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Washington v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-269

17-269

2017

State of Washington

United States of America, et al.

<p>In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the “Stevens Treaties,” which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off-reservation fishing. This so-called “fishing clause” guaranteed the Tribes “the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.”</p> <p>Since those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and (originally) the white settlers there and (today) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes’ contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts (channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20+ Tribes represented in the suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties.</p> <p>Washington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties.</p> <p>The district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

per curiam

affirmed

Civil Rights

Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-130

17-130

2017

Raymond J. Lucia, et al.

Securities and Exchange Commission

<p>The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) commenced an administrative enforcement action against Raymond J. Lucia and Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (collectively “Petitioners”) for alleged anti-fraud violations of the Investment Advisers Act arising from the way they presented their retirement wealth management strategy to prospective clients. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found liability and imposed sanctions including a lifetime industry bar against Petitioners. The Commission granted the parties’ petitions for review, and found that Petitioners had committed anti-fraud violations and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ. The Commission also rejected the argument that the administrative proceedings had been unconstitutional because the ALJ who handed down the initial decision was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. </p> <p>Petitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to vacate the Commission’s decision and order under review on the grounds that the ALJ who made the administrative ruling was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. The appeals court rejected this argument, explaining that Commission ALJs were not constitutional Officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, primarily because of their lack of authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Commission pursuant to the agency’s regulatory scheme.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Miscellaneous

Pereira v. Sessions

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-459

17-459

2017

Wescley Fonseca Pereira

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General

<p>Wescley Fonseca Pereira entered the United States in June 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to stay until December 21, 2000. Pereira overstayed his visa, and in May 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served him with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of his initial removal hearing, but instead ordered him to appear before an immigration judge “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” When the immigration court set a date and time, it mailed Pereira a notice with such information. However, the notice was sent to Pereira’s street address on Martha’s Vineyard rather than his post office box, so Pereira never received it. When Pereira did not appear for his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia.</p> <p>Pereira was not removed and instead remained in the country. In March 2013, he was arrested for a motor vehicle violation and detained by DHS. Through his attorney, Pereira filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, claiming he had never received the hearing notice with the time and place. Although Pereira conceded that he could be removed, he sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), a provision that gives the attorney general discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. This continuous period ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Pereira contends that because he did not receive notice of the time and place of his removal hearing, his presence in the country was continuous and over ten years under the statute.</p> <p>The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the hearing is nonetheless effective to end the period of continuous physical presence. However, Pereira challenges this reading of the statute. The First Circuit determined that the relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous as to whether notice must include the date and time of the hearing to be effective, but the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and thus subject to <em>Chevron</em> deference.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-530

17-530

2017

Wisconsin Central Ltd., et al.

United States of America

<p>Several subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company (“the railway”) began in 1996 paying its employees in stock options as part of their compensation. Under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1), any form of “money remuneration” paid to railway employees is subject to an excise tax “equal to a specified percentage of its employees’ wages….” (Railroad retirement tax rates are much higher than social security tax rates.)</p> <p>When employees exercise their stock options when the market price exceeds the price at which the employee has a right to buy the stock, the employee can benefit from a windfall. The Internal Revenue Service argues that this windfall is taxable, just as employees’ wages are taxable. </p> <p>The district court found for the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court reasoned that while the government’s argument that “anything that has a market value is a form of money remuneration” was too broad, it was still correct in its assertion that stock is equivalent to cash. Moreover, as a policy concern, the government’s position avoids creating a tax incentive that could distort the ways in which employers structure compensation packages.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federal Taxation

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-494

17-494

2017

South Dakota

Wayfair, Inc., et al.

<p>The so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution prohibits states from imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval. Consistent with this doctrine, the US Supreme Court held, in 1967, that a state cannot require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence within that state to collect and remit taxes for goods sold or shipped into the state. The Court affirmed this holding in 1992. In 2015, the Court heard another case with similar facts and while it declined to change its jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence questioning whether the Court should continue following the earlier cases in light of additional dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as the significant technological and social changes that affect interstate commerce.</p> <p>In an apparent appeal to the doubt expressed by Justice Kennedy in that concurring opinion, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law requiring sellers of “tangible personal property” in that state who do not have a physical presence in the state to remit sales tax according to the same procedures as sellers who do have a physical presence. The act limited the obligation to sellers with gross revenue from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000, or 200 or more separate transactions, within one year. The legislature passed the law in defiance of Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing its inability to maintain state revenue in the face of increasing internet sales and their effect on sales tax collections.</p> <p>The State commenced a declaratory judgment action in state court seeking a declaration that certain internet sellers subject to the law must comply with it. The sellers moved for summary judgment based on the binding Supreme Court cases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed to the state supreme court, and likewise bound by Supreme Court precedent, that court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Chavez-Meza v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-5639

17-5639

2017

Adaucto Chavez-Mesa

United States of America

<p>In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.</p> <p>There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Montana v. Wyoming

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/137-orig

137-orig

2017

State of Montana

State of Wyoming and State of North Dakota

<p>The Yellowstone River Compact is an interstate compact to which Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are parties. The Compact was ratified in 1950, and went into effect in 1951, in order to provide for an equitable division and apportionment of the waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries and encourage mutually beneficial development and cooperation between the three states. Among other things, the Compact serves to protect the appropriative rights that existed before 1950 among the three states.</p> <p>In 2004, Wyoming reduced the volume of water available at the state line between Wyoming and Montana by 1300 acre feet, and by 56 acre feet in 2006. Montana invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over disputes among states.</p> <p> </p>

none

CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-515

17-515

2017

CNH Industrial N.V., et al.

Jack Reese, et al.

<p>In 1998, CNH agreed to a collective-bargaining agreement, which provided health care benefits under a group benefit plan to certain employees retiring under the pension plan. Other benefits, including life insurance, ceased upon retirement. The agreement also contained a clause stating that it would terminate in May 2004. When it did expire in 2004, a class of CNH retirees and surviving spouses filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that their health care benefits vested for life and asking the district court to enjoin CNH from changing them. While that lawsuit was pending, the US Supreme Court issued a decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1010"><em>M&amp;G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett</em></a>, holding that collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. The Court’s holding in <em>Tackett</em> specifically targeted the Sixth Circuit, in which there was precedent for courts to presume that collective-bargaining agreements vested retiree benefits for life.</p> <p>Because of the intervening ruling by the US Supreme Court in <em>Tackett</em>, the district court initially awarded summary judgment in favor of CNH, but then it awarded summary judgment to the retirees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the court’s award of summary judgment to the retirees, using the same precedents the Court proscribed in <em>Tackett</em> to find the collective-bargaining agreement ambiguous as a matter of law and thus susceptible to interpretation based on extrinsic evidence about lifetime vesting.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Private Action

Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-647

17-647

2018

Rose Mary Knick

Township of Scott, Pennsylvania

<p>In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision.</p> <p>Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge.</p> <p>Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government.</p> <p>The district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-4"><em>Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City</em></a>.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Trump v. Hawaii

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-965

17-965

2017

Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.

Hawaii, et al.

<p>On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risks. EO-1 was immediately challenged in federal district court, and the judge entered a nationwide temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of several of its provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency motion to stay the order pending appeal. Rather than continuing to litigate the matter, the government announced that it would revoke that order and issue a new one.</p> <p>On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (EO-2). Section 2(c) of EO-2 directed that entry of nationals from six of the seven countries designated in EO-1 be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of the order, citing a need for time to establish adequate standards to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists. Section 6(a) directed that applications for refugee status and travel of refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) be suspended for 120 days from the effective date "to review the adequacy of USRAP application and adjudication procedures." Section 6(b) suspended the entry of any individual under USRAP once 50,000 refugees have entered the United States in fiscal year 2017. The effective date of the order was March 16, 2017. EO-2 was subject to swift litigation as well.</p> <p>On June 14, just before Section 2(c) of EO-2 was by its terms set to expire, President Trump issued a memorandum to Executive Branch officials declaring the effective date of each enjoined provision of EO–2 to be the date on which the injunctions in these cases “are lifted or stayed with respect to that provision." The government sought review in both cases, making arguments both on the merits of the cases and on procedural issues.</p> <p>In a per curiam opinion issued simultaneously with an order granting certiorari, the Court granted the government's applications for a stay of the preliminary injunction with respect to Sections 6(a) and (b) of Executive Order 13,780 (EO-2), thereby allowing enforcement of those provisions. Under the Court's ruling, the government may enforce Section 6(a) except as to any "individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States," nor may such an individual be excluded under Section 6(b).</p> <p>On September 24, 2017—the same day EO-2 was expiring—President Donald Trump issued a Proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens from eight countries. That Proclamation too was challenged in federal court as attempting to exercise power that neither Congress nor the Constitution vested in the president. The Ninth Circuit struck down the Proclamation, and the Supreme Court granted review.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-71

17-71

2018

Weyerhaeuser Company

United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.

<p>In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits. </p> <p>A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat.</p> <p>The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court. </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Gundy v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086

17-6086

2018

Herman Avery Gundy

United States

<p>Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law.</p> <p>In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. </p> <p>The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Miscellaneous

Stokeling v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-5554

17-5554

2018

Denard Stokeling

United States of America

<p>In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Kisela v. Hughes

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-467

17-467

2017

Andrew Kisela

Amy Hughes

<p>Tucson police officer Andrew Kisela and two other officers responded to a police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife. When they arrived, they saw Amy Hughes holding a large kitchen knife in what appeared to be a confrontation with another woman later identified as Sharon Chadwick. Despite at least two commands to drop the knife, Hughes did not do so and instead took several steps toward Chadwick. Kisela fired four shots through the chain link fence, seriously injuring Hughes.</p> <p>Hughes sued Kisela under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes (as is required in a motion for summary judgment), was sufficient to demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Ninth Circuit next held that Kisela was not entitled to qualified immunity because, in its view, his actions violated clearly established law in that jurisdiction.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Nielsen v. Preap

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1363

16-1363

2018

Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.

Mony Preap, et al.

<p>Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). </p> <p>The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Frank v. Gaos

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-961

17-961

2018

Theodore H. Frank, et al.

Paloma Gaos, et al.

<p>In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company’s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013. </p> <p>Among the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (“the Objectors”). </p> <p>The district court approved the parties’ settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties’ preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above. </p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-988

17-988

2018

Lamps Plus, Inc., et al.

Frank Varela

<p>Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.&nbsp;</p> <p>The district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward.</p> <p>The appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1198"><em>Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.</em>, 559 U.S. 662 (2010)</a>.</p>

majority opinion

Unions

United States v. Stitt

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-765

17-765

2018

United States of America

Victor J. Stitt, II

<p>In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-7120"><em>Johnson v. United States</em></a> invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.</p> <p>In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing.</p> <p>The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Bucklew v. Precythe

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-8151

17-8151

2018

Russell Bucklew

Anne Precythe, et al.

<p>Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.” As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired.</p> <p>The district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state’s execution method “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,” and failed to propose “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,” both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew’s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to “assume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.” Reviewing the district court’s findings <em>de novo</em>, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1042

17-1042

2018

BNSF Railway Company

Michael D. Loos

<p>Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p> <p>The FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos—$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos’s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling using alternate reasoning.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federal Taxation

Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-587

17-587

2018

Mount Lemmon Fire District

John Guido, et al.

<p>In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District.</p> <p>The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Madison v. Alabama

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-7505

17-7505

2018

Vernon Madison

State of Alabama

<p>Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.</p> <p>In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-193"><em>Dunn v. Madison</em></a>, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).</p> <p>Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-340

17-340

2018

New Prime Inc.

Dominic Oliveira

<p>Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor.</p> <p>Oliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide.</p> <p>The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime’s motion to compel arbitration.</p> <p>The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Unions

Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1220

16-1220

2017

Animal Science Products, Inc., et al.

Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al.

<p>Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. (“Petitioners”) are US vitamin C purchasers who commenced a multidistrict class action lawsuit against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al. (“Respondents”), which are business entities incorporated under the laws of China, alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Specifically, they claimed that Respondents engaged in price-fixing and supply manipulation in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Respondents did not deny that they had coordinated prices and sought to create a supply shortage, but moved to dismiss on the grounds that they acted in accordance with Chinese government regulations requiring them to do so. The district court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment of approximately $147 million against Respondents, and enjoined them from engaging in any further anti-competitive activity.</p> <p>Respondents appealed to the 2nd Circuit, which vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice. The appellate court based its reversal on international comity grounds, explaining that the district court had erred in not deferring appropriately to the Chinese government’s explanation of its domestic laws, which mandated the conduct by Respondents that was considered anti-competitive under US law. Particularly given that the Chinese government had appeared in the proceedings, the fact that Respondents could not simultaneously comply with US and Chinese laws necessitated the conclusion that the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The appeals court further held that other factors significant under an international comity balancing test derived from 3rd and 9th Circuit case law affirmed that abstention was appropriate in the instant matter.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1104

17-1104

2018

Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.

Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.

<p>Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability.</p> <p>The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule. </p> <p>The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Private Action

Culbertson v. Berryhill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-773

17-773

2018

Richard Allen Culbertson

Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration

<p>Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney’s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. § 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under § 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context.</p> <p>In ruling on Culbertson’s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both § 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the § 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the §406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his § 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under § 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap. </p> <p>In his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both § 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to § 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court’s ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Attorneys

Jam v. International Finance Corp.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1011

17-1011

2018

Budha Ismael Jam, et al.

International Finance Corporation

<p>Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital.  The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project.</p> <p>The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance.</p> <p>The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company.</p> <p>The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1275

16-1275

2018

Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.

John Warren et al.

<p>The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium “until a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.” Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect.</p> <p>Virginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court’s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Azar v. Garza

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-654

17-654

2017

Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

Rochelle Garza, as Guardian ad Litem to Unaccompanied Minor J. D.

<p>Jane Doe entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor when she was eight weeks pregnant. She was detained by immigration authorities, and placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). She was later placed in a federally funded shelter in Texas, where, after a medical examination, she requested an abortion. ORR denied her request on the grounds that agency policy prohibited shelter staff from taking any action to facilitate an abortion without direction and approval from the ORR director absent emergency circumstances.</p> <p>Doe’s guardian ad litem, Rochelle Garza, filed a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of ORR’s policy on behalf of Doe and “all other pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody.” On October 18, 2017, the district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) permitting Doe to have an abortion immediately. The next day, Doe attended pre-abortion counseling, which was required under Texas law to take place at least 24 hours in advance of the procedure, and with the same doctor who would perform the abortion.</p> <p>On October 20, a panel of the D.C. Circuit court vacated the pertinent portions of the TRO on the grounds that ORR’s policy did not constitute an “undue burden.” However, sitting <em>en banc</em>, on October 24 the appellate court vacated the panel order and remanded the matter to the district court. The same day, Garza asked the court for an amended restraining order, requesting that the government make Doe available to repeat the required pre-abortion counseling. The district court granted Garza’s request, and arrangements were made for Doe to have the counseling appointment at 7:30 a.m. on October 25.</p> <p>The details of the subsequent events were disputed, but the government, under the impression that the soonest the abortion would happen was October 26, informed Garza’s counsel that they planned to appeal the new order early on the morning of October 25. However, the same doctor who conducted Doe’s pre-abortion counseling became available for her October 25 appointment, so the appointment was moved up to 4:15 a.m. and Doe had the abortion instead of repeating the counseling with a new doctor.</p> <p>Because the abortion made the government’s claim moot, it did not ask the Supreme Court to review the <em>en banc</em> order as planned, but instead filed a petition for <em>certiorari</em> to nullify the appellate court’s <em>en banc</em> ruling so that it would not stand as precedent. The government also sought sanctions against Garza’s lawyers, arguing that they had made misrepresentations in an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Apple v. Pepper

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-204

17-204

2018

Apple, Inc.

Robert Pepper, et al.

<p>This lawsuit arose out of Apple’s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a “closed system,” meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the “App Store.” Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price.</p> <p>In 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale.</p> <p>Apple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court’s precedent in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-404"><em>Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois</em>, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)</a>. Under <em>Illinois Brick</em>, “only the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution” may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple.</p> <p>The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under <em>Illinois Brick</em> and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of <em>Illinois Brick</em> and thus have standing.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Sturgeon v. Frost

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-949

17-949

2018

John Sturgeon

Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al.

<p>John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska’s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service’s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration.</p> <p>On remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Garza v. Idaho

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1026

17-1026

2018

Gilberto Garza, Jr.

Idaho

<p>On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers.</p> <p>Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.</p> <p>Under <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1441"><em>Roe v. Flores-Ortega</em>, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)</a>, criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights.</p> <p>The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Timbs v. Indiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1091

17-1091

2018

Tyson Timbs

Indiana

<p>Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January.</p> <p>The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200.</p> <p>In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed.</p> <p>The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1077

17-1077

2018

Francis V. Lorenzo

Securities and Exchange Commission

<p>Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology.</p> <p>The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million.</p> <p>After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails.</p> <p>The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-525"><em>Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders</em>, 564 U.S. 135 (2011)</a>.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Cox v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1017

16-1017

2017

Laith G. Cox

United States

<p>This case was consolidated for argument with Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961) and Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).</p>

dismissal - improvidently granted

Civil Rights

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1498

16-1498

2018

Washington State Department of Licensing

Cougar Den, Inc.

<p>Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways." Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "any trade, traveling, and importation" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Dawson v. Steager

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-419

17-419

2018

James Dawson, et ux.

Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner

<p>West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption.</p> <p>The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

Republic of Sudan v. Harrison

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1094

16-1094

2018

Republic of Sudan

Rick Harrison, et al.

<p>Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs’ request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered. </p> <p>The judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan’s request for a rehearing en banc.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Ortiz v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1423

16-1423

2017

Keanu D.W. Ortiz

United States

<p>Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a "civil office,” including positions that require "an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).</p> <p>A judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments.</p> <p><strong>Note</strong>: This case was original consolidated under <a href="/cases/2017/16-961">Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961)</a>, and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1229

17-1229

2018

Helsinn Healthcare S.A.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.

<p>Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102.</p> <p>The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed.</p> <p>The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1272

17-1272

2018

Henry Schein, Inc., et al.

Archer and White Sales, Inc.

<p>In 2012, Archer &amp; White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest.</p> <p>After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement.</p> <p>The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit.</p> <p>In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’”</p> <p>Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Biestek v. Berryhill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1184

17-1184

2018

Michael J. Biestek

Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration

<p>Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed.</p> <p>The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Sexton v. Beaudreaux

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-1106

17-1106

2017

Michael Sexton, Warden

Nicholas Beaudreaux

<p>Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed Wayne Drummond in 2006. Two witnesses to the shooting recognized or were able to describe Beaudreaux but did not know his name. Seventeen months later, one of the witnesses was arrested for an unrelated crime, and while in custody, was shown a middle-school yearbook with Beaudreaux's photograph. The witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter in the Drummond murder.</p> <p>Officers interviewed the second witness the following day, and the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter from a photo array that included Beaudreaux and five other men. Later, the witness was shown a different photo array that used a different photograph of Beaudreaux, and again the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter. At a preliminary hearing, the witness positively identified Beaudreaux after seeing him in person.</p> <p>Beaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder and attempted second-degree robbery. Both witnesses testified and identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 50 years to life. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was denied. He filed a second state habeas petition claiming, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the second witness’s identification testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Beaudreaux filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was not reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures and that counsel’s failure to move to suppress the identification prejudiced Beaudreaux’s case.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Nieves v. Bartlett

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1174

17-1174

2018

Luis A. Nieves, et al.

Russell P. Bartlett

<p>Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in <em>Hartman v. Moore</em>, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory <em>prosecution</em> claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1307

17-1307

2018

Dennis Obduskey

McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.

<p>Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy &amp; Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.&nbsp;</p> <p>Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt.</p> <p>In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.</p> <p>Obduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider&nbsp;whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in <a href="/cases/2018/17-1351">Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC</a>.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-290

17-290

2018

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.

Doris Albrecht, et al.

<p>Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp &amp; Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures.</p> <p>In 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/06-1249"><em>Wyeth v. Levine</em>, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)</a>, which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under <em>Wyeth</em>’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to <em>Wyeth</em> and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Federalism

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-571

17-571

2018

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation

Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.

<p>Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate.</p> <p>Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299

17-1299

2018

Franchise Tax Board of California

Gilbert P. Hyatt

<p>In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies  surrounding Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt’s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties.</p> <p>Hyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt’s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.</p> <p>FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction over Hyatt’s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt’s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action.</p> <p>FTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court’s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4–4 as to whether it should overrule <em>Nevada v. Hall</em>, which provides “that one State … can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State … without the other State’s consent,” and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court’s holding on that issue.</p> <p>FTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule <em>Nevada v. Hall</em>.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Sause v. Bauer

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-742

17-742

2017

Mary Anne Sause

Timothy J. Bauer, et al.

<p>Mary Ann Sause, representing herself, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against members of the Louisburg, Kansas, police department, as well as the current and former mayor of the town. In her complaint she alleges that two police officers visited her apartment in response to a noise complaint, entered her apartment without consent, and “then proceeded to engage in a course of strange and abusive conduct.” She further alleges that at one point she “knelt and began to pray but one of the officers ordered her to stop.” Sause claims that the officers’ conduct violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The defendants moved to dismiss Sause’s claim for failure to state a claim, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Sause—now with counsel—argued only that her free exercise rights were violated by the officers’ conduct (dropping her Fourth Amendment claims). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Gamble v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-646

17-646

2018

Terance Martez Gamble

United States

<p>Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1958/7"><em>Abbate v. United States</em>, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)</a>, that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1094

17-1094

2018

Nutraceutical Corporation

Troy Lambert

<p>Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product. </p> <p>Lambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations.</p> <p>The district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert’s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3). </p> <p>Ten days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court’s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement. </p> <p>Three months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition.</p> <p>A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)’s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert’s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Azar v. Allina Health Services

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1484

17-1484

2018

Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services

Allina Health Services, et al.

<p>The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different “parts” of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C.</p> <p>HHS contracts with “fiscal intermediaries” to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports.</p> <p>The Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of “patient days” for patients “entitled to benefits under part A” of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars.</p> <p>The plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an “interpretive rule” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and thus was exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an “interpretive rule” and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1471

17-1471

2018

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

George W. Jackson

<p>In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank’s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson’s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson.</p> <p>Home Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.</p> <p>The district court denied Home Depot’s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not “antagonistic parties on the same side,” and granted Jackson’s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a “defendant” eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment—to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction—was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA’s removal statute.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Herrera v. Wyoming

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-532

17-532

2018

Clayvin Herrera

Wyoming

<p>Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season.</p> <p>Herrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit’s 1995 decision in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/73/982/557379/"><em>Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis</em>, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995)</a>, the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court’s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court’s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1625

17-1625

2018

Rimini Street, Inc., et al.

Oracle USA, Inc., et al.

<p>Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle’s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle’s software in lawful competition with Oracle’s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle’s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle’s website by a means that violated the Oracle website’s terms of use.</p> <p>Oracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 U.S.C. § 505 allows for recovery of “full costs” and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/16-55577/16-55577-2017-11-16.html"><em>Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution</em></a> in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C § 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1201

17-1201

2018

Gary Thacker, et ux.

Tennessee Valley Authority

<p>Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly.</p> <p>The district court dismissed the Thackers’ lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.</p> <p>The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA “may sue and be sued in its corporate name,” subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-96

18-96

2018

Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association

Russell F. Thomas, Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission, et al.

<p>To sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,” and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license.</p> <p>Two entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court.</p> <p>The district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1702

17-1702

2018

Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al.

Deedee Halleck, et al.

<p>A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide “at least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.” This channel must be open to the “public on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.” New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN).</p> <p>Petitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights.</p> <p>Generally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires “state action.” However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC’s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-124"><em>Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC</em></a> to find that New York City had “delegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum” of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

United States v. Haymond

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1672

17-1672

2018

United States of America

Andre Ralph Haymond

<p>Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond’s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond’s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime.</p> <p>The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court’s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond’s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court’s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.</p>

plurality opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Gray v. Wilkie

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1679

17-1679

2018

Robert H. Gray

Robert Wilkie

<p>The Agent Orange Act of 1991 was intended to make it easier for US veterans who were injured by Agent Orange, the toxic herbicide used during the Vietnam War, to obtain disability benefits. The Act provides that to obtain benefits, veterans need only show that they served in the “Republic of Vietnam” during a 13-year period and that they developed any one of several diseases associated with Agent Orange.</p> <p>In 2016, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) changed its policy to allow only veterans who set foot on Vietnamese soil or served in the country’s “inland waterways” to be eligible for benefits under the Act. This change effectively excludes US Navy veterans, such as the petitioner in this case, who served in Vietnam’s ports, harbors, and bays, which are definitionally excluded from “inland waterways.”</p> <p>The crux of the dispute in this case is that the VA made this policy change by revising the manual in which it publishes its policies and procedures for resolving benefits claims. Petitioner Robert Gray challenged the new policy in the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, relying on 38 U.S.C. § 502, which gives that court authority to review challenges to rules and policies issued by the VA before the rules are actually enforced. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim because the challenged policy was merely a revision of the manual and did not amount to “rulemaking” that carries the force of law. As such, it falls outside the scope of § 502.</p>

dismissal - moot

vacated/remanded

Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1594

17-1594

2018

Return Mail, Inc.

United States Postal Service

<p>Return Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (“USPS”) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).</p> <p>The Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Smith v. Berryhill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1606

17-1606

2018

Ricky Lee Smith

Nancy A. Berryhill

<p>In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit.</p> <p>Smith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration.</p> <p>Smith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith’s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014.</p> <p>The Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council’s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council’s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1657

17-1657

2018

Mission Product Holdings, Inc.

Tempnology, LLC

<p>Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology’s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology’s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology’s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products.</p> <p>After accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to “reject any executory contract” that is not beneficial to the company.</p> <p>Although the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Mont v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-8995

17-8995

2018

Jason J. Mont

United States of America

<p>Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017.</p> <p>While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions.</p> <p>Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

The American Legion v. American Humanist Association

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1717

17-1717

2018

The American Legion, et al.

American Humanist Association, et al.

<p>In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations.</p> <p>Several non-Christian residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission’s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/89"><em>Lemon v. Kurtzman</em>, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)</a>, the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Flowers v. Mississippi

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-9572

17-9572

2018

Curtis Giovanni Flowers

State of Mississippi

<p>In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers’s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase.</p> <p>In the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders.</p> <p>Flowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers’s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8349"><em>Foster v. Chatman</em>, 578 U.S. ___ (2016)</a>, where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-6263"><em>Batson v. Kentucky</em>, 476 US 79 (1986)</a>.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

City of Escondido v. Emmons

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1660

17-1660

2018

City of Escondido, California, et al.

Marty Emmons

<p>In April 2013, Escondido police officers responded to a domestic violence call, which ended in the arrest of Maggie Emmons’s husband. He was later released. In May 2013, police received a 911 call about another domestic disturbance at the same residence. The same officer responded, along with a second officer, and the 911 dispatcher informed the officers that two children could be in the residence and attempts to return the 911 call had gone unanswered.</p> <p>When the officers arrived at the residence, they knocked on the door but received no answer. Through a side window, the officers spoke with Emmons wife and convinced her to open the door so they could perform a welfare check. As officers were speaking with her, an unidentified man told Emmons to back away from the window.</p> <p>A few minutes later, and after additional officers had arrived, a man opened the apartment door and came outside. One of the officers told the man not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to walk past the officer. The officer stopped him, took him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Police body-camera video shows that the officer did not hit the man or display any weapon, and that the man was not in any visible or audible pain either as a result of the takedown or while on the ground. Minutes later, officers helped the man up and arrested him for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest and delaying a police officer.</p> <p>The man turned out to be Emmons’s father, Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons sued all of the police officers present and the City of Escondido for use of excessive force, among other claims, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court rejected the excessive force claim as to all but the officer who took down Marty Emmons. With respect to that officer, the district court found that the law was not clearly established that the officer could not act the way he did in that situation, so he was entitled to qualified immunity.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the excessive force claims against two of the officers, finding that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the events in question.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Kisor v. Wilkie

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-15

18-15

2018

James L. Kisor

Robert L. Wilkie

<p>Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to “reopen” a denial by “submitting new and material evidence.” In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file.</p> <p>Notably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to “reconsider” a previously denied claim in the event that it “receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.” This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed.</p> <p>The VA’s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term “relevant” as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor’s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as “relevant” for purposes of this section because it did not “suggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.” In the VA’s view, records are not “relevant” when they are not “outcome determinative.”</p> <p>Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Taggart v. Lorenzen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-489

18-489

2018

Bradley Weston Taggart

Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al.

<p>In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, “[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.”</p> <p>Petitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (“SPBC”). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman.</p> <p>Emmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC’s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys’ fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys’ fees.</p> <p>In November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings.</p> <p>After the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart’s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart’s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys’ fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts.</p> <p>Brown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys’ fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart’s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys’ fees on the theory that Taggart had “returned to the fray.”</p> <p>While the attorneys’ fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the “Creditors”) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against him in the state court action.</p> <p>The state court ruled that Taggart had “returned to the fray” as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys’ fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination.</p> <p>Subsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart’s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had “returned to the fray.” On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys’ fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had “knowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys’ fees.” On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys’ fee claim.</p> <p>Back in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart’s actions did not constitute a “return to the fray” and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys’ fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys’ fees against Taggart, and the BAP’s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys’ fees.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Shoop v. Hill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-56

18-56

2018

Tim Shoop, Warden

Danny Hill

<p>In 1986, Danny Hill was convicted in an Ohio court for the torture, rape, and murder of a 12-year-old boy. An intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1993.</p> <p>After unsuccessfully seeking to obtain post-conviction relief in state and federal court, Hill filed a new petition in Ohio state court arguing that his death sentence was illegal under <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-8452"><em>Atkins v. Virginia</em>, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)</a>, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal execution of a defendant who is “mentally retarded.” The trial court denied the claim, an intermediate court affirmed the denial, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review.</p> <p>In 2010, Hill filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking federal review of his <em>Atkins</em> claim. The federal district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Though it expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-797"><em>Moore v. Texas</em>, 581 U.S. __ (2017)</a>—in which the Court struck down a state law that relied on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for the purpose of eligibility for the death penalty—the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the language and the decision of&nbsp;<em>Moore</em> itself in reaching its decision granting the petition.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-459

18-459

2018

Emulex Corporation, et al.

Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza

<p>Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex’s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company’s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.)</p> <p>It is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger’s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws.</p> <p>The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient.</p> <p>Reviewing <em>de novo</em> the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1042"><em>Ernst &amp; Ernst v. Hochfelder</em>, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)</a>, and <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-66"><em>Aaron v. SEC</em>, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)</a>, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing).</p>

per curiam

Economic Activity

United States v. Davis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-431

18-431

2018

United States of America

Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover

<p>On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above.</p> <p>On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1498"><em>Sessions v. Dimaya</em>, 584 U.S. __ (2018)</a>, the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of <em>Dimaya</em>, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part.</p> <p>18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In <em>Dimaya</em>, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under <em>Dimaya</em> but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause.</p>

majority opinion

vacated in-part/remanded

Due Process

Iancu v. Brunetti

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-302

18-302

2018

Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office

Erik Brunetti

<p>Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand “fuct,” founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the <a href="https://trademarks.justia.com/853/10/fuct-85310960.html">mark FUCT</a>, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of “fuct” sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Rehaif v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-9560

17-9560

2018

Hamid Mohamed Rehaif

United States of America

<p>Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased.</p> <p>A federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who “is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.” The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.</p> <p>At trial, the government requested a jury instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.” The government also requested the instruction that “[t]he alien’s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation”; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that “[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.” The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif’s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended).</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Quarles v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-778

17-778

2018

Jamar Alonzo Quarles

United States of America

<p>Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-7120"><em>Johnson v. United States</em>, 576 U.S. __ (2015)</a>, in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months’ incarceration.</p> <p>Under federal law, a generic burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles’s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-457

18-457

2018

North Carolina Department of Revenue

The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust

<p>In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice’s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice’s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“the Trust”), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina.</p> <p>In 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed.</p> <p>The The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “minimum contacts” connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-315

18-315

2018

Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.

United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt

<p>The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts—including forgery, deception, and threats—to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward.</p> <p>From February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup.</p> <p>Several years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors’ fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison.</p> <p>After he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a <em>qui tam</em> action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt’s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) “6 years after the date on which the violation … is committed” or (2) “3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances….” The district court granted the contractors’ motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt’s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court’s dismissal <em>de novo</em>, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-389

18-389

2018

Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd.

Brian Newton

<p>Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California’s laws offered Newton no protections.</p> <p>A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is “applicable” and “not inconsistent” with federal law. California’s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Federalism

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-481

18-481

2018

Food Marketing Institute

Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media

<p>The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA.</p> <p>Argus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4—which covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”—applied to the information sought.</p> <p>For the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of “confidential” different from the term’s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what “substantial competitive harm” means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that “competitive harm may be established if there is evidence of ‘actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.’”  Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA’s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Privacy

McDonough v. Smith

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-485

18-485

2018

Edward G. McDonough

Youel Smith

<p>During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged.</p> <p>After the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough’s acquittal on December 21, 2012.</p> <p>On December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim.</p> <p>The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough’s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has “reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-525

18-525

2018

Fort Bend County, Texas

Lois M. Davis

<p>Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned. Davis alleges that after the director’s resignation, her supervisor—who was a personal friend of the director—retaliated against her for making the complaint.</p> <p>Davis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a “previous religious commitment,” and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment.</p> <p>Davis submitted to the Commission an “intake questionnaire” in which she wrote in the word “religion” next to a checklist labeled “Employment Harms or Actions” but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims.</p> <p>The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis’s religious discrimination claim with prejudice.</p> <p>Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-944"><em>Arbaugh v. Y &amp; H Corp.</em>, 546 U.S. 500 (2006)</a>, in which the Court held that the Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

The Dutra Group v. Batterton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-266

18-266

2018

The Dutra Group

Christopher Batterton

<p>Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.</p> <p>The district court denied Dutra Group’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. </p> <p>In <em>Evich v. Morris</em>, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that “punitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,” as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that <em>Evich</em> is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1158"><em>Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.</em>, 498 U.S. 19 (1990)</a>, which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group’s argument, finding that the Court in <em>Miles</em> considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While <em>Miles</em> does limit recovery for “pecuniary loss,” punitive damages are not “pecuniary loss,” which means simply loss of money. Thus, <em>Miles</em> left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in <em>Evich</em>.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1705

17-1705

2018

PDR Network, LLC, et al.

Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

<p>Petitioner PDR Network is a company that “delivers health knowledge products and services” to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the <em>Physicians’ Desk Reference</em>, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton &amp; Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 <em>Physicians’ Desk Reference</em>. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer “because you are a member of the PDR Network.”</p> <p>On behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton &amp; Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send “unsolicited advertisement[s].” Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender “willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages.</p> <p>As a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of “unsolicited advertisement” for the FCC’s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (“2006 FCC Rule”), the court found that PDR Network’s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a “commercial aim.” Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an “unsolicited advertisement.” For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss.</p> <p>Carlton &amp; Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court’s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-280

18-280

2019

New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., et al.

City of New York, New York, et al.

<p>The State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer—which, in New York City, is the police commissioner—and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: “carry” licenses and “premises” licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to “have and possess in his dwelling” a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to “transport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.” All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.</p> <p>Three individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City—which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York—which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals and petitioner New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Association filed a lawsuit in federal district court, asking the court to declare the city’s restrictions unconstitutional and to enjoin the city from enforcing them.</p> <p>The district court found the rule “merely regulates rather than restricts the right to possess a firearm in the home and is a minimal, or at most, modest burden on the right” and thus did not violate plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The district court also held that the rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, or the fundamental right to travel. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-281

18-281

2018

Virginia House of Delegates, et al.

Golden Bethune-Hill, et al.

<p>This civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers’ claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts.</p> <p>In June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws.</p> <p>The Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.</p>

dismissal - other

none

Judicial Power

Mitchell v. Wisconsin

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-6210

18-6210

2018

Gerald P. Mitchell

State of Wisconsin

<p>In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell’s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.</p> <p>Mitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.</p> <p>Mitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue “whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5–2, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.</p>

plurality opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Rucho v. Common Cause

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422

18-422

2018

Robert A. Rucho, et al.

Common Cause, et al.

<p>A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Yovino v. Rizo

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-272

18-272

2018

Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools

Aileen Rizo

<p>The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled. Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute.</p> <p>Judge Reinhardt died after he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Kansas v. Garcia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-834

17-834

2019

Kansas

Ramiro Garcia, et al.

<p>The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue.</p> <p>In <em>State v. Garcia</em>, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law.</p> <p>In <em>State v. Morales</em>, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales’s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses.</p> <p>In <em>State v. Ochoa-Lara</em>, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law.</p> <p>All three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

Rotkiske v. Klemm

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-328

18-328

2019

Kevin C. Rotkiske

Paul Klemm, et al.

<p>Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm &amp; Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.</p> <p>Rotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a “discovery rule,” which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which “delays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing <em>en banc</em>. The Third Circuit, sitting <em>en banc</em>, affirmed the judgment of the district court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-260

18-260

2019

County of Maui, Hawaii

Hawaii Wildlife Fund

<p>The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.” In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being “waters of the United States” and exclusive of the former.</p> <p>Constructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called “effluent”) into underground injection control (UIC) wells—a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii’s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency suggested that this result required NPDES permitting.</p> <p>The district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater and into the ocean without the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County “indirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,” (2) the groundwater is a “point source” as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a “navigable water” under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Department of Commerce v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-966

18-966

2018

United States Department of Commerce, et al.

State of New York, et al.

<p>Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions.</p> <p>As part of its challenge, the challengers sought—and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized—depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross’s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue.</p> <p>On October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government’s previous stay application without prejudice, “provided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.” The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed.</p> <p>The government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below.</p> <p>Before the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction.</p>

majority opinion

Judicial Power

Ramos v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-5924

18-5924

2019

Evangelisto Ramos

State of Louisiana

<p>Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.</p> <p>Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Lamone v. Benisek

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-726

18-726

2018

Linda H. Lamone, et al.

O. John Benisek, et al.

<p>This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-333"><em>Benisek v. Lamone</em>, 585 U.S. __ (2018)</a>, the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court’s decision under a lenient standard—abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court’s ruling (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable.</p> <p>After the Court decided <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1161"><em>Gill v. Whitford</em>, 585 U.S. __ (2018)</a>—holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering—the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Kansas v. Glover

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-556

18-556

2019

State of Kansas

Charles Glover

<p>While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws.</p> <p>Glover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.</p> <p>The state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly “stacked” assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Altitude Express v. Zarda

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1623

17-1623

2019

Altitude Express, Inc., et al.

Melissa Zarda, as Executor of the Estate of Donald Zarda, et al.

<p>Donald Zarda worked in 2010 as a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.</p> <p>Zarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's “on the basis of sex” language necessarily includes discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation.” In light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/232/33/514971/"><em>Simonton v. Runyon</em>, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)</a>, and <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/398/211/597672/"><em>Dawson v. Bumble &amp; Bumble</em>, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005)</a>.</p> <p>Zarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda’s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn <em>Simonton</em> and <em>Dawson</em>, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and expressly overruled <em>Simonton</em> and <em>Dawson</em>, finding, consistent with the EEOC’s position, that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation.</p> <p>This case is consolidated for oral argument with <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1618"><em>Bostock v. Clayton County</em>, No. 17-1618</a>.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Kahler v. Kansas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135

18-6135

2019

James K. Kahler

Kansas

<p>Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed.</p> <p>In November 2009, Kahler went to his wife’s grandmother’s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler’s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily “completely lost control.”</p> <p>Under Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows “that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.” In effect, this law makes irrelevant “whether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.”</p> <p>The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Barton v. Barr

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-725

18-725

2019

Andre Martello Barton

William P. Barr, Attorney General

<p>A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.</p> <p>Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a).</p> <p>The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.”</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Bostock v. Clayton County

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1618

17-1618

2019

Gerald Lynn Bostock

Clayton County, Georgia

<p>Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”</p> <p>Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-15234/15-15234-2017-03-10.html"><em>Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital</em>, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017)</a>. Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting  procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision.</p> <p>This case is consolidated for oral argument with <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1623"><em>Altitude Express v. Zarda</em>, No. 17-1623</a>.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-107

18-107

2019

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.

<p>Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. &amp; G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home’s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.</p> <p>Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.</p> <p>The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home’s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights