elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1598959

201812

1801-2400

ELP.TRACON

TX

8000.0

TRACON ELP

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Facility ELP.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1598959

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was an IFR overflight. I was the OJTI and my Developmental took the handoff on the aircraft. As the aircraft crossed the boundary; I realized he was leaving an 085 MVA into an 080 MVA. We were already talking to the aircraft when he was in the 085 MVA and the aircraft was level at 080. This is my fault for not catching it sooner. This was never an [issue] in the past. Recently ZAB has been allowing overflights to enter our airspace level at 080. The lowest IFR altitude for ELP should be at least 090 due to all the terrain we have. The rumor mill told me it's in the process of being put into our LOA with ZAB that the lowest usable altitude for ELP is 090. This can take months to get through all the approvals it needs.

ELP Tracon Controller reported a developmental controller took handoff on aircraft at an altitude below the MVA.

1865101

202112

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1865101

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

While starting #2 engine during push back; the flight deck crew heard an unusual; but unidentified; noise. At approximately 23% N2; the First Officer observed N2 RPM stopped increasing and began to decrease. At about the same time; the tug driver reported sparks and smoke coming from the #2 engine. The stop attempt was terminated (fuel had not been introduced) and the aircraft was returned to the gate and subsequently taken out of service.

B737-800 Captain reported an unknown noise and lack of power while starting the number two engine.

1339829

201603

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

1200.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

VOR / VORTAC ZZZ

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 720; Flight Crew Type 250

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1339829

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Established on the final approach course for the VOR approach; 8 mile DME from the airport (3 miles from the final approach fix); the published altitude is 2400 ft MSL. The student I was teaching was flying the aircraft. I initiated a simulated; partial-panel situation by placing a card over the G1000 display; simulating an AHRS/ADC failure. The student proceeded to turn the aircraft and descend simultaneously. After correcting a minor course deviation; I looked down at my standby altimeter. I saw the needle on the number 2 (believing we were at 2200 ft MSL; 200 ft below the published altitude for that portion of the approach.) I soon realized we were at 1200 ft MSL. I assumed control of the aircraft and initiated a climb. The Tower called my tail number and issued a Low Altitude Alert. I informed the controller we were aware of the error and were in the process of correcting it. I am a recently certified Instrument Flight Instructor; with very little experience as an Instrument Flight Instructor. We were in a high stress portion of the flight; and I neglected to pay attention to altitude along with the course deviation I was trying to correct. This was a learning experience as an instructor; and as a pilot.

A C172 flight instructor reported that the pilot being given instrument instruction had descended well below the published altitude on a VOR approach.

1255928

201404

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

17500.0

VMC

Cloudy; Icing

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Visual Approach

Class A ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 3080; Flight Crew Type 3080

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1255928

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Weather; Airspace Structure

Weather

Prior to departure I contacted FSS automated service and received Outlook Briefing and evaluated Duats weather radar and other related data early that morning. Early afternoon I contacted FSS again and received a full Standard Briefing in addition to consulting the Duats data. The briefing at that time related that the weather; icing conditions would clear out of the area by our expected arrival time; and that flight towards the southern part of the state would enable VFR conditions. We departed mid afternoon and flew the route of flight as planned; climbing VFR until reaching cruise altitude at 17;500. Cloud density increased with us flying on top. The cloud tops appeared to be reasonably level with clear conditions above and were layered and varied from approximately 15;000 up requiring deviation from course to remain VFR. Mid flight; I estimated the cloud elevation to enable VFR all the way until our destination.At cruise to the west; the cloud tops were higher than estimated. Restricted flight areas to the north and south of our course intimidated me from deviating from course. The aircraft is equipped with prop de-ice and pitot heat; but is not equipped for flight into known icing conditions. When it became apparent that I needed to deviate from the VFR altitude to remain clear of clouds and safe from potential icing conditions; I began a climb which required a deviation into Class A airspace and simultaneously established Freq for ATC. I contacted ARTCC and was instructed to Standby. During the standby; I was required to climb to approximately 19;300 to remain clear of clouds. Upon ATC re-establishing contact; I informed them of altitude; conditions and requested clearance. ATC was helpful in providing vectors; and on the IMC descent we encountered moderate icing conditions build up in a short time; until breaking clear of clouds to establish visual approach to the airport. After the event and upon reflection; I should have established 7700 on the transponder and established contact with ATC prior to entering the Class A space. At the time the load of flying the airplane with control; clear of icing conditions; near restricted airspace with mountain terrain and two passengers prevented me from taking that clear action. Alternatively I could have turned the plane around and returned to my departure airport.

A Pilot departed a mountainous area VFR in VMC and climbed to 17;500 feet. He climbed to 19;500 feet before contacting ATC for clearance because the cloud tops rose.

1235937

201502

0601-1200

HCF.TRACON

HI

33000.0

Daylight

TRACON HCF

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A HCF

TRACON HCF

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A HCF

Facility HCF.TRACON

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1235937

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working R3/7 combined on the mid shift when Aircraft X departed HNL without prior coordination from HNL tower. This aircraft was assigned FL330. Aircraft Y departed KOA after receiving a clearance from Honolulu Center with an assigned altitude of FL330. Both of these aircraft were cleared via the same initial routing of APACK R463 AUNTI. Aircraft X routing then diverged at AUNTI via A332 HELOP ... to CYVR. Aircraft Y routing continued on R463 to ALCOA to KSFO. The time between these 2 aircraft was 12 minutes with the faster aircraft (Aircraft X M079) in front of the slower aircraft (Aircraft Y M078). This situation has happened 100's of times over the years with no problems. However; in this instance; the ZOA controller refused to accept Aircraft Y at FL330 'Because these aircraft are crossing and we need 15 minutes'. This is not a true statement. These aircraft were on same and constantly diverging routes where 10 minutes is the minimum separation standard. ZOA wouldn't accept this aircraft unless it was issued an IADOF altitude of FL320. To make this situation worse was the fact that moderate turbulence was being reported below FL330.This is absolutely unacceptable for a controller to not know what the separation standard is between 2 IFR aircraft they have separation responsibility for. If the equipment (ATOPS) that ZOA uses doesn't recognize what separation needs to be applied the controller needs to have the ability to override this. HCF needs to have ATOPS installed to ensure a smoother transition from RADAR separation to OCEANIC Non-radar separation since ZOA doesn't have the ability to override what the ATOPS is erroneously telling the controller.

HCF Controller describes a situation where ZOA Oceanic wouldn't accept an aircraft at an altitude because the ZOA controller thought they needed 15 minutes of separation. They only need 10 minutes of separation according to the HCF Controller.

1182899

201406

0601-1200

PAO.Airport

CA

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

2000

Tower PAO

Corporate

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Traffic Watch

Cruise

Class D PAO

Tower PAO

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 450

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1182899

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was the pilot of an aircraft flying along US-101 Southbound to the Dumbarton Auto Bridge Eastbound at 1;500 feet. Next to the bridge is [a company's] headquarters campus; where a Cessna was making multiple circles over and through the traffic watch corridors. This pilot constantly flew under my aircraft within 100-200 feet without any regard for avoiding a collision. I was forced to climb 200 feet just to clear him multiple times; since he was also at 1;500 feet. When turning from US-101 South to the Dumbarton Bridge; I was forced to widen my turn and fly closer to the Palo Alto Airport in order to avoid a collision. This is when a near miss collision with another aircraft occurred; and the basis of this report. Another aircraft departing from Palo Alto made a left crosswind departure at the Dumbarton Bridge. This wasn't visually noticed since I was trying to avoid a collision with the aircraft making wide turns over [the company headquarters]. Palo Alto Tower called out traffic at 1 o'clock in the upwind; which I said I had in sight. However; I had called the upwind traffic that just took off. The Tower was talking about a different aircraft. He then told the twin aircraft about me. This is the second where we both made visual contact with each other. His position was masked by my nose; but there should have been no excuse for him not to see me. He was a low wing aircraft that should have cleared seen my position against the overcast cloud layer and with my landing lights on. We were near head on collision course with a slight left offset. We both turned to the left; with me at a 30-45 degree instant bank angle. That pilot should have listened for my route; since I said it to the Tower only 2 minutes prior. Palo Alto Tower should have told the twin aircraft to stop his climb and level off at 1000 feet; which would have prevented our collision course. Palo Alto Tower also should have told the twin about me before he told me about him; which would have also caused the pilot time to think and stop his climb. Palo Alto Tower also did not tell any other pilot about the aircraft circling the campus; which was dangerously close to our route; and would have been a factor for the twin as well. Overall; I felt that the Controller at Palo Alto Tower failed to provide the separation to our aircraft within his airspace; and that both other aircraft pilots had no regard for scanning for traffic and demanded that other aircraft get of their way.

Pilot reports of a NMAC while avoiding another aircraft that is also close to him.

1604032

201812

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

11000.0

Night

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR JAGGR

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 278

Situational Awareness

1604032

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

While on the descent into DEN we were cleared to descend via the JAGGR 3 Arrival. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and briefed the arrival followed by the ILS to Runway 16L. At approximately point DANDD on the arrival; Denver Approach cleared us to cross QWIKE at 11;000 FT and to expect the RNAV (RNP) 17R. The Captain went heads down and reprogrammed the box and verbally stated that we would use the QWIKE transition. The approach was briefed appropriately. Shortly thereafter we were cleared the approach. At point STAAM on the approach; the Captain stated that the aircraft wasn't descending to the next altitude. We both looked at the MCP; ND and PFD to verify all appropriate modes. After passing point STAAM it became evident that our aircraft was not following the RF. The Captain quickly took the autopilot off and made a left turn to follow the RF. I went heads down and saw that there was a discontinuity in the FMC where the arrival ended and the approach began. I tried to remedy the problem by closing the discontinuity; but at the same time DEN Approach called informing us we were 1 NM north of the course. They offered the Visual Approach to 17R and we accepted. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Any changes in the FMC or control modes needs to be confirmed by both pilots prior to execution. This is a negative trend amongst most pilots.

B737-800 First Officer reported track and altitude deviations occurred on the JAGGR3 Arrival into DEN.

1238492

201502

0601-1200

VMC

Dawn

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation

Air/Ground Communication

Boeing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1238492

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

From start to finish of flight including taxi out; ATC complained of a stuck MIC. It took us three to four frequency changes for us to realize that it was our aircraft. We investigated the possibility of it being us with stuck MIC every time a Controller said something about it and received successful radio checks each time. We ended up figuring out it was the FO's yoke switch and ended up disconnecting all his MICs and going to alternate mode on the FO's side and still had reports of hot MIC on our previous frequency that we had in radio number two; while we used radio number one. We advised ATC of our issue and landed uneventfully. When debriefing with Maintenance Control and his investigation into malfunction; it appears that a new yoke MIC switch (FO's side) was installed incorrectly the night prior; which led to a hot MIC connection without any activation of the switch. Basically the aircraft MIC was hardwired hot from the time power was applied to it. While we trouble shot it every time; ATC issued a warning we did not think it was us until we realized the issue was following us through our frequencies. Chief Pilot was contacted and debriefed accordingly; we also advised Maintenance and Dispatch to report the issue. [Recommend] Re-evaluate Maintenance Control's evaluation procedures as related to communication equipment repair and operation's check. ATC in all phases of flight putting out that someone had a stuck MIC.

Pilot reports that from start to finish of flight including taxi out; ATC complained of a stuck MIC. A new MIC switch was installed incorrectly on the First Officer's yoke the night prior; which led to a hot MIC connection without any activation of the switch on their B737 aircraft.

1726680

202002

0001-0600

ZZZ.Tower

US

3000.0

Marginal

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Go Around

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1726680

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

During approach to the runway we went down to minimums and began to execute a missed approach. I disconnected the autopilot and advanced the power to climb and called for go-around thrust flaps 8. The positive rate gear up call was missed; but I believe I called for speed mode and nav mode as briefed with the First Officer beforehand. The First Officer became busy on the radios and flying the airplane became a secondary thing. Our speed accelerated as I pitched down to maintain 3;000 ft. as assigned. However the flaps were still extended and I reduced the power quickly to avoid over speeding the flaps. As that occurred I lost situational awareness and began to get spatially disoriented as I checked to see what was going on. In doing so we banked into a 30 degree bank to the left and began to lose altitude. Our airspeed quickly increased to 280 kts. and we got a 'sink rate; pull up' aural alerter. I recovered the airplane from a bad situation and was then able to clean up and get the airplane back into a stable stage in flight.I believe pushing the limits of my abilities in a new aircraft to me was a contributing factor. Although the First Officer and myself were legal to fly together; and the weather was legal for us to Dispatch; I believe our lack of experience and abilities were a contributing factor. This was also my 5th day of duty. Although I felt rested physically; I believe mental fatigue played a role.Although the First Officer and I had briefed the missed approach procedure and call outs; it still wasn't enough. I need to slow things down and make sure that both of us are doing our jobs. I also believe I need to speak up if I feel uncomfortable about a situation. The First Officer said he hadn't flown in nearly 3 weeks and I was new to the airplane. There were enough caution bells going off before leaving however I felt pressured to go. I wish this event hadn't happened; but I have definitely learned from it.

A CJ700 Captain reported temporarily losing control of the aircraft while conducting a missed approach.

1874399

202202

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1200.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 230

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1874399

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 1; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was flying and another aircraft was coming my direction in close proximity. I made an evasive maneuver to avoid contact.

Pilot reported taking evasive action during an NMAC with another aircraft.

1330767

201602

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Taxi

BAe 125 Series 800

Part 135

Parked

Aircraft Documentation

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance

1330767

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

I am writing this issue as I feel the ASAP needs to get this issue resolved. It has to do to a damaged Airworthiness Certificate and what constitutes it being 'legible'.I already filed a report over this in the past over the discrepancy of what the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) states and how maintenance addresses this issue but would like to repost this. The FOM states.[That this company] is authorized to operate an aircraft with damaged or missing airworthiness. Maintenance records a deferral; stating the aircraft is operated with missing certificate under exemption.If one of these certificates is damaged or missing; notify the company.As you can see; the FOM completely differs from how maintenance interprets this as the FOM states 'damage'. What is bothersome is that even in my last closure letter; the ASAP seemed to state what completely contradicts the FOM. So even though I am hesitate to apply standards contrary to what the FOM states; I will but then would like further explanation on what the maintenance mean by 'legible' as what was stated in my last closure letter. In the case of that Airworthiness Certificate; I believe it was ripped leading me to my concerns. However; in the case of this one; the damage was so bad that letters were missing from the wording of the Airworthiness Certificate.For me; I can't see how having letters missing making me interpret the intent can fall under this and still be valid? The other concern I have is going out of the country and having foreign officials and our own Customs review this Airworthiness Certificate. The issue that started this was when I was questioned about the condition of an Airworthiness Certificate by US Customs but it was only a verbal mention of it and nothing more. However; it was enough of a concern to me to start following the guidance of the FOM and deferring the Airworthiness Certificate. Initially this wasn't a problem and now I am getting pushback from maintenance and the Chief Pilot over this.In the example; I first wrote it up in and deferred it under the deferred process. Two day later; I returned to the aircraft to see the mechanics signed it off as legible and intact. To me this was a stretch to use 'legible'; but with the center missing a small section in the middle and corners missing; it definitely wasn't intact. Therefore; I sent a picture of the Airworthiness Certificate to the ACP as well as mentioning the guidance in the FOM on how to proceed with a damaged Airworthiness Certificate. The ACP and I never heard back from him but did mention to him I was deferring it again. Later I got a call from the Chief Pilot of my fleet asking me about the problem. I explained to him my concerns and he said he was fine with me deferring it which I did and it was processed and we flew our 2 legs.When we ended up we had a Aircraft on Ground (AOG) issue and wrote it up and went off to the hotel. It was while in rest I got an email from the Chief Pilot which stated; 'the aircraft is fine brother. Need you to send in a entered in error or call me'. Shortly after that I got an email from the Steward to call him when I got a chance. As I was in rest; I didn't call Chief Pilot back and then later in rest I got a new brief taking me off the airplane and was airlining out. Seeing how I had the union rep reach out to me; I called and talked to him about this. I did send him a picture of the Airworthiness Certificate; the first maintenance loge with it deferred and signed off as 'legible and intact'; a copy of what the FOM states; and my argument of why I felt it wasn 't legible. He wanted to give me a heads up that in the morning I would be dealing with this issue and be aware of this and use the escalation policy as necessary. This was nice to know and I appreciated him giving me the heads upHowever; as I mentioned; shortly after this while in rest my brief was changed to airline the next day. When looking at the mobile manager; I noticed in the notes that it stated that Chief Pilot had advised that the Airworthiness Certificate was good and for the mechanics to clear the deferral. Therefore; I am assuming the mechanics eventually signed it off. If they did; I hope they don't include the use of the word intact as it truly wasn't. I was surprised that Chief Pilot could do this but so be it.The next day; still concerned over this issue; I emailed Aircraft Documents; about this issue with a picture of the Airworthiness Certificate. She agreed it was damaged and that it should be deferred and could still be flow under the exemption the company has. However; this is when I learned something I wasn't aware of. She mentioned that the proper deferral allows for up to 10 days even though maintenance only uses 3 days. She mentioned that she has advised mainenace of this. I then mentioned to her that it would be nice to get this Airworthiness Certificate replaced but if Maintenance does indeed instruct the mechanics to sign it off; she will not be made aware of this. I never heard back from her but hopefully something will be done to address this.I mention this because as the regulations stipulate; the Airworthiness Certificate must be displayed for the all to see. For me; having this 'ratty' looking document exposed for all to see is subpar to say the least. One could say it is indicative of the condition of some of our airplanes; but either way; I feel it should be fixed. I sometimes think what would the company say if I let my uniform decay to the point of what we allow the Airworthiness Certificate on the airplane for all to see. However; that is just my personal opinion.The last item is to again mention how the deferred wording states when dealing with the Airworthiness Certificate which is 'missing/mutilated Airworthiness Certificate which is verbiage different from the FOM and different from my last closure letter. I just find it frustrating when we have a spelled out procedure in the FOM and we are being told to ignore it and use a different criteria in deciding to defer the Airworthiness Certificate. I think anytime we deviate from what the FOM states if it is indeed because of the nomenclature; it starts us down a very bad path.If the FOM procedure of dealing with a damaged Airworthiness Certificate is incorrect; then PLEASE change the wording to match the intent. If the Airworthiness Certificate CAN BE damaged but if the wording is legible or if letters are missing but you can infer what the word was; then say so and I will leave it be; as unprofessional as it looks but state this in the FOM. Please institute a program where [this company] can check these documents and make sure they are in the proper condition. I mentioned in my last [report] about having them laminated and I think that would fix the issue. The company should proactively do this and get them done so crews don't have to go through the pressure of correcting this themselves.

A Captain reported a disagreement with his company about the condition of the aircraft's airworthiness certificate and the length of time the aircraft was considered flyable following a report about the certificate's illegible condition.

1147530

201401

1801-2400

TFFF.Airport

FO

3.0

600.0

VMC

10

Night

CLR

TRACON TFFF

Air Carrier

Saab 340 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9200; Flight Crew Type 600

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1147530

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Automation Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Passing the final approach fix on the VOR approach to Runway 10 at TFFF we started our descent to minimums with an altitude restriction of 1;090 MSL before minimums. Before reaching the intermediate altitude the Controller advised us to exit the runway after landing via [Taxiway] A after which I reached for the airport diagram which I had on my left over my flight bag. When I looked back at my altimeter I was very surprised to see that we were reaching approach minimums already. I reacted by taking positive control of the aircraft; announcing my controls and disengaging the autopilot to get back when the Controller advised us that he got a terrain [low altitude] alert. I responded that we were at minimums and the Controller said 'Roger'. We never had a GPWS alert and this whole approach is conducted over the water. It was a clear night and I had the runway and the surroundings in sight from 12 miles out. We continued and made an uneventful landing and taxied to the ramp; my brand new First Officer; for whom I was conducting Initial Operating Experience; was not familiar with this airport and was the pilot flying.What I learned from this is to be very alert at all times and never take my eyes of what's going on and I strongly assure you that this will never happen again.

A Check Airman providing initial operating experience to a new First Officer was distracted by a runway exit clearance provided by the Tower and; while he researched the airport page the First Officer descended excessively triggering a low altitude alert from ATC.

1091647

201306

1801-2400

MDW.Airport

IL

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MDW

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Tower MDW

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Landing

Class C MDW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Type 189

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1091647

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 185

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1091687.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

MDW was busy like usual around this time. Traffic continually landing 4R. On pushback; we were asked if we wanted 31C. Said yes. We were cleared to lineup and wait 31C. We acknowledged and then lined up. Then we were cleared for takeoff. I read this back verbatim; 'Heading 250 cleared for takeoff 31C Company Flight Number.' But; I think ATC MEANT to clear holding traffic on 4R for takeoff instead. Anyway; an aircraft had to go-around on 4R shortly after we started our takeoff roll.

Departing MDW primary runway in use was 4R. Ground asked if we could accept 31C. We advised we were able 31C. After all required checklists completed; we were cleared to line up and wait 31C. There were several aircraft on final for 4R. Tower then cleared Company aircraft to line up and wait on 4R. As traffic cleared 4R; Tower cleared us; 'Company Flight Number; cleared for takeoff. No delay.' Without delay we began our takeoff roll. At about 80 knots; I heard Tower and Company aircraft on 4R discussing who was cleared for takeoff. Tower instructed an aircraft on final for 4R to go-around. We continued as my outside scan indicated no threats. Tower then repeated; 'Company Flight Number; cleared for takeoff.' Takeoff and climbout were normal and uneventful. Upon reflection; it is apparent that the Tower Controller cleared our aircraft for takeoff on 31C when he meant to clear Company aircraft for takeoff on 4R. Tower Controller seemed briefly unaware of what he had done; but recovered nicely by acting quickly to instruct aircraft on final to go-around and to re-clear us for takeoff; so there was no confusion on our part. Tower definitely cleared us for takeoff and; as is often the case; without delay. Had I been aware of how close the aircraft on short final was to touch down (1.5 miles maybe?); I could have questioned the clearance. But; the controllers at MDW are so competent at multiple runway departures and traffic flow; we assumed he had time to clear us for takeoff and then clear Company for takeoff on a crossing runway with no problem. This was not a near-miss situation. It was just a Controller who cleared the wrong aircraft for takeoff but then responded appropriately to his mistake.

B737-700 flight crew read back the takeoff clearance and started their takeoff roll from Runway 31C at MDW; ATC directed an aircraft on final for Runway 4R to go-around. Flight crew suspected the takeoff clearance may have been intended for an aircraft lined up and awaiting clearance for takeoff from Runway 4R; thus precluding the use of the runway for the go-around aircraft.

1124569

201310

0601-1200

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Service

1124569

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1125084.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Just finished service and began to pick up on aircraft. I heard call lights go off and got up to answer and cabin was filled with smoke and immediately started to look for fire in overhead bins and bathrooms. I then informed the No. 1 that there was no fire in the galley or bathroom then retrieved oxygen for me and customers who may have needed it. I then asked everyone to cover noses and pull their seatbacks up; and that we will be landing. As I did that [I was] going to the back to get my checklist from my manual and assisting passengers with wet cloths to their noses. As I was doing that the No. 1 made a PA to don life vests as a precaution to landing in water and we also donned ours. So me and the No. 4 where getting everyone to lower their heads to get below the smoke and be able to breath better and assisting people that needed help to put on life vests. Once everyone was seated with nose covered we took our seats for landing and landed safely. The No 1. told me to open the 3L door and to get fresh air for the cabin and she opened the 1L after we landed. By then the smoke had cleared up. The aircraft was towed to area to be unloaded and ramp stands where used to deplane the passengers. I think that engine failed and that is why we had to land.

I was the Purser and approximately 2:30 hrs into the flight the Number 3 Flight Attendant tells me there is smoke in the cabin. I looked into the cabin and saw a thick cloud of smoke quickly taking over the cabin. Passengers began to ring call lights and to complain. I quickly called the Captain; it took about 3 sets of chimes for him to finally respond. He responded and told me he was aware of the emergency and his plan to land as ASAP. I gathered the halon; and walked around oxygen and PBE. I walked over to [another Flight Attendant] who was checking the mid galley for possible sources of fire. After looking through lavatories and overhead bins; we determined there was no fire in the cabin. The Number 3 Flight Attendant and I decided to look for the Emergency checklist and were able to read up to 9. It was very difficult to read and make sense of this chart; in part do to the low visibility and the oxygen mask over my face. After reading number 9 I decided to abandon the list and go from memory. Since landing was quickly approaching and without communication from Captain (NO TEST info); I decided to do things as best as I recalled from training. I ask passengers to put on the life vest; make sure the floor space in front of their feet was clear and to assist their neighbors. I walked through the cabin to check on the passengers and found many had difficulty opening the life vest. This took away precious time since I personally had to open it for them. I made a prepare for landing PA and reassured passengers that we DID NOT anticipate landing in the water; but we were asking them to wear the life vest as a precaution. I took my jump seat and waited for landing. After a safe landing; I told the passengers we were safe and out of danger and recommended that they hug each other for comfort. I did this mostly to release tension and to reassure them that we were in fact out of danger. As the fire trucks and ground personnel took care of the airplane. I continued to stay on the PA and kept them informed of the situation.

B757 cabin crew describe a cabin smoke event caused by an engine malfunction and diversion to the nearest suitable airport.

1667570

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

210.0

10.0

3000.0

Mixed

Rain; Turbulence; 5

Daylight

3000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 65

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1667570

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Weather

Weather

In route back to home airport ZZZ in Aircraft X. Landed at ZZZ1 to let a line of storms pass then filed IFR to ZZZ. Opened IFR in air about 5 miles west of ZZZ1. I requested GPS into ZZZ with possible future request of a contact Approach as another line of storms was moving into approach area of runway 5. Weather was scattered to broken 700 AGL at ZZZ with layer approximately 3;000 MSL. Multiple cells moving through today. I was cleared direct ZZZZZ to begin the GPS 5 approach into ZZZ. Controller never approved my contact Approach request. While on a 240 heading in route to ZZZZZ I began to get in severe turbulence due to nearness of approaching storm and I turned right to a heading of approximately 360 which would intercept the FAF ZZZZZ1 vs. flying full route into worsening weather without telling [ZZZ TRACON] why. I again requested a contact Approach or vectors to final and did not receive either. I do not remember how exactly the rest of communication went with [ZZZ TRACON]. I was able to cancel approach from the air and land at ZZZ. I should have immediately told [ZZZ TRACON] I was deviating due to severe turbulence vs just requesting vectors to final or a contact approach.

SR22 pilot reported deviation for weather and severe turbulence without ATC approval.

1005948

201204

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Taxi

Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Part 135

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Inspection; Installation; Work Cards

Main Rotor

Aerospatiale/ Eurocopter

X

Hangar / Base

Air Taxi

Other / Unknown

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1005948

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft

Manuals

During the build-up of the Aft Flex coupling on the Main Rotor Drive System (MRDS); there was some question on what the correct orientation of the beveled washer. Reference Aerospatiale AS350 Eurocopter Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 63-11-00; Paragraph 4-2. The Maintenance note states: 'NOTE: The face of the washers that makes a curve must point to the flexible coupling'. The curved face of the washer is easily mistaken for the flat side. Previous revisions of the AMM showed a very clear illustration that helped avoid this confusion. It would help if it was reinstated to the newer manuals.

A Maintenance Supervisor reports their new Aerospatiale/Eurocopter AS350 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (AMM) do not have a clear Maintenance illustration reference to help determine the correct orientation of a beveled washer during build-up of the Aft Flex coupling; compared to the old manuals for the Main Rotor Drive System (MRDS).

1763953

202009

0.0

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1763953

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Other sitting stand-by

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was sitting standby and had a mask on for at least 4 hours. It has been a long time since I walked into in-flight. I feel very uncomfortable and unsafe not knowing who people are because we are all covered up. There is no way to look at your ID and know that it is the same person behind a mask. Again; as I traveled home; once released from stand by; I had a headache. This is a reoccurring event due to wearing a mask; and this time I was not even on a plane. As I return to work full time; I am very concerned about not feeling comfortable being able to see my pilots' and crews' faces. I have many studies showing that healthy people should not be wearing masks. This is not a new subject; it has been studied years ago.And I believe OSHA says that it is not safe as well. I am also very concerned about the spraying of the aircraft and would like to know the chemicals used. I take my health seriously and would never put it in the trust of anyone other than myself.

Flight Attendant reported several concerns with individuals having to wear face masks.

1763842

202009

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

60000.0

Center ZZZ

Military

U2/TRI

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Traffic Management

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1763842

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

ZZZ1 started a side-stream handoff on Aircraft X at 60;000 ft. to ZZZ ARTCC. Center flight plan showed the route of flight ZZZ5 […] ZZZ5. The flight plan showed a delay of 4+55 at ZZZ4 and never coming close to ZZZ. The pilot ended up on an incorrect ZZZ UHF frequency and they in turn shipped the aircraft to the correct sector frequency which was the sector that the aircraft was in. The CIC (Controller in Charge) called the ZZZ1 supervisor to try and figure out the route of flight. The CIC was unsuccessful in finding out what the exact route of flight was. I was told about the situation and I directed our TMU (Traffic Management Unit) to contact ZZZ1 TMU to try and determine what the aircraft's intentions were. ZZZ MOS (Military Operation Specialist) was able to contact ZZZ1 MOS and they faxed a depiction of the route of flight which had no flight plan information. The depiction showed the aircraft flying southeast after ZZZ2 but the map did not have the range to display ZZZ's portion of the flight. I called the ZZZ1 Operation manager who was not aware of the situation. The ZZZ1 MOS provided a point of contact (Person A) for the mission. I called Person A and he was unwilling to provide the route of flight. I explained that this aircraft was in controlled airspace and the controllers had no idea where the aircraft was going. By this time the aircraft was 190 miles inside of our airspace. He said that he was unable to provide the route of flight on an unsecured line. He said that the aircraft was going to go a little bit further east and then make a loop back to ZZZ2. Then he said that the aircraft was going to go to ZZZ3 and make a loop. I said that he obviously knew what the points along the flight plan was and that is what I was looking for. He again was unwilling to provide the route of flight. I inquired about this 'loop'. I asked if the aircraft was making a left turn direct ZZZ2 after ZZZ3. We were concerned about the aircraft turning right into Mexico. Person A stated that a loop meant that the aircraft would do one turn in holding with a 30 mile leg at ZZZ3. Then he stated that the pilot may make another loop 100 miles east of ZZZ2 before heading to ZZZ2. Person A stated that this was all coordinated with ZZZ1. I explained that the aircraft is now over 200 miles inside of ZZZ's airspace and that we have no coordination of what is happening. The aircraft flew from ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 where the pilot made a left hand turn in holding and then proceeded to the ZZZZZ area and made a right hand turn in holding and then back into ZZZ1 airspace.ZZZ put in a route that would get the datablock to process back to ZZZ1 but was still not the exact routing that the pilot was cleared. We never did figure out what the route of flight was. ZZZ1 needs to properly update an aircraft's route of flight before making a handoff. These types of missions need to be coordinated with ZZZ's airspace and procedures office before the mission begins.

A Center Traffic Management Specialist reported a military aircraft entered their airspace without proper coordination from the adjacent Center.

1849671

202110

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Nose Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127; Flight Crew Total 1465; Flight Crew Type 163

1849671

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 510; Flight Crew Type 40

1850105.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

On [Date]; Aircraft X suffered from a hard landing; which resulted in nose wheel locking issue. The airplane went into Maintenance and got out that same day ([Date]).On [Date1] [two days later]; the next flight took place; as part of student's MEL (Multi-Engine Land) add-on training. That was the first flight since the airplane left Maintenance. When we put the master switch on; we had indications of a nose wheel issue. We restart the master switch; and the indications disappear. I decided to takeoff - knowing that the Maintenance checked on this problem and verified the plane was safe to fly. We had a normal takeoff; normal flight where we practice maneuvers; and then we came back to practice traffic patterns. We had a normal landing. We taxied back to the runway - and didn't have any indications for landing gear issue.We took off again; had to do 1 go around due to traffic on the runway; and came back for 1 last landing. We had the gear down on midfield downwind; with all the indications showing that the gear is down and lock. I personally verified that indication - on downwind; base and final as I always do. We did a short field landing to the 1;000 ft. mark. We had a normal approach and landing. Main wheels touched first; and the moment the nosewheel touched the ground; it collapsed. I took the controls immediately; shutting the engines off; announced on the CTAF; and evacuate the airplane after securing it.

I was practicing a mock check ride with my CFI on [Date]; we started from ZZZ around XA:10 and flew to [the practice] area which is southwest of ZZZ1 to practice some maneuvers; we came back around XB:00 after a short flight to practice a couple of landings; the landing was incident free. We taxied back and took off for the second pattern work; the whole pattern looked wonderful; on short final we saw a aircraft just landed and still on runway so my CFI instructed me to go around which I did at once; during my second attempt to land; I engaged the landing gear mid-field and I even told my CFI three green; no red and one on mirror; my downwind; base and final approach went perfect; on short final I reduced my speed to 75 kts. for a short filed landing and aimed for the 1000 ft. marker; I idled both the engines before 200 ft. to the 1000 ft. marker and the aircraft came to a slow touchdown; I touched down with the main gears first and kept the nose gear up for another 50 ft. to further slow down. When I dropped the nose gear the nose sinked down and touched down the runway; the nose landing gear did not show any resistance; my CFI took control at this point and kept the aircraft on the runway as it was drifting right; he then made the announcement on the CTAF to close the runway before shutting off the master switchI had earlier flown this same aircraft [two days prior] with another Instructor; that is when we came to know that this aircraft suffered a hard landing that morning and it set the unsafe landing gear alert; the Mechanic did stop by and did some minor repairs before our flight and cleared us for that flight but requested us to bring the aircraft back to hangar after we are done; which we did.I see from the log book that between both my flights no other pilot flew this aircraft.

Flight Instructor and Student flying a PA-44 aircraft reported the nose landing gear collapsed during landing. On a previous flight; the aircraft had suffered a hard landing and a mechanic had made minor repairs and then released the aircraft.

1229057

201412

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

1500.0

VMC

Windy

Poor Lighting

Dusk

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

1229057

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

Delayed 4 hours for arrival into SFO due to high winds. Conditions at field were dusk or nearly dark; winds 010 @30 gust 45. Assigned and briefed LOC28L Circle to Land RW01R with break-out at San Mateo Bridge. Just prior to the bridge they switched us to Circle land RW01L; we continued. As we begun the circle; we programmed the box for RW01L; 5 mile centerline; 3deg GP (there are no approaches for landing north at SFO.) We closed up the discontinuities and because the course did not auto-populate; we chose direct to first fix. The magenta line curved inside the 5 mile fix; it looked reasonable in relation to our position with the airport. We began circle at 1;900 feet configured to gear and flaps 15. We elected to stay in LNAV/VNAV and AP for safety. Turning base to final we received a GPWS alert and executed a go around. The go around went well; we climbed to 5;000 feet and were vectored for same approach again; but this time landing RW01R. We ran the checklists; and discussed what went wrong. We quickly identified our errors in using a 5 mile extension; and using too much automation for a visual/unusual maneuver. We decided to draw a 3 mile extension only as a reference; and flew without AP. For some reason the PDI did not work on this approach; so we put RW01R in the fix page; and used 3 to 1 to make sure were on GP. Lining up with the runway went well; but there are no approach lights/PAPI; lots of ground clutter; a very challenging runway to pick up at night in such a high work-load environment

A B737 flight crew went around after a GPWS alert sounded while they were circling to land at SFO on RWY 01L. On the next approach they shortened the final segment from five miles to three miles and were able to fly the approach without the GPWS sounding.

1112726

201308

1801-2400

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Other / Unknown

1112726

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Taxiing out to Runway 13 at LGA; we were informed by ATC that our departure fix; PARKE; was ground stopped due to weather and that we would have to taxi onto Runway 13 to get back in line. We were issued the instruction; taxi onto Runway 13 and hold short of AA. We taxied onto the runway and were looking for AA. At about the same time; we were given the instruction; turn right onto AA and join P to hold short of BB. We were having difficulty locating AA from the runway. It was a reverse high speed turn; so we expected not to see a taxi lead in line; and because they do not use taxi lights on the pier; only reflectors; we knew it would be difficult. We were both heads up trying to find the taxiway. We saw what looked like a reverse; from our direction; taxi lead in line and started our turn. We thought we saw the taxiway reflectors and were about 90 degrees to the runway centerline when we noticed we were incorrect; and that we almost turned onto an area that was not a taxiway and stopped the aircraft. ATC at about the same time told us to hold our position. At this point we told them we made a wrong turn; but we can turn back and head towards AA. The controller waited until the next aircraft rolled out on the crossing runway; and then had us turn towards and hold short of AA. I never saw the sign for AA to hold short; but saw the 4/22 hold short line and held there. Once another aircraft had rolled out; we were cleared onto AA then P to hold short of BB. As we were waiting for takeoff; we noticed another aircraft; a MD-88; make basically the same exact error we did; and almost turn onto an area that was not a taxiway. Night; no taxiway lights just reflectors; poor signage; poor ground markings. Do not use AA for night taxiing from the 13 direction. Add a sign for Taxiway AA. Add taxiway edge lights.

After arriving at Runway 13 for takeoff; a CRJ200 Captain is advised that his departure gate is closed due to weather and to taxi onto Runway 13 and exit at AA. The crew cannot find the taxiway due to poor lighting and a lack of signs; requiring some assistance from ATC.

1789991

202102

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

94.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Learjet 55

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8250; Flight Crew Type 600

1789991

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Other IGI

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 350

1789997.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

During initial climb (FL280) TR [Thrust Reverser] #1 unlock light illuminated and horn sounded. We ran the unlock light in flight checklist with no effect on the TR light and horn. In the interest of safety we performed a Precautionary Shut Down Checklist to avoid possible TR deployment in flight. We [advised ATC] and diverted to [a suitable alternate airport].

During initial climb - TR [Thrust Reverser] #1 unlock light illuminated and horn sounded. We ran the 'unlock light in flight' checklist with no effect on the TR light and horn. In the interest of safety we performed a 'precautionary shut down' checklist to avoid possible TR deployment in flight. We [advised ATC] and diverted.

LR-55 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after precautionary shutdown of #1 engine due to a thrust reverser unlock light illuminating in flight.

1866499

202201

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

50.0

36000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

HS 125 Series

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Reverser Position Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215; Flight Crew Total 1805; Flight Crew Type 854

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1866499

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

My first officer and I were in the cruise segment of our flight at FL360 southbound from ZZZ heading towards ZZZ1 when we received the indication/annunciator that the right thrust reverser had unlocked and the light indication illuminated. I immediately began to slow the aircraft and asked the First Officer to get us a lower altitude. We were handed off to ZZZ1 Center who assigned us FL240. I used the air brakes to help slow us while maintaining a good rate of decent. Both thrust levers at idle. I instructed the FO (First Officer) to run the unlocked TR (Thrust Reverser) in flight checklist. ATC advised us that ZZZ2 was approximately 50 miles away from our position and we asked for vectors there. The checklist instructed us to shut down the affected engine. I delayed doing this until we were lower. In hindsight I don't think it would have made any difference to just shut it down at the time of reading. The TR never deployed and the light began intermittently going on and off. Around 18;000 feet we shut down the right side or Number 2 engine as per the checklist. Advised ATC of fuel and SOB (Souls on Board) and they asked if we needed emergency services. I can't remember if we asked for it or not but they were waiting for us when we landed. We discussed and agreed that we would land Flaps 25 and upon touchdown my FO would select Flaps 45 upon touchdown to insure we could use Lift Dump/aerodynamic breaking; we were single engine with a 20 plus knot gusting crosswind being that we had a great deal of runway we agreed that this was the best configuration for our aircraft. The conditions were less than ideal but I wanted to get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible and as safely as we could. In hindsight; if I were to change any of my action the only other thing I would have done differently is check the winds at the destination; next time to make sure they are at least down the runway. I felt it was urgent to get down as quickly as possible in case the actual reverser were to deploy.

Captain reported an in flight shut down and diversion caused by a reverser unlocked light illuminating. The Flight Crew elected to divert and make a precautionary landing.

1343631

201603

1801-2400

ANC.Airport

AK

2100.0

Daylight

Tower ANC

Small Aircraft

1.0

VFR

Descent

Class C ANC

Tower ANC

Military

Fighter

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Class C ANC

Facility ANC.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1343631

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While working the local control position combined with Lake Hood. Aircraft X checked in on frequency inbound to Lake Hood; I observed Aircraft Y on final to EDF. I passed traffic to Aircraft X who was almost at the same altitude. Aircraft X advised that they did not have traffic in sight. I immediately turned Aircraft X on a right turn heading 360 immediately northbound; I asked if traffic was ever passed to them they advised negative. The closest proximity was about 100 feet; less than a mile. No MOR [mandatory occurrence report] was done. We questioned one of the supervisors as to why a MOR was not done and we were advised that sometimes when someone is signed on to Cedar the MOR goes into their record and is not seen on the facility log for that day.Lake Hood airspace needs to be addressed when it comes to EDF traffic.

ANC Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict between two aircraft. The reporter blamed a specific airspace as the problem and that the pilot was never issued traffic from a previous Controller.

1593076

201811

0601-1200

VNY.Airport

CA

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Tower VNY

Fractional

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1593076

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We were abeam VNY at 5000 MSL for runway 16R. They asked if we wanted the visual and we told them no; that we wanted vectors to final. I didn't want to try and stay within the mountains to the south while trying to lose that much altitude. They vectored us to final and nothing was unusual. About JINAT; we started getting some turbulence but; nothing unusual with the mountains there. Established inbound near FURRY we noticed we had a 47kt tailwind. We continued and asked for a wind check. At that point- maybe 2000 we had 27kt of tailwind. The tower said they were calm. We discussed things as none of this was forecast and it was clear. We then got a wind shear caution. As quick as we got that we started to balloon from the increase in performance and went white over white on the PAPI. We did a go around.We had briefed all the terrain and the MSA in all quadrants. We had also briefed the 1750' Hold down on the missed. When we started to go missed tower issued a climb to 4000' and runway heading. At about 1500' they said to stop the climb at 2000' and they would bring us back for 34. Said to turn right for the visual. At this point we were in the hills on the south end and 2000 was not going to keep us clear. We could not get a revised clearance in time and climbed on our own to avoid terrain. We maneuvered to get back for a landing on 34L.It was a total fiasco and really rattled me. I think it rattled ATC too as they were treating us like a small Cessna they could keep in close. We never got a terrain warning but did get a caution at one point and climbed up more. Clear sky; no clouds and calm winds on the ground. Nobody expected this and Tower should have kept us on the published missed and turned us over to approach to get vectors back. We stayed clear of the terrain on our own but; honestly; I don't know about airspace clearance. This really rattled my cage. By the time we took back off the winds were 340 gusting to 25.

Business jet First Officer reported a windshear missed approach in VNY led to a terrain warning when ATC did not utilize the published missed approach procedure.

1667378

201907

1801-2400

JFK.Airport

NY

IMC

Rain

Tower JFK

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B JFK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1667378

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1667750.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Planned for 22L arrival. On initial contact with arrival 22R was assigned.On short final GPWS constant 'below glide slope' call-outs. PAPI was all red. Noticing red side lights and PAPI location; I stated 'displaced-threshold'; Captain responded something like 'yes or got-it'. He reacted as if to land beyond. Power/Pitch. Landed close to displaced threshold; unsure if beyond or not.Change of planned runway. Lack of attention to airport diagram.

Planned on 22L ILS; cleared 22R ILS. Transitioned to visual when well clear of weather because of offset localizer; used 3 degree line on HUD; intended to land beyond displaced threshold and I think we did but not 100 percent sure.

B737 flight crew reported possibly landing before the displaced threshold by mistake.

995502

201202

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Tower ZZZ1

Military

Super King Air 200

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ; Class D ZZZ1

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

995502

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

[There was] a BE20 on Visual Approach to the military base; talking to GCA [and] a CRJ2 on Visual Approach to ZZZ talking to Local Control. The CRJ2 appeared to turn base at about 3 miles out; so I was no longer concerned with his separation from the BE20; but then the Conflict Alert (CA) went off; the CRJ2 had extended. I called Local Control; and he said that the CRJ2 was on base leg. I called GCA and told them that the CRJ2 was on base leg. I measured the distance between the 2 aircraft and got 2.68 miles. There were 4 over-flights over ZZZ; so data-tag clutter was an issue; but I should have ensured that the CRJ2 was restricted to a shorter downwind. Recommendation; pay better attention; I should have ensured that the CRJ2 was restricted to a 5-mile final before I switched him.

TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event involving a GCA Approach and a Visual Approach; the separation problem resulting from an extended downwind by the Visual Approach aircraft.

1026649

201207

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

10

Daylight

Personal

DA40 Diamond Star

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8.8; Flight Crew Total 3650.8; Flight Crew Type 455.8

Situational Awareness

1026649

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors

Rear passenger access door was inadvertently left open on takeoff roll; and departed the aircraft prior to liftoff; takeoff was aborted prior to liftoff. The canopy-open warning light had been cancelled while taxiing; as the front canopy was then locked in the partially open position to allow cooler air to enter the cockpit. The front canopy was closed and locked just prior to beginning the takeoff roll; but the rear access door was overlooked. The two composite tabs on the access door; which attach to the hinges; snapped and the access door blew off without impacting the aft fuselage or tail. Damage was limited to the access door and its support rod.

DA40-180 pilot reported he failed to close the rear passenger access door and it departed the aircraft on takeoff roll. Takeoff was aborted.

1066342

201302

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Carrier

B757-200

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation; Work Cards

Main Gear Wheel

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 25

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1066342

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

N

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

[This is in] reference Air Carrier Maintenance Computer System; Item XXX01; on a B757-200 aircraft. One of the # 5 main wheel tie bolts had a broken nut. This is a recurring problem. About five years ago; we had problems with the tie-bolts breaking; now it is the nuts. Part failure of main tire/wheel tie-bolt lock nuts.

Reporter stated they count their Main Landing Gear (MLG) tire positions from left to right across the front row of tires on both MLGs. So #4 main tire wheel position would be the Forward Right Outboard (O/B) main tire on the right MLG. He has recently seen two tie-bolt lock nuts split open horizontally; with gaps that were paralleled with the tie-bolts at the #5 main tire (left MLG; aft O/B position) and the other at #6 main (left MLG; Aft Inboard (I/B)) position. Previous to that he has found lock nuts completely missing from tie-bolts; but couldn't remember if the threads on the tie-bolts were damaged. Reporter stated even though an MEL deferral is allowed; when a tie-bolt or lock nut has been found broken or missing; the tire is changed; if a replacement tire is available. For Mechanics; tire and wheel assemblies with broken tie-bolts; split or missing lock nuts become a safety concern whenever they have to service a tire for low air pressure. The condition of the remaining tie-bolts and lock nuts become more important under those conditions.Reporter stated that; months ago; his Air Carrier checked their B757 fleet due to numerous reports by mechanics about missing or split lock nuts on the main wheel/tire assemblies. Hydrogen Embrittlement of the lock nuts was found to be the contributing cause for early failure of the lock nuts. The Supplier was supposed to have purged his company's supply of the lock nuts. But now he is not so sure that was accomplished; because mechanics are starting to see the same issue recurring. Many mechanics do not bother filing reports about the lock nut problems; instead they just change the tire and move on to the next airplane.

A Line Mechanic reports finding main tire/wheel assemblies with split or missing tie-bolt lock nuts on their B757-200 aircraft. Hydrogen Embrittlement of lock nuts were noted as the cause of earlier failures and thought corrected; but now; similar failures are recurring.

1052294

201211

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

9000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

FBO

Bonanza 33

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Fuel Booster Pump

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Troubleshooting

1052294

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I filed IFR [for my flight] and planned to go direct. I was cleared direct to my destination and departed. Approximately 3 hours into the flight at 9;000 feet the engine experienced power interruption due to fuel stoppage. In addition to the normal fuel; the 2 wing tanks had 20 gallons each. Fuel management had been in effect for the entire flight. I advised ATC of the problem and changed from the left wing to the right wing without the engine restarting. The propeller was wind milling. I applied the electric fuel pump and the engine came to life. I advised ATC that the engine was running. I prepared to land at [a nearby airport] and asked for Tower frequency. I called the Tower with the airport in view and advised that I was 5-6 miles west for landing. I was cleared for landing. After landing; I turned off the runway and experienced total engine stoppage due to the electric fuel pump over boosting the engine. The aircraft was towed to FBO. I advised them what had occurred and assumed the engine driven fuel pump had ceased to operate. The mechanics opened the cowling to see if the obvious could be observed. Mechanic advised me he would remove the fuel pump and call me. I rented a car and proceeded to my destination. Later I received a call from [the mechanic] stating he had removed the pump and performed a bench test and not an ounce of fuel came out of the pump. We discussed the fact that a new pump could not be obtained [for a few days]. [The mechanic] called me the following day and he was extremely puzzled after inspecting the pump he found very little wrong with it; with minor exceptions. He had tested the pump with another pump in the shop and there was 15 gallons per hour flow on the test pump and on the pump removed from my aircraft there was only 4 gallons per hour. Both of us concurred it was a bad pump. On the day of departure after all maintenance had been completed; and during the test phase he discovered no fuel in the left wing. This was extremely perplexing. He said he had observed some blue staining on the top of the wing and feared a bladder had ruptured. We examined the fuel cap and it appeared to be functional. The aircraft was totally fueled and [the mechanic] moved the wing back and forth to see if there was fuel seepage. Seeing none; we concluded the cap was sufficient. I then departed. Upon take-off; I noted a tremendous amount of fuel coming from the left wing cap. I notified the Tower and returned for landing. [The mechanic] changed both gaskets on each fuel cap and noted the aircraft lost approximately 7 gallons in the short flight. Upon becoming airborne again; we encountered no problem whatsoever. I might add that I contacted two repair shops and inquired what might have caused the pump to fail so quickly. Both thought it was unusual and only an examination of the pump could determine the cause. [The mechanic] said he would send the pump to a facility for examination. Until we find out why the pump did not perform properly on test; we can only conclude the reason for the engine stoppage was lack of fuel caused by seepage of fuel from the left wing or a failed fuel pump or a combination of the two.

BE33 pilot reported diverting due to a loss of power later traced to either a defective engine fuel pump or a wing tank leak.

1869858

202201

TPA.Airport

FL

0.0

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Radio Altimeter

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 962; Flight Crew Type 962

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

1869858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling

Ambiguous

While at TPA Gate the Captains Radar altimeter fluctuated from approximately -90 ft. to 400 ft. Multiple callouts were observed such as 'retard' and various altitudes. Further; the nav FMA went from armed to captured.The malfunction rectified itself and we safely departed. An information write-up was entered into the logbook and Maintenance checked the radar altimeter in ZZZ. No errors found.I've been flying an aircraft with a radar altimeter for years and never once have I seen a malfunction such as this until the 5G turn on. Coincidence? Probably not.

Air Carrier Captain reported a malfunctioning radio altimeter while parked at the TPA terminal. The Captain suspects this malfunction is related to 5G interference.

1507137

201712

1201-1800

MSLP.Airport

FO

VMC

Night

Center MHTG

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1507137

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Procedure

We were proceeding in accordance with flight plan via at 37000 feet. We were cleared direct URNOS to cross no earlier than XX13Z for traffic separation. Slowing sufficiently required a lower altitude; so we requested lower and were cleared to 20000 feet. We were switched from Central America Control to El Salvador Approach 119.9. The frequency interference was intense; improving gradually closer to SAL. Apparently a commercial broadcast overlaps the frequency resulting in constant; extreme intrusion jamming at altitude. The Controller vectored us southeast from URNOS and cleared us to descend to 12000 feet and to maintain 230 knots; and expect 'the VOR/DME Z Runway 07.' ATIS stated to expect the VOR/DME Z Runway 07 which is an arcing procedure north of the airfield.We repeatedly confirmed the approach with ATC who nonetheless continued vectoring us to an indeterminate point. We were cleared for further descent; slowed to 210 knots. The Captain Flying; stepped down in consult with the First Officer according to the 20-1R page. Past the arc we queried controller as to which procedure to expect and were told we will be assigned one north of the VOR. These off route vectors; low speeds; and altitudes were assigned to allow two aircraft a great distance behind us to pass to the west and execute the normal arcing approach north of the airport. We were assigned a 225 heading after the CAT VOR and cleared to descend to 4000 feet. The Captain noted the vector closely overlaps the VOR/DME Y 07 and loaded that approach for backup vertical guidance. We requested clearance for the VOR/DME Y Runway 07 approach; but were assigned continued vectors and descents. The Controller had to be prompted repeatedly for each step down and turn; finally granting approach clearance on a base turn vector.While it was a black moonless night; visibility allowed a safe base turn to final in visual conditions. This controller was definitely playing a childish game with traffic sequencing; leaving our aircraft and passengers' safety in the balance in mountainous terrain. His unprofessional demeanor left us completely untrusting of the safety of his vectors and altitudes in a hazardous environment. I appreciate ATC controllers who dispassionately facilitate safe traffic flow. Unfortunately; this man is not in that class. I urge a review of the events of last night; so that a similar unsafe situation may be avoided in the future. I further note that the Runway 07 PAPI is inoperative with non-precision approaches in use; providing no cues for terminal vertical guidance. ATC re-sequenced our aircraft on descent in a mountainous terminal area; apparently to play favorites. Review this occurrence and take appropriate corrective action.

B737-800 Captain reported that while on approach to a foreign airport they were unnecessarily delay vectored and slowed down by ATC to allow other aircraft go ahead of them.

1342650

201603

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1342650

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

After a lengthy one step de-icing we then taxied to the runway. Upon being cleared to depart I performed a static; Takeoff Go-Around [powered] takeoff without incident. At thrust reduction altitude I reduced power and the First Officer (FO) set Pack 1 to on. Almost immediately we received a call from the aft Flight Attendant (FA).As the Pilot Monitoring; the FO answered the call and after I overheard his initial questions and responses I selected my ACP CABIN button to on so I could listen in. They told us that there was a lot of 'fog' coming into the aft galley; grey like smoke. While she was still on the line we reached flap retraction speed and I commanded flaps up from the FO. He raised the flaps and set Pack 2 to on. The Flight Attendant immediately said; 'Now smoke is pouring into the cabin and people are very concerned.' Hearing this I transferred control and radios to the FO; advised him to level off as soon as allowable; advised ATC of our situation and request an immediate return to the airport. He did all of the above. At this point we began to receive a moderate influx of smoke into the flight deck. The smoke seemed to be emanating from both the vents on the glare shield and from beneath our feet. I told the FO and our observer in the jump seat to don their masks. Nearly simultaneously to transferring controls we received a SMOKE: AFT LAV ECAM and associated Master Warning. I verbalized this to the cabin and within seconds received SMOKE: AFT CARGO Master Warning which I also verbalized to the FA's and asked them to stand by.I followed the above ECAM's completely to include discharge of AGENT into the AFT CARGO pit. After completing the ECAM procedure I reconnected with the FA's. We talked through the [emergency checklist] and I verified that everyone was clear on the plan; they replied affirmatively. I asked them to inspect the floor in the aft galley and cabin to check for heat. The FA reported back that they had done that and the floor was definitely not hot and the smoke seemed to have stopped entering the cabin.While back and forth between ECAM and communicating with the FA's I handed the observer our QRH and told him to open the red tab; find the smoke checklists for both lav and cargo; back us up and point out anything he thought was important or we were missing. At this point I made a PA to advise the passengers that due to the obvious smoke situation we were making an immediate return to the airport; that I felt strongly that we did not have a fire on board and that the smoke was possibly from a large ingestion of de-icing fluid; but to be safe we would return. I further advised them to expect to see a lot of fire equipment surrounding the airplane upon exiting the runway. I checked back with the FO and he briefed me that we had been cleared for a visual approach. At this point we were probably on a 7 or 8 mile left base. I consulted the observer on his thoughts and he said he had reviewed the QRH and had nothing to add and felt like we had not missed anything. At this point I contacted approach and advised them that our procedure called for disembarking passengers prior to accessing the cargo pit and requested that he pass that on to Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF). I advised him that I planned on exiting the runway; but did not want to evacuate onto an icy taxiway unless absolutely necessary and asked if we could expedite air stairs. He advised that that would occur and added that busses would be immediately dispatched as well. After collaborating logistics with approach I contacted OPS. I quickly advised them of our emergency return and asked that they help with coordinating logistics.I made a second PA advising passengers of our plan to exit the aircraft on the taxiway via air stairs into busses. I stressed to them that I needed their cooperation in a calm; orderly and safe 'normal' exit; but to be prepared for a different command if the situation changed. By now theFO had done an impeccable 'single pilot' job of: changing our destination; programming the FMS; flying and configuring the aircraft and by the time I rejoined him; now as PM; we were fully configured and stabilized for landing.I switched to tower; confirmed clearance to land and reiterated our request to ARFF to disembark passengers prior to opening the aft pit. I brought him up to speed on all my plans and coordination. I advised him that I did not intend to take control of the aircraft after landing and that I wanted him to taxi off so I was best available to continue coordinating and communicating to emergency personnel. We conducted a normal; uneventful landing. Once it was clear that we would easily make the first high-speed taxiway; but to hold short so we could keep things fully clear for use. As we came to a stop I gave a 'Remain seated' PA. Tower advised us to switch to ground frequency OPS command. Prior to connecting with ARFF I spoke with the FA's and confirmed with them that air stairs were coming to the airplane and would come up to doors 1L and 2L. They asked if they should disarm doors and I stated; yes. I gave a 'Doors verified' PA and we ran a parking checklist. We were contacted by OPS command. They told us that ARFF was conducting a 360 inspection and once cleared they would bring air stairs to the airplane. He asked if anyone needed immediate medical attention and after confirmation with the cabin crew I told him not at this time. I inquired about busses and he said they were on the taxiway behind the aircraft. ARFF confirmed that there was no external indication of fire or smoke and they were bringing air stairs to the aircraft. After door 1L was opened I met with the Fire Lieutenant (LT) in command; received his report and plan for getting the folks safely onto the busses and continued to do all my coordination face to face with him. While ARFF brought air stairs to both exits they chose to only exit passengers through door 1L in order to maintain a more coordinated control of people directly onto the busses. We made a series of PA's advising passengers of our plan to take 10 at a time down the stairs and onto the busses. We advised everyone that Paramedics were waiting at the bottom of the stairs and to let them know if they needed medical evaluation.ARFF made a final sweep of the aircraft interior and exterior and we coordinated a clearing of all their equipment. They advised their equipment was clear; we were clear to start our engines and to advise ground when we were ready to taxi. We received taxi clearance. Unfortunately; upon entering the ramp we had to wait approximately 15+ minutes for an aircraft to push back and clear. This forced both ARFF and OPS to wait as well as they were trailing us to the gate. I confirmed with Ops that they knew we were the Air Turn Back aircraft and that we and ARFF were waiting out here on the ramp. They said they were aware. We got parked and were met by a line mechanic and MX Supervisor. I gave them a firsthand report and let them know what write ups I had placed in the logbook. An ACP also met us at the plane.

During climb while turning air conditioning packs on smoke began to fill the cabin and cockpit. The crew elected to return to the point of departure. Passengers were deplaned normally.

1787299

202101

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1787299

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During climb out from ZZZ en route to ZZZ1; we got a chime that quickly went away but then continued to happen. We noticed that the [Engine] #2 oil pressure was fluctuating between the normal indication of about 67 PSI to below 31 PSI. We confirmed the chimes came from the #2 oil pressure warning. We ran the #2 oil pressure warning checklist which later asked if the NP was below 300. It showed 364 and then asked if the NH was below 64%. It was showing between 67% to 69%. We turned back to ZZZ and through out the descent and approach the chime would continue.Causes: Upon landing Maintenance notified us that the #2 Engine was leaking oil and when they opened the nacelle they noticed it had oil all inside the nacelle.

Flight Crew reported an Air Turn Back after #2 engine began to lose engine oil quantity.

1682281

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Anticollision Light

Y

Failed

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

1682281

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1682284.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

After troubleshooting the aircraft for R/H nav lights being inop; it was determined that the fwd and aft nav lights required replacement. I had grabbed a nav light off of the shelf with assistance from stores people; but inadvertently took the L/H light assy out to the aircraft. I assisted the other mechanic in taking the winglet panel off and then proceeded to replace the aft light assembly while the other mechanic replaced the forward one. After we completed the task; we performed the ops check of the system but no one noticed that the wrong color nav light was installed. We put the aircraft back together and I completed the paperwork in XXXXX. Again; it was not noticed when the paperwork was completed and the part was returned back to stores. We were probably rushing to get the job done and we did not pay attention to detail as much as we should have. A lot of things went wrong to set this up and we should have verified that we had the correct part in the first place to prevent this from happening as well as paying closer attention to the parts tag and ops check. In the future; that is exactly what I will do to keep this from happening again. Also; I signed off the work performed on both the fwd and aft nav lights even though I only replaced the aft nav light. In the future; I will not sign off work that I did not complete all of the work. I was unable to see the forward nav light when we ops checked the lights and therefore should not have taken all the responsibility for the sign off.

Trouble shot the r/h nav light and it ended up being that light. So we then changed the light and figured that the issue was the nav light and it ended up being the wrong color of the light that was installed. I believe the main problem was lack attention to detail; making sure this problem does not happen again I would be more collective and calm while changing this part and making sure it is the right part while ops checking the system.

Technician reported feeling rushed and pressured contributed in him installing an incorrect part on aircraft.

1438930

201703

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

39500.0

VMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 4876; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1438930

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

While flying at FL390; I asked to climb to FL410 for light constant turbulence. I was flying with the O2 mask on already; because I fly single-pilot; and upon reaching FL395 I heard a pop and then a small air noise. I knew immediately that my door seal had a leak and I told ATC that I needed [a lower altitude]. I started an emergency descent so that I would not lose the entire cabin. The cabin started to depressurize at approximately 4;000 FPM; so I came down as fast as I could. I was trying to relay to ATC what I needed; but was more concerned with getting the airplane to a safe altitude so that the door seal would stop leaking and repressurize the cabin. ATC asked if I needed to [assistance] and I said yes; so they let me descend to 16;000 ft. After reaching 16;000 ft; the seal stopped leaking and I had a chance to talk to ATC about what happened. We discussed what the problem was and a better way to communicate it to them if this ever happened in the future. This was not our first time our door seal froze in flight so we are currently undergoing extensive maintenance and troubleshooting to find the underlying issue. During the descent; the masks did not drop and none of the passengers were injured or even experienced any real discomfort.

CE-560 pilot reported descending without clearance after he lost cabin pressure when a door seal started leaking.

1687455

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Direct

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Other / Unknown

1687455

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I answered an incoming call as the Dispatcher working; that desk was busy. The Captain asking for 1;200 lbs added fuel. I pulled up the release and added the fuel; signed my name; and re-released it. The afternoon Dispatcher; shortly after taking over the desk discovered a [Maintenance Discrepancy] item that required the aircraft only be routed to [Company] Maintenance stations. I assumed the morning Dispatcher had verified that ZZZ was an [Company] Maintenance station when adding the Captain fuel so I did not dig into it. ZZZ is not an [Company] Maintenance station. The end result is that I signed my name to a release that was out of compliance with [Maintenance Discrepancy].The release that had already calculated out of compliance was revised by myself to add captain fuel without looking into the [Maintenance Discrepancy] compliance first.Dispatchers need to be very careful when signing their name to another dispatcher's release; no matter how minor the change. I do not believe this to have been a safety issue; however I have decided to disclose the information in an effort to improve policies and procedures in order to mitigate future occurrences.

Dispatcher reported that a release was signed that was created by another Dispatcher; resulting in errors.

1258270

201504

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

VMC

Daylight

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class B ATL

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1258270

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

On downwind following only 6 miles behind a heavy B747; we received bad wake turbulence. We advised ATC of this but they still kept us 6 miles in trail. On the way down during the descent on final approach; we were discussing the probability of discontinuing the approach and because of this high workload and the added stress of the wake and possible wake; I forgot to switch our frequency over to the tower frequency. At approximately 2000-2500 feet we decided to discontinue the approach and begin a go around and it was at this time when I called ATC to let them know we were going around that I realized I was still on approach control frequency. Approach control asked if we were with the tower but I told him no; so he then issued us a climb and heading instructions with which we complied. The approach ATC then vectored us around for another approach and landing without incident. Threats were bad wake turbulence we encountered on downwind and the possibility of encountering more wake as we continued the approach. The error was not switching frequency to tower due to high workload and stress from the possibility of more wake at lower altitudes. It is my opinion that the company should insist that ATC give us way more spacing behind a heavy B747 which is configuring and slowing for approach and landing. This is when that aircraft type becomes a danger to any and all aircraft in trail of it and the spacing must be increased.

CRJ-900 Captain reported executing a go-around when 'bad wake turbulence' was encountered on approach to ATL in trail of a B747.

1141123

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

1800.0

IMC

Icing; Rain; 7

Daylight

2300

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Turbo Commander 690 Series

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Air/Ground Communication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 9060; Flight Crew Type 110

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1141123

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Aircraft

During climbout we encountered light rime icing and I requested the deicing boot to be cycled. Later while we were in cruise pilot not flying (PNF) observed that the right deicing boot had not fully deflated. The boots were then re-inflated and they still would not completely deflate. Over the next few minutes I tried several times; using the manual mode; to make sure the regulated pressure gage was indicating within the green zone. A short time later the PNF noticed the left side artificial horizon was inop and stated that the suction gauge was indicating zero. We agreed the best course of action was to return to our departure airport. There were numerous failed attempts to reach Center and the FSS on both COMMs; after we had received our return clearance. At that time we noticed an air carrier flight seemed to be having a lot of trouble with Center as well during their climb out of our destination. The PNF was able to communicate with them and they relayed approach clearances to us from ATC. During descent the checklist was completed and I requested all deicing to be turned on. Before getting to the SSR VOR the radio trouble with ATC had ceased.A short time later the electrical system flickered; however it did not interrupt the function of the Garmin GPS nor the radios. We reported over a prominent landmark we were cleared to land Runway X. Before reaching the FAF we became VMC and the PNF called out the runway in sight. I looked up to see surrounding terrain and called for full flaps. Shortly thereafter there was a complete electrical failure; all indicator lights; the MFD and PFD; as well as the GPS and headsets were inoperative. I immediately looked outside and continued the visual approach to Runway X. About 5 seconds later the power came back on and we reconfirmed a clearance to land. From that point on the power neither flickered nor fail till shut down.After shutdown we notified Dispatch and System Maintenance and informed them of all that had happened and wrote up three maintenance squawks.

A Turbo Commander crew encountered difficulties with ATC communications; leading edge deicing boots; and their electrical system.

991100

201201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

CLR

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Hydraulic Syst Pressure/Temp Indication

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Human-Machine Interface

991100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

[We] got briefed on inbound log items from Captain bringing the aircraft in. When I stepped on the aircraft I saw two mechanics that appeared to be working on the cabin items. I put my bags in the cockpit and turned to see the mechanics leaving the aircraft. I was told by my Purser that the Mechanic told her all the items were cleared. I then ran out to the bridge to try and catch the Mechanic because it was obvious he wasn't going to debrief me. When I asked him for a maintenance status he gruffly responded everything was fixed. I returned to the cockpit and began my preflight. When I reviewed the Maintenance Release I discovered that the fix for the Center Hydraulic System Pressure light inoperative was 'cycle and cleaned switch message clears'. When I looked at the overhead panel I found the C Hydraulic System Pressure light out with both electric pumps off. I tested the lights and the System Pressure light worked properly. I also reviewed the EICAS messages and discovered the C Hydraulic System Pressure not enunciated. I wrote the system up again and contacted Maintenance. The Mechanic came to the cockpit. I pointed out the overhead panel and lack of system pressure light. He then went about pulling the annunciator light switch out and spraying it with a cleaner. The light still did not illuminate; but did test good. The mechanic left and came back with a MEL for deferral. He showed me the deferral and asked if I would be ok with going with the light deferred. I told him I didn't believe we could comply with the deferral because the last step in the MEL required the EICAS to indicate C Hydraulic System Pressure and it did not. That was the moment the mechanic understood what the true problem was. The light was working properly. I'm frustrated Maintenance did not see or understand the problem and attempted to defer a light when in fact there was a systems problem that needed to be addressed.

B757 Captain describes a maintenance sign off for a faulty Center Hydraulic System pressure light that is actually caused by a faulty pressure sensor which is not addressed by Maintenance.

1681429

201909

0001-0600

RKSI.Airport

FO

4800.0

Mixed

10

Night

10000

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Vectors; STAR GUKDO 1N

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1681429

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1681430.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While on approach into RKSI; we were assigned the GUKDO1N arrival. At approximately 20 miles southeast of the field; we given radar vectors and told to descend to 5;000 feet. The Controller said cancel all restrictions. The PF (Pilot Flying) asked the PM (Pilot Monitoring) to extend the centerline from IF (Initial Approach Fix) FASAP; per normal practice while being radar vectored. At approximately 8 miles west of the field; the Controller cleared us direct to DANAN and cleared us for the approach. We were very close to DANAN at that point. We immediately programmed DANAN into the FMC (Flight Management Computer). The PM monitoring then reprogrammed the full approach back into the FMC.While that was going on; having been cleared for the approach we started our descent to 3;000 feet. We crossed DANAN about 4;800 - 4;500 feet. About 1 minute later; ATC informed us we missed a crossing altitude at DANAN. DANAN was both listed on the STAR (Standard Terminal Arrival Route) and approach plate. When [we were] told in a terminal environment [to] cancel all restrictions and are given radar vectors; we were expecting to descend and turn when instructed by ATC. However; being put back on a full approach with very little time to prepare for it led to missing the altitude restriction. The Controller told us 'don't worry about the altitude.' We continued the approach with no further incident. Lesson learned is be prepared for last minute changes.

After a [long] flight from ZZZ; we were directed to fly the GUKDO 1N STAR (Standard Terminal Arrival Route) into RKSI for the ILS Y RWY XXR approach. Sometime prior to or after KAKSO we were vectored off the STAR; given descent to 11;000 feet and told 'delete altitude restrictions.' The CA (Captain) (Pilot Flying) used the altitude button on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) to delete some intervening altitudes from the STAR and asked me to extend the final approach course back from the approach fix; FASAP. A few minutes later; after receiving further descents through 9;000 feet and 5;000 feet; we were told to fly direct to DANAN and 'cleared the approach.' DANAN is both on the STAR and the approach. Since I am a relatively new FO (First Officer); the CA aided me on the CDU (Control display Unit); by manually inputting the FASAP fix and confirming a 'direct-to FASAP' course. We discussed some altitude inputs to the MCP with the additional pilots in the jump seats and agreed upon 1;600 feet as the proper input based on the final approach fix (HANQU) until we intercepted and captured the glide slope. During this period we sequenced DANAN in a descent. A couple minutes later; the Approach Controller came on and said we were not cleared below 5;000 feet before DANAN. We were then descending through 3;900 feet approximately 3 miles beyond DANAN. I replied that he had deleted the altitude restrictions. He came back and said that didn't include DANAN. We then saw that DANAN was also on the approach we had been 'cleared' for; and that the approach plate showed a hard altitude of 5;000 feet at DANAN. As we were sequencing FASAP in the right base turn to final; the Controller came on and said 'don't worry about the altitude' and directed us to Tower frequency. The landing was normal.[I suggest] consider leaving the STAR way points in by not extending the runway; final fix; or approach fix. Also; if re-cleared back onto a STAR or approach that has been modified by an extension of the final course; consider re-inputting the STAR and proceeding direct with all altitude constraints still active. Four pilots missed the fact that our new lateral clearance included a hard altitude that we had overridden with the MCP. It shows how dynamic even a routine approach in VMC can be.

B747 flight crew reported missed crossing altitude restriction on approach.

1084587

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

IMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

2.0

Part 135

Ambulance

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Other / Unknown

1084587

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

After a request for HEMS operation to a scene; weather reporting indicated ceilings were 1;000-2;000 FT; visibility well above VFR along the three intended routes of flight. After patient loading; second leg was begun. Weather conditions enroute required slight deviations to avoid areas where the visibility decreased along the intended course. As the flight progressed; deviations around the areas of restricted visibility became more difficult and the ceiling less well defined. Encountering 3-5 miles hazy visibility was adequate to continue; but conditions were not what were expected. Suddenly visibility was less than three miles and loss of visual reference with the surface appeared imminent. Company Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions procedure was initiated with a climb and transition to instrument flight. After climb to minimum safe altitude; Approach was contacted to declare an emergency and to request an IFR clearance and approach. With vectors to the ILS approach. Helicopter safely landed at the airport. Being somewhat new to operating in this area I expected to learn more about how weather acts here over time. However; conversations with pilots who have operated in this area for years reveal this weather can be tricky and unpredictable. Many of the weather reporting facilities are at airfields down in valleys. This is adequate for IFR airplane operations from runways to runways. Weather observations taken from more of the hill tops and less spread out would be helpful to helicopters that operate VFR close to the ground and off airport. For now the best practice to avoid recurrence would be a more conservative approach to weather/launch decisions.

EMS helicopter pilot encounters IMC during return flight from a scene. An IFR climb to the MSA is initiated and ATC is contacted for an IFR clearance to the destination airport.

1067386

201302

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

17000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1067386

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Our normal climb was stopped at 17;000 due to traffic. Upon clearance to climb; the Captain advanced power and selected VNAV. The autopilot responded so slowly that VMO was quickly reached and an overspeed warning sounded. Climbing through about FL260 the Captain brought to my attention the right engine EGT; which was in the caution band and climbing. He reduced power to get the EGT out of the caution range. At the reduced setting the EGT again climbed into the caution band. Further reductions were made until the right N1 was 15- 20% below the left engine to keep EGT in limits. No other abnormal indications were noted. We then noticed the speed decaying and the Captain initially made inputs on the MCP to correct the problem; but the autopilot did not respond. The Captain then disconnected the autopilot and recovered manually. Minimum speed reached was about 185 KIAS. After a brief discussion of the situation the Captain and I agreed we should divert back to our departure airport. The Captain took over ATC communication while I coordinated with dispatch and sent an ACARS diversion message. We declared an emergency with ATC and were cleared direct to the airport. The right engine EGT remained significantly higher than the left for the remainder of the flight but otherwise operated normally until touchdown. After touchdown the right reverser would not deploy.

When the EGT of the right engine of their B757-200 moved into the caution range during climb and required excessive thrust reduction to reduce EGT to the green band the flight crew elected to declare and emergency and return to their departure airport. They chose not to shut down the engine while doing so.

1761062

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Small Aircraft

1.0

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1761062

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Flight crew for this flight; which was my student and I; were flying traffic normally without missing radio call; looking for traffic the entire time. At the moment [the student] had flight controls turning crosswind to downwind; we received TRAFFIC ALERT on our PFD. First; we thought traffic [was] coming in from [an] Arrival; we see nothing; check our screen; and the aircraft behind us; Aircraft Y; cuts us off by 100 ft. [We] turn into downwind. I took controls of flight and quickly executed a steep turn and climb to the left to avoid collision. Tower says 'Aircraft Y; you cut off the traffic you were supposed to be following.' I made a left 360 to rejoin downwind for XXR. After I see [the] aircraft land; I would think [they] would make a full stop and taxi back to runway and prior to landing. I noticed that it was a solo student; [they were] not Private solo; did not see any instructor out in the runway environment. Once we landed; I advised [FBO staff] of incident.Before sending out solos please make sure that their situational awareness is good; and they can look for traffic on their own. It was only my flight crew and this solo in this traffic pattern.

Flight Instructor reported an NMAC while in the traffic pattern.

1785482

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Wind

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Air Carrier

Small Transport

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1785482

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Other Person

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

Prior to crossing [Runway] XX at Yankee; we did the pre takeoff checklist flow. Held the takeoff checklist until crossing Runway XX. After crossing XX at Yankee; we ran the before takeoff checklist. After the Takeoff checklist was complete; I noticed a small twin taxing from FBO East to Yankee. I brought this up to my FO (First Officer); because Ground had told him to give way to Aircraft Y but I wasn't sure he saw us. He stopped short of taxiway Yankee and asked Ground if he was to give way to Aircraft Y. Ground advised him to give way to Aircraft Y. Both my FO and I agreed we had room to taxi by since he was not interfered with taxiway Yankee. As we taxied by the twin; he told ground our wing passed over his cockpit. It was really a surprise to both my FO and me as we had saw him; discussed him and thought we had plenty of room.[Cause was] the twin pilot's lack of situational awareness during taxingIf there is any question; I should have stopped the airplane and coordinated with ground.

B767 Captain reported that during taxi the aircraft's wing reportedly passed over the top of another aircraft. The flight crew stated they believed there had been adequate clearance.

993546

201201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Carrier

B757-300

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Testing; Repair

Spoiler System

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Lead Technician 6; Maintenance Technician 17

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

993546

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Avionics 38; Maintenance Technician 38

Time Pressure; Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

993892.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other Computer Data Review

General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft

Human Factors

Aircraft X; a B757-300; arrived at gate with upper EICAS message 'Spoilers' illuminated after retracting Speed Brakes. Operation was normal after. Per Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) 27-09-00; Spoiler Control Module (SCM) 3L faulted. We did not have [Manufacturer's] Part Number (P/N) 285TXXXX-201 (with BITE troubleshooting capabilities) available for replacement of [the faulted] SCM. I thought I remembered that when our Air Carrier X received the -300 series B757's we swapped the SCM's from the -300 series B757's with the SCM's of the [earlier] -200 B757s and the later -200 series B757's. Due to the fact that the -300 series B757s SCM's had BITE troubleshooting capabilities; versus the Fault Balls in the early and later -200 series B757's; this helped in troubleshooting.We had P/N 285TXXXX-118 (with Fault Balls) in stock. I wanted to find out if we could use this part to correct the fault on Aircraft X so I contacted Maintenance Control to verify if that was correct. The Maintenance Controller; I don't recall his name; stated that we could use the -118 [SCM] part for the Corrective Action [sign-off]. We installed the -118 SCM and the Operational Check [was] good. I was notified in February 2012 that the SCM part should not have been used in Aircraft X. After being notified; I have researched this issue and found out that per the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) the -118 SCM can't be used on B757-300 series aircraft. The contributing factor that caused this was the short amount of time the aircraft was at the gate and us not wanting to delay the aircraft by checking the IPC. So I contact Maintenance Control for assistance. The corrective action to follow is to take the time to check the IPC for the correct 'Effectivity' of parts.

Aircraft arrived at gate with the report of an EICAS spoiler message. On troubleshooting; found that a BITE Check of the Spoiler Control Modules (SCMs) faulted that the 3-Left Spoiler Control Module faulted itself. The installed Part Number (P/N) 285TXXXX-201 was not stocked locally according to the Lead Mechanic. They had in stock P/N 285TXXXX-ll8. I thought they may be interchangeable and the Lead Mechanic was not sure and he called Maintenance Control. They said the -118 could be used in placed of the -201. The -118 was installed and checked with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) paperwork. Time limitations were a concern as it [aircraft] was a quick turn and delays are frowned upon. The error was discovered after a forced parts change (not uncommon recently). I should have checked the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) myself; but the Electronic Manual is difficult to navigate and time was a consideration. I should not have trusted Maintenance Control.

Reporter stated that recently; mechanics are having a difficult time getting correct information due to the mixing of similar aircraft types that have parts; like the Spoiler Control Modules (SCMs); that may or may not be interchangeable with another B757. The -118 SCMs are only used on early B757-200 aircraft but the -201 SCMs can be interchanged with any B757-200 and -300 series aircraft. Each B757 has six Spoiler Control Modules (SCMs) and the company's plan was to have at least two of the newer -201 SCMs on each of the earlier B757s; one -201 SCM on each wing; due to the improved troubleshooting capability of the -201 SCMs.Reporter stated his reference about the SCM 'Effectivity' error being found after he applied a 'forced parts change' was a reference to a procedure when a Part Number (P/N) or company Stock Number is entered into their Maintenance computer database and the program doesn't recognize; or does not want to accept; the P/N entered for a part that was removed or installed. At that point the data is 'forced' into their database by another keystroke in order to have the information recorded; even if the data entered is 'not effective' for that aircraft.

A Lead and Avionic's Mechanic had difficulty getting correct parts information when utilizing their Maintenance Control group for support to help reduce aircraft delays. They replaced a Spoiler Control Module (SCM) with an SCM not 'Effective' for a B757-300 aircraft based on information from Maintenance Control.

1787575

202102

0601-1200

7A8.Airport

NC

9000.0

VMC

60

Daylight

25000

Center ZTL

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZTL

Elevator Trim System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1787575

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

While flying a cross-country; I encountered strong mountain-wave action; making altitude difficult to hold. I asked for and received a 'block altitude'. The conditions were VMC all the way to the surface. The aircraft was on autopilot with altitude hold engaged. The autopilot called for 'trim up;' as the aircraft was descending I added power. I asked the other pilot to give it nose-up trim as he had done several times before. (The aircraft only has manual trim.) Suddenly; the aircraft nosed over. I immediately hit the autopilot disconnect button and pulled the circuit breaker. I noticed that the aircraft was very nose-heavy and I struggled to keep it from pitching down further. I called for more nose-up trim; but the problem got worse and I could barely slow the pitch-over even by pulling with both hands.During our descent; the controller queried us about our rapid descent. Given that I was extremely busy; I advised ATC. Finally; I told the other pilot to help me pull the nose up; whereupon the aircraft responded and I began adding nose-up trim and climbing back to altitude. We arrested the descent and leveled off and then I began the climb back to cruise altitude.I checked the aircraft for any control difficulties and determined that there were none; I advised ATC that I was climbing back to cruise altitude. Upon discussion with the other pilot; we determined that instead of adding nose-up trim; he was inadvertently adding nose-down. Because the autopilot had been engaged; we did not notice the wrong direction trim. We continued to our destination to get clear of the AIRMET for turbulence. Upon landing; an A&P inspected the aircraft and found no evidence of over-stressing the aircraft.

PA32-300 Pilot reported mountain wave activity and improper operation of trim resulted in loss of aircraft control.

1002077

201203

1201-1800

P48.Airport

AZ

270.0

0.5

3000.0

100

CLR

FBO

Sail Plane

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Descent

Visual Approach

Class G P48

Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Class G P48

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 8090; Flight Crew Type 5000

1002077

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 75

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Light single engine Piper passed 50 - 100 FT below me as I was approaching IP; crossing the departure end of Runway 23 about 1;400 FT above ground. The airplane approached from my 7 o'clock direction; departing (continuing) away about my 1 o'clock direction. At the time I was flying about 45 MPH and I would estimate the other aircraft cruising past me at over 100 MPH. I based my estimate on vertical separation on the wingspan of the glider I was flying which is 51 FT. They passed directly underneath me within one or two of my wingspans.

Glider pilot reported an NMAC with a light single near P48 airport.

1328569

201601

1201-1800

MGGT.Airport

FO

200.0

Tower MGGT

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 02

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1328569

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure

Airport

While on the approach to Guatemala ILS Z runway 02 ILS out of service. We used the non ILS procedures. The VTI was centered; LNAV/VNAV. Five different first officers and five different aircraft with the same results. At about 200 feet the HUD commands a further descent into the valley; at that point the PAPI appears to indicate normal.

Air carrier Captain reported on unusual indications on the ILS Z at MGGT.

1119131

201309

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

1119131

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Staffing

Company Policy

Before boarding our college football charter flight we did not have a Charter Coordinator. Having done several charters over the years; this was the first time I had had this happen. Only one other Flight Attendant and I had ever done charters; all the others were reserves. The experienced [Flight] Attendant had worked a football charter for the same team recently and said that the coaches and Athletic Department VIPs would have alcohol available on board. I have done several football charters but no other school had alcohol on them. She also said to 'expect' that the coaches would gather in the back galley and drink for the entire flight--which they did. They NEVER left the aft galley regardless of the services we were trying to do. One of the coaches wanted to plug his phone into our outlet and was told by one of the Flight Attendant's that the voltage could 'fry' his phone. He then went into the Lav and plugged it into the outlet there. I told him I would have to unplug it before takeoff. He then asked for the first of three mixed vodka drinks he would have before takeoff. In First Class the Charter Coordinator gave us a 5 minute briefing which included telling us he had purchased a half gallon bottle of expensive vodka for the Athletic Director's wife and whatever she didn't drink she was allowed to take home with her. There was very little information about the service itself to be done. The coordinator was not flying the charter with us; but advised another individual would be acting as our Charter Coordinator. When it became clear that the Coach in question was going to ask for more alcohol; I asked the experienced [Flight] Attendant if there were any limits on alcohol consumption on this flight for the coaches. She didn't know and said to ask the temporary Charter Coordinator; which I did. All the conversations were held very quietly in a galley away from the group as I didn't know if--being a charter--the rules regarding alcohol were significantly different from other mainline flights. I got no specific answer other than to be told who the security person was and what I can only describe as a personnel director. What I did NOT know was that the replacement Charter Coordinator had informed the coaches of my question and all of a sudden the coaches' attitudes towards me changed like a haboob descending. I was then treated as a pariah. The Security Director was in the galley for the whole flight as well and asked the attendants who was receiving any alcoholic drink which was being delivered into the cabin. This was; clearly; so that no alcohol was being served to a player. The five coaches in the aft galley drank 2 cases of beer between them and hard liquor as well. The Coach about whom I had spoken to the replacement Coordinator had a minimum of 9 beers/ and or cocktails in the course of the flight and those were only the ones I knew about. Several coaches asked for booze to go as well. Please let me know whatever information your department has that is pertinent to this situation. We realize that many rules are slackened for charters but; in speaking with the replacement Coordinator after the fact on our way back; he said that in nine years of doing college football charters the question had never come up. He then compared the trips to a NASCAR charter where they got so drunk that one of the people threw up on a flight attendant's shoes. I asked him who he thought would be responsible if the fellow who drank all those drinks got in an accident after our service and he said that the responsibility would be the college's and not us (Air Carrier) for having served him. Perhaps lack of procedural knowledge would fit; however; I'm not certain I've ever been faced with the situation; so I am unsure of the cause.Flight attendant's need concrete information regarding a situation with seemingly no rules or limits at all. We were going by the seat of our pants; as it were. If I am completely out of line on this; please let me know. The replacement Coordinator--unfortunately but by no means maliciously--by telling the coaches I had asked; made the flight very awkward for me for having asked him a question I assumed as a Charter Coordinator that he would have known.

A Flight Attendant reported difficulties his crew encountered controlling the alcohol consumption and behavior of coaches and Athletic Department VIPs during a charter flight for a major college football team. The reporter cited a lack of administrative direction with respect to acceptable deviations from normal line flight policy in such matters.

1194720

201408

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Fuel Crossfeed

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1194720

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Human Factors

Our aircraft arrived late due to weather in the area. On taxi out; it looked as if we were going to be delayed due to weather so we taxied out on one engine. I opened the fuel crossfeed valve to try to keep the fuel balanced while waiting to takeoff. The delay was not as long as we thought it was going to be so we went through the start procedure on the second engine and I failed to close the cross feed valve before we took off. There was a lot of weather in the area and I was focused on deviating around weather during the climbout. I did not notice the fuel imbalance until we were clear of the weather and into the cruise portion of flight. When I did notice; the fuel was approximately 4;000 LBS off. I started the crossfeed process and saw that we would need to have vectors on the arrival in order have the fuel balanced within the 1;000 LB imbalance needed to land. We received the vectors and landed with 3;250 LBS in the left tank and 2;550 LBS in the right tank. The landing was normal.I should have told the First Officer that I was opening the crossfeed valve to help keep the fuel balanced during taxi and checked the balance during climbout as I normally do. Better crew coordination is vital especially during high workload situations.

Anticipating substantial delay after taxi out due to weather the Captain of a B737-300 opted to taxi on one engine and; to protect against lateral fuel imbalance; opened the fuel crossfeed. When the delay proved minimal they started the second engine and departed only to discover during cruise they had not closed the crossfeed and were now faced with a 4;000 LB lateral imbalance.

1203774

201409

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Work Cards

Fuel

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Lead Technician 5; Maintenance Technician 17

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1203774

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Company Policy

August 2014 I was made aware of our possible non-compliance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedures for grounding a/c for maintenance. I also questioned the state of the grounding points at the X and Y side Terminal in ZZZ. The only thing I have heard back to this point is that at some point fueling determined that grounding a/c to earth was not required during fueling operations and at that time the testing and marking of the earth grounds stopped in ZZZ. I was also notified that due to tire conductivity; grounding for other maintenance tasks was not required. Per 737 AMM 12-15-21 (Oxygen Servicing) Step F 2: 'make sure the airplane is grounded correctly (static grounding; Task 20-40-11)Per 737 AMM 20-40-11; 1.A (1): ' static grounding is not necessary if the airplane is parked for turnaround flight and no maintenance is to be done. Per 737 AMM 20-40-11; 1.A (3) lists maintenance tasks that require grounding. Per 737 AMM 20-40-11; 1(A).(4) 'when static grounding is recommended in a detailed procedure; the airplane must be statically grounded to a common; approved; identified ground or verified through conductive tires. The Note after that step tells you how to verify tire conductivity. Per these steps above; I believe [that] on the B737 a/c; the only time that it is permissible to not ground the a/c is during a fueling operation when the tire conductivity has been verified and when the a/c is parked for a turnaround and no maintenance is being done. Also per this section there are no approved earth grounds at the X or Y Terminal fingers at ZZZ for the B737 a/c because of the company disclosing that our [Static] grounds are no longer marked or tested; and the AMM calls for the a/c to be grounded to a common; approved; identified ground. Noncompliance issues.

Reporter stated the Static Grounding points for aircraft at the Terminal are maintained by the air carrier; not the Airport Facilities department. Mechanics believe their air carrier is placing them in a dangerous situation by not certifying (testing) and marking Static Grounding pins. Especially since the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) requires static grounding of aircraft during certain types of Servicing. Instead; mechanics attempt to attach hard cables from the aircraft to old Static Grounding points at gate areas that are full of mud; sand and dirt in hopes of satisfying the AMM requirements. Reporter stated certain tires have an electrically conductive coating applied that acts as a static ground for the aircraft. But tire wear does affect coating conductivity; as does rain and sand. That's why verifying tire conductivity becomes so important when static grounding is required prior to specific types of servicing. Their air carrier Management continues to ignore their own written Procedures and Boeing Manual requirements.

A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed of a possible non-compliance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedures involving Static grounding of aircraft to earth during maintenance. Lead Technician also notes the lack of approved; tested; certified and identifiable earth grounds at two Terminal fingers for B737 aircraft; may have contributed to the possible non-compliance issue.

1425275

201701

1201-1800

MIA.Airport

FL

1000.0

Daylight

Tower MIA

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing; Final Approach

Class B MIA

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1425275

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft

During approach briefing; we briefed the approach to RWY 26R in Miami. We also briefed the possibility of moving to RWY 26L if it was available. The brief was to use full flaps on the short runway (26R) and flaps 3 if we were able to sidestep to the long runway (26L). Having done this probably a hundred times in every other airplane I've flown; the one thing we neglected to brief was the necessity of changing the Perf page and the flap 3 button.During the last 1000 feet the airplane started squawking at us for not having selected full flaps to match the selection of the button. I saw what had happened and also saw we only had a little over 6;000 LBS of fuel remaining. I asked First Officer to continue the approach and selected full flaps to quiet the aircraft yelling at us. I felt uncomfortable with the thought of going around at this fuel level which was the reason I asked him to continue.This was the first time I had done this sidestep maneuver in this model aircraft. It was a learning experience because I found this aircraft requires too much computer work to even consider attempting this type of maneuver again. Having easily performed this so many times; I just wrongly assumed that it was this easy to accomplish in this airplane.It takes too much work to attempt this type of maneuver this close to the airport. I will not attempt this again in this model airplane.

A319 Captain reported a GPWS warning for flap setting following a side step maneuver to a longer runway.

1582793

201809

1201-1800

JAC.Airport

WY

VMC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1582793

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Ambiguous

During approach into JAC to runway 19; under VMC conditions; cleared for the visual approach; Captain flew left of course to comply with the noise abatement of the Moose Lodge. As were just prior to abeam the lodge we got the GPWS warning for terrain. I believe the primary reason was a slightly closer path to the terrain to the left and slightly low. At no time were we in jeopardy of hitting the terrain in the VMC conditions and airport in sight. Continued approach with a right turn abeam the lodge to align with the runway.I truly believe there is so much emphasis on avoiding the Moose Lodge that it causes pilots to take a path that places them closer than necessary to the terrain to the east of the Lodge. There is no stipulation on how far is far enough. We have no idea what the noise levels are at what distance/altitude. Also there is such a fear factor in all the chart info and company airport data that on a clear; dry-runway-condition day pilots tend to make a shallower approach path to the runway. I guess the thinking is that we must land by the PAPI so if I am lower it will help; instead of making a normal approach and only 'dipping' below the glide path in the last 500 ft or so. Having flown into JAC numerous times in the last 3 months I have learned that way too much fear is imparted when the runway is dry and winds are favorable.

Air carrier First Officer reported ambiguous company noise abatement procedures into Jackson Hole airport require flying off course during approach to comply.

1298633

201509

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Rain

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Communication Systems

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14236; Flight Crew Type 8858

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1298633

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Did not have takeoff data available before push back because the incorrect runway data was sent to the airplane even though the correct runway was requested multiple times. On taxi out; the SATCOM failed; so we were unable to contact dispatch/load planning via voice. After multiple messages to dispatch; in addition to multiple distractions on taxi out; [we decided] we would pull over and sort this whole mess out at the end of the taxiway. As we approached the end; it was obvious we could not get out of the taxi lineup due to traffic and closures. We finally received the correct info as we approached our spot in the takeoff sequence.The entire concept of pushing off the gate without takeoff data is patently unsafe and dangerous in certain situations. Taxiing the aircraft; with all the inherent distractions associated with moving an airplane on the ground (heavy rain; taxiway closures; language barriers; etc); without being properly configured for takeoff with the proper flap and trim settings is just a disaster looking for a place to happen.The fact that we are putting operational performance (getting off the gate) in front of safe operation of the airplane is embarrassing to me as a professional pilot and I will never do this again. Ever. This is an incident/accident just waiting to happen and the procedures should be revised immediately; it is absolutely shocking how much 'heads down' time this procedure has generated and we are lucky nothing has happened yet.

B777 First Officer laments the new company policy of allowing aircraft to push back and taxi before receiving their final weight and balance message. In this instance; a late message at a foreign airport; caused a great deal of consternation for the First Officer.

1481875

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation

Powerplant Mounting

X

Improperly Operated

Company

Air Carrier

Inspector

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority

Maintenance Inspector 16; Maintenance Technician 5

1481875

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Technician 13

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1481877.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Three lower engine mount pins found missing from sleeves on aft mount during heavy maintenance visit.During engine build up to bring engine up to QEC [Quick Engine Change] status prior to engine installation. The aft engine mount was installed on the engine. This entails putting the mount in place and inserting sleeves through the engine case and the bearings on the mount. Pins are then inserted in the sleeves and secured with metal straps on both sides of the pins. Bolts are then torqued to secure the straps in place. The mount installation was done months ago. I cannot recall this specific occurrence with certainty since it's a fairly common procedure here. These pins are fairly large. Even if the step of installing the pins was overlooked; the left over parts should have been obvious. Possible contributing factors: there were a lot of distractions in the hangar that month since it was new at the time with construction finishing touches going on; with a lot of activity moving in equipment and setting it up.Perhaps an added step to verify pins are installed at the end of mount installation would prevent a recurrence.

I was summoned to my supervisor's office and was briefed of the incident. The discussion was my involvement of the missing pin of the aft engine mount assembly. I viewed the enclosed pictures. The pictures had shown a view of the aft engine mount assy. The locking plate was installed through the sleeve with no pin. Just a darkened hole. That aft engine mount assy was installed and signed by me along with the inspectors stamp. It was at that moment when I had tried to recall the installation of that aft engine mount assy. Along with the implications of the missing pin. I had volunteered to work in the engine shop to assist in the engine buildup. [The aircraft] #2 engine was scheduled for replacement that evening. The atmosphere in the hangar and engine shop was a comfortable one. No stress nor concerns were felt that day. My first task was a visual one. What parts were needed; locate the parts and/or parts that are already installed whether safetying is required. I noted various fuel; oil & hydraulic drain lines that require installation. Once the drain lines were installed; I proceeded on to the next project. The fwd engine mount was then installed. An inspection representative was on hand to witness the torques and safetying measures of the fwd mount. The next component to be installed was the aft engine mount. This is where my mind tends to fail me. I do recall lowering the aft mount and aligning the attach points. I also recall the pins; sleeves and locking devices for that mount being present prior to installation. I recall sliding the locking devices through the slots of the sleeves and then rotating them to align up the holes of the flanges and then securing them in place. Whether the pins were installed at the time I just do not know. But the installation of the aft engine mount was signed off by me. So in that respect I am responsible.

Two air carrier Maintenance Technicians reported that during a heavy check on an Airbus 319 it was discovered that lower engine mount pins were missing.

1048384

201211

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

2500.0

VMC

Night

FBO

DA40 Diamond Star

1.0

Part 91

Training

Climb

Direct

Class G ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 550; Flight Crew Type 200

Human-Machine Interface

1048384

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

During a night cross country training flight the instructor noticed the rear door wasn't fully secure. The instructor attempted to secure the rear door by re-setting the latch and accidentally hit the emergency latch which caused the rear door to be ripped off the airplane in flight. The aircraft was safely flown back to the home airport.

DA40 instructor pilot attempted to secure a rear door that was not fully latched in flight; resulting in the emergency latch being accidentally hit and the door departing the aircraft.

1709369

201912

1201-1800

MHK.Airport

KS

143.0

5.0

3000.0

VMC

Dusk

Tower MHK

FBO

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Class D MHK

Transponder

X

Failed

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

None

Cruise

Class D MHK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87; Flight Crew Total 93; Flight Crew Type 93

Distraction

1709369

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was receiving instrument approach training from my flight instructor while using a view limiting device. While executing a missed approach procedure for the ILS Runway 3 at MHK and in communication with Marshall; we experienced a missed approach. The aircraft was at 3;000 feet MSL on the 143 radial between the VOR and ALMAS and approximately 5 miles away from the VOR. At some point my flight instructor noticed another aircraft had taken off from MHK and was climbing towards us. After a positive exchange of the flight controls my instructor took immediate action to avoid the impending traffic. While I never saw the other aircraft; as a result of the view limiting device; I was told that the aircraft was approximately 200 feet off our wing. After the situation we contacted Marshall and were informed that radar contact had been lost during the incident. For this reason; Marshall did not alert us of the traffic. The transponder in this aircraft does have inoperative MODE C. I have been informed that the aircraft I was in should be taken to Maintenance later this month where the altitude ending from the transponder should be fixed.

Pilot reported an NMAC while on recovering from a missed approach at MHK airport.

1240274

201502

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

5000.0

VMC

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 16R

Cruise

Vectors

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1240274

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Flying under IFR and on a heading vector from SoCal to VNY at 5;000 feet. The Pilot Flying (PF) observed traffic on the TCAS that was approaching from about 10 o'clock position. The PF started the search for the traffic and alerted the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) the traffic was not in sight. The traffic got closer and a TA was received. PF continued to look for the traffic and without locating it the RA was received to descend. The PF initiated a descent and slight turn to the right to avoid the traffic. As the RA was received SoCal alerted us we had traffic and to turn left. This would have put us in direct conflict with the traffic. The resolution commenced and the 'clear of conflict' was received. The RA resulted in about a 1;000-1;200 foot descent. The PNF made a radio call to SoCal to alert them of our RA. SoCal gave us a climb to 5;000 Feet and a turn left to a heading 330. The instructions seemed to be in direct conflict with 2 other targets. One at our approximate 12 o'clock and about 700 feet above us. The other at our 10 o'clock and approximately 600 feet above us. Both targets appeared to be within about 3 miles of our position. The PF asked the PNF to query SoCal the instructions again. The PF stayed at 4;000 feet and started a shallow banked turn to the left. SoCal was busy and it was hard to get a word in. PNF asked twice for SoCal to repeat the heading. Finally the instructions were given again to expedite our climb to 5;000 and turn left to heading of 330. While in the climbing turn we received another TA from the traffic at our 10 O'clock position. The TCAS showed it 300 feet above us and slightly off our left wing. The PF looked out and saw an aircraft pass to our left and slightly behind us approximately 300-400 feet away from our aircraft; to our recollection. Neither of the 2 possible targets were ever pointed out to us. We were handed off to another controller where the PNF reminded that controller that we were climbing back to 5;000 Ft. / on a heading due to an RA. We were radar vectored onto the ILS for 16R at VNY. The crew could have tried to query ATC about the approaching conflict.

G200 First Officer reported NMAC on a flight into VNY and indicated ATC was not much help in situational awareness and mitigation.

1011145

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3500.0

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

PA-46 Malibu Meridian

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Personal

SR22

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1011145

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was working Local Control 1 with Runways 2R/2L active. A Cirrus was inbound with Approach Control at 4;000 MSL from the northwest transitioning north of the field to enter a right downwind for Runway 2R. A Meridian was inbound with Approach Control from the northeast at 4;000 MSL approaching the right downwind for Runway 2R. It appeared that the Meridian was being sequenced in front of the Cirrus. A VFR Beech Baron called me six miles southeast of the field inbound. Initially I told the Baron to reduce his speed so that I could sequence him behind the Meridian; but noticed that the Meridian was being vectored a bit further east of the airport. Therefore I told the Baron to keep his speed up and that he was number one for Runway 2R and cleared to land. After clearing the Baron; I noticed the Meridian take a turn to the north; I assumed Approach Control was spinning him for some unknown reason. A helicopter called and requested a west departure from the helipad; and I issued him a take off clearance. That's when I looked back at the RACD and noticed the Meridian had not made a complete 360 degree right turn but instead was continuing on a northerly heading. The Meridian called me at this moment stating he was entering a left base for Runway 20R. The Meridian was pointed directly at the Cirrus inbound from the northwest about to turn a 4 mile right downwind for Runway 2R. I immediately issued a Traffic Alert to the Meridian regarding the Cirrus at his 11 o'clock; one and a half miles. I believe the Meridian was only 300 to 700 FT below the Cirrus; thereby having lost standard separation. The two aircraft targets appeared to merge as the Meridian passed under the Cirrus. Realizing the pilot of the Meridian was headed to the wrong runway; my Ground Controller called Approach to obtain control of the Meridian for me and the request was approved. I provided suggested headings to the Meridian to route him back over the north end of the field to enter a left downwind for Runway 2L. About 2 minutes later; the pilot of the Meridian lined up on final for Runway 20R. I told him to break off his final for 20R and enter a left downwind for Runway 2L. The pilot replied he was lining up on final for Runway 20L. I immediately instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 2;500 MSL and turn right heading 270 so as to guide him to the left downwind for Runway 2L. Finally; the pilot of the Meridian entered the left downwind for 2L and landed. After asking Approach Control to review the tapes; the pilot was cleared for; and read back; the Visual Approach for Runway 2R. Sometime between then time Approach switched the Meridian to Tower frequency and the time he checked on with me; an excessive amount of time to switch frequencies in my opinion; the pilot must have forgotten he was headed for Runway 2R and turned left downwind to base for Runway 20R. I can provide no recommendations because this was clearly a pilot deviation that resulted in less than standard separation. Perhaps if the Approach Controller had ensured that the Meridian had leveled at 3;000 FT as assigned before switching the aircraft to Tower frequency; then when he made the erroneous northerly turn he would have at least been 1;000 FT below the Cirrus when the targets merged and separation may not have been lost.

Tower Controller described a loss of separation event when traffic inbound to the pattern entered an opposite direction downwind.

1823763

202107

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction

1823763

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection; Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Procedure

During flight preparation at the gate in ZZZ; I received two HAZMAT NOTAC forms for items we would be carrying to ZZZ1. Oxygen cylinders and batteries I believe. I made a mental note to call Dispatch to have remarks added to our dispatch release; but then I got distracted with other events (like servicing requests; weather planning; rushing); and forgot about the HAZMAT.

Air Carrier Captain reported transporting Hazmat cargo with incomplete required documents.

1003319

201204

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

CLR

Air Carrier

A320

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Repair; Work Cards

Fuel Tank

Airbus

X

Malfunctioning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 23

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1003319

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Staffing; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

At approximately XA:30pm; I went to the Hangar; an A320 aircraft; to make sure that the Fuel Tank Venting equipment was setup and operating. When I got there the blower for the right-hand side Main Fuel Tank was not operating and the blower on the left-hand main was operating at a low level. I made sure that both sides were venting and informed the Shift Supervisor in the Hangar that they had been unhooked. After approximately 20-minutes; I returned to start sumping the main tanks with other members of the fuel crew to find the right hand blower was unplugged from the air source and not operating. I asked several mechanics on the Hangar floor if they had knowledge of why the blowers air source had been unplugged and they did not. At that time; I told the Supervisor to please brief his Maintenance crew and inform them that the fuel crew needs to purge the tanks for entry. I again made sure that the blowers were operating properly and we left until after break. After break we returned again and now the blower for the left main tank was not operating. This is an unsafe practice and can not be tolerated.

Reporter stated the air blowers that are used for venting the wing fuel tanks are old and noisy. When the air blowers are in use along with additional air supply hoses attached to venturi type horns positioned in the fuel tanks to increase air movement through the wing fuel tanks during fuel tank maintenance work; the hangar environment is very loud and noisy. The blowers and venturi horns are left running to purge the wing tanks even though the fuel crew is not actually in the tanks. Reporter stated Hangar floor mechanics working on the same airplane get frustrated with the continuous loud noises and when they don't see anyone working in the fuel tanks; they have been known to disconnect the air blowers and even the air supplied to the venturi horns to have a quieter work environment. But that is an unsafe practice; especially if someone is still in a tank and also requires the air blowers to run even longer until the fuel tanks are fully vented. His Air Carrier is slowly buying new and quieter air blowers that should make a big difference in the Hangar noise level in the future.

A Fuel Tank Technician reports about finding their left and right fuel tank; wing venting air blowers had been unplugged from an A320 aircraft in their company Hangar; creating an unsafe work environment.

1727362

202002

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

6000.0

Center ZZZ

Military

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

1727362

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was the R-side. Aircraft X was IFR [VOR1] direct to [VOR2] at 6;000. Aircraft X went into a 7;000 MIA at which point I issued a low altitude alert. Training was being performed on the D-side during the event. I was too casual today at work. I was not engaged in the operation which resulted in the event.

ARTCC Controller reported descended aircraft below the MVA.

1841289

202109

1201-1800

ZZZ1.TRACON

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ1

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1841289

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On date; Aircraft X; while descending on the ZZZZZ3 arrival to ZZZ with both engines power set at about 70% we noticed the engine one oil temperature increasing to about 160 degrees C. Captain was the pilot flying and first officer was the pilot monitoring. I took the radio from the PM and called for the QRH. We reduced the power to idle and we noticed the temperature slowly getting back into the green arc. Then while still at idle the temperature started to rise again; but this time at a faster rate and as it reached 205 degrees C and in accordance with the QRH we proceeded with an engine shut down procedure of engine number one.We discontinued the approach; requested priority handling; and requested vectors towards ZZZ2; where the longer runways are more suitable for a single engine; flaps 20; approach.After running our single engine procedures we got cleared for the ILS X at ZZZ2; where we landed without further problems.The emergency vehicles where precautionary positioned by the RWY; and once cleared of the RWY they conducted a visual inspection of the aircraft.No visual damages were noticed so we continued to the gate and disembarked all the passengers.

Captain reported engine #1 over temperature on descent and elected to perform an in flight shut down of the affected engine. The Captain requested priority handling and was vectored to a new approach and a precautionary landing.

1115176

201309

1801-2400

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

22000.0

Center ZFW

Super King Air 350

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZFW

Facility ZFW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1115176

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

A Super King Air 350 was level flight level 220 direct to T82. I had the data block in RADAR handoff status to Stonewall Low (H50) I waited until approximately 2 minutes from the common ZHU/ZFW boundary to call for a handoff. The Controller would not answer the land line. I stated over the land line that I was about to spin the aircraft. H50 still wouldn't answer the landline nor take the handoff; so I turned the aircraft to a 330 heading to contain the aircraft. I had pointed out the aircraft to Ednas Low (62) for that the aircraft flight entered the southeastern portion of their airspace. I call Sector 62 and informed them that I was giving the aircraft a 360 degree turn because H50 wouldn't take the handoff. I told my Supervisor of the situation he called Houston Center. I continued to make repeated calls to H50; but they still would not take the handoff or answer the land line. I called an adjacent sector to them Bergstrom low (H96) and ask him if he would ask H50 to take the handoff and give me a call. The Controller told me that they were training on H50 and that they were very busy. I asked my Supervisor if he would call Houston Center and ask the Supervisor to ask the Controller to give me a call for that I need to know what they wanted me to do with the aircraft. My Supervisor called; I then called H50 again this time someone answered the line. I told them the aircraft was on a 180 heading what did they want me to do with the aircraft. The told me to clear him direct T82. This situation is totally unsafe if they were that busy then the Supervisor should have given them help or at minimum the OJTI should have taken the sector from the Trainee. This has been an ongoing problem with Houston Center for years. No one will do anything about this. You simply can't spin aircraft like this it is a dangerous operation. What is it going to take two aircraft to hit before someone does something about this? To contain this aircraft I issued the following vectors turn right heading 330; 360; 120; and 180 while I had aircraft climbing out of DFW terminal area that I had to make sure they would be above this aircraft. There needs to be some kind of action taken against the controllers involved including Management. Or there needs to be some kind of recurrent training. The controllers in this area simply don't care and their Management won't do anything to make the controllers do their job.

ZFW Controller described an unsafe condition involving an adjacent facility that failed to take a handoff resulting in the circling of aircraft.

1109565

201308

1201-1800

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

10200.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZFW

Corporate

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR DUMPY 4

Class B DFW

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 1800

Human-Machine Interface

1109565

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6600; Flight Crew Type 170

Human-Machine Interface

1109807.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Fort Worth Center gave clearance for us to cross CQY vortac at or below 10;000 and to cross ORVLL intersection at 9;000. Both crew members set up proper guidance via VPath to meet these restraints and noticed two minutes out from CQY Vortac that the FMS calculations were wrong and we were going to be non-compliant at the altitude restriction at CQY VOR. Multiple attempts were made to contact Fort Worth Center to let them know we were unable to meet the altitude restriction with no reply. Fort Worth Center contacted us asking our altitude after passing CQY Vortac and we reported our actual altitude of passing 9;400 MSL to maintain 9;000 MSL for our altitude for ORVLL. I believe the cause of the problem is a bug in the Honeywell 6.0 software for the Gulfstream V aircraft which continually causes the Vpath to recalculate its vertical guidance deviating from what was set. As this is just an intermittent problem with the 6.0 software; I am going to discontinue use of VNAV function the Gulfstream aircraft until 6.1 software is installed on the aircraft.

No additional information.

G-V flight crew reports missing a crossing restriction during descent due to what they believe is a flaw in the FMS software.

1317342

201512

1201-1800

BUR.Airport

CA

VMC

Dusk

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class C BUR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1317342

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport

Ambiguous

We were being vectored by approach control on a southeast heading in VMC towards a 1865 ft tower located about 5 miles southwest of the BUR runway 33 threshold; which was the highest obstacle in the vicinity of the left hand visual traffic pattern for runway 33; when we were cleared for the visual approach to BUR runway 33. Both pilots noted the location of the tower and planned a left base leg so as to have both vertical and lateral separation from the tower. We started a descent from 4000 ft MSL down to 2000 ft MSL with the plan to remain at or above 2000 ft MSL until passing abeam the 1865 ft [tower] on a 4 mile base leg. As we made the left turn to the base leg in a descent to 2000 ft MSL; and with visual lateral separation from the 1865 ft tower; we received a GPWS alert. Since we were able to see the terrain and the tower; and we knew we had both vertical and lateral separation from the tower; we elected to continue the visual approach without performing a GPWS escape maneuver.Electing to accept a visual approach from a downwind leg with a tight 4 mile base leg to final knowing there was a 1865 ft MSL tower sitting on the ridge line about 5 miles south southwest of the runway 33 threshold.Runway 33 at BUR has no published instrument approaches. Instead of accepting a visual approach from downwind; it would have been better to have asked approach control to vector us to a visual straight in approach.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to BUR Runway 33. Crew decided to ignore the warning since they had terrain and obstacle tower in sight.

1664478

201907

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

270.0

10.0

4000.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Other On SID/STAR

Class C ZZZ

Airspeed Indicator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 11400; Flight Crew Type 7500

Situational Awareness

1664478

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

I operated as Pilot Flying (Captain) on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. During the takeoff; my airspeed read 80 KIAS. My First Officer said nothing. I responded '90 KIAS.' I was unclear what was going on. He said something like '80'. At this point we were above 100 KIAS. Weather was VMC. Rather than execute high speed reject; I continued takeoff. Going airborne; after getting gear up; I noticed I lost my flight director and auto throttles disengaged. I flew raw data. Rather than make the turn on the SID; I asked for straight ahead. Noticing several TCAS targets and unsure of the aircrafts' status; we elected to [advise ATC]. We retracted the flaps; left slats out; and I called for [personnel] to come forward to work with First Officer as we climbed to 4;000 ft. The First Officer and [personnel] ran (lvl 2) 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN' and (lvl 2) 'SEL FLAP LIM OVRD' checklists. Both directed us to 'Non Alert' 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist. This checklist isolated the (suspected) faulty component as CADC2. First Officer selected data off my side... normal indications. Since we had [advised ATC] and at the time of takeoff there was convective activity on the first third of our route; I elected to return to ZZZ. First Officer and [personnel] worked landing data; got ATIS; used 'divert' function of ACARS. We flew uneventful arrival and ILS to [Runway] XXL. Hats off to TRACON for excellent handling and reference airspeed calls. Also to ZZZ ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) for excellent response.

MD-11 Captain reported that CADC2 failed during takeoff resulting in a return to departure airport.

1791758

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Light Sport Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ1

Main Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 59; Flight Crew Type 12

Training / Qualification

1791758

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Aircraft

Procedure

I am a student pilot that was performing my initial solo cross country. I had safely completed the initial leg; and was returning to ZZZ. On final; in the flare; I experienced an unanticipated crosswind gust; which resulted in the airplane dropping suddenly and causing a hard landing on the left main gear. I applied full power to go around and re-attempt the landing. I noticed that the airplane was yawing more than usual and recognized the airplane was operating in an abnormal condition. Shortly thereafter; I heard a radio call that a landing gear was visible on the runway at which point I realized that I had lost my left main gear. I continued to fly the traffic pattern under radio guidance from a CFI who was on the ground while I burned fuel and prepared for an emergency landing. On final; under instruction from the CFI; I cut all fuel and powered down the aircraft; while continuing to fly the airplane to a landing. I landed on the right main gear and the aircraft settled to the ground ultimately skidding on in its belly as it made contact with the runway surface. Due to the lack of directional control from only having the right main gear; the aircraft skidded left off the runway and came to rest in the grass left of the runway surface. I was able to exit the aircraft safely with no physical injuries. Following the event; I was interviewed by an Aviation Safety Inspector from the CITY Flight Standards Office and discussed the details shared above in its entirety.

Student pilot reported a hard landing which severed the left main gear; requiring an emergency landing.

1427035

201702

CYYZ.Airport

ON

7000.0

IMC

Rain

Tower CYYZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 5

Final Approach

STAR NUBER1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 6909

Workload

1427035

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 435

Workload

1427063.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Weather

Weather

After being delayed due to low ceilings in CYYZ we were finally descending via the Nuber1 arrival for RWY 15R. Shortly after receiving the clearance to descend to 11000 we were then assigned RWY 15L. Leaving between FL210 and 17000 or so we were given a left 360 degree turn for spacing and then direct to IKBAT - now on the transition to RWY 05. Now three approach briefs in the space of 15 mins. We then received two more left 360 degree turns while descending in heavy rain and moderate turbulence with a clearance to 7000. After the third 360 degree turn we were then transferred to the final controller and proceeded inbound for the ILS 05. The last several ATIS showed winds at approximately 090 to 100 at 5-10 kts and the final controller mentioned the same with an RVR of 6000+ for RWY 05. When cleared for the approach we were at 3000 to intercept the G/S and I noticed the winds had picked up to a 50 kt direct tailwind (F/O was flying by the way). We were assigned 160 kts and began to configure at approximately 2000 AGL. At 1500 ft the wind was a 30 kts direct tailwind and we had flaps 3 - IAS speed had increased at this point (Thrust Idle) to 170-175kts prohibiting final flaps just yet. The F/O did a great job aggressively trying to slow the A/C as we were concerned of getting a flaps 3 overspeed. As I knew from the ATIS and the controllers (TWR now) the winds were to die off very soon to less than 10 kts. Inside of 1000 ft we were just getting the airspeed to put in final flaps (Full) and were finally stabilized and on speed between 500-800 ft. The winds were now at the reported 090 at 8 kts or so inside of 500ft. The total wind shift was approximately 90 degrees (from direct tailwind) to a right crosswind - losing 40kts in the space of 1500 ft or so. The reason I elected to continue the approach was 1. Knowing about the wind shift and decrease as reported on the ATIS and from ATC. 2. Seeing a positive trend in the wind. 3. Being prepared for the missed approach (at 500ft) IF the winds and IAS stayed as they were earlier in the approach. We landed uneventfully in the touchdown zone and on speed - RWY 05 after breaking out before minimums.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 flight crew reported an unstabilized approach to CYYZ due to shifting winds.

1250635

201503

1201-1800

CYCE.Airport

ON

0.0

VMC

Icing; Snow

Daylight

CTAF CYCE

Corporate

IAI1125 (Astra)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 9400; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness

1250635

Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Weather; Airport

Airport

We departed for our destination of Centralia; ON (CYCE). Centralia has no WX reporting and uses the TAF from London. The CTAF at Centralia is not monitored; and a check of NOTAMS prior to departing for Centralia had 'no' indications of runway closures. The flight was performed VFR in VMC conditions. Winds departing were 3110G20. During approach at Centralia the wind display on our MFD's indicated it to be aligned with 34 at 18 kts.On final approach areas of what were believed to be only patchy thin snow and ice were observed to be covering approximately 10% of Rwy 34; primarily at the threshold and departure end. Some was observed also in the area where RWY 10/28 crosses RWY 17/34.Following a normal landing I as pilot not flying looked down to verify AIR BRAKES Deployed. Annunciator was on. When I raised my head saw what believed was patchy thin ice and snow at the point Rwy 10/28 crossed were actually berms left from plowing Rwy 10/28. I would estimate them to have been 1 to 3 feet in height.The Pilot Flying applied maximum braking and full aft yoke. Upon impacting the second berm the Nose Landing Gear failed and the bottom half separated from the aircraft. The Pilot Flying maintained directional control and was able to gently lower the nose to the runway. During our approach to Centralia we elected to enter on a left base rather than on the downwind; which may have given us a better perspective to view the runway. We were lulled into assuming what little snow and ice we observed on Rwy 34 was all only patchy thin as there was no NOTAM or physical indication that the runway was closed. Also; as Pilot not flying on the short flight I was busy and did not take the extra few moments I should have to observe the runway more closely. I suspect that during the last snowfall only Rwy 10/28 was plowed and the berm we impacted was left over from that. I believe the Pilot Flying did an excellent job of dealing with this mishap; as we had only a few seconds from touchdown to impact. I would like to explore; perhaps during our next Sim Recurrent what would have occurred if prior to impacting the berm the brakes had been released and while still holding full aft yoke the T/R's had been deployed. They are mounted high on the Astra and I believe these actions might have lightened the load significantly on the Nose Landing Gear during the impact with the berm.

IA1125 Captain reported nose gear damage resulted from impact with a snow berm on landing roll at CYCE.

1323954

201601

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked; Taxi

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1323954

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

The flight payload had to be significantly reduced due to tankage - a situation where the aircraft simply cannot physically carry enough fuel to carry full payload under the given flight plan requirements. The flight plan route was selected to avoid forecasted moderate turbulence. The en-route fuel burn was significantly higher than normal due to a very strong jetstream crossing all routes to Hawaii (WSI depicted the jetstream at FL350 at 140 kts). The load planner was made aware of the pre-flight payload reduction by message and acknowledged my message. Shortly after flight plan release; Captain called and requested 1;500 lbs additional fuel. I mentioned to Captain that I had already reduced the payload down significantly. Captain stated that he understood; however he wanted to have 9;000 lbs fuel over destination. I made the changes to the flight plan release; reduced the payload down even further to carry the extra fuel; issued a new flight plan revision and promptly sent the load planner another message regarding the new flight plan revision and that the required fuel has increased. Again; the load planner acknowledged the message and even sent a couple other messages that the Captain was trying to get a jumpseater onboard; which the load planner was going to deny. Prior to the departure time; several 'payload revisions' were received by message; all of them were increases. After a few of the payload revisions were received; and prior to the flight blocking an out time; I sent a message to the load planner at XA:57 stating 'UNABLE THESE PAYLOAD INCREASES; NO EXTRA FUEL TO USE TO COVER THE ADDED BURN - CAPT WANTS 9.0 FOD....' with the payload revision message attached 'FLT PLN [A] PYLD; REV PYLD [FPL B]'. After dealing with another flight maintenance issue; I noticed that the Flight had blocked an out time of XC:02; and saw on Airport Insight that the flight was heading out to [the runway] on taxiway Bravo; just past Golf. After a quick check of FL; I saw that the flight had been issued a closeout for a payload of 38;350 lbs; not the 31;600 lbs the flight plan was calculated with and released. I immediately sent an ACARS message to the flight stating the closeout payload was above our flight plan payload and that even by using the 1;500 lbs Captain add fuel the added burn could not be covered. I watched on Airport [as] the flight turned left off taxiway Bravo via C-1; left onto Taxiway Charlie and stopped prior to Juliet. Note: Had the flight not turned off left onto C-1; I was prepared to call the ATC Tower and order the flight back to the gate. The Captain made contact with me via company radio; where I restated what the payload problem was and why we did not have the fuel to cover the additional payload. The Captain indicated the current fuel onboard and that he would be ok using the Captain Add fuel for the burn. I was able to get the flight plan calculate with 38;100 lbs payload and his lower fuel; however the flight was well below the minimum takeoff fuel. The Captain and myself agreed to return to the gate to refuel and remove payload. While the flight was returning to the gate; Load Planning Supervisor called me; stated he had taken over the flight; asked for a briefing on the weight/fuel situation. I briefed him up quickly; he understood exactly what to do; made the adjustments to remove payload. The flight refueled and re-departed without any further issue. I never heard from the original load planner again.This event occurred because the load planner disregarded my messages about the pre-flight dispatcher flight plan payload reductions; even after he had acknowledged receiving the messages. At no point did I authorize any of the multiple payload increase messages received at my dispatch desk. The load planner knowingly put unauthorized additional payload onboard the aircraft causing an inadequate fuel situation and sent a load closeout to the flight. Procedures must be developed and implemented that define a weight restricted flight and how to handle it better. This weight restricted flight definition and procedures must be include in and aligned within all operation manuals (FM Part 1; Dispatch DPM and Loads). This process must include that a weight restricted flight must not depart the gate until all variables are entered into sabre (passenger closeout; ramp bags; cargo; fuel) and are verified within tolerance and acceptable. The load closeout should be sent to the weight restricted flight AT THE GATE. Load planners must be sent a training notification/reminder that under no circumstances is a payload revision/increase to be accepted without dispatch approval. The practice of allowing a weight restricted flight to depart the gate; after the Captain and Dispatcher have agreed to and signed the flight plan release based on a planned payload; only to have the payload changed transparently to the flight crew or over-ridden by the load planner while taxing out for takeoff at a busy; congested international airport is unacceptable and unsafe.

A Dispatcher reported his Load Planner allowed an aircraft on an oceanic flight to leave the gate over gross even after discussions about removing payload because the Captain requested additional fuel because of winds.

1326952

201601

0601-1200

DAL.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160

Situational Awareness

1326952

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229

1326949.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Ground Personnel

Other push back

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

An incident occurred during pushback; resulting in the towbar damaging a fitting on the bottom of the nose gear strut. The fitting is used to service the strut with hydraulic fluid and compressed nitrogen gas. As a result; the strut lost both fluid and nitrogen gas which caused the strut to compress. Maintenance was required to replace the fitting and service the strut.The initial pushback proceeded normally. After a short pushback; I was told to set the brakes. I didn't set the brakes and I told the Pushback Crew to push us back farther. The Crew told me that this is where they stop the pushback. I told the Crew we needed to be pushed back farther back. The Pushback Crew said something about pushing back any farther and we would be on a taxiway. We were in a non-movement area; but we called Ground Control and were told push wherever we needed to. I told the Pushback Crew that we were fine and to push us back farther. We were pushed back and came to a stop. I asked about setting the brakes. We stopped briefly and then the aircraft started moving forward. No communication had come from the Pushback Crew regarding pushback complete or set the brakes. I stopped the aircraft with the aircraft's brakes and asked the Pushback Crew what was going on. They told me the towbar had disconnected from the nose gear; hit the nose gear when the aircraft rolled forward; and now fluid was coming from the nose gear. I told them we would be returning to the gate. We called DAL Ops and told them we were returning to the gate. We returned to Gate where Maintenance repaired and serviced the nose gear strut.I have had the towbar disconnect on one other occasion during pushback. It occurred at the same time as this incident; just as the tug was bringing the aircraft to a stop. The aircraft came to a brief stop; the towbar disconnected; and the aircraft started rolling forward. That Pushback Crew told me the handle on the towbar that locks the towbar to the nose gear did not have the safety pin properly installed. The result was the handle floated up and released the towbar from the nose gear. I am very thankful that our Pushback Crew was not injured during this incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported the nose gear was damaged when it was struck by the pushback tug.

1765168

202010

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Center ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Landing

Class E ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

VFR

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1765168

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1765170.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Other Person

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I took sector X/Y/Z shortly after Aircraft X checked in from ZZZ Approach headed to ZZZ airport. I switched Aircraft X from frequency to different frequency. Usually when I switch an aircraft or they check in I would normally ask them to advise when they have the weather and issue any NOTAMs. I do not know why I did not ask this VFR aircraft if he had the weather or advise him of the PPR (Prior Permission Required). This is something very uncharacteristic of me. I did call traffic to Aircraft X twice before sending him to advisories and terminating his flight following. I generally treat VFR the same as IFR with regards to weather and NOTAMs. The aircraft apparently landed without calling into the airport and missed the trucks on the runway. My only conclusion is that the memory jogger for the airport 10 minute PPR was not next to the airport on the scope; it was quite a bit north of the airport. We also have a lot of other things written on the scope at this time with all the TFRs in the area. I did have several other things that required coordination and switching of frequency transmitter sites at the time but traffic was not that busy. Aircraft Y was orbiting in the TFR just outside of approach and was going to be a factor with another aircraft descending into ZZZ.I do remember being mentally exhausted from the day. We are continually forced to work combined sectors with a lot of frequency congestion; a lot of moving aircraft from frequency to frequency. Missing numerous TFRs and traffic orbiting the TFRs and listening to pilot readbacks on complex clearances. Lots of VFR aircraft with many traffic calls and aircraft not listening. We are busy in our area and keeping sectors split is not a priority. We just end up making things work and pushing through it. While this is not an excuse for why I did not do my job and issue the NOTAM I do believe it is contributing to the event in the long run.We need to return to normal staffing. We need to have sectors split out more. Ultimately we are straining our people and causing unnecessary stress in how we are currently running the area.

I assumed the CIC desk at XA:47. At XA:55 a runway incursion took place with a VFR Aircraft X who was not notified of the ten minute prior permission required for landing at ZZZ. I was unaware the incident took place until the next day. I was confident that the airspace wasn't too busy or complex for the configuration.Prior permissions for landing at ZZZ are very commonplace. The written note on the radar scope to remind us of the closure may be causing oversight because we see it so often. Perhaps we can change our way of indicating the closure using the draw function so it stands out more in our scan.

Center Controllers reported an aircraft landing at an airport where the runway was closed.

1200377

201409

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

31000.0

IMC

Icing

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; VOR / VORTAC ZZZ

Cruise

Visual Approach

Class A ZZZ

ILS/VOR

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1200377

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1200378.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

In flight; while using VOR navigation we began to have erroneous signals from both Nav1 and Nav2 about 50 miles north of ZZZ [VOR.] ATC was notified and we received radar vectors/direct ZZZ1 [VOR] when able. We assumed at this point based on the indications; it was an issue with the VOR. I was able to positively ID ZZZ1 [VOR] and we began to navigate on our own. ATC cleared us to descend; and as we descended we entered IMC and ice. It was around that time we lost ID on the station and again received unreliable signals from both VOR receivers. We again notified ATC and requested vectors for the remainder of the flight. We descended via radar vectors to the Visual without incident. Prior to conducting a Visual Approach and in visual conditions; the NAV Radio was tuned to the localizer frequency and appeared to be receiving accurate signals. This type of incident could possibly be avoided with further troubleshooting involving MEL with issues concerning VHF navigation. Furthermore the threat could be mitigated with an additional source of navigation.

We planned and plotted our course using terrestrial navigation as our FMS was on MEL for not Auto Tuning and losing VOR redundancy. About 50 miles north of ZZZ [VOR] we started getting erratic signals from both VORs. I tuned in for a Morse Code ID and was not able to get a signal. I advised ATC and they said they would look into the matter and gave us radar vectors to ZZZ1 [VOR] and cleared us direct when able. We were well outside the service volume of ZZZ1 [VOR] as we were about 200 NM northwest of the VOR. As we got within about 100 NM we had a strong clear signal; and a steady course; so we assumed that the ZZZ VOR was the issue. About 50 miles from the VOR we lost all signal and navigation capability. After trying several other VOR's we discovered that we had a NAV problem onboard. We notified ATC and Dispatch immediately. After double checking the weather and determining it was VMC with little chance of that changing; we elected to continue on using ATC radar vectors to a Visual Approach. With some limited troubleshooting it appeared that the VOR's only worked in VMC and would not work at all in icing conditions. A VOR check was completed just three days ago when the aircraft came out of heavy maintenance.This type of incident might have been avoided by requiring more troubleshooting to the MEL for issues relating to VHF navigation. The threats could also be mitigated with a tertiary source of navigation such as an ADF and/or crewmember training on PAR or ASR/SRA approaches.

CRJ-200 flight crew reports accepting an aircraft with the FMC on MEL for not auto tuning VOR's. Enroute it is determined that the VOR's themselves may be the issue and radar vectors are requested to complete the flight.

1209286

201410

1801-2400

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

7000.0

Night

Center ZDV

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

IFR

Initial Climb

Class E ZDV

Facility ZDV.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.9

Situational Awareness

1209286

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors

Aircraft X called airborne looking to pick up his flight plan. I gave him a code and received a track and proceeded to clear him. I then gave him the altimeter and thought nothing of it. My d-side and I then realized that he was actually below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) and that I had messed up. At this point he was crossing into an area of lower MIAs and I felt that the damage had already been done and that there was no need to climb the aircraft. This was a complete lack of focus on my part. I should have noticed this sooner and cleared him to a higher altitude when issuing the clearance. This is all my fault. I would like to point out that in my opinion; the lack of traffic and complexity played a part in this. We were chatting and just not engaged enough.Focus on combining sectors more to keep work force engaged. I am not sure if anything could have been combined up or not in this instance. I am commonly watching a small number of aircraft and losing focus on the sector because I have way too much time on my hands between transmissions.

ZDV Controller reports of discovering an aircraft that he was working; was below the MIA.

1782374

202101

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Other unknown

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other unknown

Class B ZZZ

Other unknown

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110.37; Flight Crew Total 2358.98; Flight Crew Type 277.87

1782374

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

Vertical 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

On approach to Runway XX at ZZZ. Pilot flying had just called for landing gear extension. We were just outside ZZZZZ intersection at exactly 2;500 ft MSL descending; a drone went right under us; illuminated by the landing light. I estimate that the drone was no more than 20 feet below our altitude; directly in-line with our flight path horizontally. The first officer caught a glimpse of it; I saw it for a fraction of a second. I would not have had time to avoid the drone. The drone was white; with something red; either paint or a dim light. The drone was reported to ZZZ tower.

Air carrier flight crew was on approach to a Class B airport and came within 20 feet of a UAV while on final approach.

1644318

201905

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

Class G ZZZ

UNICOM ZZZ

Government

Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

VFR

Training

Initial Climb

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 635; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1644318

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 0; Vertical 150

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Winds reported on the local AWOS varied from 100 to 140 degrees at 3-12 knots while I preflighted the plane and taxied from the hangar; sky was clear with several scattered layers above 5;000 feet; visibility well over the AWOS-reported ten miles. Local glider ops were using Runway XX. As I proceeded to Runway XX via taxiway; listening on CTAF and AWOS; I saw a glider in the pattern and then on final for XX; and clearly heard its calls for landing on XX. I also heard but did not understand another radio call (about which more later). This call was much quieter and less distinct than the glider call; and unintelligible; being stepped on by the AWOS broadcast. Because it was much quieter than the glider call; I assumed it was an airborne aircraft either inbound to ZZZ or calling another facility in the area. I reported taxiing across Runway Y and continued past the runway hold line. At the instant I entered Y; a helicopter flew directly overhead and continued north-easterly along a path above Runway Y. As I continued taxiing; and while performing my pre-takeoff checklist; I heard additional relatively quiet calls that were difficult to understand; but it eventually became apparent the helo was operated by [name removed] and it remained in a left closed pattern for Y. I continued to hear its position reports in the pattern as I took off from Runway XX and departed the airport area to the north-east for a short practice flight. I could hear reports from the helo for the duration of my half hour flight including immediately after I called inbound from 8 miles north-east. I also heard a call from a glider on approach to XX. When I called downwind for XX the helo was on the number for Runway Y but called and announced its departure from Runway Y and the airport area; which it subsequently did before I turned base for XX. I might have seen the helicopter as I taxied toward Runway Y if I had looked in that direction at the right time; so I will for sure be doing that in the future. However; the helo might not have been visible if it was already airborne and above my wing. The position/action radio call from the helo might have been more audible if I hadn't been listening to the AWOS at a time and location when hearing position/action reports was clearly more important; so that's another important take-away. Finally -- and beyond my control -- louder and more distinct radio calls from the helo might have helped avoid this situation.

Cessna 172 pilot reported being overflown by a helicopter while taxiing to the runway.

1636571

201903

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

CLR

Air Carrier

MD-11

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1636571

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Human Factors

I was assigned the APU perf. [work card] and my partner had a couple of air related [work cards] to complete also. Being the Number 2 Tail dock was installed I asked one of the mechanics that was assigned to the Number 2 Eng (Engine) if it was ok to run the APU while they went on break; he said sure. Another mechanic asked me to motor Number 1 and Number 3 engines for leak check and that it was ok to put the fire handles to the normal position. I asked another mechanic if I could put the flaps up; he cleared me to put the flaps up so as I entered the flt (Flight) deck I scanned all the lockout tags and noticed a couple on a fuel pump. I and the normal ones we put on every weekend. I put the Number 1 and Number 3 fire handles to normal and was trying to clear the interface message in CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) my partner suggested to put the Number 2 fire handle up so I looked at the lockout tag on it and on one side it was labeled Number 1 and Number 3 eng serv (Engine Service). On the opposite side it said Number 2 hydraulic manifold so since no other hydraulics were locked out I figured it was completed also we had no issues when putting the flaps up so I removed it and put the Number 2 fire handle to normal. At this time I proceeded to start the APU; as I was 1 minute into the start we heard people yelling turn it off so my partner pulled the APU fire handle and started to walk out of the flight deck to see the issue then he said pull the fire handle which I did. I immediately turned off the battery and secured the flight deck then went down to help contain the spill as were a few other mechanics. After talking to the other mechanics I found out the fuel control (pump) was removed from the engine and the fuel line capped and stowed. On the side of the engine this line was the origin of the leak.

MD-11 Maintenance Technician reported overlooking the lockout tags on cockpit fuel pump switch and started the APU causing fuel leak.

1560511

201807

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

2200.0

VMC

20

Daylight

25000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Other Controlled

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 15000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1560511

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1560518.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 500; Vertical 500

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Flight to ZZZ we received a TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) on final approach. Captain was the pilot flying. This flight is extremely short. During day VFR there is large traffic density in the area. ATC communications is very busy. Additionally there are inbound flights to ZZZ1. Knowing how short and busy this flight would be we briefed the approach while still on the ground. We had additional distractors of an 'Autopilot' Advisory message that we briefly addressed via the checklist. TRACON wanted our airspeed kept high along with our altitude. Which deviated from our plan to fly a slower arrival. We were cleared by Approach Control to descend to 3;400 feet; intercept the localizer and cleared for the ILS. We were then handed off to Tower Control who cleared us to land. Despite the distractors; all normal. The runway was in sight the entire time. We were fully configured; descending on the ILS. When we were around 2;400 feet MSL; Tower called traffic ahead at 2;400 feet. I verbalized he was at our altitude; but no range was given. Shortly after (estimating 2;200 feet MSL) we received 'Traffic; Traffic; Climb; Climb.' I immediately performed the TCAS RA maneuver; which was more aggressive then I have encountered in training. The green arc started at 1;000 feet VSI. We were in the maneuver for a good time before 'clear of conflict.' We never saw the other aircraft. The FO (First Officer) told the Tower 'Flight X TCAS RA' and clear [of] conflict; but Tower never acknowledged either transmission. Later he said he had numerous aircraft calling without callsigns. After clear of conflict; there was a bit of a question as to the recovery phase. We were on an instrument approach; but did not initiate a missed approach from the normal spot. The climb on runway heading is to 2;700 feet then right turn to 6;000 feet. Would that keep us clear of all this VFR traffic around us? We were talking to Tower in clear VMC conditions - would he just clear us to the visual pattern? Our last clearance was the ILS; so we initiated that missed approach procedure while Tower handed us off to Approach. We switched to Approach and asked for a heading and altitude clearance. She said 'you're supposed to fly the missed approach.' She may not have known we were VMC and could see the terrain. At any rate we were already initiating that turn and I believe we were very close to the actual procedure course. We were vectored around for an uneventful ILS to a landing at ZZZ. The amount of VFR traffic in the area is very high. Flying airliners inbound traffic is not normal operations. I believe these flights will increase as [carriers] have begun building operations at [the airport]. I recommend it would be more efficient and safe to create standard routing from takeoff to touchdown between the two airports that all parties - Approach; Tower ATC; and pilots are familiar.Recommendation to the training syllabus to add TCAS RA training during final approach phase on instrument approach. My experience is it has been administered during climb or cruise flight. Throw in some close terrain; confusing communication and numerous traffic for even better training.

On a short flight to ZZZ; our flight experienced a TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory) after switching from Approach Control to Tower inside the Final Approach Fix cleared for the approach. Switching to Tower; Tower called out helicopter traffic at our same altitude and about the same time we got a TCAS Traffic Advisory followed by an immediate RA with and climb indication and told to climb. I called Go Around and advised Tower of TCAS RA climbing. Once our established Go/Around occurred I asked Tower for Approach frequency and advised that we were climbing to 3;500 feet and requesting a turn to the right due to terrain. This matched closely with the missed approach for the procedure minus the final altitude to climb. There was a lot of traffic opposite direction going into [a nearby] airport that we did not want to climb into early. Approach advised we were supposed to be on the published missed which we briefed that we did an unscheduled TCAS RA climb. Approach was very helpful and vectored us back again for an intercept to final back into ZZZ ILS approach to an uneventful landing.

B757-200 flight crew reported having to execute an aggressive resolution to a RA.

1610500

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1610500

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification

1609883.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; MEL

Human Factors

Upon arrival at aircraft found two open write-ups in logbook. One for loose taxi light and other for essentially higher than normal indication of fuel burn between main tanks. I don't remember the exact wording. This also matched a similar write-up from the previous flight that mx (Maintenance) signed off by saying it was IAW (In Accordance With) with normal limits. Somewhere during pre-flight we noticed no indication on right main fuel tank. The fuel gauges all indicated normal when we first boarded and we had release fuel. We had already informed operations that we needed a mechanic to address the open write-ups and I assumed that the right tank indication was related to the previous write-ups; but they would all be addressed by mx action. The mechanic retrieved the logbook and went to work. Thinking that the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) was simple and would not preclude flight; I allowed boarding to continue. During the delay I found almost no communication with operations was possible so I repeatedly got off the aircraft to get agents to bring out food as we were not catered; delay kits and to get aircraft water service as we had not been not overnight. Several passengers wanted to be removed and all appropriate PAs made. I was also in regular contact with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. I needed to get off aircraft to check on the mechanic and ZZZ Operations multiple times during the three-hour delay; as I was getting no updates. After three hours the mechanic said he needed to collar some circuit breakers and that the logbook was finally signed off and coordinated with [Maintenance Control]. I again checked with Dispatch and received an updated release referencing the MELs. I knew I had been originally dispatched with a lot of extra fuel for the flight and I knew from seeing the gauges before the failure that I had been fueled to release. I requested the required fuel slip and had the fueler top off the aircraft and verify again that I had release fuel. The First Officer and I went through the MEL and concurred that all our actions were correct. Finally; with the mechanics assurance that all required actions were complied with; we took off. I printed and closely tracked the fuel log. I checked fuel used at each fix and subtracted fuel used to obtain fuel remaining. The flight was uneventful. Today I was contacted to file this ASAP. In retrospect I should have questioned the mechanics actions in disabling the other tank indications. This left me no cockpit indication of fuel remaining in the cockpit. When I saw Maintenance add MEL 28-09; that no totalizer indication was required; I assumed that it was all related to 28-06. He told me the procedure had him collar multiple CBs (Circuit Breakers) to comply. MEL 28-06 states that the aircraft has two main tank indications and that only one is required. It also states that the center fuel indication is required. I mistakenly assumed that since I had those conditions before the maintenance action; I would be good after maintenance sign off. I also assumed the FMC (Flight Management Computer) could get valid fuel indications from other than the DU (Display Unit) indications and that was maybe why this procedure was valid. I also discussed the original imbalance write-up with [Maintenance Control] and he indicated it was related to new [Company] procedure of not properly maintained the sensors. Since I know how much fuel I have to start with; and I know how much fuel I am burning and have burned; I know how much fuel I have. All boost bumps and fuel low level lights were operating. Throughout this event I was in close contact with Dispatch and [Maintenance Control]. I had no reason to believe the contract mechanic did not do exactly what was in the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) in coordination with [Maintenance Control]. In retrospect; I should have questioned why after sign off; I did not have my left and center tank indications restored. I mistakenly assumed that this wasthe desired condition after the procedure. What cannot be accounted for is a total fuel leak in both tanks. I assumed this possibility was weighed by the MEL procedure and the procedure was done correctly. I will add as a factor the three hours it took for action; but there was no pushing to depart from anyone. Just frustration.

I was called out to gate to Aircraft X for no power on wing refueling panel. After inspecting the wing fueling panel I went to the cockpit and was told by the outbound flight crew that there was no cockpit indication of the fuel quantity or totalizer. The flight crew questioned the deferrals to the right fuel quantity indication in the logbook performed by ZZZ contract maintenance. After further review I noticed that 4 ea. fuel quantity circuit breakers pulled and collared behind the first officers seat. After reading all the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) references that were applied nothing called for circuit breakers to be pulled per the MEL. I found that MEL 28-6 requires to install a busing plug jumper harness per M/M [number]. The task requires 4 circuit breakers to be pulled and reinstated after the harness is installed. ZZZ contract maintenance did not reinstate the breakers and the flight crew flew the aircraft from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with no fuel quantity indication.

Flight Crew and Maintenance Technician reported fuel quantity indication problem led to incorrect accomplishment of the Minimum Equipment List Procedure.

1570926

201808

1201-1800

DTW.Airport

MI

15000.0

TRACON D21

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS RNAV PRM Z RWY 22L

Initial Approach

Class E D21

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

1570926

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

1570947.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure

While at cruise we briefed the PRM approach for Runway 22R (both the textual and the approach plate). As with past experience this is the expected runway with the Polar arrival from the northwest. Passing through 15;000 feet. with Approach Control we were assigned Runway 22L ILS. As the ATIS vaguely stated they were using ILS Y RY 22R and RY 21L approach with the message ILS Y is offset by 2.5 degrees expect PRM. As stated we briefed and set up for Runway 22R PRM then assigned 22L passing through 15;000 feet. We then queried if the 22L approach would be a PRM since we did not see an approach plate and was not stated by ATC when the runway was assigned. After a few minutes had passed searching for the missing approach plate and given the opportunity to speak up with the frequency being busy we notified them that we did not have the appropriate approach plate but could accept the RNAV PRM Z 22L. They then assigned us the RNAV approach (aircraft was more than ten miles from the approach fix they assigned us to fly direct to and more than 30 miles from the runway) and subsequently two [company] aircraft spoke up and stated they did not have the ILS 22L PRM approach either.Rest of approach/landing was uneventful until Operations passed along that the Control Tower wanted us to call them after we had been parked at the gate for a few minutes. The Control Tower's issue was the late notification that we were unable to accept the approach (less than a 100 miles) and that we did not have the approach plate. We communicated that we in fact briefed the expected approach more than 200 miles out and had the textual PRM approach plate for all runways and the PRM approach plate for the expected runway 22R. They completely understood and at this point of the conversation and wanted to know why we or the other mentioned company no longer had ILS PRM approach for 22L. The trap here is expecting to have the necessary resources needed to complete the flight. Not only did we have textual information about all PRM approaches for Detroit metro; but also had the appropriate PRM approach chart for the expected runway. So one would assume they had all needed charts at this point. The threat was mitigated as soon as possible once identified and ATC was able to accommodate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported issues with lack of published procedures for a particular approach into DTW.

1352728

201604

0601-1200

MSLP.Airport

FO

VMC

Center MHTG

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Other VOR DME Y

Class A MHTG

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1352728

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Approach into El Salvador; failed to follow VOR DME Y approach course. Mountainous terrain at night with Spanish controller; runway changed from what was expected; Captain had not flown into MSLP in over 10 years; First Officer had never flown into field; high terrain in area; iPad in night mode. Instructed to proceed direct to fix; not on filed arrival or approach. (After landing; we discovered the fix was on a RNAV approach; which [company] said we were not approved to fly; so those approaches were not reviewed)Approach did not have heavy line from VOR thru arc; only the final approach course. Controller said; we thought; to fly over VOR and then join VOR DME Y final. We even asked again to confirm. It was unclear to the crew that he intended us to fly a published approach course. The plan view of the approach did not show an arc segment; only the final approach course.Crew flew over VOR and then self-vectored to downwind. Controller asked if we were familiar with the VOR DME Y; we replied no. We then requested vectors to final approach course and made an uneventful landing at MSLP.(Additional distraction; crew tracking gave crew unclear reassignment. Departing 4 hours earlier than original flight; with a deadhead to (original destination) with additional instructions that we would pick up our normal sequence. Once we reviewed what we thought was the plan for the following day; it appeared that they were attempting to schedule us for a 14+ hour days; when our FAR 117 legal flight duty period was 10 hours. This lead to a distraction in flight; but not to the missed approach instructions.)

First Officer reported a track deviation on approach to MSLP; citing crew unfamiliarity with the airport and poor ATC communication as factors.

1125852

201310

0601-1200

EGLL.TRACON

FO

5700.0

VMC

TRACON EGLL

Air Carrier

B777-300

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1125852

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 14000

1125856.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

First Officer [was] pilot flying. Vectors for EGLL Runway 27R. Cleared to descend to 6;000 FT. FLCH mode used with right autopilot engaged. Transition altitude 6;500 FT. Captain reset altimeter to 1006 Hp leaving 7;400 FT. First Officer did not reset altimeter to QNH until just prior to 6;000 FT. Airplane descended below 6;000 to approximately 5;700 FT with autopilot engaged. Once discovered by Captain; First Officer disengaged autopilot and climbed back to 6;000 FT. EGLL Director did not acknowledge or indicate observation of deviation. Ensure all altimeters are reset to QNH in descent 1;000 FT prior to transition altitude if clearance is below transition.

We were on downwind turning base to Runway 27R at EGLL. We were cleared from FL080 to 6;000 FT with an altimeter of 1006. The transition level was 6;500. I was flying with the autopilot on and selected FLCH to descend to 6;000 FT. We were in the turn to base when I saw BAROSET DISAGREE on the EICAS screen. The Captain had already selected 1006 on his altimeter so I pushed mine from STD to 1006. This was around 6;400 FTto 6;300 FT. We got a caution alert and I saw ALTITUDE ALERT on the EICAS SCREEN. I looked at the altimeter and it showed us 300 FT low (5;700 FT) so I immediately disengaged the autopilot and pulled the nose back up. The altitude 6;000 FT was in the altitude capture window and we were in FLCH. I couldn't understand why it didn't capture it. My guess is that I selected 1006 on the altimeter while it was transitioning to the capture mode and it disrupted the normal automation. ATC did not mention the excursion.I should have selected 1006 right after FLCH going from FL080 to 6;000 FT. The low altimeter setting made the Transition Altitude 6;500 FT that day so I needed to hit it faster. I was monitoring a descent; speed change; my time to the runway; and general visual field orientation and my cross check missed the lack of altitude capture. The B777 is so reliable that I was over confident in letting it back me up. This is a side note and had happened to me once before several months earlier. I was descending to 6;000 FT where 6;000 was the transition level. I switched the altimeter from standard to local just prior to 6;000 FT and it didn't capture the altitude that time either but I was watching it and leveled off at 6;000 FT. We discussed it then and guessed that it might have been because I selected it while it was capturing the altitude. It might be worth asking Boeing if this is a possibility.

B777 flight crew reports descending below their assigned altitude due to the altimeter setting being changed by the flying First Officer from QNE to QNH just as the aircraft is leveling at 6;000 FT. The aircraft levels off 300 FT low on QNH and is immediately returned to 6;000 FT.

1808940

202105

1201-1800

BJC.Airport

CO

5600.0

VMC

Turbulence; Windshear; Rain; 10

Daylight

Tower BJC

Other Flight School

Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Descent

Visual Approach

Class D BJC

Tower BJC

Other Flight School

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D BJC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Flight school

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 300

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1808940

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Vertical 400

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

While doing pattern work on Runway 30L; we requested a full-stop on Runway 3. Tower instructed us to 'make left downwind.' My student and I turned left to enter the left downwind Runway 3; at this time; Aircraft Y traffic was mid-field downwind Runway 30L. Traffic was cleared touch-and-go Runway 30L. Without further instruction; my student and I proceeded with a standard left pattern Runway 3. On 0.25 nm final; I see the traffic landing the parallel is still rolling on the runway; and I did not anticipate them being clear of my runway by the time my student and I crossed the threshold Runway 3; so I instructed my student to execute a go-around. This resulted in our Aircraft X directly overflying the Aircraft Y right as they rolled across Runway 3 on Runway 30L. They were not yet airborne.In hindsight; I believe Tower's instruction to make left downwind may have been intended as extend downwind; or they would call my base. Since this instruction was not given; we made a normal pattern and did not anticipate a conflict until short final.Earlier on the same flight; we had been doing full-stop-taxi-backs; and we landed Runway 30L; and exited left onto Taxiway B. The same controller gave us taxi instructions 'Runway 30L taxi via Delta' and I asked if I needed 'cross Runway 3.' During this same flight; I had prompted the previous controller a couple of times; and gotten the instruction to cross each time; but only after prompting for it. The next controller volunteered; 'we don't normally do that.' She did give me the crossing; but I am wondering why we do not volunteer that crossing since it is necessary to cross the full-hold bar for Runway 3 in order to turn left onto Taxiway D from Taxiway B; or the other way to turn right onto Taxiway B from Taxiway D.

Flight Instructor reported a NMAC during go-around on a training flight.

1422831

201702

1201-1800

LGA.Airport

NY

18000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZNY

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZNY

Center ZNY

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1422831

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We were inbound to LGA; level at 18;000 ft in smooth air; no clouds at 300 knots indicated with the autopilot on. No traffic was observed visually; on TCAS or on frequency. Suddenly we hit what I'm convinced was wake turbulence. We snap-rolled violently and in a second or two were out of the wake turbulence. Thankfully we had the seat belt sign on; and the flight attendant was ok; I'm not sure how they didn't get hurt. If a passenger had been up and or an overhead bin open; I think someone would have been hurt. I've been flying here for going on six years; and I've only experienced this once before. That incident was almost identical to this one except we were at about 11;000 ft and nearly the same geographic location. From now on flying into NYC I think I'm going to have the seatbelt sign on and flight attendant seated when we are 30 minutes out.

CRJ-200 Captain reported the aircraft 'snap-rolled violently' when they encountered wake turbulence inbound to LGA.

1578689

201809

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

39000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Total 20094; Flight Crew Type 9778

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting

1578689

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 214; Flight Crew Total 12073; Flight Crew Type 1927

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1578698.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

Y

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

XX and I were on break on flight. I had just come out of the bunk with about 20 minutes or so before we were called back to the flight deck for landing. XX was still in the bunk. I just sat down in seat 1A when shortly I started to smell an electrical burning smell. As I got up; the passenger from seat 3A in the aisle was coming by my seat mentioned he smelled the odor too from the vicinity of his seat. As I went back two rows a couple of FAs (flight attendants) just came to seat 3A and were looking at the vicinity of his seat. When I got closer to the seat I smelled a somewhat stronger smell. The FAs also stated they initially saw some thin wispy smoke when they first showed up (which I did not see). At that point; I called up front and had the FOs (first officers) turn off the IFE (Inflight Entertainment) switch to kill the power to the entertainment system and power to the seats to potentially help stabilize the situation. The FOs up front turned the switch off and also said they had a brief smell of an electrical burning odor up on the flight deck. They said before I called; they unplugged a charger from the electrical outlet (charger was not hot) and also turned off the broadband switch as a precaution. As luck would have it; the smell started to dissipate shortly after getting the IFE switch off. About then the Passenger from seat 3A mentioned he was not sure where his iPhone7 was. We all started to look around the seat for the phone and also looked for any indication of fire; hot spots; burning; or electrical arcing. None of us saw any evidence of any problems and the smell at that point was definitely dissipating. At that point I told the FAs to monitor the situation and advise if anything got worse and we were going to continue to [destination] with the IFE switch off. I also told the FOs up front to keep abreast of potential alternate airports on the last part of our route into [destination]. When I finally got back up front; I made a call to Dispatch with a patch to [maintenance control] to discuss the situation. I ask Dispatch about our gate and he came back and confirmed. A short time later Dispatch advised that [our gate] is going to have a 30 minute hold. I informed Dispatch that a wait of 30 minutes was not going to work as other passengers on the aircraft are already concerned with what was going on in the cabin and we need to park at the gate without any delay. He responded and got us [another gate] with no wait. We continued on with no delay; no other problems; and the smell almost gone. When we got to the gate; maintenance folks came on board and after a period of time; found the Passenger's iPhone 7 with a crushed screen under his seat. One interesting note was that the pilots up front had a brief electrical burning smell. This is interesting as the flight deck gets only fresh air (no recycled cabin air) from the left pack. Also; the flight deck is slightly pressurized higher than the cabin to keep the air flow going aft so no cabin air drifts up front.Pilots and the entire cabin crew did an outstanding job dealing with this potentially life threatening situation. We were extremely lucky that this incident did not turn into something more serious. Obviously the root cause of the problem was the Passenger's iPhone's crushed screen and not the seat power or entertainment system. It was a coincidence that the smell started to dissipate shortly after we turned the IFE switch off.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Boeing 777 flight crew reported detecting faint electrical fumes in the business class section; later attributed to an iPhone which had been crushed under a seat.

1235846

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

Part 121

Parked

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel

1235846

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Human Factors

I was assigned to inspect the #2 Engine for possible FOD Ingestion. During walk around the pilot noticed something resting in the vent of the R/H Lower Main Core Cowl and wrote it up in the logbook. Inspection of the R/H Lower Main Core Cowl revealed the presence of what was later determined to be a part related to the engine igniters; no damage was found on the part which would imply that it was left in the cowl rather than ingested in the #2 Engine. Furthermore the pilots confirmed that they had no abnormal indications on EICAS regarding the affected engine. After considering all the variables I decided to run both engines to verify that #2 Engine was in serviceable condition. Current ramp procedures are that no one should attempt to approach an aircraft that has the beacon on. If the beacon is on that signals anyone on the ramp that the aircraft is unapproachable until further notice. Despite knowledge of this procedure rampers continue to approach aircraft that have the beacon on; sometimes resulting in harm to themselves. I was advised to use one of the crewmembers to run the engines because we were short staffed at the time. I did my pre-run walk around; closing the cargo door and moving the baggage loader away from the #1 Engine. After completing my walk around one of the pilots agreed to right seat for me; and we started the #2 Engine successfully with no problems. While attempting to start the #1 Engine I received an amber Cargo Door Caution Message on EICAS and immediately aborted the #1 Engine Start. Immediately after aborting the start I advised the pilot in the right seat that I would be back shortly as I felt there was a serious safety risk on the ramp; with someone approaching my aircraft while I'm running engines. Upon exiting the jet bridge to the ramp I noticed a baggage handler had not only opened the Cargo Door but had repositioned the baggage loader underneath the #1 Engine. I very delicately explained to him the seriousness of what had just occurred and strongly advised him to not approach the plane again until we were finished running engines. I went back to the cockpit and resumed #1 Engine start with no further problems; and went on to sign off the open discrepancy. In hindsight in heat of the moment I felt my actions were just; a ramper approached my aircraft while running engines despite having the beacon on and was directly in the vicinity of the #1 Engine Inlet. I left the cockpit assuming the pilot in right seat was more than capable of assuming control of the right engine until I came back.I honestly do not know what can be done to avoid rampers approaching planes that have the beacon on. We continue to have problems despite being told that they are aware of this when they are trained. Since this incident I try to make a conscious effort to inform any rampers around my Aircraft that I will be running engines or pressurizing the plane and advise them to wait until we are done. As for my actions in the cockpit I felt fully capable leaving the #2 engine in the care of the pilot while I addressed the ramper trying to open the cargo door. I felt there was an immediate safety risk that needed to be resolved and didn't warrant shutting down the right engine.

A mechanic performing an engine run at the gate detects an amber Cargo Door Caution Message on EICAS and immediately aborts the Number 1 Engine Start. A bag handler had approached the aircraft and parked a belt loader in front of the left engine despite the beacon being on and the right engine running.

1023524

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Gear Up Lock

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1023524

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff; with the First Officer flying; the gear was raised. When gear handle was lowered to off position the nose gear came back down to the down and locked position. The main gear remained up. QRH was referenced and the gear handle was raised. Nose gear retracted and remained up and locked. The gear handle was left in the up position per procedure and the flight was continued to destination. All indications at this time were normal. As the flight progressed the System A hydraulic fluid slowly began to decrease below what would normally be expected at altitude. As we neared destination and began our descent Center informed us that we could expect holding. I said we could not accept any delays. Our hydraulic quantity was now at 62%. Center asked us what our divert was and gave us steering for a nearby airport. I declared an emergency and was given immediate clearance direct to a larger Class B. Our System A quantity was now at 51%. We were cleared for the RNAV approach. All checklist were completed and the gear came down and locked normally. First Officer flew a flawless approach. Touchdown and roll out were normal. ARFF checked the aircraft after we cleared the runway and followed us to the gate. Taxi and shut down were normal. Maintenance met us at the gate and told us that there was hydraulic fluid in the wheel well. I think that declaring an emergency in this situation was the correct decision. The only thing in hind sight I might do differently is to have the gear pinned after clearing the runway. I also saw that Center will do the right thing when you declare and emergency and can not accept a delay. Don't hesitate to use your authority as Captain.

B737 Captain reports the nose gear failed to remain retracted when the gear handle is placed to the up position after takeoff. The gear handle is placed in the up position for the remainder of the flight; but results in a slow loss of hydraulic fluid. An emergency is declared at destination to avoid holding or diverting.

1232892

201501

1201-1800

EGE.Airport

CO

12900.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower EGE

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25

Initial Approach

Class E ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1232892

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1232902.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Aircraft; Procedure

Airport

While executing the LDA DME 25 into EGE in CAVOK weather conditions; we received a low altitude warning from the ATC tower controller. We were descending on the RNAV arrival in managed mode on the Airbus and was coming from 'VOAXA intersection' to 'AQULA intersection' descending from 13;800 feet to 12;900 feet that is charted. The aircraft did start a little higher descent rate out of 13;800 feet to 12;900 feet to cross 'AQULA intersection' at 12;900 feet but was right on path at that fix {AQULA} . Speed was coming from I believe 180 knots down to 160 knots at that same time. That is when ATC showed an Altitude Alert and to check altitude and altimeter setting {30.48 I believe}. Ridge line was in plain sight and no other issues after that.

We were about 170 knots above or at all altitudes on the approach. The altimeter settings were correct with the latest tower call about 2 min earlier. We were in very clear VFR conditions and there was no indication from the cockpit there was any issue with terrain.

ATC called an Airbus crew with a low altitude alert while the aircraft was on the LDA DME RWY 25 to EGE descending at slightly higher than normal rate but on profile with the terrain in sight.

1632074

201903

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

15000.0

IMC

Rain

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Hydraulic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 9400; Flight Crew Type 9400

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1632074

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 7651; Flight Crew Type 7651

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1632067.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Climbing through approximately 15;000 ft the C HYD QTY EICAS message illuminated. Checked the status page and the C HYD quantity was dropping quickly. Turned off the C HYD pumps without the checklist in attempt to stop the leak. Requested to level at 19;000 to diagnose. F/O [First Officer] took the flying and ATC duties and I worked with the IRO to accomplish checklists. The C HYD SYS PRESS EICAS was now illuminated. ATC was advised of our problem and provided delaying vectors. [Notified ATC.] We began with the C HYD QTY checklist; which was the initial alert we had gotten. That directed us to the to the C HYD SYS PRESS checklist. We read and accomplished that checklist. We concluded that continuing to ZZZ1 was not practical and a return was necessary. Dispatch contact was first via ACARS to quickly tell him of our loss of the C HYD SYS and our thoughts to return for landing. We also told him of our plan to dump about 10;000 lbs of fuel. Then a phone patch was established and we discussed all of the previous and perhaps landing at ZZZ2 for a longer runway. ZZZ XXL landing distance was only 8207 ft and the wind was a slight quartering tailwind when we took off. Dispatcher provided landing data for 22L [and] XXR. ATC offered XXR with the full ILS. With a calculated required landing distance of 5800 ft and XXR having 9560 ft available the winds were now a headwind the decision was made to land ZZZ XXR. Permission was given from Center to dump fuel. Dispatch was notified and we ran the fuel dumping checklist. Flight Attendants were now advised of the emergency. During the test briefing I told them a normal landing was planned and not to prep for evacuation but mentally review the procedures. The passenger announcement was now made. When the decision was made to return to ZZZ; [Center] ATC cleared us to hold at intersection on the ZZZZZ Arrival. We held for approximately another hour and a half to burn around 21;000 lbs of fuel to reach max landing weight of 350;000 lbs. During the hold time; Dispatcher continued to provide us with the necessary support by arranging emergency equipment; ATC priority and ZZZ Operations coordination. While in holding we reviewed the checklists several times and numerous check-in's were made with the flight attendants. At least one additional PA announcement. Left the hold at 350;000 lbs and accomplished the alternate gear and alternate flap extension checklists. A normal landing was made and with the reserve brakes and steering we were able to easily make the turnoff under our own power and taxi to gate. After block in a full cockpit and cabin crew debrief was performed. The deplaning passengers were very understanding and supportive of the safety decision to return. This flight attendant crew under the Purser XX_33 XX_21 was outstanding from the onset. It was their caring and attentive attitude that lead to a calm and cooperative demeanor of the passengers. This crew is a fine example of the true spirit the company strives for. A maintenance debrief was conducted. The technicians said the ADP was leaking. They asked us if we had conferenced with [Maintenance]. I had not considered this option because I felt that the loss of the C hydraulic SYS was a clear situation that continued ETOPS flight was not an option and the written checklists were precisely all the guidance we needed to conduct a safe flight. I debriefed only with the [Chief Pilot] as the Dispatch shift had changed. However; the Pilot/ Dispatcher communication and cooperation was textbook and exactly as you would expect it to be handled. In retrospect there are several takeaways for me from this experience. First is the false sense of time available. In our training environment; time and fuel are always critical resources. Usually once an emergency happens; it is resolved and you are back on the ground within 45 minutes. In this emergency we had just departed and the amount of fuel we had; created excess time available. There was no urgency to land or make hasty decisions. Despite this fact; I still think the mindset was to accomplish all tasks ASAP. As a result of this misconception; I think I chose to dump fuel early thinking it would expedite the landing. When in fact after the dump we still had to burn 20;000 lbs. I think a better decision would have been to hold off on this checklist and perform it at a later time and perhaps a different location. I still believe dumping the fuel was the right thing to do. It saved another hour of airborne holding which may have reduced some anxiety that the passengers may have been feeling. That all being said; everything did go like a training scenario. We all felt prepared and comfortable with the checklists and the duties required of us. This is truly a credit to our training center and all of the dedicated individuals who selflessly teach and help to maintain our flying skills every year. Thank you.

During climb out from ZZZ we received an EICAS message for C HYD QTY and C HYD SYS PRESS followed by an warnings. We noticed a rapid decrease in the Center HYD System pressure and quantity and performed the checklist associated with the system malfunction. Due to the aircraft being too heavy we dumped 10;000 lbs of fuel from the center tanks and then entered holding over ZZZZZ intersection to burn fuel so we could get below landing weight. We also [notified ATC] with ZZZ Center and communicated with company to formulate the best course of action. After getting to our landing weight we departed holding finished the emergency checklist and landed in ZZZ on runway XXR without incident. We were able to taxi the aircraft to the gate under its own power. After parking at the gate we de-briefed the cockpit crew; cabin crew and the maintenance personnel. We made a log book entry of the problem.

767 flight crew reported a hydraulic system failure and the steps taken to get the aircraft on the ground safely.

1767058

202010

ZZZ.Airport

US

400.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Texan T6/Harvard (Antique)

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Other Pattern

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Champion Citabria Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 91

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 18409; Flight Crew Type 31

Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1767058

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 50

N

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While doing pattern work; I was number two to land following a Citabria; I believe; which was doing a touch and go; and the spacing was close; but I was certain there was enough spacing for the Citabria to take off prior to my landing; but the tower issued a go around to me. When I reached down to retract the flaps I lost sight of the Citabria momentarily and when I reacquired it I was closing on it very fast; just left of my course. I immediately made a right climbing turn to avoid the Citabria.The tower gave me traffic that was in the right pattern; I had originally been using the left pattern; and I acquired that traffic and was instructed to follow it; and completed a touch and go. After the event; my passenger said he thought he had heard the controller instruct me to turn left on the go around. It's possible; but my passenger had just said something to me as the controller was issuing instructions and I missed that.It appeared the primary tower controller was a trainee; we could hear someone in the background instructing him to correct instructions to aircraft in the pattern and approaches. This whole event could have been avoided had the controller not instructed me to go around when there was enough spacing to avoid a conflict with the departing aircraft.

Pilot reported that after being directed to go around; they had a near miss with a Citabria.

1357515

201605

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach; Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Type 8000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1357515

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1357815.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

We were late arriving after departing late due to lightening [at the departure airport] that had closed the ramp and the same storms forced a routing increasing the flight time. Schedule was not an issue and we were not pushing the field to make up time. Once arrived in the area; it was VMC with 10SM visibility (actually closer to 20SM). We were cleared a visual approach approximately 16 miles from runway 33L at 6;000 feet MSL after being instructed to descend to 4;000. Pilot Flying (PF) was just a bit slow to descend out of 6;000 feet and Pilot Monitoring (PM) prompted PF to start down.The aircraft continued to be high on profile and PF called for flaps 1 and selected LVL CHG 203 knots. PM had the VOR frequency to note the 10 DME/3;000 feet restriction and was instructed to contact Tower approximately 8 NM out. While the gear was down; the PF failed to select a lower speed in the window; which caused the auto throttles to increase power; although the aircraft was already high on profile. The PM failed to notice the 203 in the speed window. PM became task saturated; resulting in PM's failure to switch to Tower while directing PF to disconnect the auto throttles; pull the nose up to get below 195 knots; in order to select flaps 15 and continue on profile.Crew was able to track flaps on speed and accomplished the Before Landing Checklist. The runway was clear and everything looked like a normal approach from 1;000 feet AGL. Once turning off of the runway; the Crew noticed they were still on Approach frequency as they switched to Ground. Ground didn't mention anything except taxi instructions to the gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported becoming distracted; high on profile; and landing without clearance from the tower.

1021402

201207

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

CLR

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Work Cards

Nose Gear Wheel

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1021402

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was changing the left nose tire [on a B767-300] because it showed signs of wear. I used the correct Maintenance Manual 32-45-02; Page 401. I used the new tooling designed to release when a spacer is missing. I believe I installed all parts and retorqued tire correctly. The company informed me that they found the washer not installed on tire next to retaining nut. The plane never incurred any damage or delay to my knowledge.

A Line Mechanic was informed that a washer next to the axle retaining nut for the left nose tire was found not installed on a B767-300 aircraft; after he signed for the tire change.

1818831

202106

0601-1200

ORD.Airport

IL

Marginal

Daylight

Tower ORD

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS/PRM 10R

Final Approach

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1818831

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Procedure

After being cleared the ILS PRM Y to Runway 10R at ORD and being cleared to land; Tower issued a go-around instruction to our aircraft. The ILS PRM Y has a 2.5 degree offset course to the runway due to the close nature of the two Runways 10R and 10C. At approximately 500 feet; we gained sight of the runway and began maneuvering to stabilize the approach on runway centerline by approximately 200 feet. The go-around command was issued at approximately 300 to 400 feet. The go-around instructions were to climb to 2;500 feet and fly the localizer course. The CRJ-200 procedure for a go around is to TOGA; advance power and set the flap to 8 degrees and initiate a climb. This was accomplished uneventfully; however; we were already approximately 0.5-1 dot left on the localizer proceeding visually toward the runway centerline. Once the TOGA is initiated; the command bars will raise to command a climb and also capture the heading the aircraft is currently on when the button is pushed. This all happened as we were transitioning back into IMC. The localizer was still displayed on both displays; however due to the sensitivity of the localizer beam at that distance from the antenna; I am not certain of our actual deviation in terms of distance to the left of course. The Tower Controller informed us we were supposed to be following the localizer course and issued a right turn to heading 140 degrees; followed by a new heading of 150 degrees. We complied and were vectored around a radar pattern to an uneventful landing on 10R.Although we could have possibly corrected faster to the localizer course to prevent the left of course deviation; I think this is an unnecessarily complicated go-around instruction. The 'button pushes' required; and the delays in the automation system before it appropriately reacts essentially rule out even using it; especially in low energy state while transitioning back into IMC. Even though we had immediately pressed the NAV button after the TOGA; the command bars did not capture the course because we had been maneuvering visually and were far enough away from the localizer course so it defaulted to 'roll' mode. This added an element of confusion and additional button pushing as we were executing the go around. Also; I have personally never been issued a clearance to rejoin a localizer course during a go-around in my aviation career; so it was definitely unexpected. I would recommend a non-breakout go-around clearance on a PRM be limited to something very simple like a heading and an altitude to climb to. This would simplify the communication and lower the overall workload in the cockpit during a critical phase of flight.

Air carrier Captain reported confusion with a go around procedures directing they fly the localizer outbound when they were offset from the localizer on a visual portion of the ILS PRM Y to Runway 10R at ORD.

1044349

201208

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

4500.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

DC Generator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13.3; Flight Crew Total 470; Flight Crew Type 460

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

1044349

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

I was flying VFR above a scattered layer and noticed my radio lights growing dim and the ADF not working properly. I looked at the ammeter for the generator and it was on zero. I made a 180 degree turn to return to the airport and started a cruise descent and noticed the airspeed indicator was near red line. I slowed the aircraft down and noticed that the controls were becoming mushy while the airspeed was still in the yellow arc. I then ignored the ASI and flew the plane back to the airfield by feel and without radios or a transponder. I landed without incident and the ASI read 110 KTS right when the stall warning went off just before touchdown and when I came to a full stop the ASI read 70 KTS.

While flying VFR; a PA28 pilot notices that the generator has apparently failed and a turn is made to return to the departure airport. During descent airspeed is noted to be near the red line but slowing produces a mushy feeling in the flight controls. The airspeed indicator is ignored and the aircraft is successfully flown to a safe landing by feel alone.

1483770

201709

1801-2400

VHHH.Airport

FO

TRACON VHHK

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID RASE1E

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1483770

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

Normal operations preceded this event and standard briefings were completed. The Captain called for a Preflight checklist prior to receiving the clearance so I mention that we should get one prior to running the checklist. There was a delay in getting the clearance because the automated PDC was unusable. The departure clearance was given and copied by me. It had a minor change to it as we were originally filed for the RASE3C departure. The change was to the RASE1E departure. Immediately after receiving the clearance; the Captain and other non-flying First Officer; in the observer's seat discussed the new departure; but I was preoccupied trying to get the checklist to display on my MFDU panel. Nor did I see the departure being loaded into the FMC. There was a brief discussion about the differences on the departure; and specifically the PORPA waypoint. I believe the discussion resulted in the PORPA waypoint actually being deleted from the departure; but I did not see that happen. There was also a very short briefing about the new departure procedure that followed; and although I was not part of the discussion; I concurred with the other two pilots as to the accuracy of the departure. I did so having only given a quick glance at the departure chart. There was no fix-by-fix briefing of the new departure; or any mention of flyover waypoints. Had I taken the time to review the departure completely this may never had happened.The takeoff was normal; and the left autopilot was armed shortly after liftoff. Almost immediately after takeoff; the Hong Kong Tower and departure controllers began to query about our flight path because I believe the deleted waypoint resulted in the aircraft making a turn to the right toward the PORSH waypoint. The Captain seemed aware of the course deviation and had already begun to correct our path when ATC questioned us. The Captain said to me we are returning to course; and I respond to ATC with this information.Only moments later; the Ground Proximity Warning system activated with a terrain warning. The Captain responded as required and continued a turn to the left away from terrain and to regain the proper ground track. After clearing the terrain conflict; the left autopilot was re-engaged; and the departure continued without further incidence.Several factors led to this event. One was poor and non-standard communication in the flight deck. Although I read about the waypoints as being flyover points; I had forgotten about that as I was very focused on making sure I had completed all of my other duties as First Officer. This should have been a very important time on the preflight briefing; and it was omitted by ALL pilots. Another was the late clearance delivery with a change to what we were expecting. There were similar sounding and looking waypoints right next to each other (PORPA; PORSH) that may have led to some confusion; but I don't understand how a waypoint; with bold red lettering about required speed and altitude could have deliberately been deleted from a departure that was loaded from the FMC.

Widebody First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning when they flew an incorrect track departing VHHH.

1825783

202107

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dawn

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 121; Flight Crew Total 3004; Flight Crew Type 3004

1825783

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 2843; Flight Crew Type 2843

1825788.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Take Off

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

We commenced our takeoff normally. At around 95 kts; we got an ECAM for Y RSVR Lo Lvl and Y RSVR Lo Air Pr. The Captain initiated the abort with a max speed of approximately 100 kts. All callouts and notifications were made and we were able to taxi clear of the runway and stop. ATC notified us that we had trailed smoke so we asked him to roll the ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) equipment. We ran the rejected takeoff checklist and then ran the ECAMs of which there were several all relating to the hydraulic issue. ARFF indicated that we had dumped a lot of hydraulic fluid. We were towed to the gate for repairs and offloaded the passengers and bags.

Received a Master Caution light and ECAM during takeoff roll on Runway XXR at ZZZ and accomplished a rejected takeoff. The Master Caution and ECAM occurred at approximately 95 kts and Reject initiated between 95-105 kts. During the reject; several ECAMS displayed indicating loss of the Yellow Hydraulic system reservoir and Yellow system air pressure. At slow speed and with normal brakes and nosewheel steering available; I opted to take high speed Taxiway XX to safely clear the runway and bring aircraft to a full stop while the First Officer coordinated with Tower controller to roll the AARF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) equipment as Tower stated they saw what appeared to be smoke trailing from the number two engine. While awaiting AARF response; we ran the Rejected Takeoff QRC and handled the ECAMS; started the APU and communicated with the passengers [and] inflight crew. After AARF arrival and initial inspection; we shutdown the number 2 engine with AARF on scene; then chocked the gear and shutdown the number 1 engine which had been used to keep normal brakes available. We coordinated with Operations and Ground Control for uneventful tow back to the gate for repair.

A320 Flight Crew reported a Rejected Take Off when the Yellow Hydraulic system showed low quantity and had to be towed back to the gate.

1363775

201606

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

Ground ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Test Flight / Demonstration

Taxi

None

Brake System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 2500

1363775

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft

I was taxi testing the aircraft. I taxied to [the] runway; then turned around and taxied back to the ramp. I lost brakes and taxied into another aircraft. The damage to the other aircraft was minimal; and I broke my taxi light on my left wing.

C172 pilot reported taxiing into another aircraft following brake failure.

1612125

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cockpit Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1612125

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

During inflight bathroom break; the cockpit door was opened. Upon FA (Flight Attendant) entering flight deck; FO (First Officer) tried closing the cockpit door. Upon closing door; the door appeared to bind. Repeated attempts were made to try and close the door however the door was extremely warped. Flight Attendant later described what looked like spring near bottom of door. Flight landed at destination with Flight Attendant guarding door with cart blocking access until landing gear extension. First Officer utilized crash axe for defense and necktie to hold door closed. Armed LEO was informed of situation and to provide assistance in unlikely event of a level 4. A non-revning FA was also able to provide assistance. Dispatch was notified along with Maintenance Control. No guidance exists for cockpit door issues in flight.

ERJ-190 Captain reported cockpit door jammed during cruise rendering it unlocked for remainder of flight.