elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1279761

201507

0601-1200

NCT.TRACON

CA

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1279761

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

This is more a safety concern report. The RAZZR arrival into SJC is one of the new RNAV arrivals. When landing runway 12L/R the profile has you descending over EDMND fix at or above 5;400 feet at 230 KIAS. The next fix is JESEN with an altitude of 4;000 feet according the STAR plate they are 4.3 NM apart. That would be a close but possible descent if planned properly. Except in between the two; 1 nm past EDMND the aircraft will pass under Class B airspace from SFO. It isn't possible to cross a fix at 230 KIAS; in one mile slow to 200 to comply with FAR speed limits and descend to meet the next altitude. I tried to comply with all and couldn't do it; even with full spoilers out. There is a NOTAM out regarding speed at ZORSA at 200 KIAS so this would appear to be a known problem. The TEKKY departure has a similar problem showing a max speed of 230 KIAS while under B airspace.

Arrival and departures at SJC operate under the SFO Class B and crews need to observe the 200 knot airspeed restriction.

1436232

201703

1801-2400

SCT.TRACON

CA

Night

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1436232

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were assigned the RNAV RNP 31L into PSP. It was nighttime and the Captain (Pilot Flying) had briefed the approach and said to tell Approach Control that we did not want the RNAV Visual. They left us high and we were having difficulty getting down and asked for vectoring turns. We originally wanted a right 360 but the Controller kept asking us if we could see the airport and whether we wanted 'just the good old fashioned visual'; in his words. Finally the Captain said he could see the field and we accepted the visual but used the RNAV as a course backup. As we were angling right toward final and descending; I called out terrain that I could see right in front of us but the Captain said he had a visual on it. Right after that we got a momentary GPWS warning 'Terrain; Terrain' and then 'Pull up' just as he was aligning with the final to 31L and intercepting the course for the RNAV (backup). He was hand flying at the time. No other warnings were heard and the Captain reiterated that he had the terrain in sight. He was configured and stable by 1000 ft AGL. We landed on 31L without further incident.Poor vectoring on Approach Control's part in their haste to give us clearance for a visual rather than the requested approach. Stick to the original plan and fly the approach as briefed. Insist on more appropriate descent profile from approach and also vectoring turns or a 360 to lose altitude.

B737 First Officer reported poor vectoring by ATC; and that the Captain continued a night visual approach into PSP after receiving a GPWS terrain warning; stating the terrain was in sight.

1653608

201906

0601-1200

JFK.Airport

NY

17000.0

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Climb

Class E N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1653608

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We were given what we [heard was] clearance direct to COPES Intersection. Pilot monitoring read back clearance 'direct COPES' and selected COPES Intersection on the right CDU. I confirmed and we proceeded to the intersection. Later departure gave us a heading of 320 degree and advised that we had been cleared direct to COATE Intersection. We then proceeded as directed.Suggestions: Having two intersections with similar sounding names is a problem.

Heavy Transport aircraft Captain reported a navigation error due to similar sounding waypoints COPES and COATE.

1358786

201605

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

PA-18/19 Super Cub

Part 91

Personal

Landing

Flight Deck

Personal

Passenger

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

1358786

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Passenger

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

The night before the flight; a friend called and asked if I wanted to go flying in his Super Cub the next day; the weather had recently cleared; and he was looking for some company to go for a ride. It had been over a year since I had flown in the airplane; I only have about ten hours in the type; and was not tailwheel current so I rode as a passenger in the back seat. Prior to the flight; the pilot and I discussed our roles and confirmed that he was pilot in command and I was present only as a passenger. After flying to an airport about forty miles away; with an 1800 ft paved strip about thirty feet wide; the pilot made a couple landings. I was enjoying the ride; I'm no expert on Super Cubs; but the pilot seemed to be doing a great short-field technique and handling the airplane well. The third landing started out no differently; the approach and three-point touchdown were well-executed from my vantage point. After touchdown the pilot appeared to have good directional control of the airplane. As the airplane slowed; however; I felt a subtle; then very noticeable vibration coming from the tail; followed by a sudden jerk to the left. As the airplane rolled off the runway into the grass; it decelerated quickly as the pilot applied the brakes; the tail lifted; and I could see a tetrahedron and runway sign directly ahead of us. The prop struck the sign and stopped the engine; and the tail came back down as the aircraft came to a stop. We both exited the airplane. Although I was not in any manner acting as crew on this flight; as a CFI who had formerly given instruction to the pilot; I am concerned that I will be viewed as having failed at some implied responsibility with respect to this flight.

After landing and during taxi in a Piper PA18 the pilot lost control of the steering and ran off the runway.

1692404

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Corporate

Helicopter

2.0

Part 91

Photo Shoot / Video

Parked

Y

Installation

Instrument and Control Panels

X

Improperly Operated; Design

Company

Contracted Service

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Lead Technician 20

1692404

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

A helicopter was brought into the shop for an avionics upgrade. It was found that personnel or others had modified the aircraft by installing replacement display monitors and video switching components that are not listed on the installed STC and are non-TSOed. The video switching unit was found tie-rapped to a video monitor mount with a power cable that does not meet aviation requirements. The LCD monitors had been replaced with different units with no data regarding structural mounting or any changes in electrical system load. The forward talent monitor position had a prior approved mount/monitor removed and a 'ram' style mount installed to support the monitor. This situation was reported to Management but ignored. Due to unscheduled maintenance requirements and poor planning; the helicopter was placed back in service. The external camera has an 'aux box' that contains various video support equipment. This aux box was found strapped to structure in the aft cargo area and does not conform to the original STC mounting configuration. Parts are on hand to correct this; but Management decided to continue ops with the current non-approved mounting method. The helicopter does not conform to the approved installed STC equipment and previously approved (by XXX/field approval) replacement items. There is no record entry regarding installed monitors/video switching unit being properly documented and no record of the 'aux box' configuration being changed. The aircraft continues to be operated as an electronic news gathering rotorcraft with unapproved equipment installed.

No additional information.

Technician reported that a helicopter had numerous pieces of equipment installed incorrectly and without documentation.

1241228

201502

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

Marginal

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1241228

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

On descent we heard a load blaring noise that couldn't be identified or silenced that continued all the way into the gate until maintenance eventually identified the sound as the bathroom smoke detector alarm; no other associated sounds; smells or warning signs were observed by the flight crew relating to this sound.Through the descent; approach and landing we were experiencing a slowness to respond from the #2 engine relating to thrust lever position (both forward and back) and in comparison to the #1 engine; at times we had as much as a 3 inch split or more at the top of the thrust levers between engine #1 and engine #2 after we were be able to get the N1s equal and stable. While being vectored for the approach we began to configure for landing; first flaps 1; then flaps 5 followed by flaps 10. While we were configuring we were still having a problem with the #2 engines response and noticed I was having an increased problem in controlling the airplane. I noticed that we had a higher than usual pitch attitude for our speed and configuration as well as sluggish responses from the controls including rolling issues and I caught in my scan that we were showing an asymmetric flap problem with the left indicating flaps 5 and the right indicating flaps 10. We declared an emergency and asked for vectors to work on the problem. At one point during this event the autopilot had switched from command to Control Wheel Steering while in a vectored turn and the auto throttles had disengaged completely. We worked through the problem via the QRH and ultimately landed the aircraft on runway 27L with flaps 5 and without further incident. Multiple simultaneous aircraft equipment failures.One suggestion would be to include an actual bathroom smoke detector alarm sound in the training environment. This was the first time in my career hearing this sound and my crew and I were completely unfamiliar with this sound.

B737 pilot reported multiple seemingly unrelated aircraft equipment anomalies; complicated by a bathroom smoke detector blaring that continued to the gate.

1757507

202008

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Other unknown

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 5616; Flight Crew Type 2576

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1757507

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Other final approach

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Vectored between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 for an ILS into ZZZ with the weather just a lot of smoke. ATC pointed out VFR traffic to our 9 o'clock. We finally saw it over the lake the left of the LOC doing chandelles or lazy 8s and it showed that the traffic was within 200 ft. of our altitude. No RA nor TA ever occurred. ATC asked if we wanted to take a heading away from the traffic. Just before we saw it we clicked off the AP and turned right and slight up.

Air carrier Captain reported a NMAC on final with a small aircraft preforming maneuvers near the localizer.

1684225

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload

1684225

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload

1684238.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Departing ZZZ on the takeoff roll at approximately 100 knots; we had a bird strike in the vicinity of the nose gear. All Engine Indications were normal and there was no smell present.Subsequently we noticed the Hydraulic system A quantity decreasing slowly. All other indications were normal. We contacted dispatch and the [Chief Pilot] regarding both the bird strike and the decreasing hydraulic quantity. The [Chief Pilot] on duty was an Airbus pilot who recommended we divert. I asked for a pilot familiar with 737 systems and operation to contact us. (Name) was not scheduled to be on duty but made himself available and was an excellent resource. We discussed diverting or continuing. Due to the rate of system A fluid loss at the time; we anticipated a total loss of system A before we arrived at any alternate. Since we were in a heavy 900 with extra fuel; and we would be performing the same procedure regardless of where we landed; we elected to continue to ZZZ1 and monitor the hydraulic system. Approximately half way through the flight at 20 percent quantity remaining; the ENG 1 Hydraulic Low pressure light illuminated and we accomplished the appropriate QRH.[As we neared our destination]; the hydraulic system A quantity dropped to 0 percent; and [notified ATC] and requested CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) as a precaution for the landing in ZZZ1. Even though the system A quantity was zero; we didn't have the low pressure light for the system A electric pump or associated Flight Control annunciator light. We elected to wait to perform the Loss of System A QRH until we had all three of annunciator lights associated with the condition statement in the QRH. We asked for a 20 mile final to allow time for manual gear extension if it became necessary. We selected gear down approximately 20 miles out and the gear extended normally. We configured the aircraft normally; however as we slowed and configured the remaining annunciator illuminated. We completed the Loss of System A QRH and accomplished a normal flaps 30 landing on XXL in ZZZ1. After clearing the runway; ground notified us that CFR recommend we stop at our present position for possible smoke coming from the nose gear. I checked the status of hydraulic system B and noted it was at 58 percent. I suspected that what CFR thought was smoke and put the Nose Wheel Steering switch back to Normal (to remove system B pressure from the nose wheel actuator) and the smoke or haze subsided.We then requested a tow to the gate which was coordinated by ZZZ1 Ops and Maintenance. To facilitate the Tow; we started the APU; however we didn't open the APU bleed in case hydraulic fluid was in the vicinity of the APU inlet. (Name) had suggested caution on using the APU due to possible hydraulic fluid ingestion. I'm not sure if we would have been as aware of that possibility if not for his insight. Once the engines were shut down and [Company] Maintenance was at the side of the aircraft; I asked if they would check for hydraulic fluid near the APU inlet; and they indicated there was fluid around the inlet. Because of this; I elected to keep the APU Bleed off; however the cabin temperatures did become rather warm by the time all passengers were off. One note; the tow team did a fantastic job considering the presence of hydraulic fluid and mist in the nose wheel area; however they did not have a headset available for communication with the flight crew. We were able to communicate by opening the window and shouting and using hand signals; but this was not ideal.Once parked; we deplaned from the left rear exit to keep passengers away from any hydraulic fluid present in the vicinity of the nose of the aircraft.The entire crew debriefed the event on the aircraft once all passengers had deplaned. Recommend having a fleet specific expert available at all times. A [Chief Pilot] from another fleet is not as helpful during this type of event. Recommend the tow team for these types ofevents have an operating headset for communications.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-900 fight crew reported a bird strike during takeoff which caused damage to hydraulic lines; resulting in a subsequent loss of fluid in Hydraulic System A.

989741

201201

1801-2400

ZME.ARTCC

TN

33000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZME

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZME

Altitude Hold/Capture

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction

989741

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness

989738.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

At FL330 approximately 90 minutes into flight with the autopilot on for less than 1 hour; I noticed a slight descent of approximately 100-150 FT. Almost simultaneously the autopilot trim light illuminated; I disconnected the autopilot. It disconnected with a noticeable bump which descended the aircraft another 50 or so feet; for a total of approximately 200-225 FT. I re-trimmed the aircraft; and returned the aircraft to FL330. I checked the autopilot trim to insure it was still operational. Approximately 3 minutes later we were given a vector; as I turned the aircraft with the autopilot; it began a descent of approximately 500 FPM. I again disconnected the autopilot; and switched to autopilot #2. We were not in icing conditions; nor were we at the maximum altitude for our gross weight. We checked the QRH. The aircraft seemed to operate normally with autopilot #2 until at lower altitudes when the autopilot trim light again illuminated while maneuvering. We landed uneventfully; called Maintenance Control and wrote up the discrepancy in the logbook. There were no ATC conflicts noted. Sometimes things happen. Better maintenance schedules unlike the new schedules which would detect problems before they occur. No fly until failure policy; preventive maintenance!

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

A MD83 AUTOPILOT TRIM (AP) put the aircraft in a slight descent several times during flight with AP1 selected. At lower altitudes with AP2 the AP TRIM likewise allowed a descent while turning.

1110896

201308

0601-1200

TPA.TRACON

FL

3000.0

Marginal

TRACON TPA

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B TPA

TCAS Software

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

1110896

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Y

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

We were in a climbing right turn off of Runway 18L cleared to 4;000 FT. About 3;800 FT we received an RA with no previous TA. The RA directed us orally and visually to 'descend' at 1;500 - 2;000 FPM and showed the target directly on our position at the same altitude. I immediately initiated a descent to comply while we both searched outside for traffic [with] no avail. As we descended; the target stayed in the same place at the same altitude. We advised ATC of the RA and they assured us no traffic was in the area. We stopped our descent at 3;000 FT and began our climb up to 4;000 FT. The RA continued for about 2 minutes showing the same position and altitude. It then went away and operated normally for the rest of the flight. I'm sure the transition from climb to 1500 FPM descent in short period was disconcerting for the passengers. We advised the flight attendants and passengers after the event to explain what happened and to ease fear. There were no reports of injuries or adverse reactions. When arriving at our destination; the TCAS was deferred.

An MD-83 on departure responded to an apparently false TCAS RA.

1750008

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

220.0

1.0

6500.0

VMC

5

Dawn

5000

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach; Landing

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 3938; Flight Crew Type 144

1750008

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure

On visual final to [Runway] XX at ZZZ; backed up with an ILS; I was pilot monitoring. Vectors and descent from Center and ZZZ Approach brought the aircraft in steep; relatively high energy; and on a short turn to final. At the time; the aircraft was very light on payload and fuel (I believe a Vref of about 118 with flaps 25); so the aircraft was slow to decelerate; but significantly overpowered with high thrust settings. The geometry that Approach was using was greater than 90 degrees to final; which led us to assume we were being vectored through the approach course for a longer final. Approach then cleared us for the visual to XX. The CA executed a turn to final and descended to 5;100 feet MSL; but due to energy state and angle-off of final elected to go-around; which was the conservative call. He directed me to ask for; and I asked for a left visual 360; which Tower denied. ZZZ Tower then directed the aircraft to climb to 6;500 feet MSL and fly a heading. 6;500 feet was set in the MCP window. With the aircraft going around; I called the altitude as the aircraft approached 6;500. Simultaneous to this I was deconfiguring flaps as the CA turned toward the assigned heading. I observed the altitude high and said 'Altitude High' or something similar twice. The CA disengaged the autopilot and hand-flew returning to 6;500 feet. No mention of altitude was made by either ZZZ Tower; or ZZZ Approach when we returned to their frequency. The subsequent approach was uneventful. An aggravating factor to this was the short final and high energy state that approach was attempting to set up for us. If I were to do this again I would either ask for extended vectors or an instrument approach to better manage energy. For the go-around itself; because it was initiated before the aircraft started descending on glide slope; managing altitude; heading; and thrust independently similar to an RNAV/RNP go-around would have helped mitigate the altitude issue. I believe I was proactive in calling the approach to the assigned altitude; as well as making calls when the aircraft climbed above that. The PF was doing a good job of flying the aircraft through a non-standard missed approach (the assigned altitude and heading were not what the instrument approach go-around are); but the performance impacts of a very light aircraft under go-around thrust made it difficult to immediately arrest the climb rate.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing an unstabilized approach and electing to go-a round.

1777991

202012

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

93.0

4.0

50.0

VMC

Daylight

Commercial Operator (UAS)

DJI Mavic 2 Zoom

Part 107

None

Observation / Surveillance (UAS)

Class B ZZZ

N

Small

Multi-Rotor

N

Manual Control

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Company

Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0.5; Flight Crew Total 13; Flight Crew Type 13

Other / Unknown

1777991

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Other Post-Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Prior to taking off I checked the UAS FM (facility maps) and observed that I could not exceed 50 feet AGL as I was in ZZZ Class B airspace. In an error; I did not file a flight plan and instead flew the drone; keeping it at an altitude of 50 feet AGL or below. After ending my flight I realized my error and immediately contacted my company UAS coordinator. In the future I shall always remember to file a flight plan and receive authorization before flying in controlled airspace.

UAS pilot reported inadvertently flying in Class B controlled airspace without authorization.

1039422

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1039422

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General Declared Emergency

Human Factors

I was working all sectors combined. An aircraft departed the airport and soon after said he had a 'flap failure' and needed to return to the airport. ATC declared an emergency for the aircraft. While I was getting all the needed information from the emergency aircraft and talking with the CIC; a C402 was on a downwind vector for ILS Runway 5. Because I was focused on the emergency; the C402 got a late base turn which put him right on the boundary of N90's airspace. A better scan from myself and CIC would have prevented this.

TRACON Controller distracted by an emergency allowed an aircraft to stray onto the boundary of another facility's airspace without a point out.

1109539

201308

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

RV-8

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 120

Human-Machine Interface

1109539

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Crosswind landing on RWY XXR. Winds called at 240/10. After a good wheel landing; when the tail wheel touched the runway; the airplane weather-vaned into the wind. I was unable to prevent the airplane from angling to the right and the airplane departed the runway surface. After traveling a hundred FT or so in the gravel; the airplane came to rest on asphalt where a taxiway exits RWY XXR. While travelling through the gravel; the aircraft hit the taxiway identification sign. The sign damaged the right wing and the right fuel tank. I called Tower; shut down the engine and turned off the master switch; and egressed the airplane. I was able to pull [it] about 50 FT off the Tower/Ground controlled taxiway to the fuel pumps. An inspection of the tail wheel assembly and rudder control cables is forthcoming.

RV8 pilot reports losing control of his aircraft during landing in a crosswind and departing the runway causing some damage to the aircraft and an airport sign.

1223557

201412

0001-0600

ORD.Tower

IL

800.0

Night

1800

Tower ORD

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1223557

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

We were cleared to land 28R by Tower on an 8 mile final. On short approach (800 ft); tower cleared a cargo to 'Line Up and Wait'; 28R. I could not see the traffic and did not know where the cargo aircraft currently was. I decided to initiate a go-around on the side of Safety.Tower should never give 'Takeoff' or 'Line Up and Wait' instructions to a departing aircraft; until the landing traffic has landed and cleared the point of the runway that the departing aircraft is holding short. This hazardous clearance from Tower; could lead to an aircraft landing on top of another.

Pilot reports being on short final when the Tower Controller put an aircraft into position on the same runway. Pilot elects to execute a go-around.

1015513

201206

1201-1800

LNS.Airport

PA

2.0

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower LNS

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class D LNS

Tower LNS

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Climb

Class D LNS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 340; Flight Crew Type 110

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1015513

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

IFR flight to LNS under VMC [I was] vectored by Harrisburg approach for right downwind for Runway 26 LNS. [I was] cleared for landing on Runway 26 by LNS Tower. Descending into base leg for landing; and saw other traffic; a high-wing Cessna climbing at same horizontal distance from runway; probably within 300 FT vertical separation. LNS has radar; I was never alerted to this traffic. After traffic passed over me; I heard the other traffic announce to Tower that they had passed me. I feel that Tower should have vectored the other traffic away from the arrival end of the runway; and alerted me to their presence.

An IFR pilot descending through 2;000 FT into LNS had a near miss with a departing aircraft but was never alerted about its presence until he saw it pass within 300 FT.

1322692

201601

1201-1800

ABE.Airport

PA

0.0

VMC

Turbulence; Gusty Wind; 10

Daylight

40000

Tower ABE

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Tower ABE

Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 860; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1322692

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Horizontal 500

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was on a training mission to complete a flight review and IPC on this gusty windy day. Winds were 340/11G21. We were completing the last instrument approach as part of the IPC and finishing up for the day; planning to land full stop out of the ILS 6 at ABE. The distance from the runway end to the intersection with Runway 31 is not much more (possibly less than) 2;000 feet. During the approach we were given no Land and Hold Short (LAHSO) instruction; and had one been given I would have declined it as landing out of an ILS to minimums can require significant runway; very often requiring crossing Runway 31. The landing was challenging due to the gusty winds; and after landing and during rollout I was given a 'Hold Short of Runway 31 - landing traffic' instruction approximately 500 feet from Runway 31. As I looked to my right there was a King Air that rotated and was about to touch down on 31; and had we not been able to stop (or had to execute a late go-around); there could have been a serious incident. The controller clearly put himself in a bad situation and did not take steps to correct it in a timely manner.Fortunately the strong gusty winds that day allowed for a very short rollout in the Mooney and we were able to stop and make a turn prior to Runway 31; which is usually not the case when flying that approach.

Mooney pilot reported a ground conflict after landing at ABE. Reporter stated this could have developed into a dangerous situation.

1093760

201306

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

13.0

1300.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3500

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 1800

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1093760

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On level out going to practice area; the engine began to hiccup/surge and then loose partial power; I notified Tower of my intent to land immediately; and was cleared. The power loss was momentary at that time. It occurred again; and I declared an emergency to get on the ground as soon as possible. Tower asked the questions re souls aboard and fuel; which I answered. They also asked if I wanted to have them roll equipment. I was still developing power; and could make the field and so I declined the equipment rollout. Power hiccup/surge occurred a third time on descent; but we never lost power completely. On touchdown; Tower indicated 'good Job' and on taxi; Tower asked; 'are you canceling the emergency.' I responded yes. I taxied to my Mechanic's hangar and now await word on why the power surge happened.

After takeoff; a PA32R engine began surging then partially loosing power; so the pilot declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport with engine still developing power.

1720182

202001

1201-1800

7000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Main Gear Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196; Flight Crew Total 20294; Flight Crew Type 11614

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1720182

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

Flight was uneventful until approaching ZZZZZ; the final approach fix for Runway XXR in ZZZ. When we placed the gear handle down; we received an ECAM for the landing gear doors not closed. The ECAM showed the gear down and locked but the gear doors in the fully extended position. I have seen the main gear doors open on the ground and know ground clearance is very close. Not knowing if they would clear on touchdown; I elected to go-around but kept the gear extended; planning to contact Maintenance for guidance. The First Officer flew the go-around and I asked her to stay below 220 kts. at 10;000 ft. MSL. I gave her the radios and asked her to tell ATC we would need delay vectors to troubleshoot the problem; while starting the ECAM procedure. I also made a PA announcement to the passengers quickly explaining the problem and telling them we were trouble shooting the problem.I referenced the QRH for L/G Doors not Closed; but the procedure is for when the doors don't retract on takeoff. The procedure directs to recycle the gear if the gear handle is up but does not address if the gear handle is down. I elected to cycle the gear up and down but the gear doors remained in the extended position. While I was doing this; I sent a message to Dispatch to 'Call Me' and received no response. After several more minutes; I sent 'Call ME NOW.' I have a screen shot of the AIRINC frequencies on my IPAD and was starting to retrieve it when I received the frequency on ACARS. I called ZZZ1 AIRINC but was not able to get immediate service because another aircraft was on the frequency. Eventually; I was patched to [another sector] and requested Maintenance Airframe. Waiting for Maintenance; I continued running the ECAM when I received another ECAM F/CTL Slat SYS 2 Fault; and then a CB tripped ECAM for CB tripped on the AFT panel followed by another ECAM for CB tripped on the overhead panel. The time delays were costing us valuable fuel which was now below 5;000 pounds. When we initiated the go-around; we had 7;700 pounds of fuel remaining but with the gear doors open and gear down our fuel was rapidly being depleted. I discovered after searching for tripped CBs they were associated with LGCIU 1 and in lieu of the rapidly depleting fuel and the time delays; I elected to reset tripped CBs; hoping they might be the cause and the solution to the problem. The overhead CB reset but the AFT one did not. I left the AFT out.During all of this I noticed ATC had moved us to the south of the airport by almost 30 miles and I asked the First Officer to have ATC keep us within 20 miles of the airport and a lot closer. Approach eventually worked us of to just southwest of the airport.By this time Maintenance came on; we were down to almost 4;300 pounds of fuel; and I explained the situation with the CBs and the gear doors. Maintenance asked if the gear showed down and locked which it did and I asked if there was a possibility of the gear doors impacting the runway on landing. The Maintenance Controller said there was a possibility [of] the gear doors sparking on landing. I am not sure how I ended the conversation with the Controller other than to say we will have to land with the doors open. At this point I called the Flight Attendants and told them to do a Cabin Prep for Evacuation. I asked them how much time they needed and they replied 10 minutes. I said unable; you have five minutes. I made a PA announcement to the passengers and explained the situation and told them it is possible the gear doors might be a problem and we would be landing soon.The First Officer had set up the FMGC for XXR and [requested priority handling from] ATC. I quickly briefed the approach and took the aircraft and asked her to tell ATC we needed to get the aircraft on the ground. I reminded her if the gear doors cause a problem and it leads to an evacuation; to grab the QRC and read the checklist. Just prior to landing; we received an ACARS message that said 'Upon furtherreview; the gear doors should not be a problem.' Great news but a little late. By now we were within the FAF for XXR. The approach was normal and at 500 feet AGL; I gave a 'BRACE BRACE BRACE' PA and the FAs started their commands. I made a very smooth touchdown and the ARFF crew said there were no sparks on landing. We rolled to a stop on the high-speed taxiway with NWS and LGCIU1 inop; and I made a PA to 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated.' Fuel was less than 3;400 pounds. We waited for a ground crew to come out and tow the airplane and they needed the gear pins that are stowed in the cockpit. We threw them out the FO's side window to the ground crew. The ground crew's interphone radio initially was very readable but became very scratchy and unreadable. It might have been because there was a different cord with the tug. We used hand signals to verify brakes released. We made the slow trip to the terminal where I briefed the mechanics; and Flight Ops representatives. A couple of lessons.The QRH needs to address Landing Gear Doors Extended on Landing. Would it have been better to retract the gear rather than leave them down? This would have reduced the fuel consumption rate and given us more time to trouble shoot the situation once Maintenance was on the line.The fuel consumption rates with the gear doors open and gear down is incredibly high. The QRH says 15% for the doors only. We were fortunate we were tankering fuel to ZZZ and had extra; but if we had been at normal landing fuel amounts; the situation would have been worse. Also; the noise level with the gear doors open is very loud.I had multiple ECAMS popping up on top of each other; with the CBs tripping. I never did see an ECAM for LGCIU1 fault but it was listed in the INOP systems. I was saturated.The lack of response from Dispatch was frustrating and wasted valuable time and fuel exacerbating our situation. When I did get through to the Maintenance Controller; I was left with very little time to be able to make any evaluative decisions and had to go with what I knew at the time.Having to go through a middle man (AIRINC) wastes time and when you get there you are on a party line.When I originally elected to go-around; I had no idea it would take us almost 35 minutes to get the aircraft back on the ground. The sense of time was very compressed. Had I known the gear doors would not be a hazard with them in the extended position; I probably would have elected to come back around immediately; evaluating the existing ECAM instead of wasting valuable time trying to contact Maintenance; but I was trying to use all our available resources. They weren't readably available.Training kicks in very fast. The Flight Attendants did a wonderful job preparing the cabin in a very short amount of time. It was the Purser's second trip since training. The First Officer; still on probation; did an outstanding job communicating to ATC; flying the aircraft; and setting us up for the follow-on approach. We were together as a crew; divided our tasks; and then came back together for the approach.I checked with Maintenance the following day and the mechanics had not been able to fix the problems.Writing this type of report has caused me to second guess and question all of my decisions. I should be satisfied the result was successful with no damage and no body injured. But I have to ask what could I; should I; have done better?

A320 Captain reported that troubleshooting a landing gear door malfunction caused the aircraft to land with critically low fuel.

1591597

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

75.0

VMC

Daylight

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

VFR

Photo Shoot / Video

Class D ZZZ

Company

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Confusion

1591597

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Other Person

Other after flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Looked at airspace on the morning and saw Temporary flight restrictions and was notified the temporary restriction was removed early that morning. Later when flights were reviewed it appears I penetrated controlled airspace in my inspection without prior authorization. In review with drone coordinator; it appears I confused the TFR with the Class D Controlled Airspace for ZZZ. I have updated my airspace software to prevent from future incursions.

Drone operator reported penetrating Class D airspace.

1751848

202007

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 10

CLR

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Flight Director

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1751848

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1751849.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Vectored to join the Rwy XX ILS inside ZZZZZ; called the field and cleared for the visual. Disconnected to autopilot to descend and join the glide slope (which was below us). Continued to hand fly since the Aircraft wouldn't lock the glide slope outside the localizer. As localizer came in; the flight directors remained on the horizon and unusable. I asked the FO (First Officer) to turn off and turn on both flight directors to regain their use. At that point (just outside ZZZZZ1) the flight directors were giving us good glide slope and localizer information. We put the gear down and commenced to slow to approach speed inside ZZZZZ1 (still hand flying) and I disconnected the autothrottles somewhere around 1000 ft. AGL. Approximately 600 ft. (inside 3 miles) we received an aural 'Glide Slope; Glide Slope' warning. At that time I noticed that while my flight director in the HUD and on the PFD was centered; the glide slope information was deflected all the way to the top of my display. A quick scan of the FO's PFD showed centered flight director as well. Checking the PAPIs for Rwy XX showed 4 red. I leveled off and added power to fly to the glide slope again; readjusted power; and landed uneventfully. No warnings or cautions were displayed.When we reconnected the Flight Directors inside ZZZZZ; descending on the glide slope; they came back directly where I wanted them showing me on glide slope and on course. I did not check LOC and glideslope annunciations on the PFD. Is it possible they did not capture the glideslope? I would doubt that since I got a Glideslope aural warning. I have no idea why the flight directors both sides had us descending below glide slope inside 3 miles on the approach. Wrote [a maintenance] entry; called [maintenance control] and conferenced in the Avionics tech for a verbal debrief on the gripe.I guess I could have caught the error had I been cross checking the glide slope on the right hand side of the HUD display; but I sit back far enough that I have to make an effort to see it; and it's not in my habit pattern on a visual. I'm normally working lineup; glide slope; airspeed; and any crosswind correction looking outside and through the HUD. It was my error for not scanning the PAPI to detect the gradual settle - which I'll put down to fatigue - but the flight director was centered! Long day. Error captured and uneventful landing - but very troubling to see the flight directors do that.

On visual approach to ZZZ Rwy XX; we were GS/LOC captured; on speed with the AP off. I was looking outside when the PF (Pilot Flying) asked me to cycle the FD's (Flight Directors). This was at approximately 1000 ft.; to my recollection; and I complied; ensuring the correct switches (FD's). After cycling them off then on; all appeared normal and the PF verbalized this. A few moments later; however; we were below GS which I noticed when I looked back outside and saw the PAPI. I remember hearing the aural 'Glideslope' warning once; but I do not remember exactly when this occurred. We did not receive any other alerts. The FD had been centered on my side; but I don't recall the GS indicator position. I did not notice the FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciators); which were likely no longer in approach mode: V/S (Vertical Speed) and HDG (Heading Hold) Hold; as I believe we never re-selected the Approach tile. I was looking outside at the PAPI which was red; and was starting to say this when the PF leveled off. He made airspeed corrections as well. We were red over white and stable at 500 ft. I did note then the GS indicated we were slightly low; consistent with a non-coincident PAPI. Landing was uneventful and we were VMC the entire approach with a visual clearance.The approach appeared normal to me until the PF asked me to cycle the FD's. Even immediately after; the aircraft appeared to be in the correct altitude/attitude. As I was focusing on making sure I had selected the correct switches (FD's); it took that small amount of time for the actual aircraft position to become apparent to me. I viewed my centered FD; which appeared normal; and visually crosschecked the PAPI's; which were abnormal - red over red; at approximately 800-700 ft. This led to a moment of confusion and I was not focused on the FMA's; which were likely in basic mode after cycling the FD's. As far as I remember; we never re-selected the Approach tile. With the delayed recognition of being low; receiving an aural GS alert; leveling off; throttle movement and airspeed monitoring; and thinking about a possible go around; a lot was occurring in quick succession. I failed to recognize the situation early and this could have led to an undesired state if left unchecked.My focus was outside until becoming distracted by the call to cycle FD's. My focus then shifted inside. While doing so; I failed to effectively monitor the aircraft position; PAPI; and FMA status. Focus must be on 'flying the aircraft' first and being a good pilot monitoring. I should have been more proactive in verbalizing the aircraft state; once noticed; and my attention should always be on active monitoring. I should have gathered more information about what the CA (Captain) saw when we cycled the FD's. Finally; my failure to notice the start of deviation from red over white to red over pink would have allowed more of a buffer to correct other failures; such as reselecting Approach tile or verifying the GS indicator against the PAPI as well as cross checking CA/FO indications.

B767 flight crew reported Flight Director malfunction on approach.

1756464

202008

1201-1800

VMC

Daylight

Corporate

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Other 107

None

Other Inspection

Corporate

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 137

None

Agriculture

Cruise

Hangar / Base

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 550

1756464

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

In-flight; Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

During a UAV structure inspection; a Crop duster passed well away from the inspection. No evasive action was taken due to the UAV's close proximity to structure.

UAV Operator reported an airborne conflict during routine inspection with a Crop Duster.

1083857

201304

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Cockpit Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

1083857

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During approximately the last hour of the flight the cockpit requested a restroom break. I went into the cockpit and the Captain had trouble getting the door to open but with the help of the First Officer it opened. When I tried to open it for the Captain to come back in there was trouble again it seemed jammed. With the help of the First Officer I was able to get it open. The First Officer then tried to get out to go to the restroom and the door would not budge. The Captain then called the other flight attendants and I then took the jumpseat in the cockpit for the landing. Once we landed the door opened with no problem.

An A319 Flight Attendant entered the cockpit for the Captain's restroom break and the door jammed requiring two people to open it. The Flight Attendant remained in the cockpit for landing after which the door operated normally.

1482967

201709

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1600.0

VMC

10

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

2.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 247

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1482967

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

The mission was planned as a local area sortie for me to log instrument approaches. I invited another pilot along as my safety pilot and he was in the right seat. My three approaches and landings were uneventful and we departed ZZZ1 VFR back to ZZZ under tower control. Once I had ZZZ in sight; I informed ZZZ1 tower and they switched me to advisory.My safety pilot flew one pattern and landing and I elected to fly the full stop landing. On the full stop landing; I decided to practice a no-flap landing. I retracted the landing gear on departure leg and as we turned to downwind; the conversation turned away from flying the airplane. I arrived on downwind; abeam the approach end without performing my landing checks and I failed to lower the landing gear. At this point; I was still involved in the non-flying conversation.I rolled out on final concentrating on making the no-flap landing and failed to confirm the gear was down. I expected a lower than normal power setting due to having the flaps retracted. My first indication of my error was the scraping noise as we contacted the runway. I moved the mixture to cutoff as we were sliding on the runway and we egressed after the airplane stopped. I called the FBO at ZZZ and told them to shut down the runway.I think there are several contributing factors to this incident. First; I failed to maintain a sterile cockpit in the airport environment. Second; I had a lapse of checklist discipline and the no-flap pattern disrupted my habit pattern. I normally perform the landing checklist abeam the approach end and then re-confirm a gear down indication rolling out on final; however I was overly concentrating on the no-flap approach.Finally; after recent engine maintenance; I discovered the landing gear warning horn was sounding at an abnormally high power setting (roughly 18-inch Manifold Pressure). I asked my mechanic to readjust it; which he did. I failed to adequately operations check the new setting to ensure the horn was sounding at the appropriate power setting (approximately 14-inch Manifold Pressure). As a result; the warning horn did not sound on this approach.

C182 pilot reported a gear-up landing occurred due to distractions and the lack of gear warning horn.

1699799

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

2.0

Part 135

Passenger

Descent

Wing Flight Control Surface

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1699799

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Upon descent 15-20 miles from the ZZZZZ for arrival into ZZZ; I felt an un-commanded left wing down force upon the aircraft. I corrected by rolling wings level and looked at the wing and noticed the sheet metal had de-laminated on the inboard forward portion of the left aileron. I conducted a control check and the aircraft responded correctly with control inputs with a bit of extra right aileron force needed to keep the wings level. I continued to ZZZ and landed uneventfully. [The cause was the] age of aircraft or an improper bonding of the sheet metal to the surface underneath.

C402C Captain reported an uncommanded left wing down-force due to a delamination of a portion of the left aileron skin sheet metal.

1503827

201712

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

High

Galley Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 0

Safety Related Duties; Boarding

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

1503827

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Attendant

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

I had arrived and boarded the plane prior to report time and I had told the gate agent to board 25 minutes before departure; the captain dismissed my statement and instead told the gate agent to board 10 minutes earlier. I then boarded the plane and introduced myself to the captain. He made it a point to tell me that he wanted to get out as soon as possible and beat the snow. When doing the security check I made the captain aware that I was unsuccessful at opening the aft galley compartment that contained the demo equipment and AED. He came to the back with me and tried for himself. He was also unsuccessful at opening it. He said is it ok that that you just see the yellow thing. I told him that if I can't get in I can't check to see if my equipment is functioning. He said he didn't want to get maintenance out because it would cause delays and he wanted to get out as early as possible because of the coming snow. I told him I understood and reiterated that the 'heart machine' is in there along with the demo equipment. He made it known that he understood and was like 'yeah that's what's blocking the door.' He kept asking me the same questions in different ways; asking me if I was ok with flying without it opening. I responded; this is the first time this has happened to me; I'm new. I'm telling you what the issue is and I can't do what I'm supposed to do in regards to the equipment so I'm not sure what else I'm supposed to tell you. I'm looking to you. He responded 'it'll be fine' we can go like that.When the other FA came on I told her that I would have to read the demo announcement and the captain came out to let us know that we would be boarding now (way before standard 25 minute boarding time). Still not done prepping in the back I stopped talking and went to the back to finish. He then came to the back and was asking if I was ready to board; and mentioned how we didn't want to be stuck on the ground for 2 hours. I told him I was but was asking what the word and flight time was; because we were never briefed. We boarded as normal and when the door had closed I reminded the other FA that I would have to read the demo announcement. She asked why and I explained that I can't get the door open but the captain told me it was ok. She came to the AFT and tried to open the door herself and was also unable to open it. She asked me if I was comfortable flying like that. I told her I don't know; I told the captain the issue and he said it was ok so I assumed it was ok. She said 'no; it's not ok' and called the flight deck. The captain seemed to be confused by what she was telling him and I stepped in and reminded him of the issue that I had just previously discussed with him. He told us to try again and if we still can't get it open we would return to the gate. After numerous attempts we called and told him we still couldn't get it open. We got to the gate and the captain came directly out of the flight deck and began to tell the gate agents how we had to call maintenance; that 'we were back there...' looking at it and we can't fly like that and we had fixed it before but it must of slipped out again. This was not true; we had not fixed it at all.I believe the captain would advise me the best; safest and most compliant way so I ignored my own judgement and allowed him to make the final call. I'm glad the senior flight attendant wasn't afraid to speak up for the both of us. One shouldn't be afraid to question the captain's call and should make sure to discuss (CRM) everything with the whole crew before boarding.

ERJ-170 Flight Attendant reported the flight crew was unable to open the aft galley compartment that contained the demo equipment and AED.

1694670

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Class D ZZZ

N

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

Ground Spoiler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1694670

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Both engines were started at the gate with the GPU. We were pushed out of the gate and during the disconnect and after start flow; the Flight Taxi switch failed with the audible 'click' to the Flight position while I disengaged the control lock. Although the switch was in the Flight position; the PFCS (Primary Flight Control System) showed that the spoilers were stowed; verified by looking at the wings. The roll inboard roll outboard advisory light was dark; the improper configuration while in ground mode.Maintenance Control was contacted through Dispatch. It was determined that the switch could not be deferred under MEL 27-XX-X due to not meeting the conditions of line 'a' of the MEL and item 2 of the operating procedure. As we were returning to the gate; when I advanced the power levers with the Flight Taxi switch still in the Flight position; the spoilers deployed and the advisory lights illuminated. We parked and deplaned.Maintenance Control asked us to do a full power down/power up cycle of the aircraft. Under the direction of Maintenance Control we assisted Contract Maintenance with the running of the engines and system operation as per the task card. Engines were again started at the gate and at the tug disconnect/after start point; the same exact failure occurred. As soon as I disengaged the control lock the Flight Taxi switch failed a second time with the audible 'click' to the Flight position and the PFCS showed that the spoilers were stowed; verified by looking at the wings. The roll inboard roll outboard advisory light were dark.At this point it was my understanding that we had reproduced the same system failure after a full power down and reset of the aircraft and that the task had failed. Maintenance Control asked if we would help pinpoint which power lever's micro switch might be the culprit. During this procedure it could not be determined which lever was the issue. Through a lengthy process the spoiler system and switch started operating normally. Maintenance Control authorized Contract Maintenance to sign it off.After two identical failures of the spoiler controls; reproduced after a hard reset that did not have MEL relief; I had safety concerns about the stability of the system. I conferred with a Duty Officer. With the information at hand; I felt that the issue had not been resolved and did not feel comfortable operating the aircraft. I made the difficult decision of refusing the aircraft.After what had been a cooperative and professional operation with the Maintenance Control Technician; a frustrated Maintenance Manager or Director came on the phone and proceeded to attempt to undermine 'Ready Safe Go' by belittling; berating and shaming me for my decision.

DH8-400 Captain reported refusing the aircraft after maintenance improperly complied with MEL procedures.

1743727

202005

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1743727

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1743728.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

At the start of my shift today myself and other AMT's were assigned an aircraft to put back in service and given training with threat of being disciplined if the training wasn't complete. This type of guidance is confusing in how one should go about prioritizing one's work.

At the start of shift on [date]; I was given a training due notification and told to have all modules completed before end of the shift or I would be disciplined. I was also given a job assignment to assist in getting Aircraft X back in service. When ask what took precedence I was told the aircraft; and felt conflicted with 2 job assignments and the threat of possible discipline.

Technicians reported confusion over training related to prioritization of work requirements.

1081832

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

28000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-400 and 400 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1081832

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

We had 5 daytime tracks. Because of staffing considerations; and in light of the recent furloughs; I was told that we were unable to accept random routes or aircraft on even altitudes in an effort to push flights back and delay flights on the ground in Europe. Due to this restriction; aircraft which would normally be at higher altitudes were stuck at FL310 and below. I started receiving reports of flights getting turbulence between 30w and 40w just prior to entering my airspace. I advised the supervisors that I may not be able to stick to these rules due to the turbulence reports. Air Carrier X was approximately 10 minutes from 41n040w when he began to encounter moderate turbulence at FL280; I received the ARINC message; [and] the flight was requesting FL320 but was held down by 4 other flights above him. I received a call from ZZZZ requesting a deviation 30L of course for the flight which I approved. I then received the desperate message from the flight; apparently in response to ZZZZ's unable higher message saying 'get me any deviation then; I don't care; moderate turbulence.' ZZZZ then called me asking if I could approve the flight descending from FL280 to FL260; no deviation; I approved the flight descending. Upon entering my airspace. I eventually was able to step climb the aircraft reference the traffic that was holding him down. They were all requesting higher as well; some as much as 7;000 feet. Just as I was relieved from the position; the relieving Controller got a call from ZZZZ stating another flight was in Severe Turbulence and he had to approve the flight at FL380; because there was no other altitude available. During this entire exchange; the Supervisor kept passing by and commenting that we must 'be mean' and joking that he split the sector again; hoping I would 'quit complaining' about the restrictions and the unsafe; adverse effects it was having on the flights. I had a problem with that because my priority was the safety of these flights; and because I was forced to deny other flights even altitudes higher up; even if there was no traffic at those higher levels; the lower flights encountered safety hazards. I told the Supervisor about this; and I was told the users were all aware of this for days and they knew to expect it. I know that is not true because I personally answered a call yesterday from a Dispatcher inquiring about a 'rumor they heard that we were going to be at 50% reduced staffing; how that was going to effect the flights and that he hadn't seen any NOTAMS or advisories regarding the impact to the flights.' I was also told that all adjacent facilities knew about these restrictions and should have planned accordingly so to space flights out and give us more spacing; in order to minimize holding at sectors that may be effected by furloughs and have minimum or no staffing; which did not happen; now these flights are airborne and stuck. Stop the furloughs. Our users are encountering hazardous and potentially dangerous conditions as a result.

Enroute Controller described an unsafe condition event when traffic encountering turbulence could not be granted an altitude change in part due to both traffic and staffing restrictions; the reporter listed the recent 'furloughs' as a casual factor.

1293168

201509

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1293168

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1293171.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Incursion Runway

Y

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were number one for departure on runway 17R. Tower called and cleared us for takeoff on runway 17R. She said 'RNAV NAVYE cleared for takeoff 17R'. We also heard her clear another aircraft to land on runway 17C. All aircraft lights were illuminated as we took the runway for departure. The First Officer cleared the right side of the runway. I said 'Clear Left' and we noted the aircraft on final for what we thought was 17C. With the angle; it was hard to tell he wasn't lined up on 17C. We were 3/4 of the way across the hold short line for 17R when we realized he was actually on final for runway 17R. I stopped the aircraft immediately and the First Officer got on the radio and announced we were on the runway...that we were not clear. We did not have time to clear the runway before the aircraft flew by us and landed. It appeared to us that he leveled off and extended his landing. He never went around but someone on the radio stated; 'Don't worry guys...I've got it'.Had we not stopped the aircraft when we did; we would have been directly in his landing path and an accident was probable. There was never any urgency on the part of the controller to acknowledge or correct the problem. We asked to taxi clear of the runway and for a phone number to call the tower. Once clear of the runway with the parking brake set; I called the tower and talked with the supervisor. He said there was no problem as our aircraft nose was barely over the hold line. We were 3/4 of the way across the hold short line just short of the threshold paint when the aircraft went by us. We were not just over the hold line! The supervisor acknowledged that the controller had made a mistake. She had been given the flight; which was on a medical [urgency] and she did not realize he was landing on runway 17R. He also acknowledged that because of our actions; an incident was probably averted.Close runway proximity led us to believe the aircraft on final was on 17C. The controller had just cleared an aircraft to land on 17C and nobody had been cleared to land on 17R. The controller had been given the medical [urgency] flight and was unaware of their landing runway. The controller never told them to go-around; and they never initiated a go-around even after realizing we were on the runway. Better communication between the air traffic controllers. Runway 17R was being used for a medical [urgency] landing. No aircraft should have been cleared to takeoff until that aircraft was on the ground.

Better communication between the controllers and possibly the emergency aircraft. Maybe not allowing aircraft to depart during [priority] landing on runways that are close ie XXR/XXC; just in case the aircraft [in distress] lands on the wrong one.

A flight crew reported being cleared for takeoff with an aircraft on final for the parallel runway. As the crew crossed the hold line it became apparent that the other aircraft was lined up for the runway cleared for takeoff. The Captain on the ground stopped the aircraft and the Tower was informed of the situation. The other aircraft was allowed to land. Reports from the other crew are also included.

1811597

202106

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

75.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Class E ZZZ

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 4000

1811597

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was conducting an intro flight in Aircraft X. We had begun our take off roll and got to rotation speed; the aircraft left the ground and was slow to climb. I was pitched at about 10 to 12 degrees.The aircraft then had a reduction in power about 75 ft. off the ground before the engine surged back into full power. Once realizing that we were not going to have sufficient power to maintain the climb I immediately pulled the power back to idle and landed on the remaining runway. Air speed was approximately 95 kts. We landed with about 300 ft. remaining which resulted in a runway excursion of approximately 5 ft. There was no damage to the aircraft or airfield lighting. I taxied the aircraft back to the ramp and was able to shut down; no further incidents.

Pilot reported aborting takeoff at 75 feet AGL after engine power loss and landing on remaining runway.

1169095

201405

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

VMC

Daylight

Tower ORD

Fractional

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 135

Passenger

Landing

Class B ORD

Tower ORD

Air Carrier

A340

2.0

Part 129

Landing

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1169095

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Wake turbulence encounter close to ground. We were following an Airbus A340 to [Runway] 10C at O'Hare. I told the Captain that I was going to hand fly the aircraft and stay a dot to two dots high due to the aircraft in front of us. We were at 300 FT AGL and about two dots high on VGLI when the airplane started to pitch down and rapidly roll to the left. I was holding the yoke in my right hand and immediately grabbed it with my left hand to apply right aileron to counter the roll. It took me three tries to disconnect the yaw damper. I had to ask the Captain to 'help' push the throttles forward as my hands were full. We executed a successful go-around. We were high intentionally to avoid the wake but we hit it anyway. Possibly the [A340] was above the glide path as well. We maintained our assigned speed to keep our distance; and did not slow further as there was traffic behind us. Little jets don't fit in at major airports; plain and simple.

A CE560 First Officer encountered wake vortices from an A340 while landing at ORD.

1469000

201707

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1469000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Equipment / Tooling

After an uneventful taxi out to runway 30; we were cleared for takeoff. After completing the appropriate checklist; I pushed the power levers into the takeoff detent. As we started to roll; I checked the rudder pedals for authority and found that they were jammed. I retarded the throttles and slowed the aircraft to taxi speed. The Pilot Monitoring notified the tower that we were aborting the takeoff and needed to taxi clear of the runway. After exiting the runway and completing the after landing checklist I stopped the aircraft. I looked down and saw that there was a hose and small nozzle blocking the rudder pedals. We taxied back to the gate; entered the discrepancy in the log book and waited for maintenance to come to the aircraft. They found the issue and repaired it. No further issue was found.

EMB-145 Captain reported rejecting takeoff due to jammed rudder pedals. Taxied back to gate for maintenance corrective action.

1707157

201912

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

270.0

2.0

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6500

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

FBO

Lancair Columbia

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Test Flight / Demonstration

Initial Climb

None

Class C ZZZ

Door

X

Improperly Operated; Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 3320; Flight Crew Type 50

Other / Unknown

1707157

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was giving a demonstration flight to a person who had never flown a Columbia 400. The person was in the left seat; I was in the right. I showed him how to latch the door; and during the taxi and run-up I never saw a 'door open' annunciation on the panel; which should show up when any of the aircraft's doors are not latched. The person said his door was closed and latched; and he even tugged on it for security. I should have visually checked that the door was secure. We took off and were climbing out about a mile or so from the departure end of the runway; heading west; when suddenly the left door opened and completely detached from the airplane. I took control immediately and told the Departure Controller that we lost the door and needed to return to the airport with priority. The Controller switched me back to Tower and we landed uneventfully. I later went up in another airplane with a coworker and searched the area briefly for the door; and then drove in the area looking for it as well; but was unsuccessful.

Columbia 400 pilot reported that a cabin door detached from the aircraft on takeoff; resulting in a return to land.

1669391

201907

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

Broken Clouds; 9

Daylight

10000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 15300; Flight Crew Type 65

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1669391

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Police / Security Involved

Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

Departed to ZZZ. Flight conditions were clear and calm. Upon arrival to into Class B airspace; Approach Control was very busy. We had multiple heading turns and a descent down to 1500 feet. We were unfamiliar with the airport ZZZ and ATC cancelled flight following. At this time we were over the airport and not aware of our position which was the wrong airport. My student pilot and I spotted the runway and continued to approach and land. The runway we landed on was 22 the runway we were supposed to land on was 23... which was ZZZ1 Air Force Base. I realized as soon as we landed that we were at the wrong airport. The Tower and the Base was closed on Sunday but we did have security meet us. We were detained and fined $250. We were assured this happens often but do not plan on it happening to us again.

PA32 Flight Instructor reported misidentifying landing runway resulting in unauthorized landing at military base.

1428351

201703

0601-1200

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

37000.0

Daylight

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID ORCKA 1

Class A ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1428351

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

On a new OAPM (Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex) route Aircraft X on the ORCKA 1 SID checked in climbing to 19000 feet instead of 23000 feet. Update the system to reflect proper altitudes.

ZLA Center Controller reported an aircraft using a new OAPM departure procedure checked on their frequency climbing to the wrong altitude.

1006454

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

36000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 450

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1006454

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1006457.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were asked if we could make 40;000 FT within 2 1/2 minutes (from 36;000 FT). We responded to the affirmative and were subsequently cleared to 40;000 FT with the restriction of 2 1/2 minutes. When it became apparent to the Controller that we could not meet the restriction he vectored us off course. The lesson here is simply this: If you cannot easily make the restriction do not accept it. It is too risky. I should not have accepted the clearance. The difference between 36;000 FT and 40;000 FT in terms of fuel use is insignificant and posed a risk that was too great for the benefit derived. In the future; I will decline clearance to a higher altitude from a high altitude unless it is painfully obvious that we can make it. I think the Company should give additional high altitude performance training to Crews and suggest that perhaps the risk is high compared to the reward when tasked with high altitude changes in altitude when there is a time limit involved that is close to performance limits as it was with our situation.

[Narrative 2 contained no new information]

A B737-700 Crew accepted a climb from FL360 to FL400 to be level in 2 1/2 minutes but when ATC discovered that restriction would not be met vectored the aircraft off route.

1305716

201510

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

9000.0

VMC

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID EMMYS5

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 259; Flight Crew Type 2316

Confusion; Other / Unknown

1305716

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Departed Runway 8 on EMMYS5 Departure. PDC clearance was climb via EXCEPT maintain 10;000 feet. Departure control contacted climbing out and clearance from departure control was 'climb via SID.' I asked for clarification and response was 'climb via EMMYS5; comply with altitude restrictions.' At this point I read back 'climb to FL230 and comply with the EMMYS 5 restrictions.' I asked the Controller to mark the tapes. Another carrier aircraft right behind us had the same confusion on climb instructions.The clearance limit we were given was to 10;000 feet. When the Controller stated 'comply with restrictions'; it confused us because our restriction was to 10;000 feet. We were not cleared to FL230. The verbiage that is being used may be in compliance with the 7110.65; but it is not what is used elsewhere. The Pilots are expecting to hear relief (climb to FL230) or a continue climb via the departure to FL230. I spoke with Denver TRACON in regards to this confusion. If a previous restriction is applied to an aircraft; the Aircrew is expecting to hear a relief from that altitude or comply with the climb instruction. Again; the terminology may be correct in accordance with a manual; but it is confusing in the dynamic environment of ATC and clear and concise wording is critical to safety.

B737 First Officer reported receiving a PDC clearance to climb via the SID EXCEPT maintain 10;000 feet. When Departure was contacted after takeoff the instructions were 'climb via SID.' The reporter asked for clarification as he was not sure if the climb limit was the 10000 feet in the PDC or the FL230 on the RNAV chart.

1862617

202112

0601-1200

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49.25; Flight Crew Total 29.88; Flight Crew Type 29.88

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1862617

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213.57; Flight Crew Total 560.90; Flight Crew Type 560.90

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1862596.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Procedure

I failed to account for a Final DG Summary before I taxied towards the runway. My FO made me aware of my mistake and we called requesting a final DG from Operations. We also discovered the ACARS prompt to request a final DG and we selected it. A Final DG printout was onboard prior to takeoff. We also discovered a printout we received at the gate that did not say final DG; but had the location of DG. This printout may have been the Final DG summary; but were not certain as I don't recall it having a handler's file number.

Push back and taxi without verification of Final DG [Summary]. Power failure at jet bridge prior to APU power caused backlog / jam of ACARS messages. Received planned DG Summary and a change to DG showing dry ice removed; but did not request Final DG Summary until on taxi. Received Final DG Summary and no further issues ensued.

Air Carrier flight crew reported pushback from the gate without the required Final DG Summary. Final DG Summary was requested and received shortly thereafter.

1162986

201404

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1162986

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

The inbound crew wrote up Brakes Sys 2 Fault ECAM. Contract Maintenance did not appear to make any effort to fix the problem; simply did a secondary check; then pulled and collared the circuit breakers. I was not comfortable with the status of the brakes and what backup systems I did and did not have; so I told the passenger agents that I needed to review the MEL and talk to Dispatch and Maintenance Control before deciding if we were going to operate this aircraft. I was concerned about our heavy takeoff weight and landing at EWR on the short Runway 29 in the rain). I recommended that they delay boarding as I was leaning toward NOT accepting this deferral.Once I got the Maintenance release I contacted our Dispatcher who was having problems with her headset. After 3-4 different calls I was able to get another Dispatcher to tie me through to Maintenance Control and we discussed the brakes and the MEL and a procedure we were going to have to complete to make sure the brakes worked on the accumulator; which was our only remaining backup brake system.In the middle of this process my First Officer and I were joined in the cockpit by a very animated passenger agent. He wanted to know 'What we thought we were doing' and that 'He had already released the airplane.' He said he had '160 people who are trying to get to Newark' (which is 40 over the capacity of our aircraft; by the way). I told him I was deciding whether or not I was going to accept the release as there were factors beyond a simple MEL deferral to be considered.He got very agitated and told us he was going to call System Operations and report this. I said that was fine with me and asked him his name. I had to ask him his name; and then his whole name; three times (he wore neither ID badge nor nametag) before he told me.I found the agent's behavior to be very unprofessional and I do not appreciate him pushing us to accept an aircraft simply on his say so. I have been given Captain's Authority for a reason and I intend to exercise it in the name of safety; in accordance with our Code of Ethics; and in compliance with SOPs. I will be very disappointed if I learn this agent is a supervisor; or perhaps even the station manager. His treatment of me and my First Officer was very unprofessional and; if he IS a supervisor; makes for a hostile work environment. I do not appreciate such histrionics and pilot pushing by Management.In the end; we flew the aircraft to EWR where it continued on without being fixed.

An A319 Captain--while determining the acceptability of an MEL brake system deferral for a flight to a short; wet runway--was confronted by a contentious passenger agent insisting they depart as scheduled. The flight ultimately departed when the Captain was satisfied with the maintenance status of the aircraft.

1056786

201212

0601-1200

VHHH.Airport

FO

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

TRACON VHHH

Air Taxi

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID BEKOL3A

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 450

1056786

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were given the BEKOl3A departure from Hong Kong airport and departed on Runway 7R. Shortly after takeoff we encountered what I thought was severe wind shear which I now believe was wake turbulence. The aircraft rolled sharply to the left into a 60 degree bank. I [tried] to the best of my ability to get the aircraft back to a straight and level flight but by that time we were off course well to the left of the departure. We had the terrain in sight at all times. I'm sorry for the deviation from the SID; but I did [try] to the best of my ability to correct an unfortunate situation and fly a safe aircraft.

G200 Captain reported a wake vortex encounter shortly after takeoff from VHHH that resulted in a roll and a track deviation from the assigned SID.

1859329

202111

0001-0600

ROA.Airport

VA

Night

TRACON ROA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E ROA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1859329

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Was cleared a visual approach via downwind for Runway 24 into ROA. On the downwind an aural EGPWS warning 'terrain terrain pull up' was received and corrected immediately. After correcting; the approach was completed and the aircraft landed safely.

Air carrier First Officer reported an EPGWS Terrain Alert on approach to ROA airport.

1287500

201508

1801-2400

SDF.Airport

KY

900.0

VMC

Night

CLR

TRACON SDF

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 35R

Final Approach

Vectors

Class C SDF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

1287500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

The only way to prevent this from happening in the future would be to not accept a tight base turn (with in 5 NM of the airport) the combination of the base turn and the shallow intercept vector how flexible I could be. If I had a steeper intercept I may have overshot the localizer course and caused a traffic conflict. Had I remained high to intercept the locilizer before descending I would not have in position to land (Landing would have required an excessive descent rate).The reality is this was a lose; lose; lose situation both the situations I described and the choice I made all should have resulted in a go around. The go around should have been instinctive with no hesitation but seeing the runway and being what I felt was well in position to land clouded my judgment.I was Flying to SDF at night time and we were vectored over the airport for 35R (there was inbound traffic on 35L). After we flew over the airport we were given a 160 heading for about 3 miles. Shortly there after ATC asked if we could accept a base turn in two miles for a Visual Approach. I accepted the base to visual clearance and continued the approach in accordance with the SOP procedure for a visual approach. we were issued a 270 heading then a 320 heading and cleared for the approach. I armed the approach and initiated the descent as we were already 1 1/2 dots high on the glideslope remaining on the 320 heading. Around 1;500 feet to 1;700 feet we received a low altitude alert from the tower. Still high on the glideslope by approximately 1 dot I arrested the descent asked my copilot to check the frequencies for the ILS and he also check the chart for obstacles. I had terrain up on my MFD. Seeing the airport outside and no Immediate risk from obstacles according to the approach chart; or visually by looking outside. I continued the visual approach to a landing with out incident on the 320 heading we did not intercept the Localizer until 900 feet AGL. A low altitude alert is a serious situation and should not be taken lightly. There is always a degree of disbelief but If you were aware for the danger the Tower would not need to tell you. Not accepting turns inside the the FAF and being established on Altitude and course prior to the FAF would prevent this situation.

A Pilot on a night visual to SDF was issued a low altitude alert by Tower after descending rapidly from a high turning; descending base but intercepted the final at 900 feet AGL.

1209067

201409

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22600; Flight Crew Type 6000

Time Pressure

1209067

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

Transportation service arrived 15 minutes late combining 4 crews; 8 crew members; from 2 van times. We arrived to the aircraft 25-29 minutes before departure. Aircraft was more than half boarded. The first thing flight attendant said as we stepped on the aircraft was could you turn the power on in the galley. The battery switch was off; emergency exit lights were not armed. They would not be able to make PAs with the power off and only the ground service being powered.

B737 Captain reports arriving at the aircraft 29 minutes prior to departure due to transportation issues to find the aircraft half boarded and the lead Flight Attendant requesting the power be turned on. The battery switch was off; emergency exit lights were not armed and they could not make PA's with the power off.

1780055

202012

Night

CLR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise; Parked

Class A ZZZ

Low

166.0

127.0

4.0

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 35; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 6; Flight Attendant Total 35; Flight Attendant Type 90

Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Service

1780055

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Passengers X and Y interfering with crew members duties FAR 121.580; refusing to wear a mask and consuming alcohol they brought with them on board the aircraft FAR 121.575.Causing disruption in the cabin.

Flight Attendant reported two passengers refused to wear masks; brought their own alcohol on board the flight and interfered with flight attendant duties.

1029629

201208

1801-2400

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

VMC

Night

Ramp ATL

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

1029629

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Procedure

As we cleared the runway; Ground cleared us across Runway 26L and into the Ramp via Taxiway E3. There was another carrier aircraft that was holding for us to enter the ramp. As we passed the other aircraft; the First Officer called Ramp twice before getting a response. At that time; we had entered the ramp as I believed that Ground had cleared us onto the ramp to get out of the way for the other carrier to continue taxiing. He told us we could not enter the ramp without talking to him and told us; 'Sorry would not cut it.' He then cleared us. Both the First Officer and I could not find any such names on the Commercial Chart pages. We saw vehicles crossing the ramp in front of us and stopped short of that roadway. He informed us that we had stopped at the half road; not the quarter road. We then asked for an explanation and he explained that the ramp was divided by three areas. We could not find any of that terminology on any of the ground charts. We then proceeded to the gate without further incident.

An ATL arrival was questioned by 'Ramp Control' regarding entry into the ramp area. The flight crew indicated that improvements in the charting depictions were needed reference 'ramp names/locations'.

1820481

202107

0001-0600

ZZZ.Tower

US

15000.0

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other

1820481

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Physiological - Other

1821611.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

Right after takeoff; Flight Attendant Name and myself smelled a strong odor. Smelled like chemical/acetone to me. I went out into cabin; the odor was strong for about 5 rows from back galley. I asked the passengers if they had used anything like nail polish; or anything with chemical base. Everyone said no. I asked if they smelled it; they said yes. I looked and felt in overhead bins found nothing. My eyes were burning. I went and told Name that I couldn't find the source of odor. She called Captain to report what was happening. The Captain said she'd get back to her. We then notified the number one flight attendant. Then the Captain made a PA announcement that we were returning to the airport. And that we'd be landing in about 15 minutes. I'm still out in cabin trying to find anything that was causing the smell. After Captain's announcement; passenger in 25F hands me a open wipe packet with the used wipe in it. She said she used it right after takeoff. It was the exact smell. It had a concentrated eucalyptus oil in it. I asked her why she didn't tell me this when I first came out into cabin. She said she didn't hear me. There is no way she didn't hear me. To prove my point; when the Captain said we were returning to airport; giving no reason why. This passenger then hands me this wipe packet. She did hear me but for whatever reason didn't admit she had used this product right after takeoff. Now that she realized the repercussions of the situation; she admits to using product. I took used packet to Name to let her smell it; we both agreed this was the odor; F/A called to tell Captain. But everything was already in motion to go back and land. The Captain makes an announcement to passengers that we are returning due to a odor in cabin. And that it needs to be accessed. At the gate firemen came on with meters to test the air. It was all good. Name showed them the eucalyptus packet. We followed procedures in every way.

Climbing out of ZZZ at approximately 12;000 MSL we got a call from the aft flight attendant. She reported a gaseous odor similar to kerosene; that was making her eyes water. The Captain and I elected to return to ZZZ. We [requested priority handling] and conducted and overweight landing without any further cause for concern. Upon arrival at the gate; the flight attendant determined that the cause of the odor was an 'herbal cleaning wipe' that a passenger had brought on the aircraft to clean their respective seat. The flight attendant's overreaction and hasty response to the cleaning wipe created an unnecessary divert.[Reporter suggested] Flight attendants should be vigilant but also patient and reasonable.

Flight Crew reported an air return due to fumes emanating from sanitary wipes.

1236435

201501

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Class G ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 200

Human-Machine Interface

1236435

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

After takeoff on runway 05 at approximately 100 ft at full power; I experienced a surge in engine power. The engine continued to surge from 900-1000 rpm to 2400 rpm (full power). The aircraft was in a climb attitude at approximately 1400 fpm climb. As the engine surged; the aircraft would continue to climb; then when the engine lost power; the aircraft would descend. I was able to turn to set up a landing on the closed runway used by the Radio controlled aircraft club; however I was too fast (110mph) and too close in to make that runway. I then continued on to land on the remaining portion of that runway however; just at touch down; the engine again surged to full power and the aircraft entered a steep climb. At this time I was over the [condominium hangars] area of the airport at approximately 100 ft. and 120 mph. The engine continued to run at climb power for several seconds before quitting again. While under power; I was able to turn for an intended landing on runway 05 however the engine lost power again at just short of alignment with the runway so I extended the speed brake and executed a normal landing on taxiway alpha. There were no other aircraft operating either in the air or on the ground at the airport at the time. Upon a normal taxi to the run up area at the east end of the airport; I stopped the aircraft to evaluate the situation and determine the cause of the engine surge. I discovered the fuel valve to be set on the main fuel tank (as is normal for takeoff) however it was out of the detent and partially closed; restricting full fuel flow to the engine. This condition caused the power surges as the carburetor bowl would fill (full power) then use the fuel and cut off as the bowl would refill for the next surge. The aircraft is equipped with a main (header) tank holding 22 gal with 21.5 gal useable and had 17.5 gal on board at the time. The fuel valve has been removed at this time and will be replaced with a fuel valve with a spring loaded position locking pin instead of a decent to prevent a partial on condition. As an experienced experimental aircraft builder and test pilot I have become familiar with this type of test flight and always conduct test flights at low activity times at the airport and announce over Unicom that I am conducting a test flight and may need to use an alternate runway to land. This test flight was conducted with full safety in mind with an on ground observer; fire extinguisher and following published test flight procedures.

When the power on the pilot's experimental aircraft started to surge dramatically between barely running and full power shortly after takeoff he maneuvered during powered surges to align with and land safely on a taxiway at the airport. Post flight examination determined the fuel tank selector valve was not in the detent thus restricting fuel flow to the engine.

1570079

201808

1201-1800

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

Marginal

Rain

Daylight

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-800 Advanced

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID ZZZZZ2

FMS/FMC

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1570079

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Workload

1570080.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Observer

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

Just after takeoff we had a dual FMC failure. Captain was pilot flying and took control of aircraft while both First Officers ran checklists and com. Captain asked NFP (non-flying pilot) to quickly tell ATC we have lost all navigation capability and get a vector. Busy frequency and when able to broadcast he was unable to transmit. Observer FO (First Officer) took communications and told ATC. By this time ATC could see we were off course and asked if we had terrain ahead in sight and we replied yes and could maintain clearance. CA (Captain) started a turn to [the] right. ATC had us turn back to heading 140 for a moment and then 090 climb to 9;000 feet. At this time we got basic Nav back per checklist and continued on course. Contacted Dispatch; [Maintenance]; [Chief Pilot] via SATCOM. Elected to continue at least to [an alternate airport] if not all the way to [our destination]; had lots of fuel to burn or dump regardless. We had concerns about class 2 Nav without FMC limitations in Vol 1. About 1hr into flight recovered L FMC only and continued to [our destination]. Heavy rain [at origin airport] and we suspect that water got into E/E [Electrical/Electronic] compartment?Be more proactive during heavy rain to ensure ground crews and flight crew keep L1 door shut. Now that myself and [the] crew have experienced a dual FMC failure at one of the worst times of a flight; I will certainly be better prepared in the future. Thankful for a good experienced crew and CRM. We talked it through once established on a safe heading and altitude and got the company personnel involved via SATCOM.

I was in the observer's seat. There had been moderate to heavy rain from the time we reached the aircraft until departure. On takeoff roll; I noticed the flaps indication on the upper EICAS [Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System] flash to the expanded view; momentarily; three times. I took note; and decided to wait until airborne to mention it. Shortly after takeoff; at about 1;000 feet; we got the EICAS message 'NO LAND 3.' Shortly thereafter; several more EICAS messages appeared; including AUTOTHROTTLE and AUTOPILOT. Captain manually disengaged the AP (autopilot); FO (First Officer) cycled the FDs (flight displays). Captain attempted to re-engage the AP; but by then the CDUs (control display panels) read 'TIMEOUT-RESELECT' and all of the Nav data had dropped from both NDs (navigation displays). Captain advised that his plan was to continue hand-flying; and asked the FO to advise ATC that we needed a vector. FO tried to; but found that he was unable to transmit. I was able to tell them that we needed a vector because of a navigation system failure; but there was some confusion. The controller didn't give us a vector right away; but advised that we were below the minimum altitude for that sector; and asked if we could see the terrain and maintain clearance. I advised that we could; and he gave us a heading of 140. After a few moments; he said that we were now above the minimum altitude and gave us a new heading of 090; and I believe an altitude of 7;000. By now the FO in the right seat had the use of the radio again; and we continued the climb. He also began running the ECL (Electronic Checklist); which regained us the use of the flight plan and the AP; but not the autothrottle. With a course visible on the ND; we elected to initially continue on course using HDG and FLCH. Once things had calmed down a bit; the FO took over flying and radio duties while the Captain made a SATCOM call to company. As we continued; we considered alternates and fuel dump requirements; but about an hour into the flight we regained use of the left FMC. At this point; we re-engaged LNAV; VNAV; and autothrottles; and decided to continue to [our destination].

B747 flight crew reported that during climb the aircraft lost all navigation systems and had a dual FMC failure.

1354752

201605

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1354752

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1354751.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals

Company Policy

Takeoff out of ZZZ was completed using the company provided ATOG for departure off runway 31 with tailwind calculations completed and at an approved weight. After departure I felt there may have been a compatibility issue and during cruise I looked in the AFM and discovered supplement 3 is not compatible with supplement 26. Which means operations in tailwinds between 10-20kts cannot be conducted on gravel runways. There is absolutely no reason there should be ATOGS provided to crewmembers for tailwind operations from a gravel runway when this is not valid. This is a trap the company has overlooked apparently and the tailwind notes for 10-20 should be removed from the ATOGS completely and immediately to prevent other crews from this circumstance.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

DHC-8-100 flight crew discovered incompatibility with ATOG procedures off gravel surfaced runways.

1352520

201605

1201-1800

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

27000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZOB

Corporate

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class A ZOB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2650; Flight Crew Type 1600

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1352520

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

On a flight we were level at 27;000 feet when we received the following transmission from Center. '(Aircraft X) climb and maintain flight level 290; Correction (Different Call Sign)descend and maintain Flight level 280.' Both of us in the cockpit hesitated to initiate the climb and concurred that his 'correction' may be wanting us to disregard his first instruction. There was then 10-15 seconds of radio chatter before we could confirm our climb to 29;000 feet. The Controller confirmed the climb; and we began climbing immediately. Another controller (Trainer/Supervisor?) came on to ask us if we were climbing. We confirmed that we were. The controller then stressed we needed to climb at best rate to 29;000 feet in a given amount of time. We were easily able to comply with that request. I believe the only way to resolve this problem was for the controller to use the term 'Break' in between his two separate commands to two separate aircraft. I believe we did the right thing in delaying our climb; as his phraseology made us believe there was a conflict with the climb. A quick scan of our TCAS showed that as a possibility. Instead; it sounds as though they needed us to climb ASAP. I do not believe any separation issues occurred. We were able to meet the controller's climb requirement well before the timed duration he gave us.

A pilot received confusing instructions from the Center controller. The pilots delayed complying with the instruction until they were able to verify the instruction with the Controller.

1100645

201307

0001-0600

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

Air Carrier

Q400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion

1100645

Other fatigue

Person Flight Crew

Other Incident dependent

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

First of all; I am filing this report via the safety reporting system rather than the fatigue reporting system because after my last fatigue call (Dec 2012); due to the irresponsible and reckless reporting by the company of my fatigue event; I have lost all confidence in that system of reporting. I am a reserve pilot. I bid AM reserve because I prefer a morning flying schedule. Due to what I can only speculate as a lack of proper pilot staffing; I am routinely swapped from AM to PM and vice versa. I am also frequently assigned to flying out of my base which creates the requirement to deadhead to and from duty assignments. My purpose is to call attention to the practice of swapping reserve pilots between AM and PM duty shifts; requiring a radical adjustment to sleep patterns and thus putting a pilot in a situation of significantly degraded ability and performance in the airplane due to fatigue. My bid this bid is AM reserve. Day 2 I am assigned a PM day trip with a scheduled completion time of 22:28. 7 hours block time. I woke up around 05:00 that day as I am accustomed to a morning circadian rhythm. This is not a pull the plug event as I know due to experience I can get through the day ok. It will take a toll; but I felt confident I could accomplish the mission for the day. One day in itself is not cause for calling off the trip fatigued. I can recover from that. The issue I want to draw attention to is my last leg; a 20:20 departure with a 2 hour flight time is that at that point in the day; my performance is degraded. Missed radio calls; missed calls from my First Officer lack of attention; difficulty focusing; and having to make an increased effort to focus and concentrate. I completed the days' assignment without any problems but feel I would be sharper if I would be assigned flying within my original AM duty period. There are a few significant factors that go into a fatigue call. It is not black and white but rather unique to the situation. For example; circadian swaps force a sleep deficit. The best strategy I've employed has been to let myself sleep later in the morning. This catches up my sleep deficit but adjusts me to a PM rhythm. With the small number of days off between duty weeks; this makes it extremely challenging to reset my sleep rhythm back to AM. Accepting a trip from a circadian swap depends on the days' duty assignment. How long of a day? How many legs? Is there weather to consider and increased workload to fly that weather? Does the aircraft have MELs that increase workload such as an inoperative autopilot? These are some of the factors I consider when deciding whether to call off a trip. How much can I fly today before I have to refuse an assignment due to fatigue? There are some slam dunk [events] such as busting an altitude or an unnoticed engine over torque or falling asleep in flight that make it easy to know I've crossed the line between tired and fatigued. During yesterdays trip I noticed my performance degrading on the last leg. Prior to departure; I noticed my temper flaring up and my patience wearing thin when the gate boarded our flight while we were on a crew break. At that time approximately 20:00 is my normal bedtime. Departure was 20:20. When I returned to my crash pad; I found it very difficult to focus and concentrate. My mood was bad; which from personal experience is one of the indicators for how I know I'm fatigued. The drive back to my crash pad is 10 minutes and it took more concentration than usual to operate my vehicle safely. The remainder of my reserve week is now shifted to PM flying. I am dragging and my performance is not at peak. I don't feel any safety issues for today's flight assignment; but with continued circadian swaps as I am required to be back on AM reserve 2 days after having flown a week of PM flying; the requirement to call off a trip due to fatigue is almost a certainty. AM to PM is more manageable that a shift from PM to AM. If mybody wants to sleep at midnight; there is nothing I can do to force myself to sleep earlier. If my first reserve day next week is a 04:00 report; there is no possible way I can be properly rested for that trip assignment. A couple of years ago this airline had a fatigue task force which identified circadian swaps as a primary cause of fatigue. For a reserve pilot it is the norm to be swapped multiple times during a 5 or 6 day reserve stretch. Fatigue is inevitable.

An air carrier Dash 8 Reserve First Officer provided this routine fatigue report with concrete examples of the causes and effects of circadian rythym disruptions from swaps between AM and PM flight assignments.

1423649

201702

1201-1800

MDST.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MDST

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 952

1423649

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was the flying pilot. During our takeoff roll; at high speed; but prior to V1; I heard the tower controller at MDST airport say our call sign but I did not understand what else they said; the captain responded 'unable' then shortly called V1 and for me to rotate. I performed a normal rotation and takeoff. After we had cleaned up and after completion of the after takeoff check; the captain asked me if I was ok with us having continued the takeoff. I wasn't quite sure what he meant until he explained that the tower controller had cancelled our takeoff clearance late during our departure roll. As we were performing a max thrust; bleeds off takeoff; at the maximum allowable gross weight for that runway; with passengers on board; the captain stated that in the interest of safety; he did not call for a rejected takeoff. As we continued the takeoff; we did not have to perform what would have been a high risk; high speed abort. I agree with his decision. It was the safest thing to do.

Air carrier First Officer reported MDST Tower canceled their takeoff clearance just prior to V1; but the Captain elected to continue the takeoff.

1761102

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Marginal

Air Carrier

Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

Part 121

Test Flight / Demonstration

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class C ZZZ

Flap/Slat Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1761102

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

The aircraft was due for an Operational Check Flight after a C check (heavy maintenance). Reaching acceleration altitude; I retracted the flaps from 15 degrees to up and received a Flap Disagreement annunciation. We continued the initial climb and ran the QRH procedure for a Flap Disagreement. The flaps would go back down to the previously selected position normally; but when attempting to again raise the flaps to UP the disagreement returned. Although the flaps were able to extend fully to the landing position (25 degrees) I elected to [request priority handling] and return to ZZZ. ATC was notified and the flight terminated with no further issue.Maintenance said that this issue has been present with this aircraft for many months and although additional trouble shooting and changing of parts the problem continues. Apparently this issue has been troubling Maintenance for some time. They have changed nearly everything in the system and the problem persists. Maintenance has not been able to duplicated the issue on the ground.

EMB-120 Captain reported a flap disagreement during a maintenance test flight.

1282376

201507

1801-2400

VGC.Airport

NY

0.0

VMC

10

Night

Corporate

Challenger CL600

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 300

1282376

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

During touchdown a deer ran across the runway and impacted the aircraft's right inboard flap. Landing and rollout were without incident. Taxied clear. Upon visual inspection observed damage to flap. Airport is completely fenced in; but wildlife is still abundant.

CL-600 Captain reported impact with a deer at VGC during landing roll.

1691748

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

1691748

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

This report is titled; 'Did you have any issues on the last flight?' In cruise flight at FL350 I noticed the number two engine was indicating an LP Vibration of 4.0. I handed control of the plane to my First Officer and gave him the radios; while I pulled out the QRH and ran the QRH procedure for 'Engine Abnormal Vibration.' Reducing the engine thrust by 2% N1 returned the vibration to within normal range. The vibration was not associated with any peak throttle changes and was not momentary in nature. We also did not notice any actual vibrations from the engine; it was only indicated. Upon completion of the QRH we contacted Dispatch via ACARS to notify them of the discrepancy and to coordinate a potential return to ZZZ for any needed Maintenance action. I asked this question as I knew the plane had previous issues with the number two engine and coordinating Maintenance action would likely be easier in a Maintenance base. Dispatch responded with; 'Did the message go away.' I replied that it did when I reduced thrust on the engine; and that I need to know immediately if Operations would like me to return to ZZZ for Maintenance or continue to our destination. This was due to our location in flight of nearly halfway between origin and destination. Dispatch responded with 'Follow the QRH.' There seemed to be a lack of understanding of the what I was specifically asking; as the QRH has no further guidance regarding a land as soon as practical vs possible; it simply states -END-. The MIAC directs you to notify dispatch regarding the discrepancy and coordinate with them. With the flight being near the halfway point; the engine stable; and top of descent approaching; and with no specific guidance from Operations; I elected to continue to our destination. Given the time constraints of the flight; I did not have an adequate amount of time (pull ATIS; load the approach; brief arrival; brief approach; find out gate; load landing numbers; etc.) to call dispatch and explain the intricacies of the QRH procedure and the potential need of Maintenance work upon landing correlating with my original question on what dispatch would like me to do. Overall there was very little support from Dispatch regarding this situation; and while I do not have a problem making a decision on whether to continue or return to ZZZ; it was very uncomfortable being told 'Run the QRH' when specifically asking what they wanted us to do. It felt very much as if the dispatcher was 'hands off' and uninterested in the outcome of the flight given the abnormal situation we were in.Upon Landing; I looked into the Maintenance logbook a little further and counted 10 previous write-ups for the same discrepancy in a roughly two-week period. Adding mine; 11. Additionally; the previous write-up for high engine vibration has a re-wiring of the harness and had an open discrepancy for high power engine runs needed. The follow logbook entry detailed the engine runs; which were done to 45%. That closed the discrepancy which was completed the day prior to this flight. This does not seem in line with what the previous entry called for; nor does it seem in line with my understanding of what the task card calls for (see attachments). I called up Dispatch and Maintenance Control and informed them of the discrepancy on our flight. When notifying Maintenance Control; the Controller stated; 'Let me read this to you and you tell me if you think we even need a write-up' He proceeded to read a excerpt from the GE MX manual regarding a transient abnormal vibration indication based off peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. I stated that while it sounds like the guidance from GE says it is normal; and I felt that an indication such as that in the cockpit is abnormal and that I would like to write it up.I felt there was a lot of pressure from the controller to not write it up given that guidance from GE; but with the repeat discrepancies; and without that languagein front of me to read; I felt it was best to writ e the discrepancy in the logbook and have Maintenance come out to look at the issue. He replied that if I did write it up; it would likely take contract Maintenance a while to come out and we would likely have to do engine runs and that would take a long time. While these are all facts; I couldn't help but feel the intent of him telling me this information was to discourage me from writing it up due to the personal inconvenience it would cause myself and the crew. I had to interrupt him and start telling him what I was writing over the phone to finally get the discrepancy written up. About a half hour later; contract Maintenance appeared at the aircraft with guidance from Maintenance Control on a corrective action. It consisted of an inspection of the wiring harness on the engine along with several other items. Additionally; it had guidance that directed us to do a high-power engine run. When reading over the guidance provided by Maintenance Control via Maintenance task card; there were several conditions that needed to be true for the corrective action to take place. According to the Maintenance task; the vibration needed to be transitory in nature. Below that was a definition of transitory. The definition was a condition that resulted in a high vibration indication as a result of peak throttle movement that goes away after engine stabilization. This condition did not match what was written up in the logbook for this discrepancy as the throttle was not moving and engine parameters were steady in cruise flight. Engine vibration indications did not reduce until the throttle was reduced per the QRH procedure. I informed the contract Maintenance that I felt this task was the inappropriate one for the write up; and that I was going to call Maintenance Control and seek a remedy for that. The contract Maintenance Technician was very understanding and stated numerous times he felt 11 repeat discrepancies for the same issue were 'odd' and that he felt 'when something like that keeps happening you have to take corrective action with regards to replacing parts; you cannot keep writing it up' and that; 'Them replacing the wiring harness was a good start; but clearly that did not resolve the issue.' I told him I appreciated the support and understood he was only acting on behalf of Maintenance Control in this situation. Upon calling Maintenance Control; I discussed my feelings regarding the Maintenance task being inappropriate; and the Maintenance Control felt that while he agreed with what I was saying on principle; he was only going off the guidance that GE provided and that it was indicating a normal situation. I told him that I did not feel an amber indication on the EICAS to be a normal situation; to which he replied that is was 'right on the line.' I ask him if he felt it was truly appropriate to continue to sign the aircraft off and continue to have repeated write ups; to which he replied; that a situation such as that is less than ideal. I asked him what he would do to resolve it and he stated that he felt that was above his pay grade. At this point I asked to speak to the on duty Chief Pilot regarding this issue; as I felt there was a significant lack of accountability and responsibility on the company's part regarding this issue as no one wanted to stop the operation and ensure everything is truly being done safely and that an aircraft at Company X was operating in a fully airworthy condition. Speaking with Chief Pilot on the phone; he sated he understood what I was saying and that I as PIC has full authority to stop the operation if I did not feel comfortable. This is the first time anyone empowered me to make a tough call and I appreciated Chris' support over the issue. I informed him that I would be unwilling to accept the aircraft unless some Maintenance action was taken to troubleshoot the issue; and that I would assist in this endeavor by doing engine runs so Maintenance could troubleshoot the root cause of the high vibration.Completing the engine runs; the vibration on the right engine appeared within normal range. We returned to the gate and the contract Maintenance Technician signed the aircraft off as airworthy. I called dispatch to notify them that I was not going to be accepting the plane. The dispatcher stated; 'So you are refusing an airworthy aircraft?' to which I replied; 'Yes.' I see no reason to ask the pointed question other than to attempt to intimidate me into second guessing myself and taking the aircraft. I felt it was self-evident the circumstances of my unwillingness to accept the aircraft and that asking that question served no other purpose other than to intimidate me; which I feel is inappropriate. I titled this report; 'Did you have any issues on the last flight?' because when reporting for duty before this flight; a Company X Maintenance Technician in ZZZ made a special trip to the aircraft to ask me if it had any issues flying as it had; 'Been written up a bunch for a high vibe' and that he; 'wanted to see if it was actually fixed' I informed him that I had just reported and didn't know if there any issues. I wish this had peaked my attention sooner than it did; as I think it summarizes the systematic issues I experienced on this flight. To the best of my knowledge this plane was operated the next day and I do not know if it has had any future issues with the right engine; but I cannot imagine the issue was resolved as no corrective action was taken by Maintenance.I have read many accident reports in my time as a pilot and the one theme between them all is a culmination of small factors that usually add up to a toxic set of circumstances that lead to the eventual accident or incident. Having a high engine vibration indication; while not an emergency; may lead to an accident or incident if given enough time and opportunities for a crew to react poorly to that circumstance. I feel the company's unwillingness to resolve the repeat discrepancy is unacceptable and unsafe. Despite operational pressures; the airline should take a plane out of service for items that are clearly not resolved.

Aircraft was written up a total of 11 times including four days in a row.

Captain reported refusing to fly an EMB-175 aircraft that had been written up 11 times for excessive engine vibration.

1244513

201503

1201-1800

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

15000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZMA

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E ZMA

Center ZMA

Military

Fighter

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Tactical

Climb; Descent

None

Class E ZMA; Special Use LAKE PLACID MOA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1244513

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Military

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 80

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1243907.0

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working the radar side and d side of sector 66/67. I observed two sets of MODE C intruders departing the Tampa terminal area. Both aircraft were rapidly maneuvering and changing altitude between 8;000 and 10;000 feet. I issued traffic to several aircraft and amended several aircraft altitude clearances to keep aircraft separated from the MODE C intruders. After issuing numerous traffic advisories on the MODE C intruder and asking for visual identification of the traffic; one aircraft stated that the MODE C intruder in question was a flight of two aircraft with one aircraft squawking off/standby. I watched the MODE C intruder complete numerous hard turns in every direction and change altitude rapidly. Due to this I opted to keep any aircraft in conflict with the MODE C intruder at a safe altitude above the intruder. After finding out that the intruder was a flight of two; I amended Aircraft X's altitude clearance to 12;000 and told him to expect MOEMO at 10;000. At the this point the MODE C intruder had showed a history of rapid climbs and descents between 8;000 and 10;000. I then started a position relief briefing. Shortly into the briefing I issued traffic to Aircraft X who was passing through 15;800 with the mode intruder at '1;100 rapidly maneuvering and reported as a flight of two'. I then corrected the traffic's altitude to Aircraft X to 11;100 which the pilot responded 'roger'. At this time there was almost 5000 feet of separation between the two aircraft with an altitude clearance that would have stopped the only aircraft I was talking to (Aircraft X) approximately 1000 feet above the MODE C intruder's current altitude. I continued with the relief briefing and shortly after we heard a pilot report something about 'seeing an aircraft pass by'. I stopped the briefing and observed Aircraft X passing through 15;100 feet and the MODE C intruder was at 11;100 still. However the next update occurred almost simultaneously and the MODE C intruder's changed from 11;100 to 15;200 within close proximity of Aircraft X descending through 15;000. I asked Aircraft X if he had the traffic in sight and received an explicit response with no traffic information. Shortly afterwards the pilot reported that the two aircraft had passed above and behind him and stated that they were jets. The pilot did not state whether he responded to an RA (resolution advisory) but did veer west of course. When the traffic was clear I reissued the route clearance and crossing restriction. Throughout this entire session with the MODE C intruder I was unaware of the type aircraft. I suspected that it was a P-51 Mustang that we regularly observe as a MODE C intruder. I knew that the aircraft were relatively quick; they rapidly change direction and stayed more or less within a block altitude of 8;000-10;000 feet. On two occasions I observed the aircraft seemingly change its direction rapidly to 'intercept' the aircraft that I was issuing traffic calls to. Upon being relieved from the sector the relieving controller elected to vector another aircraft in conflict with MODE C intruder. Shortly after issuing the vector we observed the MODE C intruder turn in the same direction. The relieving controller then put the aircraft back on course and issued traffic while maintain altitude clearance from the MODE C intruder. We then observed the MODE C intruder return to the Tampa terminal area where our management identified the aircraft as Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z. High performing jet aircraft; especially military in formation operating in a high volume area should be in direct contact with air traffic control. I am confident that I had been in communication with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z this whole situation could have been avoided.

While in non-maneuvering level flight with a 2 ship of Aircraft Y and Z type at an altitude of 11;500 at 200 knots; I witnessed an Aircraft X pass off my right side about 3000 feet laterally in a 10 degree right bank. I was in Class G airspace within the confines of the Lake Placid West MOA. I was not in contact with Miami Center at the time.

ZMA Controller reports of airborne conflict between commercial traffic and unknown traffic at the time. Pilot of unknown aircraft reports that he was in the confines of a MOA when he saw a commercial aircraft off his right side in a 10 degree bank.

1757757

202008

0001-0600

AUS.Airport

TX

0.0

Dawn

Ground AUS

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1757757

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

Our taxi clearance to Runway 17R was C1 to C to 17R. We didn't see C1 on the airport diagram and had to request progressive taxi. Approaching the taxiway we finally saw it painted on the pavement; but no taxi signs.

Air carrier First Officer reported AUS taxiway C1 is marked with paint on the pavement; but does not have a sign.

1339724

201603

1201-1800

EWR.Airport

NJ

IMC

Rain

Daylight

TRACON N90; Tower EWR

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 04R

Initial Approach

Class B NYC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1339724

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I am writing not only in reference to the incident which occurred today; but also to call attention to what I have observed to be a consistent and recurring problem which I feel is a considerable safety threat. I feel very strongly that further investigation is warranted. The matter at hand is that there seems to be ongoing issues with localizer reception especially during IMC and rain. Today we came very close to executing a go around/missed approach on account of this issue; as has happened on multiple occasions. We received vectors to the final approach course; however we were completely unable to receive the localizer signal whatsoever until we were within about 3 miles of the FAF. We used RNAV guidance on the monitoring pilot's side and followed the vectors as long as we could. However; as we are unable to use RNAV beyond the FAF; we discussed and both agreed that if the signal hadn't been received and identified by 1NM to the FAF; that we would execute a go around. Fortunately the signal came in just in time; and we were able to continue. I have noticed that this a consistent issue which if anything is getting worse. I'm not sure whether the issue lies with the airplane itself or with the ground equipment; but I can say that other airplane types typical don't seem to report similar issues. I know that the aircraft tends to experience large amounts of radio/com static during precipitation; so perhaps this is a related problem. However I really only see it in this airport. Just to make sure; I wrote up the airplane in question; but as I've said this happens all the time. Although nothing bad happened; this is an ongoing issue. To me; the big threat here is that crews have come to accept this condition and 'push' approaches farther than they should. We're all guilty of it. This is one of my main motivations for writing this report to call attention to this matter.

EMB-145 Captain reported they did not receive localizer signal until 3 miles from the FAF. Reporter stated this was a common occurrence on this approach at EWR.

1877537

202202

0601-1200

CZUL.ARTCC

PQ

3000.0

IMC

Snow; Icing

Daylight

Tower CYUL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1877537

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

1877540.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Software and Automation; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Chart Or Publication

3;000 feet cleared approach ILS 24R. Set FAF/GS (glideslope) altitude and initiated descent. Approaching level and prior to GS capture; ATC called and asked us to confirm altitude and altimeter and on GS. Responded with information and leveling at GS intercept altitude; below GS. Rest of approach landing uneventful. Spoke to Approach Control Supervisor following event. He wanted to explain that specifically for that approach in VMC there is a VFR corridor below the approach course; and that while today wasn't a big deal due to IMC conditions; it could create a safety conflict. The OMEKI approach fix does not appear in the MCDU (Multi Function Control Display Unit) with ILS 24R selected. Consider including OMEKI as part of database for ILS24R.

We're given 3;000 feet until established; then descended to platform altitude to intercept glideslope. Missed an altitude between FAF and IAF of 2;500 ft. but the FMS doesn't have the fix in between in data base. ATC then called to verify our altitude thinking we're descending on the glideslope For Runway 24R in CYUL when we were just descending to platform altitude. If the database had the altitude restrictions for OMEKI like it does on the approach plate then issue maybe have been resolved. Everything else outside the approach was uneventful. But I believe it's something that should be brought up for safety Concerns. The OMEKI is used for VFR corridor; but it was IFR day. Consider putting OMEKI for data base in for ILS 24R.

An Air Carrier flight crew conducting a Visual Approach into Montreal (YUL) reported they descended below flight path and received a low altitude alert from ATC. The fix OMEKI which has an appropriate crossing altitude is not displayed from the database on their FMC.

1291474

201508

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Installation; Testing; Work Cards

Engine Oil Seals

General Electric GE CF34-8

X

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

1291474

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1291475.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Human Factors

August 2015. In ZZZ; myself Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT X) and AMT Y; during a Service Check found a leak from the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) on the Left-hand Engine. While changing the IDG carbon seal; documents and references were misunderstood. The distractions inside the Hangar aided in misplacement of the O-Ring. The work interruptions from Management distracted us from the task at hand. We preformed the Leak Check and Operational Check and found everything to be within limits. Nothing seemed unusual and we signed off the aircraft. The following day; it was brought to our attention we had placed the O-Ring in the wrong place. While we were discussing this; the aircraft lost oil from the Left Engine and made an emergency landing.I would suggest more descriptive [maintenance] illustrations. A new Warning added to the Maintenance Manual; or internal document added. Availability to faster; more reliable access to manuals. Better training on (IDG) carbon seal replacement.

Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT X) and I (AMT Y); were installing a new carbon seal on the IDG on Engine One. During that process; we put a seal in the wrong location. We misinterpreted the diagram depicting where the seal went. Throughout this process we had to keep going back to the [Maintenance] Manual to print out sub-tasks using computers that are exceptionally slow; as well as endure many interruptions/inquiries at the hands of Management which added to our distraction. After installation; we performed the Leak Check in accordance with the Maintenance Manual and there were no leaks so we did not realize our error at the time. During discussion about the project; Supervision found that we had incorrectly installed the O-Ring. By the time we discovered this fact it was the following day; (the mistake happened the day before). As the lines of communication to right this wrong had been opened; the aircraft lost the oil on the Left Engine most likely due to our mistake. The aircraft subsequently performed an emergency landing. It was easy to misinterpret the diagram in the Maintenance Manual. The interruptions due to slow network access to the online Maintenance Manual and repeated Management interruptions added to the situation.

After their CRJ-200 aircraft had departed; two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians realized they had installed a new carbon seal O-Ring at the wrong location on # 1 Engine Integrated Drive Generator. # 1 Engine lost all oil in flight. Distraction; inadequate and easy to misinterpret maintenance diagrams; work interruptions from Management; lack of training and experience and a slow on-line Maintenance Manual program were noted as contributors.

1344468

201603

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A300

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Repair

Fan Reverser

X

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1344468

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1344469.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Human Factors

My partner and I were assigned to install the left thrust reverser (TR) Control Display Unit (CDU) on an Airbus A300; number 1 engine. The previous shift had removed the old one. This aircraft (AC) had been on the ground for days but there was no available staffing to complete this task. The AC was now on the schedule for a flight so we were in a stressful situation. Neither one of us had performed this task before. We installed the CDU referencing [the] Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) using [a tablet]. We measured the appropriate gaps after my partner ran the TR opened and closed by hand twice to check for binding etc. At this point we were approached by the lead around 2 am to stop work and go see the manager because we were going to be held over for mandatory OT. (By this time; the outbound flight had been swapped.) My partner was pretty upset because he is a single parent and has nannies watching his two girls and he really needed to get home. We used the MEL to ensure the AC was in proper configuration. We both inspected the motor for proper installation; FOD; and tooling. I performed the ops check with APU air because my partner wasn't engine run qualified. Afterward; we rechecked the gap measurements once again. When I reviewed the [manual] references for compliance; I breezed right over the Full Authority Engine Control (FADEC) rig. The AC was put on the schedule for the next night. At departure; the number 1 engine would throttle would not advance beyond idle because I missed the FADEC rig. It returned to the gate for repair. I can only say that the responsibility was mine. I've been working in the industry too long to make any excuses.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

The Number 1 Engine Throttle on an A300 was unable to advance beyond idle because Maintenance neglected to accomplish the FADEC rig after installing the CDU for Number 1 Engine Reverser.

1425240

201702

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Powerplant Fire Extinguishing

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Time Pressure

1425240

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1424659.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Flight was running approximately 30 minutes late. I was proceeding through my first flight flow for the aircraft. I was at the stall protection test and just reaching for the guarded switch light when the number 2 Flight Attendant entered the cockpit and requested conditioned air for the cabin.I was looking over my shoulder at her as I pressed what I thought was the stall test switch light. Then I immediately went to the overhead panel and started the APU. As my hand was dropping from the overhead panel a 'green' switch light illuminated on the glare shield. Instinctively; I reached toward it to press and extinguish said light. Having never seeing the Bottle Armed/Press to discharge light 'on' during line operations; I reacted as if the 'green' roll switch light was illuminated. I realized as I was pressing the switch light; just what was happening. I inadvertently discharged the left (#1) engine fire bottle.Rushing to complete my First Flight flow I allowed myself to get distracted. I got out of my expected flow movement. Didn't realize I 'missed' my intended switch and reacted out of instinct.

Captain inadvertently discharged engine number 1 fire bottle during his first flight of the day checks.I was in the process of doing my preflight items and loading of the FMS while the Captain was doing his first flight of the day checks. While loading the FMS I heard the caution chime and the captain say that he had just inadvertently discharged the engine number 1 fire bottle. We then notified maintenance; the rest of the crew and operations of what happened. I then made an announcement that the aircraft had a maintenance issue and that we would have to deplane. We then deplaned the passengers and maintenance took the aircraft.Possibilities of what may have caused the event are:-Rushing to get the flight out on time because it was late to the gate.-Interruption from the flight attendant during first flight of the day checks.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported the Captain inadvertently discharged the #1 engine fire bottle during preflight.

1571608

201807

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Mixed

Cloudy; 10

Daylight

600

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Learjet 45

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 6044; Flight Crew Type 70

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1571608

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Vertical 500

Automation Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Weather; MEL; Human Factors

Human Factors

This specific aircraft had a database problem with both UNS-1 FMS (Flight Management System) units. After a previous software update; it reset the date to a future date; and as a result; the FMS was unusable for RNAV/GPS approaches. A GPS approach could be loaded in the FMS; but the message 'No RAIM at FAF (Final Approach Fix)' would display; and all guidance would be lost after crossing the FAF on an IAP (Instrument Approach Procedures).As a result; the company issued an email explaining the problem; and stating that GPS approaches could not be flown; as there would be no guidance after the FAF; and that ground-based approaches were to be used until the problem could be solved; as per manufacturer's instructions on the original squawk.The gist of it was this: The FMS could guide you on a RNAV/GPS approach up to the FAF; but after that point; all lateral and vertical guidance would be lost.We flew the arrival into ZZZ and were handed off from Center to Approach Control. I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and was responsible for the radio communication. The PIC was the PF (Pilot Flying) on this leg. We had discussed the problem with the FMS en route; and had agreed on the fact that there would be no guidance on an RNAV/GPS approach after the FAF; and that we would plan on the ILS approach.ATIS reported the winds as calm; overcast at around 6;000/6;500 feet; and FEW clouds at 600 feet. It also reported that the Runway 9 was in use; and to expect the RNAV/GPS or visual approach to Runway 9.Upon handoff to Approach Control; I informed them that we were unable any RNAV approaches; and he responded that he assumed that meant that we were looking for the ILS; which I confirmed. He came back at some point saying that the ILS was out of order and asked what we wanted to do. I had already given the PIC the ATIS report; and he instructed me to tell them that we could accept the RNAV/GPS to Runway 9. The controller asked us to confirm that we were indeed able to accept the RNAV approach; and the PIC nodded his head and said yes; so I replied with an affirmative. We were cleared direct to IAF (Initial Approach Fix). I had loaded a different waypoint in the FMS as an IAF; so had to reload the approach into the FMS. The PIC requested a vector to fly towards [IAF] while we were getting the approach loaded into the FMS; and ATC gave us a heading to fly; and when able- direct to [IAF]. Once loaded; we navigated to [IAF]; and turned inbound onto the final approach course at [waypoint]; towards the FAF. I was busy with the before landing configuration of the plane; and the checklist- with my head down; and glanced momentarily outside and saw that the reported FEW 600 feet was a fairly solid layer underneath with patches of ground contact; closer to BKN in my opinion.Approach handed us off to the Tower; but the PIC asked for confirmation that we had indeed been cleared for the approach. The Tower Controller asked us to standby for a second while he confirmed- he confirmed that we were. I was busy completing the BEFORE LANDING checklist; and when I looked up- saw that we had flown past the FAF and were descending in IMC conditions into the layer of cloud. I looked over at the PIC to ask him what his intentions were; and to see if he had some form of guidance on his PFD (Primary Flight Display) when the Tower Controller called on the radio saying : 'Stop your descent immediately!' as we had triggered a ground proximity warning for him. I looked up; and saw that we had just broken out below the cloud layer; and that there was a ridge line between us and the runway.We continued visually; and landed on Runway 9.In hindsight; there should not have been any assumptions made on my part that the PIC and I were on the same page regarding the functionality of the FMS. I should have clarified with the approach controller that we would only be able to accept the approach up until the FAF; and if we were not in VMC at that point; that we would be diverting to [an alternate airport]; or another alternate- if they were not willing to allow us to fly the ILS approach into ZZZ. I should have been more assertive towards the PIC; insisting on a missed approach when we reached the FAF without the airport in sight.

Learjet 45 pilot reported flying a RNAV/GPS approach when it was not authorized.

1031414

201208

1201-1800

N07.Airport

NJ

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3500

TRACON N90

Personal

Cessna 340/340A

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Vectors

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2670; Flight Crew Type 2000

Human-Machine Interface

1031414

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

IFR flight plan with amended clearance. Take off from Lincoln Park Airport; which is close to Newark; was uneventful and initial climb was normal. At about 1;000 FT autopilot began to malfunction; made a number of abrupt uncommanded turns which caused a course deviation. [I] had some directional control issues as a result of autopilot problems. This continued for a short period of time; between 1;000 FT and 2;500 FT during climb. Shut down autopilot; still malfunctioned; and then pulled circuit breaker which resulted in complete deactivation of autopilot. By this point aircraft was off course and; as a result of autopilot problems; badly out of trim. [I] had to throw myself on the mercy of ATC and advise concerning problems. Was given a series of vectors to re-establish aircraft on proper course and [had] to adjust for proper altitude. After re-establishing control of the aircraft; resumed course set forth in flight plan and completed rest of trip without incident.

A Cessna 340 pilot suffered abrupt and uncommanded turns shortly after takeoff due to a malfunctioning autopilot on an IFR flight. A complete electrical shutdown of the autopilot allowed control to be regained manually and the flight was completed as planned.

1763803

202009

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

1200.0

IMC

Turbulence; Rain; Windshear; 10

Daylight

1200

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 35

Workload

1763803

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

Weather

Went out for practice approaches. Wind was calm on departure and enroute; cold front came in on the way back and encountered severe turbulence; severe downdrafts and heavy precipitation in IMC after I was cleared for the GPS RNAV 1L approach. Lost about 2300 ft. causing me to go below IFR minimum altitude in the approach. Could not control the aircraft because of downdrafts and turbulence. Ended up breaking the clouds at about 1200 ft.; no downdrafts at this point but still encountered severe turbulence because of the gusty winds at low level. I was cleared for the visual. Landed safely and no injuries for both pilots on board. Aircraft got inspected by maintenance and there is no damage.

PA28 Instructor reported loss of control in IMC in approach due to downdrafts and turbulence.

1122489

201310

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Dawn

9900

Ramp ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Parked

None

Switch

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1012; Flight Crew Type 450

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

1122489

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Trying to turn panel lighting off when smoke erupted from knob that was being turned. Light smoke with electrical smell was visible about 1 minute after occurrence and elected to proceed back to the ramp. No other smoke was indicated on the 3 minute taxi back to the ramp. Aircraft engine was shut down and aircraft parked with no fire or burnt wire being noted. Fire trucks were standing by. What caused the problem I believe was the knob not being used in years and the switch being overworked. To prevent a recurrence would be to not move the knob as well as having the knob and electrical wiring repaired and to working order. Also; to use the checklist and to evacuate if the need arises.

A C150 panel light knob emitted smoke as it was turned so an emergency was declared; the pilot returned to parking and secured the aircraft.

1211876

201410

1201-1800

LGB.Airport

CA

800.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower LGB

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D LGB

Tower LGB

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 91

VFR

Landing

Class D LGB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 360; Flight Crew Type 182

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1211876

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 200

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Was on the VOR 30 practice approach (still under IFR clearance) with student; tower issued missed instructions to go missed at the approach end. They then issued more to stay below 1000 feet to avoid traffic in the pattern. 3/4 mile out; tower issued traffic alerts for two separate aircraft to call in sight; I had already had one in sight in a downwind leg and the other came out from under the glare we had with the sun hitting us. At which point I took controls from the student and proceeded with a sharp turn away from the airport and southeast bound (almost a full 180). As I started that turn; tower told us to go missed immediately and asked what our altitude was. I responded with '800 and flying below the traffic.' Tower then said; 'If you turned when I had told you wouldn't of had a traffic alert. Contact SoCal approach.' 'Heading out; over to approach.'At the time I took control we were opposite direction; 200 feet below in the middle of cleaning our aircraft up from the approach. We had only been given up to the approach end to complete our missed; and once we got there we had on coming traffic. I had to take control from the student; still operating under IFR my student did not know what was going on and had she continued with normal missed procedures would have turned us into the oncoming and may have caused a collision. Tower none the less acted as if it was our fault when they had not routed all traffic under their airspace correctly.

A flight instructor and student flying a practice VOR RWY 30 approach at LGB suffered an NMAC with pattern traffic when the transmission and receipt/execution of a go-around clearance from ATC was not accomplished in a timely fashion.

1788532

202102

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

800.0

VMC

Wind

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach; Landing

Class B ZZZ

Aileron

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1788532

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

At 800 feet AGL; clicked autopilot off for a visual landing. At 500 ft.; FO called 'Stable; cleared to land Runway XX Center.' I replied 'Landing.' Between 500 and 400 feet AGL tried to make small lateral correction with aileron but aileron movement was limited. Used a touch of rudder for correction. Clicked autopilot button again and crossed checked then confirmed that 'Flight Director' was displayed in PFD. Landed uneventfully but elevator movement was very heavy in flare. After landing at taxi speed; I tried to move the yoke left and right and there was very limited movement. The First Officer tried as well with the same result. We checked the Flight Control and Hydraulic Displays and both were normal.I considered a go-around but quickly [determined] a go around would be extremely difficult with big power changes and limited flight control capability. The flight path was set up to touch down in the landing zone on speed so I elected to land.Unsure what caused the flight controls to be limited. After landing; I debriefed Maintenance in the cockpit and put a detailed write up in the logbook.

B777-200 Captain reported aileron flight control stiff during landing and limited movement after landing.

1870369

202201

1801-2400

SNA.Tower

CA

600.0

VMC

Tower SNA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B SNA

Radio Altimeter

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 231; Flight Crew Total 344; Flight Crew Type 344

1870369

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were on final GNAV RNP Z 02L approach into SNA; about 2 miles south of the field. Captain was flying and I was Monitoring. We were in VMC and the Captain was hand flying the aircraft. At about 600 ft.; AGL I received an amber RA flag in my RadAlt indicating my RadAlt had failed. I immediately crosschecked with the Captain and his was still indicating correctly. Just above 500 ft. I started receiving my RadAlt indications again. I had no other indication issues until touchdown. Touchdown was uneventful with all systems working correctly.

Air carrier First Officer reported radio altimeter anomalies on final approach to SNA.

1591960

201811

1801-2400

HYI.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Night

CTAF HYI

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 970; Flight Crew Type 900

Situational Awareness

1591960

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

Prop strike. [I was] taxiing aircraft at HYI airport from ramp to taxiway at night. No markings or lighting indicated direction to taxiway. With airport diagram open as a reference; [I] cut a corner of the pathway short; putting the nose of the aircraft in the ditch. I immediately secured the aircraft and evacuated. Prop and engine were damaged and also the corner of the pathway where the prop struck. No evidence of any other damage. No injuries. Taxi speed was a brisk walk and aircraft lights were on. Contributing factors were night operations; unfamiliar airport; and lack of illumination/markings. To prevent recurrence; avoid going to unfamiliar airports at night and have improved lighting and markings at airport with hazards close to pathways and taxiways.

Small aircraft pilot reported taxiing into a ditch at HYI airport. Reporter cited poor lighting and signage as contributing factors.

1653457

201906

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap/Slat Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Type 44

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

1653457

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 2334; Flight Crew Type 823

1653480.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft

Crew was on downwind for visual approach XXR at ZZZ. First Officer was high minimums with approximately 45 hours in the 737. Due to this; CA (Captain) was required to conduct the landing. A thorough brief and discussion took place at cruise and it was decided FO (First Officer) would fly the approach and when Before Landing Checklist was complete and aircraft was stable aircraft control would be exchanged for CA to complete the landing. ATC gave a base vector and traffic call for aircraft going to XXL. Crew visually acquired traffic and was told to maintain visual separation and were subsequently cleared for the visual approach. FO disengaged the autopilot and began calling for configuration changes. At approximately 2000 ft AGL the aircraft was configured with gear down and flaps 15 at 180 KIAS. Around this time TCAS produced a TRAFFIC TRAFFIC call based on the previously acquired traffic going to XXL. The alert momentarily caused a distraction to both pilots. The FO continued slowing the aircraft and at around 170 KIAS called for flaps 30 and the landing checklist. Aircraft speed continued to slow and approach target speed of approximately 154 KIAS. At no time after flaps were moved to 30 was aircraft speed increased above 170 KIAS and definitely did not approach flaps 30 over speed of 175 KIAS. The landing checklist was accomplished and the FO observed the CA moving the flap handle to the 30 position. However; due to flying the visual approach and being distracted by parallel traffic the FO did not crosscheck and verify the flap gauge was reading 30. The CA called 'flaps 30 green light' and visually saw flap gauge indicating 30. Shortly after this the 1000 ft call was made by the CA and controls were exchanged as previously briefed during the arrival briefing. The FO made a 500 foot call and CA replied with stable. At approximately 150 AGL the GPWS began issuing a TOO LOW FLAPS aural warning. Both FO and CA confirmed the flap handle was in the 30 position and that LE EXT green light was illuminated. The aircraft was stable on glide slope; lateral course; and airspeed. Around 100 to 50 AGL it was finally discovered that the flap gauge was reading 25 and not 30. By the time this configuration was verified by both pilots the CA had already begun the landing flare and aircraft was about to touchdown. Due to confusion; workload management and the extremely low altitude of the aircraft the crew determined the best course of action was to continue the landing. Upon touchdown the speed brakes auto deployed; auto brakes engaged and the aural warning silenced. After clearing the runway the flap handle was moved out of the 30 detent to up and the flaps properly tracked. The flap handle was then moved to the 30 detent and flaps properly tracked. Flap handle was finally moved up again and after landing low was completed. Crew taxied to gate and shutdown aircraft normally.

We were flying second leg of four day trip. Visual approach at ZZZ for runway XXR. My flying partner is under [minimum] hours so I needed to make the landing at ZZZ. On account of the excellent weather conditions I felt it safe and appropriate to let the First Officer fly the approach until we completed the landing checklist. We were executing a flaps 30 landing. Approximately 1600 ft the first officer called 'flaps 30; landing checklist'. I selected flaps 30; and completed the landing checklist noting the flap indicator at 30 and green light. At that point we transferred control of the aircraft and I completed the visual approach to XXR. The 1000 ft and 500 ft calls were all normal. After passing approach lights; and approximately 100 ft AGL we received a too low flaps GPWS warning. My thought was this must be a false warning. If the flaps weren't at the 30 position we would have received this warning at a much higher altitude (~500 ft RA) and of course executed a missed approach. This GPWS warning occurred so late; and the approach speed; pitch attitude; and aircraft feel were all normal I decided it was safer to continue the landing. The touchdown was normal. We exited runway XXR at [taxiway] intersection and held short of XXL as instructed. We noticed the flap lever in the 30 detent. The flap indicator was showing 25. As we had a few minutes to hold we retracted the flaps. Then selected 5; 15; and 30 positions all working normal. I am not certain why the flaps were in the 25 position. I must have not seen that the flap indicator wasn't 30; but 25 on completion of the landing checklist. If there was any indication of an unsafe landing condition I would have most certainly executed the missed approach as required for this particular GPWS warning. I felt it safer to continue the landing as we were basically in the flare phase by this point. I also felt that this was a false GPWS warning at that low an altitude on approach.

B737 flight crew reported a too low flaps GPWS warning at 100 ft AGL.

1238229

201502

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1238229

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

This aircraft has a back course button and three control wheel steering buttons on the Mode Control Panel that do not belong there; on other airplanes those spaces have been blanked out. There is no reference at all in our manuals to these buttons and we have received no training on how to use them; nor are they labeled inop. We called local maintenance and then the Duty Manager; who coordinated with Maintenance Control; and were told that this was acceptable. We did not make a maintenance logbook entry as nothing was wrong with the airplane. I feel very strongly that this creates an unsafe situation as this one airplane is different than every other in the fleet. The situation is made worse by the buttons not being labeled inop (if they in fact are inop) or by the pilot group not being trained on how to use them if they are active.

B757 First Officer states that an aircraft he was assigned to fly has a back course button and three control wheel steering buttons on the Mode Control Panel that do not belong there.

1090135

201305

0601-1200

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

Daylight

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZDC

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1090135

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

We got our clearance and verified the route. My First Officer; who was new to the Airplane and the Company; entered the route into the FMS. I read the information that was in the FMS and the First Officer looked at the information on the release and ATC clearance. Little did I know that he had misread both our release flight plan and the actual clearance (which was the same as our filed route.) The file route looked like this: KCLT MERIL6 MERIL RDU J207 FKN J79 JOANI J79 JFK KRANN KBOS. What was entered in the FMS was: FKN JOANI J79 JFK KRANN3 [KBOS.] I read back what was in the FMS which got an affirmative response from the pilot flying. It wasn't until just after FKN that we found out that the route which had been entered was incorrect. The Controller cleared us to Salisbury and we were back on the correct course; a four mile deviation.We captains need to be reminded that the person sitting next to us may not have been at this airline for 20 years or more. There may be some confusion with day to day operations; as there was in this case. Had I been more proactive; I could have caught our error. When I read our route back during the verification process; I hesitated at the part that said FKN JOANI; that didn't sound right to me. When I got an affirmative response from the First Officer...I moved on. Next time I won't.

The Captain of an A321 failed to note when his First Officer; new to the airline; loaded the route in the FMS incorrectly. A track deviation ensued.

1006335

201204

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

45000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Part 91

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cockpit Window

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1006335

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

While in cruise at FL450 we had an amber CAS message indicating 'WSHLD HEAT INOP R.' We performed the appropriate abnormal procedure and within a minute or two of the CAS message we had the right forward window shatter. We performed the 'Cockpit Forward or Side Windshield Cracked or Shattered' abnormal procedure and elected to exercise our Emergency Authority and divert into [a nearby suitable airport]. We elected to have emergency personnel standing by and evaluate our passenger after shutdown. The medical personnel made the determination that passengers did not require any medical attention.

A corporate jet Captain reported that the right forward cockpit window shattered. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.

1142963

201401

1801-2400

PBI.Airport

FL

3000.0

TRACON PBI

Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class C PBI

Facility PBI.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1142963

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Human Factors

Ten miles south of SUA there's obstruction at 1;000 FT MSL. I descended an aircraft to 1;500 FT; our MVA we use in this area should be 2;000 FT. The aircraft got a 'low altitude alert' and was at 1;900 FT descending as he was overflying the obstruction. I issued the low altitude warning and asked pilot to verify he was at 2;000 FT and pilot said 'no; you gave us 1;500 FT'. I told the pilot to climb to 2;000 FT and pilot decided to cancel IFR. Simply forgot the obstruction was there. It would be nice if there was a circle or a better way to highlight the obstruction on the RADAR map instead of just a little upside down V.

PBI Controller described an MVA loss of separation event when a descent clearance was issued; but not realized by the reporter; additional video map highlights were suggested.

1350535

201604

1801-2400

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

Rain

Night

Ground EWR

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1350535

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

We pushed and started engines [in EWR] and taxied out 'RC'. At 'RC' ground's clearance was; 'taxi 4L-Bravo-Delta'. I started taxiing forward to make a right turn on to 'Bravo.' If you look at the taxi sign at the intersection of 'RC' and 'B' and the 10-9 page can be confusing. The F/O and I discussed the turn on to 'B' (F/O was stating 'B' was second right (which was really Delta) but I turned southbound on to 'B' the first right turn. Then checking the 10-9 seeing that I now could not get to Delta [I] stopped A/C. Ground gave amended instruction to turn left 'N' then right on 'D'. The night environment of the taxiways and rain added to the confusion at this intersection. I strongly recommend making this intersection a 'hot-spot'. Recommend the clearance from GND be 'Taxi 4L via RC - Right on Delta' or 'RC to the outer; Right turn on D'. Also recommend large lettering with arrows on the taxiways to provide guidance. Also the new Jepp Pages do not expand like the old Jepp Pro. The confusion of the taxi route (with the F/O trying to trap the confusion) further impeded my cognitive process. Having flown 7 out of the last 8 days most likely added to the fatigue I was experiencing. I am upset that I recognized the 'fatigue onset' too late and should have called in fatigued [earlier].

B737-800 Captain reported having difficulty complying with the taxi clearance at EWR citing fatigue; weather conditions; and taxiway markings as contributing.

1829295

202108

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

8000.0

IMC

3

Daylight

1500

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Electrical Distribution

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 2433; Flight Crew Type 2190

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1829295

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

In cruise at 8;000 feet in IMC from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; about 40 minutes out from ZZZ; my avionics master switch failed; and fused in the off position. Loss of autopilot; radios; intercom; GPS/NAV; transponder; ADS-B; iPad; and music. Stupid me; my handheld radio was in the baggage compartment.I began hand-flying and held 8;000 feet and a rough heading of 210; per my IFR clearance. I got my iPhone out and loaded ZZZ into ForeFlight and began navigation with it. I was able to text priority handling to my pilot friend at ZZZ; and he called ZZZ Tower. ZZZ approach coordinated with ZZZ approach; and they kept my path cleared. Airport conditions were relayed via text.I made position reports as able; and about 30 miles out loaded the GPS Runway XX approach to ZZZ and began my descent. I broke out about 1;300 feet AGL; 3 miles from airport. I then entered a left downwind for Runway YY; received a green light from Tower while on left base; rocked my wings; and landed.XX years or less ago; I would have been totally screwed and this could have been a fatal accident. The iPhone saved our lives! I was able to stay calm; fly the airplane; and navigate; knowing I would have a safe outcome thanks to my cell phone!

PA-28 pilot reported loss of avionics power and was forced to use a cell phone to text a friend at destination airport. The friend relayed pilot's intentions to ATC and was able to land at destination.

1648582

201905

0601-1200

COS.TRACON

CO

8700.0

Night

TRACON COS

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Vectors

Class C COS

Facility COS.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Physiological - Other

1648582

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

Human Factors

I was notified by management that I assigned a Aircraft X an altitude below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I take complete responsibility for this; and to my knowledge; I have never done anything similar in the past. The weather was coming in. I vectored Aircraft X for an ILS Approach and descended him to 9;000 feet. The MVA in that area is 8;900 feet. While on a base turn and just about to be cleared for the approach; Aircraft X requested a descent to 8;700 feet; which is the crossing altitude at the final approach fix. I approved it; turned and cleared him for the ILS at 8;700 feet. Aircraft X then turned faster than expected and I had to cancel his approach clearance and fix his intercept. Again; I assigned him 8;700 feet to maintain. I then cleared him again; he intercepted the localizer; and he landed without incident. I'm not really sure why I approved 8;700 feet initially. That is never an altitude that I assign to anyone. Aircraft X requested it; and for some reason I approved it. The only rationale I have is that I was extremely fatigued; and I believe that Aircraft X was the first aircraft I had talked to in hours. Again; this was my fault; and I will make sure that this never happens again under my watch. Return to prior mid shift procedures; and perhaps require 9 hours off between day/mid shifts. Every other shift has a 9 hour requirement; but the mid only has an 8 hour requirement. The new mid procedures also significantly increase fatigue. In this case; I have to attribute sleep deprivation as the main contributing cause.

COS TRACON Controller reported they descended an aircraft to an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1757583

202008

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1757583

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1757585.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Other Person

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

Gate agent in ZZZ notified me that passenger was not complying with the mask wearing. He would put it up (handkerchief) over his mouth then let it fall down when she walked away. I talked to him before shutting the door informing him of our policy and that he would not be allowed to fly if he didn't wear his mask. He was surly saying he was getting ready to eat. He said he would wear it when he wasn't eating. He continued to keep it down around his neck; only lifting it up over his mouth when we did our checks throughout the flight. I again told him he wouldn't be allowed to fly on his connecting flight if he didn't comply. He informed me that I was interfering with his constitutional rights. I said you have a right to refuse to wear a mask. The company also has the right to deny your passage on the flight. He said fine-he didn't need to go to ZZZ1 Traveling with a woman and 2 children.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight attendants reported a customer service agent advised them a passenger was not complying with face mask policy.

1595155

201811

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

Parked

Repair

Oil Line

X

Malfunctioning

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Technician

Training / Qualification

1595155

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

Performed Number 2 engine HMU (Hydro Mechanical Unit) installation and installation of Number 2 engine oil/fuel heat exchanger. Followed steps and procedures in manuals during job task. Went thru and retraced our steps after completion of job; visualizing each step we had done. Found no problems with the installation of either part. After completion of work task; performed idle leak check for 5 minutes. No leaks were found at this time. Performed actuators test where no faults were found.Suggested Resolution: After installation of this kind of job; replace the idle run leak check with a takeoff power type leak check so this may be caught before plane is release. High power engine run would provide a different dynamic as opposed to the idle run leak check.

A319 Mechanic reported that an idle engine check was insufficient to check for oil leaks.

990837

201201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

0.0

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

IFR

Initial Climb

None

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Supervisor / CIC; Ground; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

990837

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Staffing; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was working the GC; CD and CIC positions combined. Aircraft X called for IFR clearance to ZZZ. I didn't realize that he was calling from ZZZ1 and believed him to be on the ground at ZZZ2. Because I believed the aircraft to be at ZZZ1 I did not issue a hold for release to the aircraft. Aircraft X subsequently departed ZZZ2 without authorization from the approach control.This was my sixth day working and frankly I was tired and just missed it. This was the third week in a row that I have been working six days a week. I am scheduled to work two more weeks of six day work weeks prior to some vacation time. I believe that fatigue was a major factor and the only cure for this will be an elimination of the amount of overtime we have been working. However; we have been working six day work weeks since April of 2008 and there does not seem to be an end in sight.

Controller working combined positions issues IFR clearance to an aircraft on the ground at a nearby airport; believing the aircraft to be on the ground at the airport where the tower is located.

1167448

201404

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

B737-800

Part 121

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation

Main Gear

Boeing

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 12000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1167448

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1167457.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Staffing; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

First Officer (F/O) did walk around last night in ZZZ; Gate X; Flight ZZZ-ZZZ1. Push time scheduled late evening. Called Maintenance with gripe concerning #1 Main Landing Gear (MLG) Tire Brake pins being below flush. Aircraft a B737-800. Waited 30-minutes. Single Maintenance Technician comes out and tells us the pins are above flush. F/O and I point out to him that two are; two are not. We want the Brake System fixed. He departs. (My assessment: he just wanted to get away so he could go home.) About 30-minutes later (and after ZZZ Operations deplaned the passengers); two COMPETENT technicians arrive and diagnose the problem. They claim the delay in arriving was due to a Shift change. The real problem is that two of the brake pucks are fused to the Brake and Wheel Assembly with associated metal damage and fragmentation. Some parts are the diameter and length of my thumb. No mention of whether the [tire] Fuse plugs had melted. Solution: Change the entire MLG tire; wheel; axle and brake assembly. Maintenance technicians comment that damage was so bad that the Wheel Assembly could have catastrophically failed upon next Takeoff or Landing. The previous inbound crew [into ZZZ] had taxied to the gate with no apparent problems or issues. We departed ZZZ about 2.5-hours late. Everything worked fine thereafter. Recommend sending competent Maintenance technician to aircraft the first time. ZZZ Maintenance took a long time to respond to my request for service. Equipment malfunction.

Reporter stated he had talked with the previous inbound flight crew and they did not have any indications of a faulty brake or tire. The left Main Landing Gear (MLG) Outboard (O/B) tire fuse plug did not blow and the left O/B brake did not appear to be overheated. But two of the four Brake Wear pins on the damaged brake were below flush. He doesn't remember whether the forward or aft wear pins were below flush. The other two wear pins were in serviceable range for wear; but may have been stuck. The O/B brake started falling apart; parts falling off; when technicians began removing the tire and brake. Classic B737s have a total of two Brake Wear pins for each brake; one forward and one aft compared to the NexGen aircraft that have four wear pins per brake.

I did walk around last night in ZZZ. Push time scheduled late evening. Called Maintenance with gripe concerning # 1 Main Landing Gear (MLG) Tire Brake pins being below flush. Aircraft a B737-800. The real problem is that two of the brake pucks are fused to the Brake and Wheel Assembly with associated metal damage and fragmentation. Some parts are the diameter and length of my thumb. No mention of whether the [tire] Fuse plugs had melted. Solution: Change the entire MLG tire; wheel; and brake assembly. Maintenance technicians commentedthat damage was so bad that the wheel assembly could have catastrophically failed upon next takeoff or landing.

A Captain and First Officer report Number 1 Tire Brake wear pins on the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) were found below flush during a walkaround on a B737-800 aircraft. Two of the brake pucks were fused to the Brake and Wheel Assembly with associated metal damage and fragmentation. Maintenance Technician noted Wheel Assembly could have catastrophically failed upon next takeoff or landing.

1288961

201508

1801-2400

LGB.Airport

CA

0.0

Night

Tower LGB

Small Aircraft

1.0

Taxi

None

Tower LGB

Military

Fighter

1.0

Part 91

None

Taxi

None

Facility LGB.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction

1288961

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Procedure

I just relieved the previous controller; I was working normal pattern traffic and VFR ins and outs. Aircraft X called for a departure; left standard; then changed to left crosswind at river. I built a window for the departure. Ground Control asked me for a crossing of 25L at Lima and Bravo twice. I gave the crossing at Lima; and with a restriction for traffic on the runway; Bravo twice. I had planned to use Line Up and Wait (LUAW) for Aircraft X; but because of the tower staffing being marginal; Controller In Charge (CIC) was combined with Clearance Delivery (CD); and LUAW was not authorized. I remembered that; so I didn't line Aircraft X up. When I observed the landing aircraft clear the runway; I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff; forgetting about the crossing. When Aircraft X rounded the corner; the first crossing was complete. The ground controller alerted me that they were still crossing one more; and was able to stop the second aircraft Y in the flight before they crossed the hold bars. I cancelled Aircraft X's takeoff clearance; they exited them from F1 and the second Aircraft Y crossed without incident.I need to be more focused coming into the position. Having adequate staffing numbers for the facility to be able to use LUAW throughout all busy hours would help. Realistically; most Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) here ignore the rules of LUAW for the sake of the operational efficiency.

LGB Tower Controller reported that there was approval for two aircraft to cross the runway. After one crossed the Controller reported that they cleared an aircraft for takeoff. Ground Control advised Local Control of the second aircraft that was cleared to cross. Local cancelled the takeoff clearance before the crossing aircraft crossed the hold short bars.

1749703

202007

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

3000.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

3500

Center ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 209; Flight Crew Type 193

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1749703

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 0; Vertical 200

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

While on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ; I had a near midair collision; NMAC; with another aircraft not talking with ATC and had to immediately take evasive action to avoid the other aircraft by climbing.The other aircraft was less than a half-mile away; closing within 50 degrees of a head-on collision and level at our assigned altitude of 3;000 feet MSL. The other aircraft flew directly under us within 200-300 feet from what we could tell and took no action to maneuver away from us. ATC had given us a Traffic Advisory call; saying; 'Traffic; 2;700 feet and at your 1 o'clock; northbound; unknown type.' I could see them on ADS-B In and saw that they were actually in a slight climb and then leveled off at 3;000 about 10 seconds after the traffic call-out. ADS-B In showed 0 feet vertical separation. Because of this; I was vigilantly staring at my 12 to 1 o'clock looking for them. [I] saw them closing towards us and in less than a second; I pulled up and gained 300 feet Less than 2 seconds later; they passed directly under us.After ensuring they were no longer a factor; I began correcting our altitude back down to our assigned altitude of 3;000 feet and called ATC to let them know we had a NMAC. He said; 'I showed that traffic at 2;700 feet' again and didn't ask anything more about the situation. I feel like ATC should have done more to separate us and given us a vector away from the closing traffic. Yes; at that moment; we were in VMC and were able to avoid at the last moment; but we had just emerged from the clouds and only saw the traffic as we got around the corner of another cloud. If we had reacted seconds later; I feel [that] we would've collided.

C172 Pilot reported a NMAC and states that ATC could have done more in the way of separation.

1230694

201501

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

BAe 125 Series 800

2.0

IFR

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1230694

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Environment - Non Weather Related

After takeoff with positive rate of climb; the gear was selected up. The gear handle stopped only halfway. I left the gear selected in the down position and figured that we would gain altitude and check it out. I looked out the front and saw a flock of geese. I said it out loud to make sure the pilot flying had seen them; however there was nowhere to go. We then heard and felt geese hit the plane. The left engine indications became erratic and we decided to return for landing. I informed the tower of what had happened and our intentions. We were cleared to enter downwind and land. I then heard someone say that our left engine was smoking. We had gained enough altitude to make the decision to shut the left engine off; especially with the indications we were getting and the fact that it was reported smoking. We landed cautiously with the knowledge that the gear was down during the bird strike and could potentially be damaged. The landing was normal and we taxied to parking.

Distracted by a landing gear that failed to retract; the flight crew of a BAE-125-850XP noted a gaggle of geese too close ahead to avoid; and felt one or more strike the aircraft. The impact was followed by erratic indications and a report of smoke from the left engine heard over the radio. They performed an inflight shut down; and returned to their departure airport for an uneventful landing.

1753148

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Troubleshooting

1753148

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

A couple along with their lap child got on the plane toward the end of boarding. Their assigned seats were X1 and X3. They wanted to sit together and they asked the man in X4 if he would be willing to switch but he said no. I talked to the gate agent and asked if Y3 was still being blocked off for social distancing. The gate agent said that it was blocked off. The man in Y4 said he was willing to switch but I informed everyone about the seat being blocked and Passenger X got argumentative with me asking why they couldn't move. I apologized and told them that it was blocked for social distancing for the flight attendants. He got upset and asked me for my name. In flight he was busy with the lap child so I gave his wife my name and employee number. About halfway through the flight they both had their masks off and they were not eating or drinking anything. I had my B Flight Attendant tell them to put their masks on because they didn't have an issue with her. Passenger X informed her that his broke so she gave him a replacement.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger became argumentative when told they could not switch seats due to social distancing.

1350948

201604

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Repair

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

Bombardier

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1350948

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The following events occurred at a Maintenance (Mx) hangar on shift.Early in the shift I was working on my aircraft when the inspector asked me to come with him so he could show me a discrepancy he had just found and wrote up. He showed me that the passenger (pax) door seal was torn under the support wheel of the door. He informed me that he would get the parts and removal and installation task for me. After removal of the door seal; and upon inspection of the door seal retainer and given the prior problem with the pax door seal; it appeared the pax door support wheel lock lever was bent back and was the cause; or at least a contributing factor in the damage of the pax door seal which required replacement. I believe that when the door was either deployed or retracted; the lock lever from the support wheel was catching on the door seal. I documented my inspection findings by noting that the pax door support wheel lock lever was bent on the Aircraft work order form. I decided to show the inspector the bent lock lever and asked him to look up the part in the GMM (General Maintenance Manual) to see if it was an RII (Required Inspection Item) item. He then left to look up the part. Upon seeing my write up for the pax door support wheel lock lever; my lead that night; appeared to get irritated. He and I inspected the damage together. After looking at the bent support wheel lock lever; he directed me to change my write up of the problem. He specifically told me to change the write up to pax door support wheel will not lock. He told me 'you can just beat the lock lever straight; or use a hydraulic press to reshape it. I've done it before on other aircraft'; and for the corrective action state that you adjusted the support wheel with the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) task for adjusting the wheel assembly. That particular task that he said you could sign off the adjustment of the support wheel with; deals with the pulley system and does not say anything about being able to beat the lever back into proper shape. Around this time the inspector came back with his RII stamp and overheard mine and my lead's conversation about him asking me to change the write up from pax door support wheel lock lever is bent; to pax door support wheel will not lock. I advised my lead that I refuse to change my write up of the problem. I felt that this was a safety issue requiring appropriate attention and repair. As a result of my refusal to obey his direction he became very angry; loud; sarcastic; aggressive; and threatening to me. He would not let up and repeatedly tried to bend me to his will to change the write up. It was determined by the inspector that the item I had written up WAS an RII item and the inspector stamped over top of my write up; RII. My lead's behavior became worse when he learned that we did not have the parts in stock and the aircraft would have to be AOG (Aircraft on Ground). He became even more irate; threatening; and intolerable. I felt extremely uncomfortable and bullied by his verbal conduct and his behavior and action in invading my personal space and getting close to me. I felt my lead was attempting to physically intimidate me as his verbal conduct was unsuccessful in getting me to change the write up. I admit to refusing to obey his order to change the write up; which ultimately resulted in the grounding of the Aircraft. I respectfully submit that such order was both unlawful and unreasonable.Later in the shift; on the same aircraft; I discovered a high temperature problem with hydraulic system #3 while performing the necessary operational checks for the door seal that I had changed. I then [investigated] the problem by using common knowledge about the system by running system #3 hydraulic pumps 3a and 3b independent of each other. I noticed that with just pump 3a on the temperature would raise 1 degree every 15-20 seconds and was reading approx. 85 C. When 3a pump was turned off and 3b was turnedon; the reservoir temp for hydraulic system 3 would drop down to about 50 C within a few minutes; which is normal operating temperature. Hydraulic pump 3a was not functioning normally and again when turned on for a short period of time; the hydraulic temp rose again to approx. 80 C; causing the high temperature reading in the system. I went and notified my lead of the high temperature problem with system #3. He immediately declared without any other regard to what the system was actually doing with the pumps on and off: 'It's the reservoir; it's always the reservoir; you'll need to change it'. The Inspector overheard the problem and printed out the FIM (Fault Isolation Manual) [guidance] for me. My lead took the FIM and pointed to the last corrective action which says replace reservoir. I pointed out to him that there are many steps per the FIM that must be followed prior to changing the reservoir; [for example] taking a level 1 hydraulic fluid sample; purging hydraulic system #3 reservoir; and changing the temp transducer on the reservoir; and that none of those steps had been complied with yet. He still declared he thought it was the reservoir. I then indicated that I believed the problem to be hydraulic pump 3a. My lead reacted to my statement of belief as if he was disgusted. I then began to explain to him my reasoning and outlined for him my troubleshooting methods and findings. My lead restated numerous times: 'it's the reservoir'. I disagreed. We continued the disagreement of opinion discussing the issue. He appeared to be angered; again with me. In an attempt to break the impasse; I ran hydraulic pump 3a with him present. I pointed out that pump 3a was making very audible grinding/shattering noises when in operation (which is clearly not normal). He still insisted it was the reservoir. I disagreed with him. I also pointed out that pump 3a was scalding hot (you could fry an egg on it) which is not normal and that pump 3b was warm/hot to the touch. My lead and I still disagreed and we continued arguing the reasons for our respective opinion. He pointed to the fact that pump 3a was making correct pressure and said over again it's a reservoir problem. We could not agree. We walked over to the paperwork cart where the inspector happened to be. Finally my lead in a dismissive manner said to me to: 'write it up how you think it should be wrote up'. After I wrote up the discrepancy; he made copies of the paperwork for MX control and went into the office. There was no other discussion between my lead and myself until later in the back shop.I followed his instruction. On the aircraft work order; I wrote 'hydraulic system 3 high temp with 3a pump on and 3b off.' I ordered the new hydraulic pump from stores and several mechanics and I started the removal process for hydraulic pump 3a. The other mechanics on shift including the several Bombardier mechanics came over to the aircraft and had commented on how horrible the hydraulic pump had sounded. One mechanic said it sounded like a bearing going out. Once the old pump was removed we took the pump in the back shop to secure it down with the vise because we had to swap over the unions from the old pump to the new pump and replace the packings. During this process my lead came in the back shop and saw the 2 hydraulic pumps and immediately got hostile; offensive; and again invaded my personal space. He asked why I had not changed the reservoir. I responded to him that it was not the problem that I had wrote up on the aircraft paperwork. He then loudly kept repeating: 'It's not going to fix it; It's not going to fix it'; which made a scene in front of my coworkers. It made me feel uncomfortable; and I did not understand why he was trying to make me feel this way; considering he asked me to write up the problem on the paperwork how I thought it should be wrote up. As he stormed out of the back shop he ordered other mechanics to go get a reservoir out of stock with all the packings and get it ready because the pump would not fix it. I avoided my lead and I did not talk to him the rest of the shift. The supervisor on duty came into the back shop just as we finished swapping the unions over to the new pump. He asked what was going on; and I gave him a brief description of what had happened; and asked him if it was alright to install the new pump because it was ready to be installed and suggested that we could talk after the shift. He agreed. I began the install of the hydraulic pump 3a with a few mechanics. We installed the new hydraulic pump 3a and performed the necessary servicing; bleeding; leak checks; and operational tests. The pump was operational; and no more defects for hydraulic system 3 were found by myself or first shift (turnover). All operational checks were satisfactory; and no more high temperature messages appeared.I never received any kind of acknowledgment about the pump actually fixing the problem on the aircraft from my lead; supervision; or base manager. Instead I was called into the base manager's office; with the supervisor present to discuss the event that occurred. I answered a few of his questions and gave them a brief description of what had happened; and was told by the manager and supervisor that we would talk again the following day; because they needed to sit down and talk with my lead. At no time when I left the manager's office did I feel that I was at risk of being wrote up; let alone having disciplinary action taken against me (time off work without pay).I have since learned that I am being wrote up and disciplined for insubordination because I did not follow an alleged direct order from my lead to change the reservoir. I do not believe that any of my actions; conduct; and/or performance constitutes insubordination. Insubordination is comprised of three elements: a direct; clear order that is lawful and reasonable communicated from a supervisor to an employee; the direct unequivocal order must be understood by the employee and; a willful and intentional refusal to obey a lawful and reasonable order by the supervisor either verbally or through non-performance.Although my lead repeatedly expressed his belief that the reservoir was the problem; it was never communicated to me as a direct order. This is supported by his last statement to me: 'write it up how you think it should be wrote up'. The first element of insubordination therefore is not satisfied. Had he truly wanted me to change the reservoir; and like general practice in our hanger; he could have simply placed on the aircraft work order that the reservoir was bad from 'his troubleshooting'. This was not the case. My lead's conduct that night was one of irritation; aggressiveness; cursing under his breath; threatening; and physical intimidation directed towards me. His conduct; I felt; was clear evidence of retaliation as a result of my write up in incident #1 above; which grounded his aircraft. I respectfully submit that my lead's close held opinion that the reservoir was the problem was wholly unreasonable given his failure to fully analyze the issue. His (gut) feeling proved wrong. It appears his desires discipline against me to divert attention from his misconduct and 'snap' judgment errors.We are all human. I can admit my errors. In this matter I cannot admit to an error or the alleged violation because I have committed none.I believe that incident #1 was a result of my lead wanting the plane at the gate (on time) and did not want the aircraft to be grounded. I strongly believe he was trying to compromise the safety of our passengers by having me change a write up for something that was bad and we did not have in stock; so that his aircraft could make gate time. Since I stood my ground and would not change my write up and got the inspector involved; the plane was AOG and did not fly on that day due to waiting on parts. I believe that incident #2 involving my lead and myself was simply

A Maintenance Technician reported that while troubleshooting a Bombardier CRJ200 hydraulic overheat problem; the Mechanic and the Lead working the aircraft could not agree on what path to take to make a proper repair. The Mechanic and Lead also disagreed on an entry door seal repair due to a support wheel lock lever that was bent.

1240496

201502

1201-1800

TUPJ.Airport

VI

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower TUPJ

Fractional

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1240496

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Out of TUPJ; we called for taxi and clearance. Common to get it all at once at this airport. The controller gave us Taxiway D to the active runway and immediately spit out the clearance at a fast speed. We held position as my partner tried several more times to understand the clearance. The Controller seemed to get irritated as we tried to figure out his instructions. The island accent and pace of his instructions were making it difficult. We finally got it in the box as he instructed us to expedite the back taxi for he had two aircraft inbound. We did so and then took off. After takeoff he told us to contact departure and to 'next time wait for takeoff clearance.' No further communication took place as we switched to departure. We both believe he gave us takeoff clearance. Slower communication from ATC. It is very difficult to understand the accent. Patience from ATC. If he felt rushed; he should have stopped us from continuing onto the runway.

A Captain reported TUPJ ATC was very difficult to understand but with effort the clearance and taxi instructions were completed. After back taxiing on the runway he took off without clearance because he misunderstood the Controller.

1419443

201701

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

VMC

Dawn

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1419443

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1419710.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Aircraft

We took off [and] set takeoff power. As we were cleaning up the airplane I noticed that the ITT (Inter Turbine Temperature) on the right engine was flashing red. I asked the First Officer to look in the QRH for a high ITT message. He did not find any checklist that corresponded with that discrepancy. We were on the DME ARC and I clicked off the autopilot to avoid turning towards the mountain range while we were having engine problems. We returned to land. I asked my FO to also look up to see if there was an overweight landing checklist in the QRH; there was none. We kept the descent rate to a minimum and landed. Before I left the airplane I pulled up the information on the event and saw that on three different occasions during our flight MDC (Maintenance Diagnostic Computer) tagged the Right Engine for ITT exceedances. I took a picture of the MDC. I also [noted] that there were several other right engine ITT exceedances in the MDC dating all the way back to August. Maintenance; in collusion with [our] 'engineers' decided that there was no exceedances in the engine limitations and signed the aircraft off as good. I was notified that maintenance was completed on the aircraft - which was interesting to me because there was no possible way that any maintenance could have been done in that amount of time.When I arrived to the airplane I read the sign off; which read: 'Interrogated MDC found to be within limits in accordance with CRJ 900 FIM (Fault Isolation Manual).' I pulled up the MDC and I saw that all of today's ITT exceedances had been erased from the MDC (which I also took a picture of). I contacted maintenance with my concerns about the maintenance sign off. The mechanic told me that they had their engineers look at it and we were good to go. That the engine didn't exceed any limitations. And we were getting the red indication because of the high elevation of the airport. They wanted me to pack this plane full of passengers and takeoff again. In my mind this clearly was not operating at the highest level of safety (i.e.: critical airport; high elevation; heavy and having engine issues; plus our maintenance and so called 'engineers' haven't done a thing but pencil whip the issue - I want to be real clear this has little to nothing to do with our outsourced mechanic. He was under constant guidance of our maintenance department and 'engineers'.) I explained to the maintenance controller that if I were to take off and receive another ITT message the results of the flight would be the same. This is a critical terrain airport and for us to take the airplane with this sign off would not be operating at a high level of safety. I agreed with the maintenance controller that we should do an engine run up at takeoff power and see if the gauge went red again. Maintenance agreed. During the engine run up the ITT gauge went red again. I wrote the discrepancy up again.Threat: The people at this company who call themselves engineers (which should make me have confidence in that title) clearly put operational integrity over safety. Since this incidence I have found out that there is a test titled: Power Assurance. I would have thought that an engineering department would have considered doing that test. Especially since I am at a critical terrain airport. But they did no sort of test. They conveniently found a way to pencil whip the write up. The FAA allows our company to have our own engineering team as opposed to using Bombardier.Threat: Lack of Captain's ability to communicate with the company from [this international airport].Threat: Language barrier.Threat: The MDC reported ITT exceedances since August.Threat: Complete lack of understanding from Operations about what I do as a pilot; and why I would not want to fly over critical terrain with the engine ITT flashing red.Threat: Lack of guidance in the QRH.Threat: Engine exceedance from earlier that morning just seemed to disappear.I realize I cannot trust the system. We need a better maintenance department and better [Operations Controller].

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after receiving a high ITT warning on the right engine.

1008222

201204

0601-1200

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

Daylight

Ramp LAX

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1008222

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Company Policy

After landing we were assigned a gate in LAX. Both the First Officer and I noticed a train of three baggage carts close to the area where the right wing-tip would pass. The Marshaller was signaling to proceed; and even appeared to glance at the carts in question. The First Officer was closely observing the distance between our wing and the carts; and assured me we had adequate clearance. There was no wing-walker on the right side. I proceeded very slowly. At about 25 feet prior to the gate; we were jolted by a moderate bump; as the Marshaller simultaneously signaled 'emergency stop.' I immediately stopped the aircraft. The First Officer saw the carts jolt and commented with surprise that we had made contact with the carts. I then announced to the passengers that we had struck a cart; and asked them to stay seated. We completed the engine shutdown and associated checklist. Operations / ramp soon deplaned the passengers via the ramp and stairs. The right winglet had struck the second of the three carts. The aircraft was damaged on the right winglet leading edge about one-third to one-half the way up; with paint scratches and markings on the navigation light and the outside of the winglet. I thought about stopping; but instead I elected to proceed on the basis of the Marshaller's signals and the First Officer's assurance we had wingtip clearance. I was at first somewhat confused by the two lead-in lines (one was for larger jets; and the other; dashed line was for RJ's). I was focused on the Marshaller and being on the correct lead-in line and didn't see that the carts were in the safety diamond. The ramp was very busy; there was no wing-walker on the right side; and the visibility out of the side windows is limited and possibly distorted by the thick; angled window glass. The environment was very fast-changing and dynamic; requiring extra vigilance. The Marshaller was possibly distracted by the busy ramp; and he did not see the impending collision until it was happening. The cart we struck was turned at an odd angle with reference to the other two carts on either side of it; so it's corner was protruding further out than it appeared; making the distance from the wing harder to judge. My First Officer and I simply mis-judged the distance from the wings to the carts. I should have refused to proceed until the carts were moved. I relied on the judgment of others to keep moving at a time when prudence should have dictated that I stop. Captains should be extra conservative when taxiing in busy and congested areas. When in doubt; stop and make people move things or assure adequate clearance at each point of potential collision. All flight crewmembers should be warned and educated about the apparent and potential visual distortions and illusions which can occur; and when in doubt; either crew-member should use the brakes to avoid collisions.

A CRJ Captain struck the right winglet on a baggage cart at LAX after the First Officer and Marshaller both signaled to continue.

1212179

201410

1801-2400

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

No Aircraft

Facility ZAU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

1212179

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

With the new rule about changing data blocks in some one else's airspace people are routinely either calling on every climbing or descending aircraft to get control; slowing the sector down to sometimes unsafe conditions or just changing the data block which is against the rules. This needs to be fixed now!Change the rule fast before this causes an accident.

ZAU Controller describes a rule change about data blocks and how people are calling for permission to change the data block creating more work for the sector.

1113742

201309

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Ice/Rain Protection System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1113742

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1113755.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

While taxiing to the runway; we received an ENG 1 A-ICE DISAG level one alert. The Captain stopped short of the runway and I referenced the QRH. The QRH indicated that there was no consequence; but we would need to leave icing conditions. I looked up the MEL on my handy dandy iPad. When searching the table of contents; I found MEL 30-22-04 'ENG ANTI-ICE Switchlights--DISAG Lights'. It said normal complement of 3 and all three may be inoperative. We contacted Maintenance and told them of our alert. Maintenance said they thought we had to return to the gate. I indicated we were looking at MEL 30-22-04 and it was not flagged. He responded; 'If you want to use that one; you can use the crew MEL' or something to that effect. We sent the ACARS message to initiate the Crew MEL process indicating what alert we had and what MEL we though we needed to use. We did not get an ACARS response initially so the Captain called Dispatch on the phone to get the process moving. Dispatch sent the information for the Crew MEL. As I looked at the MEL closer; I wasn't sure if we had the right MEL; so I asked Maintenance why they thought we needed to return to the gate. He didn't indicate what MEL he thought we should use nor offer any real help. He just wanted us to use Crew MEL process and put an orange MEL sticker in the jet. The Captain and I discussed this and agreed that the engine anti-ice could be turned on in accordance with the MEL and we did get the ENG 1 A-ICE On alert. We used ENG Anti-ice failed open for the takeoff performance data and selected ENG 1 anti-ice ON for takeoff. We took off uneventfully. We were able to turn the anti-ice off airborne and the DISAG did not come back initially. It did come back and flicker on/off a few times enroute. I believe the valve was slightly out of adjustment and wasn't fully closing on deck which is why we got the intermittent indications. While airborne enroute to our destination; I looked closer at the MEL and found MEL 30-22-01; Engine Nose Cowl Anti-ice Shutoff and regulator Valves Engine 1 or 3 valves (Inop Open). This was indeed a flagged item. I think this is what Maintenance probably looked at first when they suggested we come back to the gate but they never told us this. As a crew; we found the non-flagged MEL we used in the Crew MEL and were not aware of the one we should have used. I think Maintenance was not very helpful in two ways; communication in what they were thinking regarding the MEL they thought we should use and they were just as happy to send us on our way using Crew MEL with the wrong MEL. For the Crew MEL process to work; Maintenance needs to communicate what they are thinking since maintenance is their specialty. We need to pull information from them better to ensure we are in full compliance with the MEL. I believe we ended up using the wrong MEL in the Crew MEL process. If Maintenance had been more forthcoming in what MEL they thought we should be using rather than saying 'If you want to use that MEL...' we would have come back to the gate and done it properly. If we had asked more questions when it didn't seem right we might have found the correct MEL...although I did indicate we were trying to get our facts straight as Maintenance was bugging us about the orange sticker.I suggest better communication. Maintenance needs to tell us what MEL they think it is rather than just going with what we think it is. We are not maintenance experts although we do know the airplane and the MEL system; that is primarily a maintenance area of expertise. We can do a better job pulling info if we aren't getting the support we need. I don't think I'll encourage the captain to use Crew MEL if this is the support we get from Maintenance regarding the proper MEL to use.

The crew MEL process is intrinsically flawed. It depends on pilots being as versed in maintenance of the aircraft as Maintenance Control. It is too easy; in the middle of the night; to misinterpret a level 1 problem. The Crew MEL process; designed to save time and money; is a degradation of safety and should be revisited.

A DC-10 crew MELed an engine anti-ice system after leaving the gate when the ANTI-ICE DISAG light came on because they thought it was an indication error and after takeoff the fault self corrected.

1607830

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1607830

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1608002.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

Even though the [takeoff data] was briefed beforehand somehow flaps were set to 1 on the taxi even though planned for 2. Immediately upon ATC contact we were given a runway change and elected to do the taxi checklist later at the end of the runway. We changed the flight plan and I reloaded the box and still hadn't caught that the flaps were in configuration 1 instead of 2 even though the box was set for 2. The taxi checklist was called for below the line and both of us had not realized we never did before the line. This was a huge error as we were hurrying to comply with ATC in getting out in front of a certain aircraft. All configuration tests showed normal. We took off completely normal and the only time we realized the flaps were set to 1 instead of 2 was when the Captain called flaps 1. This event occurred due to multiple distractions at very important phases of the taxi. The way the threat and error model is set up; this should have not occurred; but still did. We were both at a loss at how this could have happened to us when there are multiple checks in place to prevent it from happening.This amount of time myself and the Captain have spent reviewing what happened and replaying the event is a start. There are adequate steps to avoid this and somehow we were distracted at just the right times at every one. There is really nothing more that needs to be done procedure wise; just more attention to detail on our part.

During pushback we were informed by the FAs [Flight Attendants] that a young boy had soiled himself and was in the lav. Expecting a short taxi and not knowing how long he would be; I coordinated with ramp to hold in the alley rather than clog up ground control. We began the checklist by completingthe flight control check at which time ramp asked us to leave the alley for traffic.Ground gave us taxi instructions and a runway change and we proceeded to taxi. Meanwhile the FAs called and informed me the the boy's father was heading to the lav with a change of clothes. I contacted the FAs to inform them we would park in the pad and wait for the family to finish. In the pad we completed the flight plan review after the runway change. The FAsthen called to say they were ready and we completed the taxi items ''below the line' as tower cleared us to line up and wait. Upon departure we realized the flaps were set to configuration 1 when the [performance data] called for configuration 2. Through the numerous calls with ramp; tower; and the FAs we failed to notice the incorrect flap setting. ECAM configuration indications/warnings were normal. Numerous distractions and coordination with FAs; ramp and ground led to breaking up the normal flow of the taxi checklist.I feel that we tried to mitigate distractions by waiting in the alley and then at the end of the runway while the passenger issue was resolved. When the cabin was set I felt in the green not realizing we had passed through a barrier. In the future I will treat distractions the same as we do runway changes in which we review the plan from the beginning and in its entirety. Reviewing the taxi checklist triggers and flows 'from the top' will ensure I haven't bypassed a barrier.

A321 flight crew reported multiple distractions resulted in taking off with the incorrect flap setting.

1341950

201603

1201-1800

RYY.Airport

GA

4.0

3000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3500

TRACON A80

Corporate

HS 125 Series

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Visual Approach; Direct

Class E A80

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E A80

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Situational Awareness

1341950

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 200

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On a re-positioning flight to RYY at 3000 ft Atlanta ATC cleared us for a visual approach to Runway 27. Shortly after; ATC called traffic for us at 1000-1100 o'clock and 2500 ft. I saw the traffic on TCAS but at this time had no visual. Watching said traffic on TCAS; I saw it go from 500 ft below to 400; 300; 200. TCAS gave us an RA and I complied. As I climbed; I got a visual on the aircraft. Though I saw the aircraft; I continued complying with the RA until we were at approximately 3800 ft. I asked ATC who the aircraft was and they told us they were not talking to them. While I realize he is running a business and we all share the airspace; keeping your 'head on a swivel' is definitely something everyone should practice. In his type of operation; I would suggest that he keeps open communications with Atlanta and local towers.

HS125 Captain reported an NMAC on arrival into RYY.

1591110

201811

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

1600.0

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Descent

Direct

Class C ZZZ

Government

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

Cruise

Other Erratic

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1500

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1591110

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 0; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Returning to ZZZ from the south at 4500 feet (low to avoid the strong north wind) with flight following; I advised Approach I was beginning descent to ZZZ. I have an iPad with ForeFlight on my control yoke and this displays the ADS-B information. At 2200 feet in descent; just south of the ZZZ1 area; the controller told me to hold at 2000 feet. I didn't know why until I saw a target westbound from ZZZ1; as if on takeoff/departure. It appeared it would intersect with my path; but it didn't climb above about 1400 feet. I expected to be cleared to descend again after the other aircraft crossed my path. But the aircraft turned north just before my path and went north; paralleling my path. I figured he must be making a right-traffic return to ZZZ1. But he didn't turn; he kept heading north. I turned about 20 degrees left (to about 310 degrees) to diverge from the other aircraft and coincidentally; to be directly aligned with the ZZZ runway. And because I was too high; getting close to ZZZ; I slowed to approach speed and dropped flaps in preparation for a quick descent. This also allowed me to drop back behind the other aircraft so I could descend behind him. ATC cleared me to descend and I immediately started down. The other aircraft then turned left; to the west; and presented a collision hazard. I turned about 30 degrees right to go behind the aircraft. He turned south; headed directly at me. I turned east in a steep turn and either leveled off or climbed a bit. The other aircraft went under my plane and seemed to be only 200 to 300 feet below me. It was a law-enforcement helicopter and it apparently had decided to circle there. I made a minor; not strong-enough complaint to ATC and he told me to change to local frequency (He was very busy). I was panicking and I don't remember how I got away from the jerk; but I remember making a steep; full-flap descent and normal landing at ZZZ. There are two possible ways to interpret this. One is that the helicopter pilot knew where I was all the time and was having fun bullying me. The other; more likely; is that this guy didn't look at all for other aircraft and was focused on events on the ground. I can't believe that someone who flies all the time in busy airspace like [here] would not be using ADS-B to be aware of other traffic; but if this guy had it; he didn't look at it any more than he looked around for traffic visually. Helicopters operating regularly in busy areas should be required to have ADS-B In and they should be trained to look for other aircraft. Or they should be in a patrol car instead of doing dangerous things in the air over populated areas.

Cessna 182 pilot reported an NMAC with a law enforcement helicopter.

1093658

201306

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Marginal

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1093658

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

At about 25 minutes out; our Flight Attendant reported some light white smoke that came out around seat XA accompanied by a small amount of electrical smell. This was also confirmed by a jumpseating Flight Attendant who also voiced his concerns about the smell and the smoke. There was no smoke build up noted but a small amount of white smoke appeared to linger according to them. We checked our systems via the MFD pages and found nothing unusual while we prepared the QRH for smoke/fire in the cabin. The Captain turned off the recirculation fan as a precaution. After hearing the same report more than three times from the our Flight Attendant and that same report being confirmed by the jumpseating Flight Attendant and the passenger seated at row X; we decided to declare an emergency. We were already on the arrival so we proceeded to the original destination. We did not see any smoke in the cockpit but I did detect that electrical smell for a brief moment only right before we got the first call from our Flight Attendant. We were cleared direct and received priority for the ILS approach. Emergency crew and equipment were waiting upon our arrival and they found no signs of fire. Maintenance was also on board after the fire department crew left. We acted on the conservative end by declaring emergency in case there was indeed a fire and a valid source of smoke. We did not run the QRH as we did not find any concrete reason to do so but felt the need to get expedited handling by ATC so we can get on the ground as soon as possible.

EMB145 Captain is informed of electrical smoke and fumes emanating from a row of seats by a Flight Attendant. The recirculation fan is turned off as a precaution. After being informed of further smoke and smell incidents the Captain elects to declare an emergency and lands safely at the destination airport.

1632265

201903

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

3000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

TRACON NCT

DA40 Diamond Star

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Approach

TRACON NCT

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1632265

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

We were in a hold over SAC VOR at about 3;000 ft. with flight following from North Cal. Another aircraft (CE-172?) came within 300 ft. vertical separation (according to my Stratus 3 and ForeFlight display on iPad). The pilot of the other aircraft involved in this encounter (CE-172?) also reported to North Cal that his ForeFlight warned of being close to our aircraft. That day there were a lot of aircraft in the area (according to Stratus 3 and Foreflight display).

Pilot reported a NMAC with a Cessna while holding over the Sacramento VOR.

1107533

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Situational Awareness

1107533

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

Departed. On climbout; Master Warning for a TAIL COMP TEMP HIGH. Accomplished Immediate Action Items declared an emergency returned to the departure airport. Aircraft had a previous history; of this problem. Captain called it a night.

A MD-83 TAIL COMP TEMP HIGH and Master Warning alerted after takeoff; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1323435

201601

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Marginal

Icing

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1323435

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

It had been snowing all day and the light snow continued into the evening. We had a light cargo load. We deiced and planned for an engine anti ice departure. Before TO; we did a momentary run up to 60% N1; and began our takeoff roll.The FO called 80 KTS; I crossed checked my airspeed and responded 'check'. Thereafter the FO called/said V1. Expecting to hear 'rotate' immediately following the v1 call (V1; Vr were the same) and not hearing it; I waited a moment; glanced down at the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and saw we were well beyond the 'blue' airspeed line. As I began to rotate; the rotation did not feel normal; I slowed the rotation rate and the airplane lifted off.Bothered as to why the airplane rotated so sluggishly the FO and I discussed what we both saw. At the 80 KTS call the FO said he noticed the blue speed line had dropped to 100 KTS. He then saw V1 near the top of the PFD speed tape; and said or commented 'V1'. After hearing V1; I hesitated on the rotation because I didn't hear Vr. A quick glance at the PFD airspeed blue line confirmed we were well above it; however; what I didn't recognize was the blue line that we were well past was at 100 KTS and not V1. The V2 speed had dropped out and the blue line speed defaulted to 100 KTS. -The correct V2 dropped from the FMS and the 100 KTS default speed was displayed on the PFD. -An early rotation was initiated as a result of this; and miscommunication. I heard V1; but the intent was not to call V1. It was uttered somewhat as a 'surprise'. -V1; Vr and V2 were entered into the FMS and V2 bug set on standby airspeed indicator during the performance check; and confirmed again during the 'below the line' portion of the before takeoff checklist. -I relied on the blue line as a reference and being above it rather than the actual speed. -Even though I had heard V1 and confirmed we were above the blue line; I now make it a habit to confirm the speeds on both the PFD and standby airspeed indicators. -Pay even more attention to the actual speed; rather than the speed in relation the blue line. -Make a mental note of the takeoff speeds

Airbus Captain experienced a loss of V speeds during the takeoff roll resulting in the First Officer calling V1 well before the actual V1 and the Captain initiating rotation. The Captain notes the sluggish rotation and the aircraft is allowed to fly off the runway.