that considers factors such as risk, investment return, and expenses of available investment alternatives, and the fiduciary must give “appropriate consideration” to “the role the investment or investment course of action plays . . . in the plan’s investment portfolio,” 29 C.F.R. §§2550.404a-1(b)(i)-(ii). Fiduciaries cannot discharge their duties “by the simple expedient of including a very large number of investment alternatives in its portfolio and then shifting to the participants the responsibility for choosing among them.” Hecker, 569 F.3d at 711. This removes the benefit of pooling assets consistent with the size of the Plan. A. Shell Defendants used an obsolete, imprudent structure for the Plan’s investment menu. 52. Since 2014, Shell Defendants have retained over 300 designated investment options in the Plan, most of which are Fidelity’s proprietary mutual funds. Shell Defendants refer to these investments as the “Fund Window.” 53. Shell Defendants agreed to allow Fidelity to automatically put its mutual funds in the Plan without any initial screening process by Shell Defendants to determine whether the funds are prudent options for participants to invest their retirement assets. 55. At all relevant times, each investment in the “Fund Window” was a designated investment alternative in the Plan that required oversight by the Plan’s fiduciaries. 56. Despite failing to monitor or remove any fund in the Fund Window, Shell Defendants utilized their discretion and made decisions related to investments in the Fund Window. For example, among others, as of December 31, 2014 the Plan retained the Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund—Class K mutual fund in the Fund Window. By December 31, 2018, the Shell Defendants caused the Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund to move to a commingled pool structure. 57. By 2012, only a few Fidelity clients still used an investment structure similar to the Plan’s Fund Window, and Fidelity no longer offered the investment structure to new clients. Consultants and legal advisors throughout the industry told those very few plan sponsors that retained fund windows that they had a duty to monitor funds in the window and remove imprudent ones. 59. Despite including over 300 funds in the Plan, Shell Defendants did not monitor any funds in the “Fund Window” and failed to remove any funds from the fund window. 60. By 2014, similarly situated fiduciaries who diligently monitored and reviewed their plans’ investments had eliminated fund windows and transferred the assets in such windows to investments in similar asset classes within their plans’ core menu of approximately 13 to 16 investments (not including target date funds). 62. Apart from the imprudent structure of the unmonitored Fund Window, Shell Defendants’ failure to regularly monitor and review each of the Plan’s designated investment options on an ongoing basis caused the Plan to retain numerous funds that consistently failed to meet performance objectives, exposed plan participants to excessive unmonitored risks, lacked a sufficient performance history to conduct due diligence, or experienced other significant negative qualitative events such as departures of key investment personnel. Had Shell Defendants conducted the type of investment process used by knowledgeable and diligent fiduciaries of similar defined contribution plans, these options would have been eliminated from the Plan or replaced. Shell Defendants’ failure to do so caused the Plan substantial losses compared to prudent alternative investments that were available to the Plan. 65. Shell Defendants also failed to monitor mutual fund performance for investments in the Plan. For example, the Templeton Developing Markets Trust significantly underperformed its prospectus benchmarks for the 1-, 5- and 10-year periods in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.7 Other prudent investment professionals reviewed this type of information and took action by removing the fund from their plans. Indeed, many other Plan sponsors removed the Templeton Developing Markets Trust mutual fund from their plans during this period. However, Shell Defendants did not evaluate this investment to determine whether it should be removed from the Plan after many years of significant underperformance. Instead, by December 31, 2015 over $2.5 million in Plan assets remained in the Templeton Developing Markets Trust and $3.4 million by December 31, 2018.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a baby products company that owns and operates www.adenandanais.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in August of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.adenandanais.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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29. EQT is “the largest producer of natural gas in the United States … with emphasis in the Appalachian Basin and operations in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio[.]”1 30. To complete its business objectives, EQT hires personnel, such as Heaster, to perform inspection services. 31. EQT considers Heaster and the Putative Class Members to be contractors. 32. But EQT does not hire these workers on a project-by-project basis. 33. Rather, EQT hires and treats these workers just like regular, even if sometimes short term, employees. 34. Many of these individuals worked for EQT on a day rate basis (without overtime pay). 35. These workers make up the proposed Putative Class. 36. For example, Heaster worked for EQT as a Landman from approximately October 2016 until April 2018. 37. As a Landman, Heaster’s primary job duties include making phone calls to land and mineral rights owners, setting up appointments with these owners, visiting the land to facilitate contracts and lease agreements, and submitting paperwork. 38. Heaster did not have any supervisory duties. 39. Heaster did not hire for fire employees. 41. Heaster was a blue-collar worker. 42. Throughout his employment with EQT, he was classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day rate basis. 43. Heaster and the Putative Class Members work for EQT under its day rate pay scheme. 44. Heaster and the Putative Class Members do not receive a salary. 45. If Heaster and the Putative Class Members did not work, they did not get paid. 46. Heaster and the Putative Class Members receive a day rate. 47. Heaster and the Putative Class Members do not receive overtime pay. 48. This is despite the fact that Heaster and the Putative Class Members often work more than 10 hours a day, for as many as 7 days a week, for weeks at a time. 49. Although Heaster typically worked up to 7 days a week, for 10 or more hours a day, he did not receive any overtime pay. 50. Heaster and the Putative Class Members received the day rate regardless of the number of hours they worked, and even if they worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 51. Without the job performed by Heaster and the Putative Class Members, EQT would not be able to complete its business objectives. 52. Heaster and the Putative Class Members relied on EQT for work and compensation. 53. Heaster and the Putative Class Members worked in accordance with the schedule set by EQT and/or its clients. 54. Heaster and the Putative Class Members cannot subcontract out the work they are assigned by EQT. 56. Heaster and the Putative Class Members’ work must adhere to the quality standards put in place by EQT and/or its clients. 57. Heaster and the Putative Class Members did not substantially invest in the tools required to complete the overall job to which they were assigned. 58. Heaster and the Putative Class Members did not market their services while employed by 92. Heaster brings this claim as a collective action under the FLSA. 93. The Putative Class Members were victimized by EQT’s pattern, practice, and/or policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. 94. Other Putative Class Members worked with Heaster and indicated they were paid in the same manner (a day rate with no overtime) and performed similar work. 95. Based on his experiences with EQT, Heaster is aware that EQT’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 96. The Putative Class Members are similarly situated in all relevant respects. 97. The Putative Class Members are blue-collar workers. 98. Even if their precise job duties might vary somewhat, these differences do not matter for the purposes of determining their entitlement to overtime.

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19. Excluded from the Class are all claims for wrongful death, survivorship and/or personal injury by Class members. Also excluded from the Class is Mercedes Benz, any entity in which Mercedes Benz has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, heirs, and successors. 28. Mercedes Benz designed and manufactured the Rims installed on the Vehicles as original manufacturer’s equipment. 29. As demonstrated below, Mercedes Benz spent millions of dollars on print advertisements, television commercials, and website graphics and videos extolling the virtues and strength of its Vehicles, and specifically the Rims. These advertisements explicitly and implicitly endorsed and represented that the Rims were of a quality and strength to operate under normal driving conditions, and even under off-road conditions. 30. Mercedes Benz’s promotional literature and advertisements are replete with still graphics, illustrations and video footage depicting Mercedes Benz Vehicles equipped with the Rims operating not only under normal driving conditions, but traversing treacherous off-road terrain, including desert and mountain landscapes. Moreover, these depictions are not limited to sport utility vehicles, but include Mercedes Benz cars as well. 32. Mercedes Benz’s 2006 Accessory and Wheel catalog makes the following claim regarding all Mercedes Benz wheels, including the Rims: In technical terms, every Genuine Mercedes-Benz and AMG wheel is state-of-the-art. Each is crafted of a proprietary aluminum alloy formula that meets our exceedingly high original equipment requirements for strength and durability with minimal weight. That’s crucial, because wheels are a significant part of your vehicle’s unsprung mass, where every pound saved con-tributes directly to more dynamic and comfortable performance. After all, it’s the wheels of your vehicle that transfer power to the road; mile after mile, bend after bend. Besides the material used to manufacture the wheel, and its weight, dimensions such as rim diameter, rim width, offset, backspacing and bolt circle are critical factors that must be considered when matching any custom wheel to your vehicle. We have developed each and every one of our wheels to preserve or to optimize the driving characteristics of a specific Mercedes-Benz model. Further, our wheels are subjected to load tests which exceed statutory requirements. Considering the importance and complexity of wheels, it’s no wonder that Mercedes-Benz engineers devote so much attention and scrutiny to them. A wheel only earns the name Genuine Mercedes-Benz when we are convinced that it will meet our high standards for safety, dependability and performance – not to mention aesthetics – and make your vehicle even more special. In short, Genuine means premium quality. 33. Contrary to the representations made by Mercedes Benz, the Rims bend, deform, dent, warp or fracture in ordinary driving conditions, in the complete absence of driving-related trauma, or when traversing even extraordinarily slight road irregularities. 34. The Rim failures result from the defective design and/or manufacture of the Rims alone, and/or a defect resulting from combining the Rims with other components of the Vehicles. 36. These defects alone, or when combined with other factors, cause the Rims to fail under normal driving conditions and render the Rims, and therefore the Vehicles, unsafe and unfit for their intended use. 37. Despite these defects, and resulting Rim failures, Mercedes Benz has refused to repair or replace the Rims under its Warranty. 38. Mercedes Benz Vehicles are warranted by a 48 month/50,000 mile Warranty. The Warranty provides as follows: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) warrants to the original and each subsequent owner of a new Mercedes-Benz passenger car that any authorized Mercedes-Benz Center will make any repairs or replacements necessary, to correct defects in material or workmanship arising during the warranty period. 39. The Warranty documentation specifically states that Mercedes Benz’s “intention is to repair under warranty, without charge to you, anything that goes wrong with your car during the warranty period which is our fault.” 40. Notably, the Warranty does not disclaim defects in the material or workmanship of the Rims. 41. Because the defective Rims require repairs before the expiration of four years and 50,000 miles, the Warranty obligates Mercedes Benz to repair or replace them. 43. Mercedes Benz’s refusal to honor the Warranty harms Plaintiffs and the Class by forcing them to expend time and incur out-of-pocket costs to repair or replace the defective Rims although they should be covered by the Warranty. 44. Based on information it had, should have had, or of which it was aware or should have been aware, Mercedes Benz knew the Rims were designed and/or manufactured so that they could not withstand normal driving conditions and, as a result, the Rims would fail under normal driving conditions and were accordingly defective. 45. The federal government’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) complaint database reveals that the Rims easily fail under normal driving conditions and that Mercedes Benz will not replace the failed Rims under its Warranty program. Specifically, the NHTSA database illustrates the type of bending, warping, cracking and fracturing to which the Rims are prone, and shows Mercedes Benz’s blatant disregard for the Warranty and potential safety hazards presented by the defective Rims. 49. The complaints are illustrative of the type of complaints common between Plaintiffs and other Class members. Regardless of the Vehicle’s make or model, the complaints are strikingly similar, each demonstrating that the Rims fail regularly, under normal driving conditions, and that Plaintiffs and the Class have incurred, will incur, or will continue to incur, out-of-pocket costs associated with repairing or replacing the defective Rims on each of their Vehicles. The complaints also demonstrate that although Mercedes Benz was made aware of the defect, it continues to deny Warranty coverage for the Rim failures. 51. By contrast, the defect present in the Rims was not known or reasonably discoverable by Plaintiffs and the Class prior to purchase of the Vehicles. Plaintiffs and the Class had to experience the defect first-hand, thereby exposing them to an unreasonable safety risk. 52. Because the Rims often fail within the time period and mileage covered by the Warranty, Mercedes Benz is required to provide replacement parts or repairs necessary to correct the defective parts. 53. Rather than provide the remedy prescribed by the Warranty, however, Mercedes Benz has actively concealed the defect present in the Rims from consumers. Mercedes Benz has also engaged in a campaign of piecemeal correction, refunding all or a portion of the cost of replacement Rims only where convenient or where customer relationships perceived by Mercedes Benz to be essential so demand, in an attempt to further cover up the fact that the Rims are defective. 54. Notwithstanding Mercedes Benz’s knowledge of numerous Rim failures and the defective material and design of the Rims, Mercedes Benz failed and continues to fail to advise potential and/or current owners or lessees of Vehicles of the defective nature of the Rims – that they are known to bend, warp or even break under normal driving conditions – and instead has engaged in a calculated pattern and practice to hide the true nature of the Rim failures. 56. Mercedes Benz knew that potential car buyers and lessees would deem the defect in the Rims to be material such that reasonable consumers who knew of the defect either would have paid less for the Vehicles or would not have purchased or leased them at all. 57. Had Plaintiffs and the Class been advised of the defects present in the Rims, or the fact that Mercedes Benz would refuse to honor its Warranty, Plaintiffs and the Class would not have purchased Vehicles or would have paid substantially less for them. 58. To make matters worse, the Mercedes Benz Operators Manual specifically warns of the detrimental effects and dangers associated with use of tires and Rims that are not “Mercedes Benz Original equipment.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Class cannot substitute the Rims in order to alleviate the problems or potential dangers posed by their defects. 66. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, relied in good faith upon Mercedes Benz’s written representations and warranties in making their determination to purchase or lease their Mercedes Benz vehicles. 68. With the purchase or lease of each vehicle, Mercedes Benz specifically and uniformly warranted in writing that any part of the subject vehicle that proved to be defective would be replaced by Mercedes Benz at no cost to Plaintiffs or members of the Class. 69. Mercedes Benz has breached its express warranties to Plaintiffs and the Class members in that the Rims do not perform as represented by Mercedes Benz. 70. Mercedes Benz has also breached its express warranties to Plaintiffs and Class members in that Mercedes Benz failed and continues to fail to replace and/or repair the Rims that proved defective under normal driving conditions. 72. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiffs and the other Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 74. Mercedes Benz is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of Sections 2301(4)-(5). 75. The Vehicles are “consumer products” within the meaning of Section 2301(1). 76. Mercedes Benz’s express warranty is a “written warranty” within the meaning of Section 2301(6). 78. Mercedes Benz’s breach of the express warranty has deprived the Plaintiffs and the other Class members of the benefit of their bargain. 79. The amount in controversy of the Plaintiffs’ individual claims meets or exceeds the sum or value of $25. In addition, the amount in controversy meets or exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit. 80. Mercedes Benz has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure its breach of written warranty, including when Plaintiffs and other Class members brought their vehicles in for replacement of the defective Rims. 81. As a direct and proximate result of Mercedes Benz’s breach of its express written warranties, Plaintiffs and the Class members have suffered damages and other losses in an amount to be determined at trial. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled are entitled to recover damages, consequential damages, specific performance, diminution in value, costs, attorneys’ fees, rescission, and/or other relief as appropriate. 82. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 84. Mercedes Benz used, by means of an affirmative act, an unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, in connection with the advertisement or sale of its Rims and Vehicles with the capacity and/or intent to mislead or deceive Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8- 1, et seq. (the “New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act”). 85. In addition, Mercedes Benz knowingly concealed, suppressed, omitted, left out, or did not mention important or significant facts purposely or with the intent that Plaintiffs and the Class would rely on that concealment, suppression and/or omission in connection with the sale or advertisement of its Rims or Vehicles in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Plaintiffs and the Class relied upon the facts as communicated to them without having the opportunity to also consider the facts which were concealed, suppressed, or omitted when they purchased or leased their Mercedes Benz Rims and Vehicles. 86. As a direct and proximate result of Mercedes Benz’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class members have suffered or will suffer damages, which include, without limitation, the diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ vehicles, costs to inspect, repair, and/or replace the Rims, and reimbursement of the costs and expenses already expended by Plaintiffs and the Class members as a result of the failed Rims in an amount to be determined at trial. BREACH OF WRITTEN WARRANTY PURSUANT TO THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

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10. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 11. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: a) Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants that violate 3 the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter sent to hundreds of persons; b) There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation whether the defendants violated various provisions of the FDCPA as alleged more fully below; c) Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. d) Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. e) Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained competent attorneys to represent the Class. f) A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. g) A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as 4 monetary damages. If Defendants’ conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. h) Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 20. All preceding paragraphs are re-alleged. 21. Section 15 U.S.C. §1692e of the FDCPA provides that: “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 22. The November 9 Letter contains a false and misleading statement, in advising consumers that they may raise a complaint regarding defendant’s debt collection practices at the website www.speakoutohio.gov. In fact, no such website exists. 23. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 24. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 9. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of herself and all similarly situated New York consumers and their successors in interest. The Class consists of: a) All New York residents who were sent letters from Defendant, b) in connection with a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), purportedly owed to Chase Bank USA, N.A., and c) in which the following language appears: “If you have a complaint about the way we are collecting this debt, please contact the Ohio Attorney General’s office online at www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov or www.speakoutohio.gov.” The class excludes all persons in bankruptcy proceedings. FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENT 15 U.S.C. §1692e

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10. In the last four years, United began placing automated telephone calls to Plaintiff on her cellular telephone at telephone number XXX-XXX-5758 regarding the Loan. 11. United called Plaintiff from telephone numbers 646-783-4330, 800-833-1940, 646-783-4319, and 646-462-4902. 12. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“autodialer”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 13. When Plaintiff answered the calls from United, she heard a prerecorded voice message asking Plaintiff to “please hold” for the next available representative. After the message the calls would be routed to a live agent. When Plaintiff did not answer the calls, United left blended prerecorded/automated voice messages in her voice-mailbox stating: “This is an important message for Isaiah Evans. Please have Isaiah Evans call United Auto Credit at . . . .” This is indicative of United’s use of a “predictive dialer,” an autodialer under the TCPA. 14. Plaintiff does not owe a debt to United. Plaintiff has never done business with United. Plaintiff did not give her number to United or permit Isaiah Evans to do so. Plaintiff did not provide prior express consent to United to autodial her cellular telephone. Accordingly, the automated calls placed by Defendant to Plaintiff were in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 16. Nonetheless, United continued to place automated, prerecorded voice calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone. 17. Plaintiff was annoyed, frustrated, and inconvenienced by United’s calls. United’s calls often distracted Plaintiff from her work or from caring for her children. United called from several different numbers and Plaintiff was unable to successfully screen the calls. 18. The telephone number called by Defendant was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs charges for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 19. The calls from Defendant to Plaintiff were not placed for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 20. Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf the following classes (the “Classes”): TCPA Class: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) United placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an autodialer or a prerecorded voice (5) within four years of the complaint (6) where United did not have express consent to call said cellular telephone number. Willful/Knowing Violation Class: (1) All persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) United placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) using an autodialer or a prerecorded voice (5) within four years of the complaint (6) after said person had advised United to cease calling. 22. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but based upon the size and national scope of United and the automated nature of the calls, Plaintiff reasonably believes that the Classes number in the thousands. 23. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendant. 24. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over any questions that affect only individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: i. Whether United engaged in a pattern of using an autodialer to place calls to cellular phones; ii. Whether United had prior express consent to place the calls; and iii. Whether United willfully violated the TCPA. 25. As a person who received automated telephone calls from United on her cellular phone without having given prior express consent, and who advised United to cease calling, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Classes. 27. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. The interest of individual Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages for violation of the TCPA are small in comparison to the costs and expenses of litigation of such claims. Management of these claims is likely to present few difficulties because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their cellular telephones as United did not attempt to obtain consent required by the TCPA prior to placing the calls. 28. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class appropriate. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 29. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 30. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and the Classes. 31. United made automated telephone calls to the wireless telephone number of Plaintiff and the other Class members. These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of Plaintiff or the other Class members and were not made for emergency purposes. 33. Each of the aforementioned calls by United constitutes a violation of the TCPA. 34. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call made in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 35. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 36. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: • Defendant violated the TCPA; • Defendant used an autodialer; and • Defendant placed calls to the Plaintiff and the Class without prior express consent. 37. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 38. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and the Class. 39. United made automated telephone calls to the wireless telephone number of Plaintiff and the other Class members. These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of Plaintiff or the other Class members and were not made for emergency purposes. 40. United has therefore violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), which makes it “unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” 41. Each of the aforementioned calls by United constitutes a willful violation of the 9. Plaintiff’s acquaintance “Isaiah Evans” obtained an auto loan from United (the “Loan”). Plaintiff was not a debtor or co-signer on the Loan.

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12. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: • All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from ARS, which included the alleged conduct and practices described herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 15. Sometime before January 30, 2018, Plaintiff allegedly incurred financial obligations to EMERGENCY PHYSICIAN ASSOCIATES OF SOUTH JERSEY, PC 33. Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 34. Defendant’s collection letters and/or notices would cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused as to his or her rights. 35. Defendant’s letters were designed to cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused as to his or her rights. 36. The content of Defendant’s letter was designed to cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused about what Defendant meant by the statement that: “account(s) are delinquent and may have been reported to the credit bureaus.” 37. The content of Defendant’s letter was designed to cause a false sense of urgency for the least sophisticated consumer to pay the obligation. 38. Defendant’s letter would cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused as to whether every account listed in the January 30, 2018 letter would be eligible to be reported to credit bureaus. 39. The January 30, 2018 letter’s use of the word “may” does not remove from the realm of possibility that the least sophisticated consumer would be deceived into thinking that every account listed in the January 30, 2018 letter would be eligible to be reported to credit bureaus. 40. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 42. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by creating a false sense of urgency to pay the debts to avoid an impact to his credit file. 43. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that each and every account was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 44. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 69920525 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 45. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 69979834 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 46. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 71094327 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 47. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing that account number 69920525 was within the seven year period to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 48. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing that account number 69979834 was within the seven year period to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 50. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character or legal status of the debt. 51. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 69920525 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 52. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 69979834 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 53. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that account number 71094327 was eligible to be reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 54. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing to Plaintiff that the each and every account was eligible for being reported to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 55. Section 1692e(5) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. 56. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA by falsely threatening to post information regarding account number 69920525 to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 58. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA by falsely threatening to post information regarding account number 71094327 to one or more of the national credit reporting agencies. 59. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 60. Defendants actions and conduct described herein violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 61. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 62. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 63. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to receive proper notices mandated by the FDCPA. 64. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were sent letters which have the propensity to affect their decision-making with regard to the debt. 65. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS RESOLUTION SERVICES; and JOHN DOES 1- 25, Defendant(s). Plaintiff, KEITH STACKHOUSE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) by and through his undersigned attorney, alleges against the above- named Defendant, HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC D/B/A ARS ACCOUNT RESOLUTION SERVICES (“ARS”), JOHN DOES 1-25 their employees, agents, and successors (collectively "Defendants") the following:

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10. The debt at issue (the “Consumer Debt”) is a financial obligation Plaintiff incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 11. The Consumer Debt is a “debt” governed by the FDCPA and FCCPA. See 15 U.S.C §1692a (5); Fla. Stat. §559.55(6). 12. Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C §1692a(3). 13. FHC is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA and FCCPA. See 15 U.S.C §1692a (6); Fla. Stat. §559.55(7). 14. On a date better known by FHC, it began attempting collect the Consumer Debt from Plaintiff. 15. On or about June 28, 2018, FHC sent a collection letter to Plaintiff (the “Collection Letter”) in an attempt to collect the Consumer Debt. A copy of the Collection Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” 16. The Collection Letter constitutes “collection activity” within the meaning of §559.715 of the FCCPA. 18. FHC’s collection activities against Plaintiff constituted a criminal misdemeanor under Florida law. See, Fla. Stat. § 559.785. 19. Florida law specifically and unequivocally states: [a]fter January 1, 1994, no person shall engage in business in this state as a consumer collection agency or continue to do business in this state as a consumer collection agency without first registering in accordance with this part, and thereafter maintaining a valid registration. Fla. Stat. § 559.553(1). 20. The FCCPA defines “consumer collection agency” as “any debt collector or business entity engaged in the business of soliciting consumer debts for collection or of collecting consumer debts, which debt collector or business is not expressly exempted as set forth in s. 559.553(4).” Fla. Stat. § 559.55(7). 21. FHC is a “consumer collection agency” as defined by the FCCPA because it is a debt collector and collects consumer debts through the mail from Florida consumers. 23. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. 559.553(1) and 559.55(7), FHC was required to be licensed as a consumer collection agency by the State of Florida. 24. Since the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in LeBlanc, at least two Judges in the Southern District of Florida have ruled that collection activity by an unlicensed debt collector violates the FDCPA. See Balthazor v. Security Credit Services, LLC, 2012 WL 171097, *3 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 20, 2012) (Cohn, J.); Collins v. Erin Capital Management, LLC, Case No. 1:12-cv-22839-CMA (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Altonaga, J.) (Order dated Oct. 28, 2013). 25. Based upon an online license search last conducted on September 28, 2018 at the website maintained by the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, FHC has never been licensed to collect consumer debts in the State of Florida.2 26. Plaintiff maintains that FHC’s unlicensed collection activity is unlawful; Plaintiff has filed the instant lawsuit alleging that any and all of FHC’s debt collection activities taken against the Plaintiffs and members of the class were in direct violation of the FDCPA and/or Florida law. 27. Defendant FHC knew or should have known that it was not licensed as a Consumer Collection Agency, yet Defendant never disclosed to any consumer that it was in fact a crime for FHC to directly or indirectly collect upon the Consumer Debt. 29. Any potential bona fide error defense which relies upon FHC’ mistaken interpretation of the legal duties imposed upon them by the FDCPA would fail as a matter of law. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2010). 30. This action is brought on behalf of the following class: The Unlicensed Debt Collection Class: (i) all persons in the State of Florida (ii) who were sent a letter (iii) between June 28, 2017 and June 28, 2018 (iv) from Defendant (v) in an attempt to collect a debt incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, (vi) while Defendant was not licensed to collect debt in Florida. 31. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because Defendant have dispatched thousands of identical dunning letters to members of the class attempting to collect consumer debts. A. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist to the class and predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. 34. Excluded from the class are Defendant’s agents and employees, Plaintiff’s attorneys and their employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family. 40. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding Factual Allegations. 41. Under Count I, FHC is liable to Plaintiff for its attempt to collect debts while unlicensed. 42. FHC’s failure to obtain a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553, while actively engaging in debt collection in the State of Florida, violated 15 U.S.C § 1692e and e(10) because attempting to collect a debt while not licensed as required by Florida law is a false, deceptive, and misleading practice. 43. FHC’s failure to obtain a consumer debt collection license as mandated by Florida Statutes § 559.553, while actively engaging in debt collection in the State of Florida, violated 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A) because attempting to collect a debt and/or actually collecting a debt while not licensed as required by Florida law constitutes a false representation of the character and legal status of the debt. VIOLATION OF THE FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq.

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12. At all times relevant to the complaint herein, Defendant engaged in telecommunications by means of telephone facsimile machines as defined by the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant regularly advertises its goods and services to recipients by transmitting fax advertisements. 14. Upon information and belief, the faxes were sent by means of a telephone facsimile machine that has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or onto paper, and send thousands of faxes per day to facsimile numbers that were preselected by Defendant. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no procedure or means for recipients who do not consent to receiving the faxes to stop receiving them. 16. In this instant case, Defendant had no prior established business relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had never in the past used Defendant’s services, nor given Defendant consent to receive unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. 17. Within four (4) years prior to the commencement of this action, Defendant, or a third party agent acting on behalf of Defendant, willfully and knowingly transmitted facsimiles to Plaintiff that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. 19. Defendant’s facsimile advertisement further failed to properly advise Plaintiff of the right, method or process of how to opt-out of receiving further such facsimile advertisements from Defendant in the future. See Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C and Exhibit D. 20. Plaintiff did not give Defendant, or any third party acting on behalf of Defendant, prior express invitation or permission to transmit the aforementioned facsimiles, thereby rendering them unsolicited. 21. Plaintiff did not agree to make available its facsimile number for advertisement in a directory. 22. Defendant transmitted at least four (4) unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes. 24. Defendant’s failed to provide the proper notice to Plaintiff and the putative class members of the method and/or process of how to opt-out of receiving such future facsimile advertisements with the all of the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 26. Defendant, whose products or services were advertised, or whose clients’ and/or agents’ products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of these faxes. 27. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Classes, consisting of: a. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agents(s) and/or employee(s) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. b. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s) where said advertisements failed to properly notify the recipient of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 31. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 32. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 33. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Classes predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any unsolicited fax advertisements to a Class member; b. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any fax advertisement to a Class member which failed to properly advise the recipient of an ability to opt-out of receiving such future fax advertisements from Defendant; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and d. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 35. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Classes will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 36. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 37. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state laws. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 38. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 41. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 42. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 45. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 47. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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39. Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all persons who were wrongfully arrested and charged with at least one count of disorderly conduct on September 15, 16 or 17, 2012 by police officers while they were engaged in expressive speech activity in connection with Occupy Wall Street activities. 40. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. Based on information made publicly available by the NYPD, at least 220 people had their First Amendment rights interfered with and were arrested without articulable criminal conduct. 43. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class. Like the other members of the class, the Plaintiffs were victims of the NYPD’s policy, practice, and/or custom of arresting individuals engaged in expressive speech activity absent actual criminal conduct. 44. The legal theories under which the Plaintiffs seek relief are the same or similar to those on which all members of the class will rely, and the harms suffered by the Plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by the class members. 45. The Plaintiffs have a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action, have no conflicts of interests with members of the class, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs have all been arrested for expressive speech activities absent actual criminal conduct and are members of, or otherwise participated in, the Occupy Wall Street movement. Furthermore, they are engaged citizens interested in utilizing and protecting their First Amendment rights as guaranteed under the United States Constitution. 47. The Plaintiff class should be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to class members, the interests of the Plaintiffs and potential class members are aligned, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the case. 48. The Plaintiffs were participants in the Occupy Wall Street movement. 49. OWS, among other things, protests the institutionalized inequality that funnels political power, wealth, and resources to a tiny fraction of people and their corporations, and denies the vast majority of ordinary Americans and people their fair share. In particular, OWS sought, and seeks, to bring attention to the unfair way in which ordinary people are allowed to suffer terrible hardship due to mortgage debt, student loan debt, or lack of affordable healthcare, as politicians and businessmen blame these people for “irresponsibility,” while huge banks were rescued from any consequences of their own decision-making and actions by government bailouts funded by those same ordinary people’s taxes. 51. During this period, the NYPD continually arrested members of OWS for peaceful protest activity. For example, on September 19, 2011, individuals associated with OWS marched from Zuccotti Park to the financial center area and back to Zuccotti Park. During this march, NYPD Inspector Edward Winski reached across a police barricade and tried to drag an individual over the barricade. The New York Times wrote about this arrest and the police statements regarding the conduct underlying this arrest: Another man was arrested, and the police initially said he was charged with jumping a police barrier and resisting arrest. But a reporter and a photographer for the [NY T]imes who witnessed and documented the episode between the man in the orange hat and the police did not see him attempting to jump a barrier. Late in the afternoon, the police said the man was charged with committing disorderly conduct by impeding pedestrian traffic, not with jumping a barrier. 52. The following day, September 20, 2011, a slightly rainy morning, Inspector Edward Winski, along with other officers, entered Zuccotti Park and unlawfully ordered the OWS media team to remove protective tarps from its computers and video- gear. 53. Approximately three (3) individuals were arrested on that date, and sued Inspector Edward Winski and the City of New York, for the unlawful arrests. 54. Initially, Inspector Edward Winski reported that the tarps had been hanging from trees and this allegation was part of the criminal complaint. However, after the District Attorney of New York was alerted to video of the incident, a superseding complaint was filed removing the allegation that the tarps were tied to trees. 56. Over the course of the following year, numerous similar altercations occurred between the police and OWS, many resulting lawsuits for improper arrests and the improper actions of the police towards protesters, including, among other things, pepper spraying individuals engaged in expressive speech activities.4 57. Despite the numerous altercations and resulting arrests, most of the arrests culminated in dismissals, ACD’s, or declined prosecutions. For example, on October 14, 2011 the City of New York sought to physically remove Occupy Wall Street from Zuccotti Park. Hundreds of people flocked to the park to defend it from this physical eviction. After an announcement that the NYPD would stand down and that the park would not be cleared, fifteen (15) individuals were arrested but the arrests ultimately resulted in twelve (12) dismissals, ACD’s, or declined prosecutions. 59. There were twenty-one (21) arrests on this date that resulted in fifteen (15) dismissals, ACD’s, declined prosecutions and/or acquittals. 62. As the dismissal record of the cases against OWS protestors shows, the majority of the people arrested had not done anything wrong. 63. Indeed, further proof of the improper policing of members of Occupy Wall Street can be seen by the voluminous litigation that has arisen related to the improper policing of the constitutionally protected expressive speech activity. 64. Since 2011, more than eighty (80) separate litigations have been filed in the Southern District of New York alone. Approximately fifty (50) of these litigations have been settled at a cost in excess of $1,500,000 dollars, not including the defense costs associated with these matters. 65. Seventeen (17) of these litigations were filed before September 15, 2012, and the First Anniversary of OWS. FALSE ARREST 169. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 170. Plaintiffs were arrested by the members of the NYPD without probable cause, without a warrant, and without the Plaintiff’s consent. 171. As a result of the above constitutionally impermissible conduct, Plaintiffs and the class suffered violations of their civil rights, loss of liberty, and other special damages. 172. As a result of the police officers’ impermissible conduct, the Plaintiffs demand judgment against the City of New York and the Chief Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, along with punitive damages, together with attorney’s fees and costs. OCCUPY WALL STREET

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16. Merchco provides “retail installation solutions” across “the continental United States, Puerto Rico, Alaska and Hawaii.”1 17. In each of the past 3 years, Merchco’s gross revenues have exceeded $5 million. 18. It has a “base of full-time employees located in 38 states[.]”2 19. Its employees routinely handle materials (e.g., tools) produced for commerce. 21. To provide its services, Merchco employs carpenters, merchandisers, installers, and project leads.3 22. Until recently, Merchco paid these workers on day-rate basis. 23. For example, Merchco employed Bresko (a Day Rate Worker) as a carpenter from approximately September 2012 to January 2019. 24. Bresko’s job duties included installing wall systems, counters, and display cases, as well as performing custom millwork. 25. Bresko provided these services in multiple states across the nation. 26. Merchco paid Bresko under its day-rate pay plan. 27. By late 2018, Bresko’s day rate was $300 a day. 28. In the two-week period ending September 22, 2018, Bresko worked 102 hours over 11 days. 29. Merchco paid Bresko a total of $3,300. 30. This is equal to 11 days times Bresko’s day rate of $300 a day. 31. But Merchco dressed up its paystubs to suggest Bresko was being paid an “hourly rate” plus “overtime” with a “bonus.” 32. But the “bonus” varied so Bresko always earned the same “day rate” for each day that he worked. 34. This, of course, totals $3,300 (exactly what you would expect given that he worked 11 days at a day-rate of $300). 35. Bresko’s pay always reflected the number of days that he worked times his day-rate. 36. Merchco paid Bresko this way until the end of 2018. 37. Merchco’s efforts to conceal the way it was paying its employees reflects its knowledge of the FLSA’s overtime requirements and a conscious effort to evade those requirements. 38. Merchco knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its day-rate pay policy violated the FLSA. 39. Merchco treated all Day Rate Workers as W-2 employees. 40. Merchco paid all Day Rate Workers according to the same day-rate plan. 41. Merchco’s policy of paying the Day Rate Workers a day rate, with no overtime pay, violates the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.112 (explaining how overtime is to be paid to day-rate employees). 42. Merchco’s day-rate plan affects the Day Rate Workers in a similar manner because they are each owed overtime pay for the same reason. 43. Bresko and the other Day Rate Workers are similarly situated for the purposes of their overtime claims. 44. The collective action class is, therefore, properly defined as: All Day Rate Workers employed by Merchco in the past 3 years. 46. Merchco owes Bresko and the other Day Rate Workers the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. 47. Because Merchco knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practice violated the FLSA, it owes these wages for at least the past three years. 48. Merchco also owes Bresko and the other Day Rate Workers an amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 49. Bresko and the other Day Rate Workers are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action.

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52. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 53. Defendants paid Plaintiff and the Collective Members a sub-minimum wage, ostensibly according to the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA, which allow an employer to pay an hourly wage less than the statutory minimum wage, provided that the employer complies with the requirements of the tip credit provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) 54. Defendants paid Plaintiff and the Class Members a sub-minimum wage, ostensibly according to the tip-credit provisions of the NMSA Minimum Wage Act and the AMWO, which allow an employer to pay an hourly wage less than the statutory minimum wage, provided that the employer complies with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions of NMSA NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). 55. Defendants paid their tipped employees–including Plaintiff and the Collective Members–sub-minimum, tip-credit wages without informing them of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 56. Therefore, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions and thus cannot avail itself of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA. 58. Therefore, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions and thus cannot avail themselves of the tip-credit provisions of the NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). 59. Defendants did not allow Plaintiff and the Collective Members to retain all tips they earned, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 60. During approximately May 2020, Defendants engaged in the practice of compensating Plaintiff and the Collective Members the full minimum wage while retaining all tips provided to Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 61. As a result, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C 206(a) and the CAA. 62. Thereafter, Defendants reduced Plaintiff and the Collective Members’ wages down to $5.65 per hour without notifying Plaintiff or the Collective Members of their intent to do so. 63. As a result, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) and thus cannot avail themselves of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA. 64. Defendants did not allow Plaintiff and the Class Members to retain all tips they earned, in violation of NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). 65. During approximately May 2020, Defendants engaged in the practice of compensating Plaintiff and the Class Members the full minimum wage while retaining all tips provided to Plaintiff and the Class Members. 67. As a result, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). and thus cannot avail themselves of the tip-credit provisions. 68. Defendants engaged in the practice of deducting $3.55 from Plaintiff and the Collective Members’ wages for each shift they worked to cover the cost of a meal, regardless of whether or not Plaintiff or the Collective Members ate during their shift. 69. Such policy on Defendants’ part violated the FLSA because the deductions from Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ paychecks brought their wages below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 70. Defendants engaged in the practice of deducting $3.55 from Plaintiff and the Class Members’ wages for each shift they worked to cover the cost of a meal, regardless of whether or not Plaintiff or the Class Members ate during their shift. 71. Such policies on Defendants’ part violated the FLSA because the deductions from Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ paychecks brought their wages below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). 72. Plaintiff left her employment with Defendants on or about June 20, 2020. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff her final paycheck. 73. As a result, Plaintiff was not compensated any wage whatsoever for her final two weeks of work for Defendants. 75. Therefore, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff at least the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in her final two weeks of work for Defendants, in violation of NMSA Minimum Wage Act and the AMWO. 76. Plaintiff and the Collective Members bring the FLSA claims in this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 77. Plaintiff asserts those claims on behalf of herself and on behalf of all similarly situated tipped employees employed by Defendants, who were not paid all compensation required by the FLSA during the relevant time period as a result of Defendants’ compensation policies and practices. 78. Plaintiff seek to notify the following employees of their rights under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to join this action by filing in this Court written notice of their consent to join this action: All individuals who worked at any time during the past three years at any restaurant owned or operated by Defendants in the job position of server and who were paid for their work on an hourly basis according to the tip credit provisions of the FLSA, (i.e. an hourly rate less than the applicable minimum wage, excluding tips). 79. The FLSA provides for a three-year statute of limitations for causes of action arising out of a willful violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255. As alleged above, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees’ claims arise out of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA. Accordingly, the Court should require appropriate notice of this action be given to all tipped employees employed by Defendants within three years from the filing of this Complaint. 81. The identities of these employees, as a group, are known only to Defendants. Because the numerous members of this collective action are unknown to Plaintiffs, joinder of each member is not practicable. 82. Because these similarly situated tipped employees are readily identifiable by Defendants and may be located through their records, they may be readily notified of this action and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their FLSA claims. 83. Collective adjudication is appropriate in this case because the tipped employees whom Plaintiffs wish to notify of this action have been employed in positions similar to Plaintiff; have performed work similar to Plaintiff; and have been subject to compensation practices similar to those to which Plaintiff has been subjected, including unlawful payment of sub-minimum wages for non-tipped work and unlawful application of the FLSA’s tip credit provisions. 84. Plaintiff brings her New Mexico wage claims as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of the following Class Members: The Class Members are all of Defendants’ current and former servers who were paid an hourly rate of less than the New Mexico minimum wage on account of their receiving tips, starting three years before this lawsuit was filed up to the present. 86. Typicality. Plaintiff claims are typical of the Class Members because like the Class Members, Plaintiff was subject to Defendants’ company-wide policies and practices and was compensated in the same manner as the other Class Members. Defendants regularly withheld tips from Plaintiff and the Class Members while continuing to compensate them at a rate below the applicable minimum wage. As a result, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members minimum wage for all hours worked. 87. As a result of such policy and practice by Defendants, Defendants violated the minimum wage provisions of NMSA § 50-4-22. 88. Adequacy. Plaintiff is a representative party who will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class Members because it is in her interest to effectively prosecute the claims in this Complaint in order to obtain the unpaid wages and penalties required under New Mexico law. Plaintiff has retained attorneys who have expertise in both class actions and wage and hour litigation. Plaintiff does not have any interest that may be contrary to or in conflict with the claims of the Class Members she seeks to represent. 90. Common issues of law include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendants properly paid all minimum wages due and owing to Plaintiff and the Class Members; b. Whether Defendants were entitled to impose a tip credit on the wages of Plaintiff and the Class Members; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to compensatory damages; d. The proper measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class Members; and e. Whether Defendants’ actions were “willful.” 91. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit. Even in the event any of the Class Members could afford to pursue individual litigation against a company the size of Defendants, doing so would unduly burden the system. Individual litigation would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and burden the court system with duplicative lawsuits. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying judicial results and establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 93. This type of case is well-suited for class action treatment because: (1) Defendants’ practices, policies, and/or procedures were uniform and company-wide; (2) the burden is on Defendants to prove it properly compensated its employees; (3) the burden is on Defendants to accurately record hours worked by employees; and (4) the burden is on Defendants to prove it properly imposed the tip credit upon its employees. 94. Ultimately, a class action is a superior forum to resolve the New Mexico state law claims set forth in this Complaint because of the common nucleus of operative facts centered on the continued failure of Defendants to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members according to applicable New Mexico laws. 95. Nature of Notice to be Proposed. As to the Rule 23 Class Members, it is contemplated that notice would be issued giving putative class members an opportunity to opt out of the class if they so desire, i.e. an “opt-out notice.” Notice of the pendency and resolution of the action can be provided to the Class Members by mail, electronic mail, print, broadcast, internet, and/or multimedia publication. 97. Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff and the Collective Members of (1) the amount of the tip credit being claimed by Defendants; (2) that the amount claimed by Defendants must not exceed the value of the tips actually received by Plaintiff and the Collective Members; and (3) that all tips received by Plaintiff and Collective Members must be retained by the Plaintiff and the Collective Members in the absence of a valid tip pooling arrangement limited to employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. As such, Defendants were not entitled to apply the tip credit to the wages paid to Plaintiff and the Collective Members. 98. In approximately May 2020, Defendants reduced Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ hourly wage from the full minimum wage down to $5.65 per hour without providing them notice of their intent to do so. As a result, Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members the full minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF TIP CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF IMPROPER DEDUCTIONS FROM WAGES 125. Plaintiff and the Class Members reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 126. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of automatically deducting $3.55 from Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ wages for each and every shift that Plaintiff and the Class Members worked to pay for food regardless of whether or not Plaintiff or the Class Members ate during that shift or not. Such policy and practice resulted in Defendants compensating Plaintiff and the Class Members at a rate or less than the applicable minimum wage, in violation of NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO § 13-12-3(A). 127. Such policy and practice by Defendants resulted in Plaintiff and the Class Members being paid below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of NMSA § 50-4-22 and AMWO §

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of §20(a) of the Exchange Act Against Defendant Steven Fife) 30. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all purchasers of common stock of Active Power during the Class period, (the “Class”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of the class. Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein, members of the immediate family of each of the Defendants, any person, firm, trust, corporation, officer, director or other individual or entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest or which is related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants, and the legal representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-interest or assigns of any such excluded party. 31. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Active Power securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ exchange. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are at least hundreds of members in the proposed Class. Members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Active Power or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using a form of notice customarily used in securities class actions. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and securities litigation. 35. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the Class members to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 36. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein; (b) whether the April 30, 2013 Press Release and April 30, 2013 8-K filing issued by Defendants to the investing public misrepresented material facts concerning Active Power and its business; and (c) the extent of injuries sustained by members of the Class and the appropriate measure of damages. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 40. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 41. During the Class Period, defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Active Power securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Active Power securities and options at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 43. By virtue of their positions at Active Power, defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to defendants. Said acts and omissions of defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. 44. Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within defendants' knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of Active Power, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of Active Power internal affairs. 46. During the Class Period, Active Power securities were traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which the defendants made, issued or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased shares of Active Power securities at prices artificially inflated by defendants' wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased said securities, or would not have purchased them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of Active Power securities was substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of Active Power securities declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 48. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company's securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Active Power, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Active Power's business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non- public information about Active Power's corporate governance violations and false financial statements. 51. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Active Power' s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Active Power which had become materially false or misleading. 53. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of Active Power. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of Active Power, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, Active Power to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of Active Power and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 54. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the Exchange Act.

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16. Stemline is presently conducting an ongoing pivotal Phase 2 trial in blastic plasmacytoid dendritic cell neoplasm (“BPDCN”), using Stemline’s experimental compound, SL-401. At present, BPDCN has no approved treatment. 17. On January 18, 2017, a cancer patient in a Stemline clinical trial tied to SL-401 died from a severe side effect. 18. On January 20, 2017, Stemline commenced the Offering, offering 4.5 million shares of its common stock at $10.00 per share, with expected gross proceeds to Stemline of $45 million. 19. On January 20, 2017, Stemline filed a Form 424B5 with the SEC, containing Stemline’s Prospectus Supplement, dated January 20, 2017, for the Offering (the “Prospectus” and together with the Registration Statement, the “Offering Documents”). Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 29. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than defendants who acquired Stemline securities publicly traded during the Class Period, and/or pursuant and/or traceable to the Offering, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of Stemline, members of the Individual Defendants’ immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Officer or Director Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants' wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 34. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 35. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that: • Stemline shares met the requirements for listing, and were listed and actively traded on NASDAQ, a highly efficient and automated market; • As a public issuer, Stemline filed periodic public reports with the SEC and 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 39. This Count is asserted against Defendants is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 40. During the Class Period, Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 41. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: • employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; • made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or • engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Stemline securities during the Class Period. 43. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other Stemline personnel to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 44. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Stemline securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of Stemline securities during the Class Period in purchasing Stemline securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 46. As a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial. 47. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchase of Stemline securities during the Class Period. 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Stemline, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Stemline’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about Stemline’s misstatement of revenue and profit and false financial statements. 50. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Stemline’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Stemline which had become materially false or misleading. 52. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Stemline. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above. 54. The Offering Documents for the Offering was inaccurate and misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. 55. Stemline is the registrant for the Offering. Defendants are responsible for the contents of the Offering Documents based upon their status as directors of the Company or because they signed or authorized the signing of the Registration Statement on their behalf pursuant to Sections 11(a)(1)-(3) of the Securities Act. 56. As issuer of the shares, Stemline is strictly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the misstatements and omissions. 58. By reasons of the conduct herein alleged, each Defendant named in this Count violated Section 11 of the Securities Act. 59. Plaintiff acquired Stemline shares pursuant to the Offering Documents. 60. Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages. The value of Stemline shares has declined substantially subsequent to and due to Defendants’ violations. 61. At the times Plaintiff purchased Stemline shares, Plaintiff and other members of the Class were without knowledge of the facts concerning the wrongful conduct alleged herein and could not have reasonably discovered those facts prior to the Offering. Less than one year has elapsed from the time that Plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the facts upon which this Complaint is based to the time that Plaintiff filed this Complaint. Less than three years elapsed between the time that the securities upon which this Count is brought were offered to the public and the time Plaintiff filed this Complaint. 62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above. 63. This claim is asserted against the Individual Defendants, each of whom was a control person of Stemline during the relevant time period. 64. For the reasons set forth above in the First Claim, above, Stemline is liable to the Plaintiff and the members of the Class who purchased Stemline shares in the Offering based on the untrue statements and omissions of material fact contained in the Offering Documents and Prospectus, pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act, and were damaged thereby. 66. None of the Individual Defendants made reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Offering Documents were accurate and complete in all material respects. Had they exercised reasonable care, they could have known of the material misstatements and omissions alleged herein. 67. This claim was brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statements and omissions in the Offering Documents and within three years after Stemline shares were sold to the Class in connection with the Offering. 68. By reason of the misconduct alleged herein, for which Stemline is primarily liable, as set forth above, the Individual Defendants are jointly and severally liable with and to the same extent as Stemline pursuant to Section 15 of the Securities Act. Background For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 11 of the Securities Act Against All Defendants Violations of Section 15 of the Securities Act Against Individual Defendants Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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19. In an effort to gain business, generate revenue and promote product sales, Defendant runs marketing campaigns by way of mass calling campaigns. Defendant ran these marketing campaigns without the prior express written consent of the call recipients as required by law. Further, Defendant continued to call those prospective customers even after he or she revoked consent from future contact. 20. The TCPA was intended to give individuals control over how and where they received calls. When Defendant makes calls to individual’s cellular telephones without their consent, it fails to address or represent the limitation imposed by the TCPA. In doing so, it takes control away from consumers and violations both the spirit and letter of the TCPA 21. Beginning no later than September 2018, Plaintiff began receiving unsolicited phone calls on his cellular telephone from Defendant. 22. On September 19, 2018, Plaintiff received an unsolicited phone call to his cellular telephone number from 303-756-9500. The September 19th call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone was automated and featured a prerecorded voice. 23. Again, on November 5, 2018, Plaintiff received another unsolicited phone call to his cellular telephone number from 303-756-9500. 25. The calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were automated and/or featured prerecorded voice messages. 26. The unsolicited phone calls placed to Plaintiff’s wireless telephone were placed via and “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and by using “an artificial or prerecorded voice” system as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A), which had the capacity to produce or store numbers randomly or sequentially, and to dial such numbers, to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 27. The telephone number that Defendant, or its agents, called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurred a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 28. These telephone calls constitute calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 29. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant or its agents prior express consent to receive unsolicited phone calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 30. These telephone calls by Defendant or its agents therefore violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 31. Plaintiff is not alone in receiving these unsolicited phone call advertisements. In fact, numerous consumers have complained of receipt of similar unsolicited phone calls, stating they never provided their cellphone numbers to the Defendant, or provided any permission, let alone prior express written consent, to the Defendant to receive the offending phone calls, and yet continued to receive the phone calls. 34. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 36. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 37. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using unsolicited phone calls, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were thereby damaged through Defendant’s unlawful actions. 38. This suit seeks only statutory damages and injunctive relief on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 39. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 48. Each such telephone call described herein was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to in effect make hundreds or thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of consumers’ wireless phone numbers without human intervention. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 50. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 51. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-51 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 53. Defendant made unauthorized automated phone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and other members of the Class without the prior express written consent. 55. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. 56. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 57. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 58. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 59. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 62. An order certifying the Class as defined above, appointing Plaintiff Straczynski as a Class Representative, and appointing the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron as Class Counsel. 63. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees (in the event of a class recovery) and costs. 64. Any other relief the Court may deem reasonable, just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ.

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11. During January of 2016, Plaintiff Jelinson Tejada provided his cellullar telephone number in connection with the purchase of an IDT calling product. 12. Tejada then received numerous text message advertisements at the same number from Defendant’s 5-digit short message service (“SMS”) code. 13. The text messages were not addressed to Plaintiff by name and were written in an impersonal manner. 14. Defendant sent the same (or substantially the same) generic telemarketing and/or advertising text messages at random through an automatic telephone dialing system to Plaintiff and Class. 15. Prior to sending these text messages, Defendant never informed Plaintiff and Class clearly, conspicuously, and in writing that they would receive recurring automated telemarketing and/or advertising text messages on their cellular phone. 16. As such, Defendant never received the requisite consent to send the text messages at issue. 17. The text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made by Defendant or on their behalf. 18. Through their conduct, Defendant caused Class Members actual harm by sending the unauthorized text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only subjected to the aggravation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text messages, but also costs paid to their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages. 20. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described text messages were being sent on a widespread basis, and that the text messages were being sent to consumers who had not provided prior express written consent to receive them. 22. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendant’s records. 23. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Defendant sent text messages to Class Members using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), as contemplated by the 28. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 29. In an effort to solicit consumers, Defendant sent unauthorized and unwanted telemarketing and/or advertising text message calls to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephones without their prior express written consent. 30. Defendant sent the telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. 31. Defendant utilized equipment that sent the telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 32. Defendant took steps to physically place such text message calls and/or was so involved in placing the calls as to be deemed to have initiated them. 33. By sending telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiffs and members of the Class's cellular telephones without prior express written consent, as defined pursuant 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(f)(8), and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 35. Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. 36. Additionally, as a result of Defendant unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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. Violations New Yot~k Labor Law Nonpayrnent of Straight \Vages 190 et .\·eq. and (J50 et !>;eq. and "'12 NYCRR I C~unille Forest and the New York Class) 1. Due to Defendants' violations of the NYLL, are entitled to recover from attorneys' and costs of the action, and Plaintiffs do not seek liquidated In embers of the York Class but reserves their right to do so. 35. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. 8 all 216(b ), specifically, on state years were: (a) not (b) were not -L., 'L'" ~ and (c) were not compensated tor time worked over forty hours per week at overtime rates (the '·FLSA Collective controlling interest in the Company or JCP. excluded are and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion fro1n the Collective Plaintiti is unable to state the exact nmnber of the without discovery of Defendants' books and records but estimates the hundred if not thousands individuals. 39. and during required tneal periods and to perfonn work on-the-clock and/or off-the-clock for vvhich they were not fully compensated. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff and n1en1bers of the FLSA Collective Class time and one half their regular rate of pay tor hours worked beyond forty hours in a workweek. 40. Defendants' unlawful conduct has been \videspread, repeated and consistent. 41. Defendants' conduct was willful and in bad faith and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class. 9 the tn are known to Defendants and are identifiable 45. Excluded from the New York Class are Defendants, their legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling interest in the Company or JCP. Also excluded are persons and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the New York Class. 46. As of January 28, 2012, JCP operated 43 stores in New York State. In addition, Defendants employed hundreds of hourly-wage employees at its New York based department 10 numerous were not rv•~"""""'"~'<Cl1'£::.r1 and during meal to comply with the NYLL. The Plaintiffs and other New York that they have uncompensated or under-compensated comn1on uv''"'·.d,\.1.:>. practices, and patterns of conduct. H4U,l\,LLL<J and Defendants' have been to Defendants' Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the York PlaintitTs have retained counsel competent and experienced in cmnplex class action and and hour litigation. There is no cont1ict between the Plaintiffs and the New York Con11non law and fact as to the that are not lin1ited to, the following: (a) vVhether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class for off-the-clock tin1e spent working in violation of New York Law; (b) Whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay PlaintitTs and the New York Class for all of the compensable time that they worked for Defendants while clocked-in; (c) Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all 11 (f) (g) (h) Whether to compensated; Whether willfully or with The nature and extent of InJUrieS. adjudication of the controversy to York Labor § the the posting and notice practice York Plaintitis and New York Class Defendants~ benefit which was not tailing to pay was instituted tC't"t:>Cr'l!r'rl of the law; and and the tneasure of datnages for treattnent will pern1it a large nmnber of sitnilarly situated persons to prosecute their cmnn1on clain1s in a single forum siinultaneously, efficiently and 'Without the duplication of eflort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. Individual class members' damages are inadequate to justify the costs of prosecuting their claims in any manner other than a class action. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Members of the New York Class are readily identifiable from Defendants' own 12 L their nr't'r..-..•~,,~,, course that will result ..,, ... T .... "''""' ~·-U11--~....,""" to Plaintitls and the New intend to send notice to all 1ne1nbers of the New York Class to the extent 69. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the satne were fully set forth herein. 70. Pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 190, 191, 193, 198 and 652, Defendants have willfully failed to pay the straight wages due as set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint to Plaintiffs and the New York Class in violation of New York Labor Law §§ 190, 191,193,198 and652 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2. 71. Defendants were not and are not permitted by state or federal law, or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, to withhold or divert any portion of the Plaintiffs' and the New 15 concern to not court worked at established rate. New York Class, seek the amount of at least the tninimum Labor Law., and such other not but reserves their right to do so. 78. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2 apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and 16 to '""'1"\rt"r'r•"V\"'1'~r of Regulations. New York Labor Law- Unpaid Overtime (On Behalf of the New York Class) The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff, Afza AnJum and the FLSA Collective Class) same were fully set forth herein. At all relevant Defendants and to be, "employers'' commerce, within the § At all relevant continue to etnploy, employees, including Plaintiff and of the of are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth bring Anjum, Terrana, Veronica Monahan and Camille Forest own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Article 9 of New York on behalf of a Class consisting of: years not 'fJ'-'"k'"'"'"'". f(x all work perton11ed while clocked-in; (b) were not all work perfonned while off-the-clock; and (c) were not c01npensated for titne worked over torty hours per week at overtitne rates (the ··New York Class'').

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56. Marshalls’ and HomeGoods’ stores owned and/or operated by Defendants operate under the same corporate policies, procedures, and programs. 57. All Assistant Store Managers at Marshalls and HomeGoods share the same uniform job descriptions. 58. Upon information and belief, well over fifty (50) percent of all of Defendants’ Assistant Store Managers’ time was spent performing duties such as stocking and running merchandise, processing merchandise in the backroom, cleaning the store, ringing the registers, unloading the delivery trucks, performing markdowns, store recovery, trash disposal, as well as other duties typically expected of hourly employees. 59. Rather than increase staff or hours worked by non-exempt employees in order to assure the proper functioning of a store, upper management required Assistant Store Managers to work longer hours and fulfill tasks expected of hourly employees. 60. As a result, Assistant Store Managers have worked excessive amounts of overtime hours in order to perform the duties of hourly positions. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Assistant Managers were required to work up to seventy hours a week and/or six days each week. 62. This type of forced overtime without pay is common-place within Defendants’ stores. The potential putative class/collective Plaintiffs have worked and continue to work overtime hours without statutorily required compensation. 63. In order to effectuate this scheme and practice, upper management dissuaded employees from asking questions about overtime pay.

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32. In 1886, Johnson & Johnson was founded to develop medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and consumer products. 33. Johnson & Johnson boasts that its corporation includes over 250 subsidiary companies with operations in 60 countries and worldwide sales over 70 billion dollars across 175 countries. 34. Johnson & Johnson’s brands include numerous well-known pharmaceutical, medical device, and consumer product companies. In addition to OGX, Johnson & Johnson’s consumer brands include Neutrogena, Aveeno, Listerine, Band-Aid, Tylenol, and Johnson’s. A. Johnson & Johnson’s Business. Violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”) (On Behalf of the California Sub-Class) 145. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 121 as if fully set forth herein. 146. The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 147. Defendant’s false and misleading labeling and other policies, acts, and practices were designed to, and did, induce the purchase and use of the Products for personal, family, or household purposes by Plaintiff and Class Members, and violated and continue to violate the following sections of the

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31. Plaintiffs bring the First Cause of Action, an FLSA claim, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked as an Manual Worker for Aerotek nationwide who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 32. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective for their overtime hours worked. 33. Consistent with Defendant’s policies and patterns or practices, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not paid the proper overtime compensation of 1.5 times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 34. All of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 35. As part of their regular business practice, Defendant has intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to, willfully failing to pay their employees, including Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective, the correct overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 37. The members of the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. 38. There are more than fifty members of the New York Class. 39. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the New York Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each member of the New York Class in separate actions. 40. Plaintiffs and the New York Class have all been injured in that they have been uncompensated, under-compensated, or untimely compensated due to Defendant’s common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected everyone in the New York Class similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each member of the New York Class. 41. Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the New York Class and has no interests antagonistic to the New York Class. 42. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented many plaintiffs and classes in wage and hour cases. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the New York Class that predominate over any questions only affecting Plaintiffs and/or each member of the New York Class individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) whether Defendants correctly compensated Plaintiff and the New York Class proper minimum wages for all hours worked up to and including 40 per workweek; (b) whether Defendants correctly compensated Plaintiff and the New York Class for all hours worked up to and including 40 per workweek as agreed upon; (c) whether Defendant correctly compensated Plaintiffs and the New York Class for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek; (d) whether Defendant correctly compensated Plaintiffs and the New York Class with spread of hours pay, as required by the NYLL; (e) whether Defendant compensated Plaintiffs and the New York Class on a timely basis, as required by the NYLL; (f) whether Defendant failed to furnish Plaintiffs and the New York Class with a proper time of hire wage notice, as required by the NYLL; and (g) whether Defendant failed to furnish Plaintiffs and the New York Class with accurate statements with every payment of wages, as required by the NYLL. 45. Consistent with their policies and patterns or practices as described herein, Defendant harmed Plaintiffs, individually, as follows: Leetisha Roundtree 46. Roundtree was employed by Defendant as an hourly manual worker (warehouse worker) for Aerotek from April 3, 2020 through July 2020. 48. During his employment, Roundtree submitted timesheets which amounted to workweeks in which she worked excessive amounts of overtime. 49. Defendant failed to pay Roundtree for all of her hours worked. In this regard, Defendant “shaved time” from the time reported by Roundtree, and paid her for less hours than she worked and reported. 50. Throughout her employment, Roundtree would work shifts of over ten hours from beginning to the end of her shift. Despite working shifts of over ten hours, Defendant failed to provide Roundtree with spread of hours pay as required by the NYLL. 51. At hiring, Defendant informed Roundtree that she would be paid $16.00 per hour. However, upon receiving her first paystub and paystubs thereafter, Roundtree was in fact only paid $15.00 per hour. Thus, Defendant failed to pay Roundtree her agreed upon wages as required by the NYLL. 52. Despite regularly spending more than twenty-five percent of his shift performing manual work, Defendant failed to compensate Roundtree on a timely weekly basis. Specifically, Defendant often paid Roundtree her wages later than the allowed time for manual workers under NYLL § 191(1)(a). 53. Defendant failed to provide Roundtree with a proper time of hire wage notice as required by the NYLL. 54. Throughout his employment, Defendant failed to provide Roundtree with accurate wage statements with each payment of wages as required by the NYLL. Onieko Dolphy 56. At all times relevant, Dolphy has been a non-exempt employee under the FLSA and 62. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 64. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective worked in excess of 40 hours during workweeks in the relevant period. 65. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the premium overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA – at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 66. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied proper overtime compensation in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 67. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 68. Pursuant to the NYLL, Defendant has been required to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class minimum wages for all hours worked. 69. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class the minimum hourly wages to which they are entitled for all hours worked, in violation of the NYLL. 70. As a result of the common policies described above Defendant has violated the minimum wage provisions of the NYLL with respect to Plaintiffs and the New York Class by: shaving Plaintiffs and the New York Class’s hours. 72. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 73. Pursuant to NYLL, Article 6 § 191(1)(d), Defendant has been required to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class the wages they have earned in accordance with the agreed terms of their employment. 74. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class the earned wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, pursuant to the agreed-upon terms of Plaintiff’s employment. 75. As a result of the common policies described above Defendant has violated the agreed upon wage provisions of the NYLL with respect to Plaintiffs and the New York Class by: failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the New York Class for all hours worked up to and including 40 at their agreed upon rate of pay. 76. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendant their agreed wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 77. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 79. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class the premium overtime wages to which they were entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations – at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay – for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 80. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 82. Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class compensation of one hour’s pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate for each day that the length of the interval between the beginning and end of their workday – including working time plus time off for meals plus intervals off duty – was greater than 10 hours or for workdays that Plaintiffs and the New York Class worked. 84. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 85. The timely payment of wages provisions NYLL § 191 and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant and protect Plaintiffs and the Class. 86. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class on a timely basis as required by NYLL § 191(1)(a). 87. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to recover from Defendant the amount of their untimely paid wages as liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided for by NYLL § 198. 88. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 90. Due to Defendant’s violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiffs and the New York Class are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars for each workday that Defendant failed to provide them with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b). 91. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 92. Defendant failed to supply Plaintiffs and the New York Class with an accurate statement of wages with every payment of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), listing: dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 94. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 95. Plaintiff Dolphy complained to Defendant regarding his unpaid wages verbally in May 2021 and June 2021, and in writing on at least May 19, 2021 and May 26, 2021. Thereafter, on June 4, 2021, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. As such, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff Dolphy for attempting to enforce his rights under the FLSA. 96. Plaintiff Dolphy’s complaint regarding unpaid wages against Defendant is a protected activity under 29 U.S.C. § 215(3). 97. Defendant terminated Plaintiff Dolphy in an effort to harass and intimidate, and/or to otherwise interfere with his attempts to vindicate his rights under the FLSA. 98. Terminating Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff Dolphy’s complaints regarding unpaid wages constitutes retaliation and discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(3). 99. Plaintiff Dolphy has suffered damages including, but not limited to, intimidation, harm to his reputation, legal costs, and delay as a result of Defendant’s retaliation. 100. Due to Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff Dolphy is entitled to recover form Defendant back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Fair Labor Standards Act – Retaliation (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff Dolphy, individually) Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective) New York Labor Law – Failure to Pay Timely Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Minimum Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Agreed Upon Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Proper Time of Hire Wage Notices (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Spread of Hours Pay (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the New York Class)

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) FRANCISCO and THE STATE OF )

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14. On or about October 5, 2019, Mrs. Corrigan enrolled her daughter Samantha Corrigan (“Samantha”), an 8th grader at the Doherty Middle School in Andover, MA, in an educational tour of Spain, scheduled for April 17 through April 25, 2020, and offered to the Doherty students by EF Education Tours, Inc., EF Travel, Inc., EF Educational Exchange, Inc., EF Education First, Inc., EF Explore America, Inc., EF Institute for Cultural Exchange, Inc. and/or EF Education First International Ltd. (collectively “EF”). 15. The EF website, under “Help Center” and “Payments & Policies,” contains a document entitled “Booking Conditions,” which contains a section entitled “Release and Agreement.” According to EF, the Booking Conditions and Release and Agreement constitute the entire agreement between EF and Mrs. Corrigan. 16. EF did not disclose to Mrs. Corrigan the legal name(s), complete street business address(es), telephone number(s), and/or owner(s) of the seller of travel services or the provider(s) of the travel package. EF also did not disclose the complete terms of its cancellation policy. 17. The EF Booking Conditions make reference to EF Education First International, Ltd., a Swiss entity that is not registered to do business in Massachusetts. 19. On October 6, 2019, EF charged $4,180.00 to Mrs. Corrigan’s credit card, thereby paying in full for the EF travel services. 20. Soon after enrolling Samantha, Mrs. Corrigan began receiving email and telephone travel insurance-related marketing solicitations from EF. 21. On November 21, 2019, Mrs. Corrigan received a telephone call from an EF Travelers Support Agent, who touted the benefits and strongly recommended the purchase of the Global Travel Protection Plan for Samantha’s tour at a one-time premium of $165.00. 22. EF described its Global Travel Protection Plan as follows: “Travelers can choose to enroll in the Global Travel Protection Plan, which we offer because many insurance companies do not provide adequate coverage for people traveling abroad. Designed specifically with EF travelers in mind, this affordable plan provides protection for travelers should something unexpected happen before, en route or during the tour.” 23. Mrs. Corrigan informed the EF Travelers Support Agent that she wanted to review the policy terms before authorizing payment. 25. Mrs. Corrigan agreed to purchase the Policy and paid the $165.00 premium online through her EF account. 26. The Policy provides, among other things, for full reimbursement of “Trip Cost” upon cancellation of a “Trip” for a covered loss, to wit: 3. Without limitation, EF and/or Me to We Trips, Ltd. in collaboration with Free The Children and its affiliated companies, partners, any companies acting on its behalf, each of their directors, officers, employees, volunteers, sponsors, independent contractors, agents, and authorized representatives (together referred to as “MTW”) are not responsible for any injury, loss or damage to person or property, death, delay, or inconvenience in connection with the provision of any goods or services occasioned by or resulting from, but not limited to, acts of God; force majeure; acts of government; acts of war or civil unrest; insurrection or revolt; strikes or other labor activities; criminal, terrorist, or threatened terrorist activities of any kind; overbooking or downgrading of accommodations; structural or other defective conditions in houses, apartments, or other lodging facilities (or in any heating, plumbing, electrical, or structural problem therein); mechanical or other failure of airplanes or other means of transportation or for any failure of any transportation mechanism to arrive or depart timely or safely; dangers associated with or bites from animals, insects, or pests; sanitation problems; food poisoning; epidemics or the threat thereof; disease; lack of access to or quality of medical care; difficulty in evacuation in case of a medical or other emergency; or any negligent or willful act or failure to act of any third party or for any other cause beyond the direct control of EF or MTW. 52. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify, expand, or amend the definitions of the proposed Classes. 53. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 54. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the proposed Classes since that information is in the control of Defendants, but the members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 55. There are questions of law or fact common to the Classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 56. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Classes, because all members of the Classes will be similarly affected by the judgment sought in this action. 57. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the members of the Classes and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class litigation. 58. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all Class members is impracticable. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 6. I further agree to release the Released Parties from any and all decisions to cancel, modify, or delay the tour as a result of unforeseeable events that are beyond the reasonable control of EF or MTW or which become necessary or advisable so as to increase the quality of the tour. 60. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation above. 61. Defendants made an offer to Plaintiff/Class Members concerning travel services containing illegal provisions and illusory promises. 62. Defendants made an offer to Plaintiff/Class Members concerning travel insurance. 63. Plaintiff/Class Members made payments to Defendants. 64. Plaintiff/Class Members and Defendants formed/may have formed valid, binding contracts. 65. If so, Defendants breached the contracts by failing and refusing to offer full cash refunds and travel insurance benefits for undelivered, purchased travel services as a result of 68. Defendants were obligated to act in good faith and to deal fairly with Plaintiff/Class Members. 69. Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing and refusing to offer full cash refunds and travel insurance benefits. 7. I agree that this Release applies to and binds myself and my minor child enrolling on tour (if applicable) along with my personal representatives, executors, heirs, and family. 70. Plaintiff/Class Members suffered damage as a result of Defendants’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 71. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation above. 72. Defendants received payments from Plaintiff/Class Members. 73. Defendants have been unjustly enriched to the detriment of Plaintiff/Class Members. 74. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference each and every allegation above. 75. Plaintiff/Class Members have property rights to refunds of amounts paid for undelivered travel services purchased from Defendants. 76. Defendants intentionally exercised control over and/or interfered with such rights. 77. Plaintiff/Class Members have suffered damage as a result. Breach of Duty of Good Faith & Fair Dealing (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Breach of Contract (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Conversion (On Behalf of Plaintiff and Class) INC., EF INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL EXCHANGE, INC., EF EDUCATION FIRST INTERNATIONAL, LTD., UNITED Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in New York. This location also offers dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 26. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 3. Whether the hotel provides a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision-impaired guests. 30. Due to the lack of information relating to the accessibility features of Defendant’s hotel through the reservation system on the Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public in their hotel. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis using the services that the hotel offer to the public because of the lack of information on accessibility through the reservation system on the Website. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant’s hotel or book rooms in Defendant’s hotel in the future if the Plaintiff was able to learn about the accessibility of Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms for blind and vision- impaired persons through the reservation system on their website and those accessibility features meet the needs of the Plaintiff. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotel and guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotel, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including restaurants and attending events. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the provisions of the ADA relating to providing information about accessibility features of the hotel and the guest rooms on its Website reservation system would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the services and facilities at Defendant’s hotel, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the failure to provide information on its Website reservation system sufficient to advise that the hotel is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are compliant with ADAAG1 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotel and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotel or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, and, as a result, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotel is located in the State of New York and constitute a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, causing the Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotel has removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 76. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates a physical location in New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotel by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and their establishments under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 88. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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32. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3), on behalf of the members of a Class, which is defined as follows: All persons or entities in the United States who purchased Inductors (including through controlled subsidiaries, agents, affiliates, or joint- ventures) directly from any of the Defendants, their subsidiaries, agents, affiliates or joint ventures from January 1, 2003 through August 1, 2014 (the “Class Period”). 33. The Direct Purchaser Class definition encompasses those who purchased Inductors directly from any of the Defendants, even if the Inductors purchased were manufactured, sold, or distributed by a given Defendant’s predecessors, parents, business units, subsidiaries, affiliated entities, principals, agents, or co-conspirators. 34. This definition of the Direct Purchaser Class specifically excludes the following persons or entities:  Defendants and their co-conspirators, subsidiaries, agents, and/or affiliates; Defendants’ officers, directors, management, employees, subsidiaries, and/or agents; all governmental entities; and the Judges and chambers staff in this case, as well as any members of their immediate families. 48. Inductors (sometimes referred to as chokes or coils) are passive electronic components that store and regulate energy in a circuit using principles of electromagnetism. A. Inductors Generally A.  Inductors Generally ............................................................................................................11  B.  The Market for Inductors was Strong in 1980s and Most of 1990s ...................................14  C.  International Trade Agreement and Recession Disrupts Inductor Market ........................15  D.  Defendants Turn to Cartel Activity....................................................................................16  E.  Prices of Inductors Defy Economic Forces .......................................................................18  MURATA ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA, INC.; PANASONIC CORPORATION; PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH V.  AFFECTED COMMERCE ...........................................................................................................10  VI. 

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12. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 13. Defendant manufactures, markets and/or sells Lands’ End apparel products that have been represented on Defendant’s website as “Made in USA.” 14. Contrary to the representation, Defendant’s apparel products are wholly and/or substantially manufactured or produced with component parts that are manufactured outside of the United States. 15. Based upon information and belief, the offending Necktie purchased by Plaintiff, and presumably all other offending Lands’ End products, are wholly made and/or manufactured in China and/or include component parts such as fabric and thread which are not in fact made or manufactured in the U.S.A., as represented by Defendant. 16. Defendant markets, and continues to market, and represent to the general public via its website that certain Lands’ End apparel products are “Made in USA.” In addition, Defendant fraudulently concealed the material facts at issue in this matter by misrepresenting to the general public the true country of origin of the offending apparel products. Defendant possesses superior knowledge of the true facts that were not disclosed, thereby tolling the running of any applicable statute of limitations. 27. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 28. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”), against Defendant, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). 29. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who purchased one or more of Defendant’s apparel products, that were advertised with a “Made in USA” country of origin designation, that were foreign-made and/or composed of foreign-made component parts, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Subclass of the Class (“the Subclass”), consisting of: All persons within California who purchased one or more of Defendant’s apparel products, that were advertised with a “Made in USA” country of origin designation, that were foreign-made and/or composed of foreign-made component parts, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 31. Defendant and its employees and/or agents are excluded from the Class and the Subclass. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff currently believes that there are hundreds of thousands, if not more, members of the Class within the United States; and there are hundreds of thousands of members of the Subclass located within the State of California. This matter should therefore be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 42. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), establishes a federal cause of action for, among other things, false advertising by: (a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which…(B) in commercial advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.” [Emphasis added]. 44. Defendant violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), by making false and misleading statements and/or omissions of fact in commercial advertisements by marketing and representing that its apparel products are “Made in USA” when they actually foreign-made and/or contain component parts that are manufactured outside of the United States. 45. Defendant’s false and/or misleading representations actually deceived and/or had the capacity to deceive Plaintiff and the Class members whose decision to purchase Defendant’s apparel products in reliance upon Defendant’s representation that its apparel products are “Made in USA.” 56. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 68. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. provides that unfair competition means and includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading marketing.” 69. By and through Defendant’s conduct alleged in further detail above and herein, Defendant engaged in conduct which constitutes unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices prohibited by Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. 82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 83. Business & Professions Code § 17533.7 provides: It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to sell or offer for sale in this State any merchandise on which merchandise or on its container there appears the words “Made in U.S.A.,” “Made in America, “ U.S.A.,” or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit, or part thereof, has been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United States. VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE BUS. & PROF. CODE, SECTION 17533.7 VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT CAL. CIV. CODE SECTION 1750, ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE BUS. & PROF. CODE, SECTION 17200, ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF SECTION 43(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1125, ET SEQ.

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[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] 22. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 24. From mid-April 2017 to January 31, 2018 Plaintiff Jian Zhang was hired by Defendants to work as a cook for Defendants’ restaurant located at 2050 Western Ave., Guilderland, NY 12084. 25. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff Jian Zhang for his overtime hours worked over forty (40) each workweek according to state and federal laws. 26. Throughout the entire period of time when Plaintiff Jian Zhang was employed by the Defendants, Plaintiff Jian Zhang worked from 11am to 10pm daily for six days per week. Plaintiff Jian Zhang had one day off per week. Plaintiff worked at least 66 hours a week. 27. Plaintiff Jian Zhang was paid a flat rate of $4800 per month for the first two months of his employment, then raised to $5000 per month until the end of his employment. 28. Plaintiff Jian Zhang was paid bi-weekly. Defendant “Jane” Chen (first name unknown) a/k/a “Female Boss” determined work schedule and paid the Plaintiff in cash. 29. From mid-April 2017 to January 31, 2018 Plaintiff En Rong Zhang was hired by Defendants to work as a cook for Defendants’ restaurant located at 2050 Western Ave., Guilderland, NY 12084. 30. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff Chen minimum wage or overtime hours worked over forty (40) each workweek according to state and federal laws. 31. Throughout the entire period of his employment, Plaintiff En Rong Zhang worked from 11am to 10pm daily for six days per week. Plaintiff En Rong Zhang had one day off per week. Plaintiff worked at least 66 hours a week. 33. Plaintiff En Rong Zhang was paid bi-weekly. Defendant “Jane” (first name unknown) Chen a/k/a “Female Boss” determined work schedule and paid the Plaintiff in cash. 34. Defendants did not maintain accurate, contemporaneous records of the Plaintiffs’ wages or hours worked. For instance, the Defendants paid the Plaintiffs in cash. 35. Plaintiffs were not compensated for New York’s “spread of hours” premium for shifts that lasted longer than ten (10) hours, six days each week. 36. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs for any overtime hours worked over forty (40) each workweek according to state and federal laws. 37. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with a wage notice at the time of hiring. 38. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with any wage statement. 39. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 40. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiffs and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 41. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiffs were not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 42. Plaintiffs and the New York Class Members’ workdays always lasted longer than 10 hours. 43. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and other Class members’ New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which they worked over 10 hours. 45. Defendants did not post the required New York State Department of Labor posters regarding minimum wage pay rates, overtime pay, tip credit and pay day. 46. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiffs, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 47. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) in violation of the FLSA and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 48. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 50. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 51. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate action by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 52. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 54. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 55. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 56. Plaintiffs bring their NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at SHU Chinese Restaurant on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 58. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) members of the class. 59. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime wages. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiffs and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 61. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 63. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Defendants paid Plaintiffs and Class members the New York minimum wage for all hours worked c. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; d. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay as required by the NYLL; e. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; f. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work. 65. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiffs are covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 66. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiffs, within the meaning of FLSA. 67. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 68. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 69. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiffs, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 70. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 72. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 73. At all relevant times, plaintiffs were employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 74. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 75. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 76. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 77. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 79. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 80. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiffs and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 81. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 82. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiffs’ and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 83. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiffs and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 85. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 86. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 87. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs was not in good faith. 88. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 89. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 90. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 91. Plaintiffs on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 93. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(1), the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $50.00 per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $5000.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-b). 94. The Defendants’ NYLL violations have caused the Plaintiff irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 95. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 96. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide detailed paystub information to employees every payday. NYLL §195-1(d). 97. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of each Plaintiff, and did not provide the paystub on or after Plaintiff’s payday. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Failure to Provide Wage Notice at the Time of Hiring] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—New York Pay Stub Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Hour Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective]

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1. What is the nature and extent of those damages; and 2. What relief should be awarded to Plaintiff and other proposed class members. 34. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf and all others similarly situated. This action satisfies the Rule 23 requirements of commonality, numerosity, superiority, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 35. The proposed class which Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows: 7 All AAA policyholders who made: (1) a structural damage claim for property located in the State of Ohio; and (2) which resulted in an actual cash value payment during the class period from which “non-material depreciation” was withheld from the policyholder; or which should have resulted in an actual cash value payment but for the withholding of “non-material depreciation” causing the loss to drop below the applicable deductible. In this definition, “non-material depreciation” means application of either the “depreciate removal,” “depreciate non-material” and/or “depreciate O&P” option settings within Xactimate software. The class period for the proposed class is the maximum time period as allowed by applicable law. The class excludes all claims arising under policy forms expressly permitting the “depreciation” of “labor” within the text of the policy form and any claims in which the initial actual cash value payment exhausted the applicable limits of insurance. 36. Plaintiff reserves his right to amend the definition of the proposed classes through discovery. The following persons are expressly excluded from the classes: (1) Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; (2) all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the proposed Class; and (3) the Court to which this case is assigned and its staff. 37. The members of the proposed class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff reasonably believes that hundreds if not thousands of people geographically dispersed across Ohio have been damaged by Defendant’s actions. The names and addresses of the members of the proposed class are identifiable through records maintained by Defendant, and proposed class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mailed, published and/or electronic notice. 38. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all proposed class members and predominate over any questions affecting only individual proposed class members. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed class include, but are not limited to: A. Whether Defendant’s insurance policies allow Defendant to depreciate labor in calculating ACV payments for covered losses; 8 B. Whether Defendant’s insurance policies are ambiguous concerning the depreciation of labor costs in calculating ACV payments, and if so, how Defendant’s insurance policies should be interpreted; C. Whether Defendant’s depreciation of labor costs in making ACV payments for covered losses is a breach of the insurance contracts issued by Defendant to Plaintiff and other proposed class members. D. Whether Plaintiff and other proposed class members have been damaged by Defendant’s breaches, as alleged herein, and if so: 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all the proposed class members, as they are all similarly affected by Defendant’s custom and practice of unlawful and unjust conduct and their claims are based on such conduct. Further, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all proposed class members because their claims arise from the same or similar underlying facts and are based on the same factual and legal theories. Plaintiff is no different in any material respect from any other member of the proposed class – all members of the proposed class had labor unlawfully depreciated by Defendant. 40. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the proposed class. Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class action litigation and complex insurance-related cases and will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed class. Plaintiff and his counsel will prosecute this action vigorously. 41. A class action is superior to all available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joining all proposed class in one action is impracticable, and prosecuting individual actions is not feasible. The size of the individual claims is likely not large 9 enough to justify filing a separate action for each claim. For many, if not most class members, a class action is the only procedural mechanism that will afford them an opportunity for legal redress and justice. Even if proposed class members had the resources to pursue individual litigation, that method would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which such cases would proceed. Individual litigation exacerbates the delay and increases the expense for all parties, as well as the court system. Moreover individual litigation could result in inconsistent adjudications of common issues of law and fact. 42. In contrast, a class action will minimize case management difficulties and provide multiple benefits to the litigating parties, including efficiency, economy of scale, unitary adjudication with consistent results and equal protection of the rights of Plaintiff and proposed class members. These benefits would result from the comprehensive and efficient supervision of the litigation by a single court. 43. No unusual difficulties are anticipated in the management of this case as a class action. 44. Class certification is further warranted because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the proposed class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the proposed class as a whole. 45. Plaintiff may seek, in the alternative, certification of issues classes. 46. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues when doing so would materially advance the litigation as a whole. 47. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 10 48. Defendant entered into policies of insurance with Plaintiff and other members of the proposed class. These policies govern the relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff and other proposed class members, as well as the manner in which claims for covered losses are handled. 49. The insurance policies at issue were drafted by Defendant and are essentially identical in all respects material to this litigation. 50. Plaintiff and other proposed class members complied with all material provisions and fulfilled their respective duties with regard to their policies. 51. The policies of insurance Defendant issued to Plaintiff and other proposed class members state that in the event of a loss Defendant may fulfill its initial contractual obligation to an insured party by paying the ACV of the loss. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant’s custom and practice has been, and is, to make such payments based upon Defendant’s calculation of the ACV for the loss, net of any applicable deductible. 52. Defendant breached its contractual duty to pay Plaintiff and other proposed class members the ACV of their claims by unlawfully depreciating labor costs. 53. Defendant’s actions in breaching its contractual obligations to Plaintiff and other proposed class members benefitted, and continue to benefit, Defendant. Likewise, Defendant’s actions damaged, and continue to damage, Plaintiff and other proposed class members. 54. Defendant’s actions in breaching its contractual obligations, as described herein, are the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff and other proposed class members. 55. Accordingly, Plaintiff and other proposed class members are entitled to recover damages sufficient to make them whole for the amounts Defendant unlawfully withheld from their ACV payments as labor cost depreciation. 11 56. Plaintiff restates and incorporate by reference all preceding allegations. 57. This Court is empowered by the Declaratory Judgment Act as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 to declare the rights and legal relations of parties regardless of whether further relief is or could be claimed. 58. A party may seek to have insurance contracts, before or after a breach, construed to obtain a declaration of rights, status, and other legal relations thereunder adjudicated. 59. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have complied with all relevant conditions precedent in their contracts. 60. Plaintiff seeks, personally and on behalf of the proposed class, a declaration that Defendant’s property insurance contracts prohibit the withholding of labor costs as described herein when adjusting losses under the methodology employed here. 61. Plaintiff further seeks, personally and on behalf of the proposed class, any and all equitable relief available under the law that the Court deems necessary and proper to the administration of justice, including, but not limited to, identifying and locating policyholders, and notifying the same of the circumstances complained of and the restoration of their rights and remediation of their losses, and preclusion by Defendant in engaging in the conduct described herein, as may be permitted by law. 62. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have suffered injuries. BREACH OF CONTRACT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND RELIEF

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PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (Referral) SUNNIE CHAPPELL, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, 1. Unusually large number of parties. 10. Existence of highly technical issues and proof. 2. Unusually large number of claims or defenses. 3. VALIDITY OR INFRINGEMENT OF THE SAME PATENT, COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT. 3. Factual issues are exceptionally complex 4. APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME BANKRUPTCY CASE AND ANY CASE RELATED THERETO WHICH HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE SAME BANKRUPTCY JUDGE. 4. Greater than normal volume of evidence. 5. Extended discovery period is needed. 6. Problems locating or preserving evidence 7. Pending parallel investigations or actions by government. 8. Multiple use of experts. 9. Need for discovery outside United States boundaries. IV. ORIGIN (PLACE AN “X “IN ONE BOX ONLY) TRANSFERRED FROM MULTIDISTRICT APPEAL TO DISTRICT JUDGE 1 ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) (IF COMPLEX, CHECK REASON BELOW) OTHER STATUTES - "4" MONTHS DISCOVERY TRACK 375 FALSE CLAIMS ACT 376 Qui Tam 31 USC 3729(a)

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10. DoorDash has developed significant market power, particularly as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. With many restaurants unable or unwilling to offer dine-in services, many consumers have turned to DoorDash to have restaurant food delivered in lieu of eating out. 11. The market power is such that restaurants are put in a difficult situation: they can become Partner Restaurants and pay exorbitant fees and commissions to Defendant, or they decline to do so and risk losing out on sales. 40. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 41. Defendant’s conduct as set forth herein significantly impacts interstate commerce and commerce within this district. 42. As described more fully herein, Defendant has engaged in a course of conduct with respect to the advertising of its services and the services of restaurants that contains false and/or misleading statements of fact, or omissions of critical facts, including those of Plaintiff and members of the Class. 43. These false and/or misleading statements, or omissions of material facts, include the following: a. Suggesting in its advertising that Defendant has a business relationship with Plaintiff and members of the Class and that it is authorized to provide information regarding their services when in fact no such authorization exists; b. Providing false and/or misleading information about the operating status of restaurants, including whether it is open, whether food can be delivered from that restaurant, and whether other services are available from those establishments. c. Failing to advise consumers that restaurants are in fact open and delivery from restaurants may be available through other services or means. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 53. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 provides: It is unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services, professional or otherwise,. . . to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated … from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, . . . or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement . . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading. 54. Defendant caused to be made or disseminated throughout the United States, through advertising, marketing and other publications, statements, including statements included in its general advertising and on its website that falsified information about Plaintiff and the Class, and omitted material information from consumers and members of the Class. 55. Defendant knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable care that the omitted information was material to consumers. 56. Defendant has violated Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 because its omissions regarding the operations of Plaintiff and members of the Class were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 62. California’s Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., defines unfair business competition to include any “unfair,” “unlawful,” or “fraudulent” business act or practice. The Act also provides for injunctive relief, restitution, and disgorgement of profits for violations. 9. DoorDash has relationships with certain restaurants around the country (“Partner Restaurants”) where DoorDash will take online orders from consumers using DoorDash’s websites and/or mobile apps which are then relayed on to the Partner Restaurants, and then DoorDash’s drivers will pick up the orders and deliver them to the consumers. Upon information and belief, DoorDash collects payments for these orders, and then Partner Restaurants have various commissions and related fees held back from funds collected from orders in payment to DoorDash for the services that it provides. FALSE ADVERTISING (Lanham Act § 43(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.)

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16. Mr. Golden is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt. 18. Plaintiffs’ alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, homeowners association fees (the “Debt”). 19. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts. 20. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another. 21. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiffs written communication dated April 22, 2020. 22. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s April 22, 2020 letter is attached as Exhibit A. 23. Defendant’s April 22, 2020 letter was its initial communication with Plaintiffs with respect to the Debt. 24. Defendant’s letter purported to contain the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 25. However, Defendant’s April 22, 2020 letter stated, in relevant part: “Unless you dispute the validity of the debt, or any portion, within 30 days after receipt of this letter, the debt will be assumed to be valid.” Exhibit A. 26. This statement fails to inform Plaintiff that the Debt will be assumed to be valid by Defendant. 28. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s April 22, 2020 letter is based on a form or template (the “Template”) used to send an initial written communication to a consumer. 29. Defendant has used the Template to send initial collection notices to at least 40 individuals in the State of North Carolina within the one year prior to the filing of this complaint. 30. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to represent the following class: All individuals with a North Carolina address to whom Defendant sent an initial collection letter based on the Template, within one year before the date of this complaint, and in connection with the collection of a debt. 31. The proposed class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State of North Carolina, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, all officers and agents of Defendants, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing persons. 32. The class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of members is impracticable. 33. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery. 34. The class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all class members can be identified in business records maintained by Defendants. 36. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class they seek to represent. 37. The claims of Plaintiffs and of the class originate from the same conduct, practice, and procedure on the part of Defendants. Thus, if brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of each class member would require proof of the same material and substantive facts. 38. Plaintiffs possess the same interests and have suffered the same injuries as each class member. Plaintiffs assert identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf of the unnamed class members. 39. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and have no interest adverse to or which directly and irrevocably conflicts with the interests of other class members. 40. Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed class. 41. The interests of Plaintiffs are co-extensive with and not antagonistic to those of the absent class members. 42. Plaintiffs have retained the services of counsel who are experienced in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately prosecute this action, and will assert, protect and otherwise represent Plaintiffs and all absent class members. 44. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the class. 45. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 46. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the questions of law and fact that are common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 47. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint in that: (a) individual claims by the class members will be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far exceed what any one plaintiff or class member has at stake; (b) as a result, very little litigation has been commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint and individual members are unlikely to have an interest in prosecuting and controlling separate individual actions; and (c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy. 49. A key provision of the FDCPA is § 1692g, which requires a debt collector to send, within five days of its initial communication with a consumer, a written notice which provides information regarding the debt and informs the consumer of his or her right to dispute the validity of the debt, and/or request the name and address of the original creditor, within 30 days of receipt of the notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 50. Congress adopted “the debt validation provisions of section 1692g” to guarantee that consumers would receive “adequate notice” of their rights under the FDCPA. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Miller v. Payco–General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991)). 51. This validation requirement is a “significant feature” of the law that aimed to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” See Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977)). 52. “To comply with the FDCPA’s notice requirements, the notice must actually and effectively convey to the consumer his right to dispute the debt.” In re Martinez, 271 B.R. 696, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff’d, 311 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a skincare products company that owns and operates www.timetospa.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Some time prior to February 28, 2014, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Seventh Avenue. (“Seventh”) 15. The Seventh obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 16. The alleged Seventh obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 17. Seventh is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 18. Defendant contends that the Seventh debt is past due. 19. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. 20. Seventh directly or through an intermediary contracted Defendant to collect the BIPG debt. 21. On or about February 28, 2014, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged Seventh debt. See Exhibit A. 23. The February 28, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 24. The Defendant’s February 28, 2014 letter states in part: “If you would like to pay by credit card We accept Visa, Mastercard, and Discover Please Call 1-800-275-7176 Ext 602 There is a fee for credit card payments.” 25. Defendant’s February 28, 2014 letter further states: “Should you have any questions, or wish to pay by phone, call our courteous staff at 1-800-275-7176 ext. 602. There is a fee for check by phone.” 26. Upon information and belief, the Defendant has no legal or contractual right to charge a fee for credit card payments or checks by phone. 27. The February 8, 2014 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window. 28. Visible through the glassine window was the Plaintiff’s name, Plaintiff’s address, and the Plaintiff’s reference number with the Defendant. 29. The reference number constitutes personal identifying information. 30. The reference number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014). 31. Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. 33. On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New Jersey within one year of the date of this Complaint. 34. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “34” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 35. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f of the FDCPA. 36. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692f(1), a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 37. The Defendant violated said section by advising the Plaintiff that they accept credit card payments, directing him to their toll free number and informing him that there is a fee associated with credit card payments. 39. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with the consumer by use of mails. 40. The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s reference number visible on the February 28, 2014 letter. 41. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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15. Defendant is a seller of design-driven wireless chargers. Through its Website, its sells various types of single-device, multi-device, and portable wireless changers. The Website also sells handcrafted stitching air pods cases; including Italian leather. 17. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy, and practice to deny Plaintiff Nisbett and other blind or visually impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its online retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Nisbett and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 18. Plaintiff Nisbett cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using JAWS screen- reading software. 21. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually impaired customers such as Plaintiff Nisbett, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Nisbett encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from taking advantage of Defendant’s online retail services and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 22. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Nisbett could independently navigate it, view goods and service items; learn about items, including construction; and easily complete a purchase, as sighted individuals can. 23. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Nisbett has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 25. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Nisbett seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Nisbett and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 33. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 36. Plaintiff Nisbett’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Plaintiff Nisbett will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 39. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail services. The Website is a service that is integrated with its online retail operation. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Nisbett, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 48. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 50. Defendant’s Website, which is accessible to residents of the State of New York, constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail operations. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with its retail operations. 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to consumers in the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 55. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 57. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its online retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 59. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 60. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 62. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 64. Defendant’s Website, which offers products available for purchase to consumers located in New York City is a sales establishment and public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with online retail operations. 65. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which offers products for sale to consumers located in the City of New York, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 66. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a), in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 72. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Nisbett contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its online retail operations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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21. Defendant is a jewelry store that operates its jewelry store as well as the Website to the public. The jewelry store is located at 360 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. Defendant’s jewelry store constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s jewelry store provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the jewelry store location and hours, jewelry, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the jewelry store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s jewelry store. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s jewelry store and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 2, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the jewelry store, jewelry, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the jewelry store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical jewelry store on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to purchase jewelry. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s jewelry store’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s jewelry store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s jewelry store. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 22. Defendant C6 is a full-service solid waste company providing waste collection, recycling and disposal services to commercial, industrial and residential customers across the state of Texas.2 23. To provide their services, C6 employed (and continues to employ) numerous workers—including Plaintiff and the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work throughout the United States. 24. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are (or were) non-exempt Waste Disposal Drivers employed by C6 for the relevant time-period preceding the filing of this Complaint through the final disposition of this matter. 25. Importantly, none of the FLSA exemptions relieving a covered employer (such as C6) of the statutory duty to pay its employees overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay apply to Plaintiff or the Putative Class Members. 26. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are similarly situated with respect to their job duties, their pay structure and, as set forth below, the policies of C6 resulting in the complained of FLSA violations. 28. C6 was (and continues to be) aware that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked (and continue to work) through their 30-minute or one-hour meal periods without pay in violation of the FLSA. 29. When calculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period, C6 deducted (and continues to deduct) thirty minutes from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA. 30. In other words, for each 5-day workweek, C6 deducted (and continues to deduct) a minimum of 2.5 hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock” hours. For a 6-day workweek, C6 deducted (and continues to deduct) a minimum of 3 hours from each workweek’s total “on-the-clock” hours. 31. C6’s systematic deduction of the 30-minute meal period from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ “on-the-clock” time resulted (and continues to result) in Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members working overtime hours for which they were (and are) not compensated at a rate not less than time and one-half as is required by the FLSA. 32. C6’s systematic deduction of the 30-minute meal period from actual hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek deprived (and continues to deprive) Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members of the required and proper amount of overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. 33. C6 also has a corporate policy to not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all time spent waiting in line at the landfill. Specifically, Plaintiff Taylor would only be paid for thirty (30) minutes of wait time at the landfill even though his actual wait time could be over an hour per day. 35. As a result of C6’s failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for performing work “off-the-clock,” Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked overtime hours for which they were not compensated. 36. C6’s failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for their “off-the- clock” overtime hours violated (and continues to violate) the FLSA. 37. C6 knew or should have known that it was miscalculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ regular rates of pay and that the proper amount of overtime compensation was not being paid to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members in violation of the FLSA. 38. C6 knew or should have known that its failure to pay the correct amount of overtime to Plaintiff and Putative Class Members would cause, did cause, and continues to cause financial injury to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. 39. C6 knew or should have known that causing and/or requiring Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform necessary work “off-the-clock” would cause, did cause, and continues to cause financial injury to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. 40. C6’s actions therefore constitute willful violations under the FLSA and were not made in good faith. V. 41. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 59. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 60. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of C6’s employees who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 61. Other similarly situated employees of C6 have been victimized by C6’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 62. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 42. 63. C6’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of C6, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members. 64. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 65. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. 67. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 68. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective will not likely obtain redress of their injuries and C6 will retain the proceeds of its violations. 69. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 70. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 42 and notice should be promptly sent. 71. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff Taylor further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)). 73. The Texas Class is defined as: 79. The Texas Common Law Plaintiffs bring their Texas Common Law Claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by C6 to work in Texas since April 3, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051. 80. Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 81. The number of Texas Common Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 83. Plaintiff Taylor and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the class members and their interests. 84. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 85. Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph 73. VI.

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50. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants had both the motive and opportunity to conduct fraud. They also had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements they made or acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of those statements. In so doing, the Individual Defendants participated in a scheme to defraud and committed acts, practices and participated in a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Tesla securities during the Class Period. 54. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Tesla during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 55. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Tesla’s securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, plaintiff believes that there are hundreds of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Tesla or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 56. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 57. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 58. Common questions of law and fact predominate and include whether defendants: (i) violated the 1934 Act; (ii) omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (iii) knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; and (iv) artificially inflated the prices of Tesla securities and the extent of and appropriate measure of damages. 59. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the Case3:13-cv-05438-CRB Document1 Filed11/22/13 Page16 of 19 60. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-59 above by reference. 61. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 62. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) Employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) Engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Tesla securities during the Class Period. 63. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Tesla securities. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased Tesla securities at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by the Individual Defendants’ misleading statements. Case3:13-cv-05438-CRB Document1 Filed11/22/13 Page17 of 19 65. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations in ¶¶1-64 above by reference. 66. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Tesla within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By virtue of their positions with the Company, and ownership of Tesla securities, the Individual Defendants had the power and authority to cause Tesla to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. Tesla controlled the Individual Defendants and all of its employees. By reason of such conduct, defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act For Violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants

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(Violations of RCW 80.36.400) For Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendant, Plaintiff alleges: (Violation of Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86 et seq.) For Plaintiff’s second claim against Defendant, Plaintiff alleges: 4.1 Defendant is in the business of offering credit card and debit card processing for merchant accounts. On the website www.elect-mer.com, apparently a marketing website for Defendant’s products and services, it states that “Accept Credit Cards at Electronic Merchant Systems offers some of the lowest rates in the country” and that the company is “[o]ne of the nation’s largest credit card processing companies” that “has been trusted for over 22 years by thousands of clients nationwide to handle credit card transactions.” 4.2 As part of its business, Defendant identifies merchants who want to enter into merchant service agreements with banks for the processing and management of the merchant’s retail credit card transactions. Upon information and belief, pursuant to Defendant’s agreement(s) with banks to solicit merchants, Defendant receives compensation. 5.1. Reallegation: Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 5.2. Violation: Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates and/or others acting on behalf has continually and repeatedly violated RCW 80.36.400(2) by using ADADs to leave recorded messages for the purpose of encouraging Plaintiff and the Class to purchase Defendant’s products and/or services. 6.1. Reallegation: Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 6.2. Violation: Pursuant to RCW 80.36.400(3), which provides that a violation of RCW 80.36.400 is a violation of RCW 19.86 et seq., the WCPA, Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates and/or others acting on Defendant’s behalf have continually and repeatedly violated the CPA by using ADADs to leave recorded messages for the purpose of encouraging Plaintiff and the Class to purchase Defendant’s products and/or services. 6.3 Damages: As a result of Defendant’s and/or its affiliates, agents and/or others acting on Defendant’s behalf’s violations of RCW 80.36.400(2), Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages, including $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the WADAD. The full amount of damages will be proven at trial. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover actual damages and treble damages, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to RCW 19.86.090. 6.4 Under the WCPA, Plaintiff and members of the Class are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant and /or its affiliates, agents and/or others acting on Defendant’s behalf from violating the WCPA in the future. 7.1. Plaintiff realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

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27. By contrast, a request for information from the PSP database costs $10.00. Moreover, if the person’s record shows arrests or convictions, there will not be a response for at least two to three weeks, and often longer. For these reasons, CRAs seldom order or wait for PSP records before generating a background check, unless the job for which a person is being screened requires a PSP record check as a matter of law. 28. AOPC also provides for bulk purchases of its criminal record information. CRAs as a matter of general practice use the AOPC database as their public source of criminal history data in Pennsylvania. 29. As a general practice, expunged criminal charges in Philadelphia are hidden from public view in AOPC’s database within days of an expungement order. They are completely eliminated from the database that is provided to bulk purchasers shortly thereafter. 31. As of the removal from public view of the expunged charges from AOPC’s database, any preparer of a background check that maintained strict procedures designed to insure complete and up to date information would have been aware that it was no longer appropriate to report the expunged charges. 32. Even if a preparer were to rely instead on bulk data obtained from AOPC, the preparer would know that expunged charges had been eliminated if it properly updated its database. 33. Defendant reported the expunged charges on Mr. Giddiens’ background check report more than a year and a half after they had been hidden from public view and then eliminated from AOPC’s database. 34. Defendant failed to search for updated public record information on Mr. Giddiens’ expunged criminal charges, because the only source of information that it could have obtained in the time frame in which it produced and sold the report to Infinity was the AOPC database, from which the charges had long been hidden from public view and removed by the time that the report was compiled. 35. In preparing a report on Mr. Giddiens in December 2011, Defendant did not search any public records in which Mr. Giddiens’ charges had not yet been expunged. Mr. Giddiens’ charges had been eliminated from all public records by that time. 36. Defendant’s background report prepared in December 2011 lists the source of the expunged case as “Court of Common Pleas” even though the case had been eliminated from AOPC’s database before the report was compiled because of the Expungement Order. 38. After retaining counsel, Mr. Giddiens disputed the accuracy of the background report to Defendant. 39. After receiving his dispute Defendant allegedly performed a reinvestigation of the information he disputed, and reported on the results of the reinvestigation in a letter dated February 20, 2012. 40. The letter violated the requirements of section 1681i(a)(6) in a number of ways, including the following: the letter did not include a consumer report that is based on the consumer’s file as that file is revised as a result of the reinvestigation; the letter did not include a notice that, if requested by the consumer, a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information shall be provided to the consumer; the letter did not include a notice that the consumer has the right to add a statement to the consumer’s file disputing the accuracy or completeness of the information; and, the letter did not include a notice that the consumer has the right to request that the consumer reporting agency furnish notification that the item has been deleted to any person designated by the consumer who has within two years prior thereto received a consumer report for employment purposes, or within six months prior thereto received a consumer report for any other purpose, which contained the deleted or disputed information. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 42. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant was acting by and through its agents, servants and/or employees who were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment, and under the direct supervision and control of the Defendant herein. 43. At all times pertinent hereto, the conduct of the Defendant, as well as that of its agents, servants and/or employees, was intentional, willful, reckless, and in grossly negligent disregard for federal laws and the rights of the Plaintiff herein. Defendant knowingly carries out a business practice of reporting criminal record information that is not current or up to date, and without assuring that such information has not been expunged and/or had its status changed. There is no reading or interpretation of section 1681e(b) of the FCRA, or any provision for that matter, which would justify, sanction, excuse or condone such a practice. 51. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 52. Pursuant to sections 1681n and 1681o, Defendant is liable for negligently and willfully violating the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom a consumer report relates, in violation of section 1681e(b). 54. Pursuant to section 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for negligently and willfully violating the FCRA by sending notices of the results of reinvestigations that do not comply with the requirements of section 1681i(a)(6)(B). 55. Pursuant to section 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for negligently and willfully violating section 1681k of the FCRA by failing to notify Plaintiff of the fact that it furnished public record information about him to Infinity, along with Infinity’s name and address, at the time it furnished such information.

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34. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of a nationwide class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). Nationwide Class: All persons or entities in the United States who had RushCard accounts prior to October 12, 2015 and were denied access to their accounts and funds on at least one occasion from October 12, 2015 to the present. 35. In the alternative to the Nationwide Class, and pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5), Plaintiff seeks to represent the following state class only in the event that the Court declines to certify the Nationwide Class above. Specifically, the state class consists of the following: Pennsylvania Class: All persons or entities in Pennsylvania who had RushCard accounts prior to October 12, 2015 and were denied access to their accounts and funds on at least one occasion from October 12, 2015 to the present. 36. Together, the Nationwide Class and the Pennsylvania Class shall be collectively referred to herein as the “Class.” Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their affiliates, employees, officers and directors, persons or entities that have RushCards, and the Judge(s) assigned to this case. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify, change, or expand the Class definitions based on discovery and further investigation. 44. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class (or, in the alternative, the Pennsylvania Class) incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 45. The conduct alleged above constitutes unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 201-2(4)(v),(vii), (xiv) and (xxi) of the UTPCPL, 73 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 201-1, et seq. 46. Defendants used and employed unfair methods of competition and/or unfair or deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of 73 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 201-2 and 201-3 47. Plaintiff and Class members are consumers who signed up for RushCard accounts. 58. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 59. A contract was created between Defendants and Plaintiff and each member of the putative Class at the time they signed up for a RushCard account. 60. As consideration for Defendants’ offer of a safe and convenient place to store their funds, Plaintiff and the putative Class deposited their funds into RushCard accounts and paid monthly fees and other charges for their RushCards. 61. Defendants breached the terms of the contracts with Plaintiff and the putative Class by denying them access to their accounts and funds. 62. Plaintiff notified Defendants of the breach within a reasonable time, and/or was not required to do so because affording Defendants a reasonable opportunity to cure their breach of contract warranty would have been futile. 63. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 67. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 68. Defendants owed duties to Plaintiff and the putative Class to use reasonable care to protect, secure, and make readily accessible their customers’ funds. 69. Defendants breached their duties to Plaintiff and the putative Class by failing to provide their customers with access their funds and accounts. 70. Defendants breached their duties to Plaintiff and the putative Class by failing to provide computer systems that were capable of providing timely access to their customers’ accounts and funds. 71. Defendants breached their duties to Plaintiff and the putative Class by failing to institute measures to secure customer funds and provide their customers with timely and accurate account balances and funds. 72. Defendants breached their duties to communicate accurate information about the computer system update and when customers could access their accounts and funds. 75. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 76. As the intended and expected result of their conscious wrongdoing, Defendants have profited and benefited from the purchase of RushCards by Plaintiff and the Class. 77. Defendants have voluntarily accepted and retained these profits and benefits, with full knowledge and awareness that, as a result of Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff and the Class were not receiving RushCards of the quality or value that had been represented by Defendants, and that reasonable consumers expected. 78. Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their fraudulent and deceptive withholding of benefits to Plaintiff and the Class, at the expense of these parties. 79. Equity and good conscience militate against permitting Defendants to retain these profits and benefits. 80. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 81. Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class all deposited funds into their RushCard accounts prior to October 12, 2015. 85. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 86. Defendants owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and the putative Class to protect, secure, and provide access to all funds that lawfully belonged to Plaintiff and the putative Class. 87. Defendants breached those fiduciary duties by denying access to funds that Defendants had no lawful right to deny and levied unlawful fees on Plaintiff and the putative Class during the times Plaintiff and the putative Class were denied access to their funds. 88. As a result, Plaintiff and the putative Class have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) BREACH OF CONTRACT (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) COMMON LAW FRAUD (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) CONVERSION (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class) VIOLATIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW (“UTPCPL”) (73 Pa. C.S.A. § 201-1, et seq.) (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania Class)

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17. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 18. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wages, overtime pay and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring and wage statement would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 19. From June 1996 to August 3, 2016, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a truck loader for Defendants’ wholesale business located at 56-71 49th Place, Maspeth, NY 11378. 20. From June 1996 to December 2014 Plaintiff worked from 5:00 a.m. until 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Plaintiff worked from 5:00 a.m. until 8:00 or 5 9:00 p.m. on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Plaintiff was off one day each week on Sundays. Plaintiff worked seventy-eight (78) to eighty-four (84) hours each week. 21. From January 2015 to August 3, 2016, Plaintiff worked from 5:00 a.m. until 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Plaintiff worked from 5:00 a.m. until 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Plaintiff was off one day each week on Sundays. Plaintiff worked seventy-two (72) to eighty-one (81) hours each week. 22. During all relevant periods, Plaintiff was paid a flat weekly rate, in cash. 23. In 2011, Plaintiff was paid $2,100 per month. Every six month after that, Plaintiff received a raise of $50 per month. 24. By 2016, Plaintiff was paid $2,600 per month. 25. Defendants did not compensate either Plaintiff minimum or overtime wages according to state and federal laws. 26. Plaintiff was required by the Defendants to sign in after he had already started working and sign out prior to his departure time. 27. Defendants kept these records in order to appear as if they were in compliance with the law. In reality, these records were not accurate, and Defendant paid Plaintiff flat rates regardless of his hours worked. 28. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with any wage notices at the time of his hiring. 29. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 30. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 6 31. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and other Class members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. These notices were similarly not provided upon Plaintiff’s and other Class members’ pay increase(s). 32. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 33. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA minimum wages, or the New York State minimum wages, in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 34. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 35. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive minimum wages and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 7 36. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 38. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate action by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 39. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the 8 members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 40. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members the minimum wage in violation of the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder c. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime wages for all hours worked above forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA and the regulation promulgated thereunder; d. Whether the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, e. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 41. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 42. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 9 43. Plaintiff bring his NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at MG Wholesale Distribution Inc. on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 44. All said persons, including the Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 45. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the class. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay minimum wage, and overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts 10 as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 47. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 48. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in 11 this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 49. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 50. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class members the New York minimum wage for all hours worked; c. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; d. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; e. Whether the Defendants provided wage statement to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL 12 f. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 52. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiff is covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 53. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiff, within the meaning of FLSA. 54. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 55. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 56. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 57. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 13 58. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by failing to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members at the statutory minimum wage when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 60. At all relevant times, plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 61. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 62. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 64. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one- 14 half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 65. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 66. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 67. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 68. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 69. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 70. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 15 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 72. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 73. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 74. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 75. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 76. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 77. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 78. Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Collective Action 16 Members and members of the Class repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 79. The Defendants failed to furnish to the Plaintiff at the time of hiring a notice containing the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section one hundred ninety-one of this article; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(1). 80. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(1), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $50.00 per workweek that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $2,500.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-b). 81. The Defendants failed to furnish with each wage payment a statement listing: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(3). 82. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(3), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $100.00 per workweek that the violation 17 occurred, up to a maximum of $2,500.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-d). 83. The Defendants’ NYLL violations have caused the Plaintiff irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself, and the FLSA collective plaintiffs and rule 23 class, respectfully request that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) Authorizing plaintiff at the earliest possible time to give notice of this collective action, or that the court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have been employed by defendants as non-exempt tipped or non-tipped employees. Such notice shall inform them that the civil notice has been filed, of the nature of the action, of their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper hourly compensation and premium overtime wages; b) Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to rule 23 of the federal rules of civil procedure; c) Designation of Plaintiff as representatives of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class counsel; d) Certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA; e) Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims and state claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and appointing Plaintiff and his counsel to represent the Collective Action Members; 18 f) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under FLSA and New York Labor Law; g) An injunction against MG Wholesale Distribution Inc., its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; h) An award of unpaid wages and minimum wages due Plaintiff and the Collective Action members under the FLSA and New York Labor Law, plus compensatory and liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five percent under NYLL §§190 et seq., §§650 et seq., and one hundred percent after April 9, 2011 under NY Wage Theft Prevention Act, and interest; i) An award of unpaid overtime wages due under FLSA and New York Labor Law; j) An award of unpaid “spread of hours” premium due under the New York Labor Law; k) An award of damages for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring as required under the New York Labor Law; l) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay wages, minimum wages and overtime compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216; m) An award of liquidated and/ or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay wages, minimum wages, overtime compensation, and “spread of hours” premium pursuant to New York Labor Law; n) An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys’ 19 and expert fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and NYLL §§198 and 663; o) The cost and disbursements of this action; p) An award of prejudgment and post-judgment fees; q) Providing that if any amounts remain unpaid upon the expiration of ninety days following the issuance of judgment, or ninety days after expiration of the time to appeal and no appeal is then pending, whichever is later, the total amount of judgment shall automatically increase by fifteen percent, as required by NYLL §198(4); and r) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Time Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Failure to Provide Wage Notice at the Time of Hiring] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class]

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10. All of Defendant’s collection actions at issue in this matter occurred within one year of the date of this Complaint. 11. Defendant’s collection communications are to be interpreted under the “unsophisticated consumer” standard. See, Gammon v. GC Services, Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). 12. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-11. 13. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from taking actions that cannot legally be taken in connection with the collection of a debt, including, but not limited to, the false representation of the character, amount or legal status of any debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), and/or taking or threatening to take actions that cannot legally be taken in connection with the collection of a debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 4 4 14. Attempts by debt collectors to collect time-barred debts violate § 1692e of the FDCPA. See, Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, 736 F.3d. 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013) (filing time-barred lawsuit); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, 744 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014)(sending collection letters on time-barred debts); Crawford v. LVNV Funding, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014)(filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts); and, Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 2015 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 26908 (N.D. Ill, 2015)(sending collection letters on time-barred debts with the same language at issue here). 15. By sending the collection letters at issue for a debt that was time-barred under Indiana Law, Defendant PRA violated § 1692e of the FDCPA. 16. Defendant’s violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA renders it liable for actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 17. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-11. 18. Section 1692f of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 19. Defendant, by attempting to collect a time-barred debt, used an unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt, in violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA. 20. Defendant’s violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA renders it liable for actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 5 5 21. Plaintiff Neeley brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Indiana from whom Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent time-barred Sears debt, by sending collection letters similar to the letters Defendant sent to Plaintiff, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s collection practice, of sending collection letters in an attempt to collect debts that were beyond the statute of limitations, violates the FDCPA, and asks that this Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(1) and (2) of the FDCPA. 22. Defendant PRA regularly engages in debt collection on debts which are beyond the statute of limitations by sending consumer letters similar to those at issue here. 23. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts by sending collection letters on time- barred debts. 24. Plaintiff Neeley’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 25. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual 6 6 members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 26. Plaintiff Neeley will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff Neeley has retained counsel experienced in class action litigation, including class actions brought under the FDCPA. 7. Due to financial difficulties caused by his spouse at the time, during 2000 Plaintiff Neeley was forced to stop paying some of his debts, which included a debt he allegedly owed for a Sears credit card. After this debt became delinquent it was allegedly transferred/sold to other debt buyers who, at some unknown point in time, sold or transferred the debt to Defendant PRA. 8. Defendant sent Mr. Neeley collection letters, dated August 14, 2014, November 12, 2014 and February 17, 2015, demanding payment of the Sears debt via various proposed payment plans. These letters also stated, in pertinent part: * * * 3 3 Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it and we will not report it to any credit reporting agency. * * * Copies of these letters are attached as Group Exhibit C. 9. Although the statute of limitations in the State of Indiana for filing a lawsuit to collect the delinquent debt at issue was, pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-11-2, six years from the date of the last payment, Defendant PRA’s letters fails to inform the consumer that it cannot sue them to collect the debt and fails to inform them that a payment on the debt may restart the statute of limitations. Instead, the letters weakly state that PRA has chosen not to sue, which, coupled with the repeated demands for a payment plan, make it look as if the debt is still legally enforceable. Violation Of § 1692f Of The FDCPA -- Unfair Or Unconscionable Collection Actions Violation Of § 1692e Of The FDCPA – False, Deceptive Or Misleading Collection Actions

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10. Defendants jointly hired and fired, supervised and controlled, set pay, determined hours, and approved time sheets with respect to Bowser and the Class Members. 11. In each of the past three years, Duke’s revenues exceeded $500,000, Guidant’s revenues exceeded $500,000, and Empyrean’s revenues exceeded $500,000. 13. Over the past three years, each Defendant employed at least two individuals that routinely handled goods or materials – such as phones, computers, and tools – that moved in, or were produced for, interstate commerce. 14. Each of the Defendants are a covered enterprise under the FLSA and are subject to its requirements. 15. Defendants, at all relevant times, paid Bowser and the Class Members at the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those worked in excess of forty per week. Defendants did not pay Bowser and the Class Members at one and one-half times their regular hourly rates for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 16. Each of the Defendants maintain employment records on Bowser and the Class Members, and can terminate their employment. 17. Bowser typically worked 50 hours per week at the Catawba nuclear station and a varied amount of overtime at the Robison nuclear station. Defendants paid $75 per hour. 18. Defendants maintained accurate records of the hours Bowser worked. 19. Defendants knew Bowser and the Class Members routinely worked more than 40 hours in a week. Defendants’ records, which show hours worked, reflect this fact. 20. It is well established that hourly workers – like Bowser and the Class Members – are not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Defendants knew Bowser and the Class Members were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions (or the provisions of any similar state overtime laws). 22. Defendants received complaints about their failure to pay overtime, but failed to correct their payroll policy. 23. Defendants’ policy of paying non-exempt workers by the hour, with no overtime pay, violates the FLSA. 24. Defendants’ policy of paying straight time for overtime affects Bowser and the Class Members in a similar manner because, as explained above, hourly workers are non-exempt from overtime. Accordingly, they are each owed overtime pay for the same reason even though their job duties differ. Bowser and the Class Members are similarly situated for the purposes of their overtime claims. 25. The Class Members include: All current and former hourly workers employed by Duke, Guidant, and Empyrean who were not paid at least time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek during the last three years. 26. By failing to pay Bowser and the Class Members overtime at one-and-one-half times their regular rates, Defendants violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 27. Defendants owe Bowser and the Class Members the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate for all overtime hours worked. Because Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, their pay practices violated the FLSA, they owe these wages for at least the past three years. 28. Defendants also owe Bowser and the Class Members an amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 9. Duke employed Guidant and Empyrean to manage its workforce and to outsource the functions traditionally performed by in-house human resource departments.

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35. The crux of the FLSA and PA State Laws is, inter alia, that all employees are entitled to be paid mandated minimum wages for all hours worked. 36. Contrary to these basic protections, Plaintiff and the members of the Classes were deprived of the mandated minimum wage for all hours they worked. 37. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes are, or were, Tipped Employees employed by Defendants. 38. Upon information and belief, all of the Defendants’ restaurant locations are/were operated under uniform policies/procedures applicable to all members of the Classes, including subjecting Tipped Employees to the unlawful pay practices complained of herein. 39. Evidencing this fact, on the Texas Roadhouse website, an individual is able to apply online to any Texas Roadhouse location, including the franchise locations owned by Defendants. By way of further example, the description for “server” is identical for all Texas Roadhouse locations. 41. As set forth above, Plaintiff was employed by Texas Roadhouse as a “server” in their Texas Roadhouse Beaver location. Plaintiff worked at this location from in or about February 2015 to February 2016. 42. Plaintiff was paid an hourly cash wage rate from Defendants and earned tips from customers who chose to leave a gratuity. 43. Plaintiff’s hourly wage rate from Defendants was $2.83 an hour. Plaintiff does not ever recall the hourly wage being raised by Defendants above $2.83 for any day worked, irrespective of how little tips were earned or the type of work performed. 44. Plaintiff typically worked for Defendants on the following days: Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday, with the average shift starting at 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff typically finished her work and left the restaurant around 12:00 a.m. On occasion, Plaintiff left as early as 11:00 p.m. when she worked during the week and as late as 1:00 a.m. when she worked during the weekend. How late Plaintiff left Defendants’ establishment depended on how much break down work she had to do at the end of her shift. 45. Plaintiff recalls that the restaurant closed at 10:00 p.m. every night, except Friday and Saturday nights when the restaurant closed at 11:00 p.m. Consequently, Plaintiff performed at least an hour or more of clean up and break down work at the end of each closing shift worked. 46. Some of the typical break down work Plaintiff and the other Tipped Employees performed when closing the restaurant included, but was not limited to, rolling silverware, filling the ice bins, breaking down the coffee bar, stocking coffee cups, and filling the salad dressings. 48. From time to time, Plaintiff worked the opening shift. Plaintiff recalls that, if she had to work an opening shift, it was usually on a Sunday. 49. Defendants required Tipped Employees, including Plaintiff, to report to work one hour before the restaurant opened to the public. During this hour, Tipped Employees, including Plaintiff, were required to perform a series of opening restaurant tasks. Such work included, for example, making coffee and tea, fill the ice bins, and set up the tables for the expeditor. 50. Plaintiff recorded their work time by logging into Defendants’ timekeeping system through the point-of-sale (“POS”) system. 51. The precise amount of time Plaintiff recorded as working each week, upon information and belief, is maintained in Defendants’ employment and/or payroll records. 52. Notably, Plaintiff was never instructed to clock in under a different job code when performing non-tip generating work (such as when rolling silverware or performing strictly “side work”) or when working prior to or after the restaurant opened/closed. Indeed, to the best of Plaintiff’s knowledge, Defendants did not keep track of such time separately from Plaintiff’s entries into the POS system. 54. Rather than pay its Tipped Employees the applicable minimum wage (either the applicable state minimum wage or the federal minimum wage, whichever is higher), Defendants chose to take a tip credit and pay these employees less than the applicable minimum wage. 55. Under applicable law, in certain circumstances, it is permissible for an employer to take a tip credit and pay its employees less than the mandated minimum wage, provided that the employee’s tips received from customers plus the cash wage paid by the employer equals at least the applicable minimum wage.1 56. According to the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Fact Sheet #15: Tipped Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (“Fact Sheet #15”): the maximum tip credit that an employer can currently claim under the FLSA is $5.12 per hour (the minimum wage of $7.25 minus the minimum required cash wage of $2.13). 57. As is made plain in Fact Sheet #15, in order to claim a tip credit, the employer must comply with five strict notification requirements. 58. First, the employer must notify the employee of the amount of the cash wage the employer is paying the Tipped Employee and that amount must equal at least $2.13 per hour. 60. Third, the employer must inform the Tipped Employee that the tip credit claimed cannot exceed the actual amount of tips received by the employee. In effect, the employer must inform the employee that the employee must still earn the mandated minimum of $7.25 per hour between the amount of the tip credit taken by the employer and the amount of tips earned by the employee. 61. Fourth, the employer must notify the Tipped Employee that all tips received are to be retained by the employee except for a valid tip pooling arrangement. 62. Finally, the Tipped Employee must be informed by the employer that the tip credit will not apply unless the employee has been informed of these provisions. 63. In short, Fact Sheet #15 effectively sets forth in plain English what is required under the regulations for an employer to properly claim a tip credit. 64. An employer bears the burden of showing that it has satisfied all of the notification requirements before any tips can be credited against the employee’s hourly wage.2 If an employer cannot demonstrate its compliance with this notification requirement, no credit can be taken and the employer is liable for the full minimum wage. 66. As set forth herein, Defendants failed to comply with certain of the FLSA’s provisions regarding the claiming of a tip credit. Pennsylvania’s Requirements 67. Pennsylvania state law has a substantially similar requirement to the FLSA’s tip notification requirements. See 43 P.S. § 333.103(d). 68. Importantly, however, Pennsylvania mandates a higher minimum cash wage and requires employers to pay at least $2.83 per hour. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the maximum tip credit is $4.42 per hour.3 69. As such, an employer cannot be said to have complied with Pennsylvania’s tip credit notification requirements where the employer simply relies on United States Department of Labor mandated posters, as said posters do not explicitly identify the tip credit amount in Pennsylvania (as it differs from the FLSA tip credit amount). 71. As explained above, the DOL has very specific requirements regarding what an employer must notify his/her employee of if that employer intends to claim a tip credit. 72. Rather than comply with the notification requirements set forth in Fact Sheet #15, Defendant chose to simply pay their Tipped Employees $2.83 per hour. In short, Defendants failed to conform to the strict regulatory requirements necessary to satisfy the tip credit notification provisions. 74. Indeed, with respect to how Defendants intended to pay Plaintiff, Plaintiff only recalls being told during her interview that Defendants would pay her “$2.83 per hour plus tips.” Plaintiff does not recall ever receiving any other information regarding how she would be compensated. 75. Defendants also failed to ensure that Plaintiff received enough tips to justify the maximum tip credit claimed by Defendants. For example, Plaintiff recalls several instances where she worked a full shift of seven or more hours and left Defendants’ establishment with only $30 in tips (clearly below the requisite amount necessary to substantiate the maximum tip credit of $4.42 Defendants claimed). When Plaintiff earned little to no tips, Plaintiff does not ever recall Defendants adjusting her hourly rate upwards so as to account for the low tip amount received. 76. The Third Circuit and district courts across the country have held that where an employer fails to satisfy any one of the notification requirements, including claiming the applicable tip credit amount in light of the tips received, that employer forfeits the tip credit and must pay the employee the full minimum wage. 77. Defendants also failed to comply with 43 P.S. 231.34 insofar as it failed to notify employees in writing whenever the tip credit claimed by Defendants changed. Rather, Defendants took the maximum tip credit permissible irrespective of whether its Tipped Employee actually earned sufficient tips to substantiate the tip credit claimed. 79. Such conduct constitutes a violation of 43 P.S. 231.34 insofar as Defendants failed to record the hours where Plaintiff and the other Tipped Employee were engaged in non-tip generating work. 80. Because of the above violations, Defendants owe Plaintiff and the other Tipped Employees $4.42 for every hour they worked and were only paid $2.83 per hour. Thus, the amounts due and owing are significant. Stated differently, due to Defendants’ failure to comply with applicable wage laws, Defendants could not claim a tip credit and owe Plaintiff and other Tipped Employees the full minimum wage for every hour worked. 81. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the Collective Class as a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b). Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and the PA Class for claims under the PA State Laws. 82. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The claims brought pursuant to the PA State Laws may be pursued by all similarly-situated persons who do not opt-out of the PA Class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. 84. Defendants have acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole, appropriate. 85. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Classes she seeks to represent. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes work or have worked for Defendants and were subject to the same compensation policies and practices. 86. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Classes that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) whether Defendants have failed to pay the full minimum wage for each hour worked; (b) whether Defendants satisfied each of the requirements in order to claim a tip credit against each hour worked; (c) whether Defendants were precluded from claiming the tip credit during the period encompassed by this Complaint; and (d) whether Plaintiff and members of the Classes are entitled to compensatory damages, and if so, the means of measuring such damages. 87. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes as her interests are aligned with those of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests adverse to the Classes she seeks to represent and has retained competent and experienced counsel. 89. Plaintiff and the Classes she seeks to represent have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable damage from the illegal policy, practice and custom regarding Defendants’ pay practices. 90. Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) and willful violation of the PMWA. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Collective Class, realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 92. At all relevant times, Defendants has had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 93. At all relevant times, Defendants have been and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 94. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the Collective Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 95. Pursuant to Defendants’ compensation policies, rather than pay Tipped Employees the federally-mandated minimum wage, Defendants took a tip credit and paid Tipped Employees only the tip-credit wage. 97. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the Collective Class, are entitled to recover from the Defendants, compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the PA Class, realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the Collective Class) PENNSYLVANIA MINIMUM WAGE ACT– MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the PA Class)

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10. Experian has used a series of different vendors over the years. Originally, these vendors relied on in-person manual reviews of courthouse records to collect tax lien information. Typically, clerk’s offices would make available copies of termination records—releases and withdrawals. Weekly update reports were made available. Docket books were examined. A careful, in-person review was conducted. 11. However, Experian and its vendors stopped this more careful process and began collection of tax lien information solely from automated resources. 12. After the switch to this automated process, Experian and its vendors rarely collected any tax lien release or withdrawal information. And the only “in- person” review of the automated data was attempted only after a consumer made a formal dispute, and even then, only rarely. 14. Upon information and belief, the methods and processes used by Experian and its vendor to gather tax lien releases and withdrawals was materially the same throughout the class period. 15. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Experian’s conduct regarding the collection of tax lien release or withdrawal information was willful and carried out in reckless disregard for a consumer’s rights under the FCRA. For example, Experian’s conduct was willful because it was intentionally accomplished through Experian’s intended procedures and because Experian believed that its diligence in collecting and reporting derogatory information was of greater economic value to its paying customers than the collection of “disposition” information that demonstrated that the debt was no longer owed. 16. Experian has also been on notice of these issues throughout the pendency of Soutter v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 3:10-cv-107 (E.D. Va.). Experian has also been sued for similar conduct in other jurisdictions. Pumphrey v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 3:11-cv-574 (E.D. Va.); Clark v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 3:16-cv-32 (E.D. Va.); Brown v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 3:16- cv-670 (E.D. Va.). 18. As a result of Experian’s conduct, Plaintiff and the putative class members suffered particularized and concrete injuries, including damages to their reputations, reductions to their credit scores, and increased risks that they would be denied credit. Facts as to Plaintiff Bridgette Fuller 19. On or around September 18, 2006, the Delaware Division of Revenue filed a tax lien against Ms. Fuller in New Castle Superior Court in New Castle, Delaware. 20. Ms. Fuller’s lien was thereafter satisfied and the Delaware Division of Revenue filed a Notice of Satisfaction in New Castle Superior Court on or around June 18, 2007. 21. Notwithstanding that this Notice was filed on or around June 18, 2007, Experian nonetheless failed to accurately report the fact that the lien had been satisfied on one or more consumer reports provided to Ms. Fuller and other third parties after that date. 22. Within the past two years, Experian published Ms. Fuller’s consumer report on at least nine different occasions to multiple third parties. 24. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following class: All natural persons who meet every one of the following definitional requirements: a. the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, or Virgin Islands court records show that the person was the subject of a federal or state tax lien filing; b. the court records also show that a release or withdrawal of that tax lien was subsequently filed; c. Experian’s records note that a consumer report regarding the person was published 15 days for more following the date of the lien release or withdrawal filing, but within two years preceding the filing date of this Complaint; and d. the Experian report contained a record of the tax lien, but did not also reflect that the tax lien had been released or withdrawn. Subclass 1: The individuals described above who were the subject of only one or more tax liens that were each withdrawn and who had no other tax liens in their file; Subclass 2: All individuals who meet the general class definition criteria, but do not meet the requirements of Subclass 1. 26. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all class members. These questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Experian adopted procedures that collected and reported updates to federal and state tax liens that were less systematic and effective than those it used to collect and report the underlying tax liens; b. Whether Experian’s uniform procedure (including those of its agent) for collecting tax lien releases and withdrawals was a reasonable procedure to ensure maximum possible accuracy in the consumer reports it furnished; c. Whether Experian did so recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally in conscious disregard of the class members’ rights; and d. Whether Experian’s conduct violated the FCRA. 28. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the class members she seeks to represent; she has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation; and she will vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the class members’ interests. 30. Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) as to the Plaintiff and to the class by failing to establish or to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of the consumer reports it furnished regarding the Plaintiff and other class members. 31. The Plaintiff and each putative class member suffered an actual injury and loss because of Experian’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 32. For example, the rights at issue were determined by Congress to be important measures of Experian’s process to ensure continued accuracy and completeness in its files and reports. 33. In each instance for the Plaintiff and each class member, their actual credit reports were materially inaccurate and reported a major derogatory public record that Experian was legally obligated to correct or omit. 34. Experian’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) was willful, rendering it liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 35. In the alternative, Experian’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) was negligent, rendering it liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 8. Experian provided reports about the Plaintiff and each putative class member which contained inaccurate tax lien information. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)

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23. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and are heavily integrated with Defendant’s entertainment centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s entertainment centers and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete desired transactions as sighted individuals do. 30. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. The Website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use computers, laptops, tablets and smart phones. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view digital content, locate Defendant’s studios and otherwise research related products and services available via the Website and request audience tickets to attend tapings of popular television shows. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendant’s entertainment centers are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s entertainment centers. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 74. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 86. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the City Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 90. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and City Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 96. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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36. The proposed Class consists of all current or former African Americans employed at Comcast’s South Side facility at any time from November of 2007 to the present who have been subject to discrimination in the terms or conditions of their employment. Additionally, the Class consists of all current or former African Americans employed at Comcast’s South Side facility since January of 2005 to the present, or since prior to that time if the evidence demonstrates an ongoing continuing violation, who have been subject to a hostile work environment based on their race. CLASS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 1981 139. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 140. Comcast has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Section 1981 by engaging in the following acts 1) forcing class members to work in substandard facilities which were infested with cockroaches and rats; 2) forcing South Side employees to install infested and/or defective equipment to its customers and denying them other necessary equipment and tools required to provide adequate service to its customers; 3) failing to provide training and to promote South Side African American employees into higher level positions; 4) failing to provide equal pay and fair evaluations to South Side African American employees; and 5) subjecting South Side African American employees to hostile work environment by: referring to African American employees in a racially derogatory manner, applying workplace rules and regulations in a racially biased manner, falsely assuming that equipment given to African American employees would be stolen, instructing African American employees to follow different protocol from similarly situated non-African American employees when placing service calls, and failing to provide African American employees with facilities that would allow equal levels of service as to the facilities of non-African American employees. DEFINITION OF THE CLASS THE CLASS IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII 141. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 142. Defendant has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Title VII by engaging in the following acts 1) forcing class members to work in substandard 40 facilities which were infested with cockroaches and rats; 2) forcing South Side employees to install infested and/or defective equipment to its customers and denying them other necessary equipment and tools required to provide adequate service to its customers; 3) failing to provide training and to promote South Side African American employees into higher level positions; 4) failing to provide equal pay and fair evaluations to South Side African American employees; and 5) subjecting South Side African American employees to hostile work environment by: referring to African American employees in a racially derogatory manner, applying workplace rules and regulations in a racially biased manner, falsely assuming that equipment given to African American employees would be stolen, instructing African American employees to follow different protocol from similarly situated non-African American employees when placing service calls, and failing to provide African American employees with facilities that would allow equal levels of service as to the facilities of non-African American employees. 41

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13. Each of the Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 14. Plaintiff Antista has possessed her current cellular telephone number for approximately 14 years. 15. Plaintiff Antista received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on November 15, 2016, from telephone number 480-448-3778; on January 3 and January 4, 2017, from telephone number 602-362-4190. 17. Each and all of these telephone calls were not for Plaintiff Antista. A MCM representative informed Plaintiff Antista that the calls were regarding her husband and her husband’s Capital One account. 18. Plaintiff Antista told MCM to stop calling but MCM continued to call. 19. Plaintiff Toft has possessed her current cellular telephone number since August 2, 2011. 20. Plaintiff Toft received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on January 6 and January 11, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1545; on January 16, 2017, from telephone number 947-333-9327; on February 20, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1550; on November 21, 2017, from telephone number 800-416-6433; on December 23 and December 29, 2017 from telephone number 248-216-1545. 21. Plaintiff Toft received a call from MCM around April 2017 and told the female representative not to call her anymore. Yet, Plaintiff Toft received at least three additional calls. 22. Plaintiff Toft never provided MCM or the original creditor, CitiFinancial Services, Inc. (“CitiFinancial”) her current cellular telephone number. 23. Plaintiff Toft opened a CitiFinancial account on August 20, 2008 and defaulted on the account sometime in June 2010. 24. Defendants are, and at all times mentioned herein were, each a “person” as defined pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 25. The telephone numbers at which Plaintiffs were contacted on, utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” were each assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 27. Moreover, Defendant’s calls placed to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone number were not made “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 28. Defendant’s calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” made for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiffs’ prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 29. Pursuant to the TCPA and the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, it is Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that Plaintiffs provided Defendant with “prior express consent” within the meaning of the Statute.7 VI. 30. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as the “Class”). 31. Plaintiffs propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons in the United States who, at any time on or after November 14, 2016, received one (1) or more non-emergency telephone call(s) from Midland Credit Management, Inc., to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, but had not provided prior express consent to receive such calls and/or had requested to stop calling. 33. Plaintiffs are unaware of the exact number of the Class Members, but reasonably believes that Class Members number, at a minimum, is in the thousands. 34. Plaintiffs and all Class Members have been harmed by Defendant’s acts because their privacy has been violated; they were subject to annoying and harassing telephone calls that constitute a nuisance; and they were charged for Defendant’s incoming telephone calls. 35. The subject Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 36. Joinder of all Class Members is impracticable due to both the large Class size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The claims’ disposition as a Class Action suit will provide substantial benefit to the parties and to the Court, avoiding multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can easily be identified by way of records maintained by Defendant and/or by the creditors on whose behalf Defendant placed the subject telephone calls. 38. As a person who received telephone calls via “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” without their “prior express consent” within the meaning of the TCPA and FCC Rules, Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each and all Class Members. Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to the interest of any other Class Member, and they will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class’ interests. 39. Plaintiffs has retained counsel experienced in handling Class Action claims that involve federal and state consumer protection statute violations, including claims made pursuant to the TCPA. 40. A Class Action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide relief is essential for compelling Defendant to comply with the TCPA. Each Class Member’s interest in individually controlling the prosecution of a separate claim against Defendant is minute because an individual action’s statutory damages for TCPA violation is small. Management of these claims is likely to be significantly less difficult than management of many other Class claims, as all of the telephone calls at issue are automated and the Class Members did not provide the statutorily required “prior express consent” to authorize the calls placed to their cellular telephone numbers. 41. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate the overall Class’ final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief. Plaintiffs additionally allege, upon information and belief, that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 43. Congress found that “automated or pre-recorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call” and decided that “banning” such calls made without consent was “the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.” Pub. L. No. 102-243, §§ 2(10-13) (Dec. 20, 1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012) (“The Act bans certain practices invasive of privacy[.]”). 44. By effectuating these unlawful phone calls, Defendant caused Plaintiffs the very harm that Congress sought to prevent—namely, a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.” 45. Defendant’s aggravating and annoying phone calls trespassed upon and interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights and interests in their cellular telephone and cellular telephone line, and intruded upon Plaintiffs’ seclusion. 46. Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiffs by wasting their time, trespassing on their phone, invading their privacy as well as causing aggravation and inconvenience. 47. Defendant’s foregoing acts and omissions constitute multiple violations of the TCPA; including, but not limited to, each and all of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 48. Due to Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and each Class Member are entitled, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every telephone call that constitutes a statutory violation. 49. Plaintiffs and all Class Members are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant from engaging in future conduct that will violate the TCPA. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.

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2. You musl hâvo used your credìt ård for the purchase. Pwc¡ases nìade with cæh advances kom anATN4 orwilh a c'tìeck thatacæss your croditcard aæ0untd0 notqualily. 3 You must notyel have lully paid forthe prchase ll all of the criteria obove âre mel and yo are still disstisfied with th€ purchase, contactus n wi.,ín0atlhe blllin0 inqu¡riesaddress on lhefrontof this billinostatement While we inveslioate, the same rules apply lo lhe d¡sputed omount 0s discussed above After we flnlsh our investigation, we will toll you our declsion, At that plnt, lfvr€ thinkyou 0',!e ân amounl andyoudo nol paywe nrây reportyou as delinquent Paylng lntoro0t Your nterest Charges begin accruìng on purc card checlß on the dale of the trânsacl in full. Howev6r, no Intereslwill be charggd 0n new Fjrchas€s fü any b¡lling cycle wlEnl . youpaidyourenlireN6wBalanceinüopreviousmonlh0nllmeiand . you payyourontirecurr€ntmonth'sbalEnceonl¡measwell, How lntorosl Chsrgos &0 C¡lculalod: ïo determino your per¡odic lntercst Charges on each blllln0 statement, we: . delermine the Av€rage 0âily 8alânce for each type ol transacl¡oni (lor e)(ample, purchases, Þal¿nce lrarFfe6, ûnd cash advances)l tfEn . multiply lhis numÞrbythe0ppl¡c¿ble oaily PeriodicBâtei then . multiply lhis numberby the tolal numb€rofdâys ln llæ billlngcycle. We use lhe apdiøble oaily Per¡odic Râte in eflecl on the billing stal€mentclos¡no dale You €n determine your Daily Per¡odic Bale by dividing the APR by 365. How Dâlly Baloncr ls Dotomlnod: We tak€ the beginn¡ng balanæ for each fype of trânsaction thal day; tlpn ûdd the fdlo'¡/¡ng: any new lranectlons; ony previous dây's periodic lnteresl Charg€st âny Flnance Chargosi any foos and châræs.Wo tlEnsubtracl âny pay'rìenß and/orcredlts \¡,þ also makerny needed adiuslments FoÌexâmple: . lf a traßaction posts after, but oæurs before the start ofa bllllng cycle,we mayâdJust the amount abovo to lnclud€ lhls lransactþn. ltwill b€ included as of lhe lirst day 0l the b¡lling . lf a transâclion for I returned paymsnt or â dispule rßolv8d in our lavor posts allsr ths b€ginning ol lho billing cycle, we will make this adiuslmont: - tho âpplicable DailyBâlance(s) andary relâtôd lnterostChargecâlculatlonsw¡ll b€adjusted to include lhe lransactbn amountas of thedâteol theoriginâl paymentfr tranecli0n To calorlate yourAveÍaoe Daily Balance, we ådd the oâily Balanæs for each d¿y ol the billing cycle: thendivide lhistotol by thenumberof dåysinthebill¡ngcycle, Annual Porænl¡go Salo: lf your Aæounl has âny variâblo râtes, your Annuål Percentago RatB(s)mayvary trboutüo Pon0ttyAPR: llyou d0 not makeyow fi¡lnlmum Payment 0ue by the PaymentDue oale,w€ mây increaseyourAPBS to the PenalfyAPR lfth¡s occurs: . wowill provido advance not¡ce belore the PenalfyAPR gm int0ef fecl . once lhe Penolty APR ooes into etfect, if you make ,ouÍ Minimum P¿ymsnt Due by lhe Payrnont Duo oate for the noxlsix corìseculive billingcycles, your råtesw¡ll r6lum lo the non- PenaltyAPRs lhatapply toyourAcc0unt . ifyou do not make the next si)( mnsecutive min¡mum payments ry th€ Payrnent oue oate,we may keep the PenaltyAPßon yourAæounl indef initely Card R€ltswal Arnual Foo:You may âvoid Fying th€ rene,¡vâl Annuâl Fee (lapplicablo) on yourAccount, ifyil d0seyourAccdntbyl¡/riling to usat th€ "8illing lnqu¡ri€s" addressshown on the frontofthis billing statemenl, llyourAmud Feeischarged periodimlly(i e monthly),!fl mayâv0id payirìg themostrecentperiodlc feebyfollowing lhe above instructions, credit6d to yourAæount as of agre8 t0 pay al least the Minimum Paymonl ouo in tim€ lo b0 the Payment Du€ Date You may pây more tlìan tho l\¡inlmum Paymsnt Due, or th€ ontire ¡b'¡/ Balânce atâny timo Payrnentsshould Þ mâlled \^/ilh a slngl€ coupon to the payrnenladdressshown on the lronl 0f yow tilllng ôtatemenl Payments musl bo made by a single chock or money order payade in lJ S dollâß ând drawn on a U S firâncial inst¡lution Paymenls may also be mâde usirìg our oplional payment by phone or online s8rvices using the phone numb8rfrWebaddr8ss list8d m the fronl of this billlng stalemenl. Pa¡ments reæived 0n any dayat tlE payment address shwn orlhefrontryS:00pm CentralTimewillbecred¡tedtoyourAccountasofthedaleolrecelpl, Payrnenls submilled by phone or onl¡ne b/ 7:00 p,m. Central Time wlll be credited to your Accounl âs of the dato ol r€ceipt Pâyments rece¡v6d atter the limes indicåted w¡ll bs tredited tho nexl day Paymenls made in p€rs0n at any HSBC bramh by clßB 0f busin6s will be crediled n0 lâter thÂn lhe date of receipt, crediting poyments lo yourAæount may be delayed up to fivedâys if the paymenl is not made as d€scribed above,tr, is n0l mailsd t0 and receivôd at lhe address provided forremittanc€; is not âccompanied by tlE payment couponl is received in an enveloF olher than the envelope provided for rem¡llancel is stapled, folded, or paper clippodi orincludes multiple poymentæupons orchecks By sondlng us s dlæk for psymmt on your Account, you outhorlzô us to mako o onotlmo olocbonlc funds ùanstor (EFT) fÌom your bank occounl or to proa6s ho paymool as a chæk ùansactlon, When wo use informâlion lrorì your clìock lo mako ân EFI, funds maybe w¡ùrdrawn from your accounl as soon âs lhe sâme day we rec€ive your pâyment, andyourcheckwill be deslroyed, Paymontby PtonorWheny0uuseouropt¡onalpaymenl by phores8rvice,yülaulhorizeus t0 Inlllâte an eleclronìc funds trarìsforfrom yourdes¡gnated bank0ccount,You must0uthorize lhe amounland tlmlrìg ofoåchpaym€nl,Pleaseretain lhls âuthorÞation foryourrocords, Gredlt Balonco: Requests for credil bal¿næ refunds shdld be malled to lhe inquiry 0ddr6s shownonlhefrontofy0übillingslatement Hearin0lmpalr€d:lftouârehearinglmpaired,coll Telecommunicatlons Devices for lhe Deal(tDo/ïlY) al thephone number listed on the frontol this b¡lling stâtoment Nogotlvo Crodlt Euroou Roporüng: We m0y report lnformation about your¡ccount to credlt bure¿us Latepaymenls,m¡ssedpaymBnls,0roth8rdefaultsonyourAccomtmâyb6reflect8d ln your credil report ll you beliove wo have reported lnaccuato lnformation about your Account to any consumor reporting agency, you slþuld nolify us and âsk us lo cotræt lhs inaæurate informalion by writing to us al lhe billing inqu¡riesaddress lisled on the fronl ol this illling slalBment, Dobtcolloctlon: Wo are required bylaw ifâpplicable, to mtifyyou thatw€ åre alt€mpt¡ng l0 col lect a debt, and any into rm atlon oblal ned wlll be used lor tha t purpose cycl€ inwhiclì ¡t posts. . líyour Acæunt ìs subject to a grace p€rlod during the billing cyclo, your paymenls wlll bo o14H6107 ' 3 ' 0s2c2013 sublmcted from all Dally Balancesin thecurrenttillingcycle To ensure accuracy, please pr¡nt neatly us¡ng upper-case letters and numbers onlyl TTT IT REFEßE¡¡CE MEBCHAI{T AÀ40UNT0F DISPUTEû- I have oxanlnod tho ohargos mdo to íry ac6unl and am dlgputlng an lt6m lq tlìo ttþwlng ! s.t trave retumeO a¡ove-rete e ndlse on - (mn/düyy) (lf avollable, ploaæ provlde ! 6 adethechargollstedabove, ln addltlon, nollhor I nor anyono Els€ author'lzod by mo rocolved th€ goods or _ sorvlces tepÍ0sented by thls tnnsactlon. Ll7 lhav0beenblll€dtwlceforthosametransactlon,Thsflrstchargelsrell€cted0n rlrv statomont ond lhs socond on mú'- slatomont. ll tho trânsâctlon mo ùúnsaõilõn fiG anfilõllar smount, pleas€ select optlo E I other-attachaletterdescÉblngyourdlspuls. Pleasel rerchanl'srcsoonæ was wasla I al A. Youf name and accounl numbel B, Dollar amount ofyour dlsputo C, Detalls ot you dlspute ! 3. Morchandlso shlppsd lo m€ arrlved damagod and/or d0fectlv6 on Plooso spoclly dalo_ (mnr/dd/yy). I attempted to retum the goods and msolve my dlspute wlth th€ merchanl. The merchant's response wos r- What To Do ll You 1ülnkYou Flnd 0 Mletako on Your Stâtomont lf you lhlnk tlære is an eflor o]ì vour stalenìent. write to us on a sooarato sheot of 0¿0er of us€ the attac'ied N0l¡f¡câtióì of 0ispuled liem fofln, al the bllllryj inquhies address ön lhe front 0f lhls billing stalement. ln your letter, gi!€ us lhe following informatitr: . Accflnt information: Your name and ûctounl number . Dollâr âmount: Th€ dollar âmount of the suspæted srffi . Doscriplion0fProblem:llyouthinkthoreisanerror0nyourbill,descr¡bewhâtyoubelieveis wrong and wfryyou believe itis0 mislûke ot t. . Thochargelnquestlolmayrem¿lnonyourstâtemont,and\¡/êmâyc0nlinuolochargeyour ¡nlorosl on that âmount. But, il we determine thal we made a miståke, you will not håve lo påy the amount in quest¡on tr any interestorother fees related to thûtamounl . Whileyoudonothâve lopåylheämountinquestion,youâretesponsible ftrtlEremainder olyourbâlance. . We can âpply anyunfaid amount againsl yourcr8dit lim¡t Your ßlghls lf You Aro Dlssâllotlod Wlh Your Crodlt Card Pürdrss6: lf you âre dissalislied with the goods or srvices lhatyou havs purchased with yourcreditcard, and you have tried ingoodfailh tocorrectthe problemwilh themerclþnt,y0u may have lhe rightnol l0 pay lhe remainin0 0mount drp on lhe purchâse Tousethisright, allof the following musl be true: 1 ThepurchasemusÌluvebeenmade¡nyourh0meStâteorwithinl00miles0fyourcutent mail¡ng address, and tlìe purchase prico musl hâve been more than $50. (Nolo: Neilhêr of these are necessary if your purchâse wâs based on an adverlisement we malled to you, ot ¡f wo own the company lhatsold you th6good6 orservices,)

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(Tips Theft) - 8 - 31. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representatives on behalf of himself and all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants in the three years preceding the filing of this complaint, (the "Collective Action Period"), and who were compensated: at rates less than the applicable minimum wage for straight time hours and at rates less than one-half times the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek (the "Collective Action Members"). - 6 - 32. Upon information and belief, the collective action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) Collective Action Members who worked for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 34. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 35. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There - 7 - will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 36. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the common questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members in accordance with minimum wage and overtime law requirements; e. Whether the Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful as that term is used within the context of the FLSA; and, f. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 37. Plaintiff know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 38. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. 39. Plaintiff sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 40. Plaintiff bring their New York Labor Law claims on behalf of all persons who were employed by Defendants at any in the six year period preceding the filing of this Complaint (the "Class Period") who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and were compensated: at rates less than the applicable minimum wage for straight time hours; at rates less than one-half times the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; and without the required "spread of hours" premium, all in violation of the New York Labor Law (the "Class"). 41. Upon information and belief, the persons in the Class identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, the Class consists of all non- managerial current and former employees and, therefore, is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. 42. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individuals lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 43. The Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. - 9 - 44. Plaintiff has committed themselves to pursuing this action and have retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the NY Class members. Plaintiff understand that, as class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsibility to the Class and Collective Action Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that he must consider the interests of the Class and Collective Action Members just as he would represent and consider his own interests, and that he may not favor his own interests over those of the Class or Collective Action Members. 46. Plaintiff recognizes that any resolution of a class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismissal thereof, must be in the best interests of the Class and Collective Action Members. Plaintiff understands that in order to provide adequate representation, he must remain informed of litigation developments and he understands that he may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 47. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Plaintiff claims are typical of the Class. 48. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether the Defendants employed Plaintiff sand the Class members within the meaning of the New York Labor Law; b. Whether the Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; - 10 - d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class members the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and the required overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; e. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and the Class members "spread of hours" premium for each day they worked a shift in excess of ten (10) hours, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; f. Whether the Defendants' violations of the New York Labor Law are willful as that term is used within the context of the New York Labor Law; and, g. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 50. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were employed by an entity engaged in commerce and/or the production or sale of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and/or they were engaged in commerce and/or the production or sale of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 51. Defendants have not been eligible to avail themselves of the federal tipped - 11 - minimum wage rate under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., because Defendants required Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to distribute a portion of their tips to workers who do not “customarily and regularly” receive tips and Defendants failed to provide required notices and maintain required records concerning their intention to take a tip credit. 52. Defendants unlawfully required Plaintiffs to share tips with employees not entitled to tips under the FLSA and/or the NYLL, including, but not limited to, managers and sushi chefs. 53. In this regard, owners and managers are tip-ineligible employees because their primary duties do not include directly servicing customers. 54. The FLSA Collective was paid at the tipped minimum wage rate rather than the full hourly minimum wage rate as required by 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 55. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied minimum wages in accordance with the FLSA in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 56. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 57. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. - 12 - 58. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the premium overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA – at a rate of 1.5 times the full minimum wage rate – for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 59. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime compensation in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 60. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 61. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have been employees of Defendants, and Defendants have been employers of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 62. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the minimum hourly wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 63. Pursuant to the NYLL, Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, Defendants have been required to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the full minimum wage at a rate of (a) $7.25 per hour for all hours worked from August 5, 2013 through December 30, 2013; (b) $8.00 per hour for all hours in 2014; (c) $8.75 - 13 - per hour for all hours worked from December 31, 2014 through December 30, 2015; and (d) $9.00 per hour for all hours worked from December 31, 2015 through December 30, 2016; (e) $11.00 per hour for all hours worked from December 31, 2016 through December 31, 2017; (f) $13.00 per hour for all hours worked from December 31, 2017 through December 31, 2018; and (g) $15.00 per hour for all hours worked from December 31, 2018 through the present date. 64. Defendants have failed to notify Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class of the tip credit in writing as required by the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 65. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post- judgment interest. 66. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 67. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants, and protect Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class. 68. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the premium overtime wages to which they were entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations – at a rate of 1.5 times the full minimum wage rate – for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 69. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are - 14 - entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 70. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 71. Defendants unlawfully demanded or accepted, directly or indirectly, part of the gratuities received by Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class in violation of NYLL, Article 6, § 196-d, and 12 NYCRR 146-2.14. 72. Defendants unlawfully required Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class to share the gratuities they received with employees other than tipped employees, in violation of NYLL Article 6, § 196-d and 12 NYCRR 146-2.14. 73. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Defendants the value of the misappropriated gratuities, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 74. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 75. Defendants have failed to furnish Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class with proper - 15 - annual wage notices as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by each employee as their primary language, at the time of hiring, and on or before February first of each subsequent year of the employee's employment with the employer, a notice containing: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 76. Due to Defendants’ violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each workday that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class with annual wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b). 77. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 78. Defendants failed to supply Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class with an accurate statement of wages with every payment of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), listing: dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by - 16 - the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 79. Due to Defendants’ violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workday that Defendants failed to provide them with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198 (1-d). 80. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 81. Defendants retained for themselves tips that by law should have been turned over to plaintiff. 82. The reason the tips belonged to the plaintiff and not the defendants is that the tips were left by customers intending to leave a gratuity to the service staff and the defendants under the NYLL and the Hospitality Wage Order to no qualify as service staff. 83. Plaintiff seeks as damages, a monetary award of all tips taken by defendants wrongfully, together with liquidated damages, pre and post judgment interest, and attorneys fees and expenses. Fair Labor Standards Act Minimum Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective) Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective) New York Labor Law Minimum Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class) New York Labor Law Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class) New York Labor Law Failure to Provide Proper Annual Wage Notices (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class) New York Labor Law Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class) New York Labor Law Tip Misappropriation (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class)

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53. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-52 as if fully re-stated herein. 54. This action is brought on behalf of plaintiff and the members of a class. The class consists of all persons who defendant’s records reflect were sent debt collection letters within the State of New York within the period of time commencing one year before the filing of this complaint up to and including the date of the filing of the complaint and who were sent a collection letter (a) in substantially the same form as the letter defendant sent to plaintiff; (b) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a consumer debt; (c) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (d) the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). The class does not include defendant or persons who are officers, directors, employees or representatives of defendant. 55. The class shall be defined as follows: All natural persons with addresses within the State of New York to whom defendant sent a collection letter concerning a consumer debt, which collection letter states, in sum or substance: “If you notify this office verbally or in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification.” from one year before the filing of this complaint to the date of the filing of this complaint inclusive, and which letter was not returned by the postal service as undeliverable. 56. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: (A) Based on the fact that the collection letter that is the gravamen of this litigation is a mass-mailed form letter, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, thousands of persons have received similar debt collection letters from defendant which violate the various provisions of the FDCPA. (B) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether defendant violated the FDCPA, § 1692g(a)(4), by sending letters to consumers which stated that the consumers may dispute their debts either verbally or in writing. (C) The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received the letters (the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of defendant. (D) The claims of plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. (E) Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel. Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 57. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 58. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, plaintiff will seek to certify a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 59. Communications from debt collectors, such as those sent by defendant, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer”. 60. As a result of the above violations, defendant is liable to plaintiff and the members of the class for an injunction and damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial, plus costs and attorneys’ fees. WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against defendant as follows: (a) certifying a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) awarding maximum statutory damages to the class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (c) awarding maximum statutory damages to plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (d) awarding actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (e) awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; (f) enjoining defendant from committing further deceptive acts and practices with respect to plaintiff pursuant to NYGBL § 349; (g) awarding statutory damages pursuant to NYGBL § 349 in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (h) in the alternative, awarding actual damages pursuant to NYGBL § 349 in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; (i) awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and disbursements pursuant to NYGBL § 349; and (j) for such other and further relief as may be just and proper. 14. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-13 as if fully re-stated herein. 15. Defendant sent plaintiff a collection letter dated May 30, 2017. 16. In the letter, defendant alleged that plaintiff owed a Merrick Bank debt. 17. The debt was alleged to be in default. 18. Defendant sent the letter to plaintiff in an attempt to collect the allegedly defaulted Merrick Bank debt. 19. The letter was defendant’s first communication with plaintiff in connection with the collection of the debt. 20. The letter was defendant’s first written communication with plaintiff in connection with the collection of the debt. 21. Defendant sent no letter to plaintiff within five days after the date on which defendant sent the letter dated May 30, 2017. 22. In the letter, defendant stated, in relevant part: FDCPA § 1692g(a)(4) 26. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-25 as if fully re-stated herein. 27. In its collection letter defendant stated, in relevant part: NYGBL § 349 39. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 to 38 as if fully re-stated herein. 40. Each of the deceptive acts and practices above-mentioned was committed by defendant in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of a service in the State of New York and constitutes a violation of NYGBL § 349. 41. Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices were consumer-oriented, in that defendant is a collector of consumer debts incurred principally or wholly by natural persons. 42. Defendant contacts hundreds of consumers within the State of New York each year by mail in an attempt to collect Merrick Bank debts. 43. Defendant’s letter to plaintiff is typical of the letters defendant mails to consumers within the State of New York in attempts to collect Merrick Bank debts. 44. Defendant’s letter to plaintiff is derived from a letter form. 45. Defendant’s letter to plaintiff is derived from a letter template. 46. Defendant has a pattern of mailing collection letters to hundreds of consumers within the State of New York each year which inaccurately notifies such consumers of their rights under federal law. 47. Defendant’s aforesaid inaccurate notification of the consumer’s rights is consumer-oriented, in that the notification was not restricted to the collection letter which defendant mailed to plaintiff, but extended to, at a minimum, initial collection letters which defendant mailed to all consumers within the State of New York at all times relevant herein. 48. Defendant’s said inaccurate notification of the consumer’s rights has a broad impact on consumers at large whose accounts are placed with defendant for collection, because at all times relevant herein defendant mailed substantially the same initial letter to all consumers in the State of New York, all of which contained the inaccurate notification of the consumer’s legal rights. 49. Defendant’s inaccurate notification was deceptive in a material way in that New York State consumers receiving defendant’s letters would believe, erroneously, that a timely verbal dispute of their debts would be sufficient to preserve their legal rights and to place certain legal duties on defendant. 50. Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer within the meaning of the NYGBL. 51. Upon learning that federal law required him to dispute the debt in writing only in order to obtain verification of the debt and a cessation of debt collection until the verification is provided, and that a verbal request was not sufficient under the law to obtain such verification or cessation, plaintiff felt annoyed, confused and surprised that defendant would fail to provide him with accurate information concerning his rights under federal law. 52. Defendant violated NYGBL § 349(a) and is liable to plaintiff under NYGBL § 349(h).

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11. Additionally, the phrase “unless you notify this office within thirty 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid” fails to clarify that this dispute must be in writing. 12. Reading the first and second sentence of the validation notice leaves the consumer with multiple interpretations. Under one interpretation, the consumer will believe that if he or she disputes the debt orally or in writing, the debt will not be presumed valid. Further, only if the dispute is made in writing will the debt collector be required to obtain verification of the debt. But this is not the case. In the Third Circuit, all disputes must be made in writing to have legal effect under Section g of the FDCPA. 13. Merely quoting the statutory language does not adequately inform the consumer of his or her rights, let alone the nuances involved in exercising such rights. See Wilson, 255 F.3d at 254; see also McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Merely including the required notice in letters to consumers is not sufficient. The notice must also ‘be set forth in a form and within a context that does not distort of obfuscate its meaning.’”) (citation omitted). 14. As such, Defendant’s letter is false, deceptive, and misleading in violation of § 1692e and fails to sufficiently inform the least sophisticated consumer of his or her rights under §1692g. 15. Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 17. Excluded from the Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant. Numerosity 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent collection letters in an attempt to collect a debt to hundreds if not thousands of consumers throughout New Jersey, each of which violates the FDCPA. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 19. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. Common Questions of Law and Fact 21. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other members of the Class. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 22. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members’ interests, in that the Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 23. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. 24. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 25. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties. 26. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 28. Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 29. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as if specifically set forth at length herein. 30. Defendant’s collection letter violates the following provisions of the FDCPA: 31. Section 1692e provides: § 1692e. False or misleading representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer… 6. On a date better known by Defendant, Plaintiff incurred debt through use of a credit card for primarily personal, family, and household purposes from WebBank. 7. In a letter dated February 21, 2018, Defendant sent an initial dunning letter to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect said debt, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 8. The dunning letter states: Unless you notify this office within thirty 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that the debt or any portion thereof is disputed, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request of this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 9. Upon reading the letter, the least sophisticated consumer would not know that the dispute must be in writing, as mandated by the Third Circuit. See Graziano v. Harrision, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). The Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq

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15. Raw foodism is a relatively new diet movement known for its health benefits. The movement focuses on the consumption of foods with living enzymes, probiotics, and nutrients to help humans fully digest food without relying on their own digestive enzymes. 16. As the name suggests, consumption of “raw” foods is vital to the raw food movement. “Raw” foods are usually organic foods that are unprocessed, uncooked, and not decontaminated to maintain the presence of enzymes, probiotics, and other qualities in their original state. Raw foods are favored over otherwise denatured or processed food for two reasons. First, the treatment process destroys or alters many of the enzymes, nutrients, and vitamins found in food. Second, raw foodists believe that foods without a significant amount of active enzymes take longer to digest and thus clog up the digestive system and arteries with partially digested fats, proteins, and carbohydrates. 17. “Raw” foods and juices cannot be pasteurized. This is because pasteurization preserves and sterilizes by substantially reducing the live, active enzymes that are the essence of raw foods. Accordingly, truly “Raw” products typically have a shelf life of five days or less. As a Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page5 of 24 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24. Plaintiff Heikkila seeks to represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who purchased the Juice Products for personal or household use, excluding those who purchased the Juice Products for resale (hereafter, the “Class”). 25. Plaintiff Heikkila also seeks to represent a subclass defined as all members of the Class who purchased Juice Products within the State of California (the “California Subclass”). 26. Members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. On information and belief, members of the Class and the California Subclass number in the millions. The precise number of Class and Subclass members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery of Defendant’s records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, email, and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendant and third party retailers and vendors. 27. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq.; b. Whether Defendant breached an express warranty made to Plaintiff and the Class; c. Whether Defendant breached an implied warranty made to Plaintiff and the Class; d. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched by its conduct; Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page8 of 24 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 32. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant. 34. The Juice Products are consumer products as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 35. Plaintiff and Class members are consumers as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 36. Defendant is a supplier and warrantor as defined in 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) and (5). 37. In connection with the sale of the Juice Products, Defendant issued a written warranty as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), by making the express warranty that the Juice Products were “Raw.” 38. In fact, the Juice Products do not conform to the Express Warranty because the Express Warranty is false and misleading in that the Juice Products are subjected to HPP, thus rendering them not “Raw,” in contradiction to the representations on the product packaging. Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page10 of 24 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 42. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant. 44. In connection with the sale of the Juice Products, Defendant issued a written Express Warranty. Defendant, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller expressly warranted that the Juice Products were fit for their intended purpose as raw juices by making the Express Warranty to Plaintiff and the Class. 45. Defendant’s Express Warranty, its affirmations of fact and promises made to Plaintiff and the Class regarding the Juice Products, and its descriptions of the Juice Products Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page11 of 24 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 48. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant. 50. Defendant is and was at all relevant times a “merchant” within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). Defendant manufactured, distributed, and marketed the Juice Products, which are “goods” within the meaning of the UCC. Consequently, Defendant impliedly warranted that the Juice Products were merchantable, including that they could pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, that they were fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, that they were of fair average quality within the description, that they were adequately labeled, and that they would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on their container or labels. However, each of these implied warranties Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page12 of 24 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 57. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page13 of 24 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 62. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Subclass against Defendant. 64. In violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq., Defendant has engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the course of transactions with Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass. Such transactions were intended to and did result in the sales of goods to Plaintiff and the California Subclass. Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass are “consumers” as that term is used in the CLRA because they sought or acquired Defendant’s goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes. 65. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5) prohibits “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he or she does not have.” Defendant violated this provision by making the Misrepresentation. Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page14 of 24 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 72. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page15 of 24 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 80. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. Case3:14-cv-00556-WHO Document1 Filed02/05/14 Page16 of 24 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. The Raw Food Movement Breach Of The Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Breach Of Express Warranty Unjust Enrichment / Common Law Restitution Violation Of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation Of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Calif. Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. Violation Of The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq. Violation Of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq.

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10. The facsimile provides a link for Defendant’s medical “VIP program” and the cell phone number and email address for Defendant’s new executive slated to appear at the conference. 11. The facsimile contains multiple graphics promoting Defendant’s mission, leadership award, a stamp of approval, and a picture of a smiling, young woman posing in Defendant’s clothing. 12. The facsimile contained no opt-out notice. 3 13. Plaintiff had no business relationship with Defendant, did not give Defendant its number, and had not consented to be sent a facsimile. 14. On information and belief, Defendant routinely sends its facsimiles to recipients where no relationship exists and sends these facsimiles without prior consent to do so. 15. On information and belief, Defendant continues to solicit businesses by sending these facsimiles nationwide. 16. Plaintiff was damaged by this facsimile by suffering a monetary loss due to the facsimile, incurring the costs of the use of facsimile paper, ink and toner, loss of employee time to review the facsimile, invasion of privacy, nuisance, interruption of work, trespass to its chattel by interfering with its office facsimile used to aid patients, stress, aggravation, and because a violation of the TCPA itself is a concrete injury. 17. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of itself and a Class of similarly situated individuals or business, defined as follows: A. All persons in the United States who received a facsimile from or on behalf of Defendant and who had no ongoing business relationship with Defendant and had not given consent to receive facsimiles from Defendant or where the facsimiles did not provide opt out language, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the class is certified. 18. Numerosity: The exact number class members is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists 4 of thousands of individuals and businesses. Class members can be easily identified through Defendant’s or its agent’s records. 19. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant sent the faxes or had them sent on its behalf; b) Whether Defendant had consent; c) Whether Defendant has processes in place to prevent these facsimiles; d) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful; e) Whether Defendant’s facsimile was a solicitation; and f) Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA. 20. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members and it sustained the same damages as other members of the Class as a result of Defendant’s actions. 21. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions, including TCPA cases. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 22. Superiority: This case is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are the best method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy in light of the common issues across the class. 5 31. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 32. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited facsimile advertising, 47 U.S.C.§ 227(b) (1) (C). 33. Defendant violated this provision by sending an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. 34. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered actual damages as set forth in paragraph 13 above and under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each violation. 35. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowingly, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to $1,500 per call. 8. On or about February 20, 2019, Plaintiff received a two-page facsimile on its fax machine with “Coolibar, Inc.” as the listed sender. (Exhibit 1) 9. Defendant touts itself as “the industry leader in innovative, high-quality UPF 50+ clothing, hats and accessories” and solicits Plaintiff to visit its booth at the AAD Annual Meeting in Washington, DC.: “We want to meet you! . . .Please set up a time to connect at the show by emailing or calling, or simply stop by Booth #3054.” Violation of 47 U.S.C § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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15. Mary Boatner purchased a 2017 Ford Explorer from Collier Ford in Weturnpka, Alabama in 201 7.The vehicle, VIN 1FM5K7D80HGC99285 was purchased by Ms. Boatner on July 3, 2017. 16. The 2017 Ford Explorer purchased by Plaintiff was dangerous and defective when purchased because its design and exhaust and/or HVAC systems permitted an exhaust odor, exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, to enter the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The defect is latent in nature because it is not obvious or ascertainable upon reasonable examination or inspection 17. At the time of the purchase, Plaintiff was not notified that the 2017 Ford Explorer she purchased was defective, nor was she notified that she and all occupants, including her husband and grandchildren, would be exposed to lethal carbon monoxide and other potentially dangerous gases while driving in her 2017 Ford Explorer during its normal and customary use. 19. When Ms. Boatner arrived in Michigan, and for several days thereafter, she experienced a general altered mental status, including, restlessness and lack of focus, fatigue nausea and headaches. 20. On July 12, 2017, Ms. Boatner learned that 2011-2015 versions of her 2017 Ford Explorers suffered carbon monoxide intrusion and took her Ford Explorer to Brighton Ford. She requested the Ford dealership check for a carbon monoxide leak and repair as needed. 21. Brighton Ford refused to accept Ms. Boatner for repair but did provide Ms. Boatner with a Ford document detailing steps for repairing cabin exhaust leaks in 2016-2017 Explorers. 22. By July 13, 2017 Ms. Boatner's symptoms had not subsided and she was admitted to Henry Ford Hospital in Clinton Township, Michigan for three (3) days. Ms. Boatner underwent several medical tests and was informed that her carbon monoxide levels were "high normal." 23. To date, Ford has not repaired Plaintiffs 2017 Ford Explorer, nor has Ford acknowledged to Plaintiff or the members of the proposed class that the 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers contain design flaws and/or defective exhaust and/or HVAC systems permitting lethal carbon monoxide and other potentially dangerous gases into the passenger compartnents of those vehicles. 24. To date, Plaintiff Mary Boatner continues to suffer from headaches as a result of her exposure to carbon monoxide while driving in her 2017 Ford Explorer. 26. The subsequent model year Ford Explorers are not dramatically different in design from the 2011 model year Ford Explorer, and the Explorers sold today are considered part of the "fifth generation" of Ford Explorer vehicles. 27. The 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers and other Affected Vehicles Were designed, engineered and manufactured by Ford with design flaws and/or defective exhaust and/or HVAC systems that permit carbon monoxide and exhaust to enter into the passenger compartments of those vehicles while being driven in a normal and customary manner. 29. Ford knew or should have known that the Affected Vehicles were dangerous and defective such that drivers and passengers of those vehicles may be exposed to carbon monoxide and other dangerous gases while the vehicles are in operation. 30. The defective vehicles were sold or leased pursuant to express and implied warranties. These warranties assured consumers that the vehicles were free from defects and Were properly equipped for the use for which they were intended. At the time the defective vehicles were sold or leased by Ford directly and through its authorized agents, the vehicles were in violation of express and implied warranties. All of the defective vehicles are still within the dates of the express written warranties, or the time or mileage limits in the express warranties should be inapplicable given Ford's fraudulent conduct, among other things. 32. Ford's control over the actions of its dealers is also evidenced by its implementation of the company's express and implied warranties as they relate to the defects alleged herein. Authorized Ford dealerships are instructed by Ford to address complaints of an exhaust odor by prescribing and implementing TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 to model years excluding the 2016-2017 Ford Explorers. B. Ford Acknowledged the Affected Vehicles' Defective Condition in TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 33. In response to customer complaints of an exhaust odor in the passenger compartments of the Affected Vehicles, Ford issued TSB 12-12-4 in or about December 2012. TSB 12-12-4 was intended to provide instructions to authorized Ford dealerships to correct the presence of an exhaust odor in 2011 through 2013 model year Ford Explorers. 34. In or about July 2014, Ford issued TSB 14-0130, which added 2014 and 2015 model year Explorers to the list of affected vehicles. TSB 14-0130 was intended to provide instructions to authorized Ford dealerships to correct the presence of an exhaust odor in 2011 through 2015 model year Ford Explorers. 35. Despite issuing TSBs 12-12-4 and 14:-0130, Ford did not inform Plaintiff or the members of the proposed class of the defects in 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers, despite the fact that those defects presented life safety issues to occupants of the vehicles. 36. Notably, TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 fail to disclose that the exhaust odor acknowledged therein is accompanied in the passenger compartment by lethal carbon monoxide. 38. In addition, TSBs 1242-4 and 14-0130 do not identify a specific fix to the exhaust odor problem. Rather, TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 require various replacements and/or repairs to several unrelated vehicle parts. This demonstrates that Ford knew of the defect, but did not know of a specific, effective fix to protect occupants of the Affected Vehicles from exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide. Based upon information and belief, Ford issued TSBs 12-12- 4 and 14-0130 hoping, but not knowing, that any one of the various replacements and/or repairs identified therein would remedy the exhaust odor complaints. C. Ford's TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 Fail to Re pair the Defects 39. Ford's TSBs 12-124 and 14-0130 fail to repair the exhaust odor problem, and vehicles which have received the repairs outlined in TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 may continue to have exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, enter the passenger compartment. 40. TSBs 1212-4 and 14-0130 identify flaws in the initial design and manufacture of the 2016 through 2017 model year Ford Explorer and other Affected Vehicles, and prescribe repairs and/or replacements which are inadequate and equally flawed and defective. 41. In TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130, Ford requires installation or use of the following replacement parts in the Affected Vehicles, among others: (i) a dual rate air extractor (part number BB5Z-61280B62-A under TSB 12-12-4 and part number BB5Z-61280B62-B under TSB 14- 0130); (ii) valve assembly auto drains (part number 4M8Z-54280B62-A); and (iii) Motorcraft® Seam sealer (part number TA2). 43. The replacement part - a dual rate air extractor - is formed of polypropylene and overmolded with thermoplastic elastomer (TPE). The dual rate air extractor includes "living hinges" and plastic torsional springs that are meant to function as a one-way pneumatic valve. 44. The dual rate air extractor has a listed purchase price of $86.33, whereas the initially installed air extractor has a listed purchase price of $22.50. However, the dual rate air extractor fails to prevent exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, from entering the auxiliary air condition systems and the passenger compartments of the Affected Vehicles. The replacement dual rate air extractors are therefore ineffective, dangerous and defective. 46. Ford designed, manufactured and engineered the 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers and Affected Vehicles using valve assembly auto drains on the rear liftgate of the vehicles which are dangerous and defective because the parts permit exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, to enter the passenger compartment. The replacement valve assembly auto drains fail to prevent exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, from entering the passenger compartment, and thus, they are ineffective, dangerous and defective. 47. Ford designed, manufactured, engineered and assembled the 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers and Affected Vehicles without properly sealing the horizontal sheet metal lap joints on the left and right sides of the underbody of the Affected Vehicles. Ford additionally designed, manufactured, engineered and assembled the 2016 through present model year Ford Explorers and Affected Vehicles without properly sealing the rear sheet metal overlap flange across the rear of the vehicle, and the auxiliary air conditioning lines. Accordingly, TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130 require that the foregoing joints, flange and lines be sprayed with "generous amounts" of rubberized undercoating, and seam sealer. However, the rubberized undercoating and seam sealer fail to prevent exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, from entering the passenger compartment. 48. TSB 14-0130 additionally requires the reprogramming of the HVAC module to the latest calibration. Reprogramming the HVAC module, however, fails to prevent exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, from entering the passenger compartment. 50. Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class has been damaged by Ford's conduct and/or inaction, as they have been exposed to harmful carbon monoxide and exhaust, they unknowingly purchased defective vehicles which cannot be safely operated, they have been forced to pay, or will pay, substantial amounts of money to repair the vehicles, if a repair can be made, and the value of their affected vehicles has been diminished because of this defect. 51. A vehicle containing the defect described herein - that is, a defect that pertnits the entry of carbon monoxide and other gases into the passenger compartment of the vehicle - is worth less than a vehicle free from such defect. Given that the defect renders driving the Affected Vehicles a health hazard which is potentially deadly, the vehicles are valueless. At the time Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, she paid a price based on the value of such a vehicle free of such defect. 52. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of herself and the members of a three proposed classes. The requirements of Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) are each met With respect to the classes defined below. 54. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class, known here as the National Magnuson-Moss Explorer Class: All persons who purchased or leased anywhere in the United States at least one of the following vehicles: 2016 - 2017 Ford Explorer. 55. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class, known here as the National Magnuson-Moss All Model Class: All persons who purchased or leased anywhere in the United States at least one of the following vehicles: 2016 - 2017 Ford Explorer, 2007-2013 Ford Edge, and 2007 -2015 Lincoln MKX. 56. Numerosity. Members of each of the four classes are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is impracticable. Based upon information and belief, Ford has sold tens of thousands of Affected Vehicles in Alabama. All of these vehicles exhibit the same issues outlined in TSBs 12-12-4 and 14-0130, and contain a defect that may cause carbon monoxide or exhaust to enter the passenger compartments of such vehicles. 58. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of each of the classes, as Plaintiff and the members of each of the classes have purchased or leased defective vehicles and have been harmed in some manner by Ford's conduct. 59. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of each of the classes. Plaintiff s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of any of the classes. Further, Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experience in complex class action litigation. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action. 60. Predominance and Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all the individual class members is impracticable. Questions of law and fact common to the members of each of the classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Likewise,, because the damages suffered by each individual class member may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it very difficult or impossible for individual class members to redress the wrongs done to each of them individually, and the burden imposed on the judicial system would be enormous. 62. For all of the foregoing reasons, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 62 as if fully set forth herein. 64. This Count is brought on behalf of the National Magnuson-Moss All Model Class and, alternatively, the National Magnuson-Moss Explorer Class and Alabama Explorer Class. 65. Plaintiff is a "consumer" within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 77. Plaintiff Boatner ("Plaintiff," for purposes of the Alabama Class's claims) repeats and realleges paragraphs [1-62] as if filly set forth herein 78. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Alabama Class (the "Class," for purposes of this Count). 79. Ford is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to the Affected Vehicles. 80. Ford expressly warranted that the vehicles would be free from defects in design, materials and workmanship. Ford promised to pay for all repairs and parts to remedy defects introduced during the design and manufacturing process. 82. Ford failed to disclose this defect, and has failed to notify Plaintiff and the members of the class, and dealers, of such defect and how to correct it. 83. Ford breached its express warranty to repair defects in materials and workmanship within the Affected Vehicles. Ford has not repaired, and has been unable to repair, the Affected Vehicles' materials and workmanship defects. 84. Ford's warranty and warranty repairs fail their essential purpose as Ford has been and may continue to be unable to repair or rectify the problem in the Affected Vehicles. Any claimed limitation on warranty rights accordingly are ineffective and unconscionable given the factual circumstances. 85. Plaintiff Boatner ('Plaintiff," for purposes of the Alabama Class's claims) repeats and realleges paragraphs [1-62] as if fully set forth herein. 86. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Alabama Class (the "Class," for purposes of this Count). 87. Ford is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to motor vehicles under Ala. Code § 7-2-104 and 7-2A-103. 89. Pursuant to Ala. Code § 7-2-315 and 7-2A-213, a warranty that Affected Vehicles were fit for their particular purpose was implied by law, and the Affected Vehicles were bought and sold subject to an implied warranty for fitness for a particular purpose. 90. The Affected Vehicles did not comply with the implied warranty of merchantability because, at the time of sale and at all times thereafter, they were defective and not in merchantable condition, would not pass without objection in the trade, and were not fit for the ordinary purpose for which vehicles were used. Specifically, the Affected Vehicles suffer a defect in that they have been designed and manufactured such that exhaust and other gases, including carbon monoxide, - may enter the passenger compartment of such vehicles during their normal and customary use. 91. Plaintiff and the other Affected members suffered injuries due to the defective nature of the Class Vehicles and Ford's breach of the warranty of merchantability. 92. As a direct and proximate result of Ford's breach of the warranty of merchantability, Plaintiff and the other Class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 93. Ford's warranty and warranty repairs fail their essential purpose as Ford has been and may continue to be unable to repair or rectify the problem in the Affected Vehicles. Any claimed limitation on warranty rights accordingly are ineffective and given the factual circumstances. A. Ford Sold and Leased Dangerous and Defective Vehicles BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (Ala. Code § 7-2-313 & 7-2A-210, etseq.) BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES (Ala. Code § 7-2-314; 7-2-315 & 7-2A-212; 72A-213 etseq.) VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT (15 U.S.C. § 2301, etseq.)

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12. Named Plaintiff brings this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons presently and formerly employed by Defendants as drivers or in positions with similar duties subject to Defendants’ unlawful pay practices and policies described herein and who worked for Defendants at any point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was initiated (the members of this putative class are referred to as “Class Plaintiffs”). 13. Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs are similarly situated, have substantially similar job duties, have substantially similar pay provisions, and are all subject to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as described herein. 14. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who were compensated improperly for overtime work in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised Notice of the instant lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. 15. Similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable by Defendants, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 17. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 18. Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as drivers. 19. Named Plaintiff’s primary duty was providing prearranged passenger transportation. 20. Class Plaintiffs’ primary duty was/is providing prearranged passenger transportation. 21. Plaintiff primarily drove sedans which transported less than 9 passengers including Named Plaintiff. 22. The sedans that Plaintiff drove weighed less than 10,000 pounds. 23. Class Plaintiffs primarily drove/drive sedans which transported/transport less than 9 passengers including Class Plaintiffs. 24. The sedans that Class Plaintiffs drove/drive weigh less than 10,000 pounds. 25. The sedans that Named Plaintiff drove did not contain a meter. 26. The sedans that Class Plaintiffs drove/drive did not contain a meter. 27. Defendant Flyte is not a licensed taxicab company. 28. Named Plaintiff never cruised for passengers. 29. Class Plaintiffs never cruise/cruised for passengers. 30. Named Plaintiff’s fares were based on a flat rate as opposed to a meter rate. 31. Class Plaintiffs’ fares are/were based on a flat rate as opposed to a meter rate. 32. Named Plaintiff regularly worked 72 or more hours per week. 34. Defendants compensated/compensate Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs by paying them a commission on the trip fares with no additional compensation provided for hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 35. Named Plaintiff earned an approximate average of $550.00 per workweek. 36. Named Plaintiff earned an hourly rate of approximately $7.64 per hour. 37. Named Plaintiff routinely worked at least 32 hours of unpaid overtime per week. 38. Class Plaintiffs routinely worked/work at least 20 hours of unpaid overtime per week. 39. Named Plaintiff worked for Defendants from in or around January 2010 to on or about June 5, 2013. 40. At no time did Name Plaintiff hire or fire any employees of Defendants. 41. At no time did Class Plaintiffs hire or fire any employees of Defendants. 42. At no time did Name Plaintiff supervise any employees of Defendants. 43. At no time did Class Plaintiffs supervise any employees of Defendants. 44. At no time did Name Plaintiff exercise discretion or independent judgment over matters of significance on behalf of Defendants. 45. At no time did Class Plaintiffs exercise discretion or independent judgment over matters of significance on behalf of Defendants. 46. Accordingly, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs were/are, within the meaning of the FLSA, non-exempt hourly employees of Defendants. 47. Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs at the rate of at least 48. Moreover, Defendants failed to implement a system to track the number of hours worked each workweek by Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs. 49. As a result of Defendants’ aforesaid illegal actions, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs have suffered damage. 50. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 51. At all times relevant herein, Defendants have and continue to be “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA. 52. At all times relevant herein, Defendants were/are responsible for paying wages to Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs. 53. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs were/are employed with Defendants as “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA. 54. Under the FLSA, an employer must pay an employee at least one and one half times his or her regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 55. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA include, but are not limited to, failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 per workweek, and failing to implement a system to track the number of hours worked each workweek by Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs. 56. Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs properly was/is willful and was/is not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law. Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation/ Failure to Track Hours) (Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs v. Defendants)

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1. Because of any person’s actual or perceived … disability …, directly or indirectly: (a) to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation; NYC Admin. Code §8-107(4) 139. The Defendants have not reasonably accommodated the Plaintiff, and other disabled individuals, in violation of New York City’s Administrative Code §8-102(4), (16), (17), (18), §8-107(4) and §8-107(15). 140. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, the Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 27 141. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the ability to enjoy non-restricted access and use of the Defendants’ Subject Facility. 142. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code the owners, operators, lessees, proprietors, managers, agents and/or employees of the Defendants’ Subject Facility have, because of the actual, or perceived, disability of the Plaintiff directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, and denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof. 143. In violation of the New York City Administrative Code, on the basis of the Plaintiff’s disability, the Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable and not acceptable. 144. The Defendants are in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 145. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law §8-502(c), notice of this action is being served upon the New York City Commission on Human Rights in accordance with the statute. 146. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ disability discrimination, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, including mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, emotional pain and suffering. 28 147. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000 from each Defendant under the New York City Human Rights Law, NYC Admin. Code §8-125. 60. The Plaintiff, who was born in 1949, is an elderly man aged beyond his 71 years. He suffers from debilitating diseases and was diagnosed with a neurological condition, which affects his walking. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist determined that he has gait dysfunction, the causes of which include peripheral neuropathy due to diabetes mellitus, chronic right basilar ganglia lacunar infarct and cerebellar ataxia. The Plaintiff’s treating neurologist also determined that he has essential tremor. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has decreased vision due 15 to glaucoma and is blind in the right eye. The Plaintiff’s gait is unsteady and he falls when he walks short distances. His treating neurologist prescribed him a wheelchair and a handicapped parking placard. The Plaintiff obtained the wheelchair and uses it regularly. The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission issued him a disabled person parking placard together with a handicapped identification card. The handicapped placard can be used in any car, in which the Plaintiff is travelling. The Plaintiff relies on his wheelchair and parks appropriately in handicapped accessible parking spaces. He also needs appropriate and statutorily mandated space next to that car, so that he may transfer from the car to the wheelchair. The Plaintiff is disabled under the statute, which in pertinent part states that Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual… . The phrase major life activities means functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. Violations of the ADA Violations of the New York State Human Rights Laws 117. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates, by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 118. The New York State Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the following: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability … of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof … to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of … disability … . NYS Executive Law §296(2)(a) 24 119. The Defendants’ Subject Facility is a place of public accommodation, as defined in New York State Human Rights Law §292(9). 120. The Defendants have further violated the New York State Human Rights Law by being in violation of the rights provided under the ADA. 121. The Defendants are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law by denying the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, full and safe access to all of the benefits, accommodations and services of the Subject Facility. 122. The Defendants do not provide the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with equal opportunity to use their public accommodation. 123. The Defendants have failed to make all readily achievable accommodations and modifications to remove barriers to access in violation of Executive Law §296(2)(c)(iii). 124. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which is in violation of the Executive Law, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, which include emotional distress, including, but not limited to, humiliation, embarrassment, stress and anxiety. 125. The Defendants have not provided the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law §296. 126. The Defendants’ direct, or indirect, unequal treatment of the Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, was demonstrated when he was discriminated against. 127. The Defendants have, because of the Plaintiff’s disability, directly, or indirectly, refused, withheld from, or denied him the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of their public accommodation. 25 128. The Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage, or custom, of the Plaintiff, and other similarly situated individuals, is unwelcome, unwanted, undesirable, unacceptable and objectionable. 129. In violation of the New York State Human Rights Laws the Defendants and their agents discriminated against the Plaintiff. 130. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ unlawful discrimination, which was, and is, in violation of the New York State Human Rights laws, the Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, personal injuries, such as mental anguish and emotional distress, including, but not limited to, depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, together with emotional pain and suffering. 131. The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages from each Defendant in the amount of $1,000 under the New York State Human Rights Law, NY CLS Exec §297(9). Violations of the New York State Civil Rights Laws 132. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 133. The Defendants have violated the Plaintiff’s civil rights on the basis of his disability. 134. Consequently, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law §40-c and §40-d, in the amount of $500 for each violation from each Defendant. 26 135. Pursuant to the New York Civil Rights law, §40-d, the Defendants are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 136. Notice of this action is being served upon the attorney general, as required by New York Civil Rights Law, §40-d, in accordance with the statute. Violations of the New York City Human Rights Laws 137. The Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference, all the allegations set forth in this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 138. The New York City Human Rights Law, in relevant part, provides the below. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation:

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(Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code § 204) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code section 1174, subdivision (d)) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code section 226.7) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code § 1198) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) (Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a)) (Against Defendant HAIR CLUB FOR MEN, LLC and DOES 1 through 100) 12. Defendants employed Plaintiff CLEMENS as hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from on or about April 29, 2014 to October 23, 2014 in the State of California. 33. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the general public similarly situated, and thus, seek class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. 34. The proposed class is defined as follows: All current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees employed by Defendants within the State of California at any time during the period from four years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment. 35. Plaintiffs reserve the right to establish subclasses as appropriate. 38. At all times herein set forth, the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) was applicable to Plaintiffs’ employment by Defendants. 39. At all times herein set forth, PAGA provides that any provision of law under the California Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the LWDA for violations of the California Labor Code may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself and other current or former employees pursuant to procedures outlined in California Labor Code section 2699.3. 40. Pursuant to PAGA, a civil action under PAGA may be brought by an “aggrieved employee,” who is any person that was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed. 41. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants and the alleged violations were committed against him during his time of employment and he is therefore, an aggrieved employee. Plaintiffs are “aggrieved employees” as defined by California Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (c). 44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 52, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 63. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 62, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 64. At all times herein set forth, the applicable IWC Wage Order and California Labor Code section 226.7 were applicable to Plaintiffs’ and the other class members’ employment by Defendants. 65. At all relevant times, California Labor Code section 226.7 provides that no employer shall require an employee to work during any rest period mandated by an applicable order of the California 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 73. At all relevant times, California Labor Code sections 11194, 1197, and 1197.1 provide that the minimum wage to be paid to employees, and the payment of a lesser wage than the minimum so fixed is unlawful. 74. During the relevant time period, Defendants regularly failed to pay minimum wage to Plaintiffs and the other class members as required, pursuant to California Labor Code sections 11194, 1197, and 1197.1. 75. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the other class members the minimum wage as required violates California Labor Code sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1. Pursuant to those sections Plaintiffs and the other class members are entitled to recover the unpaid balance of their minimum wage compensation as well as interest, costs, and attorney’s fees, and liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages unlawfully unpaid and interest thereon. 76. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 1197.1, Plaintiffs and the other class members are entitled to recover a penalty of $100.00 for the initial failure to timely pay each employee minimum wages, and $250.00 for each subsequent failure to pay each employee minimum wages. 77. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 1194.2, Plaintiffs and the other class members are entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages unlawfully unpaid and interest thereon. 78. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 77, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 84. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 83, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 85. At all times herein set forth, California Labor Code section 204 provides that all wages earned by any person in any employment between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar month, other than those wages due upon termination of an employee, are due and payable between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was performed. 90. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 89, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 94. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 93, and each and every part thereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 95. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 1174, subdivision (d), an employer shall keep, at a central location in the state or at the plants or establishments at which employees are employed, payroll records showing the hours worked daily by and the wages paid to, and the number of piece-rate units earned by and any applicable piece rate paid to, employees employed at the respective plants or establishments. These records shall be kept in accordance with rules established for this purpose by the commission, but in any case shall be kept on file for not less than two years. 96. Defendants have intentionally and willfully failed to keep accurate and complete payroll records showing the hours worked daily and the wages paid, to Plaintiffs and the other class members. 97. As a result of Defendants’ violation of California Labor Code section 1174, subdivision (d), Plaintiffs and the other class members have suffered injury and damage to their statutorily-protected rights.

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18. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 20. Plaintiff was an hourly paid employee of Defendant who worked as a frac operator in connection with Defendant’s business operations centered out of Midland, Texas. Plaintiff routinely worked in excess of 40 hours in a seven-day workweek. 21. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee of Defendant pursuant to the FLSA. Plaintiff was paid by means of an IRS Tax Form W-2. When Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per seven-day workweek, he was entitled to receive overtime premium compensation at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all such hours worked over 40. 22. In addition to receiving hourly pay, Plaintiff also received additional remuneration in the form of so-called “per diem” pay. 23. Although Defendant paid Plaintiff overtime compensation for his hours of work at one and one-half times his hourly rate of pay, Defendant failed to include all remuneration, i.e., so-called “per diem” pay, as required by the FLSA in calculating Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay. This resulted in Plaintiff not being paid all overtime premium compensation owed by Defendant.

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12. Defendant Jornaya provides a variety of “real time” products for companies who engage in telemarketing. 13. Jornaya’s products include “TCPA Guardian” and “LeadiD,” which help businesses evade the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by creating evidence of purported consent to receive telemarketing calls, and to secretly collect data from website users for marketing purposes. 14. Jornaya’s products include a tool called “Visual Playback,” which surreptitiously records, in real time, a website visitor’s keystrokes, mouse clicks, and other interactions on a website. 15. On its website, Jornaya says that its “real time” recording of user interactions begins “the moment a customer lands on a webpage.” This technology allows Jornaya to “witness[] [customers’] interactions and collect[] data related to their experience.” 32. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all California residents who visited cars.com and whose electronic communications were intercepted or recorded by Jornaya. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the class definition as appropriate based on further investigation and discovery obtained in the case. 33. Members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. On information and belief, members of the Class number in the thousands. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendants. 34. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, whether Defendants have violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 631 and invaded Plaintiff’s privacy rights in violation of the California Constitution; and whether class members are entitled to actual and/or statutory damages for the aforementioned violations. 39. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. 50. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 631 Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 635

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10. On or November 2, 2005, Defendant transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 11. Defendant created or made Exhibit A which Defendant knew or should have known is a good or product which Defendant intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the class. 3 12. Exhibit A is part of Defendant’s work or operations to market Defendant’s goods or services which were performed by Defendant and on behalf of Defendant. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendant’s work or operations. 13. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendant to send the faxes. 14. On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same and similar unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and more than 39 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendant’s facsimiles did not display a proper opt out notice as required by 64 18. Plaintiff incorporate the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 19. In accordance with FRCP 23, Plaintiff brings Count I pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who were successfully sent one or more faxes on November 2, 2005 or July 10, 2006, from Alco Vending offering a “full line” of vending machines and stating “Absolutely no charge to you to have us put in your vending machines.” Excluded from the Class are the Defendant, its employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. 4 20. Commonality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (2): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: a) Whether the Defendant sent unsolicited fax advertisements; b) Whether the Defendant’s faxes advertised the commercial availability of property, goods, or services; c) The manner and method the Defendant used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which it sent Exhibit "A" and other unsolicited faxed advertisements; d) Whether the Defendant faxed advertisements without first obtaining the recipient's prior permission or invitation; e) Whether the Defendant sent the faxed advertisements knowingly; f) Whether the Defendant violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227; g) Whether the Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; h) Whether the Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; i) Whether Exhibit A and Defendant’s other advertisements displayed a proper opt out notice as required by 64 C.F.R. 1200; and j) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 21. Typicality [Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (3): The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received a fax sent on behalf of the Defendant advertising goods and services of the Defendant during the Class Period. The Plaintiff are making the same claims and seeking the same relief for themselves and all class members based 5 upon the federal statute. The Defendant has acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members. 22. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (4): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. They are interested in this matter, have no conflicts and have retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 23. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication [Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (1): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant, and/or b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff’s claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 24. Common Conduct [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (2): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendant has acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demand such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 25. Predominance and Superiority [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (3): Common questions of law and fact predominate and a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication: a) Proof of the claims of the Plaintiff will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that the Defendant may assert and prove will come from the Defendant’s records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; c) The Defendant has acted and is continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; 6 d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support protested individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one (1) proceeding based upon common proofs; e) This case is inherently managed as a class action in that: (i) The Defendant identified persons or entities to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that the Defendant’s computer and business records will enable the Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; (ii) Liability and damages can be established for the Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense: (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning the Defendant’s practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. 26. The TCPA makes unlawful the "use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine…" 47 U.S.C. § 227. 7 27. The TCPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's express invitation or permission." 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 28. The TCPA provides: "3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation; (B) An action to recover actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions." 29. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 30. The Defendant knew or should have known that a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendant’s goods or services; b) that the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; c) that Exhibit "A" is an advertisement; and d) that the opt out notice did not comply with 64 C.F.R. 1200. 31. The Defendant’s actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendant’s junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendant’s faxes. Moreover, the Defendant’s faxes used the Plaintiff’s fax machines. The Defendant’s faxes cost the Plaintiff time, as the Plaintiff and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendant’s illegal faxes. That 8 time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff’s business activities. The Defendant’s faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff’s and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Exhibit A occurred outside of Defendant’s premises. 32. The Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., by transmitting Exhibit "A" to the Plaintiff and the other members of the class without obtaining their prior express permission or invitation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, THE SIDING AND INSULATION CO. a/k/a THE ALUMINUM SIDING & INSULATION CO., INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendant, ALCO VENDING, INC., as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint the Plaintiff as the representatives of the class and appoint the Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That Court enjoin the Defendant from additional violations; and D. That the Court award costs and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 33. Plaintiff incorporate paragraphs 3 and 4, 6 through 15, and 17 as though fully set forth herein. 9 34. In accordance with FRCP 23, Plaintiff brings Count II for conversion under the common law for the following class of persons: All persons who on or after June 15, 2005 were sent telephone facsimile messages by or on behalf of Defendant. 35. A class action is proper in that: (a) On information and belief the class consists of forty or more persons and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of fact or law common to the class predominating over all questions affecting only individual class members, including: (i) Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited faxes; (ii) The manner and method Defendant used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which it sent Exhibit A and other unsolicited faxes; and (iii) Whether Defendant committed the tort of conversion. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interests adverse or in conflict with the class. 37 A class action is an appropriate method for adjudicating this controversy fairly and efficiently. The interest of the individual class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small and individual actions are not economically feasible. 38. By sending Plaintiff and the other class members unsolicited faxes, Defendant improperly converted their fax machines, toner and paper to its own use. Defendant also converted Plaintiff’s employees’ time to Defendant’s own use. 10 39. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 40. By sending the unsolicited faxes, Defendant permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to Defendant’s own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 41. Defendant knew or should have known that its misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 42. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited faxes from Defendant. 43. Each of Defendant’s unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’ time because multiple persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendant’s unauthorized faxes. Defendant knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to Plaintiff. 44. Defendant’s actions caused damages to Plaintiff and the other members of the class because their receipt of Defendant’s unsolicited faxes caused them to lose paper and toner as a result. Defendant’s actions prevented Plaintiff’s fax machines from being used for Plaintiff’s business purposes during the time Defendant was using Plaintiff’s fax machines for Defendant’s unauthorized purpose. Defendant’s actions also cost Plaintiff employee time, as Plaintiff’s employees used their time receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendant’s unauthorized faxes, and that time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s business activities. 11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, THE SIDING AND INSULATION CO. a/k/a THE ALUMINUM SIDING & INSULATION CO., INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendant, ALCO VENDING, INC., as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representatives of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award appropriate damages; C. That the Court award costs of suit; and D. Awarding such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, but in any event, not more than $75,000.00 to any individual class member. Respectfully submitted, THE SIDING AND INSULATION CO. a/k/a THE CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates BAR METHOD Centers as well as the BAR METHOD website, offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Fitness Centers (hereinafter, its “Centers”). 21. Defendant operates its Centers across the United States, including its location in New York City at 97 North 10th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11249. 22. These Centers constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Centers provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Center locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including access to its class schedules, the ability to learn more about the Bar Method, learn about membership opportunities, including the ability to sign up for a 14 day free trial, shop its online store, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Centers and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite his intention to do so. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Centers are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Centers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind consumers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. At the time the dunning letter was sent to Plaintiff, Defendant was not and has never been licensed as a collection agency in the State of Illinois. 11. Since February 10th, Defendant has contacted Plaintiff’s in order to gather information to be used in its debt collection activities. 12. Upon information and belief, Defendant has called Plaintiff numerous times in attempts to collect debts. 13. Plaintiff specifically asked Defendant to provide their Illinois license number. Defendant failed to provide the requested information. 14. Defendant took all of the above collection actions against Plaintiff when it was not licensed as a collection agency in Illinois. 15. Upon information and belief, it is Defendant’s routine practice to violate the FDCPA and ICAA by attempting to collect debts in the State of Illinois without being licensed. 17. Members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Based on Plaintiff’s research of complaints from other consumers, Defendant is a high volume debt collector that attempt to collect many thousands of consumer debts throughout Illinois. 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant has engaged in the improper collection communications described above with thousands of consumers. 19. Plaintiff is a member of the class she seeks to represent. 20. There are no unique defenses Defendant can assert against Plaintiff individually, as distinguished from the class. 21. Plaintiff will assure the adequate representation of all members of the class and will have no conflict with class members in the maintenance of this action. Plaintiff’s interests in this action are typical of the class and are antagonistic to the interests of the Defendant. Plaintiff has no interest or relationship with the Defendant that would prevent her from litigating this matter fully. Plaintiff is aware that settlement of a class action is subject to court approval and she will vigorously pursue the class claims throughout the course of this action. 23. Most, if not all, the facts needed to determine damages are obtainable from the Defendants’ records. 24. The purposes of the FDCPA and ICAA will be best effectuated by a class action. 25. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 26. Furthermore, as damages suffered by most members of the class are relatively small in relation to the costs, expense, and burden of litigation, it would be difficult for members of the class individually to redress the wrongs done to them. 27. Many, if not all, class members are unaware that claims exist against the Defendants. There will be no unusual difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 28. Three common questions of law and fact predominate over all individual questions in this action. The common questions are whether: (1) Defendant is a “debt collector” pursuant to the FDCPA and ICAA; (2) the liabilities that Defendant has sought to collect from class members constitute “consumer debt” under the FDCPA and ICAA; and (3) whether Defendant violated the FDCPA and ICAA by attempting to collect debts in Illinois without being licensed. 30. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action. Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 31. All Class members have been damaged in precisely the same fashion, by precisely the same conduct. The loss suffered by individual Class members is calculable and ascertainable. 32. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs. 33. In order to protect consumers, the ICAA creates a licensing regime and makes it a crime for collection agencies to operate, directly or indirectly engage in the business of collecting, or exercise the right to collect debts in Illinois without first obtaining a license. 225 ILCS 425/4; 225 ILCS 425/14. 34. For every instance in which Defendant demanded payment from an Illinois consumer for a debt, whether by written correspondence or by telephone or otherwise, Defendant attempted to do so in violation of the ICAA because Defendant has never been permitted to collect debts in Illinois. 35. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs. 9. On or about February 10, 2015, Plaintiff received a dunning letter from Defendant attempting to collect an amount due to Uptown Emergency Physicians in the amount of $55.40. Exhibit 1.

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) COLLECTIONS, INC. ) 13. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be owed to a creditor other than Defendant. 14. Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 15. On or about July 30, 2018, Account Services sent the Plaintiff a collection letter. Said letter is attached and fully incorporated herein as Exhibit A. 16. Said letter stated “RE: UTSW MEDICAL CENTER” 17. Upon information and belief, one cannot find any such entity by the name of “UTSW MEDICAL CENTER” registered with the Texas Secretary of State.1 18. The letter goes on to state, “Please be advised that your past due account has been referred to this office for collection by UTSW MEDICAL CENTER.” 20. This letter does not demonstrate the relationship between Defendant and “UTSW 44. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 45. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Account Services and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 46. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is Account Services and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Account Services, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 48. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 49. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 51. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 52. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 54. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 55. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 56. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of Texas and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letters sent to the Plaintiff on or about July 30, 2018 (Exhibit A) and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes; and (b) the collection letter was sent from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present; and (c) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (d) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692g and 1692g(a)(2) for failing to correctly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Petition as if fully stated herein. 58. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that, within 5 days of Defendant’s first communication to a consumer, it had to provide Plaintiff with an effective validation notice, containing, among other disclosures, “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed” see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 60. Defendant’s violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA renders it liable for actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Petition as if fully stated herein. 62. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 63. Making a false statement of the name of the current creditor violates § 1692e of the 67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Petition as if fully stated herein. 68. Section 1692d prohibits any debt collector from engaging in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. 69. Defendant’s communications with Plaintiff were meant to shame, embarrass, and harass Plaintiff by misrepresenting the alleged debts status. 70. Section 1692f prohibits the use of unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. 71. Defendant’s communications with Plaintiff were deceptive and misleading. 72. Defendant used unfair and unconscionable means to attempt to collect the alleged debt. Collection Actions Current Creditor or Misleading Representation, & Unfair Practices

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20. First Energy describes itself as a “forward-thinking electric utility” that “has invested $10 billion in environmental efforts since 1970.” See https://www.firstenergycorp.com/about.html#gsc.tab=0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2017). 21. First Energy “includes one of the nation's largest investor-owned electric systems, more than 24,000 miles of transmission lines that connect the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions, and a diverse generating fleet with a total capacity of nearly 17,000 megawatts.” See id. 22. First Energy operates throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania and Ohio. To complete their business objectives, First Energy hires personnel to perform its necessary work. 23. First Energy Field Agents are required to assist First Energy in acquiring property to expand First Energy’s network of services and to identify easements and rights-of-way to permit them to operate. See “Real Estate Matters,” https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/ customer/help/safety/real-estate-power-lines/real-estate-matters.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2017). 25. For example, Ewing worked exclusively for First Energy from approximately June 13, 2016 to June 30, 2017 as a Field Agent performing duties as a “Stakeholder Management Land Agent.” Throughout her employment with First Energy, she was classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day-rate basis. Ewing was never paid on a salary basis. She never received any guaranteed weekly compensation from First Energy irrespective of days worked (i.e., the only compensation she received was the day-rate for each day that she actually worked). 26. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked for First Energy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and/or Ohio and throughout the United States over the past three years as independent contractors. 27. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were subjected to the same illegal pay practice for similar work. 28. Specifically, First Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate, regardless of the number of hours that they worked each day (or in a workweek), and failed to provide them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 29. The day to day activities of the Putative Class Members were conducted within designated parameters defined by First Energy. 30. Ewing and the Putative Class Members worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by First Energy. 32. During Ewing’s employment with First Energy while she was classified as an independent contractor, First Energy exercised control over all aspects of her job. First Energy did not require any substantial investment by Ewing for her to perform the work required of her. 33. Ewing was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other Field Agents) to perform her job duties. 34. First Energy determined Ewing’s opportunity for profit and loss. 35. Indeed, First Energy controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Ewing. 36. First Energy ordered the hours and locations Ewing worked, the equipment and forms she used, and the rates of pay she received. 37. First Energy controlled all aspects of Ewing’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with First Energy’s policies and procedures. 38. No real investment was required of Ewing to perform her job. More often than not, Ewing utilized equipment provided by First Energy to perform her job duties. 39. Ewing did not provide the equipment she worked with on a daily basis. 40. First Energy made the large capital investments in buildings, tools, and supplies in the business in which Ewing worked. 41. Ewing did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll and marketing. 42. Ewing was economically dependent on First Energy during her employment. 43. First Energy set Ewing’s rates of pay, her work schedule, and prohibited her from working other jobs for other companies while she was working on jobs for First Energy. 45. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Ewing to perform her job duties. 46. Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of the Putative Class Members were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by First Energy. 47. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by First Energy, including the tools used, the data to research and compile, the work schedule, and related work duties. 48. The Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre-determined parameters. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were primarily technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 49. The Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. 50. For the purposes of their overtime claims, the Putative Class Members performed substantially similar job duties related to servicing First Energy’s core business. 51. Ewing performed routine duties that were largely dictated by First Energy. 52. Ewing worked exclusively for First Energy from approximately June 2016 to July 2017 as an independent contractor. 53. Ewing was not employed by First Energy on a project-by-project basis. 54. In fact, while Ewing was classified as an independent contractor, she was regularly on call for First Energy and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. 55. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 57. First Energy’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Ewing, overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non- exempt job duties. 58. Because Ewing (and First Energy’s other independent contractors) were misclassified as independent contractors by First Energy, she and the Putative Class Members should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. 59. First Energy’s day-rate system violates state and federal law because Ewing and the other Field Agents did not receive any pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours each week. VI. 64. During all relevant times, Ewing and the PMWA Class were covered employees entitled to the above-described PMWA’s protections. See 43 P.S. § 333.103(h). 65. First Energy’s compensation scheme that is applicable to Ewing and the PMWA Class failed to comply with either 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) or 34 Pa. Code § 231.43(b). 66. At all relevant times, First Energy was subject to the requirements of the PMWA. 67. At all relevant times, First Energy employed Ewing and each Class Member with Pennsylvania state law claims as an “employee” within the meaning of the PMWA. 68. The PMWA requires employers like Defendant to pay employees at one and one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week. Plaintiff and each member of the Pennsylvania Class are entitled to overtime pay under the PMWA. 69. Defendants have and had a policy and practice of misclassifying Ewing and each member of the Pennsylvania class as independent contractors and failing to pay these workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 70. Ewing and each member of the Pennsylvania Class seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, prejudgment interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 71. Ewing and each member of the Pennsylvania Class also seek recovery of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the PMWA. 72. Plaintiff brings this claim under the Ohio Wage Act as a Rule 23 class action. 73. The conduct alleged violates the Ohio Wage Act (O.R.C. §§4111). 75. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers like Defendant to pay employees at one and one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime pay under the Ohio Wage Acts. 76. Defendants had a policy and practice of misclassifying Plaintiff and each member of the Ohio Wage Act class as independent contractors and failing to pay these workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 77. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, prejudgment interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 78. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 79. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA, Ohio Wage Acts, and PMWA. 80. Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiff indicated they were improperly classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 81. Based on her experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 83. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 84. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 85. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 86. Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. 87. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 88. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 89. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 90. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 92. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 93. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 94. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. WHO WERE CLASSIFIED AS § COLLECTIVE ACTION § PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Defendant. §

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11. The “fluctuating work week” model provides a method for an employer to pay a reduced rate of overtime compensation to individuals who work in excess of 40 hours a week; namely that the employer pays only ½ time for hours worked in excess of 40, and that the more hours worked by the individual, the lower the ½ time rate falls. 12. Cerner purported to compensate Plaintiffs Speer and McGuirk as Salaried NonExempt Associates in compliance with the “fluctuating work week model” as described in 29 C.F.R. §778.114, but violated the same statute by failing to compensate Speer, McGuirk and other similarly situated employees with the required fixed salary. 13. Namely, Salaried NonExempt Associates did not receive a fixed salary to cover all hours worked, rather that salary fluctuated with regard the number of hours worked, and thus there was no clear and mutual understanding that a fixed salary would cover all hours worked for Cerner. 14. As “Salaried NonExempt Associates” Speer and McGuirk, and those similarly situated to them, worked hours in excess of forty per week, but because of the improper application of the Fluctuating Work Week method of pay, Defendant deprived Speer, McGuirk and all other similarly situated Salaried NonExempt Associates of full compensation required under the FLSA for overtime hours worked during the course of their employment. 15. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 17. Plaintiffs Speer and McGuirk bring this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendant as Salaried NonExempt Associates. 18. This Complaint was brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for all claims asserted by the named Plaintiffs because the claims of Speer and McGuirk are similar to the claims of the putative plaintiffs of the representative action who have not been compensated at the rate required by the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty per week. 19. The FLSA class is to be defined as follows: All persons employed by Defendant in the past three years who were purportedly compensated based on the fluctuating work-week method of pay and who received additional periodic compensation as part of his/her salary. 20. Speer, McGuirk and the putative representative action plaintiffs are similarly situated, are subject to substantially similar pay provisions, and are subject to Defendant’s common practice, policy, or plan of refusing to pay employees their statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA. 21. The names and addresses of the putative members of the representative action are available from Defendant. 22. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” engaged in the interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203. 24. At all times relevant herein, Defendant has had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Dollars). 25. The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Defendant, to compensate all nonexempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a workweek. 26. Defendant failed to compensate Speer and McGuirk and all other similarly situated Salaried NonExempt Associates at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week, and therefore, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 27. Defendant failed to compensate Speer and McGuirk and all other similarly situated Salaried NonExempt Associates at the statutorily required rate for all hours worked. 28. The FLSA exempts certain categories of employees from overtime pay obligations; however, none of the FLSA exemptions apply to Salaried NonExempt Associates. 29. Speer and McGuirk and all similarly situated employees are victims of a uniform and company-wide compensation policy that violates the FLSA. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant is improperly applying a uniform policy of compensation that utilizes the fluctuating work week model of compensation when Defendant is not and has not otherwise complied with the requirements set out in the FLSA to utilize such a method of compensation. 35. Paintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the above stated paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 36. Count II is brought as a class action against Defendant on behalf of Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers employed by Defendant in Missouri 37. Under Count II, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, seek relief on a class basis challenging Defendant’s practice of failing to fully and properly compensate Missouri employees. 39. Plaintiffs’ claim under Count II meets the commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements of a class action. 40. This Rule 23 Class is believed to exceed forty persons. As a result, joinder of all class members in a single action is impracticable. Class members may be informed of the pendency of this class action. 41. There are questions of fact and law common to the Rule 23 Class that predominates over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to the class arising from Defendant’s actions include, without limitation, the following: Whether Defendant violated the Missouri Minimum Wage Law when it failed to pay salaried non-exempt employees the overtime pay owed to them. 42. The question set forth above regarding the Rule 23 Class predominates over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims. 43. Plaintiffs’ claims under Count II are typical of those of the Rule 23 Class in that class members were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices. 45. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the respective class because they are members of the class and their interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class they seek to represent. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and undersigned counsel who has experience in employment and wage and hour litigation and in class and collective action litigation. 46. Maintenance of this action as a class action is a fair and efficient method for adjudication of this controversy. It would be impracticable and undesirable for each member of the class who suffered harm to bring a separate action. In addition, the maintenance of separate actions would place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts and could result in inconsistent adjudications, while a single class action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of all class members. 47. Plaintiffs and the putative class members bring this claim against Defendant. 48. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated individuals have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under RSMo. § 290.500 et seq. 49. Defendant violated the MMWL in relevant part, by failing to pay all wages due to Plaintiffs and the putative plaintiffs. 50. Plaintiffs and the putative plaintiffs have thereby been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant on Count II of the Complaint, for an award of compensatory damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law, and for such other orders and further relief, including an award of attorney fees. WAGE LAW RSMo. § 290.500 et seq. (“MMWL”) AS A RULE 23 CLASS § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIM – FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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55. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Cnova securities: (1) pursuant and/or traceable to the Company’s Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with the Company’s IPO on or about November 19, 2014, seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Act; and/or (2) between November 19, 2014 and December 18, 2015, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the Exchange Act; and were damaged thereby (collectively, the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 56. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Cnova’s securities were actively traded on the Nasdaq Stock Market (the “NASDAQ”). While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Millions of Cnova shares were traded publicly during the Class Period on the NASDAQ. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Cnova or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 66. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Cnova, his/her control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Cnova’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Cnova, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein, except any allegation of fraud, recklessness or intentional misconduct. 73. This Count is brought pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k, on behalf of the Class, against the Section 11 Defendants. 74. The Registration Statement for the IPO was inaccurate and misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. 75. Cnova is the registrant for the IPO. The Section 11 Defendants named herein were responsible for the contents and dissemination of the Registration Statement. 76. As issuer of the shares, Cnova is strictly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the misstatements and omissions. 77. None of the Section 11 Defendants named herein made a reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement were true and without omissions of any material facts and were not misleading. 78. By reasons of the conduct herein alleged, each Section 11 Defendant violated, and/or controlled a person who violated Section 11 of the Securities Act. 81. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein, except any allegation of fraud, recklessness or intentional misconduct. 82. This count is asserted against the Section 11 Individual Defendants and is based upon Section 15 of the Securities Act. 83. The Section 11 Individual Defendants, by virtue of their offices, directorship, and specific acts were, at the time of the wrongs alleged herein and as set forth herein, controlling persons of Cnova within the meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act. The Section 11 Individual Defendants had the power and influence and exercised the same to cause Cnova to engage in the acts described herein. 84. The Section 11 Individual Defendants’ positions made them privy to and provided them with actual knowledge of the material facts concealed from Plaintiff and the Class. 85. By virtue of the conduct alleged herein, the Section 11 Individual Defendants are liable for the aforesaid wrongful conduct and are liable to Plaintiff and the Class for damages suffered. Background Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (Against the Company and the Individual Defendants) Violation of Section 11 of The Securities Act (Against the Section 11 Defendants) Violation of Section 15 of The Securities Act (Against the Section 11 Individual Defendants)

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking to collect the debt allegedly owed by “Breanna Grace.” 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 14. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 15. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone call from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 17. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 8. Beginning in or around July of 2012, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone, (909) 684-4164, in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt owed by someone other than Plaintiff. 9. Defendant placed multiple calls, often on a virtual daily basis to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone seeking to collect the alleged debt owed by an unknown debtor who is not Plaintiff. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 18th Day of October, 2012.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24. Defendant Singer owned The Key and served as Chief Executive Officer of KWF. 25. The Key was a for-profit college counseling and preparation business that Singer founded in or about 2007 and incorporated in the State of California in or about 2012. 26. KWF was a non-profit corporation in Newport Beach, California, that Singer established as a purported charity in or about 2012. Plaintiffs KERI FIDELAK, LAUREN FIDELAK, TYLER BENDIS, JULIA BENDIS, KALEA WOODS, JAMES JOHNSON and NICHOLAS JAMES JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings this action based upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, based upon, inter alia, the investigations of their attorneys.

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23. Plaintiff restates and realleges paragraphs 1 through 22 as though fully set forth herein. 24. Defendant repeatedly sent or caused to be sent frequent non-emergency text messages, including but not limited to the messages referenced above, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using a telephone facsimile machine (“TFM”) or transmitting text without Plaintiff’s prior consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(C). 25. The TCPA defines TFM as “equipment which has the capacity…to transcribe text or images, or both from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line.” 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(3). 26. Alternatively, Defendant sent these texts an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(iii). The TCPA, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), defines an ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity...to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” 28. Upon information and belief, the system employed by Defendant to place text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 29. Defendant violated the TCPA by placing numerous text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone using an ATDS without his consent. Plaintiff repeatedly placed Defendant on notice that he was the wrong party and that they did not have his consent to contact him. 30. The text messages placed by Defendant to Plaintiff were not for emergency purposes as defined by the TCPA under 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(i). 31. Upon information and belief, based on the frequency and content of the text messages, Defendant used a TFM or ATDS. 32. Defendant violated the TCPA by sending numerous text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone using a TFM or ATDS without his prior consent. 33. As pled above, Plaintiff was severely harmed by Defendant’s text messages sent to his cellular phone. 34. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no system in place to document and archive whether it has consent to continue to contact consumers on their cellular phones. 35. Upon information and belief, Defendant knew its marketing practices were in violation of the TCPA, yet continued to employ them to increase profits at Plaintiff’s expense. 36. Defendant, through its agents, representatives, subsidiaries, and/or employees acting within the scope of their authority acted intentionally in violation of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 8. Around November 2020, Plaintiff began receiving numerous unsolicited and unwanted text messages and phone calls from Defendant to his cellular phone number, (360)

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13. Even though APMs primarily performed non-exempt functions, BJ’s classified all APMs as “exempt” from the overtime requirements. This practice of classifying all APMs as exempt was uniformly applied regardless of store size, volume, location or any other individualized factor. 14. Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit to challenge BJ’s policy of improperly compensating APMs. 15. Numerous employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice and policy which are in willful violation of the FLSA. The Putative Class Members are all salaried employees who regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. These employees are victims of Defendant’s unlawful compensation practices and are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay provisions and employment practices. 16. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA result from generally applicable, systematic policy and practice and which is not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 18. During the relevant time period, Defendant has violated, and is violating, the provisions of Sections 6 and/or 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, and 215(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such employees for their employment in excess of 40 hours per week at rates no less than one and one-half the regular rates for which they were employed. 19. Defendant knowingly, willfully or in reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime compensation. The decision by Defendant not to properly pay overtime compensation to its APMs was neither reasonable, nor in good faith. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime wages under the FLSA in an amount equal to one and one-half times their rate of pay, plus liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs. IX. FLSA VIOLATIONS

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26. After receiving the April 28th text message which provided that Plaintiff could “Reply 1 if interested or 3 if not,” Plaintiff responded with “3”, to opt-out of receiving any text messages from Defendant. 27. Instead of opting Plaintiff out of receiving future messages, Defendant sent him at least ten text messages following his opt out request, including two text messages on April 28, 2018 and additional text messages on June 21, 2018, June 28, 2018, July 19, 2018, July 20, 2018 and August 4, 2018. 29. Specifically, Defendant offered Plaintiff limited time offers and credits for its services. 30. Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 32. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 33. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 1175 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 1175 Number. 34. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 35. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 36. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 37. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 41. Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “3”) being sent by a consumer, which function was also utilized by Defendant on April 28, 2018, as shown below: 42. To transmit the text messages at issue, Defendant uploaded a list of telephone numbers which are stored indefinitely by the Platform. 43. Defendant then created the content of the text messages, selected the telephone numbers to transmit the messages to, and selected a date and time for transmission. 44. In making these selections, Defendant was simply creating a set of instructions that were subsequently executed automatically (i.e. with no human intervention), by the Platform. 46. The above execution of Defendant’s instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 47. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 49. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 50. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 52. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 55. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 63. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent 64. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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45. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and a proposed class (the “California Class”) defined as follows: All California persons who, on or after June 13, 2015, purchased the Products for personal, family, or household purposes. 46. There are likely tens of thousands of class members in each class. Each class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder is impracticable. 5. In 2014, the National Institutes of Health cautioned: “experts agree that Americans eat and drink way too much sugar, and it’s contributing to the obesity epidemic. Much of the sugar we eat isn’t found naturally in food but is added during processing or preparation.” https://newsinhealth.nih.gov/2014/10/sweet-stuff. The NIH noted further: “[s]everal studies have found a direct link between excess sugar consumption and obesity and cardiovascular problems worldwide.” Id. 52. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 53. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Class for violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. (the “CLRA”). 54. This claim is for monetary relief and injunctive relief pursuant to California Civil Code section 1782. 55. Under the CLRA, “consumer” means “an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(d). 56. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” under the CLRA. 57. Under the CLRA, “person” means “an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however organized.” Id. § 1761(c). 58. Defendant is a “person” under the CLRA. 59. Under the CLRA, “transaction” means “an agreement between a consumer and another person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.” Id. § 1761(e). 6. There has long been a consensus among doctors and nutritionists that “[e]ating too much sugar contributes to numerous health problems, including weight gain, Type 2 diabetes, dental caries, metabolic syndrome and heart disease, and even indirectly to cancer because of certain cancers’ relationship to obesity.” http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/ct-sugar- addictive-20171218-story.html 60. Defendant, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and the Class members, on the other hand, engaged in “transactions” under the CLRA because, among other reasons, Defendant agreed to sell, and pursuant to that agreement sold, the Products to Plaintiff and the Class members. 61. Defendant’s actions, representations, omissions, and conduct have violated the CLRA because they extend to transactions that are intended to result, or that have resulted, in the sale of goods and services to consumers. 67. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 68. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Class for violation of California’s False Advertising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq. (the “FAL”). 69. The FAL prohibits “mak[ing] any false or misleading advertising claim.” 7. In addition, “there is emerging research that suggests high-sugar diets may increase the risk of developing [dementia].” http://theconversation.com/yes-too-much-sugar-is-bad-for-our- health-heres-what-the-science-says-92030. B. As part of a societal trend toward consuming healthier foods and natural foods, avoidance of added sugar has been and remains a significant consumer preference, with consumers strongly favoring honey as a sugar substitute. 70. As alleged herein, Defendant, in its labeling of its Products, makes “false [and] misleading advertising claim[s],” as it deceives consumers as to the honey content and sugar content of the Products. 71. In reliance on these false and misleading advertising claims, Plaintiff and the members of the Class purchased the Products. 72. Defendant knew or should have known that its labeling and marketing of the Product was likely to deceive consumers. 74. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 75. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Class for violation of the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs of California’s Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”). 76. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Defendant, as alleged herein, constitute “unlawful” business acts and practices in that they violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”) and its implementing regulations, including, at least, the following sections: - 21 U.S.C. § 343, which deems food misbranded when the label contains a statement that is “false or misleading in any particular,” with “misleading” defined to “take[] into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material”; - 21 U.S.C. § 321(n), which states the nature of a false and misleading advertisement; - 21 C.F.R. § 101.18(b), which prohibits true statements about ingredients that are misleading in light of the presence of other ingredients; and - 21 C.F.R. § 102.5, which prohibits the naming of foods so as to create an erroneous impression about the presence or absence of ingredient(s) or component(s) therein. 8. At least in part due to growing consumer awareness of health problems caused by excessive sugar consumption, in recent years consumers have shown a distinct preference for products with little or no added sugar as well as for “natural” products. 9. In August, 2016, an article in “Prepared Foods” magazine noted that “[o]ngoing concerns about obesity and sugar intake have driven interest in reduced sugar and diet drinks in recent years.” https://www.preparedfoods.com/articles/118643-trends-in-sugar-reduction-and-natural- sweeteners. A. The negative health effects of consuming excessive amounts of sugar Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. On Behalf of the Class Violation of California’s False Advertising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq. On Behalf of the Class Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. Unlawful, Unfair, and Fraudulent Prongs On Behalf of the Class

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10. Defendant’s calls constituted communications that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 11. Defendant’s calls were placed to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 12. Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant’s services and has never provided any personal information, including his cellular telephone number, to Defendant for any purpose whatsoever. Accordingly, Defendant never received Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 8. Beginning on or around July 18, 2019, Defendant called Plaintiff on his cellular telephone, ending in -7919, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. At one or more instance during these communications, Defendant utilized an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). INC; DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted this 18th day of December, 2020.

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(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Brunomars.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Brunomars.com, which Atlantic owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, Atlantic Recording Corporation, controls and operates Brunomars.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Brunomars.com is a commercial website that offers products, information and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse merchandise, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Brunomars.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Bruno Mars on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase Bruno Mars music and the various lines of Bruno Mars merchandise; and (c) The ability to view images of Bruno Mars, learn about Bruno Mars’ music and purchase albums, learn about tours and purchase tickets, and subscribe for exclusive access, among other features. 28. This case arises out of Atlantic’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Brunomars.com. Due to Atlantic’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Brunomars.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Bruno Mars, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Brunomars.com. 29. Atlantic denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Brunomars.com by preventing them from freely navigating Brunomars.com. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Brunomars.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Brunomars.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Brunomars.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Brunomars.com, these forms include search fields to locate Bruno Mars music and merchandise and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 34. Furthermore, Brunomars.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Brunomars.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Plaintiff and the class of visually-impaired encountered the following additional specific problems when visiting Brunomars.com: (a) Tour: Tour dates and tour locations are not announced by the screen-reader. Consequently, blind visitors to the website have no idea when and where a concert will take place. (b) Music + Video: The option to “buy physical” and “buy digital” buttons are skipped altogether by the screen-reader. Likewise, the five “choose to stream” button options are skipped by the screen-reader. All of these buttons lack a visible focus and are skipped on all of the albums listed. Consequently, blind visitors to the website will be unable to purchase music or stream music. (c) Store: Blind visitors to the website will not be able to purchase merchandise in the Store. The clothing items are not properly labeled on the products page. Instead of hearing a description of the product, a screen-reader user hears the image source. While the specific product page did announce the product correctly, the size combo box is mislabeled and users will not be aware of its existence, the quantity box is skipped, and most significantly, the “add to cart” button is skipped. Consequently, blind visitors cannot add to cart or proceed to checkout. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Brunomars.com. 37. Brunomars.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Brunomars.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Brunomars.com. 38. Due to Brunomars.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Brunomars.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Brunomars.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Brunomars.com. 40. Plaintiff, Mary Conner, has made numerous attempts to visit, browse, and complete a purchase on Brunomars.com, most recently in January 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Brunomars.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to make an online purchase of the 24K Magic album and the 24K CXC Pinstripe Hockey Jersey. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Brunomars.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Brunomars.com. 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Brunomars.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Brunomars.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Brunomars.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Brunomars.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that subscribeder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Brunomars.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Brunomars.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Brunomars.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Brunomars.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Atlantic has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Brunomars.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Brunomars.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Atlantic who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Brunomars.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Brunomars.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 68. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Brunomars.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Brunomars.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Brunomars.com, causing Brunomars.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Brunomars.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Brunomars.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Brunomars.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Brunomars.com, causing Brunomars.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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