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31. Defendants buy and sell precious metals to its customers throughout the United States and Texas and employ regional gold buyers and marketers to perform these services. 32. Plaintiffs and Class Members are and/or were employed as regional gold buyers and marketers. 33. As regional gold buyers, Plaintiffs and Class Members’ primary duties include, but are not limited to, answering phones, opening and closing their assigned locations, cleaning stores, cash drops, working the registers, customer service, promoting business, maintenance of the facilities of their assigned store, and weighing and buying precious metals from customers as they came in. 34. As marketers, Plaintiffs and Class Members perform the duty of handing out fliers to potential customers. 36. The commission pay method, when properly implemented, allows an employer to pay its non-exempt employees a percentage of their sales if more than half of their job is directly related to promoting sales and new business as opposed to paying the employees one and a half (1½ ) of full times their regular rates of pay. However, as regional gold buyers, Plaintiffs and Class Members spent only a small percentage of their time to promoting the business and/or looking for new business. Further, Plaintiffs and Class Members rarely exercised discretionary powers and were not free from supervision concerning matters of significance, such as scheduling employees or making decisions with respect to human resources issues. 37. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Class Members primary job duties at all times were those of a non-exempt employee. 38. As regional gold buyers and marketers, Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per work week, but during the relevant period, Defendants paid Plaintiffs and Class Members a base pay of $50.00 in addition to commissions. This amount of commissions varied from week to week, and consequently, the gross amounts that the Plaintiffs and Class Members received each week were not fixed, as the law requires. 39. Moreover, Defendants violated the law because there was no clear and mutual understanding between the parties that a fixed salary would compensate them for all hours worked each week whatever the number may be. There were many weeks when Plaintiffs and Class Members' pay fell below that applicable minimum wage rate and the compensation provided to the Plaintiffs and Class Members was at a rate less than the applicable overtime rate for every hour worked over forty (40) in a work week. 41. Defendants' method of paying Plaintiffs in violation of the FLSA was willful and not based on a good faith and reasonable belief that its conduct complied with the FLSA. 42. Plaintiffs have actual knowledge that Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek and have been denied pay at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. That is, Plaintiffs worked with other employees of Defendants who were paid pursuant to the method that fails to comply with the law. 43. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs work or have worked for Defendants, but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours per workweek. Furthermore, these same employees were denied pay at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 44. Although Defendants permitted and/or required the Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants have denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty. Defendant has also denied them full compensation at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 45. The Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as the Plaintiffs and regularly work or have worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a workweek. Similar to Plaintiffs, Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime at the federally mandated wage rate under the FLSA. As such, Class Members are similar to Plaintiffs in terms of job duties, pay structure, and/or the denial of overtime wage. 47. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 48. All Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) during a workweek and compensation for hours worked at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 49. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among Class Members, the damages for the Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by the Defendants that caused harm to all Class Members. 50. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs is properly defined as follows: The Class Members are all of Defendants' current and former regional gold buyer employees who were paid pursuant to the pay method during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint up to the present.

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(Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability) 62) Class Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the above paragraphs herein. 63) Defendants owe a duty to Class Plaintiffs to provide safe and healthy residential housing for military families. 64) Under the terms of their lease contracts, Class Plaintiffs agreed to pay rent in exchange for safe and healthy residential housing. 65) Defendants breached. their duty to provide safe and healthy residential housing. 12 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 66) Specifically, Defendants exposed Class Plaintiffs and their families to increased health risks for cancer and other adverse health outcomes without their knowledge and against their will. 67} Because of Defendants' breach of the implied warranty of habitability; it has been necessary for Class members to incur expenses and other special damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 68) Plaintiffs have sustained damages as a result of Defendants' breach, which includes the overpayment of rent and future medical expenses and medical monitoring of their health and the health of their family members. 69) As a proximate and legal result of Defendants' breach of contract, Class members have been compelled to resort to litigation and therefore request an award of all consequential damages, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees and costs incurred in such litigation; in amounts to be proven at time of trial. (Tortious Breach of Contract) 51) Class Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the above paragraphs herein. 52) Valid contracts exist between Class P1aizltiffs and Defendants for the lease of residential housing on MCBH. 53) Under the terms of their lease contracts, Class Plaintiffs agreed to pay rent in exchange for safe and healthy residential housing and that the parties' respective lease obligations and responsibilities will be construed exclusively under the substantive laws of the State of Hawaii, including but not limited to, Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 521 and the common law interpreting those statutes. 54) Under the terms of their leases and Hawaii law; Defendants tortiously breached their agreement to provide safe and healthy residential housing. 55) Specifically, Defendants intentionally and knowingly exposed Plaintiffs and their families to increased health risks for cancer and other adverse health outcomes without their knowledge and against their will despite specific and express warnings by the Department of Health for the State of Hawaii and other persons. 11 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 56) Plaintiffs have sustained damages as a result of Defendants' tortious breach, which includes the overpayment of rent and future medical expenses and medical monitoring of their health and the health of their family members. 57} Because of Defendants' tortious breach of contract, it has been necessary for Class members to incur expenses and other special damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 58) Defendants' conduct was undertaken with reckless disregard for the foreseeable consequences to Plaintiffs. 59) Defendants' conduct therefore justifies an award of exemplary or punitive damages in an amount to be proven at the trial of this matter. 60) Under the terms of their lease, Class Plaintiffs are entitled as the prevailing party to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs required to pursue this action. 61) As a proximate and legal result of Defendants' breach of contract, Class members have been compelled to resort to litigation and therefore request an award of all consequential damages, including; but not limited to, attonleys' fees and costs incurred in such litigation, in amounts to be proven at time of trial. 13) A class action is alleged pursuant to Hawaii Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 14) Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of persons ("Class") that includes: All former and present persons who have leased or resided in residential properfy from Ohana MC at Marine Corp Base Hawaii in Kaneohe, Hawaii, from 2006 to the present. 15) The Class consists of thousands of current and former tenants who lived on MCBH from ?006 to the present. The Class is thezefore so numerous that joinder of all individual plaintiffs would be impractical. 16) The Class involves questions of la~~ and fact common to al] individual members of the Class, suc11 as ~vhetller Defendants knowingly exposed military families to toxic pesticides and other toxins without their knowledge or consent. 17) The claims and damages sought by the Class are typical of the claims and relief that could be sought by individual members of the class. Specifically, all members have suffered similar injury and damages as a result of Defendants' failure to provide safe and healthy 20) In 1996, under the provisions of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, the United States Congress authorized legislation to privatize military housing whereby private companies were allowed to own and manage housing on military bases. 21) Thereafter, Ghana Military Communities, LLC ("Ghana MC") was created to renovate and construct new housing at Marine Corp Base Hawaii ("MCBH") 22) Forest City Residential Management, Inc. ("Forest City RM"), acts as Ghana MC's agent for the Lease of residential housing to military families on MCBH during all relevant times. 23) After Defendants took control of military housing at MCBH in approximately 2006, Defendants have entered several thousand leases with military families for residential housing at MCBH. 5 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 24) Plaintiffs and the Class are present and former tenants who have leased residential housing at MCBH after 2006 from Ohana MC. 25} Under the terms of their leases, Ohana MC and tenants agree: a. Military families will pay monthly rent equal to their Basic Allowance for Military Housing (``BAH"); I b. Ohana MC will provide safe and habitable housing;2 and c. To mediate any disputes or claim between them arising out of this Lease.3 26} After assuming confrol of MCBH residential housing, Ohana MC began to lease newly and previously constructed residential housing to military families in 2006. Upon information and belief, the older residential housing contained asbestos, lead-based paint, extensive mold infestation, etc. During this time Ohana MC began demolishing portions of the older residential housing to build new residential units for future lease. 27) Before taking control of MCBH housing, Defendants were warned by the contractor previously hired by the Department of the Navy to carry out demolition and construction of military housing that MCBH soils were contaminated with pesticides including chlordane, heptachlor, and heptachlor epoxide, and that all contaminated topsoil should be removed in addition to other measures.4 S`ee, e.g. Ohana MC Lease Agreement at 2, ~(3 ("Resident agrees to pay monthly Rent equal to the Basic Allowance for Military Housing at the `with dependent' rate (the `BAH') at the Resident's duty station of the pay grade of the Resident service member."). Note that assignment to privatized housing is voluntary. In other words, service members have the ability to use their BAH as they see fit; i.e. rent in the civilian market or purchase real estate in the civilian market. '' Id. at 5, X12 ("Owner is responsible ... for ensuring that the Premises are safe and habitable.") (emphasis added). 3 Id. at 10, X34. 4 Chlordane was baru~ed by the EPA in 1988 and is classified as a Group B2 carcinogen by the EPA. Similarly, heptachlor was banned by the EPA in 1974 and is listed as a Group B2 carcinogen. 6 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 28) Thus, before taking over MCBH residential housing, Defendants were aware that chlordane levels were many times higher than the EPA's Tier 1 environmental action levels ("EAL") and that chemical contamination at MCBH housing presented increased health risks for military families at MCBH. 29) Despite these warnings, Defendants did not disclose the presence of pesticide- contaminated soils to military families before leasing housing to them at MCBH. 30) Instead, after learning of the presence of pesticide-contaminated soils, Ohana MC investigated and confirmed the presence of pesticide contamination at MCBH. 31} Because of positive test results within several MCBH neighborhoods, Ohana MC concluded that all neighborhoods should be assumed to contain pesticide impacted soils beneath all existing foundations and surrounding perimeters. 32} Thus, in spite of specific knowledge of chemical contamination of MCBH residential housing, Defendants took over existing leases and entered new leases with military families without disclosure to these families that pesticide-contaminated soils had been found and confirmed at MCBH. 33) Upon information and belief, in addition to heptachlor; chlordane, and heptachlor epoxide levels in excess of EPA Tier 1 and Tier 2 levels EAL levels, Defendants are also aware of chemical contamination for aldrin, dieldrin, and endrin at MCBH in excess of recommended limits, but likewise failed to provide any notice of dangers associated with these risks to military families. 34) After learning of the presence of pesticide-contaminated soils at MCBH, Defendants created a Pesticide Soils Management Plan (the "Plan"} with input from the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH}. 7 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 35) Within the Plan, Defendants decided to allow soil contamination levels above the Tier 1 EALs based on the underlying assumption that military families would not live at MCBH longer than 6 years (i.e. two 3-year tours of duty at MCBH). Further, the Plan: a. Confirmed the presence ofpesticide-contaminated soils at MCBH; b. Assumed all neighborhoods contained pesticide-contaminated soils beneath all existing home foundations and surrounding perimeters; c. Recommended specific remediation practices to address pesticide contaminated soils such as confirming that "no visible dust" should occur during demolition and construction because of the danger of pesticide-contaminated soils; d. Claimed that detailed maps would be kept and made available to the Department of the Navy, MCBH property. management, and the HDOH detailing where pesticide- contaminated soils had been found and addressed; and e. Confirmed that written notification would be provided to residents anywhere they may contact pesticide-contaminated soils. 36) Defendants, however, did not inform military families of the Plan nor did Defendants tell military families that Defendants had agreed to accept pesticide-contaminated soils above the Tier 1 EAL at MCBH. Defendants also failed to follow their own Plan. For example: a. Rather than notifying residents that they may come in contact with pesticide- contaminated soils, Defendants' Residential Community Handbook for Marine Corp Neighborhoods ("Community Handbook") —which was provided to residents after they entered leases with Defendants —only contained anon-specific reference that chlordane and other pesticides "may be found" throughout the United States rather than acknowledging pesticide-contaminated soils had been confirmed at MCBH: 8 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates Chlordane was one of the most common pesticides applied to the soil a~~ound homes and bz~sinesses throughout the United States for protectiofZ against termites from 1948 to 1988. Other pesticides used in and around housing to prevent insect infestation and disease outbreak have also been banned. Althozrgh chlordane and othe~~ pesticides are no longer ztsed, they may be found in soils under and around housing constYztcted in both civilian and military communities. Families can safely woj~k and play in theit~ yards; howevea~, we recommend residents use pYudent pYactices by thoroughly washing theiY hands after diYect soil contact and washing all plants and vegetables g~~own on-site before consuming.5 37) Despite the provisions of the Soil Management Plan, substantial fugitive dust occurred at MCBH throughout the demolition of old housing and the construction of new housing. 38) Further, when military families complained about excessive dust, Defendants never disclosed that pesticide-contaminated soils had been confirmed at MCBH. Instead, Defendants told military families tkere was no danger. 39) Since at least 2006, Defendants have therefore failed to warn military fanulies of pesticide- contaminated soils at MCBH and knowingly and intentionally exposed military families at MCBH to higher rates of cancer and other adverse health outcomes without disclosing these risks to military families or taking sufficient steps to protect military families from such chemical contamination. 40) After military families discovered Defendants' failure to disclose the presence of pesticide- contaminated soils, residents asked L}efendants to confirm what steps had been taken to address pesticide-contaminated soils at their homes and also asked for Defendants to mediate with them to address their concerns about pesticide-contaminated soils at MCBH. 41) Defendants, however, refused to mediate with residents despite the plain language of their lease agreements with the Class to address these issues. 5 Forest City Residential Community Handbook Marine Corp Neighborhoods, at 14. 9 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 4. Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates living conditions and the claims and defenses of the Class arise front the same conduct by Defendants and a1•e based on the same legal theories. 18) Plaintiffs will adequately and fairly represent the interests of individual members of the proposed Class in that they are similarly situated persons who lived on MCBH and who ~~-ere subjected to unsafe living conditions w°ithaut disclosure by- Defendants. 19) Finally, prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which ~~~ould establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. Accordingly, a class action under Rule 23 of the Hawaii. Rules of Civil Procedure is in the best interests of judicial economy. II. STATE OF HAWAII CARA BARBER, MELISSA JONES, MELISSA STREETER AND KATIE ECKROTH, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Class Plaintiffs, ss. OHANA MILITARY CON~v1UNITIES, TO ANSWER CIVIL COMPLAINT PLAINTIFF, VS. {Breach of Contract) 42) Class Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the above paragraphs herein. 43) Valid contracts ~~ere entered between Class Plaintiffs and Defendants for the lease of residential housing on MCBH. 44} Under the terms of their lease contracts, Class Plaintiffs agreed to pay rent in exchange for safe and healthy residential housing and that the parties' respective lease obligations and responsibilities will be construed exclusively under the substantive laws of the State of Hawaii, including but not limited to, Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 521 and the common law interpreting those statutes. 45) Under the terms of their leases and Hawaii law, Defendants have breached their agreement to provide safe and healthy residential housing. 46) Specifically, Defendants have failed to: a. Disclose the presence ofpesticide-contaminated soils at MCBH; b. Provide safe and healthy housing; c. Fully implement their Pesticide Soii Management Plan; and d. Mediate residents' concerns as required under the terms of Plaintiffs' leases. 47) Class Plaintiffs have sustained damages as a result of this breach, which includes the overpayment of rent, future medical expenses, and medical monitoring of their health and the health of their family members for Defendants' breach of contract. 48) Because of Defendants' breach of contract, it has been necessary for Class members to incur expenses and other special damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 10 Lynch Hopper Salzano &Smith Revere &Associates 49) Under the terms of (heir Tease, Class Plaintiffs are entitled as the prevailing party to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs required to pursue this action. 50) As a proximate and legal result of Defendants' breach of contract, Class members have been compelled to resort to litigation and therefore request an award of all consequential damages, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees and costs incurred in such litigation, in amounts to be proven at time of trial.

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10. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated persons. 11. The putative class (the “Class”) consists of all individuals who worked as flight attendants for Defendant or its affiliates and separated from employment, prior to age 50, pursuant to Defendant’s 1995 Special Voluntary Early Out Program (“SVEOP”). - 3 - 12. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. On information and belief, in or about 1996, approximately 320 to 450 flight attendants separated from employment pursuant to the SVEOP. On information and belief, the majority of those individuals were under age 50 at the time of their separation. Plaintiffs do not currently know the names of all members of the Class. 13. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 14. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Class. 15. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 16. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 9. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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15. On or about July 26, 2019 Rausch Sturm, acting on behalf of OneMain, filed a small claims lawsuit against Plaintiff in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The case was styled OneMain Financial Group, LLC v. Kari L. Makurat, Case No. 2019sc032975, Compl. filed July 26, 2019 (Milw. Cnty. Cir. Ct.) (the “Small Claims Case”). A copy of the docket sheet as of July 20, 2020 is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A. 16. A default judgment was entered in the Small Claims Case on August 22, 2019. 17. On or about January 29, 2020, Rausch Sturm, acting on behalf of OneMain, filed an earnings garnishment notice in connection with the Small Claims Case. 18. A copy of the earnings garnishment notice was mailed to Plaintiff. A copy of this earnings garnishment notice is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit B. 19. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form earnings garnishment notice, with information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 20. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form earnings garnishment notice, used by Defendants to attempt to collect alleged consumer debts. 21. Exhibit B is confusing, misleading, and unfair to the unsophisticated consumer. 23. Exhibit B contains a “To the debtor” section, which states in part: 24. The “To the Debtor” section of Exhibit B states that the “Total amount of the creditor’s claim” is $3,408.19, including an “unpaid balance on judgment” of $3,280.69 and “estimated costs of this earnings garnishment” of $127.50. 25. Exhibit B also contains a “To the clerk of court” section, which states in part: 26. The “To the clerk of court” section of Exhibit B states that the “Amount of Original Judgment” is $3,408.19 and the “Amount of Judgment Unpaid” is also $3,408.19. 28. The “To the Garnishee” section of Exhibit B states that the “Total amount owed by the debtor” is $3,535.69, of which $3,408.19 is the “Unpaid balance on judgment” and $127.50 is the “Estimated costs of this earnings garnishment.” 29. On the face of Exhibit B, it is impossible to determine the actual “unpaid balance on judgment” when Exhibit B was mailed. The “To the Debtor” section of Exhibit B states that the “unpaid balance on judgment” was $3,280.69 but the “To the clerk of court” and “To the Garnishee” sections of Exhibit B state that the “unpaid balance judgment” was $3,408.19. 30. As a result, on the face of Exhibit B, it is impossible to determine the actual “Total amount owed by the debtor” when Exhibit B was mailed, and thus the amount that Defendants intended to garnish. The “To the Debtor” section of Exhibit B states that the “Total amount owed by the debtor” was $3,408.19, but the “To the Garnishee” section of Exhibit B states that the “Total amount owed by the debtor” was $3,535.69. 31. Exhibit B is confusing, misleading, and unfair to the unsophisticated consumer. 33. The “To the clerk of court” section of Exhibit B was signed by Aimee S. Walsh, an attorney at Defendant Rausch Sturm. 34. An unsophisticated consumer, reviewing Exhibit B and seeing an attorney signature on Exhibit B would believe that the attorney had actually reviewed Exhibit B and would understand that Exhibit B was being mailed because it satisfied all legal requirements and was consistent with the requirements of Wisconsin law. 35. Upon information and belief, Attorney Walsh’s review of Plaintiff’s file and involvement in the collection of Plaintiff’s debt was so superficial that it was effectively non- existent. 36. If Attorney Walsh had reviewed Plaintiff’s file before Exhibit B was mailed, she would have realized that the amounts stated in Exhibit B were inconsistent with each other and that Exhibit B is misleading and potentially unintelligible, and would have corrected the amounts sought in Exhibit B. 37. If Attorney Walsh had reviewed Plaintiff’s file before Exhibit B was mailed, she would have realized that the inconsistent information in Exhibit B was presented “in a manner that may mislead any other party.” 38. Plaintiff reviewed Exhibit B. 39. Plaintiff was misled and confused by Exhibit B. 40. The unsophisticated consumer would be misled and confused by Exhibit B. 42. Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibit B. The FDCPA 45. Misrepresentations of the character, amount or legal status of any debt and misrepresentations as to the proper party to pay, injure or risk injury to interests expressly protected by Congress in the FDCPA. See Encore Receivable Management, Inc., 18-cv-1484- WED, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134377 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 9. 2019); Richardson v. Diversified Consultants, No. 17-cv-4047, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118786 *10-11 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2019) (“the receipt of a communication misrepresenting the character of the debt (here, the amount owed) is the kind of injury that Congress sought to prevent through the FDCPA. ‘Such an injury falls squarely within the ambit of what Congress gave consumers in the FDCPA: ‘a legally protected interest in certain information about debts,’ with ‘deprivation of information about one’s debt (in a communication directed to the plaintiff consumer) a cognizable injury.’” (internal citations omitted); see also Pierre v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 2017 WL 1427070, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2017); Saenz v. Buckeye Check Cashing of Illinois, 2016 WL 5080747, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2016); Bernal v. NRA Grp., LLC, 318 F.R.D. 64, 72 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that Plaintiff had standing to challenge misleading communication sent to him because the communication violated his “right to be free from such misleading communications”). Such misrepresentations may cause consumers to make incorrect decisions about their finances or make payments to incorrect parties. 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) specifically prohibits “the false representation of— the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B) specifically prohibits “the false representation of any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.” 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) specifically prohibits “the false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.” 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) specifically prohibits “the collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The WCA 53. The Wisconsin Consumer Act (“WCA”) was enacted to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable business practices and to encourage development of fair and economically sound practices in consumer transactions. Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2). 55. To further these goals, the Act’s protections must be “liberally construed and applied.” Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1); see also § 425.301. 56. “The basic purpose of the remedies set forth in Chapter 425, Stats., is to induce compliance with the WCA and thereby promote its underlying objectives.” First Wisconsin Nat’l Bank v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 533, 335 N.W.2d 390 (1983). Thus, private actions under the WCA are designed to both benefit consumers whose rights have been violated and also competitors of the violators, whose competitive advantage should not be diminished because of their compliance with the law. 57. To carry out this intent, the WCA provides Wisconsin consumers with an array of protections and legal remedies. The Act contains significant and sweeping restrictions on the activities of those attempting to collect debts. See Wis. Stats. § 427.104. 58. The Act limits the amounts and types of additional fees that may be charged to consumers in conjunction with transactions. Wis. Stats. § 422.202(1). The Act also provides injured consumers with causes of action for class-wide statutory and actual damages and injunctive remedies against defendants on behalf of all customers who suffer similar injuries. See Wis. Stats. §§ 426.110(1); § 426.110(4)(e). Finally, “a customer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under [the Act].” Wis. Stat. § 421.106(1). 59. Consumers’ WCA claims under Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1) are analyzed using the same methods as claims under the FDCPA. Indeed, the WCA itself requires that the court analyze the WCA “in accordance with the policies underlying a federal consumer credit protection act,” including the FDCPA. Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1). 61. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(g) states that a debt collector may not: "Communicate with the customer or a person related to the customer with such frequency of at such unusual hours or in such a manner as can reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customer." 62. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(h) states that a debt collector may not: "Engage in other conduct . . . in such a manner as can reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customer.” 63. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j) states that a debt collector may not: “Claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist.” 64. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(k) states that a debt collector may not: “Use a communication which simulates legal or judicial process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by a government, governmental agency or attorney-at-law when it is not.” 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 66. Count I is brought against Defendant Rausch Sturm. 67. Exhibit B states the amount that Defendants are attempting to garnish in a confusing, misleading, and unfair manner. 69. Exhibit B misrepresents the degree to which an attorney was involved in Plaintiff’s file and falsely implies to the unsophisticated consumer that an attorney approved the amounts stated in Exhibit B as correct. 70. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692(2)(B), 1692e(3), 1692e(10), and 1692f, and 1692f(1). 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 72. Count II is brought against both Defendants. 73. Exhibit B states the amount that Defendants are attempting to garnish in a confusing, misleading, and unfair manner. 74. Exhibit B misrepresents to the unsophisticated consumer that it is an effective earnings garnishment notice even though it is misleading and potentially unintelligible. 75. Exhibit B misrepresents the degree to which an attorney was involved in Plaintiff’s file and falsely implies to the unsophisticated consumer that an attorney approved the amounts stated in Exhibit B as correct. 76. Defendants violated Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(1)(g), 427.104(1)(h), 427.104(1)(j), and 427.104(1)(k). 78. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of a Subclass, consisting of: (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin, (b) who were sent an earnings garnishment notice in the form of Exhibit B by Defendant Rausch Sturm, (c) seeking to collect an alleged debt owed to Defendant OneMain, where (c) the amounts stated in the “Total amount owed by the Debtor” fields of the “To the Debtor” and the “To the Garnishee” sections were inconsistent with each other, and (d) the alleged debt was incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, and (e) the earnings garnishment notice in the form of Exhibit B was mailed between July 28, 2018 and July 28, 2019, inclusive, and (f) was not returned by the postal service. 79. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 80. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibit B violates the FDCPA and/or WCA. 81. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 82. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 83. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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10. For some or all of the calls, UNIVERSAL used an auto-dialing mechanism wherein there was no caller on the line when Plaintiff answered. On only one occasion of a phone call was a person available to speak to Plaintiff. 11. These phone calls were, according to the callers, for marketing purposes or for purposes of taking surveys of consumers to gather data. 12. When one calls 646-467-6665, a prerecorded message says that the caller has reached “Universal Survey Center, a marketing and political research company.” 13. Plaintiff did not consent to these calls. 15. Plaintiff and the class have been substantially damaged by Defendant’s calls. Their privacy was improperly invaded, they were charged for the calls and they were annoyed. Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 740 (Jan. 18, 2012) (discussing congressional findings of consumer “outrage” as to autodialed and prerecorded calls); Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that unwanted cell phone robocall recipients are damaged because they are charged “out of pocket” cellular airtime minutes). 16. Plaintiff’s cell phone plan is “pay by the minute.” 17. Defendant’s violations were willful, or alternatively they were knowing; particularly a call that occurred after Plaintiff asked that they stop and indicated that she was not interested. 18. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs. 19. UNIVERSAL violated the TCPA by placing automated calls to Plaintiff and the class members’ cell phones using its predictive dialer and/or prerecorded or artificial voice without the consent of the called party. 20. UNIVERSAL has a policy, practice or procedure of placing calls to cell phones regarding the collection of an alleged debt without the prior consent of the called parties. 21. UNIVERSAL’S violations were negligent, or alternatively, they were willful or knowing. 47 U.S.C. §312(f)(1). 23. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that there are more than 40 members of the class. 24. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate any questions affecting an individual class member. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether UNIVERSAL used an automatic telephone dialing system as is used in the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders to place the calls at issue; b. Damages, including whether the violations were negligent, willful or knowing. 25. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 26. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 27. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. 29. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. 7. UNIVERSAL has called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numerous times within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint. 8. For example, UNIVERSAL called Plaintiff’s cell phone on April 22, 2014 at 8:43 p.m., April 23, 2014 at 6:17 p.m., April 24, 2014 at 8:34 p.m., April 25, 2014 at 8:32 p.m., April 26, 2014 at 1:33 p.m., April 27, 2014 at 3:59 p.m., April 27, 2014 at 7:12 p.m., April 28, 2014 at 4:08 p.m., April 28, 2014 at 7:12 p.m., April 28, 2014 at 8:39 p.m., and May 1, 2014 at 6:46 p.m.. 9. The caller ID for these calls was 646-467-6665.

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code § 4111.03) 15. Defendant operates over 230 senior living facilities throughout the United States, together with its various subsidiary companies, and has over 7,000 employees. 16. Defendant employed Plaintiff between November 2019 and April 2020 as a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”). 17. Defendant employed Plaintiff in a facility it previously owed in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, called Forest Hills Place. 18. Other similarly situated employees were employed by Defendant in nursing positions and care staff job positions, including but not limited to LPNs, caregivers, CNAs, home health aides, medication techs, and resident care partners (“nursing and care staff employees”). 19. Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees were classified by Defendant as non-exempt employees. 20. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees on an hourly basis. 21. Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees frequently worked over 40 hours per week. 4 22. Plaintiff worked on average between 60 and 70 hours each week. (Failure to Pay for On-Duty Meal Periods) 23. Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees were not provided with bona fide meal periods during which they were completely relieved from duty. 24. Defendant docked Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees for a meal period each day. 25. Defendant required Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees to clock out for a 30-minute (or 1-hour) meal period each day, and they were told they were required to clock out for a meal period. 26. Despite the fact that Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees were required to clock out for meal periods, they were not provided with bona fide meal periods during which they were completely relieved from duty. Instead, they frequently did not receive any meal periods at all and/or performed worked during meal periods. 27. Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees did not receive meal periods and/or performed work during meal periods because of the substantial amount of work they were required to perform, and because their communities were frequently short staffed. 28. Plaintiff estimates that she did not receive meal periods and/or performed work during meal periods on average 4 to 5 times each week. 29. Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees’ supervisors(s)/manager(s) observed that they did not receive their full meal periods and/or performed work during meal periods. 30. As a result of Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees for meal periods during which they performed work, Plaintiff and other 5 similarly situated nursing and care staff employees were denied significant amounts of overtime compensation. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 31. As a result of Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees not being paid for work performed during meal periods, Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees were not paid overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 32. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) 33. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of all of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees. 34. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 35. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current nursing and care staff employees employed by Defendant and/or any of its subsidiaries at any period of time between September 18, 2017 and the present. 6 36. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of more than several thousand persons. 37. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and are acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 38. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 39. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All former and current nursing and care staff employees employed by Defendant employed by Defendant and/or any of its subsidiaries in Ohio any period of time between September 18, 2017 and the present. 40. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least several thousand persons. 41. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: 7 (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its nursing and care staff employees for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. §§ 4111.03 and 4111.10. 42. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims rise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 43. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interest is not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and- hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 44. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 45. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 8 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 47. Defendant’s practices and policies of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated nursing and care staff employees for meal periods during which they performed work violated the 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 53. Defendant’s practices and policies of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated 9 nursing and care staff employees for meal periods during which they performed work violated the

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13. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this complaint as if fully stated herein. 14. Plaintiffs C.H. and S.R. are persons who received and/or are currently receiving medical care from Defendant. 15. Defendant TANDEM DIABETES CARE, INC. is a provider of health care services including products surrounding the treatment of diabetes. Defendant is a health care provider under the laws of the State of California with a principal place of business and/or headquarters located at 11075 Roselle Street, San Diego, FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF (1) THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF

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10. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following nationwide consumer class (the “Class”): • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that was sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); 3 • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: i. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; ii. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; iii. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and iv. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication 4 of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “10” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to March 6, 2017, an obligation was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff. 13. The aforesaid obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 14. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 15. Defendant is a “debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA. 16. At a time known only to Defendant, TJH MEDICAL SERVICES (“Creditor”), directly or through an intermediary, contracted Defendant to collect on its alleged debt. 17. In its effort to collect on the Creditor’s agreement, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by 5 written correspondence on March 6, 2017. (See “Exhibit A”). 18. The letter stated in pertinent part “To avoid further collection, pay it in full.” 19. Defendant’s written correspondence to Plaintiff is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 20. As set forth in the following Counts, Defendant’s communication violated the CONNECTICUT, INC., Defendant. Plaintiff ESNEDA ZULUAGA (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), a New York resident, brings this class action complaint by and through his attorneys, Sirotkin Varacalli & Hamra, LLP, against Defendant EASTERN ACCOUNT SYSTEM OF CONNECTICUT, INC. (hereinafter “Defendant”), individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon information and belief of Plaintiff’s counsel, except for allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiff, which are based upon Plaintiff’s personal knowledge.

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26. On or about January 23, 2019, Defendant sent or caused to be sent to the following text message to the 7119 Number: 27. As is apparent, the text message above advertises the commercial availability of Defendant’s property, goods, and services and encourages the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff jewelry. 29. Plaintiff received the subject text in Miami-Dade County, which is within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages identical to the one above to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district and throughout the United States. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent the same message it sent to Plaintiff on January 23, 2019 to at least 100 other cell phone numbers. 32. The Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7119 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7119 Number. 33. The source of each of the unsolicited SMS text messages sent by Defendant to the 7119 Number was 553935, which is an SMS short code owned or leased by or on behalf of Defendant or Defendant’s agent(s) or affiliate(s), and is used for operating Defendant’s text message campaign, including the sending of SMS text messages telemarketing and advertising various of Defendant’s goods and services. 34. The source of each of the unsolicited SMS text messages sent by Defendant, i.e., short code telephone number 553935, is a short code telephone number that is registered with Telcordia Technologies, Inc. (“Telcordia”) as having been assigned to Kay Jewelers. 36. In addition, Telcordia’s records confirm that “Kay Jewelers is using their non-vanity short code 553935, to send retail SMS coupons and promotions.” 37. Telcordia’s records also state that “[w]hile Kay Jewelers will not disclose how large their retail SMS campaign has become, it’s very common for retailers to exceed over 1 million … subscribers.” 38. All telephone contact by Defendant and/or affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents of Defendant to Plaintiff at the 7119 Number occurred via an ATDS (“automated telephone dialing system”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) because the unsolicited telemarketing SMS text messages were sent from 553935, which is a short code telephone number used to message consumers en masse, and because the hardware and software used by Defendant to send such messages have the capacity to store, produce, and dial either random or sequential numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Further, the complained of SMS text messages were written in a generic and impersonal manner, thus demonstrating that the text messages were sent to numerous other consumers. 39. The complained of SMS text message sent to the 7119 Number did not constitute a call made for an emergency purpose as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 41. Plaintiff has no reason to believe, that absent a Court Order, that Defendant would voluntarily stop violating the TCPA. 42. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The “Class” Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of and defined as: All persons who received an SMS text message, sent by or on behalf of Defendant or an agent of Defendant from a short code telephone number, including the short code telephone number 553935. 43. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, any entity in which the Defendant has a controlling interest, or which has a controlling interest in the Defendant, and any of Defendant’s legal representatives, assigns or successors. Also excluded is any judge presiding over this case and any member of any such judge’s immediate family. Members of the Class are referred to as “Class Members.” 44. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) after further discovery. 46. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages on behalf of herself and the Class. 47. This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance and superiority requirements. 48. Upon application by Plaintiff’s counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may also be requested to utilize and certify subclasses in the interests of manageability, justice, and/or judicial economy. 49. Numerosity. The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to amount to thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is therefore impracticable to join each member of the Class as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impracticable. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. 51. Adequacy. As Class representative, Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or conflict with, the interests of the absent Class Members and is able to fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members. Plaintiff has raised viable claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by the Class Members and will vigorously pursue those claims. If necessary, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend this Complaint to add additional representatives of the Class or assert additional claims. 52. Competency of Class Counsel. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by experienced, qualified and competent counsel committed to prosecuting this action. These lawyers are experienced in handling complex class action claims, including class actions alleging violations of the TCPA, and have previously been appointed as class counsel in such cases. 55. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members may create a risk of multiple adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class who are not parties to such adjudications, thereby substantially impairing or impeding the ability of such nonparty Class Members to protect their interests. The prosecution of individual actions by Class Members could further establish inconsistent results and/or establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 56. Defendant and/or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class appropriate. 58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-57 as if fully stated herein. 59. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 60. Because of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class Members are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future. 61. Plaintiff and all Class Members are also entitled to, and seek, an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 62. Plaintiff and Class Members also seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 63. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1–57 as if fully stated herein. 64. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 66. Plaintiff and all Class Members are also entitled to, and seek, treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 67. Plaintiff and Class Members also seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1–57 as if fully stated herein. 69. The foregoing acts constitute a temporary electronic intrusion, by Defendant, onto Plaintiff’s cellular phone and interfered with her ability to use it by temporarily occupying the telephone line. 70. The foregoing acts also caused Defendant to take up storage space on Plaintiff’s cellular phone and drew down on its battery reserves. 71. Defendant did not have consent to interfere with Plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of her cell phone. 72. Defendant’s interference with Plaintiff’s cell phone was not justified. 73. Plaintiff has been harmed as a result of Defendant’s actions. 74. The foregoing acts constitute a trespass to chattels by Defendant. 76. Because of Defendant’s conduct, which is continuing or poses the threat of continuation in the future, Plaintiff and all Class Members are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such future conduct. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA (47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Defendant) TRESPASS TO CHATTELS (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Defendant) VIOLATION OF THE TCPA (47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Defendant)

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19. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all holders of Affymetrix common stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described below (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants. 21. Headquartered in Santa Clara, California, Affymetrix is a pioneer in microarray technology and a leader in genomics analysis. Affymetrix now develops and provides innovative technologies that enable multiplex and parallel analysis of biological systems at the cell, protein, and gene level. Affymetrix’s extensive portfolio of translational and clinical solutions enables scientists and clinicians to rapidly translate their research into understanding underlying disease mechanisms, identifying biomarkers for personalized medicine, creating novel molecular diagnostic tests, and improving genetic marker-assisted breeding programs in agriculture for human health and wellness. 56. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting stockholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, among other things, the future value of Affymetrix, certain key inputs and assumptions of the financial analyses performed by Morgan Stanley in support of its fairness opinion, the financial analyses performed by Morgan Stanley, and the value of certain strategic alternatives that were considered by the Company. 58. In so doing, Defendants made materially incomplete and misleading statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). 63. Plaintiff incorporate each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 64. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Affymetrix within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Affymetrix, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 65. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 66. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The omitted information identified above was reviewed by the Board and the Conflicts Committee prior to voting on the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were, thus, directly involved in the making of the Proxy. 71. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 79. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 80. The Individual Defendants at all times relevant to this Complaint, owed a duty not to directly or indirectly deprive Plaintiff and the members of the Class of the statutory remedy of appraisal. 81. By withholding the critical and material information detailed in paragraphs 35-42, Plaintiff and the members of the Class lacked sufficient information to determine whether to pursue their statutory appraisal rights. 82. The Individual Defendants also are afforded no protection pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), because that statute only permits a corporation to exculpate directors from monetary liability for breaches of fiduciary duty and therefore that exculpatory provision does not apply to claims for equitable relief. 83. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. A. Company Background and its Poise for Growth Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against the Individual Defendants Claim for Equitable Relief Against the Individual Defendants On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act

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} ss.: COE SELVAGGIO, being duly sworn, deposes and says: York. I am not a party to the action, am over 18 years of age, and reside in East Islip, New On ?/;' 2012,deponent served the within ANSWER upon:

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31. Throughout their employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other CMs regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 32. Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and other CMs worked more than 40 hours per workweek, yet Defendant failed to pay them overtime compensation for any of the hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 33. Defendant failed to keep accurate records of the hours that Plaintiff and other CMs worked. 35. Plaintiff and other CMs were closely supervised by their Store Managers, and through common corporate policies and procedures that defined and circumscribed their work. Store Managers were responsible for the overall performance of the stores, and for coaching, evaluating and disciplining store employees, including those who worked in the café. Plaintiff and other CMs were not responsible for the overall performance of the stores, or for coaching, evaluating or disciplining store employees. 36. Plaintiff and other CMs did not have authority to hire or fire store employees, nor did they have much, if any, input into who was hired and fired. 37. During the relevant period, Defendant uniformly classified CMs as exempt from federal and state overtime pay requirements, including during the CMs’ training period. 38. All of the work that Plaintiff and other CMs performed was assigned by Defendant and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff and other CMs performed. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been pursuant to a corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by violating the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. 40. Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that federal and state wage and hour laws required it to pay Plaintiff and other CMs overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 42. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other CMs overtime was willful. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 43. Plaintiff bring the First Cause of Action, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendant as CMs at any BN bookstore in the United States, on or after September 20, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 44. Plaintiff also brings the Second Cause of Action, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendant as a CM in training at any BN bookstore in the United States, on or after September 20, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Training Collective”). 45. All of the work that Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective and FLSA Training Collective have performed has been assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective and FLSA Training Collective have performed. 47. Defendant is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay employees performing non-exempt duties, including Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective, an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 48. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective all perform or performed the same primary duties. 49. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 50. Plaintiff Brown brings the Third Cause of Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a class of persons consisting of all persons who have worked for Defendant as CMs in the State of Illinois (the “Illinois Class”) at any time between September 20, 2013 and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “Illinois Class Period”). 51. Plaintiff Brown also brings the Fourth Cause of Action, pursuant to the Illinois Act, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendant as a CM in training in the State of Illinois, on or after September 20, 2013 and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “Illinois Training Class”). 52. Excluded from the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class are Defendant’s legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the class period has had, a controlling interest in Defendant; the Judge(s) to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class. 54. Upon information and belief, the size of the Illinois Class is at least 100 workers. 55. Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class as a whole. 57. Brown’s claims are typical of the claims of the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class sought to be represented. Brown and the other Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class members work or have worked for Defendant and have been subjected to its policy and pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class, thereby making injunctive and/or declaratory relief with respect to the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class appropriate. 59. Brown has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action employment litigation. 60. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation – particularly in the context of wage litigation like the present action, where individual Plaintiff may lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. The members of the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant’s common and uniform policies, practices, and procedures. Although the relative damages suffered by individual members of the Illinois Class and the Illinois Training Class are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. In addition, class treatment is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendant’s practices. 61. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 63. Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint. 65. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 66. The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to Defendant. 67. Defendant is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 68. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and other similarly persons are, or were, employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 69. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA. 70. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint, have been willful and intentional. Defendant failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to their compensation of Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees. 71. Because Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies to this Cause of Action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 72. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 75. Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA during the CMs’ training period, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint. 76. During their training period, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the 81. Plaintiff Brown realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 82. At all times relevant, Plaintiff Brown and the members of the Illinois Class have been employees and Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of the Illinois Act. Brown and the members of the Illinois Class are covered by the Illinois Act. 83. Defendant employed Brown and the members of the Illinois Class as an employer in Illinois. 84. Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Class wages to which they are entitled under the Illinois Act. Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Class for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 85. Defendant failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records of time worked by Brown and the Illinois Class members. 87. Plaintiff Brown realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 88. At all times relevant, Plaintiff Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class have been employees and Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of the Illinois Act. Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class are covered by the Illinois Act. 89. Defendant employed Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class as an employer in Illinois. 90. During their training period, Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class wages to which they are entitled under the Illinois Act. Defendant failed to pay Brown and the members of the Illinois Training Class for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 91. Defendant failed to keep, make, preserve, maintain, and furnish accurate records of time worked by Brown and the Illinois Training Class members. Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (On behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective) Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (On behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Training Collective) Illinois Minimum Wage Laws (On behalf of Plaintiff Brown and the Illinois Class) Illinois Act Training Claims (On behalf of Plaintiff Brown and the Illinois Training Class)

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10. On or about March 7, 2011, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 11. Defendants created or made Exhibit A which Defendants knew or should have known is a good or product which Defendants intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the class. 12. Exhibit A is part of Defendants’ work or operations to market Defendants’ goods or services which were performed by Defendants and on behalf of Defendants. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendants’ work or operations. 13. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 14. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and similar unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and more than 39 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt out notice as required by 64 17. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 18. In accordance with FRCP 23, Plaintiff brings Count I pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) with respect to whom Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation for the sending of such faxes, (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship, and (5) which did not display a proper opt out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. 19. Commonality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (2): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: a) Whether the Defendants sent unsolicited fax advertisements; b) Whether the Defendants’ faxes advertised the commercial availability of property, goods, or services; c) The manner and method the Defendants used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which it sent Exhibit "A" and other unsolicited faxed advertisements; d) Whether the Defendants faxed advertisements without first obtaining the recipient's prior permission or invitation; e) Whether the Defendants sent the faxed advertisements knowingly; 5 f) Whether the Defendants violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227; g) Whether the Defendants should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; h) Whether the Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; i) Whether Exhibit A and Defendants’ other advertisements displayed a proper opt out notice as required by 64 C.F.R. 1200; and j) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 20. Typicality [Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (3): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received a fax sent on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (A) (4): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication [Fed R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (1): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 6 23. Common Conduct [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (2): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 24. Predominance and Superiority [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (B) (3): Common questions of law and fact predominate and a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication: a) Proof of the claims of the Plaintiff will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that the Defendants may assert and prove will come from the Defendants’ records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; c) The Defendants have acted and are continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support protested individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one (1) proceeding based upon common proofs; e) This case is inherently managed as a class action in that: (i) The Defendants identified persons or entities to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that the Defendants’ computer and business records will enable the Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; 7 (ii) Liability and damages can be established for the Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense: (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning the Defendants’ practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. 25. The TCPA makes unlawful the "use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine…" 47 U.S.C. § 227. 26. The TCPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's express invitation or permission." 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 27. The TCPA provides: "3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation; (B) An action to recover actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or 8 (C) Both such actions." 28. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 29. The Defendants knew or should have known that a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; b) that the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; and c) that Exhibit "A" is an advertisement. 30. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff time, as the Plaintiff and its employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ illegal faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Exhibit A occurred outside of Defendants’ premises. 31. The Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., by transmitting Exhibit "A" to the Plaintiff and the other members of the class without obtaining their prior express permission or invitation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, TARGIN SIGN SYSTEMS, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, G.R. 9 SINAGRA CORPORATION d/b/a UNCLE PETE’S PIZZA SHOP OF ADDISON and GARY R. SINAGRA, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint the Plaintiff as the representative of the class and appoint the Plaintiff's counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That Court enjoin the Defendants from additional violations; and D. That the Court award costs and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 32. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 3 and 4, and 6 through 15 as and for its paragraph 32. 33. In accordance with FRCP 23, Plaintiff brings Count II for conversion under the common law for the following class of persons: All persons who on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, were sent telephone facsimile messages by or on behalf of Defendants. 34. A class action is proper in that: (a) On information and belief the class consists of forty or more persons and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of fact or law common to the class predominating over all questions affecting only individual class members, including: 10 (i) Whether Defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited faxes; (ii) The manner and method Defendants used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which it sent Exhibit A and other unsolicited faxes; and (iii) Whether Defendants committed the tort of conversion. 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interests adverse or in conflict with the class. 36 A class action is an appropriate method for adjudicating this controversy fairly and efficiently. The interest of the individual class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small and individual actions are not economically feasible. 37. By sending Plaintiff and the other class members unsolicited faxes, Defendants improperly converted their fax machines, toner and paper to its own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s employees’ time to Defendants’ own use. 38. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff, and the other class members owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 39. By sending the unsolicited faxes, Defendants permanently misappropriated the class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to Defendants’ own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 40. Defendants knew or should have known that its misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 11 41. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited faxes from Defendants. 42. Each of Defendants’ unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’ time because multiple persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. Defendants knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to Plaintiff. 43. Defendants’ actions caused damages to Plaintiff and the other members of the class because their receipt of Defendants’ unsolicited faxes caused them to lose paper and toner as a result. Defendants’ actions prevented Plaintiff’s fax machines from being used for Plaintiff’s business purposes during the time Defendants were using Plaintiff’s fax machines for Defendants’ unauthorized purpose. Defendants’ actions also cost Plaintiff employee time, as Plaintiffs’ employees used their time receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendants’ unauthorized faxes, and that time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s business activities. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, TARGIN SIGN SYSTEMS, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, G.R. SINAGRA CORPORATION d/b/a UNCLE PETE’S PIZZA SHOP OF ADDISON and GARY R. SINAGRA, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint Plaintiff’ counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award appropriate damages; 12 C. That the Court award costs of suit; and D. Awarding such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, but in any event, not more than $75,000.00 to any individual class member. 44. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 3 and 4, and 6 through 15 as though fully set forth herein. 45. In accordance with 735 ILCS 5/2-801, Plaintiff, on behalf of the following class of persons, brings Count III for Defendant’s unfair practice of sending unsolicited and unauthorized faxes: All persons in Illinois who on or after a date three years prior to the filing of this action, were sent telephone facsimile messages by or on behalf of Defendant. 46. A class action is proper in that: (a) On information and belief, the class consists of thousands of persons in Illinois and throughout the United States and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of fact or law common to the class predominating over all questions affecting only individual class members including: (i) Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited faxes; (ii) The manner and method Defendant used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which it sent Exhibit A and other unsolicited faxes; 13 (iii) Whether Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited faxes violates Illinois public policy; (iv) Whether Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited faxes is an unfair practice under the Consumer Fraud Act; (v) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from sending unsolicited faxes in the future. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interests adverse or in conflict with the class. 48. A class action is an appropriate method for adjudicating this controversy fairly and efficiently. The interest of the individual class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small and individual actions are not economically feasible. 49. Defendant’s unsolicited fax practice is an unfair practice, because it violates public policy, and because it forced Plaintiff and the other class members to incur expense without any consideration in return. Defendant’s practice effectively forced Plaintiff and the other class members to pay for Defendant’s messages. 50. Defendant violated the unfairness predicate of the Act by engaging in an unscrupulous business practice and by violating Illinois statutory public policy, which public policy violations in the aggregate caused substantial injury to hundreds of persons. 51. Defendant’s misconduct caused damages to Plaintiff and the other members of the class, including the loss of paper, toner, ink, use of their facsimile machines, and use of their employees’ time. 14 52. Defendant’s actions caused damages to Plaintiff and the other class members because their receipt of Defendant’s unsolicited faxes caused them to lose paper and toner consumed as a result. Defendant’s actions prevented Plaintiff’s fax machine from being used for Plaintiff’s business purposes during the time Defendant was using Plaintiff's fax machine for Defendant’s unauthorized purpose. Defendant’s actions also cost Plaintiff employee time, as Plaintiff’s employees used their time receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendant’s unauthorized faxes and that time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s business activities. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, TARGIN SIGN SYSTEMS, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants, G.R. SINAGRA CORPORATION d/b/a UNCLE PETE’S PIZZA SHOP OF ADDISON and GARY R. SINAGRA, jointly and severally , as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Plaintiff as the class representative, and appoint Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award damages to Plaintiff and the other class members; C. That the Court award attorney fees and costs; D. That the Court enter an injunction prohibiting Defendant from sending unsolicited faxes to Illinois consumers; and E. Awarding such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper, but in any event, not more than $75,000.00 to any individual member. 15 Respectfully submitted, TARGIN SIGN SYSTEMS, INC., an Illinois corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons By: s/Brian J. Wanca One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys Brian J. Wanca CONVERSION ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT 815 ILCS 505/2 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. Defendant has been Plaintiff and Putative Class’ “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) and § 203(r) at all times material to this action. 11. At times material to this action, Plaintiff and Putative Class have been “employees” of Defendants as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, and performed work for Defendant within the territory of the United States, within the three (3) years preceding the filing of this collective action. 12. At all times material to this action, Defendants have been an enterprise engaged in commerce as defined by section 203(s)(1) of the FLSA, with annual revenue in excess of $500,000.00. Defendants operate across several states. Plaintiff and Putative Class has engaged in interstate commerce as Defendant’s employees during the applicable statutory period. 13. Plaintiff estimates that at least eighteen (18) other individuals also worked for Defendants during the time that Plaintiff worked there and that these individuals were subject to the same impermissible practices more fully described below. 14. Plaintiff and the putative class primarily performed manual labor as Defendants’ employees. 15. Plaintiff was paid approximately $20.00 per hour during the statutory period. 16. The putative class was paid $15.00 to $20.00 per hour. 17. Plaintiff and the putative class were provided the equipment necessary to complete the tasks Defendants assigned them. 4 18. Plaintiff did not have the autonomy to choose which tasks to complete or the manner of completion. Defendants directed and controlled Plaintiff’s activities and work load. 19. Plaintiff invested no money in facilities or equipment beyond what is expected of a normal employee of Defendant. 20. Plaintiff and the putative class did not negotiate his/their manner or rate of pay with Defendant. 21. Plaintiff and the putative class were not independent contractors for the purposes of the FLSA and were therefore entitled to overtime at 1.5 times their base rate of pay for all compensable time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 22. Plaintiff and the putative class generally worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 23. Plaintiff and the putative class, as DDT Concrete employees, would arrive at DDT Concrete’s place of business and handle necessary tasks for the day’s work before going to the job site. 24. Plaintiff and the putative class were not paid for this work and instead were only paid for time worked at the actual job site. 25. Plaintiff estimates that Defendants’ failure to record all of the hours he was engaged in compensable work resulted in one (1) to (2) hours of unpaid wages per day, which would have been compensated at an overtime rate had they been properly recorded and classified. 26. Plaintiff and the putative class are not able to provide a full assessment of the hours they worked because documents necessary to provide a full assessment are in the possession of the Defendant and third parties. Plaintiff and the members of the putative class are able to provide a reasonable estimate of the hours they worked off the clock for Defendant during the statutory period in the absence of such documents. 5 27. Defendants were unjustly enriched by their common plan, policy, and practice of failing to pay its non-exempt employees’ overtime, thereby enjoying ill-gained profits at the expense of Plaintiff and the putative class. Defendants also enjoyed lower payroll taxes thereby. 28. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 29. Plaintiff brings this case as a collective action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other damages owed. 30. The proposed collective class of similarly situated persons, also referred to in this Complaint as the “Putative Class” is defined as: All current and former individuals worked for Defendants as hourly-paid construction workers during the previous three (3) years. 31. Plaintiff seeks to pursue unpaid overtime wage claims against Defendant on behalf of himself s and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees. 32. Plaintiff and the putative class are “similarly situated” for the purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, inter alia, Defendants employed a common pay scheme whereby Defendants’ non- exempt employees were paid in a matter impermissible under the FLSA, and were denied any overtime pay thereby. 33. This action is properly maintained as a collective action because Plaintiff is similarly situated to the members of the putative class with respect to Defendants’ payroll policies, which universally denied Plaintiffs and members of the putative class all overtime compensation. 34. The collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair an efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to class members. The prosecution of separate actions could create a risk of 6 inconsistent and varying adjudications, place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts and/or substantially impair the ability of class members to protect their interests. 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as his interests are in complete alignment with those of class members. 36. Counsel for Plaintiff will adequately protect his interests as well as the interests of all putative class members. 37. Plaintiff estimates that the putative class consists of (at least) approximately eighteen (18) individuals. The precise number of putative class can be easily ascertained by examining Defendants’ payroll, scheduling, time keeping, personnel and other work-related records and documents. Given the composition and size of the class, members of the class may be informed of the pendency of this action directly via U.S. mail, e-mail, and by posing notice at Defendants’ place of business/work sites. 8. The term “putative class” refers to all hourly-paid construction workers who worked for DDT Concrete during the previous three (3) years. 9. Defendant erroneously classified Plaintiff and the putative class as “independent contractors” exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

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21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Some time prior to June 23, 2018, the Plaintiff purchased a vehicle from James Mitsubishi in Rome, New York, which he financed through an auto loan. 23. Plaintiff has made all of his regular monthly payments on the auto loan. 24. However, Plaintiff was also told to pay an additional $2,000.00 (“the alleged obligation”) on the auto loan, which he was unable to do, and was given thirty days to pay it. 25. The alleged obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 26. Defendant contends that the alleged obligation is past due. 28. The June 20, 2018 voicemail is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(2). 29. Plaintiff has not done anything that would subject him to criminal or civil charges. 30. Defendant never filed any legal charges, criminal or civil, against the Plaintiff. 31. Nor did Defendant ever intend to file any criminal or civil charges against the Plaintiff. 32. Instead, the Defendant simply made up nonsensical threats of legal action and criminal charges in an attempt to coerce Plaintiff into paying on the alleged obligation, much as the Defendant has done time and time again to numerous consumers as evinced by the numerous lawsuits listed above. 33. By making these false threats, the Defendant caused the Plaintiff a real risk of harm. Plaintiff, as would the least sophisticated consumer, would believe that he had to pay the alleged debt immediately in order to avoid the serious-sounding consequences threatened by Defendant. 34. Plaintiff further suffered extreme emotional distress, along with feelings of panic and fear as a result of the Defendant’s false threats. 35. Moreover, in the Defendant’s voicemail, the Defendant never once stated that it was a debt collector, that the communication was an attempt to collect a debt, or that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. 36. Nor has the Defendant ever given that required disclosure to the Plaintiff in any of the communications that the Defendant had with the Plaintiff. 38. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 39. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer classes: Class A: a) All consumers nationwide, b) whom Defendant falsely threatened with legal action or criminal charges, c) during the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of this action. Class B: a) All consumers nationwide, b) whom Defendant placed a voicemail to without disclosing that the communication was from a debt collector, c) during the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of this action. 40. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 41. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 43. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 44. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 46. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 48. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, misleading and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 52. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys' fees. 53. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 54. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 55. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), a debt collector must disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose. 56. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), the debt collector must also disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector. 57. The Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) by never once making any of these required disclosures. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. (False Threats And Deceptive Practices) VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 16 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. (Failure To Provide Required Disclosures)

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(Individual Claims for Violation of FLSA Against all Defendants (Individual Claims for Violation of IMWL) Against all Defendants 21 (Collective Action Claim for Violation of FLSA by Plaintiff and all those similarly situated class members) Against all Defendants 26 U.S.C.A. § 7434 27 Civil damages for fraudulent filing of information return Against ISA Experts As a Class and Individual Claim 112.Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 113.This count arises from the Defendants’ violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 7434. 114.Defendants misclassify all its employees as “Independent Contractors”. 115.From Plaintiff’s hire date to the end of his employment Defendants reported Plaintiff’s earnings to the Internal Revenue Service on Internal Revenue Service but it failed to include payments as wages. 116.Defendants’ willfully lied to the government in filing the false documents identified herein. 117.Defendants’ benefited by doing so. For example, Defendants paid less in Social Security contributions, paid less for workers compensation insurance, paid less in Department of Employment Security payments, and saved money elsewhere due to the Non-Payroll Payments. 28 118.This also resulted in a loss to Plaintiff as he has been deprived of these benefits, including but not limited to the benefit of the social security contribution that should have been made on their behalf. 119.26 U.S.C.A. § 7434 provides that: “If any person willfully files a fraudulent information return with respect to payments purported to be made to any other person, such other person may bring a civil action for damages against the person so filing such return.” 120.26 U.S.C.A. § 7434(b) allows for damages of $5,000 per violation along with reasonable attorney fees. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against Defendants seek a judgment for all amounts available pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7434, including statutory damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and such other relief that is available under the law. Plaintiff also Prays that, at the earliest possible time, the Plaintiff be allowed to give notice of this class actions, or that the Court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have at any time during the six years immediately preceding the filing of this suit, up through and including 29 the date of this Court’s issuance of Court-supervised notice, as alleged herein this complaint. Such notice shall inform them that this civil action has been filed, of the nature of the action, and of their right to “opt out” of this lawsuit. 44. Plaintiff alleges that in his last week of work, in February of 2019, he was paid no wages for his last 62 hours of work, and as an employee of Defendant was owed wages: minimum wages. Plaintiff was paid no wages, thus Defendants are liable for minimum wage violations for Plaintiff’s last two weeks of work in February of 2019. 10 45. In the two weeks of January 10 to January 23, 2019 Plaintiff worked 86.80 hours, thus should have been paid 6.80 hours of overtime, at an overtime rate, but he was paid straight time for these overtime hours. Thus is owed 46. Plaintiff’s rate of pay was $15.00 per hour, thus his half time rate would be $7.50 per hour, thus for this one week Plaintiff is owed $51.00 in overtime pay. 47. Likewise in the weeks of December 13-26, 2018 Plaintiff worked 16.80 hours of overtime, and thus is owed overtime for these two weeks of work. 48. Plaintiff was initially hired at $12.25 per hour, then increased to $12.25 per hour as a floor manager, and a training rate fifty cents more when training an employee. 49. All actions by Defendant were willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence. 50. Plaintiff had no control over his work environment whatsoever. 51. Defendants set the rules and had complete control over the venue, and Plaintiff had to obey these rules or risk everything, including loss of his job. This is the very hallmark of the economic dependence and control of an employer- employee relationship. 11 52. Despite being on notice of its violations, Defendant chose to continue to misclassify Plaintiff and other members of the proposed collective class and withhold all wages to them in effort to enhance their profits. 53. Defendants knew that persons such as Plaintiff and class were employees that should be paid under the law, and has simply chosen not to pay them. 54. Evaluation of proper classification is a multiple part test, which the Defendants have not properly applied to Plaintiff in determination of their status, rather Defendants simply assumed incorrectly that the Plaintiff and other employees were independent contractors, simply because the Defendants declared them to be. 55. The test for Employee/contractor is found in a US DOL Fact Sheet #13: Am I an Employee?: Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (revised May 2014). 56. The elements of this test demonstrate that Plaintiff and the class are not properly classified. The elements are as follows: 1) the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business. 2) Whether the worker’s managerial skills affect his or her opportunity for profit and loss. 3) The relative investments in facilities and equipment by the worker and the employer 4) The worker’s skill and initiative. 5) The permanency of the worker’s relationship with the employer. 6) The nature and degree of control by the employer 12 57. Almost none of these factors are in Defendants’ favor as alleged as follows: 1) the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business. The work of the Plaintiffs and Class is integral part of the employers’ business. ASI’s business is making calls to set up appointments for real estate sales and/or services and the Plaintiff and the class’s work is solely related to that business: the Plaintiffs and class made the calls to set up the appointments which are the key of the Defendants’ business model. 2) Whether the worker’s managerial skills affect his or her opportunity for profit and loss. For the Plaintiff and Class there was no opportunity for profit or loss, the Plaintiff and class were paid the same baseline pay, however none of the pay was classified as wages. While Plaintiff and class might have been able to earn commissions or bonuses, they did not have the opportunity to have a loss, thus showing they were not independent contractors. 3) The relative investments in facilities and equipment by the worker and the employer Here Plaintiff and class made/make no investment other than their time and efforts, while Defendant has made large investments. 4) The worker’s skill and initiative. a. Here the Plaintiff and class “skills” were simply salesmanship, no specialized skill or initiative was required. Further Defendants provide strict sales scripts that employees are to follow. b. Defendants forced employees to strict adhorance, a review of one persons calls reads: 13 Feedback: Great job at adhering to the script and asking 3 questions. Just don't forget to identify yourself to the caller. Also, ask about additional realtor needs on every call. Try to match the callers pace, if they sound elderly, or southern, slow down and confirm they understood what you are saying. Keep up the great work, overall great calls! 5) The permanency of the worker’s relationship with the employer. a. While some members of the class were short time workers, many worked for years. b. Plaintiff himself worked for Defendants for eight months. 6) The nature and degree of control by the employer a. Here Defendants have excreted strong and consistent control of employees, including: requiring particular hours of work and scheduling hours of work. b. Employees would be given a strike if they didn't dial what they were assigned. c. Strong element of control is found in the Defendants policy and procedures which reads: Proper notice will be given before any time off is approved that is not pre written on your monthly calendar. The need for a shorter day, full day off, multiple days off needs to be requested per the 3 strike guidelines. If you are running late for your shift, immediate notice needs to be given to the Manager, preferred is 2 hour notice / 58. Plaintiff brings state wage law claims, pursuant to the Illinois Minimum Wage Law 820 ILCS 105/1., as individual and class action. The Class is defined as all current, former and future employees of ISA employed as employees of the Defendant who were classified as “independent contractors” by Defendant thus depriving Plaintiffs’ of wages overtime wages, and minimum wages not paid. These include claims for all owed 14 wages due for three (3) years prior to the filling of this complaint and until an judgment is entered in this case (the “Class” and “Class Period,” respectively) (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiffs” refers to both Named Plaintiffs and the Class). 59. Excluded from the Class are ISA legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the Class period has had, a controlling interest in ISA; the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper request for exclusion from the Class. 6.80 hours of half time rate. 60. Numerosity: The persons in the Class identified above are geographically diverse and so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of members of the Class based upon the fact that during the Class Period, ISA operated two locations and all call center persons were classified as independent contractors. The numerosity is also demonstrated by the ISA having a work force of 40 call center persons (as per Individual Defendant statements). Plaintiff worked for Defendants and due to the high “turnover” of these positions the number of potential class members is increased substantially. It is estimated that there are at least 100 sales persons in the class. 15 61. Commonality: There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to this Class that predominate over any question solely affecting individual members of the Class, including but are not limited to: 62. whether the Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class within the meaning of the IMWL; a) whether Defendant misclassified those employees as “independent contractors” b) Whether Defendant paid the class minimum wages and/or over time wages; c) what proof of hours worked is sufficient where employers fail in their duty to maintain time records d) whether the Plaintiff and the Class were paid overtime wages pursuant to the overtime provisions of the IMWL e) whether Defendants’ engaged in a continuing policy, pattern or practice of failing to pay all owed wages, overtime wages and minimum wages due to the misclassification of the Individual Plaintiffs and Class Members; 63. Typicality: The claims of Representative Plaintiff is typical of the Class. 64. Adequacy: Representative Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. 65. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for their fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individual Plaintiff lack 16 the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate lawsuits in Court against a corporate Defendant like ISA. 66. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 67. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of this litigation where no individual employee can justify the commitment of the large financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in Federal Court against the corporate Defendant. 68. IMWL violation claims are brought and maintained as a class for all IMWL claims asserted by the Plaintiff. bB. The FLSA Collective Action 69. Plaintiff brings claims for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)), on behalf of all employees of ISA who were, are, or will be employed by ISA during the period of three (3) years prior to the date of commencement of this action through the date of judgment in this action, who were not compensated at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for all work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per work week and or for minimum wages owed for all hours worked. 17 70. FLSA violation claims are brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to § 16(b) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for all FLSA claims asserted by the Plaintiff, since the FLSA claims of the Plaintiff is similar to the FLSA claims of all call persons employed by 83. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint above, as if fully set forth herein. 83. Defendant's conduct and practice, as described above, were/are willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 84 By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and similarly situated members of the class for monetary damages, liquidated damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees provided by the FLSA. 85 Plaintiff names the individual Defendant as alleged elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated herein 84. Defendants intentionally failed to pay Plaintiff overtime wages as required under the FLSA. 85. Defendants’ conduct and practices, as described above, were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 20 86. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for monetary damages, liquidated damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees provided by the FLSA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three (3) years preceding the filing of Plaintiffs initial complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling. 87. Plaintiff names the individual Defendant as alleged elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated herein. 88. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint above, as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendants intentionally failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime wages as required under the IMWL and failed to pay a final checks, thus also violated the minimum wage requirements of the IMWL. 90. Defendants’ conduct and practice, as described above, are and/or were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 91. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, civil penalties and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees provided by the IMWL. 92. Plaintiff names the individual Defendant as alleged elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated herein. 93. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint above, as if fully set forth herein. 94. Defendants intentionally failed to pay Plaintiff and all other call persons overtime wages required under the FLSA. Defendants. ) CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Servando Reynoso, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as class representative, by and through his undersigned counsel of record, upon personal knowledge as to those allegations in which he so possesses and upon information and belief as to all other matters, pursuant to §216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter “FLSA”), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq (hereinafter “IMWL” ), The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA) and brings this cause of action against Defendant LGS INC, D/B/A ISA Experts (ISA)., (hereinafter “ISA” or Defendant), and Aleto Sarno, individually as an “Employer” under the FLSA, IMWL and IWPCA, and against ISA pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7434 2 (fraudulent filing of a false information return) for the filing of false tax documents and in so doing states the following: IWPCA CLAIMS Individual claims for Plaintiff 24 And Class Claims for all Misclassified Employees For Wages Owed, Last Paychecks not paid, and penalties Against all Defendants 105. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 106. Plaintiff also presents individual and Class claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act MISCLASSIFICATION

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is an outdoor recreational gear and accessories company that owns and operates www.seattlesportsco.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in March of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.seattlesportsco.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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11. Even though Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, Defendant failed and refused to pay her at a rate of one and one-half times her normal rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours. 12. Although this happened numerous times, provides the pay period of February 19, 2020 through March 3, 2020 as an example of Defendants illegal pay scheme: (a) Plaintiff worked 81.85 hours as an “Assistant Manager” at the Laclede Station location; (b) Plaintiff worked 56.64 hours as “Hourly” at the Euclid location; 13. Thus, Plaintiff worked 138.49 hours over a two week pay period, or, approximately 14. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to, based on currently available timesheet data, 29.245 of overtime per week. 15. Plaintiff was only paid for, on average, 5.52 hours of overtime, leaving an overtime pay deficit of 23.725 hours, which, for Plaintiff whose normal rate of pay is $13 per hours, equates to $462.64 per week (23.725 x $13 x 1.5). 16. The fact that Plaintiff was required to work at two separate locations has not bearing on Defendant’s overtime pay obligations. 17. In fact, the structure of Defendant’s staffing / pay practices shows a system set up to avoid having to pay full overtime wages. 18. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and a class and subclasses of persons similarly situated and seeking relief, and defined as: The FLSA Collective All current and former workers employed by Defendant who were not paid one and one-half times his or her normal rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek within three years preceding the date of filing this action through final judgment in this matter, and who elect to opt-in to this action; The Missouri Overtime Subclass All current and former workers employed by Defendant who were not paid one and one-half times his or her normal rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek within three years preceding the date of filing this action through final judgment in this matter; The Missouri Pay Reduction Subclass All current and former workers employed by Defendant who had their pay reduced without receiving 30 day’s written notice, as required by REV. STAT. MO. § 290.100. The FLSA Collective and The Missouri Overtime Subclass, and the Missouri Pay Reduction Subclass are collectively referred to herein as the “Collective” or the “Subclasses” unless otherwise indicated. Plaintiff reserves the right to add, amend, modify, or further define the Collective or Subclasses and/or 4 to move for certification of a collective or classes or subclasses defined differently than set forth above depending on the facts or law as discovered in this action. 19. Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant individually and on behalf of all Collective and Subclass members for violations of the law as set forth below. 20. The members of the Collective and Subclasses are ascertainable from objective criteria. 21. If necessary to preserve the case as a collective or class action, the Court itself can redefine the Class or Subclasses, create additional subclasses, or both. 22. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied for the proposed classes because the members of the proposed classes are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all its members is impracticable. 23. Upon information and belief there are more than 40 Missouri Overtime and Pay Reduction Subclass members. 24. Therefore, the “numerosity” requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is met. 25. The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied because there are questions of law or fact common to Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed Collective and Missouri Subclasses that predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the Collective and Missouri Subclasses. Among those common questions of law or fact are, but are not limited to, the following: a. whether Defendant failed to pay adequate wages to employees in violation of the 34. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an employer and/or joint employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 35. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff as an employer and/or joint employer and employed or continues to employ each of the Collective Action Members, within the meaning of the FLSA. 36. Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Complaint. 37. Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See, Exhibit 1, Consent to Join. 38. The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq apply to Defendant. 39. At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendant had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to its similarly-situated employees in comparable positions but holding different titles, for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 8 40. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate their employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Members, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 41. As a result of Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, is entitled (a) to recover from Defendant’s unpaid overtime wages, (b) to recover an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, and (c) to recover their unreasonably delayed payment of wages reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. Because Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 43. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff and the proposed putative Rule 23 Subclass have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the MMWL. 44. The MMWL regulates, among other things, the payment of overtime wages by employers, subject to limited exemptions not applicable herein. § § 290.500(3) and (4), 290.505.1, RSMo. 45. During all times relevant to this action, Defendant was the “employer” of Plaintiff and the Subclass within the meaning of the MMWL. § 290.500(3), (4), RSMo. 46. During all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass were “employees” withing the meaning of the MMWL. § 290.500(3) RSMo. 9 47. Pursuant to the MMWL, employees are entitled to be compensated at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times the regular rate in which such employees are employed for all work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. . § 290.505.1, RSMo. 48. Defendant, pursuant to their common policy and practice, violated the MMWL by refusing and failing to pay Plaintiff and the Employee Class overtime wages required under the MMWL. § 290.505.1, RSMo. 49. Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass are victims of a uniform policy, practice, and scheme of Defendant to avoid payment of overtime wages they were otherwise entitled to as employees. 50. Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass are entitled to damages equal to all unpaid overtime wages due within two years preceding the filing of this Complaint plus periods of equitable tolling, along with an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. § 290.527, RSMo. 51. Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass are entitled to an award of pre-judgment and post- judgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 52. Defendant is liable under § 290.527, RSMo. for Plaintiff’s costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. 53. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff within the State of Missouri. 54. On or about March 27, 2020, Plaintiff was informed that she would receive a reduction in pay of $2.00 per hour. 55. This notice was given via phone, and was not given in writing. 56. The reduction in pay took effect retroactively, and Plaintiff was never given 30 day’s notice, as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.100. 10 57. As such, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to $50.00 per person and costs of suit. 69.245 hours per work week. 3 Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff Tyojuana Lenard and the FLSA Collective MO Rev Stat §290.100 – Deficient Notice of Reduction of Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff Tyojuana Lenard and the Class Missouri Minimum Wage Law – Unpaid Overtime Wages On Behalf of Plaintiff Tyojuana Lenard and the Missouri Overtime Subclass

lose

17. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 16. 18. During the CLASS PERIOD, as part of DEFENDANTS’ illegal payroll policies and practices to deprive their non-exempt employees all wages earned and due, DEFENDANTS required, permitted or otherwise suffered PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS to take less than the 30-minute meal period, or to work through them, and have failed to otherwise provide the required meal periods to PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS pursuant to California Labor Code § 226.7, 512 and IWC Order No. 1-2001, § 11. 19. During the CLASS PERIOD, PLAINTIFF and other CLASS MEMBERS were required to work through or cut short their meal breaks because DEFENDANTS failed to maintain adequate staffing levels. DEFENDANTS required PLAINTIFF and other CLASS MEMBERS to assist customers, respond to emails, and answer texts during these breaks. DEFENDANTS regularly failed to staff enough employees to assist customers while permitting PLAINTIFF and other CLASS MEMBERS to take required meal breaks. 24. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 23. 29. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 28. 30. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1197, and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 4, payment to an employee of less than the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in a payroll period is unlawful. 31. During the CLASS PERIOD, DEFENDANTS failed to, and continue to fail to, pay PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS minimum wages for all hours worked by, among other things: requiring, suffering, or permitting PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS to work off-the-clock; requiring, suffering, or permitting PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS to work through meal breaks; illegally and inaccurately recording time worked by PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS; failing to properly maintain PLAINTIFF’s and CLASS MEMBERS’ records; failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements to PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS for each pay period; and other methods to be discovered. 32. DEFENDANTS knew or should have known that PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS worked hours for which they were not compensated. 34. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 33. 35. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194, and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 3, DEFENDANTS are required to compensate PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS for all overtime, which is calculated at one and one-half (1 ½) times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours per day and/or forty (40) hours per week, and for the first eight (8) hours on the seventh consecutive workday, with double time for all hours worked in excess of twelve (12) hours in any workday and for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours on the seventh consecutive day of work in any workweek. 36. PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS are current and former non- exempt employees entitled to the protections of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194, and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001. 41. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 40. 48. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 47. 49. During the CLASS PERIOD, DEFENDANTS knowingly and intentionally failed, and continue to fail, to provide PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS with timely and accurate itemized wage statements in writing showing each employee’s gross wages earned, total hours worked, all deductions made, net wages earned, the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, the name and address of the legal entity or entities employing PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS, piece rate wages, the last four digits of PLAINTIFF’s and CLASS MEMBERS’ social security numbers or employee identification numbers, and all applicable hourly rates in effect during each pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate, in violation of California Labor Code § 226 and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 7. 50. During the CLASS PERIOD, PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS suffered, and continue to suffer, injury as a result of DEFENDANTS’ failure to provide timely and accurate itemized wage statements, as PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS could not promptly and easily determine from the wage statement alone one or more of the following: the gross wages earned, the total hours worked, all deductions made, the net wages earned, the name and address of the legal entity or entities employing PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS, and/or all applicable hourly rates in effect during each pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate. 52. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 51. 53. During the CLASS PERIOD, as part of DEFENDANTS’ illegal policies and practices to deprive PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS of all wages earned and due, DEFENDANTS knowingly and intentionally failed to maintain records as required under California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1174 and IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 7, including but not limited to the following records: total daily hours worked by each employee; applicable rates of pay; all deductions; meal periods; time records showing when each employee begins and ends each work period; and accurate itemized statements. 55. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 54. 56. California Labor Code § 2802(a) requires an employer to indemnify an employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of her his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer. 57. During the CLASS PERIOD, DEFENDANTS knowingly and willfully failed, and continue to fail, to indemnify PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS for all business expenses and/or losses incurred in direct consequence of the discharge of their duties while working under the direction of DEFENDANTS, including but not limited to expenses for uniforms, cell phone usage, and other employment- related expenses, in violation of California Labor Code § 2802. 59. PLAINTIFF incorporates herein by specific reference, as though fully set forth, the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 58. 60. Each and every one of DEFENDANTS’ acts and omissions in violation of the California Labor Code and/or the applicable IWC Wage Order as alleged herein, including but not limited to DEFENDANTS’ failure to provide meal periods, DEFENDANTS’ failure to authorize and permit rest periods, DEFENDANTS’ failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, DEFENDANTS’ failure to pay all wages due to discharged and quitting employees, DEFENDANTS’ failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, DEFENDANTS’ failure to maintain required records, DEFENDANTS’ failure to indemnify PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS for necessary expenditures and/or losses incurred in discharging their duties, constitutes an unfair and unlawful business practice under California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. 61. DEFENDANTS’ violations of California wage and hour laws constitute a business practice because DEFENDANTS’ aforementioned acts and omissions were done repeatedly over a significant period of time, and in a systematic manner, to the detriment of PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods [Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 12] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements [Cal. Labor Code § 226; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 7] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages [Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 3] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Maintain Required Records [Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 1174; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 7] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages [Cal. Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 4] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees [Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods [Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197; IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, § 11] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties [Cal. Labor Code § 2802] (Against all DEFENDANTS) Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.] (Against all DEFENDANTS)

win

(Declaratory Relief) 111. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 110 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 112. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Fiverr.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and 26 facilities of Fiverr.com, which Fiverr owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 113. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) 26. Defendant, Fiverr Inc., controls and operates Fiverr.com. in New York State and throughout the United States. 27. Fiverr.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse the various tasks and services on demand that are available, sign up with a specific freelancer, select from a variety of service packages, and perform a variety of other functions. 28. Among the features offered by Fiverr.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Fiverr on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to find and book providers of tasks and services; and (c) learning about career opportunities, how to become a seller, about the different categories of services offered, and about the company. 29. This case arises out of Fiverr’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Fiverr.com. Due to Fiverr’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Fiverr.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Fiverr, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Fiverr.com. 30. Fiverr denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Fiverr.com by preventing them from freely navigating Fiverr.com. Fiverr.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and 9 screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Fiverr.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Fiverr.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Fiverr.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Fiverr.com, these forms include search fields to select a type of task or service, type of package, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make a selection or inquiries as to Defendant’s services, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. Specifically, Plaintiff was unable to select a service provider and consequently, he was unable to proceed to checkout, and unable to complete a transaction. 33. Additional accessibility issues with the us.marcobicego.com website include: 10 Summary Plaintiff could not find and select a service provider. In order to do so, he would have to overcome significant hurdles such as the 80+ filter links that do not have accessible names, an inaccessible table used to compare product features, and an inaccessible package selection widget. In addition, it is impossible, for a screen-reader user to apply for a job or to become a Seller on Fiverr. In both experiences the forms are not properly accessible. Labels are not read with their inputs, required input fields are excluded from normal navigation, and suggested inputs are required for a valid input but aren’t announced for a screen-reader user to know it is there. Service Search Page  The filter options do not have accessible names.  There is no skip to content link. Plaintiff had to navigate through 80+ focusable elements announced as “blank” in order to read the main content.  The information provided for each distinct service via the screen-reader is not cohesive and some parts are unlabeled. Also, it was unclear to Plaintiff which price is linked with which service. Individual Service Page  The tabular content to compare packages is not accessible. First, the tabular data is not defined so Plaintiff was unable to determine which data goes with each package. Additionally, the green checkmark that visually distinguishes additional features is not read and therefore Plaintiff was unable to determine which items are included in each package.  Each service has multiple packages such as Premium, Standard, and Basic. As a user tabs through the options, they do not hear the package name nor benefits, instead, they just hear “continue” and “price.” This creates a confusing experience for the user. Main Navigational Experience  The search field has an accessible name of “Try logo animation, edit, blank.” It was unclear to the Plaintiff that this input is for search.  The visible labels for information, such as the Popular label for keywords following it, are not properly associated with the information they label. The information is read independently of the label and it is unclear what the links are for.  There are many elements that come into focus and nothing is announced—it appears that the navigation is broken. 11 Become a Seller Process  In the first step, Personal Info, all of the fields are mandatory, but two of the fields are not well labeled to allow a user to complete it. The input to add a Profile Picture is completely skipped and the input for languages requires that you select a language from the suggestions, which are not announced, and will not allow a custom input—even if it matches the suggestion character for character. In conjunction with this, the Continue button will not work until these fields are correctly filled out, but no announcement is made nor any error text added to inform the user why it isn’t working. The process is broken.  The remainder of the process follows this theme of inaccessibility. On the 2nd step, Professional Info, input fields are announced with labels (from: year, to: year) and the corresponding skills are excluded from normal navigation. The section to add a skill also requires the user to select a suggestion option, rather than a custom input, but no suggestions are announced to a screen- reader user. Apply for a Job  The input field for Attaching a Resume is skipped in normal navigation. 34. Furthermore, Fiverr.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Fiverr.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, he was unable to access it completely. 35. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Fiverr.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 36. Fiverr.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, 12 Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Fiverr.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Fiverr.com. 37. Due to Fiverr.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Fiverr.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and services and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Fiverr.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Fiverr.com. 38. Fiverr.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Fiverr.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Fiverr.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff, Pedro Martinez, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Fiverr.com, most recently on October 30, 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Fiverr.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired 13 persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to book a writing service to help him with his resume and cover letter. 40. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Fiverr.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 41. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Fiverr.com. 42. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 43. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 44. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Fiverr.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in- fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted 14 to access Fiverr.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Fiverr.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 46. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Fiverr.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Fiverr.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 48. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Fiverr.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Fiverr.com. 49. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Fiverr.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Fiverr.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Fiverr.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and 15 (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Fiverr.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 50. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Fiverr has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Fiverr.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 52. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 53. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 16 54. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 55. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 54 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 56. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 57. Fiverr.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 58. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Fiverr.com. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful 17 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 61. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 62. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 18 64. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Fiverr who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Fiverr.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Fiverr.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 67. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 19 72. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 73. Fiverr.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 74. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Fiverr.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Fiverr.com, causing Fiverr.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 77. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would 20 fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 78. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Fiverr.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. 21 and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 85 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 87. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 22 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 90. Fiverr.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 91. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Fiverr.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Fiverr.com, causing Fiverr.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 94. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 23 95. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 96. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 98. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 99. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 98 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 100. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 24 101. Fiverr.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 102. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Fiverr.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 103. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Fiverr.com, causing Fiverr.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 104. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 25 105. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 106. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Fiverr.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 107. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 108. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 110. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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21. Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S. Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057 213/388-8693 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 decision-maker to conduct periodic reviews of those medications as treatment continues; or (d) who are natives of non-contiguous countries and to whom ORR blocks legal assistance in legal matters or proceedings involving their custody, placement, release, and/or non-consensual consumption of psychotropic drugs. 22. Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S. Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057 213/388-8693 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 lawyers from representing members of the proposed class in legal proceedings relating to custody, placement, or release. Unless this matter proceeds as a class action, the majority of class members have little chance of securing judicial review of the policies and practices challenged herein. 38. Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S. Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057 213/388-8693 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Freedom of Association Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. IX. 39. Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law 256 S. Occidental Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90057 213/388-8693 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6, 8, 12, and 19 and Exhibit 1 of the Flores Settlement, the TVPRA, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. XI. 71. The exact size of the proposed class is unknown, but likely includes hundreds of children. The size of the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 72. The claims of Plaintiffs and those of the proposed class members raise common questions of law and fact concerning whether Defendants’ policies and practices relating to the release, placement, treatment, and legal representation of detained immigrant children are consistent with the Flores Settlement, § 235 of the TVPRA, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the First Amendment of the Constitution. These questions are common to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class because Defendants have acted and will continue to act on grounds generally applicable to the named Plaintiffs and the proposed class members. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class’s claims. 74. Defendants, their agents, employees, and predecessors and successors in office have acted or refused to act, and will continue to act or refuse to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Plaintiffs will vigorously represent the interests of unnamed class members. All members of the proposed class will benefit by this action. The interests of the named Plaintiffs and those of the proposed class members are identical. 75. Plaintiffs are represented by experienced and reputable lawyers associated with non-profit public interest law firms and an international law firm serving pro bono publico. Plaintiffs’ counsel includes attorneys with years of experience litigating complex suits and class actions on behalf of children and foreign nationals, including counsel for the plaintiff class in Flores v. Sessions. VI. [DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS: RESTRICTIVE PLACEMENT] 131. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-127 of this Complaint as though fully set forth here. 132. As a matter of policy and practice, Defendants place Plaintiffs and those similarly situated in RTCs, secure facilities, and medium-secure facilities without affording them a meaningful opportunity to be heard either prior or subsequent to such placement. 133. Such policy and practice individually and collectively violate Definition 6 and paragraph 19 of the Flores Settlement, TVPRA § 235(c)(2)(A), the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. X.

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48. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through forty seven (47) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 49. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 50. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York (a) whom the Defendant’s records reflect that it attempted to collect delinquent medical debts from Medicaid recipients when it was aware of the debtors Medicaid eligibility in violation of both Federal and New York State law; and (b) the Defendant was aware that the said account was already in disputed-status; and (c) the Defendant threatened to communicate, credit information which the Defendant knew to be false; (d) the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692e(8), 1692e(10), 1692f and 1692f(1). 51. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about September 4, 2015; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Sullivan Emergency Services; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692e, 1692e(2)(a), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f, for doing business when its authority to do so in New York had been suspended. 52. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because:     A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who were sent such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 53. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy.     54. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 55. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 56. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 57. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 58. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through forty seven (47) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 59. The conduct of Defendant in collecting and attempting to collect monies owed when it was not allowed to pursuant to the New York Limited Liability Law constitutes deceptive or materially misleading activity that is directed at consumers and the public at large and caused consumers to suffer financial injuries of having increased debt and having money extracted from them. 60. As a result of the unlawful collection activity which the Defendant engaged in, Plaintiff is entitled to damages pursuant to GBL § 349 of $6,388.94 which is actual damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in her favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows:     A. Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) and Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant. Violations of GBL 349 brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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8. Beginning in or around August 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -6147 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. Comcast’s data collection allows it to identify, accurately and personally, the best candidates for any particular advertisement and when and where to show them those advertisements. 12. In addition to subscribers’ viewing histories, the PII that Comcast collects and uses to target ads includes customers’ incomes, ethnicities, education level, the cars they drive, the products they buy, and where they live—data Comcast acquires from other sources, like Experian, and matches with existing PII in the subscriber profiles Comcast creates, maintains, and updates.5 14. Comcast’s development and use of user profiles—assembled from the personally identifiable information of its cable subscribers—does not stop at the television screen. Comcast touts that its user profiles further identify (and follow) the subscriber to his or her computer or other internet-enabled devices, gather data on social media and other use, adding that data to its user profiles. Then: Comcast Spotlight’s multi-screen solutions include television and online advertising to integrate an advertiser’s message to potential customers in a more engaging and impactful way. Multi-screen advertising extends reach, builds frequency and provides advertisers with multiple exposures in Comcast homes across the county.7 Comcast sells the benefits and features of this surreptitious profiling and tracking to advertisers, touting the value of the “unifi[cation]” of “TV and online efforts,” of “unduplicated local reach” and “extend[ing] existing TV commercial creative into the online space creating cost efficiencies.”8 16. Comcast’s cable system generates, transmits, and collects data about subscribers’ cable television viewing activity (“video activity data”), including which channels, programs, and advertisements subscribers view and for how long.10 That information, and the way Comcast admits using it, show that subscriber viewing data is PII under the Cable Privacy Act.11 18. Comcast’s media partners provide further confirmation that Comcast collects its subscribers viewing data on a PII-basis (with that data linked or linkable to the specific subscriber in question). In an advertising white paper titled “Addressable TV,” data aggregator Experian explains how companies can partner with Comcast and other cable operators to use viewing data to target individual customers: Like a piece of mail that arrives in your mailbox, the TV ad can be tailored to the household, with different ads delivered to different households simultaneously across the same ad unit.13 Further, To target at the household level via addressable TV, one must buy from TV operator (Cablevision, Comcast, Dish Network, DIRECTV) who has set-top box technology to target and deliver the one-to-one ads.14 20. The personally identifiable demographic data that Comcast collects and maintains about its subscribers includes their age, gender, presence and age of children, education, occupation, marital status, household size, property ownership, mortgage/loan/insurance data, automotive ownership, general interests, and even magazine subscriptions.16 This data is personally identifiable because it is linked to and concerns a particular subscriber, and is used (without limitation) to target ads to the subscriber’s devices based on their demographic characteristics and to measure the popularity of programs among subscribers based on their characteristics. B. Comcast’s Conduct Violates Federal and State Law 21. The Cable Privacy Act requires cable operators to obtain the “written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned” before using the cable system to collect PII concerning any subscriber (subject to certain inapplicable exceptions). See 47 U.S.C. § 551(b). Comcast violated, and continues to violate, this requirement by collecting personally identifiable data from subscribers through its cable system for advertising purposes without their prior written or electronic consent, including but not limited to their personal viewing histories. 23. The Cable Privacy Act also requires cable operators to provide written notice to their subscribers, upon contracting and annually thereafter, “which clearly and conspicuously informs the subscriber of ”, among other things, the nature and purpose of the PII collected; the nature and frequency of disclosures of such PII to third parties; the duration that a cable operator will maintain said PII; the mechanism by which a subscriber may obtain access to her PII for review; and the full set of rights of the subscriber as set forth in the Cable Privacy Act. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1). Throughout the relevant period, Comcast’s Privacy Notice failed to clearly and conspicuously tell subscribers any of this information, and instead mislead subscribers as to the full extent of PII collected and used, or of the subscribers’ rights regarding said PII. 24. The Cable Privacy Act also requires cable operators to provide subscribers access to all PII regarding themselves which the cable operator collected and maintains. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(d). Comcast does not provide cable subscribers who request access to their PII with a copy of all PII regarding that subscriber that Comcast has collected and maintains. Rather, when subscribers request access to the PII associated with their account (including Plaintiff), Comcast provides only the subscriber’s name, partial social security number, address, and telephone number without providing any of the video activity data or demographic data that Comcast collects and maintains. 26. Plaintiff Wainblat subscribed to Comcast cable television service for his residence in Boston, Massachusetts beginning in approximately September 2013. 27. When Wainblat’s Comcast cable television subscription began, and at least once a year thereafter, Comcast provided Wainblat with a copy of its Customer Privacy Notice, which suffered from the above-alleged deficiencies. 28. Comcast never obtained Plaintiff Wainblat’s electronic or written consent to collect his PII using its cable system, as required by the Cable Privacy Act. 29. At the start of his cable subscription, Comcast provided Plaintiff Wainblat with a set-top cable box. Wainblat watched cable television using the set-top cable box during his cable subscription. Throughout Wainblat’s subscription to Comcast’s cable television service, Comcast collected and maintained Wainblat’s PII pursuant to its standardized practices as alleged above. 30. On April 27, 2018 Mr. Wainblat requested, through counsel, that Comcast produce the personally identifiable information associated with his account. In response, on June 27, 2018, Comcast stated: Personally identifiable information (“PII”), as that term is used in 47 U.S.C. § 551 is available to you through My Account, which can be accessed by visiting xfinity.com/myaccount or through the My Account app. Your billing statements, which may display PII, can also be accessed through My Account. If you need assistance accessing My Account or you would like hard copies of your billing statements, please submit that request to us through your counsel. 32. Comcast’s practices regarding subscriber requests are uniform, and all parties seeking access to their PII receive a similar response (and are refused access to the full complement of PII collected, maintained, and used by Comcast). 33. Wainblat faces a threat of imminent or actual harm because, inter alia: a. Comcast and undisclosed third parties continue to maintain and use his wrongfully obtained PII; b. Comcast is in continuing breach of its statutory duty to provide him with his PII; and c. he cannot make an informed decision about whether to subscribe to Comcast cable television in the future—and otherwise safeguard his privacy interest in his PII— without knowing the full extent of Comcast’s data collection and whether Comcast has ceased its unlawful practices. 34. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2318, Plaintiff brings this action for himself and the following Class (the “Class”): All persons in Massachusetts who have or had a residential Comcast cable television subscription. 36. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 37. Numerosity: The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Comcast has millions of subscribers nationwide—and at least tens of thousands of subscribers in Massachusetts—and treats each one in the same manner. The disposition of the claims of these Class Members in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. The Class Members are readily identifiable from information and records in Comcast’s possession, custody, or control. 38. Typicality: The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that Comcast systematically collected, maintained, and used Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII in the same unlawful manner. Further, the factual bases of Comcast’s misconduct represent a common thread of misconduct resulting in injury to Plaintiff and all Class Members. 40. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class Members. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions, consumer class actions in particular, and consumer privacy class actions specifically. Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 42. Comcast has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and/or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards for Comcast. 43. Injunctive and/or declaratory relief is necessary to prevent further unlawful and unfair business practices by Comcast. Money damages alone will not afford adequate and complete relief, and injunctive relief is necessary to restrain Comcast from continuing to commit its illegal and unfair policies. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 46. In violation of 47 U.S.C. § 55l(b), Comcast used its cable system to collect PII of its subscribers (including Plaintiff) without their prior written or electronic consent. 47. As described herein, Comcast’s collection and use its subscribers’ PII is not permitted under 47 U.S.C. § 551 (b)(2) because such collection is not for the purpose of: (a) obtaining information necessary to render a cable service or other service provided by the cable operator to the subscriber; or (b) detecting unauthorized reception of cable communications. 48. In violation of 47 U.S.C. § 551(c), Comcast disclosed and discloses its subscribers’ PII to third parties (including but not limited to Spotlight and Experian) without those subscribers’ prior written or electronic consent. Such disclosure is not permitted under 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c)(2) because such collection is not for the purposes enumerated thereunder. 49. In violation of 47 U.S.C. § 55l(d), Comcast failed to provide Plaintiff with access to all PII regarding Plaintiff that Comcast collected and maintains after Plaintiff requested access to his PII. Among other things, although Comcast maintains PII in the form of video activity data and demographic data relating to Plaintiff, Comcast did not provide access to that information in response to Plaintiff’s request. Comcast’s policies and procedures in this regard are uniform, with respect to Plaintiff and Class members. 50. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 52. Plaintiff and the Class suffered actual injury as a result of Defendant’s acts, practices, and omissions. 53. In violation of its statutory obligations, Defendant omitted facts concerning Comcast’s data collection and use of sensitive PII that thwarted each Class member’s reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis Comcast’s products and services and inflated the value and price thereof. Plaintiff would not have paid as much as he did (or at all) for Comcast’s services, had he known the full extent of the facts omitted by Comcast. Defendant’s conduct also resulted in an intrusion into the personal life and private affairs of each Class member, causing injury in an amount to be proven at trial but in any event valued at greater than a penny. 54. Defendant performed the actions described herein willfully and knowingly within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 93A § 9(3), thereby entitling Plaintiff and the members of the Class to attorneys’ fees and trebled damages. 55. Plaintiff made a written demand for relief pursuant to M.G.L. c. 93A § 9(3)19, and Comcast has failed to make a timely and adequate response, thereby entitling Plaintiff to judgment on this matter and for all damages authorized by statute. 9. The Cable Privacy Act also requires cable operators to provide subscribers access to all PII the cable operator collects and maintains concerning the subscriber. 47 U.S.C. § 551(d). When customers ask for this access, however, Comcast produces only the subscriber’s name, partial social security number, address, and telephone number—without providing any video activity data or demographic data that Comcast maintains. In failing and refusing to produce the information Comcast violates subscribers’ statutory rights and actively conceals its illegal practices. 1) We know Comcast illegally collects and maintains personally identifiable viewing and other data because it advertises services that depend on the collection, maintenance, and use of data that personally identifies individuals A. Comcast systematically violates its statutory obligations by collecting, maintaining, and using customers’ personally identifiable viewing data without consent, and by refusing to provide it when asked. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 551 (For Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A (For Plaintiff and the Class)

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16. The primary regulatory and industry authorities involved in the regulation of highway products include the United States Department of Transportation, the FHWA, the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (“NCHRP”), and various state departments of transportation. 74. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3), on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class (the “Nationwide Class”) initially defined as: All persons or entities who purchased one or more defective ET- Plus guardrail system (as defined herein) in the United States. 91. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 92. Plaintiff brings the Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class (“Class”). 93. Declaratory relief is intended to minimize “the danger of avoidable loss and unnecessary accrual of damages.” 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2751 (3d ed. 1998). A. The Federal Regulatory and Approval System Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et. seq. (On behalf of the Nationwide Class) Strict Liability Design Defect (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class)

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22. On or around November of 2020, Plaintiff visited the Website, using a popular screen reading software called NonVisual Desktop Access, with the intent of browsing and potentially making a purchase. 24. As a result of visiting the Website, Plaintiff is aware that the Website includes multiple barriers making it impossible for himself, and any other visually impaired or blind person, from enjoying access to the Website’s content equally to that of a sighted user. 25. For example, many features on the Website fail to accurately describe the contents of graphical images, fail to properly label title, fails to distinguish one page from another, contain multiple broken links, contain headings that do not describe the topic or purpose, and the keyboard user interfaces lack a mode of operation where the keyboard focus indicator is visible. 26. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant has not, and have never, had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure the Website is and will remain accessible to the blind and/or visually impaired. 28. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons, who need screen-readers to access websites, have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. If the Website were equally accessible to all, and if simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 guidelines were met, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Because of this, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including maintaining a website that is inaccessible to members of a protected class. 32. Due to Defendant’s violations of the ADA, and the harm it has caused, Plaintiff seeks damages, fees, costs, and injunctive relief. 33. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 34. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 35. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 38. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 44. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 46. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 50. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 51. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 52. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 53. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 55. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 56. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 60. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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21. Defendant is a financial service company that owns and operates the website, www.supermoney.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because SUPERMONEY, LLC.’s Website has never been accessible and because SUPERMONEY, LLC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that SUPERMONEY, LLC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that SUPERMONEY, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that SUPERMONEY, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that SUPERMONEY, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that SUPERMONEY, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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15. Potential opt-in members of the collective action are similarly situated to Plaintiff. They all held the same job positions and had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions. They are or were subject to the same common practices, policies, and plans of Defendants. They all suffer damages in the nature of lost overtime and minimum and other wages resulting from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 16. Plaintiff brings the third Cause of Action, the South Carolina Payment of Wage Act (“SCPWA”) claims, as an opt-out class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated current and former individuals employed by Defendants as waste disposal drivers by Defendants in South Carolina within three (3) years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. (“SC Rule 23 Class”). 18. In addition, upon information and belief, this action satisfies one or more of the requirements of Rule 23(b) Fed. R. Civ. P., because the questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the proposed Plaintiff class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 20. Upon information and belief, Defendants throughout the State of South Carolina violate the SCPWA. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 21. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 22. Defendants have residential, commercial, and industrial divisions that employ waste disposal drivers. 23. Defendants’ waste disposal drivers all collect, transport, and dispose of waste. 24. Defendants’ waste disposal drivers are all nonexempt employees under the FLSA. 25. Plaintiff is a nonexempt waste disposal driver for Defendants. 26. Class Members are (and/or were) nonexempt waste disposal drivers for Defendants within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 28. Plaintiff and the Class Members are similarly situated with respect to their job duties, their pay structure, and, as set forth below, the policies of Defendants resulting in FLSA violations. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and Class Members overtime in accordance with the 66. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained above as if repeated here verbatim. 67. This cause of action arises from Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, for its failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees at the proper overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 68. As set forth above, Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated employees, were or have been employees of Defendants within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 69. As set forth above, Defendants were “employer[s]” of Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated employees, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 70. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r) and 203(s). 71. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendants’ annual gross volume of sales made or business done was not less than Five Hundred Thousand and 0/100 ($500,000.00) Dollars. Alternatively, Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated employees, worked in interstate commerce so as to fall within the protection of the FLSA. 73. Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals regularly work or worked well more than forty (40) hours per week every week, usually at least fifty-six (56) or more hours per week. 74. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees at the overtime rate of one and one half times the normal rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) per workweek as further described above. 75. Defendants’ practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members the time and a half rate for hours in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek violates the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 76. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which its employees are employed are applicable to the Defendants or the Plaintiff and the Class Members. 77. Defendants’ failure to pay compensation at the overtime rate for all hours worked over forty (40) per workweek, is a willful violation of the FLSA, since the company’s conduct shows that they either knew that their conduct violated the FLSA or showed reckless disregard for whether its actions complied with the FLSA. 78. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained above as if repeated here verbatim. 80. Defendants are an “employer” as defined by the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (“SCPWA”), S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(1), because they employ individuals in the State of South Carolina. 81. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-40(C) of the SCPWA, “[e]very employer shall notify each employee in writing at the time of hiring of the normal hours and wages agreed upon, the time and place of payment . . . .” and the “employer shall furnish each employee with an itemized statement showing his gross pay and the deductions made from his wages for each pay period.” 82. Defendants willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and others similarly situated with proper notice at the time of their hiring as required by the law nor did Defendants provide them with compliant wage statements for each of their pay periods as required by the law. 83. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-40(C) of the SCPWA, “[a]n employer shall not withhold or divert any portion of the employee’s wages unless the employer is required or permitted to do so by state or federal law . . . .” 84. Further, “any changes [to] the terms [of wages] must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they become effective.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-30(A). 85. Defendants, however, did not pay Plaintiff and the SC Class members all wages due to them, nor did Defendants provide Plaintiff and the SC Class members with at least seven days advance written notice of the deductions or the amounts of the deductions Defendants made to their paychecks. 87. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the SC Class are entitled to receive all compensation of “wages” due and owing to them. 88. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated “wages” as defined in section 41-10-10(2) of the SCPWA for all work performed, according to the law. 89. Defendants have withheld wages of the Plaintiff and others similarly situated without providing advance notice of such amounts and absent any lawfully sufficient reason for such conduct. 90. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful conduct, Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered substantial losses and have been deprived of compensation to which they are entitled, including monetary damages in the amount of three (3) times the amount of their unpaid wages as well as costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-80 of the SCPWA. Violation of South Carolina Payment of Wages Act S.C. Code § 41-10-10, et. al. (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the SC Rule 23 Class) Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)

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10. Although Section H-10 was set to go into effect on July 1, 2019, Defendant began requiring eviction-defense attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of indigent defendants prior to July 1, 2019. 11. For example, on April 15, 2019, Mary Eason – a defendant in an eviction case brought by the Chicago Housing Authority – was granted a waiver of court fees which stated: “The applicant may participate in this case without payment of fees, costs, or charges including: filing, service or process, publication, mediation, guardian ad litem, or any other court ordered fees as listed in 735 ILCS 5/5-105(a)(1).” See 4/15/2019 Order For Waiver of Court Fees, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 12. However, after Ms. Eason subsequently retained Plaintiff to defend her in the eviction suit, Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff to file an appearance in the case because she had not paid Ms. Eason’s previously waived court fees. See May 22, 2019 Filing Rejection Notice, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 13. In order to represent Ms. Eason in her eviction case, Plaintiff paid her previously waived court fees – under protest – in the amount of $228.92 on June 5, 2019. See June 5, 2019 Appearance and Jury Demand, attached hereto as Exhibit C. 14. On May 22, 2019, the Illinois General Assembly repealed the prospective Section H-10 before it could go into effect. Public Act 101-0036. Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker approved the repeal on June 28, 2019. Id. 4 15. Nevertheless, Defendant has continued enforcing the now-repealed Section H-10 by forcing private eviction-defense attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of their indigent clients. 16. For example, on July 1, 2019, Plaintiff was required to pay $171.30 in previously waived court fees in order to file an appearance to defend an eviction case for an indigent client. See July 1, 2019 Appearance and Jury Demand, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 17. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of the following class: All Illinois private eviction-defense attorneys who have paid and are being required to pay court fees, costs and charges for clients who previously had those fees, costs and charges waived due to indigency, and all eviction defendants who have been or will be subjected to the fee requirement despite being issued fee waivers. 18. This case meets the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: 19. Numerosity. Upon information and belief, the members of the class are so numerous that their individual joinder would be impracticable. 20. Commonality. There are numerous questions of law and fact that are common to Plaintiffs and all members of the class, including, but not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant unlawfully collected court fees from private eviction-defense attorneys whose indigent clients previously had those fees waived. b) Whether Defendant’s practice of collecting previously waived court fees violates the equal protection rights of private eviction-defense attorneys. c) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that Defendant’s collection of previously waived court fees is unlawful. d) whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched; e) whether Plaintiff and class members have suffered damages; and 5 f) whether Plaintiff and class members are entitled to equitable relief. 21. Typicality. Plaintiff is a member of the class and has claims that are typical of all members of the class. Plaintiff’s claims and all class members’ claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant and may be remedied under the same legal theories. 22. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with, or interests that are any different from, those of the other class members. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in class actions of this type and other complex litigation. 23. This case may be maintained as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for declaratory relief and meets the requirements for a Rule 23(b)(3) damages action: 24. Predominance. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and the court, as well as the parties, will spend the vast majority of their time working to resolve these common issues. 25. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other feasible alternatives for the resolution of this matter. Individual litigation of multiple cases would be highly inefficient, a gross waste of the resources of the court and of the parties, and potentially could lead to inconsistent results that would be contrary to the interests of justice. 26. Manageability. This case is well suited for treatment as a class action and can easily be managed as a class action, because evidence of both liability and damages can be adduced, and proof of liability and damages can be presented, on a class-wide basis, while the allocation and distribution of damages to class members would be essentially a ministerial function. 6 27. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and class members by uniformly, unlawfully collecting money from them. Accordingly, injunctive relief, as well as legal and/or equitable monetary relief (such as disgorgement and/or restitution), along with corresponding declaratory relief, are appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 28. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 29. Section 1983 states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress… 35. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 36. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides in relevant part: In a case of an actual controversy within its jurisdiction…any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief could be sought. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 37. As set forth above, there is a real and actual controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant on whether private eviction-court attorneys may be required to pay the previously waived court fees of their indigent clients. 38. The controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant is thus real and substantial and demands specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character. 39. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment decreeing that Defendant may not require attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of their indigent clients. 8 40. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 41. Defendant’s collection and retention of previously waived court fees benefits violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 42. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, including but not limited to the actual amounts of previously waived court fees that private eviction-defense attorneys were forced to pay on behalf of their indigent clients. 6. The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, 735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq., provides a mechanism by which a landlord may legally evict a tenant. Defendants sued under the Act have a right to a jury trial and are entitled to much of the same discovery processes available to any other civil litigant. 7. Approximately 20,000 eviction cases are filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County’s Municipal Division every year. 8. Low-income eviction defendants are eligible to have their court fees waived if they meet statutory requirements. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 298. 9. However, a statutory amendment that was set to become effective July 1, 2019 added the following provision, which would have required attorneys to pay the previously waived court fees of their indigent clients: If an attorney files an appearance on behalf of a person whose fees, costs, and charges were initially waived under this Section, the attorney must pay all fees, 3 costs and charges relating to the civil action, including any previously waived fees, costs, and charges, unless the attorney is either a civil legal services provider, representing his or her client as part of a court-sponsored pro bono program as defined in Section 5-105.1 of this Code, or appearing under a limited scope appearance in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(6). 735 ILCS 5/5-105 (h-10). Equal Protection and Due Process 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq. Unjust Enrichment

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18. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through seventeen (17) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 19. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 20. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter bearing the Defendant's letterhead in substantially the same form as the letter sent to the Plaintiff, sent within one year prior to the date of the within complaint; (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of consumer debts purportedly owed to GE Money Bank; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(8) and 1692e(10) for making false and deceptive threats of credit reporting and for stating false credit information. -4- 21. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: (a) Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any question(s) affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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10. As reflected on the “Avis-Prouder” website page attached as Exhibit B, AVIS continues to make such discounts available to gay and lesbian renters, albeit with the AWD code 15. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) and/or 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 16. The Class is defined as follows: All persons who rented cars from AVIS at locations in the State of California during the period from September 15, 2010 through the date of class certification and who were charged a rate that exceeded the rate available for a comparable rental by using the IGLTA or NGLCC AWD Codes. 17. Excluded from the Class are Defendant’s employees and affiliates as well as any judicial officers who may be assigned to this matter. 18. The members of the Plaintiff Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. Plaintiff believes that there are many thousands of members in the proposed Class, who can be readily identified from AVIS’ computer records. 20. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class were similarly affected by Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 21. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in consumer class action litigation. 22. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 23. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members would be impracticable. Furthermore, as the injuries suffered by individual Plaintiff Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. VI. 24. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 26. Civil Code Section 51.5 further provides that: No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against . . . or trade with any person in this state on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or of the person’s partners, members, stockholders, directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees, business associates, suppliers, or customers, because the person is perceived to have one of more of those characteristics, or because the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have any of those characteristics. [Emphasis added] 27. The Act’s remedial provisions are set forth in Civil Code Section 52(a), which provides: Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6. 28. Plaintiff and the Class members were injured by AVIS’ violations of Civil Code Section 51 et seq. and bring this action to recover statutory damages and attorney’s fees. 29. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 31. By its actions described above, Defendant violated and continues to violate the UCL in that it has engaged and continues to engage in unlawful business practices within the meaning of the UCL, specifically violations of the Unruh Act. 32. Defendant has engaged in an “unfair” business practice by charging numerous car renters rates greater than those it makes available to persons who rent cars using the IGLTA and NGLCC AWD Codes. 33. As a direct and proximate result of these acts, Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money and property through excessive charges to their credit and debit cards. 34. Defendant received and continues to hold funds that rightfully should be restored to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Pursuant to Section 17203 of the Business and Professions Code, Plaintiff seeks an order and/or judgment from the Court (1) enjoining defendant from engaging in practices which constitute illegal and unfair competition and (2) restoring to Plaintiff and the Class all monies wrongfully acquired by Defendant by means of such practices, plus interest. 8. AVIS is one of the world’s leading car rental brands. It has extensive operations throughout the State of California, including at least 12 locations in San Diego County. 9. In or about September 2010, AVIS “signed a three year partnership with the International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association (IGLTA) that provides gay renters with discounted car rentals.” September 15, 2010 SDGLN.com article, attached as Exhibit A. The article further states that “[t]he Avis Worldwide Discount (AWD) number B450300 provides savings of up to 25 percent on global rates.” Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act California Civil Code, Section 51 et seq.

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11. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: All New York consumers for whom Defendant communicated to any person credit information, which is known to be false and/or for whom Defendant failed to communicate to any person that a disputed debt was disputed as set forth herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year prior to the filing of this Action. 12. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: a. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendant(s) that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining about a standard conduct that occurred to at least fifty (50) persons. The undersigned has, in accordance with FRCP Rule 5.2, redacted the financial account numbers and/or personal identifiers in said letter. b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to the class members which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: i. Whether the Defendants violated various provisions of the 16. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 17. Sometime prior to August 19, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred one or more financial obligations ("OBLIGATION” or “OBLIGATIONS") for which Defendant reported information to one or more national credit reporting agencies. 18. Plaintiff allegedly incurred the OBLIGATIONS in connection with personal use credit cards. 19. The OBLIGATIONS arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 20. Plaintiff incurred the OBLIGATIONS by obtaining goods and services which were primarily for personal, family and household purposes. 21. The OBLIGATIONS did not arise out of a transaction that was for non-personal use. 22. The OBLIGATIONS did not arise out of a transaction that was for business use. 23. The OBLIGATIONS is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 24. HOSPITAL and/or its predecessor is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 26. At the time the OBLIGATIONS was referred to THE BUREAUS the OBLIGATIONS was past due. 27. At the time the OBLIGATIONS was referred to THE BUREAUS the OBLIGATIONS was in default. 28. Plaintiff caused to be delivered to Defendant letters dated August 19, 2020, which was addressed to Defendant. Exhibit A, which is fully incorporated herein by reference. 29. The August 19, 2020 letters were sent to Defendant in connection with the collection of the OBLIGATIONS. 30. The August 19, 2020 letters which was sent to the Defendant stated in part: RE: Yvette Lee Creditor: COMENITY BANK Alleged Amount Due: $1,023.00 Please be advised that I dispute the above debt. RE: Yvette Lee Creditor: COMENITY BANK Alleged Amount Due: $1,654.00 Please be advised that I dispute the above debt. 31. After the date of the dispute, Defendant knew or should have known that the credit information concerning the OBLIGATIONS would be communicated to creditors and other persons. 32. The credit information communicated to these creditors and other persons did not indicate that the OBLIGATIONS were disputed. 34. Since August 19, 2020, Defendant has communicated to at least one person, credit information which is known or should be known to be false. 35. THE BUREAUS knew or should have known that its actions violated the 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 42. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus, Defendant engaged in a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the debt. 43. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character or legal status of the debt. 44. By failing to communicate that a disputed debt was disputed, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 45. By communicating credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 46. Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. 47. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false. 48. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to any person that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 50. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 51. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed as described herein, Defendant engaged in a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt. 52. Defendants’ conduct as described herein constitutes unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 53. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 54. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 55. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to have the Defendant abide by its obligations under the FDCPA and those specifically found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). 56. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. 57. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of the Defendants’ actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. 58. Defendant’s failure to act as described herein caused harm to the credit of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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(BREACH OF CONTRACT) (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND RELIEF) 10. This lawsuit only concerns property insurance coverage for buildings, and not personal contents, such as clothes and furniture. 12. On or about November 4, 2016, Rivers’ dwelling, storage building, and shed located on the Insured Premises suffered direct physical loss caused by covered peril(s) (the “Loss”). 13. The Rivers Policy was in effect at the time of the Loss, and the Loss is compensable under the terms of the Policy. As it relates to the Loss, there is no applicable exclusion. 14. Rivers promptly notified Allstate of the Loss and made a claim against the Rivers Policy. 15. After its inspection, Allstate determined that the Loss was covered by the terms of the Rivers Policy. 16. Allstate calculated its actual cash value (“ACV”) payment obligation to Rivers by first estimating the cost to repair or replace the damage with new materials (replacement cost value, or “RCV”), then subtracted depreciation. 17. The Rivers Policy, and the other property forms at issue in this pleading, do not permit the withholding or deduction of labor as depreciation as described below. 18. The Rivers Policy does not define ACV. B. Allstate’s Calculation of Rivers’ ACV Payment 19. In adjusting Rivers’ claim, Allstate affirmatively and unilaterally chose to use a “replacement cost less depreciation” methodology to calculate the loss and make its ACV payment. 21. On or about November 9, 2016, Allstate calculated the RCV of Rivers’ damaged structures at $18,545.76. 22. Allstate then used the same software to calculate the depreciation for Rivers’ damaged structures at $1,853.28. 23. Rivers was underpaid on his ACV claim as more fully described below. C. Allstate’s Practice Of Withholding Labor As Depreciation 24. When it calculated Rivers’ ACV benefits owed under the Rivers Policy, Allstate withheld costs for both materials and the labor required to repair or replace Rivers’ home as depreciation, even though labor does not depreciate in value over time. Allstate withheld labor costs throughout its ACV calculations as depreciation. Allstate also withheld labor costs as depreciation for other work necessary to repair and replace Rivers’ property. 25. Like all property insurance claims estimating software, the specific commercial claims estimating software used by Allstate allows for the depreciation of materials only or the depreciation of both material and labor in its depreciation setting preferences. 26. In this pleading, whenever reference is made to withholding “labor” as depreciation, “labor” means intangible non-materials, specifically including both the labor costs and the laborers’ equipment costs and laborers’ overhead and profit necessary to restore property to its condition immediately prior to the loss, as well as removal costs to remove damaged property, under commercial claims estimating software. 28. Plaintiff cannot determine the precise amount of labor that has been withheld based only upon the written estimate provided. To determine the precise amount of labor withheld, it is necessary to have access to the commercial property insurance program at issue, as well as the electronic file associated with his estimate. 29. While an insurer may lawfully depreciate material costs when calculating the amount of an ACV payment owed to an insured, it may not lawfully withhold repair labor as depreciation under Allstate’s policy forms at issue in North Carolina. Allstate’s failure to pay the full cost of the labor necessary to return Rivers back to his pre-loss condition left Rivers under-indemnified and underpaid for his loss. 30. Allstate materially breached its duty to indemnify Rivers by withholding labor costs associated with repairing or replacing Rivers’ property in its ACV payment as depreciation, thereby paying Rivers less than he was entitled to receive under the terms of the Rivers Policy. 32. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated. This action satisfies the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Only to the extent it is a requirement under applicable law, the proposed class herein is ascertainable. 34. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the proposed class through discovery. The following persons are expressly excluded from the class: (1) Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; (2) all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the proposed Class; and (3) the Court to which this case is assigned and its staff. 35. Plaintiff and members of the putative class as defined all have Article III standing as all such persons and entities, at least initially, received lower claim payments than permitted under the policy. Certain amounts initially withheld as labor may be later repaid to some policyholders with replacement cost provisions in their policy, if any. However, policyholders who have been subsequently repaid for initially withheld labor still have incurred damages, at the least, in the form of the lost “time value” of money during the period of withholding, i.e., prejudgment interest on the amounts improperly withheld, for the time period of withholding. 37. The relatively small amounts of damage suffered by most members of the proposed class make filing separate lawsuits by individual members economically impracticable. 38. Allstate has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed class in that Allstate has routinely withheld labor costs as described herein in its adjustment of property damage claims under its policies of insurance. It is reasonable to expect that Allstate will continue to withhold labor to reduce the amount it pays to its insureds under these policies absent this lawsuit. 39. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the proposed class and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed class include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Allstate’s policy language allows it to withhold labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; b. Whether Allstate’s policy language is ambiguous; c. Whether Allstate’s withholding of labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments breaches the insurance policies; d. Whether Allstate has a custom and practice of withholding labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; e. Whether Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have been damaged as a result of Allstate’s withholding of labor costs in its calculation of ACV payments; and f. Whether Plaintiff and members of the proposed class are entitled to a declaration, as well as potential supplemental relief, under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 41. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the proposed class. Plaintiff’s interest does not conflict with the interests of the proposed class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained lawyers who are competent and experienced in class action and insurance litigation. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiff and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the members of the proposed class and will diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for the proposed class while recognizing the risks associated with litigation. 43. In contrast, a class action will minimize case management difficulties and provide multiple benefits to the litigating parties, including efficiency, economy of scale, unitary adjudication with consistent results and equal protection of the rights of Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. These benefits would result from the comprehensive and efficient supervision of the litigation by a single court. 44. Questions of law or fact common to Plaintiff and members of the proposed class, including those identified above, predominate over questions affecting only individual members (if any), and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class action treatment will allow a large number of similarly situated consumers to prosecute their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without the necessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individuals would require. Further, the monetary amounts due to many individual members of the proposed class is likely to be relatively small, and the burden and expense of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the proposed class to seek and obtain relief. On the other hand, a class action will serve important public interests by permitting consumers harmed by Allstate’s unlawful practices to effectively pursue recovery of the sums owed to them, and by deterring further unlawful conduct. The public interest in protecting the rights of consumers favors disposition of the controversy in the class action form. 45. Class certification is further warranted because Allstate has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 47. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues when doing so would materially advance the litigation as a whole. 48. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations. 49. Allstate entered into policies of insurance with Plaintiff Rivers and members of the proposed class. These insurance policies govern the relationship between Allstate and Rivers, and members of the proposed class, as well as the manner in which claims for covered losses are handled. 50. The policies of insurance between Allstate, Rivers and the other members of the proposed class are binding contracts under North Carolina law, supported by valid consideration in the form of premium payments in exchange for insurance coverage. 51. Allstate drafted the insurance policies at issue, which are essentially identical in all respects material to this litigation concerning the withholding of labor as depreciation. 52. In order to receive ACV claim payments, Rivers and the putative class members complied with all material provisions and performed all of their respective duties with regard to their insurance policy. 53. Allstate breached its contractual duty to pay Rivers, and members of the proposed class the ACV of their claims by unlawfully withholding labor costs as described herein. 55. Allstate’s actions in breaching its contractual obligations, as described herein, are the direct and proximate cause of damages to Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. 56. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover damages sufficient to make them whole for all amounts Allstate unlawfully withheld from their ACV payments, including prejudgment interest as may be allowed by law. 57. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations. 58. This Court is empowered by the Declaratory Judgment Act as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 to declare the rights and legal relations of parties regardless of whether further relief is or could be claimed. 59. A party may seek to have insurance contracts, before or after a breach, construed to obtain a declaration of rights, status, and other legal relations thereunder adjudicated. 6. Allstate is an insurance company that provides property coverage for homes, commercial buildings, and other structures. Allstate is one of the nation’s largest insurers. 60. Rivers and members of the proposed class have all complied with all relevant conditions precedent in their contracts. 61. Plaintiff seeks, individually and on behalf of the proposed class, a declaration that Allstate’s property insurance contracts prohibit the withholding of labor costs as described herein when adjusting losses under the methodology employed herein. 62. Plaintiff further seeks, individually and on behalf of the proposed class, any and all other relief available under the law arising out of a favorable declaration. 63. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class have suffered injuries. 7. Allstate sells its property insurance policies in, inter alia, the state of North Carolina. 8. Rivers was insured pursuant to an insurance contract whereby Allstate agreed to insure, inter alia, Rivers’ property located on the Insured Premises against property damage, bearing Policy No. 90955728 (the “Rivers Policy”). 9. The Rivers Policy provided insurance coverage for direct physical loss to the residence and structures located on the Insured Premises, except as specifically excluded or limited by the Rivers Policy. A. The Property Insurance Policy and Casualty Loss

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(CLASS ACTION) 13. In August 2012, Mr. Thomas applied for a job with Best Care, a staffing agency that does business within the Chicago area. 14. As part of its ordinary and regular business practices, Best Care uses a "background check" to determine the eligibility of applicants for employment. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM) 15. Best Care requested a background check from Intellicorp. 16. Intellicorp furnished a report to Best Care (hereafter, the “Intellicorp report" or “report”). 17. The Intellicorp report was a "consumer report" governed and as defined by the FCRA. 18. Intellicorp returned eleven "hits" attributed to the Mr. Thomas, nine of which did not have a middle initial name match or had the wrong middle initial; one for a second degree sex offense conviction for a person 20 years older than Mr. Thomas, and another for a person born in a different year from Mr. Thomas. 19. None of these records belonged to the Mr. Thomas. They regarded unrelated person or persons with a similar name, but entirely different standard identifiers such as social security numbers and residences. 20. Intellicorp provided the Intellicorp report to Mr. Thomas's prospective employer. 21. Best Care received and reviewed the Intellicorp report. 22. As a result of the report, Best Care rejected him for employment. 23. Intellicorp's failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure that its report regarding the Mr. Thomas did not include information regarding a different person was a substantial factor in the rejection of Mr. Thomas's employment application and other related actual harm he suffered. 24. In creating and furnishing the Mr. Thomas's consumer report, Intellicorp failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure that the report was as accurate as maximally possible. Specifically, it allowed and/or used very loose matching criteria to determine whether to include information pertaining to strangers that had different middle names, social security numbers and resided in different states. 25. Mr. Thomas never received a letter or any other communication from Intellicorp "at the time" the report was furnished. 26. Despite providing a report for employment purposes containing public record information likely to have an adverse affect upon their ability to obtain or maintain employment, Intellicorp failed to provide notice "at the time" of the fact that the public record information was being reported by it, together with the name and address of the person(s) to whom such information was being reported. 27. On information and belief, Mr. Thomas alleges that Intellicorp did not attempt for any consumer to follow the option available at 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2), which requires a consumer reporting agency to actually contact the original source of public records information (e.g. the Court clerk) immediately before furnishing a report which includes such information. Title 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2) is thus inapplicable to the consumer reports at issue in this case. 28. Intellicorp knew or should have known about their legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission. 29. Intellicorp obtained or had available substantial written materials that apprised them of their duties under the FCRA. 30. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Intellicorp acted consciously in breaching their known duties and deprived Mr. Thomas and other members of the class of their rights under the FCRA. 31. Mr. Thomas alleges that Intellicorp's conduct as alleged herein was consistent with its established and systematically executed procedures and policies for compliance with the 32. Mr. Thomas reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 33. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Thomas brings this action for himself and on behalf of a class (the "1681k Class") initially defined as follows: a. All natural persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) (i.) who were the subject of a report prepared by Intellicorp and sold to a third party (ii.) issued within the five years preceding this case and during its pendency (iii.) that was furnished for an employment purpose, and (iv.) to whom Intellicorp did not place in the United States mail postage pre-paid, on the day they furnished any part of the report, a written notice that they were furnishing the subject report and containing the name of the person that was to receive the report. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, directors of Intellicorp, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. 34. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. The names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through documents maintained by the Intellicorp, and the Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 35. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. Without limitation, the total focus of the litigation will be Intellicorp' uniform conduct and procedures, whether Intellicorp sent the required notices, when they did so and whether Intellicorp acted willfully in their failure to design and implement procedures to assure compliant delivery and/or timing of these notices. Even the appropriate amount of uniform statutory and/or punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. §1681n is a common question. 36. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Mr. Thomas's claims are typical of the claims of each Class member. Mr. Thomas seeks only statutory and punitive damages. In addition, Mr. Thomas is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other members of the Class. 37. Adequacy. Mr. Thomas is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class he seeks to represent, he has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and he intends to prosecute this action vigorously. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a(4). Mr. Thomas and his Counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. 38. Superiority. Questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The statutory and punitive damages sought by each member are such that individual prosecution would prove burdensome and expensive given the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Intellicorp' conduct. It would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the courts. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues raised by Intellicorp's conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based upon a single set of proof in just one case. 39. Injunctive Relief Appropriate for the Class. Class certification is appropriate because Intellicorp has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate equitable injunctive relief with respect to Mr. Thomas and the Class members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 40. Intellicorp's failure to timely provide the required FCRA notices to the Mr. Thomas and other members of the putative class violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1). 41. The conduct, action, and inaction of Intellicorp was willful, rendering Intellicorp liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 42. Mr. Thomas and other members of the putative class are entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees as well as appropriate equitable relief from Intellicorp in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 43. As a result of these FCRA violations, Intellicorp are liable to Mr. Thomas and to each Class Member, for statutory damages from $100.00 to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A), plus punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2), and for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to § 1681n. 44. Mr. Thomas reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 45. Intellicorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to establish or to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of the consumer report they furnished regarding the Mr. Thomas. 46. As a result of this conduct by the Intellicorp, the Mr. Thomas suffered actual damages, including without limitation, by example only and as described herein on his behalf by counsel: loss of employment, damage to reputation, embarrassment, humiliation and other emotional and mental distress. 47. Intellicorp's violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) were willful, rendering Intellicorp liable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. In the alternative, the Intellicorp was negligent entitling the Mr. Thomas to recover under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 48. The Mr. Thomas is entitled to recover actual damages and/or statutory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees from the Intellicorp in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and § 1681o. WHEREFORE, Mr. Thomas and the Class Members pray for relief as follows: a. That an order be entered certifying the proposed Classes under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Mr. Thomas and his counsel to represent the Classes; b. That judgment be entered for Mr. Thomas individually against Intellicorp for actual and/or statutory damages and punitive damages for violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n; c. That judgment be entered for the class against Intellicorp for statutory damages and punitive damages for violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681k(a) and 1681g(a) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. That the Court award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n; and, d. That the Court grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

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14. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-13 as if fully re-stated herein. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) 15. That by letter dated October 18, 2013 defendant wrote to plaintiff in an attempt to collect a defaulted debt. 16. That in the letter defendant stated that the original creditor of the debt is Credit One Bank, NA. 17. That in the letter defendant stated that the current creditor of the debt is LVNV Funding, LLC. 18. That in the letter defendant stated that the balance of the debt is $1,193.47. 19. That in the heading of the letter, defendant stated, in pertinent part: 30. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-29 as if fully re-stated herein. 31. That by failing to inform plaintiff in its collection letter dated October 18, 2013 that the statute of limitations on the debt had expired, defendant failed to disclose relevant information to plaintiff that would have necessarily influenced plaintiff’s decision as to whether to pay the debt or any portion of it. 32. That by making the settlement offer to plaintiff, defendant encouraged plaintiff to waive his defense to a lawsuit on the statute of limitations ground. 33. That by making the settlement offer to plaintiff without also disclosing that the statute of limitations for the filing of a lawsuit for the debt had expired, defendant attempted to deceive plaintiff into believing that there is a legally enforceable obligation to pay the debt. 34. That defendant knew that if plaintiff paid any portion of the debt, plaintiff would have waived the defense of the statute of limitations. 35. That defendant knew that if plaintiff paid any portion of the debt, plaintiff would have made himself liable to be sued for the debt all over again. 36. That, moreover, in as much as defendant sent its letter to plaintiff’s address in Staten Island, New York, defendant had a duty to include the information regarding the statute of limitations required by the Administrative Code of the City of New York and the Rules of the City of New York. 37. That, upon receipt of defendant’s letter, plaintiff did not know the legal effect of paying the debt or any portion of it. - 6 - 38. That, upon receipt of defendant’s letter, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the legal effect of paying the debt or any portion of it. 39. That, upon receipt of defendant’s letter, the least sophisticated consumer would believe that she had a legally enforceable obligation to pay the debt. 40. That defendant’s failure to state in its collection letter that the debt is beyond the statute of limitations for the filing of a lawsuit is a false representation of the legal status of the debt and is therefore in violation of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, § 1692e(2)(A). 41. That defendant’s inclusion of the settlement offer in its collection letter without stating that the debt is beyond the statute of limitations also constitutes a false representation of the legal status of the debt and is also in violation of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, § 1692e(2)(A). 42. That defendant’s inclusion of the settlement offer in its collection letter without stating that the debt is beyond the statute of limitations constitutes a false, deceptive and misleading means used by defendant in its attempt to collect the debt and is in violation of the FDCPA, including but not limited to §§ 1692e and 1692e(10). - 7 - 43. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 to 42 as if fully re-stated herein. 44. That defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to effect its collection of plaintiff’s alleged debt with reasonable care. 45. That defendant’s offer of settlement in its collection letter without stating that the debt is beyond the statute of limitations shows a lack of exercise of reasonable care in defendant’s collection of the alleged debt. 46. That defendant breached its duty to collect plaintiff’s alleged debt with reasonable care. 47. That defendant’s offer of settlement in its collection letter without stating that the debt is beyond the statute of limitations constitutes a deceptive act and practice. 48. That said deceptive act and practice was committed by defendant in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of a service in New York State and constitutes a violation of NYGBL § 349. 49. That defendant’s deceptive act and practice is consumer-oriented, in that each of the letters in which defendant makes settlement offers while failing to disclose that the statute of limitations for suing on the debt has expired is a form collection letter which defendant sends to hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers in New York State each month. 50. That defendant’s letters have a broad impact on consumers at large whose accounts are placed with defendant for collection. - 8 - 51. That upon reading defendant’s collection letter, plaintiff did not know and could not know that the statute of limitations for suing him to make him pay any portion of the debt had already expired. 52. That upon reading defendant’s collection letter, plaintiff did not know and could not know that the legal effect of paying a portion of the debt would be to revive the statute of limitations to be sued. 53. That the information which defendant failed to disclose would necessarily have influenced plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer in deciding whether to pay the debt or to accept defendant’s settlement offer. 54. That, therefore, defendant’s statements in its letter to plaintiff are deceptive and misleading in a material way. 55. That plaintiff is a reasonable consumer within the meaning of the NYGBL and acted reasonably under the circumstances of this case. 56. That plaintiff suffered surprise, irritation, agitation, confusion, emotional distress, anxiety and a sense that defendant had sought to deceive him into paying or settling a debt for which he could not be sued. 57. That defendant violated NYGBL § 349(a) and is liable to plaintiff pursuant to NYGBL § 349(h). - 9 - 58. That plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1-57 as if fully re-stated herein. 59. That this action is brought on behalf of plaintiff and the members of a class. The class consists of all persons who defendant’s records reflect were sent debt collection letters within the State of New York within the period of time commencing one year before the filing of this complaint up to and including the date of the filing of the complaint and who were sent a collection letter (a) in substantially the same form as the letter sent to plaintiff dated October 18, 2013; (b) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a consumer debt for which, as of the date of the collection letter, the current creditor was LVNV Funding, LLC. and the original creditor was Credit One Bank, NA.; (c) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (d) the letter contained the above violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). The class shall be further defined as follows: All natural persons with addresses in the State of New York to whom defendant sent a collection letter which contained a settlement offer and which stated that the current creditor was LVNV Funding, LLC. and the original creditor was Credit One Bank, NA, where a lawsuit to collect the debt was beyond the applicable statute of limitations and in which collection letter defendant failed to state that the statute of limitations had expired, from one year before the filing of this complaint to the date of filing inclusive. 60. That the class does not include defendant or persons who are officers, directors, or employees of defendant. - 10 - 61. That pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: (A) Based on the fact that the collection letter that is the gravamen of this litigation is a mass-mailed form letter, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, thousands of persons have received similar debt collection letters from defendant which violate the various provisions of the FDCPA. (B) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether defendant violated the FDCPA including but not limited to §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) by failing to state in its collection letters which make settlement offers on time-barred debts that the applicable statute of limitations to be sued on the debts had expired. NYGBL § 349

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13. Since the beginning of his presidency, President Trump has pursued a cruel anti- immigrant agenda that has sought to vilify and scapegoat immigrants. President Trump has repeatedly made derogatory comments about immigrants, calling undocumented immigrants “animals,” saying, “You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people, these are animals . . . .”1 He further referred to undocumented immigrants as an “infestation” and compared immigrants and refugees to a “snake” that will “bite[]” those who help it.2 15. In January 2018, President Trump claimed so-called “sanctuary cities” were “the best friends of gangs and cartels.” In March 2018, the Trump Administration sued the State of California to enjoin three state laws that protect immigrants and limit the information that state officials may share with federal immigration enforcement authorities. In April 2018, Trump made derogatory comments about sanctuary cities in California, saying “many Sanctuary areas want OUT of this ridiculous, crime infested & breeding concept.”3 16. Similarly, on April 12, 2019, President Trump confirmed reports that his administration was planning to send undocumented immigrants to “Sanctuary Cities,” tweeting: “Due to the fact that Democrats are unwilling to change our very dangerous immigration laws, we are indeed, as reported, giving strong considerations to placing Illegal Immigrants in Sanctuary Cities only.”4 17. Defendant Wolf has echoed the President’s views. In December 2019 he stated, “[S]anctuary policies do not protect communities, they endanger them,” and referred to such policies as “devastating.” On January 15, 2020, he tweeted, “There has been a complete breakdown of law & order in New York City. NYC proudly passed sanctuary city laws & bragged about it for months. But now they, & more importantly, the citizens of NYC are facing the deadly consequences of the sanctuary policies.”5 19. In stark contrast to the Trump Administration, New York officials have sought to protect immigrant communities from hyper-aggressive and unwarranted enforcement measures, both as a matter of respect and to promote public safety. 20. In June 2019, New York State enacted the Driver’s License Privacy and Protection Act, commonly referred to as the “Green Light Law.” That law, which went into effect on December 14, 2019, authorizes the issuance of standard driver’s licenses regardless of citizenship status. 21. Concerned about the Trump Administration’s attacks on immigrants and its pattern of seeking to coerce states into engaging in federal immigration enforcement, New York State chose to include in its Green Light Law restrictions on access to databases that are maintained by its Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) and that contain certain information about those applying for driver’s licenses. Specifically, absent a judicial warrant, the Green Light Law bars access to DMV-maintained records by “any agency that primarily enforces immigration law,” including CBP and ICE. The Global Entry Program 22. The federal government operates several programs designed to expedite border crossings for vetted and approved travelers. Referred to generally as “Trusted Traveler Programs,” the best known of these programs is Global Entry. 24. The federal government has approved millions of people to participate in Global Entry, including qualifying U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and citizens of 11 other countries with whom CBP has made certain arrangements.6 Membership in Global Entry includes the TSA PreCheck benefit, which expedites traveler screening through domestic airport security checkpoints. 25. DHS established Global Entry and the other Trusted Traveler Programs pursuant to a statute directing the Secretary of DHS to “establish an international registered traveler program” in order to “expedite the screening and processing of international travelers, including United States Citizens and residents, who enter and exit the United States.” 26. In requiring DHS to create the program, Congress found that expediting “the travel of previously screened and known travelers across the borders of the United States should be a high priority” and that the “process of expediting known travelers across the borders of the United States can permit inspectors to better focus on identifying terrorists attempting to enter the United States.” 28. In June 2008, CBP began operating a pilot Global Entry program, which was successful. According to the agency’s analysis of the pilot program, “The increased volume of traffic to the kiosks by proven low-risk travelers allows CBP officers more time and resources to address higher risk security concerns” and thereby improve overall security. 29. CBP issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish Global Entry as permanent program on November 19, 2009 and published a final rule on February 6, 2012. Global Entry has since been available across the country. 30. Consistent with the congressional mandate to maximize participation in the program, the eligibility criteria for applying for the program are broad. Specifically, the program is open to any U.S. citizen, U.S. national, U.S. lawful permanent resident, and “‘nonimmigrant aliens’ from countries that have entered into arrangements with CBP concerning international trusted traveler programs.” Additionally, any applicant under the age of 18 must have the consent of a parent or legal guardian. All applicants must have a valid “machine-readable passport, a valid machine readable U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident Card (Form I-155), or other appropriate travel document as determined by CBP.” 31. Global Entry’s criteria do not require applicants to have a driver’s license, a driving record, or even residence in the United States. 32. Under these criteria, upon information and belief, millions of New York residents are eligible to apply for Global Entry. 34. A non-refundable fee of $100 is required with each completed application to submit the application. 35. Once they have submitted their applications, applicants undergo a multi-prong screening process. As part of that process, CBP routes the applications to a vetting center where their biographic information contained in the applications is queried against 21 different data systems, including: a. UPAX, a consolidated database that includes information to help identify “potential terrorists, transnational criminals, and other persons who pose a higher risk of violating U.S. law”; b. TECS, data repository that supports “law enforcement ‘lookouts,’ border screening, and reporting for CBP’s primary and secondary inspection processes”; c. IDENT, which stores and processes biometric data “to establish and verify identities,” including biometric information from INTERPOL; d. The FBI’s National Crime Information Center’s Interstate Identification Index, an automated database that integrates criminal history records from federal, state, local, tribal, and certain foreign criminal justice agencies; and e. TSDB, a consolidated database maintained by FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center that “provides information about those known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.” 37. After the vetting process, if CBP conditionally approves the application, the applicant is notified to schedule an interview at an approved Global Entry Enrollment Center or certain international airports upon arrival in the United States. 38. On the date of the scheduled interview, the applicant is required to bring their application documents and one other form of identification, like a government-issued identification card. At the interview, CBP conducts a personal interview, obtains biometric information (including a set of fingerprints and a digital photograph), and addresses any additional eligibility questions. 39. Once an application is approved, the new member receives a Global Entry card. Membership in the Global Entry program lasts for a period of 5 years so long as the application is not suspended or terminated by CBP. 40. Global Entry program members may renew their enrollment beginning one year prior to the expiration of the five-year membership. If the member submits a renewal application before their prior Global Entry membership expires, that applicant is allowed to use their Global Entry card for up to six months after the membership application date regardless of whether the card expires, in case the renewal does not get processed prior to expiration. 42. The background-check requirements that CBP imposes on Global Entry applicants who are foreign nationals living outside the U.S. vary by country. For example, applicants who are resident in Taiwan must “obtain a Police Criminal Record Certificate from their local Taiwan Police Department,” but there is no such requirement on applicants living in Panama. 43. Upon information and belief, CBP has approved Global Entry applications from non-residents — including both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens — residing in jurisdictions that do not share with the defendants the particular information that they now purport CBP requires to determine the Global Entry eligibility of New York residents. DHS Bans All New York Residents from Global Entry and Other TTPs. 44. In his State of the Union address on February 4, 2020, President Trump singled out New York for criticism because of efforts in the state to protect immigrants. The following day defendant Wolf announced on Fox News’s Tucker Carlson Tonight that he had sent a letter to New York officials immediately suspending enrollment and re-enrollment in Global Entry and other Trusted Traveler Programs (“TTPs”) for all New York State residents. 46. In announcing the New York Ban, defendant Wolf claimed banning New York’s nearly 20 million residents from applying for Global Entry was necessitated by the provision of the New York’s Green Light Law that bars immigration officials from accessing the state’s DMV records. In support of this sweeping action, however, the letter offers only one rationale: “The [Green Light Law] prevents DHS from accessing relevant information that only New York DMV maintains, including some aspects of an individual’s criminal history.” The letter does not identify the specific information it refers to and offers little explanation as to how losing access to that information affects the Global Entry vetting process. 47. Notably, this rationale does not apply to over 3.5 million New York residents for whom DMV maintains no records but who may otherwise be eligible to apply for Global Entry. 48. Most of defendant Wolf’s letter makes clear that DHS’s termination of Global Entry for New York residents is simply an attempt to force New York officials to cooperate in federal immigration enforcement by making DMV records available to ICE. While spending precious little time explaining any actual impact on Global Entry, defendant Wolf’s letter devotes substantial space to claiming that losing access to DMV records has impaired law-enforcement activities by ICE. 49. On February 6, 2020, CBP issued a press release entitled “New York Residents No Longer Eligible to Apply for or Renew Trusted Traveler Programs.” The release states: Effective immediately, . . . . New York residents will no longer be eligible to apply for or renew membership in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs and CBP will cancel all pending Trusted Traveler Program applications submitted by residents of New York. Refunds will be processed automatically. 51. New York State residents who attempt to enroll in the Global Entry program online now receive an error message and cannot complete their applications: 53. Upon information and belief, the New York Ban affects approximately 255,000 New York State residents. Over 80,000 residents — like named plaintiffs Lewis-McCoy and Dakwar — had pending applications for enrollment or reenrollment in Global Entry and other TTPs when the New York Ban went into effect. And by the end of 2020, approximately 175,000 New Yorkers who have been vetted and approved will be removed from TTPs, including Global Entry, because they now are barred from re-enrolling. Beyond those whose current enrollment or pending applications are immediately affected, the New York Ban bars millions of other New York residents — like named plaintiff Giammatteo — who might want to apply for the first time from doing so. 54. Upon information and belief, the curtailing of CBP access to New York’s DMV records has little if any effect on the agency’s ability to assess applicants for Global Entry. 55. As an initial matter, DMV possesses no records regarding millions of New York residents eligible to apply for Global Entry. Many New York residents do not drive and have never applied for a driver’s license. 56. As for those New York residents about whom DMV may possess records, upon information and belief many if not most of those records will contain no information that CBP itself would consider relevant to approval for Global Entry that it does not otherwise access through its other vetting processes. 58. Finally, before the passage of the Green Light Law, CBP may not have consistently accessed DMV records as part of its Global Entry vetting process. The plaintiffs are unaware of any reports or evidence establishing that CBP was using DMV records in this way. 59. Not only does the New York Ban bar millions of New York residents about whom DMV records contain little or no relevant information, it leaves the program open to persons about whom those records may contain considerable relevant information. Specifically, any person who moves out of New York — for instance to adjoining New Jersey, Connecticut, or Pennsylvania — becomes eligible to apply for Global Entry. A fact sheet provided to an applicant turned away from his interview at JFK International Airport on February 9 states, “If there has been a change in residence (outside i.e., [sic] if an applicant moves from the State of New York to a different state) applicants may reapply with their new information.” 60. Under the New York Ban, a U.S. citizen currently residing in New York could become eligible to apply by moving abroad and establishing residence in any foreign in country in the world, regardless of CBP’s ability to obtain intelligence regarding persons residing in the country. Similarly, under the ban, citizens of Argentina or Germany or India are eligible to apply for Global Entry if they reside in their home country, but would lose that eligibility if they moved to New York. 61. Neither DHS nor CBP has ever before singled out residents of just one state to ban them from Global Entry or any other Trusted Traveler Program. 63. As of the time of filing of this complaint, DHS has adopted a new force-of-law eligibility requirement — non-residence in New York — that governs the Global Entry program, without having followed the required notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Indeed, New York officials were surprised by the sudden announcement and did not have the opportunity to engage with DHS over its alleged concerns. 64. Addressing the New York Ban, Ken Cuccinelli, the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, warned other states about passing laws similar to New York: “I know that the state of Washington is looking at a law like New York’s ‘Green Light Law.’” He further threatened, “They should know that their citizens are going to lose the convenience of entering these Trusted Traveler Programs, just as New York’s did.” 65. Mr. Cuccinelli has also threatened New Yorkers’ future participation in the Transportation Security Administration PreCheck program, saying “PreCheck is not currently on the list (of affected programs), but that is all I'll say about that. It doesn't mean it can’t be in the future.” The Named Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Enroll in Global Entry R. L’Heureux Lewis-McCoy 66. Plaintiff R. L’Heureux Lewis-McCoy is a U.S. citizen who resides in New York, New York. He is an Associate Professor of Sociology of Education at the New York University Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development. 68. Mr. Lewis-McCoy has a valid, machine-readable U.S. passport and is eligible to apply for Global Entry. 69. Mr. Lewis-McCoy submitted a complete application for Global Entry online on October 21, 2019, and paid the required $100 application fee. His application was vetted and, upon information and belief, during the vetting process (and before the implementation of the Green Light Law), CBP had access the New York DMV information it claims it needs. Mr. Lewis-McCoy received his “conditional approval” to schedule an interview. 70. On November 5, 2019, Mr. Lewis-McCoy completed his in-person interview for his application for Global Entry at an approved enrollment center located on NYU’s campus. During the interview, Mr. Lewis-McCoy answered the agent’s routine questions like his name, date of birth, and the countries where he had travelled recently. The agent scanned a copy of his passport and his New York state driver’s license. She also took his picture and scanned his hand. Before the interview ended, the agent gave Mr. Lewis-McCoy her contact information and said that if he wanted to enroll his family in the program, as well, he could contact her and she would help enroll them. 72. Plaintiff Jamil Dakwar is a U.S. citizen who resides in New York, New York. He is the Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Human Rights Program, and an adjunct professor at Hunter College, Bard College, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice. 73. Mr. Dakwar is a frequent international traveler and wishes to enroll in the Global Entry to enjoy the convenience of expedited border processing when he returns to the United States. 74. Mr. Dakwar has a valid, machine-readable U.S. passport and meets is eligible to apply for Global Entry. 75. Mr. Dakwar submitted his Global Entry application online on January 9, 2020, and paid the required $100 application fee. 76. Upon information and belief, Mr. Dakwar’s application has been cancelled. John Harland Giammatteo 77. Plaintiff John Harland Giammatteo is a U.S. citizen who lives in New York, New York. He is an immigration attorney in New York City. 78. Mr. Giammatteo is a frequent international traveler who wishes to enroll in Global Entry to benefit from expedited processing times at the airport. In addition, he believes that Global Entry membership would result in more predictable travel times, which would allow him to save time and plan his work and personal schedules more efficiently. 79. Mr. Giammatteo has a valid, machine-readable U.S. passport and is eligible to apply for Global Entry. 81. This case is brought as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all New York State residents whose applications to enroll or re-enroll in Global Entry were pending at the time of the New York Ban or who otherwise intend to enroll or re-enroll in Global Entry. 82. The proposed class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to federal officials, approximately 80,000 New York State residents had applications to enroll in Global Entry and other TTPs pending when the defendants barred all the state’s residents from the programs, and approximately 175,000 others will be barred from applying to re-enroll in 2020 as their memberships expire. In addition, there are potentially tens or hundreds of thousands of other New York residents who may wish to apply for Global Entry. 84. The named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class with respect to the legality of the agency action at issue. 85. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. They have suffered injury from the agency action at issue and are ready, willing, and able to serve as class representatives. 86. Proposed class counsel has extensive experience litigating similar matters on a class-wide basis. 87. The New York Ban applies generally to the entire class, so that final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class. 91. The defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint are “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 92. The defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, [and] limitations, [and] short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 93. The defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint are “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 94. The defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Trump Administration’s Retaliation Against Jurisdictions that Do Not Enforce Its Anti-Immigrant Agenda Violations of the Administrative Procedure Act Violation of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

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14. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 16. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect and/or has purchased debts. 17. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 18. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f. 19. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 22. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 23. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 24. Some time prior to May 10, 2021, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to non-party Odessa Physician Assoc PL (“Odessa”). 25. The obligation arose out of transactions incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, specifically medical services. 26. The alleged Odessa obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 27. Odessa is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 28. According to Defendants’ letter, Cascade is the current creditor of the Odessa debt. 29. Cascade collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or other creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. 30. Cascade is a debt buyer. 31. Cascade purchases or otherwise acquires consumer debt from creditor(s). 32. Cascade then collects the consumer debt, hires a third party to collect the consumer debt, or hires an attorney to pursue collection litigation in connection with the consumer debt. 33. Debt Recovery was collecting the Odessa account on behalf of Cascade. 35. Debt Recovery collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – May 10, 2021 Collection Letter 36. On or about May 10, 2021, Defendants sent Plaintiff a collection letter regarding the alleged debt. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. 37. The letter states that “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, the current creditor cannot sue you for it.” 38. The letter further states, “Should you choose to make a payment for less than the discount offer it may be considered a partial payment and may re-start the statute of limitations”. 39. This statement is false, since under applicable law, the statute of limitations on the alleged debt cannot be restarted by making a payment at all. See, Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.307(d). 40. Plaintiff was misled as to her rights. 41. Plaintiff was misled into believing that making a partial payment or promise to pay could restart the statute of limitation. 42. Plaintiff could have made a partial payment to reduce the balance without fear that doing so would restart the statute of limitations. 43. Plaintiff was prevented from acting this way due to Defendants’ improper statements in the Letter. 44. Defendants’ actions were false, deceptive, and/or misleading. 45. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendants’ violations. 47. Plaintiff was therefore unable to evaluate her options of how to handle this debt. 48. Because of this, Plaintiff expended time, money, and effort in determining the proper course of action. 49. Plaintiff was hesitant to make a partial payment due in part to Defendants’ false claim that such a payment would restart the statute of limitation. 50. In addition, Plaintiff suffered emotional harm due to Defendants’ improper acts. 51. These violations by Defendants were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and the Defendants did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 52. Defendants’ collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action for the collection of any consumer debt. 53. Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its collection efforts were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendants’ collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately respond to Defendants’ demand for payment of this debt. 54. Defendants’ actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendants’ debt collection. 55. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. 57. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 58. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 59. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 60. Defendants violated said section as described above, by making false or misleading representations in violation of §§ 1692e, 1692e (2)(A), 1692e (5) & 1692e (10). 61. By reason thereof, Defendants is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 62. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 63. Alternatively, Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 64. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 66. By reason thereof, Defendants is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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41. Defendants own and/or operate as Sevens Home Care, an enterprise located in Denver County, Colorado. 42. Sevens Home Care is a company headquartered in Denver, Colorado, that offers in-home healthcare services to individuals in need of such services. 43. In October 2017, Plaintiff began her employment with Defendants as a Home Health Aide, performing in-home companionship services for Defendants’ clients. 44. In her work for Defendants, Plaintiff’s job duties included, but were not limited to, caring for clients in their homes, cooking meals for them, ensuring they took their medications, getting their groceries, helping them with incontinence, changing bedsheets, helping them eat, and bathing them. 45. At all relevant times during her employment, Defendants paid Plaintiff on an hourly basis at a rate of $12.50 or a flat daily rate, regardless of the number of hours she worked in week. 46. Plaintiff regularly worked approximately 50 hours per week in her employment with Defendants. At no time did Plaintiff receive one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek. 47. At times, the hours Plaintiff worked for Defendants substantially exceeded 50 hours in a given workweek. Nonetheless, Defendants did not pay overtime for such time that exceeded 40 hours. 49. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members were non-exempt employees. 50. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members did not have the authority to hire or fire other employees, nor were their suggestions or recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change in status of other employees given particular weight. 51. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members’ primary duty was not the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Defendants’ customers. 52. In their work for Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members’ primary duty did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 53. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time that they suffered or permitted Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 55. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of failing to accurately, if at all, record the time during which Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the Collective Members to work. As such, Plaintiffs’ time records understate the duration of time each workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs to work. 56. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Members the applicable overtime wage rate for such hours worked, Defendants have violated 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 57. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay to Plaintiff and the Collective Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, would violate federal law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA overtime wage requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 58. Defendants have and continue to willfully violate the FLSA by not paying Plaintiff and the Collective Members one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 61. Plaintiff asserts those claims on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all similarly situated employees employed by Defendants, who were not paid all compensation required by the FLSA during the relevant time period as a result of Defendants’ compensation policies and practices. 62. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on her own behalf and as a representative of the similarly situated Collective Members who are current and former Companion/Homemakers, Home Health Aides, and Certified Nurse’s Aides (“CNAs”) who are not or were not paid one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted them to work, in violation of pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), who agree in writing to join this lawsuit seeking recovery under the FLSA. 64. Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked more than forty (40) hours in a given workweek without being compensated at a rate equal to one and one-half their regular rates of pay for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) during that workweek. 65. Although Defendants permitted and/or required the Collective Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants have denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40) in a given workweek. 66. The Collective Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff. 67. The Collective Members are employees of Defendants. 68. The Collective Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay. 69. The Collective Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of job title, job duties, pay structure, and/or the denial of overtime. 70. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Collective Members. 71. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to her pay, are typical of the experiences of the Collective Members. 72. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Collective Member does not prevent collective treatment. 74. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the Collective Members, the damages for the Collective Members can be easily calculated by a simple mathematic formula. The claims of all Collective Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by the Defendants that caused harm to all of the Collective Members. 75. Plaintiff seeks to notify the following employees of their rights under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to join this action by filing in this Court written notice of their consent to join this action: All current and former Companion/Homemakers, Home Health Aides, and Certified Nurse’s Aides (“CNAs”) who were employed by Defendants at any time starting three years before this Complaint was filed, up to the present. 76. The FLSA provides for a three-year statute of limitations for causes of action arising out of a willful violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255. As alleged above, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees’ claims arise out of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA. Accordingly, the Court should require appropriate notice of this action be given to all such employees employed by Defendants within three years from the filing of this Complaint. 77. Upon information and belief, Defendants have employed more than 100 such employees during the period relevant to this action. 79. Because these similarly situated employees are readily identifiable by Defendants and may be located through their records, they may be readily notified of this action and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their FLSA claims. 80. Collective adjudication is appropriate in this case because the employees whom Plaintiff wishes to notify of this action have been employed in positions similar to Plaintiff, have performed work similar to Plaintiff, and have been subject to compensation practices similar to those to which Plaintiff have been subjected. 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 82. At all relevant times, Defendants have required Plaintiff and the Collective Members to perform labor each shift while not clocked in (“off-the-clock”). This practice most commonly, though not exclusively, occurred when Plaintiff and the Collective Members have neared 40 hours worked in a given workweek and ostensibly in order to avoid paying Plaintiff and the Collective Members overtime. 83. During such time, Defendants either did not record, or shaved from records, the time that Plaintiff or the Collective Members worked, and Defendants have not compensated Plaintiff or the Collective Members for such time that they worked. 85. As a result, Defendants violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 UNPAID OVERTIME

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14. Screening Solutions is among the biggest of this nation’s employment background screening companies, i.e., those that provide “consumer reports,” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B), to prospective employers. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (Class Claim, against Target only) 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (Individual Claim, against First Advantage LNS Screening Solutions, Inc. only) 15. Pursuant to a contract with Target, Screening Solutions has been performing a background review of Target job applicants using the particular elements chosen by Target from Screening Solutions’ offered products. Besides choosing the particular product elements to be included in a standard screen, Target also chose the order in which the various elements would be applied, so that a standard screen performed by Screening Solutions would progress automatically through the chosen hierarchy of elements. In this way, a passing score at one stage was programmed to lead to the next stage and a failing score at any stage would result in an end to the screen and a score of “In-Eligible for Hire.” 17. Target used this screening protocol as a filter to weed out applicants scored by Screening Solutions as Ineligible for Hire. Those applicants passing the entire screen were treated by Target as eligible for hire; those failing to pass any element were scored “In-Eligible” and removed from consideration for employment. 18. The particular scoring hierarchy used by Screening Solutions for Target was based on an “adjudication matrix” negotiated between the two companies. With regard to customers using the scoring service, Screening Solutions personnel would adjudicate a job applicant based on this matrix. For example, upon information and belief, the Target matrix provided that an Esteem match, or an Esteem match meeting specified criteria, would trigger a score of “Ineligible for Hire.” 19. This “scoring” or “adjudication” service is attractive to Screening Solutions’ large-chain customers like Target who are constantly hiring and promoting in very large volumes, providing the customer with a remote, outsourced tool to make its employment decisions rapidly and efficiently. 20. According to Screening Solutions, Esteem was a “Retail Theft Contributory Database” that “helps organizations identify applicants with history of theft or fraud.” It was a “membership-based contributory program [which] allows companies to legally share theft and fraud incident information.” 22. When an Esteem-participating employer “contributed” a new Esteem report to Screening Solutions, this submission consisted of two parts; first, a data transmission composed of several defined fields of information concerning the incident, and second, an electronic copy of a so-called “signed admission statement” regarding the incident. (Screening Solutions referred to this statement as a Verified Admission Statement or “VAS” and that term will be used hereafter.) 23. After receiving a new Esteem report from a customer, Screening Solutions would create an Esteem record in its database for that particular incident. The file maintained for a particular incident would consist of data pertaining to the identity of the consumer subject of the report; data about the specific incident; a classification by type of theft; and, an electronic image of the VAS. 24. While it was operational, Screening Solutions would create new Esteem files with the knowledge that the customer submitting an “admission statement” had likely not provided a copy to the employee and not disclosed to the employee at the time it was procured that the statement was going to be contributed into a nationwide theft database. In fact, Screening Solutions knew that many of its customers preferred keeping the entire Esteem system secret from its employees and made deliberate decisions not to interfere with its customers’ discretion in this regard. 26. For those customers, like Target, that used Screening Solutions’ scoring service to adjudicate the eligibility of the job applicant, a verified Esteem match would also prompt Screening Solutions to score the applicant Ineligible, in accordance with the Target adjudication matrix. 27. In March of 2012, a Maryland Target store selected Plaintiff Freckleton for hire as a Sales Floor Team Member, conditional on her clearing the Screening Solutions background search. Pursuant to its standard hiring practices, Target ordered a background screen of Plaintiff on or about March 23, 2012. 28. Screening Solutions conducted the background screen of Plaintiff on that same day, March 23, 2012. 29. After Screening Solutions determined that Plaintiff was drug-free and validated her Social Security number, it conducted a search of its Esteem database and discovered a match. In accordance with its standard procedures, Screening Solutions conducted a “verification” of the Esteem file, including in this determination a review of a VAS on file pertaining to a theft report contributed to Esteem by CVS about an incident that purportedly occurred in a CVS store in December, 2011. 31. Also in accordance with its standard practice, this rapid response by Screening Solutions to Target occurred prior to any communication with Plaintiff regarding the adverse action that had already happened. Several days after Screening Solutions transmitted the background report to Target, either Target, or Screening Solutions on behalf of Target, provided Plaintiff with a copy of the background report, along with a notice representing that the report might have an adverse effect on her application for employment. 32. While Plaintiff did not retain a copy of that mailing from Target or from Screening Solutions on behalf of Target, she recently obtained from Screening Solutions a copy of the consumer report that was included in that mailing. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 33. With regard to job applicants adjudicated as Ineligible for Hire based on an Esteem match and who were sent untimely pre-adverse action notices by either Target or Screening Solutions on behalf of Target, such notices never included copies of the Esteem VAS that Screening Solutions used to “verify” the Esteem match that was the basis of the “Ineligible” score. V. 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class defined as follows: All employees or applicants for employment of Defendant Target residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) who were the subject of a background report that scored them ”Ineligible for Hire,” beginning two years prior to the filing of this action and continuing to the resolution of this action, and for whom Target failed to provide the employee or applicant a copy of their consumer report or a copy of the FCRA summary of rights at least five business days before that determination. 36. Common Questions of Law and Fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. The common legal and factual questions include, among others: a) Whether Target failed to provide each employee or applicant for employment a copy of their consumer report at least five business days before it took an adverse action based upon the consumer report; b) Whether Target failed to provide each employee or applicant for employment a copy of their written notice of FCRA rights at least five business days before it took an adverse action based upon the consumer report; c) Whether Target acted willfully in disregard of the rights of employees and applicants in its failure to require its employees, automated systems and/or outside vendors to send consumers copies of all consumer reports relied on in classifying employment applicants as Ineligible for Hire, with a written statement of their FCRA rights, before such classification occurred. 37. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member. Plaintiff has the same claims for statutory and punitive damages that she seeks for absent class members. 39. Predominance and Superiority. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The statutory and punitive damages sought by each member are such that individual prosecution would prove burdensome and expensive given the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Target’s conduct. It would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the courts. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues raised by Target’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based upon a single set of proof in a unified proceeding. VI. 40. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations. 41. Plaintiff is a “consumer,” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 42. Screening Solutions background reports are “consumer reports” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 44. Under the FCRA, a “user” of a consumer report who intends to take an “adverse action” on a job application “based in whole or in part” on information obtained from the consumer report must provide notice of that fact to the consumer-applicant, and must include with the notice a copy of the consumer report and a notice of the consumer’s dispute rights under the FCRA, before taking the adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). After an adverse action occurs, the consumer employment applicant must receive a second notice, mandated by 15 U.S.C. §1681m. 45. The reasons for the “pre-adverse action” requirement with regard to employment situations are to alert the job applicant that she is about to be rejected based on the content of a report, and provide her an opportunity to challenge the accuracy or relevancy of the information with the consumer reporting agency or the user before that job prospect is lost. The FCRA provides that any person “using a consumer report for employment purposes” who intends to take any “adverse action based in whole or in part on the report,” must provide the consumer a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA, as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission, before taking such adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 46. For purposes of this requirement, an “adverse action” includes “any . . . decision . . . that adversely affects any current or prospective employee,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii), or “an action taken or determination that is . . . (I) made in connection with an application that was made by . . . any consumer, . . . and (II) adverse to the interests of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(v). 47. Defendant Target is a “person” that regularly uses background reports for employment purposes. 49. Target willfully violated section 1681b(b)(3) of the FCRA by providing Plaintiff and the members of the Class with the following items after, rather than before, it took adverse actions regarding applications for employment: (a) the required Pre-Adverse Action Notice; (b) a copy of the background report; and, (c) a written description of the consumer’s rights under the FCRA. As a result of this violation of the FCRA, Plaintiff and the Class members were denied the opportunity to review and dispute the report before Target took adverse action on their employment or promotion applications based on those reports. 50. Target also willfully violated section 1681b(b)(3) of the FCRA by never providing copies of the VAS to Plaintiff and those Class members whose adverse action was based on an Esteem match. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Freckleton and the Class pray for relief as follows: A. An order certifying the proposed Class under Rule 23 and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel of record to represent same; B. An award of statutory and punitive damages for Plaintiff and the Class; C. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; D. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and, E. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding allegations. 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) provides that: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 58. As a result of Defendant Screening Solutions’ violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), Plaintiff suffered intense emotional and reputational harm, being branded a thief in a nationwide database available to hundreds of her potential future employers. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Freckleton prays for the following relief, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n or 1681n, as follows: A. A finding that Screening Solutions negligently violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) as to Plaintiff Freckleton only; B. An award of actual damages; C. Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and, D. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. : SOLUTIONS , INC., f/k/a LEXISNEXIS :

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32. On February 12, 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 2790 (the “2790 Number”): 33. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 34. The link included in the text message led to a website operated by “Massage Green Spa of South Florida.”1 35. The webpage advertises “Valentine’s Day Specials” and promotes Defendants spa products. 2 37. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff a vehicle or refinancing for her current vehicle. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1). 38. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 39. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 40. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2790 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 2790 Number. 41. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 43. The text messages originated from telephone number 201-762-8081, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 44. The number used by Defendant is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 45. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 46. Specifically, the text message does not identify the intended recipient by name nor provide any identifiable characteristic of the intended recipient. Instead the text message is drafted so that it can be sent out en masse without variation. 47. Further, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 50. The telephone numbers Defendant called were assigned to a “cellular telephone service” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 51. Defendant is a seller because it is a person or entity on whose behalf telephone messages were initiated to encourage consumers to engage, purchase or transact in Defendant’s goods and services. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9). 52. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 53. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Classes defined as follows: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action until the date of a certification Order (1) were sent a text message to their cellular phone number by Defendant or its agent(s), (2) using the same equipment used to send the text messages to Plaintiff, (3) for the purpose of advertising Defendant’s goods or services, (4) without their prior express written consent or with the same purported consent Defendant claims to have obtained from Plaintiff, if any. 54. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes but believes the members of the Classes number in the several thousands, if not more. 57. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes. Among the questions of law and fact common to the various Classes are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 58. The common questions in this case subject to common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the members of the Classes will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 66. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class as prior express consent was either never obtained or was revoked at the time Defendant’s calls were made. 67. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 68. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 69. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Laura Wijesinha, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; a. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party; c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASSES Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (O.R.C. § 4111.03 — OHIO RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) 44. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 45. During her employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff Richardson worked as an office clerk filing documentation, answering phone calls, billing and performing related tasks from May 2016 until approximately July 2017. Named Plaintiff Richardson regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but was not paid one and one-half her regular rate (“overtime premium” or “overtime”) for hours she worked over 40 in any workweek. 46. During her employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff Sutherland worked as a home health aide providing companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in- home services from approximately August 2016 until approximately August 2017. Named Plaintiff Sutherland regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but was not paid one and one- half her regular rate (“overtime premium” or “overtime”) for hours she worked over 40 in any workweek. 48. During her employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff Camara worked as a home health aide providing companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in- home services beginning approximately in December 2016 and is still presently employed as of the date of this filing. Named Plaintiff Camara regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but was not paid one and one-half her regular rate (“overtime premium” or “overtime”) for hours she worked over 40 in any workweek. 49. During her employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiff Johnson worked as a human resources clerk providing office related tasks such as filing, answering phone calls, billing and related office tasks from approximately February 2017 until approximately July 2017. Named Plaintiff Johnson additionally worked as a home health aide providing companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in-home services from approximately February 2017 until approximately September 2017. Named Plaintiff Johnson regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but was not paid one and one-half her regular rate (“overtime premium” or “overtime”) for hours she worked over 40 in any workweek. 50. At all times relevant herein, the Named Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants as defined in the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 51. Subject to the elimination of a previous exemption, all Named Plaintiffs were hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants as defined in the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 53. During relevant times, Defendants suffered and permitted Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated to work more than forty (40) hours per workweek, while not compensating them for all such hours worked over forty (40) at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 54. Upon information and belief, Defendants, at all times relevant hereto, were fully aware of the fact that they were legally required to comply with the wage and overtime payment laws of the United States and of the State of Ohio, as well as record keeping laws of the State of Ohio. 55. During relevant times, Defendants had knowledge of and acted willfully in regards to their conduct described herein. 56. Defendants are in possession and control of necessary documents and information from which Named Plaintiffs would be able to precisely calculate damages. IV. 58. Examples of employees that may be members of the 216(b) Class include, but may not be limited to: home managers, support associates, caregivers, home health aides, aides, human resources clerks, administrative staff, office staff, and other employees who provided companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in-home services for Defendants. 59. Examples of employees that may be members of the 216(b) Class are in positions in the following departments of Defendants: home health aide services, skill nurse services, social work, rehabilitation services and human resources/administration. 60. Those 216(b) Class Members in the 216(b) Home Health Subclass who provided companionship services, domestic services, home care, and/or other in-home services were no longer exempt from the FLSA as of January 1, 2015. See FLSA of 1938, §13(a)(15), 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(15), (21); 29 C.F.R. §552.109(a), (c), 552.6; Dillow v. Home Care Network, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-612, 2017 WL 749196, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2017). 61. Other 216(b) Class Members in the 216(b) Hourly Employee Subclass such as human resources clerks and similar hourly employees were never subject to an exemption under the FLSA. 63. The identity of the putative 216(b) Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 64. The net effect of Defendants’ policies and practices is that Defendants willfully failed to pay overtime wages to save payroll costs. Thus, Defendants enjoyed substantial ill-gained profits at the expense of the Named Plaintiffs and §216(b) Class Members. B. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 Class Action for Unpaid Overtime Wages. 66. Examples of employees that may be members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class include, but may not be limited to: home managers, support associates, caregivers, home health aides, aides, human resources clerks, administrative staff, office staff, and other employees who provided companionship services, domestic services, home care, and other in-home services for Defendants. 67. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 68. The Named Plaintiffs are members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and their claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 69. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the Ohio Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 70. The Named Plaintiffs do not have an interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Ohio Rule 23 Class that they have undertaken to represent. 71. The Named Plaintiffs have retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 72. Questions of law and fact are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class. 74. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as a whole. 75. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 76. Questions of law and fact that are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the Ohio Rule 23 Class for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week; (b) whether Defendants kept accurate records of the amount of time the Ohio Rule 23 Class was working each day; (c) whether Defendants calculated the Ohio Rule 23 Class’ overtime rate of pay as required by the statute; (d) whether Defendants’ violations of the Ohio Wage Act were knowing and willful; (e) what amount of unpaid and/or withheld compensation, including overtime compensation, is due to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class on account of Defendants’ violations of the Ohio Wage Act; and (f) what amount of prejudgment interest is due to Ohio Rule 23 Class Members on the overtime or other compensation which was withheld or not paid to them. 78. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 79. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the 216(b) Class. 80. The FLSA requires that employees receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 81. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants employed the Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members. 82. The Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members were paid on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 83. The Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 84. Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at time-and-one-half times their regular rates for any hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 86. Defendants knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Defendants were doubtlessly aware of the January 1, 2015 exemption elimination for third party employers, yet Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which those Named Plaintiffs and 216(b) Class Members in the 216(b) Home Health Subclass who provided companionship services, domestic services, home care, and/or other in-home services are entitled. 87. In addition, Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which those Named Plaintiffs and 216(b) Class Members in the 216(b) Hourly Employee Subclass. 88. The exact total amount of compensation, including overtime compensation, that Defendants have failed to pay the Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in the possession of Defendants or were not kept by Defendants. 89. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, the Named Plaintiffs and the 216(b) Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Named Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of themselves and the 216(b) Class Members. 90. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 92. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendants, and Defendants are an employer covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio Law. 93. Ohio Law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 94. While employed by Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members in the Rule 23 Home Health Subclass worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for this time spent working since January 1, 2015. 95. While employed by Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members in the Rule 23 Hourly Employee Subclass worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for this time spent working during the past three years. 96. Defendants’ company-wide corporate policy of not paying time and a half for the hours that the Named Plaintiffs and Ohio Rule 23 Class Members worked over 40 each week resulted in unpaid overtime. 97. Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio Law. 99. For Defendants’ violations of O.R.C. § 4111.03, by which the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. The Named Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of themselves and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members. A. 216(b) Collective Action for Unpaid Overtime and Other Wages. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT 107. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 108. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers to maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek. See O.R.C. § 4111.08. See also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 et seq. 109. During all times material to this complaint, Defendants were covered employers, and required to comply with the Ohio Wage Act’s mandates. 110. Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members were covered employees entitled to the protection of the Ohio Wage Act. 111. During times material to this complaint, Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members by failing to properly maintain accurate records of all hours Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members worked each workday and within each workweek. 112. In violating the Ohio Wage Act, Defendants acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act provisions.

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18. Defendant operates a consumer loan company. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call individuals en masse promoting its services. On information and belief, Defendant obtained these telephone numbers (i.e., leads) by purchasing marketing lists containing consumers’ telephone numbers. 20. On or about April 15, 2019, Defendant twice contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone number via ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(l) without first obtaining Plaintiff’s written consent. Two additional calls were placed by Defendant on April 18, 2019. 21. Plaintiff’s cellular phone number has been included in the National Do Not Call Registry prior to 2019. 22. Plaintiff also was sent a text message on April 15, 2019. A true and correct copy of the text message from 424-383-5733 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 23. On information and belief, and based on the circumstances of the call as described above, Defendant called Plaintiff using an ATDS because there were pauses of several seconds and clicks before a live person started speaking. Plaintiff had no business relationship with Defendant, and Defendant is located over 2,000 miles from Plaintiff. 24. Due to the number and frequency of calls, it was obvious to Plaintiff that a computer was dialing his number. 25. Plaintiff understood the purpose of Defendant’s call was to have Plaintiff apply for a consumer loans offered by Defendant. 26. Plaintiff is the exclusive user of the cellular telephone that Defendant called. 28. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with prior express written consent to receive calls to his cellular telephone utilizing an ATDS and/or artificial or pre- recorded voice, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 29. Defendant’s call which utilized an ATDS invaded Plaintiff’s privacy and violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 30. Plaintiff has reason to believe Defendant has called, and continues to call, thousands of wireless telephone consumers to market its products and services without consent required by the TCPA. 31. In order to redress injuries caused by Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits certain unsolicited voice and text calls to cell phones. 32. On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all wireless telemarketing activities and an award of statutory damages to the Class members. 33. Plaintiff restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 34. Defendant made unsolicited and unauthorized calls using an ATDS to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Class. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 37. Defendant’s conduct invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. 38. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 39. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Class did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned telephone solicitations, and Defendant knowing and intentionally made the telephone solicitations to Plaintiff, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class. 40. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 42. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the class definition as the contours and parameters of the class become apparent through discovery in this matter. 43. Plaintiff and the Class members were harmed by Defendant’s acts in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid; and Plaintiff and Class members’ privacy was invaded. 44. The exact size of the Class is presently unknown but can be ascertained through a review of Defendant’s records, and it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief Defendant made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall within the definition of the Class. 45. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Class. 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. 49. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 50. This class action is appropriate for class certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class and making an award of damages and final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 51. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 53. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. 54. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. 55. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. 56. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. 57. Plaintiff restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 33 as though fully set forth herein. 58. Among other things, the TCPA and its accompanying regulations prohibit telemarketers from making telephone solicitations to persons who have listed their telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a database established to allow consumers to exclude themselves from telemarketing calls unless they consent to receive the calls in a signed, written consent. 60. Consumers who do not want to receive telemarketing calls may indicate their preference by registering their telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). 61. These registrations must be honored indefinitely, or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the database administrator. Id. 62. Because a telephone subscriber listed on the Registry must take an affirmative step to register his or her number, a telemarketer who wishes to call a person listed on the Registry must take a similarly affirmative step, and must obtain the registrant’s signed, written agreement to be contacted by the telemarketer. Id. § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii). The written agreement must also include the telephone number to which the calls may be placed. Id. 63. A person whose number is on the Registry and has received more than one telephone solicitation within any twelve-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the TCPA, can sue the violator and seek the greater of actual damages or $500, a figure that may be trebled for willful or knowing violations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 64. Telemarketers who wish to avoid calling numbers listed on the Registry can easily and inexpensively do so by “scrubbing” their call lists against the Registry database. The scrubbing process identifies those numbers on the Registry, allowing telemarketers to remove those numbers and ensure that no calls are placed to consumers who opt-out of telemarketing calls. 66. Regulations implementing the TCPA also require entities to maintain internal Do Not Call registries. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). Once an entity receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls, the number must be placed on the entity’s internal registry within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days from the date of the request. Id. at § (d)(3). 67. A seller of goods or services can be liable for TCPA violations even if the seller does not directly place or initiate the calls. 68. The provision that establishes a private right of action against an entity that violates the DNC Registry restrictions provides that “[a] person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection” may bring an action for damages and injunctive relief. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (emphasis added). Likewise, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3) provides that once a number is added to an entity’s internal Do Not Call registry, “the person or entity on whose behalf the telemarketing call is made will be liable for any failures to honor the do-not-call request.” 69. As explained by the FCC, the TCPA and its regulations “generally establish that the party on whose behalf a solicitation is made bears ultimate responsibility for any violations.” See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Mem. and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 12397 ¶ 13 (1995). 71. The FCC reaffirmed this in 2013, when it held that (a) a seller may, under principles of apparent authority, actual authority, and ratification, be liable for violations of § 227(c) by third parties, and (b) a seller may also be liable, under the express terms of § 227(c), for calls placed “on behalf of” the seller. In re Joint Pet. Filed by Dish Network, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013). 72. Between April 15, and April 19, 2019, Plaintiff received four telemarketing calls and a text message on his cellular telephone line, a number he had listed on the Do Not Call Registry prior to 2014 from Defendant. 73. These calls were placed in an effort to sell Plaintiff consumer loan services. 74. Because Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with a signed, written agreement to receive Defendant’s telemarketing calls, the calls violated the TCPA. 75. Plaintiff brings this Count pursuant to Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure individually and on behalf of: All persons whose telephone numbers were listed on the Do Not Call Registry, and to whom, during the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, more than one call within any twelve-month period was placed by or at the direction of, to promote the sale of Defendant’s services. Excluded from the class are employees and agents of Defendant as well as members of the judiciary. 77. The proposed class can be identified through telephone records and databases used in transmitting the telemarketing calls. 78. The number of class members is believed to be in the thousands, rendering the classes so numerous that individual joinder of all class members is impracticable. 79. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed class. 80. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the proposed Class, including but not limited to the following: a. Did Defendant place telemarketing calls to Plaintiff and class members? b. Is Defendant liable under TCPA § 227(c) for telemarketing calls? c. Were the calls placed under Defendant’s actual authority? d. Were the calls placed under Defendant’s apparent authority? e. Did Defendant ratify the illegal conduct by accepting the benefit of its illegally-generated business and failing to exercise its authority to end the violations? f. Were the calls placed for Defendant’s benefit, or on Defendant’s behalf? g. Did Defendant place telemarketing calls to persons on the National Do Not Call Registry? 81. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the classes. Like all class members, he received Defendant’s telemarketing calls on a number listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. 83. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 84. The likelihood that individual members of the class will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to pursue individual litigation; the low dollar-value of individual claims; the lack of an attorney fee-shifting provision in the TCPA; the fact that class members are unlikely to know that their rights have been violated; and the fact that few if any recipients of Defendant’s telemarketing calls have brought private TCPA enforcement actions against Defendant. 85. In violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), Plaintiff and all class members received telemarketing calls promoting the sale of Defendant’s services on cellular telephone lines listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. 86. Plaintiff and class members received more than one such call in a twelve- month period. 87. Defendant is liable for those violations under principles of actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification, and because the calls were placed on Defendant’s behalf and for their benefit. 89. On or about April 15, 2019, Plaintiff received a text message (“Text”) on his cellular telephone asking him to confirm he needs “$5,000.00 cash out.” A true and correct copy of the screen shot of the Text is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 90. The text identifies that it was sent from telephone number 424-383- 5733. Plaintiff is informed and believes, upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant sent text messages to consumers en masse. 91. The text is an advertisement of Defendant’s services containing automated content. 92. On information and belief, Defendant sent or transmitted, or had sent or transmitted on its behalf, the Text to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) and the FCC. Defendant’s system placed the Texts to Plaintiff automatically, using a list or database of telephone numbers, and dialing without human intervention. 93. Plaintiff never requested, desired, permitted, or otherwise provided his prior express consent to Defendant to send or transmit the Text or any other texts to his cellular telephone. 94. Plaintiff never provided his prior express written consent to Defendant to send or transmit the Text or any other advertisement or telemarketing to his cellular telephone. 95. As a result of receiving the Text, Plaintiff wasted data storage capacity, suffered the nuisance, waste of time, and aggravation that accompanies receipt of such unauthorized advertisements, and was subjected to an intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy. 97. On information and belief, Defendant sent text messages to the Class members using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 98. On information and belief, the Class members did not provide Defendant with prior express written consent to receive such text messages and, as a result, incurred expenses to their wireless services, wasted data storage capacity, suffered the aggravation that accompanies receipt of such unauthorized advertisements, and were subjected to an intrusion upon seclusion. UNSOLICITED TEXT MESSAGE VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. 227(C) — TELEMARKETING IN VIOLATION OF THE TCPA’S DO NOT CALL PROVISIONS VIOLATONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 FOR THE USE OF AN ATDS

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 27. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in June, 2020, in an attempt to purchase a product from the Defendant, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the goods, and services of the Website by being unable to learn more information about clothing, accessories and other products available online for purchase, as well as information relating to pricing, ordering merchandise, shipping, terms and conditions and return and privacy policies. 31. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes , similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 77. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 78. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 84. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 90. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(La. Civ. Code Art. 2315 – Conversion) (La. Rev. Stat. 23:635 – Unlawful Deductions) (La Civ. Code Art. 2298- Unjust Enrichment) (Violations of the FLSA – Failure to Pay Overtime) (Violations of the FLSA – Failure to Pay Correct Overtime Rate) 11. At all times material hereto, Defendant was an "enterprise engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the FLSA and had more than $500,000 in annual gross revenues. Defendant and its employees handle and work with materials that have traveled in interstate commerce, including trucks and tools manufactured outside the state of Louisiana. 12. Defendant classifies Plaintiffs and similarly-situated hourly employees as non- exempt and entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. 13. This lawsuit seeks relief under the FLSA on behalf of two classes of Plaintiffs who regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek for Defendant, but were not paid the proper overtime wages for all time worked. Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA are as follows: (a) Defendant designates a portion of the straight-time rate of Plaintiffs Bridges, Theophile, Chairs, and other similarly-situated individuals ("the Bridges Plaintiffs") as a purported "bonus." Defendant pays the Bridges Plaintiffs the specified "bonus" amount for every hour they work, but does not include the "bonus" amount when calculating their regular rate of pay for purposes of paying overtime under the FLSA; and (b) Defendant pays Plaintiff Calderon and other similarly-situated individuals ("the Calderon Plaintiffs") in cash, with no deductions for payroll taxes, and does not pay any overtime for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. Rather Defendant pays the Calderon Plaintiffs their straight-time rate of pay no matter how many hours they work in a workweek. 15. When the Calderon Plaintiffs worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendant did not pay them one and one-half (1 ½) times their regular rate of pay, but rather paid only their straight-time rate of pay for all hours worked. 16. Defendant has violated the rights of the Bridges Plaintiffs and the Calderon Plaintiffs by denying them compensation for all hours worked, including failing to pay overtime for hours worked over forty (40). 17. Defendant also has a common policy of imposing fines and making deductions from the wages of some Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated workers ("the Rule 23 Plaintiffs") for tardiness, absences, and alleged damage to tools, equipment, and customer property. (Exhibit B, Employee Points System). 18. As to tardiness, Defendant deducts $1.00 from the purported "bonus" of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs for every minute that they are late for work. (Exhibit B, Employee Points System). Defendant's policy states as follows: "Tardy or Late will result in $1 being withheld from bonus for each 1 minute absent." (Id.). 19. As to absences, Defendant deducts the full amount of the purported "bonus" of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs if they have an unscheduled absence. (Exhibit B, Employee Points System). In this respect, Defendant's policy states as follows: "No Call/No Show – employee loses bonus pay for the week." (Id.). 21. The above-referenced fines and deductions imposed by Defendant had the effect of reducing the overtime compensation of the Bridges Plaintiffs, the Calderon Plaintiffs, and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs in violation of the FLSA. 22. Defendant’s denial of legal wages and overtime compensation to the Bridges Plaintiffs, the Calderon Plaintiffs, and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs is, and has been, willful and deliberate. 23. The Bridges Plaintiffs bring their claims under Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as a collective action on behalf of themselves and all persons who have worked as non-exempt employees for Defendant during the period beginning three years prior to the filing date of the Complaint and who worked over 40 hours in one or more workweeks and received hourly overtime pay that was calculated based on regular rates that failed to include all non-excludable compensation under the FLSA, including the purported "bonus" which actually represents a portion of the employees' straight-time rate. 25. Defendant is liable to the Bridges Plaintiffs under the FLSA for, inter alia, not paying the correct overtime rate for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. The Bridges Plaintiffs consist of other similarly-situated individuals who have not received the correct overtime rate for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, and who would benefit from the issuance of Court-supervised notice and the opportunity to join this lawsuit. These similarly-situated individuals are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 26. The Calderon Plaintiffs bring their claims under Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as a collective action on behalf of themselves and all persons who have worked as non-exempt employees for Defendant and who were not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek during the period beginning three years prior to the filing date of the Complaint. 27. The Calderon Plaintiffs are similarly situated in that they have substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are subject to Defendant’s common practice, policy, or plan of only paying straight-time for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 29. The Rule 23 Plaintiffs bring the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and all other workers who have not received all wages owed as a result of Defendant's unlawful deduction policy, 30. The members of the proposed classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the size of the proposed classes is in excess of seventy (70) persons. 31. Plaintiffs Bridges and Theophile represent the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. Mr. Bridges and Mr. Theophile will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions and employment litigation, including wage and hour cases like this one. There is no conflict between Mr. Bridges, Mr. Theophile, and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members including, inter alia, the following: (i) whether Defendant converted wages and compensation owed to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs; (ii) whether Defendant unlawfully deducted sums from the wages owed to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs; and (iii) whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched by its unlawful deductions from the wages of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 34. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The Rule 23 Plaintiffs have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendant's common policy and practice. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would require. In addition, class litigation is superior because it will prevent unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about Defendant's practices. 35. This action is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the proposed classes. 36. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth. 37. The FLSA requires employers to pay all non-exempt employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 39. Thus, Defendant violated and continues to violate the FLSA by not paying the Bridges Plaintiffs at their required rate of pay, in addition to liquidated damages and interest for overtime not promptly paid in each paycheck for the applicable pay period. 40. Defendant’s conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 41. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, the Bridges Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their back overtime pay at the rate of one and a half times their applicable regular rate, in addition to an equivalent amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. The Bridges Plaintiffs also seek reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as provided by the FLSA. 43. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth. 44. The FLSA requires employers to pay all non-exempt employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 45. Defendant has violated the requirements of the FLSA by engaging in practices that have deprived the Calderon Plaintiffs of lawful compensation by inter alia, failing to pay overtime compensation for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 46. Defendant's conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 47. As a result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, the Calderon Plaintiffs are entitled to damages equal to the amount of all uncompensated time, including overtime pay, and an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid compensation owed under the 49. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth. 50. Defendant intentionally interfered with and exercised dominion and control over wages and compensation that the Rule 23 Plaintiffs had the legal right to possess as heretofore alleged. 51. As a result of Defendant’s violations of La. Civ. Code Art. 2315, the Rule 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the wages unlawfully withheld by Defendant, costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest pursuant to La. Civ. Code Art. 2315. 52. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth. 53. La. Rev. Stat. 23:635 prohibits employers from deducting any sum from their employees' wages, unless as permitted by law. 54. Defendant unlawfully made deductions from the wages of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs as heretofore alleged. 56. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of La. Rev. Stat. 23:635, the Rule 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages, penalty wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest under La. Rev. Stat. 23:632. 57. All Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth. 58. Additionally, and in the alternative, Defendant has enriched itself without cause as a result of making unlawful deductions to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' wages. 59. Defendant's enrichment was at the Rule 23 Plaintiffs' expense because they would have received the money owed had Defendant not intentionally and willfully violated federal and state wage laws through its policy of making unlawful deductions. 60. The Rule 23 Plaintiffs allege unjust enrichment in the alternative to their state-law conversion claims. 61. As a result of Defendant's willful violations of La. Civ. Code Art. 2298, the Rule 23 Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their unpaid wages, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest under La. Civ. Code Art. 2298.

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61. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) authorizes any participant or beneficiary of the Plan to bring an action individually on behalf of the Plan to obtain for the Plan the remedies provided by 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Plaintiff seeks certification of this action as a class action pursuant to this statutory provision and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 62. Plaintiff asserts his claims in Counts I–II on behalf of a class of participants and beneficiaries of the Plan defined as follows:13 All participants and beneficiaries of the SEI Capital Accumulation Plan at any time on or after September 27, 2012, excluding Defendants and employees with responsibility for the Plan’s investment functions. 63. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. The Plan had approximately 2,600 to 3,400 participants during the applicable period. 64. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class members’ claims. Like other Class members, Plaintiff is a Plan participant and suffered injuries as a result of Defendants’ mismanagement of the Plan. Defendants treated Plaintiff consistently with other Class members with regard to the Plan. Defendants’ imprudent and disloyal decisions affected all Plan participants similarly. 66. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members, including but not limited to: a. Which Defendants are fiduciaries of the Plan; b. Whether the Plan’s fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in the conduct described herein; c. Whether the Plan’s fiduciaries are additionally or alternatively liable, as co-fiduciaries, for the unlawful conduct described herein pursuant to 29 70. Defendants are fiduciaries of the Plan under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21) and 1102(a)(1). 71. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 imposes fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty upon the Defendants in their administration of the Plan and in their selection and monitoring of Plan investments. 72. The scope of the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of the Defendants includes managing the assets of the Plan for the sole and exclusive benefit of Plan participants and beneficiaries, defraying reasonable expenses of administering the Plan, and acting with the care, skill, diligence, and prudence required by ERISA. Defendants were directly responsible for selecting prudent investment options, evaluating and monitoring the Plan’s investments on an ongoing basis and eliminating imprudent ones, and taking all necessary steps to ensure that the Plan’s assets were invested prudently. This includes “a continuing duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones[.]” Tibble, 135 S. Ct. at 1829. 74. Each of the above-mentioned actions and failures to act described throughout the Complaint demonstrate Defendants’ failure to make Plan investment decisions based solely on the merits of each investment and in the interest of Plan participants. These failures were flagrant and intentional. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants’ conduct and decisions were driven by their desire to drive revenues and profits to SEI and to promote SEI’s business interests. Through these actions and omissions, the Defendants failed to discharge their duties with respect to the Plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the Plan, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the Plan, in violation of their fiduciary duty of loyalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). 75. Each of the above actions and omissions described in this Complaint further demonstrate that Defendants failed to discharge their duties with respect to the Plan with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would have used in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims, thereby breaching their duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 76. The foregoing fiduciary breaches resulted in millions of dollars in losses to the Plan. Further, SEI profited from these fiduciary breaches by receiving investment management fees they otherwise would not have received, as a result of Defendants’ imprudent and disloyal retention of SEI-affiliated funds in the Plan. 78. Each Defendant knowingly participated in each breach of the other Defendants, knowing that such acts were a breach, enabled the other Defendants to commit breaches by failing to lawfully discharge such Defendant’s own duties, and knew of the breaches by the other Defendants and failed to make any reasonable and timely effort under the circumstances to remedy the breaches. Accordingly, each Defendant is also liable for the losses caused by the breaches of its co-fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). 79. Defendants SEIC and the Plan Design Committee are fiduciaries of the Plan under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21) and/or 1102(a)(1). 80. Defendant SEIC had (and retains) ultimate authority over the management of the Plan. SEIC appointed members of the Design Committee, who appointed members of the Investment Committee and Administration Committee. SEIC also received periodic investment performance reports from the Investment Committee, and had the authority to receive periodic reports on other actions of the committee Defendants. SEIC had a fiduciary duty to monitor appointed fiduciaries. 82. A monitoring fiduciary must ensure that the monitored fiduciaries are performing their fiduciary obligations, including those with respect to the investment and monitoring of plan assets, and must take prompt and effective action to protect the plan and participants when the monitored fiduciaries fail to perform their fiduciary obligations in accordance with ERISA. 83. SEIC and the Design Committee breached their fiduciary monitoring duties by, among other things: a) Failing to monitor and evaluate the performance of the Plan’s fiduciaries or have a system in place for doing so, standing idly by as the Plan suffered substantial losses as a result of Defendants’ imprudent actions and omissions; b) Failing to monitor its appointees’ fiduciary processes, which would have alerted a prudent fiduciary to the breaches of fiduciary duties described herein; and c) Failing to remove fiduciaries whose performance was inadequate in that they continued to maintain investments that a prudent fiduciary would not have retained in the Plan, all to the detriment of the Plan and Plan participants’ retirement savings. 84. As a consequence of the foregoing breaches of the duty to monitor, the Plan suffered millions of dollars per year in losses due to investment underperformance. Breach of Duties of Loyalty and Prudence 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(B) Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries

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(29 U.S.C. § 207 - FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (O.R.C. § 4111.03 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (O.R.C. § 4113.15 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR OPPA VIOLATION) (VIOLATIONS OF RECORDKEEPING LAWS) 23. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated worked as hourly, non-exempt employees for Defendant. 24. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated held job titles which included, but are not limited to, technician2, operator, laborer, mechanic, supervisor, and crew leader (collectively referred to as “field technicians”). 26. Defendant required Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians to report to work prior to the scheduled start of their shifts to complete pre-shift duties. For example, Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were required to don personal protective equipment (“PPE”); retrieve hoses, clamps, and other equipment for the day’s work; load and strap down equipment on the vehicle; and review and complete paperwork for the day’s job. 27. With respect to pre-shift duties, Defendant maintained a policy or practice where it did not begin compensating field technicians until after their pre-shift duties were completed even though such duties were integral and indispensable to their job duties. If the field technicians reported to Defendant’s facility to complete the pre-shift duties, they were not compensated until they were in the vehicle and ready to leave for the job site. If the field technicians reported directly to the job site, they were not compensated until they finished their pre-shift duties. 28. These pre-shift duties were integral and indispensable to the principal job duties of Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians. The pre-shift duties constitute Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians first principal activity each day. 29. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians were not paid for the time spent completing their pre-shift duties. 31. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated post-shift duties include, but are not limited to, inspecting the vehicle for damage, filling the vehicle with gas, cleaning the vehicle, and unloading the equipment from the vehicle. 32. These post-shift duties were integral and indispensable to the principal job duties of Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians. The post-shift duties constitute Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians last principal activity each day. 33. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated field technicians were not paid for the time spent completing their post-shift duties. 34. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 35. Defendant’s supervisors log the field technicians time worked. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were only compensated for the time submitted by the supervisors. 36. Defendant instructed its supervisors to exclude all time spent performing pre- and post-shift duties. 37. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were only compensated for the time submitted by the supervisor, not their actual time worked. 38. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek, or they would have worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek if all of their compensable time was logged, but they were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) as a result of Defendant’s policy or practice to not compensate them for pre- and post-shift duties. 40. Defendant’s polices and/or practices of not compensating field technicians for pre- and post-shift work, apply to all of its hourly, non-exempt technicians. 41. This unpaid work performed by Named Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees constituted a part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit. 42. Moreover, this unpaid work was an integral and indispensable part of other principal activities performed by Named Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees as they cannot perform their work without performing their pre- and post-shift duties. 43. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were employees as defined in the FLSA, the Ohio Acts, and Ohio Constitution Art. 2 §34a. 44. Defendant is and has been an “employer” as that term is defined by the FLSA, the Ohio Acts, and Ohio Constitution Art. 2 §34a. 45. Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees for time spent working before and after their scheduled shifts as described herein. 46. As a result of Defendant’s common policy and/or practice described above, Named Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees have not been paid for all hours worked, resulting in overtime damages in one or more workweeks when they worked at least 40 hours during their employment. 48. Named Plaintiffs bring Count One of the action on their own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly-situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 49. The class which Named Plaintiffs seek to represent and for whom Named Plaintiffs seek the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Named Plaintiffs themselves are members, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former hourly, non-exempt field technicians3 of Defendant who worked at least 40 hours in any workweek during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the final disposition of this case (“FLSA Collective” or “FLSA Collective Members”). 50. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Named Plaintiffs, numerous current and former field technicians are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid overtime wages and damages. Named Plaintiffs are representative of those other field technicians and are acting on behalf of their interests, as well as their own, in bringing this action. 52. Named Plaintiffs bring their Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as a class action on behalf of themselves and all other members of the following class: All Ohio current and former hourly, non-exempt field technicians4 of Defendant who worked at least 40 hours in any workweek during the two years preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the final disposition of this case (the “Rule 23 Class” or the “Rule 23 Class Members”). 53. The Rule 23 Class includes all field technicians employed by Defendant who worked in the State of Ohio during the relevant time period above. 54. The Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 55. Named Plaintiffs are each members of the Rule 23 Class and their claims for unpaid wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Rule 23 Class. 56. Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Rule 23 Class. 57. Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Rule 23 Class that they have undertaken to represent. 58. Named Plaintiffs have retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Rule 23 Class. 59. Questions of law and fact are common to the Rule 23 Class. 61. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 62. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 63. Questions of law and fact that are common to the Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendant violated the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the Rule 23 Class for pre- and/or post-shift work performed; (b) whether Defendant kept accurate records of the amount of time the Rule 23 Class was working each day; (c) whether Defendant’s violations of the Ohio Wage Act were knowing and willful; (d) what amount of unpaid and/or withheld compensation, including overtime compensation, is due to Named Plaintiffs and other members of the Rule 23 Class on account of Defendant’s violations of the Ohio Wage Act; (e) whether the unpaid and/or withheld compensation remained unpaid in violation of the OPPA; and (f) what amount of prejudgment interest is due to Rule 23 Class members on the overtime or other compensation which was withheld or not paid to them. 65. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 66. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective Members against Defendant. 67. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective for integral and indispensable pre- and post-shift work performed each day violated the 74. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 75. This claim is brought under the Ohio Acts. 76. Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant, and Defendant is an employer covered by the overtime requirements under the Ohio Acts. 77. The Ohio Acts requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 78. While employed by Defendant, Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but they were not fully paid overtime wages for all such hours spent working as outlined above. 79. As a result of Defendant’s company-wide corporate policies, it failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members all overtime wages earned resulting in unpaid overtime. 81. Defendant’s repeated, knowing failure to pay overtime wages to the Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members were violations of O.R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendant willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled. 82. For Defendant’s violations of O.R.C. §4111.03, Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. Named Plaintiffs seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class Members. 83. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 84. Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant. 85. During relevant times, Defendant was an entity covered by the OPPA and Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant within the meaning of the OPPA. 86. The OPPA requires that the Defendant pay Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members all wages, including unpaid overtime, on or before the first day of each month, for wages earned by them during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month, for wages earned by them during the last half of the preceding calendar month. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(A). 88. Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members’ unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 89. In violating the OPPA, Defendant acted willfully, without a good faith basis and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. 90. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 91. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4111.08, 4111.14(G) & (H), and Article II, Section 34a of the Ohio Constitution require employers to maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek. See also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 et seq. 92. During times material to this complaint, Defendant was a covered employer, and required to comply with the Ohio’s Recordkeeping laws. 93. Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members were covered employees entitled to the protection of Ohio’s Recordkeeping laws. 94. During times material to this complaint, Defendant violated Ohio’s Recordkeeping laws with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members by failing to properly maintain accurate records of all hours Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members worked each workday and within each workweek. 95. In violating Ohio’s Recordkeeping laws, Defendant acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable recordkeeping provisions. V.

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10. Green Eggs Cafe operates three restaurants in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and one restaurant near Miami, Florida. 11. From approximately May 2017 through approximately September 2017, Green Eggs Cafe also operated a restaurant business out of Keenan's Irish Pub ("Keenan's") in North Wildwood, New Jersey. 12. Green Eggs Cafe employed Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class as servers in Philadelphia and/or North Wildwood. 13. During the past three years, at any given time, Green Eggs Cafe employed approximately 45-60 servers at its Philadelphia restaurants. 14. From approximately May 2017 through approximately August 2017 Plaintiff Keyes was employed by Defendants as a server out of the Keenan's location. During this time period, Defendants employed approximately 25 servers out of the Keenan's location. 15. Servers are primarily responsible for taking customer food and drink orders, serving food and drink and otherwise waiting on customers at restaurant tables. 16. Green Eggs Cafe also employed "runners," busboys, and baristas at its Philadelphia restaurants and at Keenan's. 17. Plaintiff Keyes typically worked a range of approximately 12 - 24 hours per week. Method of Customer Payment and Server Compensation 18. Green Eggs Cafe is an all-cash business. Customers pay their bills and gratuities only via cash. 20. Plaintiff Keyes would be compensated as follows: Plaintiff Keyes would collect all cash from her customers (comprising customer bill amounts plus tips) during her shift. At the end of her shift, Plaintiff Keyes would show her manager Brian Pizzi ("Pizzi") how much cash she collected. Pizzi worked off of an Excel spreadsheet on his laptop computer (not visible to Plaintiff Keyes) and verbally told Plaintiff Keyes how much Defendants were owed in customer bills, as well as what amount of Plaintiff Keyes' tips would be shared with "runners," busboys and baristas. Pizzi required Plaintiff Keyes to provide each of these amounts to him in cash at the end of each shift. Plaintiff Keyes would retain the remainder of the cash as her compensation. 21. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Keyes or the FLSA Class ~a "wage" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), much less the minimum wage required by 29 U.S.C. § 206, or even the sub-minimum wage allowed under Section 203(m) under limited circumstances. Rather, Plaintiff Keyes was compensated solely from customer tips when she was employed as a server by Defendants. 22. The customer tips were at all times the property of Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class, and were not the property of Defendants. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.52 ("Tips are the property of the employee whether or not the employer has taken a tip credit under Section 3(m) of the FLSA"). Unavailability of a Tiq Credit 24. Employers may only include in a tip pool those employees who "customarily and regularly receive tips." 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); 29 C.F.R. § 531.54. In a restaurant setting, tipped employees must have regular customer interaction. 25. On a typical workday, two employees who were designated as "runners" worked out of each of Defendants' restaurants. 26. In industry parlance, runners generally assist waiters and waitresses in running food from the kitchen to customer tables. Runners have customer interaction because they step in when servers are unavailable. 27. However, one of the two "runners" utilized by Defendants at each of their restaurants was in fact an expediter —that is, an employee who worked almost entirely out of the kitchen area and thus had little to no customer interaction. 28. Expediters, such as those employed by Defendants, predominately work in a restaurant kitchen, arranging customer dishes and performing other food preparatory duties. 29. Because expediters generally have little to no customer interaction, they are not the types of employees who may validly share in a tip pool. See, e.g., Ford v. Lehigh Valley Rest. Grp., lnc., No. 3:14CV227, 2014 WL 3385128 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2014). 30. Defendants' practice of including expediters in server tip pools was carried out at all Philadelphia locations, as well as at Keenan's and thus applied to the entire FLSA Class. 31. Furthermore, "an employer is not eligible to take the tip credit unless it has informed its tipped employees in advance of the employer's use of the tip credit of the provisions of section 3(m) of the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 531.59(b). (Emphasis added). 33. Where, as here, an employer utilizes atip-pooling arrangement, it "must notify its employees of any required tip pool contribution amount, may only take a tip credit for the amount of tips each employee ultimately receives, and may not retain any of the employees' tips for any other purpose." 29 C.F.R. § 531.54. (Emphasis added). 34. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff Keyes or the FLSA Class in advance as to what amount of tips would be contributed to runners, expediters, busboys, baristas, or other employees. 35. Plaintiff Keyes frequently questioned Pizzi about how he calculated the amount of cash that she was allowed to retain at the end of her shifts. Pizzi never provided Plaintiff Keyes an answer, and instead willfully refused to explain to her Defendants' wage and tip compensation system or provide Plaintiff Keyes any accounting of her compensation. 36. Without prior notice to Plaintiff Keyes, Pizzi several times changed the bases by which he would calculate tip pooling eentributions to runners, busboys, ar~d baristas. 37. Other servers similarly complained to their respective managers about the calculation of their wages, without response by Defendants. 38. Even if Defendants compensated Plaintiff Keyes with wages of at least $2.13/hour, which they did not, Defendants would be ineligible to benefit from the tip credit under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) because they did not notify Plaintiff Keyes about required tip pool contribution amounts and because expediters were invalidly included in the tip pool. 39. Defendants' wage practices described herein at Keenan's were substantially similar at its Philadelphia restaurants. 41. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff Keyes and FLSA Class Members were not exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage requirements. 42. Defendants are sophisticated multi-state businesses with access to knowledgeable human resource specialists and competent labor counsel. 43. Defendants have acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions by failing to pay Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class at least the minimum wage mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 206. 44. Plaintiff Keyes brings this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the FLSA Class defined above. 45. Plaintiff Keyes desires to pursue her FLSA claims on behalf of herself and any individuals who opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 46. Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class are "similarly situated," as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because, inter alia, all such individuals worked as servers pursuant to Defendants' previously described common pay practices and, as a result of those practices, were not paid the full minimum wage required by 29 U.S.C. § 206. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, inter alia, Defendants' common compensation, timekeeping, and payroll practices. 47. Specifically, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class the minimum wage mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 206 and instead illegally counted Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class' tips against Defendants' minimum wage obligations. 49. The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and may be located through Defendants' business and human resource records. 50. Defendants employ many FLSA Class Members. These similarly situated employees maybe readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other appropriate means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 51. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 52. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked at a rate of not less than $7.25 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). 53. GEC is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because GEC is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 54. During all relevant times, GEC was an "employer" engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 55. 1306 is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because 1306 is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 56. At all relevant times, 1306 is an "employer" engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 57. During all relevant times, Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class were covered employees entitled to the above-described FLSA's protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 59. Defendants' compensation scheme applicable to Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class failed to comply with either 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) or 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 60. Defendants knowingly failed to compensate Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class at a rate of at least $7.25 per hour worked, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 61. Defendants also failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to Plaintiff Keyes and the FLSA Class sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in violation of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2, 516.5(a), 516.6(a)(1). 62. I~ violating the FLSA, Defendants, individually and collectively, acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (On Behalf of the FLSA Class)

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13. Plaintiff and his wife, Shirley Faye Looney, jointly own a home on East Ashford Park Drive in Foley, Alabama (the “Property”). At all relevant times this was their principal residence. 14. In June 2019, Plaintiff and his wife, Shirley Faye Looney, applied for a mortgage loan in connection with the upcoming purchase of their home on East Ashford Park Drive in Foley, Alabama. The application was submitted through First Mortgage of Alabama (“First Mortgage”), a mortgage broker which brokers loans for lender, such as Carrington. 15. On or about June 7, 2019, Fort Mortgage accessed Plaintiff’s credit information and credit scores maintained by at least one consumer reporting agency. This information was accessed by First Mortgage in connection with the mortgage application. The credit information, including the scores, was obtained from at least one credit reporting agency and accessed on Carrington’s behalf and was communicated to Carrington by First Mortgage. 16. Carrington used Plaintiff’s credit score to evaluate Plaintiff’s qualifications for a mortgage loan. Based at least in part on Plaintiff’s credit score, Carrington approved the Plaintiff’s loan application. The mortgage loan was closed on August 22, 2019. 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and Class Members of the proposed Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2). 35. Plaintiff incorporates the relevant foregoing paragraphs in this complaint as if fully set out. 36. This claim is brought for Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the class described above. 37. Defendant on a regular basis makes or arranges loans secured by residential real estate. 38. Defendant on a regular basis uses a “consumer credit score,” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(2)(A), in connection with applications initiated or sought by consumers for a loan secured by residential real estate. 39. Plaintiff initiated or sought an application with Defendant a loan secured by his home. 40. Defendant used Plaintiff’s credit score in connection with his application for that loan. 41. Defendant used the credit scores of members of the class described above in connection with applications initiated or sought for a loan secured by residential real estate. 42. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and members of the class described above with the disclosures required in 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(g). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1681 ET SEQ. [AGAINST DEFENDANT]

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17. On December 3, 2019, Wrap announced that the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) had decided to train its officers on the BolaWrap and employ 200 devices in the field for a trial, pilot program. Materially False and Misleading Statements 55. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 56. This Count is asserted against Defendants is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 65. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Background For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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25. Defendant operates in Colorado, with an address of 1790 N. Gaylord St, Denver, CO 80206. 26. Defendant offers its Website in connection with its physical location. The facilities and services offered by Defendant through its Website include but are not limited to the following: Available residences, learn about apartment designs, contact information, and related services. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Residential Complex. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Residential Complex and Leasing Office and the numerous services and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. 30. Due to Defendant’s failure to build its Website in a manner that is compatible with screen reader programs, Plaintiff is and was unable to understand, and thus is denied the benefit of, much of the content and services he wishes to access or use. For example: a. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what was on the screen due to failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. b. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. c. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s Leasing Office on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the services that it provides to the public. 34. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. In fact, Plaintiff intends to return to the Website when it is equally accessible for visually-impaired consumers in order to complete his intended transaction, as it is more convenient for Plaintiff to access the Website to make a purchase than to travel to a physical location to make the same purchase. However, as long as the Access Barriers continue to exist on the Website, Plaintiff is prevented from making such a purchase. 35. These barriers, and others, deny Plaintiff full and equal access to all of the services the Website offers, and now deter him from attempting to use the Website and/or visit Defendant’s Leasing Office. Still, Plaintiff would like to, and intends to, attempt to access Defendant’s Website in the future to research the services the Website offers, or to test the Website for compliance with the ADA. 37. If the Website were accessible, i.e. if Defendant removed the access barriers described above, Plaintiff could independently research the Website’s offerings, including locations and hours and promotions available at the its physical locations. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 39. Though Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its Website, upon and information and belief, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its Website fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with vision related disabilities. As a result, the complained of access barriers are permanent in nature and likely to persist. 40. The law requires that Defendant reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities by removing these existing access barriers. Removal of the barriers identified above is readily achievable and may be carried out without much difficulty or expense. 41. Plaintiff’s above request for injunctive relief is consistent with the work performed by the United States Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), all of whom have relied upon or mandated that the public-facing pages of website complies with an international compliance standard known as Web Content Accessibility Guidelines version 42. Plaintiff and the Class have been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s failure to provide its online content and services in a manner that is compatible with screen reader technology. 43. Defendant has long known that screen reader technology is necessary for individuals with visual disabilities to access its online content and services, and that it is legally responsible for providing the same in a manner that is compatible with these auxiliary aids. 44. Indeed, the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ reaffirmed in a 2015 Statement of Interest before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that it has been a “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice “that the ADA applies to website of public accommodations.” See National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 3:15-cv-300024-MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Doc. 34, p. 4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“MIT Statement of Interest”); see also National Association of the Deaf. v. Harvard University, No. 3:15-cv-30023- MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doc. 33, p.4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“Harvard Statement of Interest”). 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. While DOJ has rulemaking authority and can bring enforcement actions in court, Congress has not authorized it to provide an adjudicative administrative process to provide Plaintiff with relief. 48. Plaintiff alleges violations of existing and longstanding statutory and regulatory requirements to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure effective communication, and courts routinely decide these types of matters. 49. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims does not require the Court to unravel intricate, technical facts, but rather involves consideration of facts within the conventional competence of the courts, e.g. (a) whether Defendant offers content and services on its Website, and (b) whether Plaintiff can access the content and services. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, thereby violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, like Plaintiff, are visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. 55. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s physical locations are a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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21. Defendant operates 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common BIOREFERENCEions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal BIOREFERENCEions common to Class Members predominate over BIOREFERENCEions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant’s laboratories are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s laboratories. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, reBIOREFERENCEs relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in her or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are professional laboratories of a health care provider and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 78. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 84. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. Defendant’s locations are professional laboratories of a health care provider and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 88. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in BIOREFERENCEion provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 92. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 93. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 94. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 97. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind prospective patients the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 100. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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71. While reserving the right to amend, modify, or otherwise revise the Class definition during class certification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, plaintiff seeks to represent a Class of all persons in the California who, on or after April 25, 2012, purchased Healthy Request Gumbo for personal, family, or household use, and not for resale. 72. The members of the proposed Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of the claims of all Class Members in a single action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and Court. 78. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 79. The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 80. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of Campbell as alleged herein constitute business acts and practices. Fraudulent 81. A statement or practice is fraudulent under the UCL if it is likely to deceive the public, applying a reasonable consumer test. 82. As set forth herein, Campbell’s health and wellness claims relating to its Healthy Request Gumbo are likely to deceive reasonable consumers and the public in light of the product’s artificial trans fat content. 83. In addition, Campbell’s deceptive omission of material information it was obligated to disclose, concerning both the presence and detrimental health effects of the artificial trans fat in Healthy Request Gumbo, and its payment for the AHA certification, are likely to deceive reasonable consumers, who would have acted differently if Campbell’s had revealed such information. Unlawful 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 92. The FAL provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services” to disseminate any statement “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. 93. As alleged herein, the advertisements, labeling, policies, acts, practices, and omissions of Campbell relating to its Healthy Request Gumbo misled consumers acting reasonably as to the healthfulness of the product. 94. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact as a result of Campbell’s actions as set forth herein because plaintiff purchased Healthy Request Gumbo in reliance on Campbell’s false and misleading health and wellness marketing claims. 95. Campbell’s business practices as alleged herein constitute unfair, deceptive, untrue, and misleading advertising pursuant to the FAL because Campbell has advertised the product in a manner that is untrue and misleading, which Campbell knew or reasonably should have known, and omitted material information from its advertising. 96. Campbell profited from its sales of the falsely and deceptively advertised Healthy Request Gumbo to unwary consumers. 98. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. Breach of Express Warranties, Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1) 105. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 106. Through the Healthy Request Gumbo product labels, Campbell made affirmations of fact or promises, and made descriptions of goods, that formed part of the basis of the bargain, in that plaintiff and the Class purchased the product in reasonable reliance on those statements. Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1). 107. These affirmations include “Healthy Request,” “Heart Healthy,” “COOKED WITH CARE,” “AHA CERTIFIED,” “Meets Criteria for Heart-Healthy Food,” and “Made with Lean Chicken Meat.” 108. Campbell breached its express warranties by selling a product that is not healthy, and not heart healthy, but which in fact detrimentally affects cholesterol levels increasing risk of CHD, stroke, and other morbidity. 109. That breach actually and proximately caused injury in the form of the lost purchase price that plaintiff and Class members paid for Healthy Request Gumbo product. 110. As a result, plaintiff seeks, on behalf of himself and other Class Members, actual damages arising as a result of Campbell’s breaches of express warranty. I. Artificial Trans Fat Causes Cardiovascular Disease, Type 2 Diabetes, and Other Chronic Morbidity Violations of the False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. Violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. Violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.

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21. The individual student plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(2) on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class consisting of all present and future Willamette female students, including currently enrolled students, students admitted for the 2016-2017 academic year, and prospective students, who participate, seek to participate, or have been deterred or prevented from participating in or obtaining the benefits of intercollegiate athletics sponsored by Willamette. 22. All class members are aggrieved persons under federal civil rights law as a result of Willamette’s actions, policies, and practices. The named individual student plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and all class members to prevent defendant from engaging in future unlawful conduct and to rectify the effects of present and past discrimination. 24. Defendant has failed to provide equal athletic opportunities for women and has provided more opportunities and better opportunities for male athletes than for female athletes. 25. For each and every year from 2006 to 2016, defendant Willamette has failed to provide substantially equal opportunities for its female students. According to Willamette’s own published reports, the number of female athletes is only about 17 percent of the full-time undergraduate female population, while male athletes make up about 28 percent of the male undergraduate population. 26. Upon information and belief, Willamette’s full-time undergraduate enrollment during the 2015-16 academic year is 1988. Women comprise over 57 percent of the full-time undergraduate student body, but they account for only about 40 percent of student-athletes. 27. The percentage of female athletes during the 2015 – 2016 academic year is not substantially proportionate to the percentage of full-time female students. 28. Defendant Willamette lacks a continuing history and ongoing practice of expanding 45. Defendants have failed to meet any of the three criteria for compliance with Title IX’s equal participation and effective accommodation requirement in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). 46. The elimination of a viable women’s team places defendant even further out of compliance with Title IX. 47. Defendant’s failure to treat female athletes substantially equally with respect to equipment and supplies, publicity, promotional materials and events, transportation, uniforms, Athletics at Willamette COMPLAINT Violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 46.

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35. Brousseau Property Management is a real estate property ownership and management company located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 36. Leja began working for Brousseau Property Management in September 2015. 37. Leja was employed as doing maintenance work. 38. At all relevant times, Leja was an hourly employee of Brousseau Property Management. 39. At all relevant times, Brousseau Property Management did not pay Leja a salary. 41. At all relevant times, Brousseau Property Management paid Leja by the hour. 42. At all relevant times, Brousseau Property Management paid Leja $17 or $20 per hour. 43. Leja reported the hours he worked to Brousseau Property Management on a regular basis. 44. Leja’s hours are reflected in Brousseau Property Management’s records. 45. Brousseau Property Management paid Leja at the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek. 46. Leja normally worked more than 40 hours in a week. 47. For example, for the two-week period ending July 28, 2018, Leja worked 48. For that pay period, Brousseau Property Management paid Leja for 52.75 hours at his hourly rate of $20 an hour. 49. And for the two-week pay period ending October 13, 2018, Leja worked 50. So for that pay period, Brousseau Property Management paid Leja for 72.75 hours at his hourly rate of $20 an hour. 51. Thus, rather than receiving time-and-a-half as required by the FLSA, Leja only received “straight-time” pay for overtime hours worked. 52.75 hours. 52. This “straight-time-for-overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA. 54. Brousseau Property Management nonetheless failed to pay certain hourly employees, such as Leja, overtime. 55. Brousseau Property Management’s failure to pay overtime to these hourly workers was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA. 72.75 hours. 84. Leja incorporates all other allegations. 85. By failing to pay Leja overtime at 1.5 times his regular rates, Brousseau Property Management violated the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 86. Brousseau Property Management owes Leja the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. 87. Because Brousseau Property Management knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practices violated the FLSA, Brousseau Property Management owes these wages for at least the past three years. 88. Brousseau Property Management also owes Leja an amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 89. Leja is entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action.

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25. On information and belief, during the relevant time period, Weder Pereira made or influenced key decisions regarding the business dealings of WCP, Rondon Siding, and Excel, including decisions regarding financial and payroll matters. 26. On information and belief, during the relevant time period, Cristina Pereira kept the books for WCP, Rondon Siding, and/or Excel, including keeping records tracking financial and payroll matters. 27. During the relevant time period, the Pereira-Entity Defendants employed workers to work on various construction jobsites, in Massachusetts (primarily) and in neighboring states. 28. During the relevant time period, Weder and Cristina Pereira treated WCP, Rondon Siding, and Excel interchangeably with respect to employing and paying the Plaintiffs. For example, Jobsite Plaintiffs would be sent on projects as employees of WCP certain weeks and Excel other weeks, without any explanation to, or action by, Plaintiffs. Further, regardless of whether Plaintiffs were allegedly working for WCP or Excel, paychecks would variously come from WCP, Rondon Siding, or Excel without any pattern or explanation. 29. During the relevant time period, Wagner Sousa approved and signed paychecks paid by WCP to Plaintiffs and Joel Dacosta approved and signed paychecks paid by Rondon Siding to Plaintiffs. B. National Lumber Arranged With the Pereira-Entity Defendants to Employ Workers at New Bedford Lumber Yard 30. During the relevant time period, National Lumber, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Reliable Truss, operated a business designing and manufacturing wood roof trusses, wall panels, timber trusses, and floor panels (“Truss and Panel Manufacturing Business”). 32. On information and belief, during the relevant time period, Manuel Pina controlled significant aspects of the day-to-day operations of the Truss and Panel Manufacturing Business. As stated in a magazine article linked to the National Lumber website referring to the Truss and Penal Manufacturing Business, “Pina is the company’s president and has led the way for co-CEOs and sibling owners, Steven Kaitz and Margie Kaitz Seligman, to expand locations and launch a number of profit centers including a turn-key division which provides framing materials and labor for major building projects throughout the eastern U.S. Pina convinced the Kaitz family to begin engineering and designing truss and I-joist systems. In-house, he hired structural engineers, architects, expert builders and framing professionals.” 33. On information and belief, in or about 2014, Manuel Pina, directly or indirectly, informed Weder Pereira that National Lumber needed workers at the New Bedford Lumber Yard to build wall panels. 34. At this time, the Pereira-Entity Defendants employed many workers, including some of the Named Plaintiffs and other Plaintiffs, to work at various construction jobsites in Massachusetts and neighboring states. 36. In arranging for the NL Plaintiffs to work at the New Bedford Lumber Yard, Weder Pereira and the Pereira-Entity Defendants generally instructed the NL Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, to report to the New Bedford Lumber Yard for work at 6 a.m. on their first day. The Pereira-Entity Defendants did not provide tools with which they were to perform the work or instructions regarding the work the employees were to perform. 37. At the New Bedford Lumber Yard, the NL Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, reported to one of the National Lumber supervisors (the “NL Supervisors”). The NL Supervisors in charge of wall panel construction were David Lopes, until approximately mid- September 2015, and Victor Botelho, thereafter. At various times, NL Supervisors Sean O’Connell and Timothy Silva also supervised the employees. 38. Manuel Pina also periodically spent time at the New Bedford Lumber Yard, observing and inspecting the work being done by employees, including the NL Plaintiffs. 39. The NL Supervisors generally directed the NL Plaintiffs to work at large tables, usually in groups of three to six men. The number of tables varied depending on the number of NL Plaintiffs working and the number of projects being worked on. The NL Supervisors determined the group each NL Plaintiff worked with. 40. The NL Supervisors provided the initial instructions to new NL Plaintiffs. 42. National Lumber provided all of the tools and raw materials the NL Plaintiffs used to build the wall panels. On information and belief, some or all of the tools and raw materials, and some of the finished wall panels, were shipped across state lines. 43. The NL Supervisors also determined the starting times, meal break, and ending times worked by the NL Plaintiffs. The NL Supervisors instructed the NL Plaintiffs when to arrive for work, which generally was 6 a.m., and when and for how long to take an unpaid meal break, which was generally 30 minutes around noon. The NL Supervisors dictated when the NL Plaintiffs left for the day, which was generally dependent on factors including the number of NL Plaintiffs working, the number and size of the panels being worked on, and the deadline by which National Lumber needed the panels to be completed. 44. The NL Supervisors determined the number of days worked each week by the NL Plaintiffs, which was generally five or six, although it could be fewer during a holiday week or during a particularly slow period. 45. By determining the hours each day and the number of days worked by the NL Plaintiffs each week, the NL Supervisors controlled the total amount of time worked by the NL Plaintiffs. 47. Starting in or around the second week in September 2015, NL Plaintiffs started using a National Lumber punch-clock at the New Bedford Lumber Yard, punching in and out to indicate when they arrived at work, went to a meal break, returned from a meal break, and left for the day. 48. NL Supervisor Victor Botelho reviewed the punch cards each week. The NL Supervisor made hand-written adjustments he determined were necessary, such as to correct a card when a NL Plaintiff forgot to punch in or out at the start or end of the day or for meal time or to add or subtract hours for other reasons. The NL Supervisor tallied the hours and indicated the total hours worked by the NL Plaintiff that week. 49. Starting in or about the second week of September, 2015, NL Supervisor Sean O’Connell prepared and signed the weekly timesheet invoices, setting forth the total hours worked by each NL Plaintiff working that week based on the punch-cards, as adjusted by NL Supervisor Botelho. 50. Starting in or about February, 2015, National Lumber conveyed the hours worked by the NL Plaintiffs to the Pereira-Entity Defendants via the timesheet invoices. 51. The Pereira-Entity Defendants used the timesheets prepared by the NL Supervisors to determine the time worked by, and the wages owed to, the NL Plaintiffs. 53. The NL Supervisors and other National Lumber employees charged with quality control at the New Bedford Lumber Yard inspected the NL Plaintiffs’ finished products prior to the panels being loaded on trucks for shipping to jobsites to determine if the wall panels were satisfactory or had to be redone. 54. The NL Supervisors frequently forced the NL Plaintiffs to lift heavy panels manually, unassisted by tools or equipment, while simultaneously providing tools and equipment to assist other non-immigrant National Lumber employees with similar tasks. The NL Supervisors often forced the NL Plaintiffs to work outside in freezing cold temperature while simultaneously allowing other non-immigrant employees to work inside. 55. National Lumber and the NL Supervisors supplied safety equipment to the NL Plaintiffs, however, the equipment provided was often inadequate and unsafe. 56. On a few occasions, the NL Supervisors directed the NL Plaintiffs to work offsite at construction job sites other than the New Bedford Lumber Yard where the wall panels were being installed. On these occasions, the NL Plaintiffs went to the jobsites in National Lumber trucks with National Lumber employees and supervisors. 58. For example, the NL Supervisors would frequently chastise, belittle, and threaten NL Plaintiffs with termination for working too slowly or making mistakes. The NL Supervisors also threatened NL Plaintiffs with termination if they asked to leave due to illness or injury, and, on one or more occasions, terminated an NL Plaintiff for staying home or leaving early due to illness. 59. On occasion, the NL Supervisors asked current NL Plaintiffs to recruit new workers and bring them to the New Bedford Lumber Yard. The NL Supervisor would then determine whether to hire the recruit to join the group working to build the wall panels; if the recruit was hired, the NL Supervisor included the recruit’s name and hours on the timesheet invoice it provided to the Pereira-Entity Defendants. 60. The NL Supervisors determined which NL Plaintiffs to lay off when work slowed, and the NL Supervisors decided whether and when to terminate a NL Plaintiff for any reason the NL Supervisor so decided. D. Plaintiffs Regularly Worked Overtime Hours at the New Bedford Lumber Yard 61. During the relevant time period, the NL Supervisors required NL Plaintiffs to, and NL Plaintiffs did, work more than 40 hours in one or more workweeks. 62. During the relevant time period, the NL Supervisors required many NL Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, to, and many NL Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, did, regularly work up to fifty or sixty hours a week. 64. During the relevant time period, most of the overtime worked by NL Plaintiffs was recorded on timesheets or punch-cards. 65. During the relevant time period, National Lumber and the Pereira-Entity Defendants were aware that NL Plaintiffs frequently worked more than 40 hours a week at the New Bedford Lumber Yard. E. Defendants Willfully Failed to Pay NL Plaintiffs Overtime Wages, Timely Wages, Wages for all Time Worked, and Earned Sick Time 66. During the relevant time period, Defendants followed a policy and practice of paying NL Plaintiffs for their work at the New Bedford Lumber Yard via checks from WCP or Rondon Siding and other entities. 67. During the relevant time period, Defendants followed a policy and practice of refusing to provide NL Plaintiffs with pay slips or earnings statements with their paychecks showing the name of the employer and employee, the day, month, year, number of hours worked, hourly rate, and the amounts of deductions or increases made for the pay period. 69. On one or more occasions after their paychecks bounced, NL Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, complained to a NL Supervisor about not getting paid. 70. During the relevant time period, Defendants paid NL Plaintiffs on an hourly basis. On information and belief, the hourly rates ranged from approximately $14 to $20 (“Straight- Time Rate”). 71. During the relevant time period, Defendants followed a policy and practice of paying NL Plaintiffs only their Straight-Time Rate for time they worked over 40 hours in a workweek. 72. During the relevant time period, Defendants followed a policy and practice of not paying NL Plaintiffs for any time they did not work. 73. On one or more occasions, some or all of the Named Plaintiffs and other NL Plaintiffs, complained to an NL Supervisor that they were not getting paid any overtime premiums. 74. On information and belief, Defendants followed a policy and practice of paying NL Plaintiffs on a quarter-hour or half-hour basis. However, for purposes of calculating wages, Defendants followed a policy and practice of rounding the time NL Plaintiffs worked down more often and more significantly than they rounded up. Defendants followed a policy and practice of frequently rounding down more than 8 minutes, sometimes significantly. The time NL Plaintiffs worked without being paid often involved time worked over 40 hours in a workweek. 76. Defendants followed a policy and practice of failing to pay NL Plaintiffs voluntarily leaving their employment all wages due to them within six or seven days of their last day of work and failing to pay terminated NL Plaintiffs all wages due to them on the day of termination. 77. On information and belief, Defendants followed a policy and practice of failing to ever pay many NL Plaintiffs wages due to them for their last week or two of work. 78. At no time after July 1, 2015 (or prior thereto) did Defendants notify NL Plaintiffs that they had the right to earn and use paid sick leave; Defendants failed to give NL Plaintiffs a copy of a notice of a policy regarding sick leave or to include a sick time policy in a handbook manual provided to NL Plaintiffs. 79. During the relevant time period, including after July 1, 2015, Defendants followed a policy and practice of refusing to allow NL Plaintiffs to earn and use paid sick leave. 80. NL Supervisors even threatened to terminate NL Plaintiffs who requested to leave early due to illness or injury. F. Pereira-Entity Defendants Willfully Failed to Pay Jobsite Plaintiffs Overtime Wages, Timely Wages, Wages for all Time Worked, and Earned Sick Time 81. During the relevant time period, the Pereira-Entity Defendants sent Jobsite Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, to perform construction laborer and carpentry work at jobsites, primarily in Massachusetts. 83. During the relevant time period, Pereira-Entity Defendants applied the same wage policies and practices to all Plaintiffs, regardless of where they worked, and followed the same wage policies and practices for the Jobsite Plaintiffs as they followed with the NL Plaintiffs. 84. During the relevant time period, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of requiring Jobsite Plaintiffs to work more than 40 hours in a workweek, and many Jobsite Plaintiffs, including the Named Plaintiffs, worked up to fifty, sixty, and even seventy hours in many workweeks. 85. During the relevant time period, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of paying Jobsite Plaintiffs on an hourly basis, but failing to pay Jobsite Plaintiffs premium pay for any time they worked over 40 hours in a workweek. 86. During the relevant time period, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of failing to provide Jobsite Plaintiffs with any earnings statements or pay slips showing the name of the employer and employee, the day, month, year, number of hours worked, hourly rate, and the amounts of deductions or increases made for the pay period. 87. During the relevant time period, Pereira-Entity Defendants generally paid Jobsite Plaintiffs on a weekly basis, with the week ending on Saturday. 89. On information and belief, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of paying NL Plaintiffs on a quarter-hour or half-hour basis. However, for purposes of calculating wages, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of rounding the time Jobsite Plaintiffs worked down more often and in greater amounts than they rounded up. Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of frequently rounding down more than 8 minutes, sometimes significantly. The time Jobsite Plaintiffs worked without pay often involved time worked over 40 hours in a workweek. 90. Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of failing to pay Jobsite Plaintiffs voluntarily leaving their employment all wages due to them within six or seven days of their last day of work and failing to pay terminated Jobsite Plaintiffs all wages due to them on the day of termination 91. On information and belief, Pereira-Entity Defendants also followed a policy and practice of failing to pay many Jobsite Plaintiffs wages for their last one or two weeks of work. 92. At no time after July 1, 2015, (or prior thereto) did Pereira-Entity Defendants notify Jobsite Plaintiffs that they had the right to earn and use paid sick leave; Pereira-Entity Defendants failed to give Jobsite Plaintiffs a copy of a notice of a policy regarding sick leave or to include a sick time policy in a handbook manual provided to Jobsite Plaintiffs. 93. During the relevant time period, including after July 1, 2015, Pereira-Entity Defendants followed a policy and practice of refusing to allow Jobsite Plaintiffs to earn and use paid sick leave. G. Wage Complaints Filed with Massachusetts Attorney General 95. After the AG Complaint was filed, the AG began an investigation of the wage practices of the Pereira-Entity Defendants and National Lumber in connection with the work of the NL Plaintiffs and the Jobsite Plaintiffs. 96. On information and belief, representatives from the AG’s office held a meeting with certain Defendants and their attorneys (the “AG Meeting”). 97. Soon after the AG Meeting, National Lumber began terminating NL Plaintiffs that were still working at the New Bedford Lumber Yard. 98. An NL Supervisor complained to Plaintiff Pinto about Plaintiff Rodrigues filing the AG Complaint and stated something to the effect that many people were losing their jobs all because one person had to go and complain. A. Pereira-Entity Defendants

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19. Acadian conducts background checks, which include investigations of criminal history, of its job applicants as part of its standard screening and hiring process. 20. In addition, Acadian periodically conducts such background checks on existing employees during the course of their employment. 21. Acadian does not perform these background checks in-house. Rather, Acadian relies on outside consumer reporting firms to obtain this information and report it to Acadian. These reports constitute “consumer reports” for purposes of the FCRA, and each outside consumer reporting firm constitutes a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA. 22. One of the outside consumer reporting firms Acadian utilizes is Kroll Background America, Inc., a subsidiary of HireRight, Inc. (“Kroll”). 23. Kroll is a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA. Acadian’s violations of the FCRA relating to the Background Check Class. 24. Acadian procured consumer report information in violation of the FCRA. 26. Acadian has repeatedly failed to comply with these disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA. 27. Acadian has an online application process that guides a job applicant’s search for specific job openings available at Acadian.3 28. The set of sequential steps a candidate must follow in order to apply online for a job with Acadian is uniform for all job openings available in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, and these steps have not changed during the relevant 5-year statute of limitations period. 29. On page 24 of a 30-page online employment application, Acadian purports to include in a lengthy paragraph, in obscurely small sized font, an authorization seeking permission to obtain the job applicant’s background information for Acadian’s hiring decision. 31. Acadian does not have a stand-alone FCRA disclosure or authorization form, and the paragraphs above do not comply with the FCRA’s specific disclosure and authorization requirements. 32. Acadian’s practice violates the plain language of the statute, and flies in the face of unambiguous case law and regulatory guidance from the FTC. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Video Only, Inc., No. 06-1362, 2008 WL 2433841, at *11 (D.Or. June 11, 2008) (“I grant summary judgment of liability that Video Only violated . . . 15 § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I). This section provides that at any time before the report is procured, a disclosure is made in a document that consists solely of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes. Video Only disclosed this possibility as part of its job application, which is not a document consisting solely of the disclosure.”); see also, Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) guidance (“The disclosure may not be part of an employment application . . . . A disclosure that is combined with many items in an employment application -- no matter how ‘prominently’ it appears -- is not ‘in a document that consists solely of the disclosure’ as required by [1681b(b)(2)(A)].”); 5 see also, FTC Staff Report at p. 51 (“The disclosure cannot be part of a printed employment application.”).6 34. Moreover, Acadian’s above-referenced authorization in paragraph 30 of this Complaint does not consist solely of a disclosure and authorization to obtain consumer report information. In addition, the paragraph contains the following release language: “I release from all liability anyone supplying such information, and I also release the employer from all liability that might result from making an investigation.” 7 35. The insertion of such a release of liability by Acadian also is contrary to the plain language of the statute and longstanding regulatory guidance. The FTC warns that “the form should not include any extraneous information.”8 In fact, the FTC further warns specifically that “[t]he inclusion of such a waiver [of liability] in a disclosure form will violate Section 604(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA [15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)], which requires that a disclosure consist ‘solely’ of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.” Id. 36. By including such an extraneous release, Acadian willfully disregarded this regulatory guidance, and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) by procuring consumer report information on employees without complying with the disclosure and authorization requirements of the statute. Acadian’s violations of the FCRA relating to the Adverse Action Class. 38. Acadian typically does not supply job applicants or employees a copy of their consumer reports prior to taking such adverse action against them. 39. This practice violates one of the most fundamental protections afforded to prospective and current employees under the FCRA, and also runs counter to longstanding regulatory guidance. See Exhibit 6 (“[15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)] requires that all employers who use consumer reports provide a copy of the report to the affected consumer before any adverse action is taken. Employers must comply with this provision even where the information contained in the report (such as a criminal record) would automatically disqualify the individual from employment or lead to an adverse employment action. Indeed, this is precisely the situation where it is important that the consumer be informed of the negative information …”).9 40. By failing to supply Plaintiff and Putative Class members a copy of their respective consumer report prior to taking adverse employment action against them based on such reports, Acadian willfully disregarded this regulatory guidance and the plain language of the statute in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)(A). V. 41. Mr. Landrum applied for work with Acadian on July 10, 2013, and in this regard, Mr. Landrum completed Acadian’s online employment application.10 42. Following completion of his employment application, Mr. Landrum periodically inquired about Acadian’s employment decision.11 44. On September 25, 2013, as scheduled, Mr. Landrum interviewed with Ms. Barbara Hughes, an employee of Acadian. 45. On September 26, 2013, Ms. Hughes ordered a criminal background report from Kroll pertaining to Mr. Landrum.13 46. On October 25, 2013, Acadian informed Mr. Landrum that the company had decided not to hire him.14 47. On November 18, 2013, Mr. Landrum submitted an email to Ms. Hughes inquiring about the details of Acadian’s decision not to hire him.15 Mr. Landrum received no response from Ms. Hughes or from any other employee of Acadian. 48. Importantly, at no time subsequent to Mr. Landrum’s July 10, 2013, application for employment did Acadian supply Mr. Landrum a copy of his consumer background report. 49. As a result, Mr. Landrum was deprived of any opportunity to review the information in the report and discuss it with Acadian before the company took adverse action against him on October 25, 2013. 16 51. Mr. Landrum asserts his claim in Count 1 on behalf of a Putative Adverse Class defined as follows: Proposed Adverse Action Class: All employees or prospective employees of Acadian who received notice on or after May 26, 2009 (or who did not receive any notice) that Acadian was taking adverse employment action against them based, in whole or in part, on information contained in a consumer report, and who were not given a copy of the consumer report in advance. 52. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Counts 2 and 3 on behalf of a Putative Background Check Class defined as follows: Proposed Background Check Class: All employees or prospective employees of Acadian who were the subject of a consumer report procured by Acadian (or that Acadian caused to be procured) on or after May 26, 2009. 53. Numerosity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a): The Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Acadian regularly purchases and utilizes information in consumer reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees and existing employees, and frequently relies on such information, in whole or in part, as a basis for adverse employment action. Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, more than one thousand employees and prospective employees satisfy the definition of the Putative Classes. Information concerning the exact size of the Putative Classes is within the exclusive possession of Acadian. 55. Adequacy under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Classes, and has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation. 57. This case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual Class member’s claim as separate action would potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 59. Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Putative Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Putative Classes, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendant’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from common and uniform policies and practices, resulting in common (and multiple) violations of the FCRA. 60. Members of the Putative Classes do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against Defendant, as the amount of each Class member’s individual claims is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution, and Plaintiff is unaware of any similar claims brought against Defendant by any members of the Putative Classes on an individual basis. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Defendant’s practices. 61. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all Putative Class members’ claims in a single forum. 62. Mr. Landrum intends to send notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The names and addresses of the Putative Class members are available from Defendant’s records. Acadian conducts employment background checks (including criminal background checks) during its hiring process.

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(Civil Damages for Fraudulent Filing of Information Returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a)) 135. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 136. By failing to provide Plaintiff and NJWL Class Members with accurate IRS Forms W-2 for all of the tax years during which they were employed by Defendants, and failing to properly record, account for, and report to the IRS all monies paid to Plaintiff and the Class as compensation for all of the work performed during the course of employment with the Defendants, and failing to properly report employee income and withhold amounts listed on W-2 forms as monies withheld, Defendants filed fraudulent information returns with the IRS, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7434. 137. Under the Internal Revenue Code, “[i]f any person willfully files a fraudulent information return with respect to payments purported to be made to any other person, such person may bring a civil action for damages against the person so filing such return.” 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a). 1.8, NJSA 34:19-7 and NJAC12:2-1.3. 1.8, NJSA 34:19-7 and NJAC12:2-1.3. 1.8, NJSA 34:19-7 and NJAC12:2-1.3. 41. Plaintiffs brings claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including cooks, servers, bussers, runners, bartenders and other similarly situated employees, employed by Defendants on or after the date that is three years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class period”). 43. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail for the last address known to Defendants. 44. Plaintiffs also bring claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt current and former employees, including but not limited to other cooks, chefs and staff, on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class period”). 46. The proposed Class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants; upon information and belief, there are in excess of twenty (20) Class Members. 47. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims, which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate action. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, which were and are (1) failure to pay minimum wage, (2) failure to pay overtime, (3) failure to pay sick leave, (4) penalties for required notices, (5) liquidated damages and (6) attorneys’ fees, interest, and costs. 48. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. The Plaintiffs and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 49. The Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have no interests antagonistic to the Class. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 52. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: (a) Whether Defendants employed the Plaintiffs and Class members within the meaning of the 53. Erdem worked for the Defendants at the 178 Piermont Road, Cresskill, NJ 07626. 54. Erdem was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt employee from approximately December 2015 to April 27, 2019. During this time period, Erdem would work six (6) days per week for a total of 67 hours. 56. Defendants paid Erdem $12.50 per hour for forty hours of work. 57. Defendants refused and failed to pay Erdem for sick leave. 58. Defendant falsely reported that Erdem only worked 40 hours per week on the pay stubs provided despite Erdem working approximately 68 hours per week. 59. For the hours worked in excess of forty each week, Defendants failed to pay Erdem at the required minimum wage rate. 60. Although Erdem worked over forty hours per week, Defendants failed to pay Erdem at the required overtime premium rate. 61. Defendants reported that Erdem was paid an hourly rate of $12.50 per hour. 62. The Defendants did not provide any of the required notices to Erdem upon his hire or at any time thereafter; said violation include but are not limited to the following: NJSA 12:21- 63. The Defendants did not provide Erdem with a proper wage statement with each payment he received. 64. Defendants failed to pay Erdem for sick leave, failed to pay Erdem minimum wage, and failed to pay Erdem for the overtime hours worked. Wage Claims for Erdal 65. Erdal worked for the Defendants at the 178 Piermont Road, Cresskill, NJ 07626. 66. Erdal was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt employee from approximately 2011 to April 27, 2019. During this time period, Erdal would work six (6) days per week for a total of 67 hours. 68. Defendants paid Erdal $12.50 per hour for forty hours of work. 69. Defendants refused and failed to pay Erdal for sick leave. 70. Defendant falsely reported that Erdal only worked 40 hours per week on the pay stubs provided despite Erdal working approximately 68 hours per week. 71. For the hours worked in excess of forty each week, Defendants failed to pay Erdal at the required minimum wage rate. 72. Although Erdal worked over forty hours per week, Defendants failed to pay Erdal at the required overtime premium rate. 73. Defendants reported that Erdal was paid an hourly rate of $12.50 per hour. 74. The Defendants did not provide any of the required notices to Erdal upon his hire or at any time thereafter; said violation include but are not limited to the following: NJSA 12:21- 75. The Defendants did not provide Erdal with a proper wage statement with each payment he received. 76. Defendants failed to pay Erdal for sick leave, failed to pay Erdal the minimum wage, and failed to pay Erdal the overtime hours worked. Wage Claims for Yavuz 77. Yavuz worked for the Defendants at the 178 Piermont Road, Cresskill, NJ 07626. 79. During Yavuz’s employment with the Defendants, Yavuz worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 80. Defendants paid Yavuz $12.50 per hour for forty hours of work. 81. Defendants refused and failed to pay Yavuz for sick leave. 82. Defendant falsely reported that Yavuz only worked 40 hours per week on the pay stubs provided despite Yavuz working approximately 68 hours per week. 83. For the hours worked in excess of forty each week, Defendants failed to pay Yavuz at the required minimum wage rate. 84. Although Yavuz worked over forty hours per week, Defendants failed to pay Yavuz at the required overtime premium rate. 85. Defendants reported that Yavuz was paid an hourly rate of $12.50 per hour. 86. The Defendants did not provide any of the required notices to Yavuz upon his hire or at any time thereafter; said violation include but are not limited to the following: NJSA 12:21- 87. The Defendants did not provide Yavuz with a proper wage statement with each payment he received. 88. Defendants failed to pay Yavuz for sick leave, failed to pay Yavuz the minimum wage, and failed to pay Yavuz the overtime hours worked. 89. Although the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members worked over forty hours per week, Defendants never paid them for the extra hours worked. 90. Although the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members worked over forty hours per week, Defendants never paid them at the required minimum wage rate. 92. Although the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members had earned sick leave, Defendants never paid them for the sick leave hours earned. 93. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New Jersey State minimum wage to the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members. 94. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) or the New Jersey State overtime rate (of time and one-half) to the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members. 95. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing proper wage statements to the Plaintiffs and Class members, in violation of the NJWL. 96. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing proper notices to the Plaintiffs and Class members, at the beginning of employment and at any time thereafter, in violation of the NJWL. 97. Upon information and belief, Defendants were well aware of the FLSA and the NJWL having been fined and penalized in the past for violating said laws. 98. Despite knowledge, Defendants intentionally and maliciously acted in violation of the FLSA and the NJWL. 99. The Plaintiffs retained Akin Law Group PLLC to represent the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. Wage Claims for Erdem

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Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (Against Sterling and the Officer Defendants) 39. The members of the Class are located in geographically diverse areas and are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 17,250,000 shares of Sterling common stock were sold in the IPO. Throughout the Class Period, Sterling securities were actively traded on NASDAQ. Although the exact number of Class members is unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are thousands of members of the Class who traded the Company’s common stock during the Class Period. 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as Plaintiff and members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal laws as complained of herein. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, those of the Class. 43. A class action is superior to alternative methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members of this Class is impracticable. Furthermore, because the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for the Class members individually to redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 45. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 46. Sterling is the unitary thrift holding company of Sterling Bank and Trust, founded in 1984. The Company is headquartered in Southfield, Michigan with its primary branch operations in the San Francisco Bay Area and Greater Los Angeles with an emerging presence in New York and Seattle. The Company specializes in residential mortgages but offers a broad suite of products and services to individuals, professionals, businesses and commercial customers. 48. On October 19, 2017, Sterling filed a Registration Statement on Form S-1. Sandler was identified as the underwriter of the IPO. 49. On October 31, 2017, Sterling filed Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 with the SEC. Sandler was identified as the underwriter of the IPO. 50. On November 7, 2017, Sterling filed Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 with the SEC. Sandler was identified as the underwriter of the IPO. 51. On November 13, 2017, Sterling filed Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1 with the SEC. Sandler was identified as underwriter of the IPO. 52. On November 16, 2017, the Registration Statement was declared effective by the 76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 77. This Count is asserted against Sterling and the Officer Defendants and is based upon § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 78. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of these defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for the Company’s securities. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about the Company’s finances and business prospects. 80. Information showing that these defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is within these defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of the Company, the Officer Defendants each had knowledge of the details of the Company’s internal affairs. 81. The Officer Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs complained of herein. Because of their positions of control and authority, the Officer Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of the Company. As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Officer Defendants had a duty to disseminate timely, accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company’s businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects. As a result of the dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price of the Company’s securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning the Company’s business and financial condition which were concealed by these defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired the Company’s securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by these defendants, and were damaged thereby. 83. By reason of the foregoing, Sterling and the Officer Defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder in that they: (a) employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) failed to disclose material information; or (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with their purchases of Sterling common stock during the Class Period. 84. As a direct and proximate result of Sterling and the Officer Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 85. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. During the Class Period, the Officer Defendants participated in the operation and management of the Company, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the Company’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about the Company’s misstatement of income and expenses and false financial statements. 88. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Officer Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by the Company which had become materially false or misleading. 89. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Officer Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which the Company disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning the Company’s results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Officer Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause the Company to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Officer Defendants, therefore, were “controlling persons” of the Company within the meaning of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of the Company securities. 91. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in each of the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 92. This Count is asserted against Sterling, Judd, Lopp, the Director Defendants and the Underwriter Defendants for violations of § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, on behalf of all members of the Class who purchased or otherwise acquired Sterling shares issued in or traceable to the IPO. 93. The Registration Statement for the IPO contained untrue statements of material fact and omitted other facts necessary to make the statements not misleading. 94. Judd, Lopp, and the Director Defendants signed the Registration Statement and were officers and/or directors when the Registration Statement became effective and are liable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)(2) and (3). The Underwriter Defendants were underwriters of the IPO Offering and are liable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5). This Count is not based on and does not sound in fraud. Any allegations of fraud or fraudulent conduct and/or motive are specifically excluded from this Count. For purposes of asserting this claim under the Securities Act, Plaintiff does not allege that Sterling, Judd, Lopp, the Director Defendants and the Underwriter Defendants acted with scienter or fraudulent intent, which are not elements of a § 11 claim. 96. The Underwriter Defendants were the underwriters of the IPO. The Underwriter Defendants acted negligently and are liable to members of the Class who purchased or otherwise acquired Sterling securities issued in the IPO. 97. None of these defendants made a reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement and the Prospectus were true and without omissions of any material facts and were not misleading. 98. Plaintiff and other members of the Class who acquired the securities in the IPO pursuant to the Registration Statement did not know of the misrepresentations alleged herein or of the facts concerning the untrue statements of material fact and omissions alleged herein, and could not have reasonably discovered such facts or conduct. Background Violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act (Against Sterling, Judd, Lopp, the Director Defendants and the Underwriter Defendants) Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against the Officer Defendants)

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14. Mercedes House is an apartment building located at 550 West 54th Street, New York, New York. It rents within this buildings, studio apartments, and apartments with one or more bedrooms. 15. Mercedes House’s Website is heavily integrated with its building, serving as its gateway. Through the Website, Mercedes House’s tenants and prospective tenants are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the building, including its location, apartment features and building amenities; view images and floorplans of the apartments; learn about the neighborhood; learn about the available apartments, including that a twelvemonth lease includes one month free rent; learn about the developer, apply for the apartment; book a tour; or contact the leasing office via an online form. 16. It is, upon information and belief, Mercedes House’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its apartment building. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Mercedes House’s apartment building and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. -7- 17. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 18. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about July 16, 2018, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Mercedes House’s apartment building. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is largely because the non-text images lack alt-text describing them. They are not tagged with descriptions, not even file names. Several images are not even detected. Plaintiff Fischler was unable to learn about the apartment layouts because when he selects a floor plan, a pop-up window is opened but no image is detected. He was unable to learn about neighborhood features. When he selected restaurants and cafes, a pop up window opens. However the screen reader is not alerted to the new information and the screen reader's focus is not redirected. b. Navigate the Website. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty navigating the Website due to the repeated use of pop-up windows, which are not compatible with screen readers. He also had difficulty trying to book an appointment, despite repeated efforts he was unsuccessful. 19. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Mercedes House offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non- compliant websites: -8- a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. Document titles are blank. c. Links use general text like "Read More" with no surrounding text explaining the link's purpose. d. PDFs are not tagged and therefore are inaccessible by screen readers. e. Webpages have duplicate IDs which cause problems in screen readers. f. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to a different destination. g. Webpages have markup errors. Mercedes House Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Mercedes House offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Mercedes House’s apartment building and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about available apartments, book an appointment as sighted users can. -9- 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Mercedes House has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 24. Mercedes House therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 26. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Mercedes House lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction -10- under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Mercedes House to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Mercedes House to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 compliant; b. Training Mercedes House employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Mercedes House’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Mercedes House’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility- related problems. 27. Although Mercedes House may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Mercedes House lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Mercedes House has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue -11- from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. Mercedes House has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Mercedes House’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Mercedes House’s apartment building, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Mercedes House’s apartment building, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Mercedes House’s apartment building, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 34. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: -12- a. Whether Mercedes House’s apartment building is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 35. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Mercedes House has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Mercedes House has acted or refused -13- to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 37. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Mercedes House’s apartment building is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Mercedes House’s apartment building. The Website is a service that is integrated with this building. -14- 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are -15- provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. 47. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Mercedes House’s State of New York apartment building constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Mercedes House’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Mercedes House. Mercedes House’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these apartment building. 49. Mercedes House is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York apartment building and the Website. Mercedes House is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 50. Mercedes House is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its New York apartment building to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Mercedes House makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). -16- 51. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 52. Mercedes House’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Mercedes House has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 53. Mercedes House discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Mercedes House’s Website and its New York apartment building under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Mercedes House from continuing to engage in these unlawful -17- practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 54. As Mercedes House’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. Mercedes House’s New York City building is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with that establishment. 57. Mercedes House is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its New York City apartment building and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 58. Mercedes House is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its New York City apartment building to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Mercedes House makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). -18- 59. Mercedes House’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 60. As such, Mercedes House discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Mercedes House from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 61. As Mercedes House’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 62. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -19- 63. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Mercedes House denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its apartment building, which Mercedes House owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Mercedes House, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. ‐  Untrue or Misleading Advertising)  (Unjust Enrichment)  (Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes)  22. Throughout the Class Periods (as defined below), Bayer engaged in a  widespread marketing campaign to mislead consumers about the nature, composition,  and nutritional and health benefits of its One A Day multivitamins in order to make  these multivitamins more desirable to consumers, increase sales, and gain market share.  23. Each type of Bayer One A Day multivitamin is substantially similar to the  multivitamin purchased by Plaintiffs because each multivitamin prominently bears the  One A Day logo, makes one or more of the unlawful Disease Prevention and Energy  Claims, and provides a substantially similar combination of vitamins.   24. Bayer deceptively markets its One A Day multivitamins using the  following unlawful claims:  11 Bayer AG, 2013 Annual Report 110 (2014).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page6 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 6‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 59. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2),  and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Plaintiffs seek to represent the  following classes:  National:  All persons in the United States who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim at any time during the applicable limitations period (the “National  Class Period”).  Excluded from the Class are Defendants’ officers and  directors and the immediate families of Defendants’ officers and directors.   Also excluded from the Class are the Defendants and their subsidiaries,  parents, affiliates, joint venturers, and any entity in which Defendants have  or have had a controlling interest.   California:  All persons in California who purchased Bayer One A Day  multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim between October 15, 2010 and the date of filing (the “California  25 One A Day website, One A Day Energy, http://oneaday.com/energy.html (last visited  Aug. 14, 2014) (emphasis added).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page15 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 15‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 69. Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the unlawful business acts and  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.  70. Plaintiffs and Class Members are consumers who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins for personal, family, or household purposes.  71. Bayer had a statutory duty to refrain from unfair or deceptive acts and  practices in the manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling of One A Day  multivitamins.  72. Bayer violated this duty through its misleading and deceptive marketing  and labeling practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins.   73. Plaintiffs and Class Members were misled or deceived by Bayer’s  misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling practices with respect to its One A  Day multivitamins.   74. As a result of Bayer’s misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling  practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins, Plaintiffs and Class Members  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page18 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 18‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 81. Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege Bayer’s deceptive marketing and  labeling practices as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.   82. As a result of Bayer’s deceptive marketing and labeling of its One A Day  multivitamins, as described above, Bayer was enriched, at the expense of Plaintiffs and  those similarly situated, through the payment of the purchase price for One A Day  multivitamins.   83. Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience  to permit Bayer to retain the ill‐gotten benefits that it received from Plaintiffs and those  similarly situated, in light of the fact that the One A Day multivitamins purchased by the  Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated were not what Bayer purported them to be.  Thus,  it would be unjust or inequitable for Bayer to retain the benefit without restitution to  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page22 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 22‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601 84. Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the untrue or misleading advertising  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above, each of which  constitutes untrue or misleading advertising under California Business and Professions  Code §§ 17500, et seq.  85. At all material times, Bayer engaged in a scheme of offering its One A Day  multivitamin varieties for sale to Plaintiffs and other members of the Class by way of,  inter alia, commercial marketing.  These marketing materials misrepresented or omitted  the true results of taking these multivitamins.  Said advertisements and inducements  were made within the State of California and come within the definition of advertising  as contained in Business and Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. in that such marketing  materials were intended as inducements to purchase One A Day multivitamins and are  statements disseminated by Bayer to Plaintiffs and the Class and were intended to reach  members of the Class.  Bayer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have  known, that these statements were untrue or misleading.   86. In furtherance of this plan and scheme, Bayer has prepared and distributed  within the State of California via commercial marketing, statements that deceptively  represent the ingredients contained in, and the nature and quality of, One A Day  multivitamins.  Consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, necessarily and  reasonably relied on these materials concerning One A Day multivitamins.  Consumers,  including Plaintiffs and the Class, were among the intended targets of such  representations and would reasonably be deceived by such materials.   87. The above acts of Bayer, in disseminating said deceptive and untrue  statements throughout the State of California to consumers, including Plaintiffs and  members of the Class, were and are likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO Document1 Filed10/15/14 Page23 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 23‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601

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19. Defendants operate an American gourmet grocery store located in Morris County in New Jersey. 21. Defendants are associated and joint employers, act in the interest of each other with respect to employees, pay employees by the same method, and share control over the employees. 22. Each Defendant possessed substantial control over Plaintiff Naula’s (and other similarly situated employees’) working conditions, and over the policies and practices with respect to the employment and compensation of Plaintiff Naula, and all similarly situated individuals, referred to herein. 23. Defendants jointly employed Plaintiff Naula (and all similarly situated employees) and are Plaintiff Naula’s (and all similarly situated employees’) employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. 24. In the alternative, Defendants constitute a single employer of Plaintiff Naula and/or similarly situated individuals. 25. During 2020 Defendants had a gross annual volume of sales of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are separately stated). 26. In addition, upon information and belief, Defendants and/or their enterprise were directly engaged in interstate commerce. As an example, numerous items that were used in the gourmet grocery store on a daily basis are goods produced outside of the State of New Jersey. Individual Plaintiff 27. Plaintiff Naula is a former employee of Defendants who was employed as a line cook and a pizza maker. 29. Plaintiff Naula was employed by Defendants from approximately February 9, 2020 until on or about March 31, 2020. 30. Defendants employed Plaintiff Naula as a line cook and a pizza maker. 31. Plaintiff Naula regularly handled goods in interstate commerce, such as produce and other supplies produced outside the State of New Jersey. 32. Plaintiff Naula’s work duties required neither discretion nor independent judgment. 33. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Naula regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 34. From approximately February 9, 2020 until on or about March 31, 2020, Plaintiff Naula worked from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 10:00 p.m., Mondays through Thursdays and from approximately 9:00 a.m. until on or about 10:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Fridays through Sundays (typically 92 to 93 hours per week). 35. From approximately February 9, 2020 until on or about March 31, 2020, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff Naula for any of his hours worked. 36. For approximately seven weeks, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff Naula any wages for his hours worked. 37. Defendants never granted Plaintiff Naula any breaks or meal periods of any kind. 38. Plaintiff Naula was not required to keep track of his time, nor to his knowledge, did the Defendants utilize any time tracking device such as punch cards, that accurately reflected his actual hours worked. Defendants’ General Employment Practices 40. Plaintiff Naula was a victim of Defendants’ common policy and practices which violate his rights under the FLSA and New Jersey Labor Law by, inter alia, not paying him the wages he was owed for the hours he worked. 41. Defendants’ pay practices resulted in Plaintiff Naula not receiving payment for any of his hours worked, and resulted in Plaintiff Naula’s effective rate of pay falling below the required minimum wage rate. 42. Defendants habitually required Plaintiff Naula to work additional hours beyond his regular shifts but did not provide him with any additional compensation. 43. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA by failing to maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records. 44. Upon information and belief, these practices by Defendants were done willfully to disguise the actual number of hours Plaintiff Naula (and similarly situated individuals) worked, and to avoid paying Plaintiff Naula properly for his full hours worked. 45. Defendants engaged in their unlawful conduct pursuant to a corporate policy of minimizing labor costs and denying employees compensation by knowingly violating the FLSA. 46. Defendants’ unlawful conduct was intentional, willful, in bad faith, and caused significant damages to Plaintiff Naula and other similarly situated former workers. 50. Plaintiff Naula repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 51. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were Plaintiff Naula’s employers within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class Members), controlled the terms and conditions of their employment, and determined the rate and method of any compensation in exchange for their employment. 52. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. 54. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members) at the applicable minimum hourly rate, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 55. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members) at the applicable minimum hourly rate was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 56. Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members) were damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 57. Plaintiff Naula repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 58. Defendants, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), failed to pay Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members) overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. 59. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members), overtime compensation was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 60. Plaintiff Naula (and the FLSA Class members) were damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Defendants Constitute Joint Employers VIOLATION OF THE MINIMUM WAGE PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA

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(Violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983) (Violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1) 13. Following completion of a ride, Uber calculates a fare based on a base amount, ride distance, and time spent in transit, which may be multiplied during "surge" periods if rider demand is high and/or driver supply is low, and then processes a transaction on behalf of the driver. Uber then collects a percentage of the fare as a software licensing fee and remits the remainder to the driver-partner. 14. Uber users like Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, provide their name, mobile number, email, language, and credit card numbers or PayPal account information to Uber in exchange for an Uber account and access to the Uber App. To become an Uber account holder, an individual first must agree to Uber's terms and conditions and privacy policy. 15. Uber account holders can obtain a "Fare Quote" directly from the Uber App by entering their pickup location and destination. The Uber App calculates the approximate amount based on the expected time and distance. A rider pays a driver a fare in a transaction facilitated by Uber, but to which Uber is not a party. Uber facilitates payment of that fare by charging the user's credit card or Pay Pal billing information on file and purportedly serves as the drivers' "limited payment collection agent" in this regard. Uber then sends a receipt to the user's email address. The Uber Driver 17. Uber has steadfastly maintained that the driver-partners are not employees of Uber, not part of any Uber joint venture, and are wholly independent. In exchange for being listed on the Uber App, the drivers agree to pay a percentage of the fare to Uber. The fares are calculated based on an Uber-generated algorithm. As demand for car services increases among users, applying the Uber algorithm results in increased fares or "surge pricing.” Defendants’ surge pricing model allows for up to eight times the standard fare to be charged during periods of high demand. Defendants, with the drivers conspiring with them, have employed surge pricing on a regular basis. 18. Uber has not publicly revealed the specifics of its pricing algorithm. Upon information and belief, Defendant Kalanick conceived of and implemented the "surge pricing" model into the Uber algorithm to artificially manipulate supply and demand by imposing surge pricing on drivers who would otherwise compete against one another on price. Kalanick and Uber control the fares charged to riders. Through the pricing algorithm and its surge pricing component, Kalanick and Uber artificially set the fares for its driver-partners to charge to riders. 19. Although they are independent partners, the drivers are not controlling the fare. Uber uses "surge pricing" to incentivize its driver-partners to use the Uber App during periods of peak demand. Uber provides alerts to its driver-partners relating to "surge pricing" based on demand or limited availability of drivers. 21. Uber manipulates its pricing algorithm by, among other things, encouraging drivers who are not available or willing to receive trip requests to log out of the Uber App in order to show less supply (which equates to higher fares). 22. Defendant Kalanick has stated “you want supply to always be full, and you use price to basically either bring more supply on or get more supply off, or get more demand in the system or get some demand out. It's classic Econ 101." Kalanick has further explained the power of his surge pricing model by revealing that “when demand outstrips supply, the price comes up in a particular neighborhood or across a city." With the power of this app, Defendants and their conspiring drivers reap artificially high profits during peak demand periods like New Year's Eve, Houston Livestock and Rodeo, and major sporting events. The Drivers Involvement in Price Fixing 23. All of the independent driver-partners have agreed to charge the fares set by Uber's pricing algorithm. Uber purports to allow its driver-partners to depart downward from the fare set by the Uber algorithm. In reality, however, drivers cannot do so. The drivers collect fares through the Uber App, rather than through a direct transaction with the rider. Accordingly, Uber controls the fare. The driver-partners agree to adhere to it because the artificial rates set by the pricing algorithm are higher on average than the fares that Plaintiff and Class Members would otherwise be charged in a competitive marketplace. 25. But for Defendants and Uber drivers’ conspiracy to fix fares charged by drivers using the Uber App, Uber ride-share service fares would have been substantially lower, including during the implementation of surge pricing. Absent these anticompetitive actions, riders would have been able to obtain rates resulting from fare competition among drivers. Defendants’ imposition of surge pricing is not to perfectly match supply with demand as purported, but instead to remove some demand so that prices stay artificially high and Defendants and drivers reap artificially high profits. 26. Upon information and belief, Kalanick's Uber ride-share service comprises approximately 80 percent of the mobile app-generated ride-share service market. As a result of Kalanick's anticompetitive actions, competition in the market for mobile app-generated ride-share service, and the sub-market of Uber car service, has been restrained. Statewide Class 27. Plaintiff sues on behalf of himself and a class of persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Class consists of all persons in the State of Texas who, on one or more occasions, have used the Uber App to obtain a ride from an Uber driver-partner and paid a fare for that ride set by the Uber pricing algorithm. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their co-conspirators, their employees, officers, directors, and legal representatives and heirs. 28. The persons in the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is impracticable under the circumstances of this case. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, the exact size of the Class is easily ascertainable, as each Class member can be identified by using Defendant's records and/or the records of Uber. Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are many thousands of Class members. 30. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Class' claims, as they arise out of the same course of conduct and the same legal theories as the rest of the Class, and Plaintiff challenges the practices and course of conduct engaged in by Defendant with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained as Class Counsel able class action litigators. 33. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. 34. Plaintiff does not believe it is necessary to prove a relevant market. To the extent one is required the relevant product market is mobile app-generated ride-share service, with a relevant sub-market of Uber car service. 35. To the extent required, the relevant geographical market is the State of Texas. 36. Kalanick, Uber, and Uber's driver-partners have entered into an unlawful agreement, combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Specifically, Kalanick coordinated an unlawful agreement among the Uber driver-partners to adhere to the Uber pricing algorithm (including its Surge Pricing component) for fares charged to Uber riders. 37. This unlawful arrangement consists of a series of vertical agreements between Kalanick and each of the Uber driver-partners, as well as a horizontal agreement among the Uber driver-partners to adhere to the Uber pricing algorithm. 38. Were it not for their understanding that the other driver-partners were agreeing to the same thing, some driver-partners would not have entered the vertical agreements with Kalanick and Uber. 39. Through Kalanick's and Uber's actions, the Uber driver-partners have been enabled to participate in a horizontal agreement amongst themselves to adhere to the artificial price setting embodied in the Uber pricing algorithm. Defendant and Uber have sought to obscure the unlawful nature of this arrangement by disingenuously claiming that Uber driver-partners can charge a lower fare than the one generated by the Uber algorithm. At the same time, Defendant and Uber tout the ability for Uber driver-partners to earn more money by adhering to the Uber algorithm, and they facilitate Uber driver-partners' opportunities to meet together. 41. Despite Kalanick's position as a vertical market participant, his organizing of the conspiracy subjects him to per se liability for the results of the horizontal price-fixing agreement just as much as if operated at the same level as the driver-partners. 42. In addition, Kalanick's role as an occasional Uber driver puts him in a horizontal relationship with his driver-partner peers, which further supports per se treatment of his arrangements in restraint of trade. 43. Plaintiff and the Class members have been injured and will continue to be injured in their businesses and property by paying more for Uber car service than they would have paid or would pay in the future in the absence of Defendant's unlawful acts. 44. Plaintiff and the Class members have sustained substantial damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 45. The unlawful contracts, agreements, arrangements or combinations will continue unless permanently enjoined and restrained. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to an injunction that terminates the ongoing violations alleged in this Complaint. 46. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. 47. Through unlawful contracts, agreements, arrangements or combinations, Defendant has restrained trade in violation of Section 15.01 et. seq., of the Texas Business and Commerce Code also known as the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. 48. For the same reasons that Kalanick is liable for a Sherman Act violation for orchestrating an unlawful price fixing agreement among the Uber driver-partners, so too is he liable under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. 50. Plaintiff and the Class members have been injured and will continue to be injured in their businesses and property by paying more for Uber car service than they would have paid or would pay in the future in the absence of Defendant's unlawful acts. 51. Plaintiff and the Class members have sustained substantial damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 52. The unlawful contracts, agreements, arrangements or combinations will continue unless permanently enjoined and restrained. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to an injunction that terminates the ongoing violations alleged in this Complaint. Plaintiff Ryan Swink, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, by and through his counsel of record, Bruse Loyd and Kathleen A. O’Connor of Jones Gillaspia & Loyd, LLP, files this First Amended Original Complaint against Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) and its Chief Executive Officer and co-founder, Travis Kalanick ("Kalanick"), alleging as follows: What is Uber?

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18. Best Buy is an international retailer of consumer electronics. With over 1,000 stores located within the United States, and 30 stores in Georgia alone, Best Buy is one of the largest and most prominent retailers in the nation. 20. By deceiving consumers about the Products’ mAh, Best Buy is able to sell more of, and charge more for, the Products than it could if they were labeled accurately. Further, Best Buy is incentivized to mislead consumers to take away market share from competing products, thereby increasing its own sales and profits. 21. All of the Products are marketed, sold, and advertised in a substantially similar manner, and there is no non-trivial difference amongst the models other than the differences in purported mAh. 23. Best Buy draws attention to its Products’ mAh by prominently displaying the mAh rating on advertising materials and the product package. B ) The Products Cannot Deliver The Full mAh Amount To PEDs As Advertised 24. Best Buy knew at the time it sold the Products that they were incapable of delivering the mAh it promised. 25. In very basic terms, the Products consist of an internal battery cell (or series of batteries’ cells) and a circuit board that controls the technology. The Products’ circuit boards convert the internal batteries’ charge to a voltage that PEDs, like cell phones, can accept. 27. This conversion and distribution process necessarily reduces the amount of mAh delivered into a PED. 28. Reasonable consumers such as the Ms. Robinson read the advertised mAh and would expect and understand that the Products can actually deliver that mAh amount, not that they are incapable of doing so. 29. Because of the process described above, Best Buy knows the Products are technologically incapable of delivering the amount of mAh Best Buy represents. 30. Ms. Robinson hired an experienced and reputable outside laboratory to perform tests on the same model of INSIGNIA battery she purchased (INSIGNIA 8000), as well as on the 2600 mAh Product models. These tests were done in accordance with recognized engineering standards. 32. On November 7, 2018, while in Georgia, Ms. Robinson saw and relied on Best Buy’s mAh representations about the INSIGNIA 8000. 33. On INSIGNIA’s package, Best Buy said that the INSIGNIA 8000 had “8000 mAh.” 34. Ms. Robinson purchased the INSIGNIA 8000. 35. After purchasing the INSIGNIA 8000, Ms. Robinson was disappointed to find she was forced to recharge the INSIGNIA 8000 more often than she expected. 36. Ms. Robinson, like any reasonable consumer and member of the putative classes, would not have purchased the Product, or would have paid less, had she known the truth about its mAh. 37. On July 9, 2019, Ms. Robinson’s counsel sent Best Buy a letter informing them of the harm caused by Best Buy’s deceptive acts. 38. Best Buy has not remedied the situation for Ms. Robinson or the classes that Ms. Robinson represents. 40. Additionally, Ms. Robinson brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals within certain States (the “Multi-State Class”), defined as follows: All consumers who purchased the Products in California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington. Excluded from the Multi-State Class are any of Best Buy’s officers, directors, or employees; officers, directors, or employees of any entity in which Best Buy currently has or has had a controlling interest; and Best Buy’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns. 41. The Georgia Class and Multi-State Class are referred to collectively as the “Classes.” 42. Ms. Robinson reserves the right to later alter the Classes’ definitions in any manner allowed by law. 43. At this time, Ms. Robinson does not know the exact number of members of the Classes; however, based on Best Buy’s sales, market research, and publicly available information, Ms. Robinson believes that the number of members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Best Buy is a major player in the power bank market. 45. Ms. Robinson’s claims are typical of those of the Classes. Like all members of the Classes, Ms. Robinson purchased Best Buy’s Products bearing the claim that the Product’s ability to deliver mAh was greater than it really is. And like all Class Members, Ms. Robinson sustained damages from Best Buy’s wrongful conduct. There is nothing unusual or distinct about Ms. Robinson’s claims compared with others who meet the class definitions. 46. Ms. Robinson will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer products class actions. Ms. Robinson has no interests which conflict with those of the Classes. 48. No member of the Classes has a substantial interest in individually prosecuting a separate action. The damages for each individual member of the Classes likely will be relatively small compared with the costs of this complex litigation. Thus, absent a class mechanism, it would be virtually impossible for class members to obtain an effective remedy. 49. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive or equitable relief are met, as Best Buy has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the members of the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. 50. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Classes would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Best Buy. For example, one court might enjoin Best Buy from selling any Products, whereas another might require label changes. Additionally, individual actions could be dispositive of the interests of the members of the Classes even where certain members of the Classes are not parties to such actions. 51. Best Buy’s conduct is generally applicable to the Classes as a whole and Ms. Robinson seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Classes. As such, Best Buy’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. A) BEST BUY Markets Its Products By Emphasizing Their mAh.

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(CALIFORNIA CLASS) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. – Unlawful Conduct Prong of the UCL) 126. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 127. California Business & Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 128. Defendant’s representations and omissions are “unlawful” because they violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”) and its implementing regulations, including: (ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) (Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. – False and Misleading Advertising) 147. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 148. California False Advertising Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code sections 17500 and 17508) prohibits “mak[ing] any false or misleading advertising claim.” 149. Defendant makes “false [and] misleading advertising claim[s],” by deceiving consumers as to the absolute and relative amounts of vanilla and natural ingredients in the Product. 150. In reliance on these false and misleading advertising claims, Plaintiff and class members purchased and consumed the Product without the knowledge it contained a de minimis amount of natural vanilla and a substantial amount of non-vanilla flavors, including from synthetic sources. 151. Defendant knew or should have known that its representations and omissions were likely to deceive consumers. 152. As a result, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief, restitution, and an seek an order for the disgorgement of the funds by which Defendant was unjustly enriched. 1. 21 U.S.C. § 343, which deems food misbranded when the label contains a statement that is “false or misleading in any particular,” with “misleading” defined to “take[] into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material”; 2. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n), which states the nature of a false and misleading advertisement; 3. 21 C.F.R. § 101.18(b), which prohibits true statements about food ingredients and descriptions that are misleading in light of the presence of other ingredients;

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41. Plains is a publicly-traded master limited partnership, or MLP, involved in interstate and intrastate crude oil pipeline transportation and crude oil storage activities that has grown into one of North America’s largest energy pipeline operators. That growth has been achieved through a two-decade acquisition binge during which Plains acquired significant pipelines and terminal systems – many of them aging and in need of significant repair – in California, Texas and Canada, among other places. 97. As alleged herein, the Company, Plains Holdings, and the Officer Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated in or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, the Company, Plains Holdings, and the Officer Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Plains, their control over, and receipt or modification of Plains allegedly materially misleading statements, and their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Plains, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. All Defendants ............................................................................................... 41  COUNT IV Violations Of Section 12(a)(2) Of The Securities Act Against The Underwriter Defendants ............................................................ 42  COUNT I Violations Of Section 10(b) Of The Exchange Act And Rule 10b-5 Against Plains, Plains Holdings And The Officer Defendants ..................................................................................................... 39  The Officer Defendants And The Director Defendants ................................ 43  XI.  PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................ 44  V.  DEFENDANTS’ FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS ................... 15  A.  Line 901 Ruptures, Causing Extensive Damage To The Santa Barbara Coastline ...................................................................... 30  B.  Plains Senior Executives Conceal The True Extent And Scope Of The Spill .............................................................................. 31  C.  Regulatory And Congressional Investigations Reveal Further Information Concerning Plains’ Defective Pipeline Maintenance, Monitoring And Spill Response ..................... 32  D.  Plains Reveals The Line 901 Spill Was Far More Severe Than Reported ..................................................................................... 33  VI.  VII.  PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE: FRAUD ON THE MARKET DOCTRINE ................................................................................. 34  VIII.  LOSS CAUSATION/ECONOMIC LOSS .................................................... 35  IX. 

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21. Defendant is a furniture store that operates its furniture store as well as the Website to the public. The furniture store is located at 2652 Broadway, New York, New York. Defendant’s furniture store constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s furniture store provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the furniture store location and hours, furniture, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the furniture store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s furniture store. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s furniture store and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the furniture store, furniture, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the furniture store for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical furniture store on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to purchase furniture. 29. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s furniture store’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s furniture store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s furniture store. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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21. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Plaintiff brings his First Cause of Action as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf of himself and the following collective: All persons employed by Defendants at any time since February 10, 2013 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) who worked as electricians and helpers (the “Collective Action Members”). 22. A collective action is appropriate in this circumstance because Plaintiff and the Collective Action members are similarly situated, in that they were all subjected to Defendants’ illegal policies, including, but not limited to, failing to pay overtime premiums for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours each week. As a result of this policy, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members did not receive the legally-required overtime premium payments for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 23. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members have substantially similar job duties and are paid pursuant to a similar, if not the same, payment structure. 24. Pursuant to the NYLL and the New York common law, Plaintiff brings his Second through Sixth Causes of Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the following class: All persons employed by Defendants at any time since February 10, 2010 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Unpaid Wages Class Period”) who worked as electricians and helpers (the “Unpaid Wages Class Members”). 25. The Unpaid Wages Class Members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Unpaid Wages Class Members are determinable from the records of Defendants. 6 For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Rule 23. 26. The Unpaid Wages Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Unpaid Wages Class Members is unknown to Plaintiff, the facts on which the calculation of that number can be based are presently within the sole control of Defendants. 27. Upon information and belief, there are in excess of forty (40) Class Members. 28. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Unpaid Wages Class Members and such questions predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Unpaid Wages Class Members. Such common questions will determine Defendants’ liability to all (or nearly all) Unpaid Wages Class Members. These common questions include: a. whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members within the meaning of the NYLL; b. whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members; c. whether Defendants failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members for all hours worked over forty (40) in a given week; d. whether Defendants breached contracts with local, state and/or federal governmental entities by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members, who were third-party beneficiaries of such contracts, at New York State and/or New York City prevailing wage rates; e. whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members overtime hours at the prevailing wage overtime rates for all hours 7 worked on prevailing wage projects in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek or eight (8) hours per day; f. whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members supplemental benefits on prevailing wage jobs as required by the New York City and New York State prevailing wage schedules; g. whether Defendants were unjustly enriched by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members at prevailing wage rates on prevailing wage jobs; h. whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members with proper wage notices and wage statements; i. whether Defendants’ failure to properly pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members lacked a good faith basis; and j. whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 29. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Unpaid Wages Class Members’ claims. Plaintiff, like all Unpaid Wages Class Members, is an electrician who worked for Defendants pursuant to their corporate policies. Plaintiff, like all Unpaid Wages Class Members, was, inter alia, not paid overtime wages for all hours worked over forty (40) in a given workweek; not paid prevailing wages, supplemental benefits or daily/weekly overtime prevailing wages for work performed on NYCHA housing developments; and was not provided with proper wage notice and wage statements. If Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for the Class claims enumerated in this Complaint, they are also liable to all Unpaid Wages Class Members. 30. The Plaintiff and his Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class. There 8 are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wages Class Members, and the Plaintiff brings this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Unpaid Wages Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover his own damages. 31. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action litigators who are well-prepared to represent the interests of the Unpaid Wages Class Members. 32. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendants are sophisticated parties with substantial resources. The individual plaintiff lacks the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against the Corporate Defendant. The individual members of the Class have no interest or capacity to bring separate actions; Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy; it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in one case; and there are no likely difficulties that will arise in managing the class action. The Tax Fraud Class 33. Pursuant to 26 U.S. Code § 7434, Plaintiff Lythcott brings his Seventh cause of action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the following Class: All persons employed by Defendants from February 10, 2010 through the entry of judgment in this action (the “Tax Fraud Class Period”) who received incorrect Form W2s from Defendants and all other employees for whom Defendants filed fraudulent tax information (the “Tax Fraud Class Members”). 34. The Tax Fraud Class Members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Tax Fraud Class Members are determinable from the records of Defendants. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 23. 35. The Tax Fraud Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 36. Upon information and belief, there are well in excess of forty (40) Tax Fraud Class Members. 37. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Tax Fraud Class Members and such questions predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Tax Fraud Class Members. Such common questions will determine Defendants’ liability to all (or nearly all) Tax Fraud Class Members. These common questions include: a. whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Tax Fraud Class Members; b. whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records for all wages paid and tax withholdings taken by Defendants to Plaintiff and the Tax Fraud Class Members; c. whether Defendants failed to issue the tax authorities accurate information reports which included all wages paid and tax withholdings taken by Defendants to Plaintiff and the Tax Fraud Class Members for the relevant tax year; and d. whether Defendants’ failure to file accurate information returns was done willfully and with the intent to avoid certain tax obligations; and e. whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to statutory damages, actual damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 38. The answer to these questions would drive resolution of the litigation. If a judge and/or jury agrees with Plaintiff on these issues, Defendants would be liable to all Tax Fraud Class Members for their tax fraud violations. 10 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Tax Fraud Class Members’ claims. Plaintiff Lythcott, like all Tax Fraud Class Members, is an electrical employee of Defendants who worked for Defendants pursuant to their corporate policies. Plaintiff Lythcott, like all Tax Fraud Class Members, was, inter alia, issued fraudulent tax documents including Form W2s which did not reflect all of his wages paid and/or tax withholdings taken by Defendants. If Defendants are liable to Plaintiff Lythcott for the claims enumerated in this Complaint, they are also liable to all Tax Fraud Class Members. 40. Plaintiff and his Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class. There are no conflicts between Plaintiff Lythcott and the Tax Fraud Class Members, and Plaintiff brings this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Tax Fraud Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover his own damages. 41. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action litigators who are well-prepared to represent the interests of the Tax Fraud Class Members. 42. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 43. Defendants are sophisticated parties with substantial resources. The individual plaintiff lacks the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants. The individual members of the Class have no interest or capacity to bring separate actions; Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy; it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in one case; and there are no likely difficulties that will arise in managing the class action. 11 44. At all relevant times, Defendant Lintech has been in the electrical contracting business. Upon information and belief, Defendants currently own, operate and manage an electrical contracting company located at 3006 Tilden Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11226. 45. According to the website for Lintech, “Lintech is a MNC Company with head quarters at Brooklyn, USA which created many firsts in Brooklyn in terms of Solar Energy Management System & other electrical & mechanical services.…Over the years our engineers and technicians have encountered many different types of electrical, plumbing, solar plant, mechanical & automobile installation. …Whether you’re building out new space, renovating an existing facility, or are in need of building repairs, our staff of skilled professionals can complete the projects to your complete satisfaction.” Lintech, according to the web site, “serve[s] many industries, including Automotive, Building Automation, Home Technologies, Medical Devices, Power Tools and Lawn & Garden” and focuses its core business on “project management, in house Voltora electrical sign, electrical installation, planned maintenance, energy saving surveys & reporting, inspection testing of all electrical systems and carbon reduction planning.” (http://www.lintechelectric.com) 46. Upon information and belief, “Derrick” and “Clive” were supervisors of the Corporate Defendant. Upon information and belief, Defendant Tudor is in constant contact with Derrick, Clive and other supervisors to ensure that the company is operating in accordance with their standards and policies, including the unlawful policies complained of herein. B. The Public Works Contracts 47. Upon information and belief, Defendants have entered into certain contracts, as 12 either a subcontractor or prime contractor, with public agencies to provide electrical work on government projects within the City of New York, including but not limited to certain NYCHA developments, or with prime contractors not currently known, to furnish labor, material and equipment to perform work on the Public Works Projects (the “Public Works Contracts”). 48. Upon information and belief, the Public Works Contracts obligated Defendants to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members at or above the local prevailing wage rates, including any required supplemental benefits and overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, eight (8) hours per day, hours worked on Saturday and Sunday and hours worked during the evening. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff proper prevailing wage rates, supplemental benefits and overtime premiums was a corporate policy that also applied to all of Defendants’ other similarly situated employees. 49. As employees of Defendants who were assigned to work on Defendants’ publicly- financed projects, Plaintiff and the Class Members were intended third-party beneficiaries of Defendants’ Public Works Contracts. 50. As required by law, a schedule containing the prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits (“prevailing wage schedules”) to be paid to the plaintiff Class should have been annexed to and formed a part of the Public Works Contracts. If not annexed to the Public Works Contracts, these schedules were expressly or impliedly incorporated into the contracts as a matter of law and/or public policy. 51. The promise to pay and ensure payment of the prevailing wage and supplemental benefit rate stated in the Public Works Contracts was made for the benefit of all workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects and, as such, the workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects are the beneficiaries of that promise and the 13 contracts entered into between Defendants and government agencies. 52. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of the Public Works Contracts entered into by Defendants, Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class performed various electrical tasks, including, but not limited to, running power from basements to sidewalk bridges, lights and elevators, setting and connecting pipes, pulling and connecting wires, boarding and running power from panel boxes, installing breakers, connectors and fixtures, pulling wires through conduits and setting up scaffolding for repairs and asbestos removal. 53. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff should have been paid at the prevailing rate of wages (including supplemental benefits) of: a. July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010: $47.00 plus $39.24 in supplemental benefits per hour;1 b. July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011: $49.00 plus $40.40 in supplemental benefits per hour; c. July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012: $49.00 plus $40.16 in supplemental benefits per hour; d. July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013: $49.00 plus $40.16 in supplemental benefits per hour; e. July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014: $52.00 plus $46.13 in supplemental benefits per hour; f. July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015: $53.00 plus $47.54 in supplemental benefits per hour; 1 The rates listed below are those of an “Electrician ‘A’” from the Office of the Comptroller, City of New York’s § 220 Prevailing Wage Schedules. 14 g. July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016: $54.00 plus $50.03 in supplemental benefits per hour. C. Plaintiff’s Work for Defendants 54. At all relevant times, Plaintiff performed electrical services for Defendants in New York City. Throughout his employment period, Plaintiff performed work on numerous NYCHA developments pursuant to a three (3) year contract between NYCHA and Lintech. 55. Plaintiff Lythcott worked for Defendants as a helper for approximately one (1) month in or around September 2012 and an electrician from in or around mid-May 2015 through in or around late October 2015 (the “Lythcott Employment Period”). 56. As an electrician, Plaintiff Lythcott performed electrical work on numerous NYCHA developments, including LaGuardia Houses, Roosevelt Houses, Sumner Houses, Mariner’s Harbor Houses, South Beach Houses, Marcy Houses, Isaacs Houses and Pennsylvania-Wortman Houses, from in or around May 2015 through in or around October 2015. As a helper, Lythcott primarily performed work on private homes. 57. As a helper, Plaintiff Lythcott’s duties included breaking concrete and sidewalks, digging holes to run pipes, pulling wires and screwing panel boxes into the walls so that Con Edison could run lines and install meters in front of houses. As an electrician, Plaintiff Lythcott’s duties included running power from basements to sidewalk bridges, lights and elevators, setting and connecting pipes, pulling and connecting wires, boarding and running power from panel boxes, installing breakers, connectors and fixtures, pulling wires through conduits and setting up scaffolding for repairs and asbestos removal. 58. For approximately one (1) month in or around September 2012, when Plaintiff Lythcott worked as a helper, he typically worked four to five (4-5) days per week, Monday 15 through Friday, from between approximately 8:00 am and 8:30 am to between approximately 5:30 pm and 6:00 pm, for a total of approximately forty-five (45) hours per week. 59. From in or around May 2015 through in or around October 2015, when he worked as an electrician, Plaintiff Lythcott typically worked five (5) days per week, Monday through Friday, from between approximately 7:00 am and 8:00 to between approximately 5:00 pm and 6:00 pm, and sometimes later, for a total of approximately forty-six to forty-eight (46-48) hours per week. Although he was scheduled to work from 7:00 am to 4:00 pm, Plaintiff Lythcott was required to remain on the job site until the work was finished, which was typically one to two (1- 2) hours past his scheduled shift. 60. For approximately one (1) month in or around September 2012, when Plaintiff Lythcott worked as a helper, he typically received fifty dollars ($50.00) per day for his work, after taxes. For approximately two (2) weeks in or around May 2015, Plaintiff Lythcott earned one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) per day, after taxes. From in or around June 2015 through in or around October 2015, Plaintiff Lythcott received two hundred dollars ($200.00) per day, after taxes. On the two (2) occasions that Plaintiff Lythcott received a paystub, he observed that his “hourly rate” was thirty-five dollars and eighty-five cents ($35.85). Prior to receiving paystubs that showed an hourly rate, Lythcott had been informed by his supervisors that he would receive either one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) or two hundred dollars ($200.00) per day for his work, not an hourly-based pay. 61. Throughout the Lythcott Employment Period, Plaintiff Lythcott did not receive benefits of any kind, much less correct supplemental benefits for his work on NYCHA housing developments, nor was he paid the prevailing wage in effect at that time. 62. When he worked as a helper, Plaintiff Lythcott was paid entirely in cash. He 16 typically received his cash payments from “Clive,” a Lintech supervisor. From in or around May 2015 through in or around October 2015, Plaintiff Lythcott received his wages entirely in check. Plaintiff Lythcott typically picked up his checks at Lintech’s main office located at 3006 Tilden Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11226. The checks that Plaintiff Lythcott received often contained the names of the NYCHA development(s) on which he had worked during the relevant pay period. 63. Throughout his employment period, Plaintiff Lythcott received a flat day rate that did not vary with the number of hours that he worked. Thus, although he typically worked well in excess of forty (40) hours per week, Plaintiff Lythcott did not receive overtime premiums of one and one-half (1.5) times his hourly rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40). 64. On only two (2) occasions, which were the last two (2) weeks of his employment period, Plaintiff Lythcott received a paystub showing his hourly rate. Despite the fact that Plaintiff Lythcott worked in excess of forty (40) hours for both weeks, the paystubs showed payment for only forty (40) hours per week. At no point prior to the last two (2) weeks of his employment did Plaintiff Lythcott receive a written notification of his regular hourly rate, a paystub showing the number of hours that he worked or any other document showing his regular hourly rate, his overtime rate or his hours worked. 65. When Plaintiff Lythcott worked as a helper, Clive kept track of the hours that Plaintiff Lythcott and his crewmembers worked and reported this information to the main office. From in or around May 2015 through in or around October 2015, Defendants kept track of the hours that Lythcott worked by requiring him to record his arrival and departure times on a NYCHA sign-in sheet specifically for electricians on the job site, signed by a Lintech supervisor. Although he often signed in and out exactly when he arrived and left the job site, he did not receive proper overtime premiums when he worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day or forty 17 (40) hours per week. 66. When employees signed in and out, supervisors “Derrick” and “Clive” would frequently instruct them not to write down their overtime hours on the sign-in sheet. 67. On at least two (2) occasions in 2015, Plaintiff Lythcott observed investigators on NYCHA job sites. On one occasion, a supervisor, “Clive,” instructed Lythcott to ignore any questions about his wages or inform investigators that he made one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) per week “after tax.” On another occasion, when investigators arrived on the job site, “Derrick” instructed Plaintiff Lythcott and several of his coworkers not to speak to them and to move to a secluded area that was out of the investigators’ line of sight, despite the fact that they had been assigned to do bridging work and take down lamps at the front of the building. 68. On at least one occasion, Plaintiff Lythcott overheard “Derrick” inform a coworker that the company “doesn’t pay overtime, just flat pay” when a coworker asked why he was not receiving proper overtime pay. 69. When Plaintiff Lythcott asked Derrick why he was not receiving the applicable prevailing wage, Derrick replied that it was “not on him” and urged him to ask Defendant Tudor. Approximately two (2) or three (3) days after he asked about his wages, Derrick informed Plaintiff Lythcott that work was “slowing down” and that he was not needed on the job site. However, Lintech was still active on multiple projects and called another electrician back to work shortly after Lythcott was terminated. 70. Although Plaintiff Lythcott was generally permitted to take a thirty (30) minute break, he was occasionally denied a break because he was required to perform other tasks. 71. In January 2016, Plaintiff Lythcott received a Form W2 from Defendants for his earnings from working for Defendants in 2015. The Form W2 showed that his total federal 18 income taxes withheld for 2015 was thirty-two dollars and ninety-one cents ($32.91) despite the fact that Lythcott’s Federal Income Tax withholdings on the two (2) paystubs that he received, were two hundred and forty-seven dollars and thirty-two cents ($247.32) and fifty dollars and ninety-three cents ($50.93), respectively. While Defendants claimed to have been withholding taxes from Plaintiff’s wages each week, and in fact told Plaintiff that the wages he was being paid was “after taxes,” the Form W2 reflects an incorrect amount of federal income taxes withheld by the Defendants. 72. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ filing of false information returns for Plaintiff is a corporate policy of Defendants’ which applied to all of their employees. 73. Plaintiff Lythcott has spoken to Defendants’ other employees on various job sites, who were also not paid overtime premiums for hours in excess of forty (40) each workweek, who also did not receive correct prevailing wages, and who received Form W2s which reflected an incorrect amount of federal taxes withheld. 74. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime premiums of one and one-half (1.5) times the regularly hourly rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week was a corporate policy that applied to all electricians employed by Defendants. 75. Upon information and belief, during the period of time for which Plaintiff and the members of the putative Class performed work on NYCHA housing developments, Defendants failed to ensure payment of the correct prevailing rate of wages and supplemental benefits, including overtime pay, to which Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class were entitled. 76. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and their other similarly situated employees with proper wage notices at the time of hire or on February 1 of each year or proper wage statement(s) with every payment of wages or accurate wage statements pursuant to the NYLL. 19 77. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Collective Action Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 78. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 79. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members at the correct overtime wages for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 80. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 81. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as described in this Class and Collective Action Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Class and Collective Action Complaint were unlawful. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 82. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 20 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Unpaid Wage Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 84. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants, and protect Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members. 85. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members the proper overtime wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 86. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members one and one-half (1.5) times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 87. Through its knowing or intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, Defendants have willfully violated the NYLL, Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations. 88. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 21 89. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Unpaid Wage Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 90. Upon information and belief, the Public Works Contracts entered into by Defendants contained schedules of the prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits to be paid to Plaintiff and the employees performing work pursuant to such contracts. 91. Those prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits were made part of the Public Works Contracts for the benefit of the Plaintiff and the other employees performing work pursuant to such contracts. In the event that the contracts or agreements entered into failed to explicitly contain prevailing wage schedules, the prevailing wage requirements were supplemented as a matter of law, requiring Defendants to pay the Plaintiff and Unpaid Wage Class Members prevailing wages, daily/weekly overtime and supplemental benefits for all work performed. 92. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at the correct prevailing wage rates for straight time, overtime, and supplemental benefits for work performed on Public Works Projects constituted a material breach of the contracts entered into directly or indirectly between Defendants and certain public entities. 93. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at prevailing wage rates, he is entitled to relief from Defendants for breach of contract under New York common law of contracts. 22 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Unpaid Wage Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 95. Based on Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members the appropriate prevailing wage rates, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff. 96. Equity and good conscience require that Defendants pay restitution to Plaintiff. 97. Upon information and belief, when Defendants entered into the contract, they agreed to pay the required prevailing wages, overtime, shift-differential and holiday premiums, and supplemental benefit rates of pay to Plaintiff and other employees who performed work pursuant to the contracts. 98. Plaintiff provided valuable services to Defendants performing prevailing wage jobs for which Plaintiff expected compensation. Defendants knowingly accepted such services yet failed to pay Plaintiff the reasonable value of such services as defined by the New York State and New York City prevailing wage schedules. 99. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at prevailing wage rates on prevailing wage jobs and Defendants’ corresponding unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of unjust enrichment. 100. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff the reasonable value of the valuable services they rendered, Plaintiff is entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of quantum meruit. 23 A. Defendants’ Company BREACH OF CONTRACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members) FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT – UNPAID OVERTIME (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members) FRAUDULENT FILING OF INFORMATION RETURNS (On Behalf Of Plaintiff and the Tax Fraud Class Members) 108. Plaintiff Lythcott, on behalf of himself and the Tax Fraud Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 109. Defendants filed fraudulent information returns on behalf of Plaintiff Lythcott and the Tax Fraud Class Members in violation of 26 U.S. Code § 7434 by failing to accurately report all taxes withheld from the Plaintiff’s wages by Defendants during the relevant tax year. 25 110. Defendants willfully filed these fraudulent information returns for Plaintiff Lythcott and the Tax Fraud Class Members to avoid certain tax obligations. 111. For Defendants’ willful fraudulent filings, Plaintiff Lythcott and the Tax Fraud Class Members are entitled to damages pursuant to 26 U.S. Code § 7434(b). NEW YORK LABOR LAW – UNPAID OVERTIME (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW –WAGE NOTICE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members) 101. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Unpaid Wage Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 102. At all relevant times, Defendants employed and/or continue to employ Plaintiff and each Unpaid Wage Class Member within the meaning of the NYLL, §§ 2 and 651. 103. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members notice as required by Article 6, § 195, on the date of hire and February 1 of each year, in English or in the language identified by Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members as their primary language, containing Plaintiff’s and Unpaid Wage Class Members’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 104. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants fifty dollars ($50.00) per employee for each workweek that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 24 NEW YORK LABOR LAW – WAGE STATEMENT VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members) 105. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Unpaid Wage Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 106. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and Unpaid Wage Class Members with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195, containing Plaintiff’s overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; and an accurate count of the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable. 107. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants one hundred dollars ($100.00) per employee for each workweek that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The Unpaid Wages Class UNJUST ENRICHMENT & QUANTUM MERUIT (Pled In The Alternative) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Unpaid Wage Class Members)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a firearms manufacturing company, and owns and operates the website, www.shoptaurus.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.shoptaurus.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse firearms for purchase and delivery, view safety, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various firearms for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 25. Defendant, Donna Salyers’ Fabulous-Furs, Inc., controls and operates fabulousfurs.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Fabulousfurs.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse coat and jackets products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Fabulousfurs.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Fabulous Furs on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of coats, jackets, and accessories; and (c) learning about shipping and return policies, sales and promotions, gift ideas, career opportunities, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of Fabulous Furs’ policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by fabulousfurs.com. Due to Fabulous Furs’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Fabulousfurs.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Fabulous Furs, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Fabulousfurs.com. 29. Fabulous Furs denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Fabulousfurs.com by preventing them from freely navigating Fabulousfurs.com. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Fabulousfurs.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Fabulousfurs.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 33. On Fabulousfurs.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as coats and jackets, have been added to the shopping bag because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product. Moreover, blind customers are unable to select the quantity of the product they desire. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Fabulousfurs.com. 34. Furthermore, Fabulousfurs.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Fabulousfurs.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Fabulousfurs.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 37. Fabulousfurs.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Fabulousfurs.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Fabulousfurs.com. 39. Fabulousfurs.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Fabulousfurs.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Fabulousfurs.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff, Linda Slade, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Fabulousfurs.com, most recently in November 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Fabulousfurs.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Faux Fur Swing Coat in the color Black. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Fabulousfurs.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Fabulousfurs.com. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Fabulousfurs.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of Defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Fabulousfurs.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Fabulousfurs.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Fabulousfurs.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Fabulousfurs.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Fabulousfurs.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Fabulousfurs.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Fabulousfurs.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Fabulousfurs.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Fabulous Furs has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Fabulousfurs.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 58. Fabulousfurs.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Fabulousfurs.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Fabulous Furs who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Fabulousfurs.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Fabulousfurs.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Fabulousfurs.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Fabulousfurs.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 77. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Fabulousfurs.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Fabulousfurs.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Fabulousfurs.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 94. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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1. An order certifying that Count I may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel to represent the class previously set forth and defined above. 14. Sometime prior to February 1, 2019, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt to Credit One Bank, N.A. (“Credit One”) related to a personal credit card account with an account number ending in 5609 (the “Debt”). 15. The Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from a personal credit card account in Plaintiff’s name that was issued by Credit One. 16. The Debt arose out of a credit card account which Plaintiff opened for his personal use. 17. Plaintiff’s credit card account that was issued by Credit One was neither opened nor used by Plaintiff for business purposes. 18. Plaintiff’s personal credit card account Debt to Credit One is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 19. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, but before the initiation of this action, Plaintiff was alleged to have fallen behind on payments owed on the alleged Debt. 2. Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(8); 20. The Debt went into default because of non-payment. 21. After the Debt went into default, the Debt was allegedly sold by Credit One to MCM. 23. MCM claims that they purchased the Debt and are now the entity to whom the Debt is owed. 24. MCM contends that the Debt is in default. 25. The Debt was in default at the time the Debt was allegedly purchased by MCM. 26. Plaintiff disputes the Debt. 27. At all times relevant hereto, MCM acted in an attempt to collect the Debt. 28. On or about February 22, 2019, MCM began reporting the Debt to the three major credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion (the “Credit Bureaus”). 29. MCM reported the Debt to the Credit Bureaus as “In Collection” and with a “Past Due” amount of $1,131. 3. An award of statutory damages for Plaintiff and the class members pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; 30. MCM reported the Debt to the Credit Bureaus as a part of their efforts to collect the Debt. 31. MCM’s reporting of the Debt to the Credit Bureaus is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 32. On or about February 28, 2020, Plaintiff mailed two letters to MCM (the “Letters”). (Annexed and attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Letters that Plaintiff mailed to MCM, except the undersigned counsel has in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and Plaintiff’s street address to protect his privacy) 33. The Letters concerned the same Debt and stated: I am disputing the above referenced debt and refuse to pay it under any circumstances. 35. The Letters were received by MCM at their respective addresses in the first or second week of March of 2020. 36. The Letters were not returned to Plaintiff as undeliverable. 37. In March of 2020, MCM had actual written notice from Plaintiff in the form of the Letters attached as Exhibit A that he disputed the Debt. 38. On May 22, 2020, Plaintiff obtained his credit report from TransUnion. 39. On the credit report from TransUnion the Plaintiff obtained on May 22, 2020, MCM was reporting the Debt. (Annexed and attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the relevant portion of the credit report from TransUnion the Plaintiff obtained on May 22, 2020 showing the Debt being reported by MCM) 4. Attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and 40. On the credit report from TransUnion the Plaintiff obtained on May 22, 2020, MCM was not reporting that the Debt was disputed. 41. Nowhere does the credit report attached as Exhibit B indicate that the Debt is disputed by the Plaintiff. 42. The credit report from TransUnion the Plaintiff obtained on May 22, 2020 states that MCM last updated their reporting on the Debt on May 12, 2020. 43. Approximately two months prior to May 12, 2020, MCM had actual knowledge in the form of the Letters attached as Exhibit A that Plaintiff disputed the Debt. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 46. The conduct of the Defendant in this case violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 and 1692e(8). 47. 15 U.S.C. §1692e provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. 48. MCM violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) because they failed to communicate to the Credit Bureaus that the Debt was disputed despite having actual written notice in the form of the Letters from the Plaintiff that the Debt was disputed. 49. According to the credit report attached as Exhibit B, on May 12, 2020, MCM reported Plaintiff’s Debt to the credit bureaus without notifying the Credit Bureaus that the Debt was disputed. This violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) because MCM had actual knowledge in the form of the Letters they received from the Plaintiff in March of 2020 that the Debt was disputed. Despite this actual knowledge that the Debt was disputed, MCM did not report the Debt as disputed to the Credit Bureaus in violation of § 1692e(8). 50. The violations of the FDCPA described herein constitute per se violations. 52. Plaintiff has alleged a concrete harm because the FDCPA creates a substantive right to be free from abusive and misleading debt communications and Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA resulted in concrete harm to Plaintiff. 53. Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the proposed class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k because of the above FDCPA violations. 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 55. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56. The Class is initially defined as (a) all consumers (b) with a New Jersey address (c) who disputed a debt that MCM was reporting to any of the Credit Bureaus (d) after receiving notification of the dispute MCM continued to report the debt to the Credit Bureaus without notifying the Credit Bureaus that the disputed debt was disputed, (e) on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action. 57. The class definition above may be subsequently modified or refined in an amended complaint or in any motion for class certification. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (15 U.S.C. §1692e)

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11. In enacting the relevant FCRA provision, Congress unambiguously required credit-reporting agencies, such as Experian, to "clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer" who requests his or her credit file "all of the information in the consumer's file at the time of the request," including the sources of the information. 15 U.S.C. § 168lg(a)(l)-(2). 12. Disclosure of the source of a consumer-reporting agency's information is vital so that certain credit reporting errors that originate at the source can be corrected, and so that consumers always know who is furnishing important credit information about them. 13. Congress this created a consumer's legal entitlement to material information in their credit file - the ability to always know what information was to be in their credit report and who was supplying it. 14. Despite the clear mandate of § 168lg, Experian willingly bends the rules to appease some of its customers and to ensure that those customers use Experian' s products, as opposed to its major competitors Equifax and Trans Union. 15 u.s.c. § 1681i (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM) 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (INDIVIDUAL CLAIM) 15. Experian has substantial notice and knowledge that its policy violates the FCRA, but Experian knowingly deprives consumers of this important and mandatory FCRA-govemed information. 17. In December 2014, granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in Dreher, fmding Experian willfully violated the FCRA as to the plaintiff and nearly 70,000 consumers. Again, the Court observed: "[a ]!though gifted legal minds can create myriad interpretations for how many sources or what kinds of sources should be included in the disclosure, the term 'sources' clearly includes, at the very least, the entity that gives that information directly to the consumer reporting agency." Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 572, 579-80 (E.D. Va. 2014) (Gibney, J.). 18. In addition to Dreher, Experian has been sued repeatedly for failing to clearly and accurately disclose the sources of information it obtains and reports regarding consumers. See, e.g., Williams v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-1102 (E.D. Va.); Beattie v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-1195 (E.D. Va.); Clarkv. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-32 (E.D. Va.); Scott v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Case No. 3:14-cv-394 (E.D. Va.). 19. Despite these lawsuits, including a $12 million dollar judgment entered against in Dreher, Experian has not significantly modified its procedures to clearly and accurately disclose the sources of information it reports. 20. In fact, upon information and belief, Experian consciously refuses to even adopt a written policy for compliance with§ 1681g(a)(2}-a cornerstone provision of the FCRA enacted more than 40 years ago. 22. In order to attempt to circumvent state usury, payday lending, and consumer fraud statutes, John Paul Reddam ("Reddam") created several criminal enterprises, including Delbert Services Corporation ("Delbert"), CashCall, Inc. ("CashCall") and WS Funding, LLC ("WS Funding") to market and collect illegal loans. 23. Reddam's scheme was designed to violate the usury and payday lending laws of multiple states, to disguise Reddam and his companies' roles, and to ostensibly shield the scheme from liability through a business structure that attempted to exploit Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity to "avoid state and federal law and to game the entire system." Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811F.3d666, 676 (4th Cir. 2016). 24. Although Western Sky held itself out to consumers as the actual lenders of these internet payday loans, CashCall funded these illegal loans purportedly made by Western Sky and, unbeknownst to consumers, was the entity that performed the underwriting requirements. 25. The companies engaged in this deceptive practice in order to evade liability because Westerns Sky held itself out to the public as a standalone tribal entity that was supposedly part of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and, by its assertion, entitled to Native American Tribal Sovereign Immunity. 26. Although Western Sky operated within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, the Sioux Tribe did not have any ownership interest or operating role in Western Sky, nor did it receive any profits from Western Sky. 28. Contrary to the misrepresentations in the Loan Agreement, Western Sky was not an actual lender. As explained by the New Hampshire Department of Banking in 2013, Western Sky was "nothing more than a front to enable CashCall to evade licensure by state agencies and to exploit Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity to shield its deceptive business practices from prosecution by state and federal regulators." 29. As explained below, Experian helped facilitate Western Sky and Reddam's deceptive scheme by: (1) misrepresenting to consumers that it furnished reports directly to Western Sky when, in reality, Experian furnished those reports directly to CashCall; (2) failing to disclose CashCall as a source of the information despite Experian's unquestionable knowledge that it was CashCall who supplied the underlying information to Experian; and (3) by disclosing "Consumer Loan Trust" as a source of information even though "Consumer Loan Trust" never furnished any information to Experian. Experian Misrepresents the Roles of Western Sky, CashCall and Delbert 30. In order to qualify for the internet payday loan, Western Sky ostensibly required consumers to electronically sign a loan agreement (the "Loan Agreement"). 31. On November 20, 2012, Mr. White applied for a loan with Western Sky and electronically signed a template Loan Agreement. 32. As part of Reddam's deceptive scheme, the Loan Agreement did not reference CashCall and, more importantly, did not authorize Cashcall to obtain Mr. White's credit report. 33. After Mr. White submitted his application on November 20, 2012, he received an e-mail from Western Sky indicating that his application was conditionally approved. 35. The "Your Credit Score and the Price You Pay for Credit" email was sent by "[email protected]." 36. On November 29, 2012, Mr. White received another email from Western Sky entitled "Notice of Assignment, Sale or Transfer of Servicing Rights." This e-mailed explained "[e]ffective today, your loan is now owned by WS Funding, LLC and will be serviced by a company called CashCall." 37. In May 2014, Mr. White requested a full copy of his file from Experian, who furnished Mr. White with a copy of his consumer disclosure. 38. In this disclosure, unbeknownst to the Plaintiff at the time, Experian falsely represented that it furnished Mr. White's credit report to Western Sky on November 20, 2012. 39. Recently, through discovery produced by Delbert in Hayes v. Delbert Services Corporation, Case No. 3:14-cv-258 (JAG), Plaintiff discovered that Experian did not, in fact, provide any report to Western Sky on November 20, 2012. 40. Instead, Experian provided the November 20, 2012 report to CashCall and knowingly misrepresented this fact to help facilitate CashCall's efforts to evade licensure and attempt to exploit Indian Sovereign Immunity. 41. Experian not only misrepresented that it provided Mr. White's report to Western Sky, but it also falsely identified "Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust" as a source of certain information in the May 2014 report. 43. Instead, upon information and belief, CashCall provided Experian with all of the information appearing in the Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust tradeline, yet Experian concealed this information from consumers. 44. On October 8, 2014, Mr. White mailed a letter to Experian disputing the information purportedly reported by "Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust." In his letter, Plaintiff explained that the Defendants' account should be deleted because the loan was null and void in Virginia. To verify the accuracy of his representations, Plaintiff enclosed regulations regarding consumer finance licensing in the Commonwealth of Virginia and a recent complaint against an internet payday lender filed by the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia showing that similar loans were considered null and void in Virginia. 45. Experian conducted its investigation of Mr. White's dispute by secretly contacting CashCall-not Delbert Services or the Consumer Loan Trust-a clear indication that Experian knowingly concealed this relevant information from Mr. White. 46. More specifically, when Experian received a consumer dispute, Experian usually translates that dispute into an "ACDV" form. 47. Experian then electronically transmits the ACDV to the source of the information through a dispute system named "e-Oscar." 48. As reflected by the ACDV produced involving Delbert, Experian sent the ACDV to CashCall in response to Mr. White's dispute dated October 8, 2014. 50. In March 2016, Mr. White requested a full copy of his file from Experian, who furnished Mr. White with a copy of his consumer disclosure. 51. Again, this disclosure identified Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust as a source of the information while at the same time concealing CashCall-the entity who gave the relevant information directly to Experian. 52. At this time, White discovered that Experian reported information belong to Plaintiffs father in his credit report, including an American Express card opened in 1967-the year White was born. 53. Experian included this information in Plaintiffs credit report due to its lax threshold designed to over-include information in consumer reports. Accordingly, White alleges an individual claim against Experian under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) for its failure to reasonably ensure the maximum possible accuracy of his credit reports. 54. Likewise, Mr. Hayes requested a full copy of his file from Experian, who furnished Mr. Hayes with a copy of his consumer disclosure dated April 2, 2016. Again, this disclosure identified Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust as a source of the information while at the same time concealing CashCall-the entity who gave the relevant information directly to Experian. 56. Experian not only deprived Plaintiffs of important information, but Experian also subject Plaintiffs and the class members to increased risk of harm, including the increased risk that Plaintiffs and the class members would continue to pay amounts on these unlawful loans. Experian's conduct also made it more difficult for Plaintiffs and the class members to get these illegal loans removed from their credit reports. 57. Further, the value of the incomplete or partial credit disclosure Experian provided was thus less in some amount than the $12.00 price the FCRA sets as the cost of such disclosure. 58. Plaintiffs restate each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 59. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this action for themselves and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) (a) who requested their consumer file from Experian or any of its affiliated companies, subsidiaries, or any other Experian entity, (b) within five years preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and ( c) to whom Experian provided a response that included a Delbert Services and/or Consumer Loan Trust tradeline. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, directors of Experian, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. 60. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs' counsel estimates that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 62. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. Experian's response to a consumer's request for a full copy of his or her consumer file routinely failed to disclose Cash Call as the source of the information during the full class period. The violation alleged is the same and the class claim will rise and fall entirely based upon whether or not Plaintiffs' claiin rises or falls. 63. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling actions involving unlawful practices against consumers and class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. The Plaintiffs are aware of their responsibilities to the putative classes and have accepted such responsibilities. 64. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper. Prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 66. Certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that: a. As alleged above, the questions of law or fact common to the members of the classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member. Each of the common facts and legal questions in the case overwhelm the more modest individual damages issues. Further, those individual issues that do exist can be effectively streamlined and resolved in a manner that minimizes the individual complexities and differences in proof in the case. b. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Consumer claims generally are ideal for class treatment as they involve many, if not most, consumers who are otherwise disempowered and unable to afford and bring such claims individually. Further, most consumers affected by Experian's FCRA violation would likely be unaware of their rights under the law, or who they could find to represent them in federal litigation. Additionally, individual litigation of the uniform issues in this case would be a waste of judicial resources. The issues at the core of this case are class wide and should be resolved at one time. One win for one consumer would set the law as for every similarly situated consumer. 67. Experian violated § 1681g(a)(2) of the FCRA by: (1) failing to clearly and accurately disclose CashCall as the source of the information reported in the Delbert Services/Consumer Loan Trust tradeline; and/or (2) by misrepresenting that Consumer Loan Trust was a source of the information even though Consumer Loan Trust did not exist and never provided any information to Experian. 69. Experian is permitted to charge up to $12.00 for a consumer disclosure. However, it m fact uses its confusing website and marketing campru.gn ("FreeCreditReport.Com") to direct consumers to a product for which it charges at least $21.95 per month. In fact, it does this to direct consumers away from the one actually free option they have - AnnualCreditReport.com. 70. Nevertheless, whether a plaintiff or putative class member managed to obtain their one free annual credit disclosure or instead paid for it, the value of that report is still set at $12.00. 71. Because the consumer disclosures Experian provided did not include all of the information Experian was obligated to include in them, they were worth some amount less. 72. Additionally, by example only and without imitations, the rights at issue were determined by Congress to be important measures of Experian' s process to ensure continued accuracy and completeness in its files and reports. 73. The conduct, action, and inaction of Experian was willful, rendering Experian liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. In the alternative, the violation was negligent entitling class members to the $12.00 value of a complete credit disclosure. 75. As a result of these FCRA violations, Experian is liable to the Plaintiffs and to each putative class member for statutory damages from $100.00 to $1,000.00, punitive damages, and/or actual damages in the amount of $12.00, as well as for their attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 76. Plaintiffs restate each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 77. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. White bring this action for himself and on behalf of a class defmed as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) (a) who requested their consumer file from Experian or any of its affiliated companies, subsidiaries, or any other Experian entity, (b) within five years preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency, and ( c) to whom Experian provided a response that included an inquiry from Western Sky. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, directors of Experian, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. Mr. White is a member of this class. 78. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs' counsel estimates that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 80. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. Experian's response to a consumer's request for a full copy of his or her consumer file routinely failed to include the source of the public records information that it reported about consumers during the full class period. The violation alleged is the same and the class claim will rise and fall entirely based upon whether or not Plaintiffs' claim rises or falls. 81. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling actions involving unlawful practices against consumers and class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. The Plaintiffs are aware of their responsibilities to the putative classes and have accepted such responsibilities. 83. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that Experian has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 84. Certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that: a. As alleged above, the questions of law or fact common to the members of the classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member. Each of the common facts and legal questions in the case overwhelm the more modest individual damages issues. Further, those individual issues that do exist can be effectively streamlined and resolved in a manner that minimizes the individual complexities and differences in proof in the case. b. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Consumer claims generally are ideal for class treatment as they involve many, if not most, consumers who are otherwise disempowered and unable to afford and bring such claims individually. Further, most consumers affected by Experian's FCRA violation would likely be unaware of their rights under the law, or who they could find to represent them in federal litigation. Additionally, individual litigation of the uniform issues in this case would be a waste of judicial resources. The issues at the core of this case are class wide and should be resolved at one time. One win for one consumer would set the law as for every similarly situated consumer. 86. Each Plaintiff and putative class member suffered real and actual injury. They were denied important information that was to have been part of their consumer disclosure otherwise to be provided upon request. 87. Experian is permitted to charge up to $12.00 for a consumer disclosure. However, it m fact uses its confusing website and marketing campaign ("FreeCreditReport.Com") to direct consumers to a product for which it charges at least $21.95 per month. In fact, it does this to direct consumers away from the one actually free option they have - AnnualCreditReport.com. 88. Nevertheless, whether a plaintiff or putative class member managed to obtain their one free annual credit disclosure or instead paid for it, the value of that report is still set at $12.00. 89. Because the consumer disclosures Experian provided did not include all of the information Experian was obligated to include in them, they were worth some amount less. 90. Additionally, by example only and without imitations, the rights at issue were determined by Congress to be important measures of Experian's process to ensure continued accuracy and completeness in its files and reports. 91. The conduct, action, and inaction of Experian was willful, rendering Experian liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168ln. In the alternative, the violation was negligent entitling class members to the $12.00 value of a complete credit disclosure. 93. As a result of these FCRA violations, Experian is liable to the Plaintiffs and to each putative class member for statutory damages from $100.00 to $1,000.00, punitive damages, and/or actual damages in the amount of $12.00, as well as for their attorney's fees and costs pursuantto 15 U.S.C. § 168ln. 94. Mr. White incorporates all other factual allegations set forth in the Complaint. 95. Experian violated multiple sections of§ 1681i as to Mr. White, including but not limited to its conduct of: (1) failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information was inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information or delete the item from Plaintiffs credit file in violation of§ 168li(a)(l); (2) failing to review and consider all relevant information submitted by Mr. White in violation of §1681i(a)(4); (3) failing to promptly delete the disputed inaccurate items of information from Mr. White's credit files or modify the item of information upon a lawful reinvestigation of§ 168li(a)(5)(A); and (4) failing to promptly delete the disputed inaccurate items of information from Mr. White's credit files or modify the item of information upon a lawful reinvestigation in violation of §168li(a)(5)(A). 97. The violations by Experian were willful, rendering it liable for punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to§ 1681n. In the alternative, Experian was negligent, which entitles Plaintiffs to recovery under 15 U.S.C. §16810. 98. Mr. White is entitled to recover actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney's fees from Experian in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and §16810. Statutory Framework and Experian 's Recidivist Conduct Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) (EXPERIAN) Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 168lg(a)(l) and 1681g(a)(3) (EXPERIAN)

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24. Defendant Ehealth, Inc. is an online health insurance broker. Around the period Obamacare went into effect, Ehealth seized on the opportunity to offer Medicare options to eligible consumers. In an effort to solicit potential customers, Defendant recruited, or employed call centers who began making telephone calls, en masse, to consumers across the country as early as 2015. On information and belief, Defendant and or its agents purchase “leads” containing consumers’ contact information and create electronic databases from which Defendant and or its agents makes automated calls. 27. On or about January 21, 2014, Plaintiff registered her cellular phone number with the area code (972) and ending in 0183 with the National Do Not Call Registry. 28. During February 2016, Plaintiff began to receive calls on her cellular telephone from the number (888) 353-4202, offering health insurance options. 29. Plaintiff is the regular carrier and exclusive user of the telephone assigned the number ending in 0183. The number is assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff is charged for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 30. Plaintiff never had a business relationship with Defendant. 31. Plaintiff never provided Defendant with prior consent to contact her on her phone via a text message or a telephone call. 32. Nonetheless, Defendant called Plaintiff dozens of times on her phone during a twelve-month period. Defendant always attempted to sell Plaintiff health insurance. 43. Plaintiff has standing to bring this suit on behalf of herself and the members of the class under Article III of the United States Constitution because Plaintiff’s claims states: (a) a valid injury in fact; (b) an injury which is traceable to the conduct of Defendant; and (c) is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016) at 6; Robins v. Spokeo, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) (cert denied. 2018 WL 491554, U.S., Jan. 22 2018); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); and Chen v. Allstate Inc. Co., 819 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016). 44. Plaintiff’s injury must be both “concrete” and “particularized” in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. (Id.) 52. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and the following class defined as follows (the “Class”): “DNC2 Class”: All individuals in the United States who: (1) received more than one telephone call made by or on behalf of Defendant within a 12- month period; (2) to a telephone number that had been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least 30 days. 72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 73. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 74. The TCPA’s implementing regulation—47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)—provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered her or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). A. CLASS ALLEGATIONS VIOLATION OF TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“DNC Claim”)

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10. MLB Media is a limited partnership in which the club owners of Major League Baseball (“MLB”) teams are limited partners. MLB Media operates as the internet, telephone, and media marketing arm for MLB. 11. Given that MLB club owners, including the Giants, provided MLB Media’s initial capital contributions, MLB Media is under constant pressure to perform. 12. Desperate to help drive the fan engagement that the MLB club owners so critically rely on, and to combat nosediving ratings and declining fan engagement, MLB Media and the club owners, including the Giants, began skirting their obligations under the TCPA and employed intrusive and illegal telephone marketing strategies. 14. The shortcode telephone numbers listed in the preceding paragraph were each leased, purchased, or otherwise acquired by Defendant MLB Media and are each an “MLB Media Shortcode” and collectively the “MLB Media Shortcodes.” 15. The MLB Media Short Code registrations were part of MLB Media’s scheme to gain access to baseball fans’ cell phones and bombard them with advertisements and telemarketing pitches. 16. The MLB Media Shortcodes were obtained from Telcordia Technologies, Inc., a company that assigns these number resources. 17. Short code telephone numbers are used to send text messages en masse from telephone dialing systems that have the capacity to produce or store telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator and to send such messages in an automated fashion without human intervention. 19. MLB Media’s marketing tactics walk consumers into an onslaught of marketing messages delivered straight to their cell phones without regard to whether the text recipients are trying to drive safely, pray in peace, focus attention on their jobs or families or otherwise attempting to seek solitude in their homes or elsewhere. b. The Giants’ Participation in MLB Media’s Integrated Text Marketing Scheme 20. The Giants operate a San Francisco-based major league baseball team in the Western Division of the American League. 21. The Giants operate an advertisement and telemarketing campaign that involves sending advertisement and telemarketing text messages to consumers’ wireless telephones without first obtaining their prior express written consent. 22. Through MLB Media, the Giants use the MLB Media Shortcodes 99778 and/or 80899 to send illegal advertisement and telemarketing text messages to consumers and to further MLB Media’s and the Giants’ marketing campaigns. Advertisement and telemarketing text messages from Defendants that promote the Giants are sent from MLB Media Shortcodes 99778 and/or 80899. 24. Defendants sent to Lee’s Cell Number, inter alia, the following unsolicited messages from MLB Media Shortcode 99778 through the use of an ATDS: a. May 1, 2019: 41. Excluded from the Classes are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest of either of Defendants, and any of Defendants’ legal representatives, assigns or successors. Also excluded is any judge presiding over or attorney appearing or participating in this case and any member of any such person’s immediate family. Members of the Classes are referred to as “Class Members.” 42. Plaintiff reserve the right to modify the definition of the Classes or to add, when appropriate, one or more issue classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) or subclasses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5). 43. Plaintiff and all Class Members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendants and/or their agents, affiliates or subsidiaries. 44. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages on behalf of herself and the Classes. 45. This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance and superiority requirements. 47. The number of persons within each Class is substantial, believed to amount to thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is therefore impracticable to join each member of the Classes as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Classes renders joinder impracticable. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. Typicality 48. Plaintiff received at least one text message from Defendants sent via an ATDS without providing her “prior express written consent” to receive “advertisement or “telemarketing” text messages via an “ATDS” within the meaning of the TCPA. This is the same harm suffered by the absent Class Members. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the other Class Members she seeks to represent, and Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with and not antagonistic to those of the other Class Members she seeks to represent. Plaintiff and all Class Members have been impacted by, and face continuing harm resulting from, Defendant’s violations and/or misconduct as alleged herein. Adequacy of the Plaintiff 50. Plaintiff retained and is represented by experienced, qualified and competent counsel committed to prosecuting this action. These counsel are experienced in handling complex class action claims, including class actions alleging TCPA violations. Commonality and Predominance 51. There are well-defined common questions of fact and law that exist as to all members of the Classes and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes. These common legal and factual questions do not vary from Class Member to Class Member, may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any Class Member, and include (but are not limited to) the following: a. Whether Defendants caused to be transmitted, advertisement or telemarketing text messages to Class Members’ cell phones; b. Whether Defendants were transmitted using an ATDS; c. Whether Defendants can meet their burden in proving that they obtained the Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ prior express written consent (as defined by 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(f)(8)) to send them advertisement and/or telemarketing text messages with an ATDS; d. Whether the complained-of conduct was knowing and/or willful; e. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 53. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual litigation of the claims of all Class Members is impracticable. Even if Class Members could afford to pursue individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts for individual litigation of numerous cases to proceed. Individualized litigation also presents the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. By contrast, the maintenance of these claims as a class action, with respect to some or all the issues presented herein, presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each Class Member. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 55. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members may create a risk of multiple adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class who are not parties to such adjudications, thereby substantially impairing or impeding the ability of such nonparty Class Members to protect their interests. The prosecution of individual actions by Class Members could further establish inconsistent results and/or establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 56. Defendants and/or any of their affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes appropriate. 57. Moreover, on information and belief, the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-57 as if fully stated here. 59. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 61. Plaintiff and all Class Members are also entitled to, and seek, an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each text message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 62. Plaintiff hereby incorporates paragraphs 1-57 as if fully stated here. 63. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 64. Because of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class Members are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future. 65. Plaintiff and all Class Members are also entitled to, and seek, treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA (47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Classes Against Defendants) VIOLATION OF THE TCPA (47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Classes Against Defendants) a. Defendants’ Integrated Text Message Marketing Campaign

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17. Alliance MMA was formed on February 12, 2015 to acquire companies in the mixed martial arts (“MMA”) industry. The Company aims to create a highly organized feeder organization to the sport’s highest level of professional competition including The Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), Bellator MMA, World Series of Fighting and other prestigious MMA promotions worldwide. 18. On August 16, 2016, the Company filed a registration statement on Form S-1 with the SEC. The registration statement was subsequently amended, with the final amended registration statement on Form S-1/A filed on August 30, 2016 (collectively, the “Registration Statement”). The Registration Statement was declared effected by the SEC on September 2, 2016. 19. On September 30, 2016, the Alliance MMA acquired the assets and assumed certain liabilities of six companies. Additionally, the Company acquired a seventh company. The seven companies consisted of five regional MMA promotion companies, a live MMA video promotion and content distribution company, and an electronic ticketing platform serving MMA and other combat sports events. 20. On or about October 6, 2016, the Company completed its IPO that consisted of a public sale of a 2,222,308 shares of the Company’s common stock at $4.50 per share. 22. The Registration Statement, signed by Defendants Danner and Price, provided the Company’s financial statements for the three and six months ended June 30, 2016, including the following statements of operations 24. The Registration Statement also provided the Company’s financial statements for the six months ended June 30, 2016, including the following statement of operations: 30. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company’s common stock pursuant or traceable to the Registration Statement issued in connection with the IPO (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 31. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Alliance MMA common stock was actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Alliance MMA or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. Upon information and belief, these shares are held by hundreds if not thousands of individuals located geographically throughout the country and possibly the world. Joinder would be highly impracticable. 33. Plaintiffs have and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 34. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including: (a) whether the Securities Act was violated by Defendants; (b) Whether the Registration Statement contained false and misleading statements of material fact and omitted material information required to be stated therein; (c) To what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages. 35. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 36. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 38. The Registration Statement was inaccurate and misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. 39. None of the defendants named herein made a reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement were true and without omission of any material facts and were not misleading. 40. By reason of the conduct herein alleged, each defendant violated §11 of the Securities Act. 41. Plaintiffs acquired the Company’s stock pursuant and/or traceable to the IPO. 42. Plaintiffs and the Class have sustained damages. The value of the Company’s common stock has declined substantially subsequent to and due to defendants’ violations. 43. At the time of their purchases of the Company’s common stock, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were without knowledge of the facts concerning the wrongful conduct alleged herein and could not have reasonably discovered those facts prior to the disclosures herein. Less than one year has elapsed from the time that Plaintiffs discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fact upon which this Complaint is based to the time that Plaintiffs commenced this action. Less than three years has elapsed between the time that the securities upon which this Count is brought were offered to the public and the time Plaintiffs commenced this action. 45. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation above as though fully set forth herein. 46. Plaintiff Derek Riddick purchased 450 shares of Alliance MMA stock through a subscription agreement in Alliance MMA’s initial public offering. 47. Pursuant to the subscription agreement executed by Plaintiff Derek Riddick, the “offering and sale” of Riddick’s shares were “made pursuant to an effective Registration Statement on Form S-1 (File No. 333-213166) . . . filed under the Securities Act of 1933.” 48. The prospectus through which Alliance MMA conducted its initial public offering was incorporated within the registration statement identified in Plaintiff Derek Riddick’s subscription agreement. 49. As alleged above, the registration statement pursuant to which Plaintiff Derek Riddick purchased his shares contained an untrue statement of material fact and/or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make statements therein not misleading. 50. Network 1 used offered or sold Alliance MMA securities by the use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or the mails. 51. Network 1 used offered or sold Alliance MMA securities by means of a prospectus or oral communication. 53. Members of the Class, whom Plaintiffs represent herein, did not know that the Registration Statement contained untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements accurate. 54. Those members of the Class who purchased Allied MMA securities in the initial public offering directly from Network 1 have sustained damages as a result of the untrue statements of material facts and omissions in the Registration Statement, for which they hereby elect to rescind and tender their shares of Alliance MMA common stock in return for the consideration paid for Alliance MMA common stock with interest or seek rescissory damages. 55. This claim was brought within the applicable statute of limitations. 56. By virtue of the foregoing, Network 1 has violated Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2). 57. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and realleges each and every allegation above as though fully set forth herein. 58. This Count is brought pursuant to §15 of the Securities Act against the Individual Defendants. 59. The Individual Defendants each were control persons of the Company by virtue of their positions as directors and/or senior officers of the Company. 61. None of the Individual Defendants made reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Prospectus and Registration Statement were accurate complete in all material respects. Had they exercised reasonable care, they could have known of the material misstatements and omissions alleged herein. 62. This claim was brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statements and omissions in the Prospectus and Registration Statement and within three years after the Company’s securities were sold to the Class in connection with the IPO. It is therefore timely. 63. By reason of the above conduct, for which the Company’s is primarily liable, as set forth above, the Individual Defendants are jointly and severally liable with and to the same extent as the Company’s pursuant to Section 15 of the Securities Action, 15 U.S.C. 77o. For Violation of Section 11 of the Securities Act (Against All Defendants) For Violation of Section 12 of the Securities Act (Against Network 1) For Violation of Section 15 of the Securities Act (Against the Individual Defendants) I. Company Background

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18. At all times relevant, Plaintiff is and was an individual residing within the State of California. 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States of America whose consumer credit report from Transunion was provided to the consumer by means other than in writing without the consumers’ specification or authorization within the five-year period prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 31. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several hundreds, if not more. This matter should therefore be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 32. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, engaged in unlawful practices, when it provided Plaintiff with a free annual consumer report in the form of two (2) audio CD’s without Plaintiff’s specification or authorization to make the disclosure by such alternative means under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1692X (FCRA)

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 14. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 15. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 33. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 4th day of January, 2017. 8. Beginning in or around October 2015, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone ending in -7333, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. Plaintiff advised Defendant several times to correspond in writing and cease the calls, but Defendant continued to contact Plaintiff on her cellular telephone. 9. Defendant called from the phone number (855) 306-9681. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(The NY WARN Act – NYLL, Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Class Members) (The WARN Act – Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Class Members) 37. For many years, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were employed by Defendant in various positions in Defendant’s residential service programs. 38. On March 11, 2020, Defendant issued letters to some, but not all, of its employees, including many of the Plaintiffs and Class Members, that stated that its Board had decided that it “must immediately begin the process of closing”. The March 11th letter did not indicate a closing date but promised to “try to keep everyone informed as this situation develops”. A copy of the 3/11 letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit “1”. 39. Sixteen days later, on March 27, 2020, Defendant issued letters to some, but not all, of its employees, including many of the Plaintiffs and Class Members, informing them that their employment would terminate on or about May 1, 2020. A copy of the 3/27 letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit “2”. 41. Several weeks later, on or about April 23, 2020, many of the Plaintiffs and the Class Members received letters from Defendant indicating that their employment would terminate on April 27, 2020 (“Termination Letter”). A copy of a Termination Letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit “4”. 42. On or about May 1, 2020, Defendant ceased operations at its Manhattan location. As a result of this closure, Defendant terminated almost all of its employees employed at its Manhattan location, including all of the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 43. As the permanent shutdown of Defendant’s Manhattan location resulted in an employment loss of more than 50 full-time employees within a thirty (30) day period, the shutdown constituted a plant closing as defined in the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C .§ 2101(a)(2). 44. As the permanent shutdown of Defendant’s Manhattan location resulted in an employment loss of more than 25 full-time employees within a thirty (30) day period, the shutdown constituted a plant closing as defined in the NY WARN Act § 860-(a)(6). 45. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class Members with sixty (60) days advance notice of the plant closing as required by the WARN Act, and with ninety (90) days advance notice of the plant closing as required by the NY WARN Act. 46. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members their wages and salaries following their respective terminations, and failed to make the 403(b) contributions and provide health insurance coverage and other employee benefits payments in respect to them for sixty (60) and ninety (90) calendar days from the date(s) they were given notice of Defendant’s plant closing. 48. Further, the Defendant failed to provide a statement in its Warn Notice stating the basis for providing less than the required notice, as required by the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C § 2101(b)(3), and NYLL § 860-(c)(2). 49. Defendant committed the foregoing acts in an effort to suppress their labor costs, and acted knowingly, intentionally and willfully against the Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 50. Plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. P. (“FRCP”) Rule 23, to recover unpaid wages, salary, 403(b) contributions, health insurance coverage, other employee benefits, and other damages on behalf of all individuals employed in the State of New York by Defendant who were terminated as part of the plant closing ordered by Defendant in the latter half of April/early May of 2020 and did not receive sixty (60) days notice under the WARN Act and/or ninety (90) days notice under NY WARN Act. All said persons, including Plaintiffs, are referred to herein as the “Class Members” and/or the “Class”. 51. The number, names and addresses of the Class Members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant. The dates of employment and the rates of pay for each Class Member, and the wages paid to them, are also determinable from Defendant’s records which they are required by law to maintain. Notice can be provided by means permissible under FRCP Rule 23. 52. The proposed Class is so numerous – the Warn Notice that Defendant filed with the New York State Department of Labor identified 141 employees – that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. 54. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class Members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class Member. 55. As fellow employees of Defendant, which failed to provide them with the notices required by the WARN Act and the NY WARN Act, Plaintiffs and the other Class Members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices, and procedures. 56. Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiffs have retained Harrison, Harrison & Associates, competent and experienced employment litigators. 58. Upon information and belief, employees of defendants in these types of actions are often afraid to individually assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation and former employees are fearful of bringing individual claims because of the fear that doing so could harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. A class action provides class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 59. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including whether Defendants failed to provide the Class Members with the advance written notice of their terminations required by (a) the WARN Act, and (b) the NY WARN Act. 60. Absent a class action, many of the Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries. 62. The WARN Act requires that an employer not order closure or a mass layoff until 60 days after it serves written notice to the affected employees. 63. The failure of Defendant to provide Plaintiffs or the Class Members with the required 60 days advance notice of Defendant’s plant closing was unconscionable and irresponsible and constituted a blatant violation of the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102. Upon information and belief, Defendant was aware that it was going to shut down and nonetheless failed to provide its long-term employees, some of whom had worked for Defendant for more than twenty years, with the statutorily required notice that it was closing. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have sustained damages, including loss of earnings, in an amount to be established at trial, and Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages and health and retirement benefits, pre and post judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to the WARN Act, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 65. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, reallege and incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 66. The failure of Defendant to provide Plaintiffs or the Class Members with the required 90 days advance notice of Defendant’s plant closing was unconscionable and irresponsible, and constituted a blatant violation of the NY WARN Act, NYLL § 860-(b).

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19. The Plan was adopted by Associated’s Board on February 23, 2011, and approved by the Company’s shareholders on May 4, 2011. 20. The Plan provided for the granting of various stock awards to the Company's officers, employees, and non-employee directors. 21. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Plan, the Compensation Committee is responsible for administering the Plan. 22. The Plan provided that no individual participant could be granted awards during a calendar year covering more 125,000 shares (the "Limit"). 23. Specifically, as stated in Section 3(d) of the Plan: No participant may be granted Stock Options or other Awards under the Plan with respect to an aggregate of more than 125,000 Shares (subject to adjustment as provided in Section 3(C) hereof) during any calendar year; provided, however, that in connection with the commencement of employment, a participant may be granted Stock Options and Share Appreciation Rights with respect to an aggregate of 100,000 Shares, which will not count against such annual limit. (Emphasis added.) 24. An “Award” is defined in Section 1 of the Plan and covers all possible awards that may be granted under the Plan. Specifically, an “Award” is defined as “any award of Stock Options, Share Appreciation Rights, Restricted Shares, Deferred Shares or Other Share-Based Awards under the Plan.” 25. As described immediately below, the Board violated the Limit in both 2012 and 2013. 6  The Awards to Friedman 26. On February 2, 2012, the Compensation Committee (which at the time consisted of defendants Delaney, Schoff, and Schwarz), granted Friedman an award of restricted shares under the Plan. As described in the Schedule 14A Proxy Statement filed by the Company with the SEC on March 26, 2012 (the "2012 Proxy"), the award “consist[ed] of restricted shares granted on February 2, 2012” and had a grant date fair value of $1,050,000. As indicated in a Form 4 filed by Friedman with the SEC on the next day the award consisted of 63,714 shares. 27. Additionally, as described in a Schedule 14A Proxy Statement filed by the Company with the SEC on March 28, 2013 (the “2013 Proxy”), on February 15, 2012 the Compensation Committee granted Friedman stock options to purchase 125,000 shares of Associated common stock. 28. Accordingly, during the 2012 calendar year, Friedman was granted stock awards covering 188,714 shares under the Plan, 63,714 shares in excess of the Limit. These excess shares are ultra vires and should be rescinded. 29. On February 1, 2013, the Compensation Committee (which at the time consisted of defendants Sanfilippo, Schoff, and Schwarz), granted Friedman an award of restricted shares under the Plan. As described in the 2013 Proxy, the award “consist[ed] of restricted shares granted on February 1, 2013” and had a grant date fair value of $938,000. As indicated in a Form 4 filed by Friedman with the SEC on February 5, 2013, the award consisted of 57,370 shares. 30. Additionally, as described in the 2014 Proxy, on February 1, 2013 the Compensation Committee granted Friedman an award of restricted stock units covering 192,661 shares. Friedman filed a Form 4 noting the award on February 5, 2013. 7  31. Accordingly, during the 2013 calendar year, Friedman was granted stock awards covering 250,031 shares under the Plan, 125,031 shares in excess of the Limit. These excess shares are ultra vires and should be rescinded. The Defendants Intentionally Violated the Plan 32. The Defendants intended to violate the Plan. There were only two basic facts that would have put the Defendants on notice of the violations: the existence of the 125,000 share calendar year limit in the Plan and the size of the awards granted to Friedman. Each of the Defendants knew and/or were on notice of the 125,000 share calendar year limit in the Plan and each of the Defendants knew and/or were on notice of the size of the awards granted to Friedman. 33. Specifically, the following facts lead to the conclusion that the Defendants were aware of the existence of the Limit: a. Defendants Delaney, Sanfilippo, Schoff, and Schwarz were members of the Compensation Committee responsible for administering and overseeing the Plan and thus certainly knew the terms of the very plan they were administering. b. Defendants Friedman, Adams, Gibbons, and Milstein were on the Board that adopted the Plan in February 2011. Defendants Adams, Gibbons and Milstein were also on the Board that adopted amendments to the Plan on February 25, 2014, including an amendment to the Limit. Accordingly, it is reasonable for the Court to infer that Friedman, Adams, Gibbons, and Milstein were aware of the existence of the Limit. c. Each of the Defendants are eligible to receive and have received awards under the Plan as part of their annual compensation. And the following facts lead to the conclusion that the Defendants were aware of the size of the equity awards granted to Friedman:   a. Defendants Delaney, Sanfilippo, Schoff, and Schwarz were members of the Compensation Committee that approved the grants to Friedman and thus certainly knew the size of the awards they granted. 8  b. Moreover, the Compensation Committee reports its compensation decisions to the full Board. As stated in the 2014 Proxy, "the [Compensation] Committee reports to the Board with respect to the design and implementation of executive compensation." The 2014 Proxy also state that the "Chairman of the [Compensation] Committee is responsible for updating the Board of Directors on all matters related to the executive compensation program." c. The size of the awards made to Friedman were made in public filings with the SEC, including Form 4s and proxy statements. Accordingly, it is certainly reasonable to infer that the full Board was aware of the size of the awards. Finally, as described below, Defendants’ efforts to conceal their misconduct is further evidence that Defendants were aware that they had violated the Plan. Defendants Amend the Limit and File a False and Misleading Proxy 34. On February 25, 2014, the Board adopted the Amended Plan. The Amended Plan had two major differences from the Plan. 35. First, in the Amended Plan, the Board increased the number of shares available for issuance by 2,700,000 shares. 36. And second, the Board amended the Limit increasing it to 500,000 shares and making it applicable only to stock options and share appreciation rights. A redline of these amendments appears below: Annual Award Limit. No participant may be granted Stock Options or other Awards Share Appreciation Rights under the Plan with respect to an aggregate of more than 125,000 500,000 Shares (subject to adjustment as provided in Section 3(C) hereof) during any calendar year; provided, however, that in connection with the commencement of employment, a participant may be granted Stock Options and Share Appreciation Rights with respect to an aggregate of 100,000 Shares, which will not count against such annual limit. 37. In other words, while the Plan limited all stock awards that could be granted to an individual participant during any calendar year at 125,000, the Amended Plan only limited the amount of stock options and share appreciation rights that could be granted to an individual participant during a calendar year and set that limit at 500,000. Under the Amended Plan, there 9  would be no annual limit on the number of restricted shares, deferred shares or other share-based awards that could be granted to an individual participant during a calendar year. 38. On March 28, 2014, the Board filed the 2014 Proxy in connection with the 2014 Annual Meeting, which was held on May 7, 2014. In the 2014 Proxy via Proposal No. 2, the Board solicited shareholder approval of the Amended Plan. Additionally, via Proposal No. 1, the Board solicited the re-election of each of the Company’s Board members. 39. The Company’s shareholders approved the Amended Plan and re-elected each of the Company’s Board members at the 2014 Annual Meeting. However, the decisions made by the Company’s shareholders were based on a materially false and misleading 2014 Proxy. 40. First, the Board failed to disclose in the 2014 Proxy that the Compensation Committee granted Friedman more shares than allowed under the Plan in each of the preceding two years. In considering whether to approve an equity compensation plan which would allow the Compensation Committee to grant an additional 2.7 million shares, it was important for shareholders to have known that the Compensation Committee granted more shares than allowed under the Plan in each of the last two years. Similarly, truthful and complete disclosure regarding the Board’s repeated violations of the Plan is material information in determining whether to re-elect each of the seven members of the Board, and especially the three members of the Compensation Committee. Truthful and complete disclosure of this information is important for shareholders in determining whether these directors can and will faithfully comply with their fiduciary duties to the Company. 41. Moreover, in the 2014 Proxy the Board actively concealed its past violations of the Plan. In describing the limit, the 2014 Proxy deceptively states: “Currently, the number of stock options that can be granted to an executive is capped at 125,000 stock options per annum.” 10  Of course, if the Limit actually applied only to stock options, the Board would have been in compliance with the Plan. However, the Board conveniently failed to disclose that the Limit applied to all awards, and not just stock options. 42. Additionally, in Proposal 2 the Board described the differences between the Plan and the Amended Plan. As stated in the 2014 Proxy: "The details of the Restated Equity Plan are consistent with the Equity Plan, approved by shareholders on May 4, 2011, except to increase the shares available for future Awards by 2,700,000 shares, and increase the individual annual Award limit of Stock Options and Share Appreciation Rights to 500,000." This is false. This description of the annual limit leads shareholders believe that the Plan originally limited only stock options and share appreciation rights and that the Amended Plan was simply increasing that limit. Of course, what the Board was really doing was removing the annual limit on restricted shares, deferred shares or other share-based awards, the very limits they had previously violated. 43. The Board’s active attempt to conceal its past misconduct—first by amending the Plan after the fact to alter the terms that it violated and then by omitting these changes from the 2013 Proxy’s discussion of the amendments—evidences the directors’ breaches of their duty of loyalty. 44. In conclusion, the 2014 Proxy was materially misleading and prevented shareholders from casting an informed vote regarding Proposals 1 and 2 at the 2014 Annual Meeting. 11  45. Plaintiff brings this action derivatively on behalf of Associated to redress injuries suffered, and yet to be suffered, by the Company as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ misconduct. 46. Plaintiff has owned Associated stock during the time of the wrongful course of conduct alleged herein and continues to hold Associated stock. 47. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent the interests of Associated in enforcing and prosecuting its rights and has retained counsel competent and experienced in shareholder derivative litigation. 48. At the time of this filing the Board consists of the following seven directors: Adams, Friedman, Gibbons, Milsten, Sanfilippo, Schoff, and Schwarz (the “Current Board”). Each member of the Current Board was on the Board when the Plan was violated, and was on the Board that filed the false and misleading 2014 Proxy, and each member has been named as a defendant in this Action. 49. Plaintiff did not make a demand on the Current Board prior to instituting this Action. A pre-suit demand upon the Current Board is futile for several reasons. 50. Defendants Sanfilippo, Schoff, and Schwarz were members of the Compensation Committee that granted awards in violation of the Limit. Friedman accepted awards in violation of the Limit and the remaining Current Board members allowed to the grants to occur despite having knowledge of the Plan violations. The Board’s actions, in approving, permitting, and/or accepting awards in violation of the express, unambiguous terms of the Plan could not have been a good faith exercise of business judgment, and accordingly demand is excused. In addition, as a result of their actions, each Current Board member faces a substantial likelihood of liability, and 12  therefore are incapable of considering a demand here. Accordingly, demand as to the Current Board is excused. 51. Moreover, the entire Current Board attempted to conceal its misconduct—first by adopting the amendments to the Plan that altered the terms that were violated and then by filing a proxy that concealed the nature of these amendments. These actions by the Current Board are a breach of Current Board’s duty of loyalty and accordingly demand is excused. 52. In addition, Defendant Friedman is incapable of considering a demand in this action because he is neither disinterested nor independent. Friedman received the awards challenged herein, and thus has a strong financial incentive to maintain the status quo by not authorizing any corrective action because it could force him to disgorge the improperly obtained awards. Accordingly, Friedman is not disinterested. In addition, as CEO of the Company, and with his principal source of income based on his role with the Company, Friedman is not independent 53. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of owners of Associated common stock as of March 19, 2014 the record date for the determination of shareholders who were entitled to vote at the 2014 Annual Meeting (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their affiliates, immediate families, legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 54. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of members in the Class. According 13  to the 2014 Proxy, as of March 19, 2014, over 57 million shares of common stock were represented by the Company as outstanding. All members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Associated or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using forms of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 55. Questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, inter alia, the following: a. Have the Board members breached their fiduciary duties by filing the false and misleading 2014 Proxy; and b. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were harmed by being forced to vote at the 2014 Annual Meeting on the basis of the false and misleading 2014 Proxy. 56. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. 57. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 58. A class action is a superior method for adjudication because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications for individual members of the Class and of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. 14  59. Conflicting adjudications for individual members of the Class might as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 60. A class action is a superior method for adjudication because the cost of prosecuting individual actions is prohibitive and the expense of adjudicating repetitious individual claims in different courts would be an inefficient use of judicial resources. 61. Concentrating the litigation of claims in this forum is desirable because the Company is an Ohio corporation and the litigation involves issues of Ohio law. 62. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, making a class-wide adjudication a superior method of resolving the claims and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 63. There are no issues requiring individualized resolution or the creation of sub- classes, thus class-wide adjudication will not present manageability concerns. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 65. As officers and/or directors of the Company, each of the Defendants owed the Company and its shareholders fiduciary duties. 66. In authorizing, approving, and/or by abdication of duty permitting the granting of awards in violation of the terms of the Plan, the Defendants exceeded their authority under the Plan, did not act in good faith toward the Company and thus breached their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. 15  67. These actions were not a good faith exercise of business judgment to protect and promote the Company’s corporate interests, but rather lined the pockets of Friedman at the expense and to the detriment of the Company. 68. Defendants also breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by intentionally violating the Plan and then engaging in efforts to conceal their misconduct. These actions were not in the Company’s best interest. 69. Friedman breached his fiduciary duty to the Company by accepting grants in violation of the Plan for his own personal benefit to the detriment and expense of the Company. Accordingly, Friedman breached his fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith. 70. As a result of the Defendants’ actions, the Company has been and will be damaged. 71. Plaintiff and the Company have no adequate remedy at law. 72. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 73. The Defendants have caused and will cause the Company to waste valuable corporate assets by granting Friedman awards in excess of what was authorized under the Plan. 74. By granting Friedman awards in excess of the amount allowed under the Plan in 2012 and 2013, the Defendants granted awards that no director of ordinary sound business judgment would award, so as to constitute waste. 75. As a result of this waste of corporate assets, the Defendants are liable to the Company. 16  76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 77. Friedman received unauthorized personal financial benefits as a result of the awards challenged herein. 78. It would be unconscionable and against fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience for Friedman to retain the benefits of the awards that were granted in plain violation of the Plan. 79. Friedman has been unjustly enriched at the expense and to the detriment of the Company. 80. Accordingly, this Court should order Friedman to disgorge the shares awarded in excess of the Limit. 81. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. 82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein. 83. The fiduciary duties of the Current Board require them to be completely truthful with the Company’s shareholders and disclose all information material to the decisions that confronted Associated shareholders at the 2014 Annual Meeting. 17  84. As set forth above, the members of the Current Board have breached their fiduciary duty by filing and seeking shareholder action on the basis of the materially false and misleading 2014 Proxy. 85. As a result, Plaintiff and Class members have been harmed as they were forced to cast votes at the 2014 Annual Meeting based on a false and misleading proxy statement. 86. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Against All Defendants) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Candor in Connection with the 2014 Proxy (Direct Claim against the Current Board) The Plan Unjust Enrichment (Against Friedman) Waste of Corporate Assets (Against the Defendants)

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16. Plaintiffs bring this nationwide class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated variable annuity purchasers to halt and remedy the harm caused by Defendant Jackson National Life Insurance Company’s misrepresentation of and systematic breach of its contract provisions in connection with the calculation of surrender charges. 17. Defendant Jackson National markets and sells its variable annuity products on a national basis primarily through its network of individual sales agents, marketing organizations, third party marketing organizations (“TPMOs”) brokerage firms and financial institutions. JACKSON NATIONAL uses four principal distribution channels to effectuate the sale of its variable annuities, which include independent broker/dealers, regional broker/dealers, financial institutions and individual sales agents (collectively referred to herein as “Affiliated Agents”). 18. A large portion of Defendant’s annuity business is effectuated through Jackson National’s “deal direct” system, wherein individual agents contract with and are appointed by Jackson National to promote and sell Jackson National products, including variable annuities. 19. Defendant also utilizes marketing organizations and/or brokerage firms that hire and manage groups of independent sales agents on behalf of Jackson National, who are trained to sell Jackson National variable annuity products. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 8 20. Defendant Jackson National prepares, disseminates and approves standardized information, account service forms, brochures, illustrations, marketing and sales materials to Affiliated Agents for effectuating the sale of variable annuities to customers, many of whom are senior citizens. Jackson National markets its variable annuity products primarily to older Americans and senior citizens in the Eastern District of Texas and nationwide. 21. Jackson National designs a variety of variable annuity products and product options that are represented to guarantee safety of principal, lifetime income streams, and market growth opportunities. However, Jackson National omits and fails to disclose that it designs its variable annuity products and product options with features intended to discourage benefit utilization and penalize undesired contract holder behavior. Defendant uniformly omits and fails to disclose material facts, costs, and risks associated with its design of these variable annuity products. 22. Jackson National omits and fails to disclose that certain of its product features automatically result in adverse impacts to contract values unless contract holder action is taken. 23. Jackson National also omits and fails to disclose that it engages in corporate management actions which penalize Affiliated Agents from engaging in activities that would result in utilization of contract holder benefits or from engaging in activities that would influence contract holder behavior in such a way that may in fact be in the best interest of the contract holder, but which is not profitable to the Defendant. . CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 9 37. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons as the Court may determine to be appropriate for class certification treatment, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class. The Nationwide Surrender Charge Class 38. The proposed Nationwide Surrender Charge Class is defined as follows: All persons who, within the applicable statute of limitations, purchased a Perspective family series, Elite Access series, or Retirement Latitudes series of variable annuity products from Jackson National Life Insurance Company or its affiliates, and incurred a surrender charge during their ownership of such product (“Nationwide Surrender Charge Class”); CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 14 39. The Nationwide Surrender Charge Class is reasonably estimated to be in the thousands or tens of thousands and is thus so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their addresses are unknown to Plaintiffs, but can be ascertained through Defendant’s records. Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mailing, publication or other notice. 40. There is a well-defined community of interest in the relevant questions of law and fact affecting the putative Nationwide Surrender Charge Class members concerning the breaches of contract and the uniform application of surrender charges in violation of the contract provisions. 41. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions affecting Nationwide Surrender Charge Class members, including, but not limited to, the following: • Whether Defendant violated the provisions of the variable annuity contracts in the way in which it assessed surrender charges; • Whether Defendant is liable for the excess surrender charges that it has imposed; • Whether Defendant has harmed the members of the class in connection with living benefits; • Whether Defendant has harmed members of the class in connection with death benefits; • Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Surrender Charge Class have sustained damages; • Whether Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Surrender Charge Class are entitled to damages; 42. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions affecting Class members, including, but not limited to, the specific amount of damages that each Plaintiff or class member has suffered. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 15 43. With respect to each putative class, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the absent class members. If brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of each class member would require proof of many of the same material and substantive facts, rely upon the same remedial theories and seek the same relief. 44. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the classes and have no interests adverse to or that directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of other class members. 45. Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the Court and the putative classes in a representative capacity with all of the obligations and duties material thereto. 46. Plaintiffs have retained the services of counsel who are experienced in complex class action litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel will adequately prosecute this action, and will otherwise assert, protect and fairly and adequately represent Plaintiffs and all absent class members. 47. Class certification is appropriate under F.R.C. P. 23(b)(1), in that the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications on the same essential facts, proof and legal theories would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the classes. 48. Class certification is appropriate under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 16 49. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint because: a) individual claims by the class members would be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far exceed what any one class member has at stake; b) little individual litigation has been commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint, and individual class members are unlikely to have an interest in separately prosecuting and controlling individual actions; c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy; and d) the proposed class action is manageable. 50. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, Defendants’ officers and directors, those persons’ immediate families, and the successors and predecessors of any such excluded person or entity. The Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class 51. The proposed Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class is defined as follows: All persons who, within the applicable statute of limitations, purchased a Perspective family series, Elite Access series, or Retirement Latitudes series of variable annuity products from Jackson National Life Insurance Company or its affiliates (“Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class”); 52. The Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class is reasonably estimated to be in the thousands or tens of thousands and is thus so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their addresses are unknown to CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 17 Plaintiffs, but can be ascertained through Defendant’s records. Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mailing, publication or other notice. 53. There is a well-defined community of interest in the relevant questions of law and fact affecting the putative Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class members concerning the breaches of contract and the uniform application of surrender charges in violation of the contract provisions. 54. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions affecting Nationwide Injunctive Surrender Charge Class members, including, but not limited to, the following: • Whether Defendant has misrepresented the provisions of the variable annuity contracts in the way in which it assessed surrender charges; • Whether Defendants marketing materials, including the Prospectus for each variable annuity product, misrepresent the way in which Jackson National will assess Surrender Charges • Whether Defendant’s Affiliated Agents are disseminating false information about the manner in which Surrender Charges are imposed • Whether declaratory or injunctive relief should be granted to stop the offending conduct 55. Common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions affecting Class members, including, but not limited to, the specific and uniform way that Defendant has represented the calculation of Surrender Charges and the way in which Defendant has imposed Surrender Charges. 56. With respect to each putative class, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the absent class members. If brought and prosecuted individually, the claims of each class member CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 18 would require proof of many of the same material and substantive facts, rely upon the same remedial theories and seek the same relief. 57. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the classes and have no interests adverse to or that directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of other class members. 58. Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the Court and the putative classes in a representative capacity with all of the obligations and duties material thereto. 59. Plaintiffs have retained the services of counsel who are experienced in complex class action litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel will adequately prosecute this action, and will otherwise assert, protect and fairly and adequately represent Plaintiffs and all absent class members. 60. Class certification is appropriate under F.R.C. P. 23(b)(1), in that the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the class. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications on the same essential facts, proof and legal theories would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the classes. 61. Class certification is appropriate under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2), in that Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to each class, making final declaratory, injunctive or other relief appropriate. 62. Class certification is appropriate under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 19 63. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint because: a) individual claims by the class members would be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far exceed what any one class member has at stake; b) little individual litigation has been commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint, and individual class members are unlikely to have an interest in separately prosecuting and controlling individual actions; c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy; and d) the proposed class action is manageable. 64. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, Defendants’ officers and directors, those persons’ immediate families, and the successors and predecessors of any such excluded person or entity. 65. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 66. Jackson National’s assessment of surrender charges was done consistently and uniformly in a manner contrary to the terms and conditions of the applicable contracts. In particular, Jackson National’s assessment of a surrender charge on a surrender charge was a violation of the variable annuity contracts issued by Jackson National. 67. Jackson National’s actions in violation of the variable annuity contracts were done intentionally or recklessly. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 20 68. All conditions precedent to the liability or obligations of Jackson National have occurred or have been waived. 69. Plaintiffs and each member of the Nationwide Surrender Charge Class have suffered damage in an amount to be determined. Plaintiffs allege that the total damages to the Nationwide Surrender Charge Class exceed the sum of five million dollars ($5,000,000). 70. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiffs have a fiduciary relationship with Jackson National. Jackson National controlled the premium amounts and had complete control of the calculation of amounts to be deducted as surrender charge. 72. Jackson National breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs by intentionally or recklessly performing calculations that were contrary to the contract provisions and failing to inform Plaintiffs or members of the Class that they were acting in contravention of the contract. Jackson National breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs by placing its own interest above that of Plaintiffs. 73. Jackson National’s acts, omissions and false representations directly and proximately caused injury to Plaintiffs, which resulted in damages to be determined, but consisting of wrongful surrender charges collected, reduced living benefits under the Jackson National contracts, and reduced death benefits under the Jackson National contracts. 74. Plaintiffs seek damages proximately caused by Jackson National. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 21 Punitive Damages. 75. Plaintiffs’ injury resulted from Jackson National’s intentional or reckless acts, which entitles Plaintiffs to exemplary damages. Jackson National knew, or was severely reckless in not knowing, that its actions were in violation of the contract terms and provisions, and that its omissions were material and harmful to Plaintiffs and all members of the class. 76. All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs’ claim for relief have been performed or have occurred. 77. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 78. By virtue of its dissemination of marketing materials and other uniform documents describing the variable annuities purchased by members of the putative class and through the uniform sales pitches made by its agents, Jackson National has disseminated false information to all members of the putative class about surrender charges. The way in which Jackson National describes the imposition of Surrender Charges is very different than the way in which Jackson National actually calculates and imposes the Surrender Charges. These misrepresentations, made to Plaintiffs in this district, were made negligently, or recklessly without regard for the truth of such representations. All Plaintiffs and class members are deemed to have relied on these material misrepresentations, and have suffered damages as a result of these misrepresentations in that the Surrender Charges actually imposed are more than what was represented to the members of the putative class. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 22 Injunctive Relief 79. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 80. Jackson National’s actions in violation of the terms of the variable annuity contracts continue and are ongoing. 81. Plaintiffs seek an injunction to prohibit Jackson National from continuing to violate the terms of the variable annuity contracts with respect to the calculation of surrender charges. 82. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law because it would require successive lawsuits to compensate Plaintiffs and members of the Class for the ongoing harm and the only effective way to protect the class members is to enjoin Defendant from the improper conduct. 83. All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs’ claim for relief have been performed or have occurred. 84. Injunctive relief is appropriate for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because Jackson National has acted on grounds and in ways that apply generally to all class members, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Plaintiffs’ Demand for Jury Trial 85. Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment as follows: a. Determining that this action is a proper class action under Rule 23 of the Federal CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 23 Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Awarding damages to the class in the amount of improper surrender charges paid by Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, c. enjoining the improper calculation of surrender charges upon withdrawals made by Plaintiffs and the Class members from their Jackson National Life Insurance Company variable annuity contracts; d. Awarding compensatory damages in favor of Plaintiffs and the other Class members against Jackson National for all damages sustained as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing, in amounts to be proven at trial, including pre-judgment interest thereon; e. Awarding other appropriate injunctive relief against Jackson National such that the contracts of Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ can be properly managed pending trial of this case; f. Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action, including counsel fees and expert fees as may be authorized by law; and g. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT-Page 24 Dated: November 29, 2016. Respectfully submitted, Breach of Contract Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against Jackson National Jackson National’s Conduct Negligent Misrepresentation

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10. The calls Defendant placed or caused to be placed qualify therefore as telemarketing calls where Defendant was offering its services. 33. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 41 as fully set forth herein. 43. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) is a regulation prescribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227. 44. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service…” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. Defendant made unsolicited calls to Plaintiff’s and the class members’ cellular telephones, using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. 46. The calls were made without the Plaintiff’s and the class members’ prior express written consent, and were not made for any emergency purpose. 47. Defendant’s violation of the TCPA resulted in an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy and right to enjoy the full utility of her cellular device; a legally protected interest. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 41 as fully set forth herein. 52. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) is a regulation prescribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227. It is a violation of the TCPA to “initiate any telephone solicitation to: (2) A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations …” 47 C.F.R. § 6. Plaintiff, at all times relevant herein, is and was the user, with sole dominion and control, of a cellular telephone assigned the number, ###-###-1014 and of her landline telephone number ###-###-6522. 7. On or about February 2010, Plaintiff started receiving unsolicited autodialed calls on both her cellular telephone and landline phone from multiple different telephone numbers all assigned to Wells Fargo. 8. The telephone calls Plaintiff received regarded a home loan for “Ruth Phillips.” Wells Fargo was offering to lower the price or refinance a home mortgage. 9. Defendant also left some voice records on Plaintiff’s voice mail box, one of which had the following content: Hi Ruth, good afternoon, Ida Clairemont with Wells Fargo. I just wanted to thank you again for banking with us. I just wanted to see if everything is okay with regard to your mortgage. I was looking at your mortgage and it looks like we can possibly reduce that rate for you. If you want to do maybe a free annual mortgage review. If you want to do that please give a call back. Violation of the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) Violation of the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)

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(For Unfair Business Practices Against All Named Defendants and Does 1 Through 10) (For Violation of California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2) Against All Named Defendants and Does 1 through 10) 18. Cumulus provides the Broadcast Service to members of the public in 2 4 California and elsewhere, and broadcasts sound recordings through numerous radio 2 5 stations throughout California, including, without limitation, the following: 26 (a) 27 28 1116419vl Fresno: (i) KSKS- 93.7 FM; (ii) KMGV- 97.9 FM; and (iii) KWYE 2 3 24. Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of itself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated owners of Pre-1972 recordings, which recordings were reproduced, perfonned, distributed or otherwise exploited by Cumulus via the Music Service in California. The proposed Class is comprised of and defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings of musical performances that initially were "fixed" (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972, which sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed and/or otherwise exploited by Cumulus via any form or method of delivery or storage (e.g., terrestrial broadcast, Internet, computer, server, etc.) in California (the "Class"). 25. This action may be properly brought and maintained as a class action 2 6 because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the members 2 7 of the proposed Class are clearly and easily ascertainable and identifiable. 28 6 31. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 3 0 above, as though fully set forth herein. 32. Pursuant to California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and the members of the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 33. Through its unauthorized reproduction, performance, distribution, or other exploitation via the Music Service of Pre-1972 Recordings (including the Recordings) in California, Cumulus has infringed the exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings in violation of California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2). 34. As a direct and proximate consequence of Cumulus's violation of California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2), Cumulus has received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 3 5. As a direct and proximate consequence of Cumulus's violation of California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount that is not as yet fully ascertained but which Plaintiff will ascertain and present through competent evidence at trial, but which is no less than $5 million. 36. Cumulus's conduct is causing, and unless enjoined and restrained by this Court will continue to cause Plaintiff and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated or measured in money. Plaintiff and each member of the 9 38. Pursuant to California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2) and California common law, 1 o Plaintiff and the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 11 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 12 3 9. Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest invested substantial time and money in developing the Recordings. 40. Because Cumulus does not obtain licenses, it does not incur any of the costs that a licensee is otherwise obligated to pay in order to reproduce, perform, distribute or otherwise exploit via the Music Service Pre-1972 Recordings (including 17 the Recordings). 18 41. Cumulus has misappropriated, and continues to misappropriate, for its own 19 commercial benefit, the exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 2 o Recordings reproducing, performing, distributing or otherwise exploiting via the Music 21 Service Pre-1972 Recordings (including the Recordings). 22 42. As a direct and proximate consequence of Cumulus's misappropriation, 2 3 Cumulus has received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff 2 4 and the Class. 2 5 43. As a direct and proximate consequence of Cumulus's misappropriation, 2 6 Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount that is not as yet fully 27 28 10 46. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 30 above, as though fully set forth herein. 47. Pursuant to California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2) and California common law, Plaintiff and the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 48. Cumulus's conduct in reproducing, performing, distributing, or other exploitation via the Music Service Pre-1972 Recordings (including the Recordings) constitutes a misappropriation of the property rights of the Plaintiff and the Class in the Pre-1972 Recordings and a violation of California Civil Code§ 980(a)(2). 11 6 (For Misappropriation Against All Named Defendants and Does 1 Through 10) 7 3 7. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations set forth above in paragraphs 1 8 through 30 above, as though fully set forth herein. 9

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(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Northsideusa.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Northsideusa.com, which Northside owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 23 100. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 99 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 101. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 102. Northsideusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 103. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Northsideusa.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 104. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Northsideusa.com, causing Northsideusa.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 24 105. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 106. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 107. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Northsideusa.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 108. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 25 111. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 13 18 (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) 25. Defendant, Triple T Trading Ltd d/b/a Northside USA., controls and operates Northsideusa.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Northsideusa.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse footwear and accessories, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Northsideusa.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Northside on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of footwear and accessories; and (c) learning about shipping and return policies, promotions, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of Northside’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Northsideusa.com. Due to Northside’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Northsideusa.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Northside, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Northsideusa.com. 29. Northside denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Northsideusa.com by preventing them from freely navigating Northsideusa.com. 30. Northsideusa.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 9 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Northsideusa.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Northsideusa.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Northsideusa.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Northsideusa.com, these forms include search fields to locate footwear, fields that specify the size and color, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. In fact, when Plaintiff attempted to select a size and color, her screen-reader could not recognize the button. Consequently, she was unable to “add to cart” or proceed to checkout and unable to complete a transaction. 33. Similarly, Northsideusa.com lacks accessible drop-down menus. Drop-down menus allow customers to locate and choose products as well as specify the color and size of certain items. On Northsideusa.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as footwear, have been added to the shopping cart because the screen-reader does not indicate the 10 type of product. Moreover, blind customers are unable to select the size or color of the product they desire. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Northsideusa.com. 34. Furthermore, Northsideusa.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Northsideusa.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Northsideusa.com also lacks accessible forms. Color and size boxes allow customers to specify the color and size of certain items. On Northsideusa.com, blind customers are unable to select specific color and size because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the color and size box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Northsideusa.com. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Northsideusa.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 37. Northsideusa.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and 11 blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Northsideusa.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Northsideusa.com. 38. Due to Northsideusa.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Northsideusa.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Northsideusa.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Northsideusa.com. 39. Northsideusa.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Northsideusa.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Northsideusa.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff, Rasheta Bunting, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Northsideusa.com, most recently in August 2018, but was unable to do so 12 independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Northsideusa.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a pair of Seaview Open Toe Sport Sandal. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Northsideusa.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Northsideusa.com. 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Northsideusa.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Northsideusa.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Northsideusa.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Northsideusa.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Northsideusa.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 49. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Northsideusa.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Northsideusa.com. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Northsideusa.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; 14 (b) Whether Northsideusa.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Northsideusa.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Northsideusa.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Northside has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Northsideusa.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 15 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 58. Northsideusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Northsideusa.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful 16 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 63. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited 17 to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Northside who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Northsideusa.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Northsideusa.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 68. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Northsideusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Northsideusa.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Northsideusa.com, causing Northsideusa.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 19 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 8 80. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 20 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Northsideusa.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the 21 conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Northsideusa.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Northsideusa.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Northsideusa.com, causing Northsideusa.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 94. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither 22 fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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19. In or around February of 2012, Plaintiffs applied for work with Defendant in Texarkana, Arkansas. 20. Plaintiffs had to complete and sign various forms as part of the employment application process. One of the forms was the "Background Investigation Consent." 21. On the "Background Investigation Consent," Plaintiffs had to agree to "release Lindsey Management Co., Inc., the properties under its management and/or its agents, and any person or entity, which provides information pursuant to this authorization, from any and all liabilities, claims or law suits in regards to the information obtained from any and all of the above reference sources used." 23. Rather, Defendant's background investigation consent contained extraneous information which clearly violated the "stand-alone disclosure" requirement and undercut the very purpose of the requirement. 24. Despite its failure to provide Plaintiffs with the required stand-alone disclosure, Defendant subsequently requested background checks from outside consumer reporting agencies. 25. Defendant willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by procuring consumer reports on Plaintiffs for employment purposes without first providing Plaintiffs clear and conspicuous written disclosures, in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes. v. ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS PRACTICES 26. Defendant conducts background checks on job applicants as part of its standard employment application and screening process. 27. Upon information and belief, a large number of Defendant's job applicants are required to sign a Background Investigation Consent substantially identical to the form attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 28. Defendant does not perform these background checks in-house. Rather, Defendant relies on outside consumer reporting agencies to obtain this information and report it to Defendant. 29. The background reports procured by Defendant constitute "consumer reports" for purposes of the FCRA. 32. Plaintiffs assert their claim on behalf of the class defined as follows: Any person who applied to a Lindsey Management apartment community and whose application included a liability release regarding consumer reports and for whom Lindsey Management procured a background check for employment purposes in the period beginning five years prior to the filing of the Complaint and continuing through the date the class list is prepared. 33. The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 34. Defendant regularly uses its disclosure to procure consumer reports on job applicants. 35. Hundreds of Defendant's current, former, and prospective employees satisfy the class definition. 36. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the members of the class. Defendant typically uses an identical disclosure to procure consumer reports on prospective and existing employees. 38. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 39. Plaintiffs' counsel are competent to litigate Rule 23 class actions and other complex litigation matters, and to the extent, if any, that they find that they are not, they are able and willing to associate additional counsel. 40. Plaintiffs are unaware of any existing litigation regarding the subject matter of this lawsuit. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendant had a policy of procuring consumer reports on prospective and existing employees; b. Whether Defendant violated the FCRA by procuring such consumer reports without a FCRA-compliant disclosure; c. Whether Defendant's FCRA violations were willful; d. The proper measure of statutory damages; and e. The proper measure of punitive damages. 43. Plaintiffs intend to send notice to all members of the class to the extent required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The names and addresses of the class members are available from Defendant's records.

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25. As a result of Defendant’s policies and practices with regard to curb ramps in the City’s pedestrian right of way, people with mobility disabilities have been discriminated against and denied full and equal access to the benefits of the City’s pedestrian right of way program or service, and to facilities in which City programs, services, and activities are made available to the public. 36. Plaintiff Artie Lashbrook has lived in the City of San Jose since the late 1960s, and has used a wheelchair since approximately 2011. Plaintiff experienced numerous barriers to access and unsafe conditions while attempting to use curb ramps within the City of San Jose, including missing and non-compliant curb ramps. 37. Over the years, Plaintiff has encountered hundreds of locations in various neighborhoods where curb ramps in the City’s pedestrian right of way are either missing or inaccessible. Plaintiff Lashbrook resided for several years near the intersection of Monterey Road and Edenview Drive. Plaintiff’s ability to navigate the pedestrian right of way in his own neighborhood was severely hampered by the lack of accessible curb ramps throughout the pedestrian right of way, including three non-compliant curb ramps at the northeast, southeast, and southwest corners of the intersection of Monterey Road and Edenview Drive. He also encountered a non-compliant curb ramp at the southeast corner of Monterey Road and Roeder Road. Given that these non-compliant curb ramps were adjacent to Mr. Lashbrook’s home, he had no option but to encounter these ramps when he left his home to engage in his community. 38. Since August 2017, Plaintiff has lived in the Mt. Pleasant neighborhood. There, he encountered two missing curb ramps at the intersection of Mt. Palomar Drive and Mt. Vista Drive, and two missing curb ramps at the intersection of Mt. Vista Drive and Mt. Herman Drive. Those corners lacked curb ramps until approximately June 2018. Plaintiff continues to encounter missing curb ramps at the intersections of Mt. Palomar Drive and Mt. Hood Way, Mr. Palomar Drive and Mt. McKinley Drive, and Mt. McKinley Drive and White Road. 42. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and on behalf of all persons with mobility disabilities who use or will use the pedestrian right of way in the City of San Jose, as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 53. Title II of the ADA provides in pertinent part: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 69. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in pertinent part: “[N]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 70. Plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in the services, programs, or activities that are provided to individuals in the City. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). 71. The City is a direct recipient of federal financial assistance sufficient to invoke the coverage of Section 504 and has received such federal financial assistance at all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint. 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 78. Section 11135(a) of the California Code provides in pertinent part: “No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of . . . disability, be unlawfully denied the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is funded by the state or receives any financial assistance from the state.” California Government Code § 11135 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

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16. Plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, seeks class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all disabled individuals in the United States that are unable to walk as a result of their disability and, as a consequence, must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device and who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Hotel, Website and the Websites. 17. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all disabled individuals in State of New York who are unable to walk as a result of their disability and, as a consequence, must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device and who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Hotel, Website and the Websites. 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all disabled individuals in the City of New York who are unable to walk as a result of their disability and, as a consequence, must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device and who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Hotel, Website and the Websites. 19. The Class is so numerous, being composed of millions of disabled individuals in the United States that are unable to walk as a result of their disability and must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device, that joinder of all members is impracticable, Additionally, there are questions of law and/or fact common to the Class and the claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the Class claims. 20. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class including: a. Whether the Hotel and Website are "public accommodation[s]" under the ADA and New York laws; b. Whether there was a violation under the ADA due to the barriers that exist at the Defendant’s Hotel and its Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; and c. Whether there was a violation under New York law due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Hotel and its Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 21. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class as they both claim that Defendant violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to have it’s Hotel, Website and the Websites accessible. 22. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members as the Plaintiff and the Class are individuals having the same claims as they are unable to walk and must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. 23. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the Class making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. 24. Questions of law or fact common to Class members predominate questions affecting individual Class members and a class action will fairly and efficiently decide this action. 25. Counsel for the Plaintiff is experienced representing both Plaintiffs and Defendants in Class actions. As such the Class will be properly represented. 26. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action as it will prevent the filing of a voluminous number of individual lawsuits throughout the United States by people who are individuals having the same claims as the Plaintiff all of whom are disabled, unable to walk and must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. 27. Defendant is required by the ADA, its accompanying regulations contained in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Architectural Guidelines and 2010 ADA Standards to ensure that its place of lodging complies with the standards applicable to public accommodations and is accessible to disabled individuals. 28. 28 C.F.R. §36.302(e)(l), which became effective on March 12, 2012, provides: “Reservations made by places of lodging. A public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging shall, with respect to reservations made by any means, including by telephone, in-person, or through a third party – (i) Modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms; (ii) Identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs; (iii) Ensure that accessible guest rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type; (iv) Reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems; and (v) Guarantee that the specific accessible guest room reserved through its reservations service is held for the reserving customer, regardless of whether a specific room is held in response to reservations made by others”. 29. “Section 36.302 of the 1991 Title III regulation requires public accommodations to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when such modifications are necessary to afford access to any goods, services, facilities, privileges advantages or accommodations, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations. Hotels, timeshares resorts, and other places of lodging are subject to this requirement and must make reasonable modifications to reservation policies, practices or procedures when necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities are able to reserve accessible hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible rooms”. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 30. Third-Party reservation services should also be subject to these requirements. 31. Hotels, motels and other places of lodging are required to identify and describe all accessible features in the hotel and guestrooms; “[t]his requirement is essential to ensure individuals with disabilities receive information they need to benefit from the services offered by the place of lodging.” “As a practical matter, ……. designating a room as “accessible” does not ensure necessarily that the room complies with all of the 1991 Standards.” 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 32. “Further hotel rooms that are in full compliance with current standards may differ, and individuals with disabilities must be able to ascertain which features – in new and existing facilities – are included in the hotel’s accessible guest rooms. For example, under certain circumstances, an accessible hotel bathroom may meet accessibility requirements with either a bathtub or a roll in shower. The presence or absence of particular accessible features such as these may mean the difference between a room that is usable by a particular person with a disability and one that is not”. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 33. For hotels that were built after the effective date of the 1991 Standards, it is sufficient to advise that the hotel itself is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guestroom, to specify the room type, the type of accessible bathing facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 34. “For older hotels with limited accessibility features, information about the hotel should include, at a minimum, information about accessible entrances to the hotel, the path of travel to guest check-in and other essential services, and the accessible route to the accessible room or rooms. In addition to the room information described above, these hotels should provide information about important features that do not comply with the 1991 Standards. For example, if the door to the “accessible” room or bathroom is narrower than required, this information should be included (e.g., door to guest room measures 30 inches clear)”. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 35. The Hotel is a place of public accommodation that owns and/or leases and operates a place of lodging pursuant to the ADA. Additionally, the Website is a place of public accommodation defined as a “place[s] of exhibition and entertainment,” “places of recreation,” and “service establishments.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7). 36. Defendant, by itself or by and through a third party owns, operates, maintains and controls the Website and Websites which contains an online reservation system located at www.borohotel.com, www.hotels.com, www.hoteltonight.com, www.reservations.com, and www.booking.com. The Website and Websites are subject to the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Section 36.302(e). 37. Prior to the commencement of this action, Plaintiff visited the Website and Websites on various dates including January 28, 2019 and date thereafter to learn about accessible features of the Hotel and in order to assess whether he could reserve an accessible room at the Hotel. However, the Plaintiff was unable to do so as the Website does not comply with the requirements of the ADA, including the requirements contained in 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e). The Plaintiff and others desire to stay at the Hotel but don’t know if they are able to do so due to the lack of information on the Website and Websites. Plaintiff plans on visiting the Website and Websites regularly to see if the Defendants have modified their site to be in compliance with the ADA. So far they have not. 38. The Defendants discriminate against the Plaintiff and other disabled individuals throughout the United States who are unable to walk and must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device excluding them of the same goods, services, features, facilities, benefits, advantages and accommodations of the Hotel and Website that are available to others. 39. The Website’s homepage mentions features in reference to accessibility features of the Hotel’s room and the common areas. The problem is that the reservation system does not detail which rooms are accessible or not. Consequently, Plaintiff and the Class cannot chose a room that they know will be accessible. If you click the link “Book A Room” no information arises in reference to the accessibility of a particular room or information for Plaintiff to decipher which room is accessible or not. There is literally no information about the room’s accessibility features. If you put in particular dates to reserve a room and access the availability of rooms on particular dates and see a list of available rooms on that date no accessibility information or accessibility details for each type of available room are displayed. You can click on the rooms features but there is no narrative detailing whether the room is accessible or not. 40. The Website’s reservation system contains no information as to whether any of its rooms available on particular dates contain accessible features including but not limited to roll in showers or bathtubs, built in seating, grab bars, lowered sinks, wrapped pipes, sink and door hardware, or sufficient maneuvering space complaint within the room. 41. The Website also is devoid of most of the accessibility information concerning common areas and Hotel amenities and whether the Hotel is accessible in accordance with the 1991 Standards, or if not, the ways in which it is not with regard to the Hotel’s entrance, the registration desk, recreational facilities, the restaurants, the parking areas, business center and the routes to and from all of the aforementioned to and from each other such that the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass can evaluate to determine whether the Hotel is accessible to them, although it provides very general information. 42. Plaintiff has saved and retained all webpages from the Website and Websites concerning his claim and that of the Class and Subclass. 43. Upon information and belief, Defendant has not complied with various reservation system requirements: (i) that accessible rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other non-accessible guest rooms have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type [§ 36.302 (e)(1)(iii)] and (ii) the requirement to reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from reservation systems. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (e)(1)(iv). 44. Plaintiff and the Class will visit the Website and Websites again to determine if the Defendant has complied with the laws and to learn about the accessible (and inaccessible) features of the Hotel and rooms because they desire to stay there. 45. Plaintiff and other disabled individuals requiring mobility assistance are aware that the Website is non-compliant at this time and that they have been discriminated against by the Defendants. 46. The Website can be viewed by individuals located in New York State in addition to the other states of the United States and can be reached from computers, tablets and cellphones which can access the internet. 47. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all other mobility-impaired individuals by denying full and equal access to and enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations offered on the Website in violation of the ADA. 48. Modifying the Website and Websites to comply with the ADA is readily achievable without undue burden. 49. Defendant’s non-compliant acts prevents the Plaintiff, Class and Subclass from having equal access as the remaining public preventing them from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Website. 50. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “49” as if set forth fully herein. 51. The Plaintiff is uniped, an amputee, and must use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. The Plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities and is therefore an individual with a disability as defined under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 52. Title III of the ADA provides that ''No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. §36.201. 53. Title III of the ADA provides that “places of public accommodation” may not discriminate against people with disabilities. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) ("place of exhibition and entertainment," "place of recreation," and "service establishments"). 54. Defendant has failed to provide accessibility features on its Website and Websites about the Hotel, its common areas, its features, its reservation system and its rooms thereby making it non- accessible to disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. 55. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device to participate in programs or services or providing a service that is not equal to that afforded to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(i-iii). 56. Discrimination includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 67. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “66” as if set forth fully herein. 68. At all times relevant to this action, the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290 et. seq. covers the actions of the Defendant. 69. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this action, has a substantial impairment to a major life activity of walking and is an individual with a disability under Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(21). 70. The Defendant, at all relevant times to this action, owns and operates a place of accommodation, the Website and the Hotel, within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(9). Defendant is a person within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(1). 71. The Website and Websites are gateways to and part of the Hotel which is a place of public accommodation. 72. Plaintiff has visited the Website and Websites and has encountered barriers of access that exist. 73. Pursuant to Article 15 N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2)(a) “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation ... because of the ... disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof." 74. Discrimination includes the refusal to adopt and implement reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when they are necessary to afford, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law§ 296(2)(a), § 296(2)(c)(i). 75. Defendant’s actions violate Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(a) by discriminating against the Plaintiff and Subclass by (i) owning and operating the Website that is inaccessible to disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device; and (ii) by not removing access barriers to its Website in order to make accessibility features of the Hotel and its rooms known to disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device; and (iii) by refusing to modify the Hotel’s online reservation systems on its Website and Websites when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. This inaccessibility denies disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant makes available to individuals who are not disabled and can walk without the need of a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(c). 76. The Defendant’s discriminatory practice also includes, "a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(c). 77. Established guidelines exist for making websites accessible to disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device and are easily obtainable. These guidelines have been used and followed by government and businesses in making their websites accessible to disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device, including but not limited to, having descriptions of accessibility features of a Hotel or lack thereof of its entrance, its common areas, its rooms, its travel routes to and from various components of the Hotel and having a reservation system that does not exclude the disabled. Incorporating these components in its Website and Websites would not fundamentally alter the Defendants’ Website, Hotel or business and would not result in an undue burden. 78. Defendant’s have intentionally and willfully discriminated against the Plaintiff and Subclass in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) and this discrimination continues to date. 79. Absent injunctive relief, Defendant’s discrimination will continue against the Plaintiff and Subclass causing irreparable harm. 80. Plaintiff and the Subclass are therefore entitled to compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each and every discriminatory act in addition to reasonable attorney fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exe. Law §§ 297(9), 297(4)(c) et seq. 81. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “80” as if set forth fully herein. 82. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 83. Persons within N.Y.S. are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner of a place of public accommodation, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40. 84. No person because of disability, as defined in § 292 (21) of the Executive Law, shall be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law (“CVR”) § 40-c. 85. § 292 of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law deems a disability a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function. As such the Plaintiff is disabled under the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. 86. Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Subclass under CVR § 40 as Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation that does not provide full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges to all persons and discriminates against disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. 87. Defendant intentionally and willfully failed to remove the barriers on their Website discriminating against the Plaintiff and Subclass preventing access in violation of CVR §40. 88. Defendant has failed to take any steps to halt and correct its discriminatory conduct and discriminates against and will continue to discriminate against the Plaintiff and the Subclass members. 89. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 a corporation which violates any of the provisions of §§ 40, 40-a, 40-b or 42 shall be liable for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby… in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Plaintiff or Defendant shall reside. 90. Plaintiff and the Subclass hereby demand compensatory damages of five hundred dollars for the Defendant’s acts of discrimination including civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq.. 91. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “90” as if set forth fully herein. 92. At all times, the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 et. seq. applied to the conduct of the Defendant as the Defendant owns and operates the Website and is a person under the law. 93. At all times concerning this action the Plaintiff and the Subclass have had a substantial impairment to a major life activity of walking and are individuals with a disability under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(16). 94. At all times concerning this action the Defendant’s Website is a place of public accommodation as defined in N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 95. “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of the actual or perceived ……. disability …. of any person to withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations required to make reasonable accommodations to a disabled individual and may not “refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 96. The willful and intentional non-removal of the Website’s barriers of access for the Plaintiff and the Subclass by the Defendant discriminates against disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device by denying them full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled individuals who can walk without the use of use a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device. 97. It is discriminatory for the Defendant “not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to …. enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity." N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 98. Defendant’s actions will continue to prevent the Plaintiff and Subclass from accessing the Website as the remaining public can and the Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. 99. Plaintiff and Subclass are also entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries and loss sustained as a result of the Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in addition to punitive damages and civil penalties and fines for each offense, attorney fees, costs and disbursements of this action. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8), § 8-126(a) and § 8-502(a). CLASS AND SUBCLASS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 100. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “99” as if fully set forth herein. 101. The Plaintiff claims that the Website and Websites contains barriers denying disabled individuals who cannot walk without the use of a wheelchair or other motorized mobility device full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website. 102. Defendant’s Website and Websites fail to comply with applicable laws and the Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Subclass under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. 103. The Defendant denies these claims. 104. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment such that the parties understand and know their respective rights and obligations. THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York City Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF, THE CLASS AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Human Rights Law

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1. Certify this action as a class action. 2. Appoint Alex Cooper as Class Representative of the Class and her attorneys as Class Counsel. 3. A finding that the Defendant violated the FDCPA and/or an admission from the Defendant that it violated the FDCPA. 34. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-33. 35. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that, within 5 days of Defendant’s first communication to a consumer, Defendant was required to provide Mr. Cooper with an effective validation notice, containing, among other disclosures, “(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 36. Defendant’s form collection letter violates § 1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA because it failed to identify effectively the current creditor to whom the debt was owed. See Janetos, 825 F.3rd at 324-325; see also, Long v. Fenton & McGarvey, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170421 (S.D. Ind. 2016); Pardo v. Allied Interstate, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 125526 (S.D. Ind. 2015); Deschaine v. National Enterprise Systems, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31349 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Walls v. United Collection Bureau, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68079 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Braatz v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123118 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 37. Defendant’s violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 38. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-37. 39. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 4. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class, and against Defendant. 40. Making a false statement as to the name of the original creditor is a materially misleading statement which violates of § 1692e of the FDCPA. See Tourgeman, supra, 755 F.3d at 1122. By failing to properly identify the correct creditor, Defendant’s letter violated § 1692e of the FDCPA. 41. Defendant’s violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 42. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-41. 5 43. Section 1692f of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 44. Defendant, by failing to properly identify the creditor violated § 1692f of the FDCPA. 45. Defendant’s violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 46. Plaintiff, Alex Cooper, brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Indiana from whom Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt via the same form collection letter that Defendant sent to Plaintiff which failed to explain who owns the alleged debt at issue in this matter. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s form letter violated the FDCPA and asks the Court award damages as authorized by §1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 47. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection, using the same form collection letter that was sent to Mr. Cooper in its attempts to collect delinquent consumer debts from other consumers. 48. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts by sending other consumers the same form collection letter it sent to Mr. Cooper. 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for their fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 5. Actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). 50. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, prays that the Court grant the following: 6 6. Statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). 7. Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 8. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted, /s/ John T. Steinkamp John T. Steinkamp John Steinkamp and Associates Attorney for Plaintiff 5214 S. East Street, Suite D1 Indianapolis, IN 46227 Office: (317) 780-8300 Fax: (317) 217-1320 Email: [email protected] /s/ Andrew A. Ault Andrew A. Ault Andrew A. Ault, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff 5214 S. East Street, Suite D2 Indianapolis, IN 46227 Office: (317) 866-0948 Email: [email protected] Violation Of § 1692g(a)(2) Failure To Identify Effectively The Current Creditor Violation Of § 1692f Of The FDCPA – Unfair Or Unconscionable Collection Actions Violation Of § 1692e Of The FDCPA – False, Deceptive Or Misleading Collection Actions

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 22. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public stockholders of Oclaro (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 24. Oclaro manufactures and markets optical components, modules, and subsystems used in telecommunications, data communications, aerospace, consumer optics, and semiconductors. 52. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 56. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 57. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of stockholder votes in proxy communications that contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading[.]” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 67. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 68. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Oclaro within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Oclaro, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the S4 filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 69. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the S4 and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. The Proposed Merger

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56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 55 of this complaint as though the same were more fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers are employees of Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA. 58. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA. 59. As a matter of common policy Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers have been classified as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 60. This common policy of classifying Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers as exempt is incorrect: neither Plaintiff nor the similarly situated Implementation Managers satisfy any of the exemptions in the FLSA. 61. This common policy of misclassifying Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers as exempt has been in effect since at least August 2017. 62. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers should have been classified as non-exempt from no later than August 2017 through the present. 63. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers have regularly worked more than forty hours in workweeks since August 2017. 64. Defendant has not paid any overtime compensation to Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers when they have worked more than forty hours in workweeks since August 2017. 66. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers has violated the FLSA. 67. For at least the past three years, Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been knowing, willful, and in reckless disregard of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. 68. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers are entitled to recover from Defendant the overtime pay improperly withheld by Defendant, plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 69. Defendant has knowingly and intentionally violated the FLSA’s requirement at 29 U.S.C. §211(c) that it maintain accurate records of time worked, and at 29 U.S.C. §207(a) that it pay a premium rate for overtime worked. 70. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Implementation Managers are also entitled to recover liquidated damages under the FLSA. 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 70 of this complaint as though the same were more fully set forth herein. 72. There are 20+ similarly situated Implementation Managers who, like Plaintiff, have reported to offices in Pennsylvania and/or who have performed the bulk of their work in Pennsylvania since August 2017. Individual and Class Action Individual and Collective Action

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15. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of Nevada. 16. At all times relevant, Defendant conducted business in the State of Nevada. 17. On or about December 20, 2010, Plaintiff allegedly entered into a gym membership agreement, and at some point thereafter fell behind on the payments. This debt was money, property, or their equivalent, which is due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person to another person and were therefore “debt(s)” and a “consumer debt” as the terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). 18. Plaintiff takes no position as to the validity of the alleged debt. 19. Subsequently, the alleged debt was allegedly assigned, placed or otherwise transferred, to Defendant for collection. 20. On or about August 21, 2014, Defendant or its agent/s began contacting Plaintiff via written letter (the “letter”) in attempt to collect the alleged debt. This letter was a “communications” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(2). 47. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(P) (FDCPA) • an award of statutory damages of $1,000.00 to each named Plaintiff, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), against Defendant; • an award of any such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of each Defendant, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B), against Defendant; • an award of costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), against Defendant; and • any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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44. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Hanger during the Class Period. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, directors, and officers of Hanger and their families and affiliates. 45. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. As of November 10, 2014, there were approximately 35.29 million shares of Hanger stock outstanding, owned by hundreds or thousands of investors. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict with those of the Class. 49. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 55. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 56. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Hanger securities at artificially inflated prices. 58. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the Company’s financial well-being, operations, and prospects. 59. During the Class Period, Defendants made the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded to be false or misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 60. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material fact set forth herein, or recklessly disregarded the true facts that were available to them. Defendants engaged in this misconduct to conceal Hanger’s true condition from the investing public and to support the artificially inflated prices of the Company’s securities. 61. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Hanger securities. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased the Company’s securities at the prices they paid, or at all, had they been aware that the market prices for Hanger securities had been artificially inflated by Defendants’ fraudulent course of conduct. 63. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 64. Plaintiff repeats, incorporates, and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 65. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Hanger within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. By virtue of their high-level positions, participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations, direct involvement in the day-to- day operations of the Company, and/or intimate knowledge of the Company’s actual performance, and their power to control public statements about Hanger, the Individual Defendants had the power and ability to control the actions of Hanger and its employees. By reason of such conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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22. During all relevant times herein, Defendant was and is an employer as defined by Title VII. 23. During all relevant times herein, Representative Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are/were applicants of Defendant as defined by Title VII. 24. Plaintiff is a female. 25. Plaintiff was an applicant for employment of Defendant commencing her application process on or around August 4, 2016. 26. On or about August 4, 2016, the Plaintiff responded to an employment advertisement Defendant had placed on Craig’s List for prospective employees. 27. Plaintiff was informed by the Defendant that jobs were available, but that the Defendant hired for construction sites and did not have jobs for women. 29. Plaintiff was a qualified, competent, and dedicated applicant that was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, female. 30. Upon information and belief, during this time period numerous males were hired instead of the Plaintiff. 31. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not hired by Defendant. 32. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were as qualified or more qualified than the male applicants that were eventually hired by Defendant. 33. The failure to hire Plaintiff and other similarly situated applicants was based on the unlawful consideration of gender. 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 35. All conditions precedent to the institution of Plaintiff’s claims under Count I have been satisfied. 36. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are/were applicants of the Defendant. 38. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have suffered adverse job actions, in that they have been denied employment opportunities and hire because of their gender [female]. 39. Defendant treated similarly situated male employees more favorably than the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class were treated, as alleged herein. Defendant intended to, knowingly engaged in, condoned and/or ratified severe gender discrimination and failure to hire, as alleged herein. 40. The actions of Defendant as perpetrated by its agents and as described and complained of above, are unlawful employment practices in that they likely have the effect of discriminating against, depriving and tending to deprive equal employment to, and otherwise adversely affecting Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class because of their gender [female] in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. 41. At all times relevant to this cause of action, Defendant had a duty under Title VII to refrain from discriminating against Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class based on their gender [female]. 43. The discriminatory actions by Defendant, through their management, agents and employees, were intentional and willful, and in deliberate disregard of and with reckless indifference to, the federal laws, state laws, and the rights and sensibilities of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class. 44. Defendant, by and through its agents, engaged in the foregoing acts and conduct when it knew or should have known that the same were in violation of Title VII and any alleged reasons to the contrary are pretextual. 45. The actions of Defendant in intentionally engaging in and condoning gender discrimination against Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have caused Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class consequential damage. 46. There is a causal connection between the Plaintiff's and the Rule 23 Class’ gender, and the dissimilar treatment suffered by Plaintiffs at the hands of the Defendant. COUNT I (DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. – DISPARATE TREATMENT)

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(Overtime Violations – Ohio Overtime Class) 53) Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 54) Ohio law requires employers to pay overtime in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 207, 213, as amended; and O.R.C. § 4111.03(A). 9 55) Defendants are individual and joint “employers” covered by the overtime requirements set forth in the OMFWSA. 56) The OMFWSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate of not less than one and one-half their regular rates. 57) As employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated work or worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, and were not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40. 58) Defendants violated the OMFWSA by not paying Plaintiff and others similarly situated drive time, which resulted in unpaid overtime. 59) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not exempt under the OMFWSA. 60) Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees drive time resulted in not being paid overtime compensation at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) each workweek in violation of the OMFWSA. 61) By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated provisions of the OMFWSA. 62) As a result of Defendants’ practices, Plaintiff and the Ohio Overtime Class members have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the OMFWSA; and because wages remain unpaid, damages continue. 63) Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. 10 (Overtime – FLSA Collective) 45) Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 8 46) Defendants are individual and joint “employers” covered by the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. 47) The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate of not less than one and one-half times their regular rates. 48) As employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated work or worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, and were not paid for drive time which resulted in unpaid overtime in those workweeks. 49) Defendants’ failure to keep records of all drive time each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees violated the 11) At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been individually and jointly in the business of providing home health care. 12) Plaintiff and others similarly situated were jointly employed by Defendants as Non- Exempt Direct Support Professionals (“DSPs”). Plaintiff and all other similarly situated DSPs were responsible for providing home care on behalf of Defendants. 13) Plaintiff and others similarly situated regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 14) Defendants, however, failed to pay overtime compensation in numerous instances in which Plaintiff and others similarly situated worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 15) Furthermore, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were required to travel to and from more than on work location within the same workday, but were not paid for this travel time. 16) Defendants’ failure to pay drive time resulted in additional unpaid overtime. 17) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were employees of Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA and the OMFWSA. 18) At all relevant times, Defendants were individual and joint employers within the meaning of the FLSA and the OMFWSA. 19) At all relevant times, Defendants comprised an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 4 20) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206- 207. 21) At all relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were not exempt from the protections of the FLSA or the OMFWSA. 22) At all relevant times, Defendants shared operational control over significant aspects of the day-to-day functions of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 23) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to hire, fire and discipline employees, including Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 24) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to set rates and methods of compensation of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 25) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the authority to control the work schedules and employment conditions of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 26) At all relevant times, Defendants shared ultimate authority and control of employment records. 27) At all relevant times, Defendants have mutually benefitted from the work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 28) At all relevant times, Defendants have not acted entirely independently of each other and have not been completely disassociated with respect to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 29) At all relevant times, Defendants shared the services of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 5 30) At all relevant times, Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interest of each other in relation to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 31) Defendants knowingly and willfully engaged in the violations of the FLSA and the OMFWSA described herein. 32) The exact amount of unpaid overtime compensation that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated is not yet known by Plaintiff, because most, if not all, records needed to make such calculations are within the possession or control of Defendants or were not kept by Defendants. 33) The FLSA and the OMFWSA require employers to make, keep, and preserve records of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment, and to preserve such records. To the extent that Defendants failed to make, keep, and preserve records of all required and unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, including drive time, Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable estimate of such time. 34) Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 35) Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of other similarly situated employees who have been, are being, or will be, adversely affected by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 36) The collective which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current DSPs, or similar care providers with different job titles, who worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours during any workweek within three years 6 preceding the Complaint filing date and through the final disposition of this matter (the “FLSA Collective”). 37) This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 38) The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt-in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 39) Plaintiff further brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and a class of current or former employees employed by Defendants in Ohio, defined as: All former and current DSPs, or similar care providers with different job titles, who worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours during any workweek within the two years preceding the Complaint filing date and through the final disposition of this matter (the “Ohio Overtime Class”). 40) The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact size of the potential Ohio Overtime Class; but, upon information and belief avers that each class consists of at least 50 employees (the exact number will be in Defendants’ records). 7 41) There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Overtime Class including: whether Defendants’ practices in Ohio resulted in its employees not being paid overtime wages and whether such wages remain unpaid. 42) Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Overtime Class members. Her interests are not antagonistic to but, rather, are in unison with, the interests of the Ohio Overtime Class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage- and-hour litigation and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Overtime Class in this case. 43) The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Overtime Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendants’ liability to the class are common to each class as a whole and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 44) Class action treatment is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Overtime Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Overtime Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation.

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19. Meridian is a life science company doing business in (i) the development, manufacture, sale and distribution of diagnostic test kits, primarily for certain gastrointestinal, viral, respiratory, and parasitic infectious diseases, and elevated blood lead levels; and (ii) the manufacture and distribution of bulk antigens, antibodies, PCR/qPCR reagents, nucleotides, competent cells, and bioresearch reagents used by researchers and other diagnostic manufacturers. B. Material Misstatements and Omissions during the Class Period 20. The Class Period begins March 25, 2016. On March 24, 2016, after the market close, Meridian issued a press release also attached as Exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K filed with the SEC announcing the acquisition of Magellan (“March 2016 Press Release”). The Company made material misrepresentations in the press release, including in pertinent part: 29. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Meridian, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Meridian’s allegedly materially misleading statements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Meridian, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 13 of 24 PAGEID #: 13 14 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all individuals and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Meridian Securities on the public market during the Class Period, and were damaged, excluding the Company, the defendants and each of their immediate family members, legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which any of the defendants have or had a controlling interest (the “Class”). 39. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Meridian securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Meridian or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. Upon information and belief, these shares are held by thousands if not millions of individuals located geographically throughout the country and possibly the world. Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 17 of 24 PAGEID #: 17 18 Joinder would be highly impracticable. 40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by the defendants’ respective wrongful conduct in violation of the federal laws complained of herein. 41. Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by the defendants’ respective acts as alleged herein; (b) whether the defendants acted knowingly or with deliberate recklessness in issuing false and misleading financial statements; (c) whether the price of Meridian securities during the Class Period was artificially inflated because of the defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and (d) whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 43. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 18 of 24 PAGEID #: 18 19 a class action. 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 45. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (1) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (2) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Meridian Securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan, and course of conduct, each of the Defendants took the actions set forth herein. 46. Defendants: (a) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s Securities in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Meridian securities in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. All Defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 47. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the business, operations and future prospects of Meridian as specified herein. Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 19 of 24 PAGEID #: 19 20 48. These Defendants employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud while in possession of material adverse non-public information, and engaged in acts, practices, and a course of conduct as alleged herein in an effort to assure investors of Meridian’s value and performance and continued substantial growth, which included the making of, or participation in the making of, untrue statements of material facts and omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made about Meridian and its business operations and future prospects in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, as set forth more particularly herein, and engaged in transactions, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of Meridian Securities during the Class Period. 49. Individual Defendants’ primary liability, and controlling person liability, arises from the following facts: (1) Individual Defendants were high-level executives, directors, and/or agents at the Company during the Class Period and members of the Company’s management team or had control thereof; (2) each Individual Defendant, by virtue of his responsibilities and activities as a senior officer and/or director of the Company, was privy to and participated in the creation, development and reporting of the Company’s financial condition; (3) each Individual Defendant enjoyed significant personal contact and familiarity with the other Individual Defendant and was advised of and had access to other members of the Company’s management team, internal reports and other data and information about the Company’s finances, operations, and sales at all relevant times; and (4) each Individual Defendant was aware of the Company’s dissemination of information to the investing public which they knew or recklessly disregarded was materially false and misleading. Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 20 of 24 PAGEID #: 20 21 50. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. Such Defendants’ material misrepresentations and/or omissions were done knowingly or recklessly and for the purpose and effect of concealing Meridian’s operating condition and future business prospects from the investing public and supporting the artificially inflated price of its securities. As demonstrated by Defendants’ overstatements and misstatements of the Company’s financial condition throughout the Class Period, Defendants, if they did not have actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged, were reckless in failing to obtain such knowledge by deliberately refraining from taking those steps necessary to discover whether those statements were false or misleading. 51. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts, as set forth above, the market price of Meridian’s securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the fact that market prices of Meridian’s publicly-traded securities were artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the false and misleading statements made by Defendants, or upon the integrity of the market in which the Securities trades, and/or on the absence of material adverse information that was known to or recklessly disregarded by Defendants but not disclosed in public statements by Defendants during the Class Period, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class acquired Meridian’s Securities during the Class Period at artificially high prices and were or will be damaged thereby. 52. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiff and other members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity and believed them to be true. Had Plaintiff and the Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 21 of 24 PAGEID #: 21 22 other members of the Class and the marketplace known the truth regarding Meridian’s financial results, which was not disclosed by Defendants, Plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Meridian securities, or, if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices that they paid. 53. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 54. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company’s Securities during the Class Period. 55. This action was filed within two years of discovery of the fraud and within five years of each plaintiff’s purchases of Securities giving rise to the cause of action. 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 57. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Meridian within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions, agency, ownership and contractual rights, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control, and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. The Individual Defendants provided Case: 1:17-cv-00774-SJD Doc #: 1 Filed: 11/15/17 Page: 22 of 24 PAGEID #: 22 23 with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to have been misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or to cause the statements to be corrected. 58. In particular, each of these Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. 59. As set forth above, Meridian, the Individual Defendants each violated Section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, by their acts and omissions as alleged in this Complaint. 60. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s Securities during the Class Period. 61. This action was filed within two years of discovery of the fraud and within five years of each Plaintiff’s purchases of Securities giving rise to the cause of action. A. Company Background The Individual Defendants Violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. Beginning in April 2013, Defendant began contacting Plaintiff with an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) using an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A) in order to discuss the Defendant using Plaintiff’s services to sell Plaintiff’s vehicle. 14. On information and belief, Plaintiff did not provide Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers to Defendant through any medium at any time. 15. Between April 2013 and May 2013, Plaintiff has received multiple calls from Defendant where Defendant utilizes an “artificial or prerecorded voice” in conjunction with an ATDS. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 25. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited marketing and artificial or prerecorded voice messages from Defendant without prior express consent which message by Defendant or its agents was not made for emergency purposes, within the four years prior to the filing of this action. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 39. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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16. Defendant is an online retailer of botanical supplements. Through the Website, customers can purchase supplement blends designed for various needs including, increasing energy, improving brain function, immunity, or skin, relieving -7- stress, aiding in digestion, and other wellness issues. Defendant does not operate any brick-and-mortar locations, so the Website is Defendant’s exclusive point of sale. 17. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. Through the Website, customers can view and purchase Defendant’s entire line of products. Customers can also get answers to frequently asked questions, create and manage an account, learn about shipping and refunds, and contact the company via an online form. 18. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operations. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers are also, inter alia, able to: learn about Defendant’s products, including where the ingredients are sourced, purity standards, and health benefits; get recipes using Defendant’s products; read the blog; and learn about the company. 19. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Olsen and other blind or visually-impaired users’ access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its online retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Olsen and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s online retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 20. Plaintiff Olsen cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using JAWS screen- reading software. -8- 21. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about July 27, 2021, Plaintiff Olsen encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s online retail operations. Because of these barriers, he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is in part due to the fact that images are not accompanied by the requisite alt-text. For example, on the home page, there are several images underlaying text. While the text is accessible, the images are not and the text does not describe what is being depicted in the images. On the shopping pages, images are all labeled with the product name. On each product page, a sighted user can see images of the packaging, the nutrition label, and weekly expected results. These images are completely inaccessible to screen reader users and the information, if available at all, is not easy to locate elsewhere on the Website. Therefore, screen reader users cannot learn about products and product benefits equal to sighted users. Screen reader users also have difficulty learning about products available for purchase on the Website because the main navigation menu does not expand for screen reader users as it does for sighted users. For example, a sighted user can hover over “Shop” and see a submenu with the various types of products one can shop for, organized by type or benefits, or what some of Defendant’s best-selling products are. Because these submenus are not accessible to screen reader users, they must take extra steps to learn about the products and they cannot easily shop by benefit or format. Also, due to the inaccessibility of the submenu, several pages are completely inaccessible to screen reader -9- users, such as the page “Hanah launches purity quality results” on which one can learn about where the ingredients are sourced and lab testing to ensure quality. b. Navigate the Website. Plaintiff Olsen found this site difficult to navigate using his screen reader. As mentioned above, the main navigation menu at the top of the page does not expand, as it does for sighted user. Clicking on “shop” just loads a new page with all of Defendant’s products and no way to filter. Similarly, “about” leads to the page “company” with no way to reach the other pages under the “about” link. There are several unlabeled elements throughout the Website, including the links for “cart,” “account,” and “search.” Therefore, a screen reader user cannot easily search the Website by keyword, manage an account, or access the shopping cart. When shopping for items, the one-time purchase or subscribe and save options are not labeled as selectable and there does not appear to be a way to select delivery frequency. 22. Plaintiff Olsen was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. Tables are not properly labeled with row and column headers. c. Links use general text like “read more” with no surrounding text explaining the link purpose. d. Frames do not have a title. e. Button elements are empty. -10- f. Form controls have no label and no programmatically determined name. g. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. h. Webpages have duplicate IDs which cause problems in screen readers. i. Webpages have markup errors. j. Radio button groups are not contained in a fieldset element. k. Headings are not nested correctly and at least twenty (20) headings are empty. l. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to different destinations. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 23. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Olsen, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Olsen encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from taking advantage of Defendant’s online retail services and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 24. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Olsen could independently navigate it, view goods and service items; learn about Defendant’s products, including sourcing and nutritional information, and complete a purchase, as sighted individuals can. -11- 25. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Olsen has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 26. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Olsen and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Olsen alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Olsen; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Olsen, as a member of a protected class. 27. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 28. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Olsen seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 29. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Olsen seeks a permanent injunction under 42 -12- U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Olsen to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 AA compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 30. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 31. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Olsen and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 32. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the -13- Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 33. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 34. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant online during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 35. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 36. Plaintiff Olsen seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 37. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: -14- a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “commercial marketplace” effecting interstate commerce; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 38. Plaintiff Olsen’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 39. Plaintiff Olsen will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act -15- on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 40. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 41. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 42. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 44. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail operations. 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, -16- services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 46. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 47. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 48. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Olsen, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. -17- 49. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Olsen requests the relief as set forth below. 50. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 52. Defendant’s Website constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail operations. 53. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to and accessible by consumers located in the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 54. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. -18- 55. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 56. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 57. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 58. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: -19- a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 59. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 60. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 61. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 62. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -20- 64. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 66. Defendant’s Website constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). Defendant’s Website is a service that is integrated with its online retail operations. 67. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its online retail operations and the Website, which is marketed to and accessible by consumers located in the State. For these reasons, Defendant is a “person: under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 68. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 69. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] -21- from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 70. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 71. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Olsen and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its online retail operations under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Olsen seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. -22- 73. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 74. Plaintiff Olsen is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff Olsen, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Olsen contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Defendant’s online retail operations and its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and that the Website fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 78. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a gardening supplies retailer that owns and operates www.gardeners.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)- (2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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15. Defendant Profrac Services, LLC, is an oil and gas well serving company headquartered in Texas with additional locations in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. 16. Plaintiff Singleton worked from approximately February of 2018 until November of 2018 as an equipment operator. 17. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Texas and New Mexico. 18. As an equipment operator, Plaintiff was responsible for fracturing wells to aid in the production of oil and gas. 19. Defendant paid Plaintiff and its other technicians on an hourly basis, however, Defendant failed to pay its equipment operators the proper amount of overtime. 20. Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basis. 22. Plaintiff was paid a bonus. 23. In addition to their hourly wage, Defendant pays it equipment operators nondiscretionary bonuses tied to the number of completions a frac crew completes in a month. 24. This bonus payment was issued separately, often on a separate check from the standard payroll check. 25. Defendant informs its crews in advance of their work what conditions must be met in order for its crews to receive the bonus payment. 26. When Defendant calculates overtime, it does not include these bonus payments in the regular rate as required under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.208. 27. By excluding these bonus payments from the regular rate, Defendant calculated overtime using an artificially low regular rate and, as a result, significantly underpaid the amount of overtime it should have paid to its employees. 28. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee. 29. Plaintiff worked a significant amount of overtime. His typical workdays were 10- 12 hours, seven days a week. This schedule yields 40-44 overtime hours a week. 30. Other equipment operators work the same or more hours per week as Plaintiff. 31. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, all of Defendant’s other hourly paid equipment operators were non-exempt employees. V. 33. This count arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA for its failure to pay Plaintiff and Class Members overtime compensation based on the FLSA’s time-and-a-half formula. 34. For each hour worked in excess of forty (40) each week, Plaintiff and Class Members were entitled to be paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 35. By failing to pay overtime based on that formula, Defendant violated and continues to violate the FLSA. 36. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are employed are applicable to Defendant, Plaintiff, or Class Members. 37. Defendant did not have a good faith belief that its pay policy did not violate the 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 43. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the NMMWA. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed and continues to employ, “employees,” including the New Mexico Class Members and Plaintiff, within the meaning the NMMWA. 44. The NMMWA requires payment of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for each hour worked per week over 40 hours. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-22(D). 45. As a result of the foregoing conduct, as alleged, Defendant has failed to pay wages due under the NMMWA, thereby violating, and continuing to violate, the NMMWA. 46. Plaintiff brings his claims on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-26(C)-(E) which authorizes a private cause of action for Plaintiff and the New Mexico Class Members to recover their unpaid wages plus interest, an additional amount equal to twice the unpaid or underpaid wages, as well as costs of court and attorneys’ fees. 47. As part of its regular business practices, Defendant has engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of violating the FLSA on a class wide basis, as described above. 49. Although Defendant permitted and/or required Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendant has denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty. 50. Plaintiff has actual knowledge, through conversations with his co-workers, that a class of similarly situated Class Members exists who have been subjected to Defendant’s policy of not paying the overtime rate for all hours worked over forty. Plaintiff’s knowledge stems from his lengthy employment tenure with Defendant. 51. Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff in that they all performed similar duties, were paid on an hourly basis, and were denied complete overtime pay because of Defendant’s policy of not including bonus payments in the regular rate. 52. Plaintiff’s job title was equipment operator. 53. All equipment operators have the same or similar job duties. 54. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on personal circumstances of individual Class Members. 55. The experience of Plaintiff, with respect to his employment classification and pay, is typical of other workers across Defendant’s business. 56. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member does not foreclose collective treatment. 57. Class Members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a workweek. 59. In the last three years, Defendant has employed over 100 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff. 60. In the last three years, Defendant has employed over 50 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff and paid them a bonus. 61. In the last three years, Defendant has employed over 50 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff and paid them a bonus which was not included in the respective employee’s regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. 62. In the last three years, Defendant has employed over 50 other hourly paid employees and paid them a bonus which was not included in the respective employee’s regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. 63. In the last three years, Defendant has paid monthly bonuses to over 100 hourly paid employees. 64. Defendant has time sheets for the hours worked by Class Members and Plaintiff. 65. Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the FLSA. 66. Like Plaintiff all Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty during a workweek. 68. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the individual Class Members in proportion to the number of hours they worked, damages for each individual can be easily calculated using a simple formula. 69. The claims of all Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused harm to all Class Members. 70. Class Members were paid hourly. 71. Class Members had similar job duties. 72. As such, the class of similarly situated employees for purposes of FLSA collective treatment is properly defined as follows: All of Defendant’s current and former equipment operators paid on an hourly basis with bonuses during the three years before the date of the filing of this Complaint to the present. 73. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 74. Plaintiff brings his overtime claims arising under the NMMWA as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of the following class: All of Defendant’s current and former equipment operators paid on an hourly basis with bonuses during the three years before the date of the filing of this Complaint to the present who worked in New Mexico. 75. Although Plaintiff do not know the precise number of members of the proposed class, Plaintiff believe there are more than 40 individuals that fit into the class. 77. The identity of the members of the class is readily discernible from Defendant’s records. 78. Plaintiff and the proposed class on one hand, and Defendant on the other, have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedy sought, namely back wages plus penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees and the cost of this lawsuit. 79. Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the class. These questions predominate over the questions affecting individual class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited, to the following: a. Whether Plaintiff and the Class Members worked hours in excess of forty hours per work week; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class Members were denied overtime pay at a rate not less than one and one half times their regular rate under New Mexico law; c. Whether Defendant incorrectly did not consider bonus payments for purposes of calculating overtime owed. 80. These and other common questions of law and fact, which are common to the members of the class, predominate over any individual questions affecting only individual members of the class. 81. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the classes because Plaintiff was not paid overtime wages in accordance with New Mexico law and because Defendant failed to properly calculate overtime for Plaintiff just as it did with other the New Mexico Class Members. 83. The class action under New Mexico state law is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims of Plaintiff and the New Mexico Class Members. The injuries suffered by each individual class member are relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of a complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. It would be virtually impossible for members of the classes individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them; even if the members of the class could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation presents the possibility for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex, legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class action presents far fewer logistical issues and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (COLLECTIVE ACTION)

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to February 24, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to creditor PSEG-NJ. 22. The PSEG-NJ obligation arose out of transactions incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 23. The alleged PSEG-NJ obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. PSEG-NJ is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Defendant ICS contracted with PSEG-NJ to collect the alleged debt. Violation – February 24, 2020 Collection Letter 26. On or about February 24, 2020, Defendant ICS sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. See a true and correct copy of the Letter attached at Exhibit A. 28. The letter states that the account information is scheduled to be reported in “your creditor’s name,” which according to the Letter is PSEG-NJ. 29. However, upon information and belief, Defendant ICS reports the debt in their own name to the national credit reporting agencies. Therefore, the letter is deceptive by stating that the account will be reported in the name of the original creditor. 30. In addition, the letter states “I.C. System” will not submit the account information until the expiration of the time period described below, implying that after said “expiration of the time period,” Defendant ICS would be doing the credit reporting. 31. In the alternative, if both Defendant ICS and the original creditor are both reporting to the national reporting agencies, it would constitute deceptive double-reporting. 32. It is deceptive for two companies will report to the credit reporting agencies on the same debt. 33. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 34. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 36. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 37. Defendant violated § 1692e: a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 38. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a jewelry retailer that operates LINKS OF LONDON Stores (hereinafter its “Stores”) as well as the LINKS OF LONDON website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 21. Defendant operates LINKS OF LONDON Stores across New York. At least one of these Stores is located in New York City, including its Store located at 535 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022. 22. These Stores constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Stores provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Store locations and hours, the ability to browse and purchase jewelry, including rings, necklaces, bracelets, earrings, gifts, sale items, promotional information, and related goods and services. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Stores and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Stores on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Stores are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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16. On or about April 22, 2010, upon information and belief, Defendant CAH purchased the Hospital in order to operate as a critical access hospital in the County of Yadkin. 18. Defendant CAH did not close the Hospital or terminate all employees prior to April 30, 2015. 19. Upon information and belief, in April 2015, Defendant CAH negotiated a lease extension with the County of Yadkin to operate the Hospital through July 31, 2015. 20. Upon information and belief, in May 2015, the County of Yadkin and Defendant CAH were in negotiations for the leasing of the Hospital after July 31, 2015. However, an additional lease was not completed. 21. On May 21, 2015, Defendants notified some of its employees that their final day of employment would be May 23, 2015, the Mass Layoff Termination Date. Additionally, those employees received a document detailing Human Resource related matters from Defendant HMC, with the contact individual being from Defendant 25. Named Plaintiffs bring this Claim for Relief for violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2101 to 2109, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated former employees, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), who worked at or reported to Defendants’ Hospital and were terminated without cause on or about the Mass Layoff Termination Date, and within 30 days of that date, or were terminated without cause as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs and/or Hospital closing ordered by Defendants on or about May 23, 2015, and who are affected employees, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “WARN Act Class,” and individually and collectively referred to as the “WARN Act Class Members”). 27. Defendants as employers, did not give Named Plaintiffs or any of the WARN Act Class Members the statutorily required 60 days' notice of the mass layoff or termination in violation of the WARN Act. 28. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5), Named Plaintiffs maintain this claim on behalf of themselves and each of the other similarly situated former employees who are members of the WARN Act Class. 29. Each of the other similarly situated former employees are similarly situated to Named Plaintiffs in respect to his or her rights under the Federal WARN Act, in at least the following ways: Named Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated former employees were discharged by Defendants without cause on their part; Named Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated former employees are “affected employee(s)” within the meaning of the Federal WARN Act (29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5)); Defendants were required by the WARN Act to give Named Plaintiffs and other similarly situated former employees at least 60 days' advance written notice of their respective layoff and/or terminations; prior to their termination, neither Named Plaintiffs nor the other similarly situated former employees received written notice that complied with the requirements of the WARN Act; and Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated former employees their respective wages, salary, benefits, and accrued severance pay for the 60 days' period following notice of their terminations and after notice of their respective layoff and/or termination. 31. Upon information and belief, the identity of the members of the class and the recent residential address of each of the WARN Act Class Member is contained in the books and records of Defendants. 32. Upon information and belief, Defendants employed more than 130 employees at the Hospital. Additionally, upon information and belief, the rate of pay and benefits that were being paid by Defendants to each WARN Act Class Member at the time of his/her termination is contained in the books and records of Defendants. 33. Common questions of law and fact exist as to members of the WARN Act Class, including, but not limited to, the following: whether Defendants were employers under the WARN Act; whether all WARN Act Class Members were protected under the WARN Act; whether the members of the WARN Act Class were employees of Defendants who worked at or reported to Defendants’ Hospital; whether Defendants unlawfully terminated the employment of the WARN Act Class Members without cause on their part and without giving them 60 days' advance written notice in violation of the WARN Act; and whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay the WARN Act Class members 60 days' wages and benefits as required by the WARN Act. 35. Class certification of these claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the WARN Act Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the WARN Act Class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation—particularly in the context of WARN Act litigation, where individual plaintiffs may lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants, and damages suffered by individual WARN Act Class members are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. 36. Concentrating all the potential litigation concerning the WARN Act rights of the members of the Class in this Court will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments. It will also conserve the judicial resources and the resources of the parties and is the most efficient means of resolving the WARN Act rights of all the members of the Class. 37. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the WARN Class to the extent required by Rule 23. Warn Act Class Allegations (29 U.S.C. § 2104; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)

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