Works by J. Petitot
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Jean Petitot [30] J. Petitot [7] Jacques Petitot [1]
Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.) - 1999 - Stanford University Press.details
This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and ...
Consciousness and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Husserl: Phenomenology and Cognitive Science in Continental Philosophy
Husserl: Philosophy of Mind, Misc in Continental Philosophy
Perception and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Mind
Perception and Phenomenology in Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology and Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Perception, General in Philosophy of Mind
Temporal Experience in Philosophy of Mind
Vision in Philosophy of Mind
Constituting Objectivity. Transcendental Perspectives on Modern Physics.P. Kerszberg, J. Petitot & M. Bitbol (eds.) - 2009details
In recent years, many philosophers of modern physics came to the conclusion that the problem of how objectivity is constituted (rather than merely given) can no longer be avoided, and therefore that a transcendental approach in the spirit of Kant is now philosophically relevant. The usual excuse for skipping this task is that the historical form given by Kant to transcendental epistemology has been challenged by Relativity and Quantum Physics. However, the true challenge is not to force modern physics into (...) a rigidly construed static version of Kant's philosophy, but to provide Kant's method with flexibility and generality. In this book, the top specialists of the field pin down the methodological core of transcendental epistemology that must be used in order to throw light on the foundations of modern physics. First, the basic tools Kant used for his transcendental reading of Newtonian Mechanics are examined, and then early transcendental approaches of Relativistic and Quantum Physics are revisited. Transcendental procedures are also applied to contemporary physics, and this renewed transcendental interpretation is finally compared with structural realism and constructive empiricism. The book will be of interest to scientists, historians and philosophers who are involved in the foundational problems of modern physics. (shrink)
Philosophy of Physics, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science
Structural Realism in General Philosophy of Science
Physics and the Phenomenal World.Jean Petitot & Barry Smith - 1996 - In Roberto Poli & Peter Simons (eds.), Formal Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 233-254.details
The paper challenges the assumption, common amongst philosophers, that the reality described in the fundamental theories of microphysics is all the reality we have. It will be argued that this assumption is in fact incompatible with the nature of such theories. It will be shown further that the macro-world of three-dimensional bodies and of such qualitative structures as colour and sound can be treated scientifically on its own terms, which is to say not only from the perspective of psychology but (...) also ontologically. A new sort of emergentist position will be defended, one which yields the basis of a method for describing the perceptually salient macroscopic world in mathematical terms. Broadly, it will be argued that the macroscopic world exists in virtue of certain specific sorts of boundary-patterns in the field of what is captured by the theories of microphysics. (shrink)
Color Experience in Philosophy of Mind
Emergence in Physical Science in Philosophy of Physical Science
Ontology in Metaphysics
Sound in Philosophy of Mind
Why Connectionism is Such a Good Thing. A Criticism of Fodor and Pylyshyn's Criticism of Smolensky.Jean Petitot - 1991 - Philosophica 47.details
Connectionism and Neural Networks in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
New Foundations for Qualitative Physics.Jean Petitot & Barry Smith - 1990 - In J. E. Tiles, G. T. McKee & C. G. Dean (eds.), Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence. London: Pitman Publishing. pp. 231-49.details
Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...) mind are concerned. When it comes to the sciences of external reality, however, it continues to hold sway, so that contemporary philosophers B even while devoting vast amounts of attention to the language we use in describing the world of everyday experience B still refuse to see this world as being itself a proper object of theoretical concern. Here, however, we shall argue that the usual conception of physical reality as constituting a unique bedrock of objectivity reflects a rather archaic view as to the nature of physics itself and is in fact incompatible with the development of the discipline since Newton. More specifically, we shall seek to show that the world of qualitative structures, for example of colour and sound, or the commonsense world of coloured and sounding things, can be treated scientifically (ontologically) on its own terms, and that such a treatment can help us better to understand the structures both of physical reality and of cognition. (shrink)
Matter in Philosophy of Physical Science
Perception and the Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Perceptual Qualities in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physics, General Works in Philosophy of Physical Science
Symmetry in Physics in Philosophy of Physical Science
The Causal Theory of Perception in Philosophy of Mind
Topology in Philosophy of Mathematics
Morphological Eidetics for Phenomenology of Perception.Jean Petitot - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press. pp. 330--371.details
Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology in Petitot J., Varela JF, Pachoud B., Roy JM.J. Petitot - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.details
Philosophy of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
Morphodynamics and Attractor Syntax: Constituency in Visual Perception and Cognitive Grammar.Jean Petitot - 1995 - In Tim van Gelder & Robert Port (eds.), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 227--83.details
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Programming the Emergence in Morphogenetically Architected Complex Systems.Franck Varenne, Pierre Chaigneau, Jean Petitot & René Doursat - 2015 - Acta Biotheoretica 63 (3):295-308.details
Large sets of elements interacting locally and producing specific architectures reliably form a category that transcends the usual dividing line between biological and engineered systems. We propose to call them morphogenetically architected complex systems (MACS). While taking the emergence of properties seriously, the notion of MACS enables at the same time the design (or "meta-design") of operational means that allow controlling and even, paradoxically, programming this emergence. To demonstrate our claim, we first show that among all the self-organized systems studied (...) in the field of Artificial Life, the specificity of MACS essentially lies in the close relation between their emergent properties and functional properties. Second, we argue that to be a MACS a system does not need to display more than weak emergent properties. Third, since the notion of weak emergence is based on the possibility of simulation, whether computational or mechanistic via machines, we see MACS as good candidates to help design artificial self-architected systems (such as robotic swarms) but also harness and redesign living ones (such as synthetic bacterial films). (shrink)
Artificial Life in Philosophy of Biology
Biological Modeling in Philosophy of Biology
Complex Systems, Misc in Philosophy of Physical Science
Developmental Systems Theory in Philosophy of Biology
Emergence in Biology in Philosophy of Biology
Emergence, Misc in Metaphysics
Simulation and Reality in Philosophy of Computing and Information
Le Physique, le Morphologique, le Symbolique.Jean Petitot - 1990 - Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2):139-183.details
Refaire le «Timée»:. Introduction à la philosophie mathématique d'Albert Lautman.Jean Petitot - 1987 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 40 (1):79-115.details
On the Linguistic Import of Catastrophe Theory.Jean Petitot - 1989 - Semiotica 74 (3-4):179-210.details
Semiotics in Social Sciences
Hypothèse localiste, modèles morphodynamiques et théories cognitives: Remarques sur une note de 1975.Jean Petitot - 1989 - Semiotica 77 (1-3):65-120.details
Philosophie transcendantale et objectivité physique.Jean Petitot - 1997 - Philosophiques 24 (2):367-388.details
German Idealism in European Philosophy
Neurogeometry of V1 and Kanizsa Contours.Jean Petitot - 2003 - Axiomathes 13 (3-4):347-363.details
We present a neuro-geometrical model for generating the shape of Kanizsa's modal subjective contours which is based on the functional architecture of the primary areas of the visual cortex. We focus on V1 and its pinwheel structure and model it as a discrete approximation of a continuous fibration π: R × P → P with base space the space of the retina R and fiber the projective line P of the orientations of the plane. The horizontal cortico-cortical connections of V1 (...) implement what the geometers call the contact structure of the fibration π, and defines therefore an integrability condition which can be shown to correspond to Field's, Hayes', and Hess' psychophysical concept of association field. We present then a variational model of curved modal illusory contours based on the idea that virtual contours are "geodetic" integral curves of the contact structure. (shrink)
Representation in Neuroscience in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Localist Theory Morphodynamic Models, and Cognitive Science-Comments on a 1975 Study.Jean Petitot - 1989 - Semiotica 77 (1-3):65-119.details
CONSTITUTING OBJECTIVITY The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science.Michel Bitbol, Jean Petitot & Pierre Kerszberg (eds.) - 2009details
Feminist Epistemology in Epistemology
Francisco Varela : Le Cercle créateur.Michel Bitbol & Jean Petitot - 2018 - Revue de Synthèse 139 (3-4):411-417.details
Choix Et Croyance: Vers Une Logique de L'Idéal.Jean Petitot - 1983 - In Herman [Ed] Parret (ed.), On Believing. De la Croyance. Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches. De Gruyter. pp. 237-266.details
20th Century German Philosophy in European Philosophy
Dynamical Modeling and Morphological Analysis.Jean Petitot - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):649-649.details
After a historical sketch of the dynamical hypothesis, we stress that it is a functionalist hypothesis. We then tackle the point of a dynamical approach to constituent structures and emphasize that dynamical modeling must be coupled with morphological analysis.
Dynamical Systems in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
La naturalizzazione Della fenomenologia: Storia di un progetto.Jean Petitot - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 37:141-146.details
Présentation.Jean Petitot - 1990 - Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2):3-12.details
The Naturalist Reorientation of Phenomenology.J. Petitot - 1995 - Archives de Philosophie 58 (4):631-658.details
The Problems of Cognitive Dynamical Models.Jean Petitot - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):640-640.details
Amit's "Attractor Neural Network" perspective on cognition raises difficult technical problems already met by prior dynamical models. This commentary sketches briefly some of them concerning the internal topological structure of attractors, the constituency problem, the possibility of activating simultaneously several attractors, and the different kinds of dynamical structures one can use to model brain activity: point attractors, strange attractors, synchronized arrays of oscillators, synfire chains, and so forth.
Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology.Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud & Francisco J. Varela - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.details