Let's Have a Conversation...​
ICANN's compromises for the RPMs raise significant concerns.
In a space of two days, two ICANN-related documents made their appearance: GAC's response to the ICANN Board's questions in relation to the scorecard and the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook responding to the GAC's document. The issue of Rights Protection Mechanisms was apparently so significant that the GAC submitted its clarifications in a separate document from all other issues.
In relation to the RPMs, the latest version of the Guidebook seeks to strike an unsuccessful compromise in some issues and provides some significant changes to the previous version. However, for me two things stand out more than the others and I don't suggest that the other issues are not of some concern: inclusion of all types of IP rights in the Trademark Clearinghouse and the 'loser pays' model of the Uniform Rapid Suspension System.
Inclusion of all types of intellectual property in the Trademark Clearinghouse!
The GAC's responses in relation to the Clearinghouse provide some great insight regarding the vision the trademark holders in association with the various governments – most certainly those that have already indicated their wish for strict forms of IP protection – have for such a mechanism.
In particular, the GAC provided some clarification regarding its proposal for the inclusion of all types of intellectual property rights within the Clearinghouse. According to the answers submitted to the Board, the GAC explains that such an inclusion "would obviate the necessity to develop separate mechanisms for these types of intellectual property". Exactly when did we discuss and further decide that copyrights and patents would require a similar mechanism? Where did ICANN acquire the legitimacy to authorize the creation of a mechanism for types of intellectual property other than trademarks? Well, we all know that ICANN does not have the legitimacy to even suggest policy for other types of IP rights (personally, I even contest its legitimacy to create policy for trademarks) and in any discussions we had about potential inclusion of other IP rights in the Clearinghouse even the trademark community failed to sell such a proposal. Simply, there are no valid arguments that would justify ICANN opening up the Clearinghouse to any forms of IP that can be valid or legitimate.
So, this begs the question: why does the GAC insist on it? I can think of one answer: by including all types of IP rights in the Clearinghouse, the IP community will have the opportunity to use the Clearinghouse for all kinds of purposes, e.g. for blacklisting domain names and registrants. This is not a Hollywood science fiction scenario (and, if it is, I certainly claim copyright before I get bullied into surrendering it). Both in the US (COICA) and UK (Policy dealing with domain names used in criminal activity), Congress and NOMINET respectively, are exploring ways concerning the take down of domain names that facilitate the infringement of copyright and the promotion/sale of rogue pharmaceuticals and counterfeit goods. We all know and have read the arguments with this kind of regulation – free speech, human rights and fair use are all at stake. We also know that certain governments do not pay attention to these concerns and continue to pretend that the only real victim here is the IP community. But, whereas such regulatory initiatives were limited to certain jurisdictions and national sovereignties, now they might become international policy. My point is this: if all types of IP rights were to be included, what would stop the Clearinghouse from using its database in a way far and beyond its original scope? What would prevent the Clearinghouse to start a separate 'blacklist' that lists those domain names that legislation like COICA addresses? How can we ensure that the database that will be created under COICA will not be fed into the Clearinghouse?
In all this, ICANN does not appear to take the GAC's considerations on board, but does not appear to either categorically reject them. ICANN chooses to be vague on this issue. In section 3.2.4, ICANN's final version of the Clearinghouse states: "The proposed standards for inclusion in the Clearinghouse are: other marks that constitute intellectual property", which might simply be addressing what GAC refers to as 'local rights', although, even in this case, local rights are subject to cultural relativism and are highly contested because of their highly national nature; and, then in section 3.6 "Data supporting entry into the Clearinghouse of marks that constitute intellectual property of types other than those set forth in sections 3.2.1-3.2.3 above…", which sort of gives the Clearinghouse carte blanche into accepting other forms of IP rights; and, finally, the way the term 'ancillary services' is used in the final version of the Guidebook is also alarming. The original vision of 'ancillary services' was to put to rest the debate as to whether common law marks should be included in the Clearinghouse; and, because the community could not decide, the idea was to allow the inclusion of common law marks through an 'ancillary services' mechanism. Now, ancillary services are divorced from their association with what types of trademarks should be included and could be interpreted as allowing the Clearinghouse to provide services – classed as 'ancillary - for other types of intellectual property.
This provision in the Clearinghouse is vague and opaque – and we all know vague policies can mean one thing: wide, discretionary and potentially bias interpretations. At least, this is the case with ICANN's policies and I hope I get to be wrong.
The 'Loser Pay's model in the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS)
In light of news hitting the Internet that trademark bullying is not only a rumor but a current practice exercised by big and powerful trademark owners, ICANN has submitted in its recent version of the URS a provision for a 'loser pays' all model to domain name disputes. According to the provision: "A limited 'loser pays' model has been adopted for the URS. Complaints listing twenty-six (26) or more disputed domain names will be subject to an Response Fee which will be refundable to the prevailing party. Under no circumstances shall the Response Fee exceed the fee charged to the Complainant".
Although the reality is indeed that if someone registers this amount of domain names corresponding to a certain mark, that someone is most probably a cybersquatter, ICANN does not explicitly state whether these 26 domain names should come from the same individual. ICANN only states that the Complaint should list 26 or more domain names, but it does not clarify whether the complaint should be against the same respondent. So, again here, this provision can be read as allowing the Complainant to bring one complaint for several domain names which concern the same mark but are registered by different registrants. Can this be the case? There is nothing to suggest otherwise and, if the discretion panels normally exercise in such policies is indicative, nothing stops the URS from being expanded to such a procedural allowance.
But, the 'loser pays' model, even if this limited, creates a much bigger problem. It feeds into trademark intimidation and bullying, sort of legitimizing it if you wish. The fact is that, so far, trademark bullying occurred through the fear of court litigation and its associated costs. The message to registrants was clear: we will sue you if you don't comply and, if we do, you end up engaging and paying a lot of money, which we can afford and you can't. So, its better to surrender your domain name now that you still have the time. All this was happening at a national level. Now, with this provision, the same practice will also happen at an international level with the blessings of ICANN.
Imagine, for instance, someone who has registered 26 variations of a trademark for free speech purposes. Will that someone be subject to a URS and, more importantly, to a potential 'loser pays' model?
This provision will certainly disincentivize legitimate registrants from responding, encouraging further the existing culture of defaults and creating an unbalanced and biased system. Needless to say that the URS is not equipped for such a provision. The URS lacks the checks and balances that exist in traditional adjudication as it promotes speed. You cannot have a system that wishes to award such costs and not have some checks that ensure this takes place according to due process. Systems, like the UDRP and this one, are prone to bias and abuse as they are conceived to protect certain rights – so why feed into this bias?
So, ICANN has entered again a very dangerous territory. The compromise solution that ICANN provided (remember that the GAC originally did not want to put a cap in the 'loser pays' model) is as problematic. The criterion that ICANN uses is not clear and the provision is certainly open to the widest interpretations possible. I hope I am mistaken here, but this system can easily backfire and it will certainly allow many mark holders to use also the URS as a tool for intimidation and bullying.
Default – A story of terror in the domain name adjudication process
For adjudicators and decision makers default constitutes perhaps one of the major procedural hurdles during the adjudication process. A defaulting party is the one that fails to appear before a court of law or a tribunal within a timely manner, thus failing to exercise her right of defence. Unquestionably, this kind of procedural awkwardness imposes a shadow of doubt in the delivery of justice. The problems with default are many: defendants don't get to respond to the plaintiff's assertions; judges find it extremely hard to produce solid decisions; justice struggles. If we were to prioritize, we could easily argue that the greatest challenge of default focuses on how the adjudicator will be able to reach decisions in a fair and equitable manner without, however, capitulating its own obligation for independence and impartiality; the judge cannot possibly be asked to read the defaulting party's mind, thus inevitably decisions need to be taken absent the defendant.
But somehow, even in the absence of the defendant, justice is still ensured. The existing checks and balances of traditional adjudication processes alongside axiomatic principles relating to the rights of the parties provide a sound basis for the delivery of justice. As part of their mandate to deliver justice, courts have to make sure that the defendant is served and, if that fails, at the very minimum the court must exhaust all the possibilities for service of process. At the same time, courts also have to abide by the idea of the presumption of innocence and the right of defence. Article 48 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states: "1. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. And, 2. Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed".
With this in mind, nothing in ICANN's dispute resolution mechanisms remotely resembles this thinking. The truth is that ICANN's processes have historically suffered from the issue of default. When the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution (UDRP) was created back in 1999, default was not identified as part of its procedural rules. It was an issue that the drafters of the UDRP had either not considered or they intentionally omitted. But, default was inevitable, especially in a mechanism designed for online disputes like the UDRP, which concerns parties located anywhere in the world and everything is done electronically, from the submission of the necessary forms until the delivery of justice. So, when default started creeping into the UDRP system, the panels opted for the easiest, fastest and most unfair option – they associated it with bad faith, generating this way a vicious circle of decisions that made all defaults indiscriminately tied to bad faith. And to make matters much worse, no one within the adjudication process (ICANN or WIPO or any other accredited dispute resolution provider) stopped to question or even investigate some of the possibilities of default. Because bad faith aside, default may occur for various reasons: the domain name holder (respondent) did not receive the complaint because the email went into her spam folder; the respondent did not have time to respond to the complaint (the UDRP gives the respondent 14 days to respond); the respondent resides in a developing country or a somewhere with limited Internet access; the respondent does not speak English (and most of the complaints are submitted in English); the respondent does not understand what the UDRP is or how it works; the respondent does not have the time or money to hire an attorney to assist with the response – and the list of reasons goes on.
Fast forward now to ICANN's new gTLD program and the idea of a Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS). After years of debate, multiple versions of the same policy and controversial meetings, the issue of default still appears not to be settled correctly and to constitute one of the worst attributes of ICANN's dispute resolution mechanisms. The Governmental Advisory Committee's (GAC) recommendation, which in relation to default has been accepted by the ICANN Board, basically disseminates one simple message: default means bad faith. The GAC scorecard says: "If, as is expected in the majority of cases, there is no response from the registrant, the default should be in favour of the complainant and the website locked". All this sentence is wrong: 'as expected' means that default constitutes some sort of a bizarre normative account in domain name disputes; 'in the majority of cases' means that without having implemented the URS, we should expect more than half of the URS cases to be in default; 'the default should be in favour of the complainant' means default equates to some form of malicious conduct.
On top of all this, the Examiner is stripped of any right to attempt to identify good faith, even in the case of default. Using what I consider a very bad choice of words to refer to the party defaulting as 'non-cooperative' both ICANN and the GAC agree, "In addition, the examination of possible defences in default cases according to para 8.4(2) means an unjustified privilege of the non-cooperating defendant." Here is the paradox with this approach. On the one hand, the UDRP (and the current language of the URS) give wide discretionary powers to the panels to find bad faith and interpret it any way they see fit. On the other hand, however, it doesn't allow the panels to find good faith and apply it. The argument goes that adjudicators cannot be expected to be 'mind readers'. Sure and I am sure that none of us wants them or expects them to be although some UDRP panels have already done so to prove the impossible (for example, in Educational Testing Services v. TOEFL, the panel seeking to establish bad faith said exercised its discretion by stating the following: "[…] because Respondent is contributing no value-added to the Internet – it is merely attempting to exploit a general rule of registration – the broad community of Internet users will be better served by transferring the domain name to a party with a legitimate use for it."). But, some domain names are, on their face, registered for fair use. Take, for instance, <ihatebrand.com> - wouldn't you consider use of such a domain name to fall under fair use?
So, we find ourselves in a very bad conundrum – if the new gTLD program is meant to build bridges and invite applicants from across the world – developing countries included – then this approach will make it impossible. We need to understand and appreciate that not all registrants are bad actors who wish to take advantage of trademarks and we need to find ways to differentiate between those in good faith and those in bad faith. A good way would be to allow the Examiner, should she wishes to, to make determinations of good faith.
The ICANN Board Submits Preliminary Answers to GAC's Scorecard on Trademarks
The long-awaited interaction between the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) and ICANN's Board of Directors wrapped up its proceedings today in Brussels, one day after the originally scheduled two day meeting. Trademark issues were once again at the forefront of the discussions with the ICANN Board providing some preliminary – and not final – answers to the GAC's scorecard. For those who have not read or heard the trademark issues raised before the Board, the GAC scorecard focused on three issues relating to the protection of trademarks on the Internet: the Trademark Clearinghouse, the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) and the Post Delegation Dispute Resolution Process (PDDRP). In my previous blog post, I identified the issues that I thought were problematic with the GAC scorecard, focusing mainly on the URS and the way it sought to provide a mechanism that would be beneficial for the trademark community and for no one else.
ICANN, in submitting its preliminary answers, got many things right, but also got some things wrong, whilst it referred some questions back to the GAC for more clarification. The ICANN Board emphasised that its inclination was not final and that further discussions with the GAC would be necessary to clarify and resolve the various outstanding issues. A further call between the GAC and the ICANN Board will be scheduled in the next few days (and before ICANN's San Francisco meeting) to further discuss and deliberate on these issues with the hope that both entities will reach some agreement.
Regarding the GAC's recommendation for all types of IP rights to be included in the Trademark Clearinghouse, the Board accepted in principle this proposal asserting, however, that further discussions were necessary to ensure that the implementation of this recommendation would not leave any rightful mark owners outside this framework. The Board accepted the recommendation that both sunrise services and IP claims should be mandatory and raised its objections on the issue of whether 'IP claims services and sunrise services should go beyond exact matches to include exact match plus key terms associated with goods and services identified by the mark and typographical variations identified by the rights holder'. In relation to this, the Board expressed its difficulty in understanding and setting criteria as to how far the notion of these exact matches could go. One of the things that the Board focused on (and appeared to be quite adamant about it) is that only genuine trademark owners should be given the right to be listed in the Clearinghouse. By 'genuine' the Board asserted that proof of use on behalf of trademark owners should be required, expressing fears that various mark owners can potentially approach jurisdictions where no substantive review is conducted and, therefore, receive protection when it is debatable whether such protection should exist in the first place. Finally, in relation to who should bear the costs of sustaining the Clearinghouse, the Board asserted that trademark owners should pay a fee for registration, Registry operators should be required to pay a fee for using the services provided by the Clearinghouse and left open the idea that potentially registrants might bear some of the costs, since they will be using the Clearinghouse as a point of reference when registering a domain name.
In their majority, these preliminary answers seem to be fine. The fact that the ICANN Board was not willing to straightforward accept the 'exact match plus key word' issue is a very positive step in limiting the rights that mark owners should enjoy in the Internet, just like in traditional trademark law. The Board was actually very reasonable in expressing its difficulty in understanding how such a provision would work, what criteria would apply and what would be boundaries be.
Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS)
Regarding the URS, the Board's preliminary answers were far more contentious. The Board accepted the GAC's recommendation to reduce the timescales but did not deliberate on which specific ones this reduction would apply (the URS includes various timescales ranging from the time of response to the time of appeal). However, the Board did indicate that the system is meant to be 'rapid', indirectly indicating that there might be a reduction in the time for the response. The Board also accepted that there should be a standardised format for the submission of the complaint, which, from the GAC proposal, appears not to apply in the case of the response. The Board further accepted that a qualified 'Examiner' should adjudicate URS disputes, instead of panel appointments. The Board was once again adamant that proof of use of the trademark should also apply in the case for a successful URS proceeding and, further, asserted that even in default the Examiner should have to go through the process in delivering his/her decision. The Board, however, rejected GAC's recommendation for lowing the standard of proof from 'clear and convincing evidence' to a 'preponderance of evidence', stating that the first lays somewhere in between the notions of 'preponderance of evidence' and 'beyond reasonable doubt' and, thus, it is only fair. The Board took also a negative view on the recommendation that the bad faith element should be abandoned (an issue that I personally felt should not have made it to the scorecard) and rejected the 'loser pays' model, which was controversial and would act as a deterrent for registering new gTLDs. The time for filing an appeal in default cases, which was originally set in 2 years, was accepted by the Board as appropriate and as complying with the wishes of the wider community. The Board also accepted that the fee for a URS proceeding should not exceed the amount of $300 and indicated its wish to allow transfer of the domain name after a successful URS. Finally, the Board rejected again the notion of extending exact matches to keywords.
The worst aspect of the Board's preliminary answer is the idea of allowing transfer of the domain name through a successful URS. As far as I am concerned, this recommendation stands no merit or justification and could in principle be the reason for the collapse of the whole URS. The initial justification of the URS was that it would be distinct from the UDRP as far as its remedies are concerned. Two distinct mechanisms with two distinct remedies: the UDRP would retain its remedial focus on transfer or cancellation of the domain name, whilst the URS would simply 'lock' the domain name. By allowing transfer of the domain name through a system intentionally not designed to proceed to substantive evaluation of facts, the need for the UDRP will slowly decrease. It should be anticipated that over time the URS will be used for every contentious issue, making the UDRP redundant. And, why shouldn't it? If you are a trademark owner, of course you will opt for the cheaper (max. $300) and faster (the whole process will last substantially less than a UDRP process) system. And, if as I fear, the time of response is minimised to just 14 days, then 'adios' due process, procedural justice and balance.
The way the Board decided to treat default is also quite problematic. The Board appeared to share the GAC's (negative) view that default means bad faith and, thus, the defaulting party (the language used is 'the non-cooperative party') should not be given any privileges. Again, both the GAC and the Board misunderstand the idea behind default and take into consideration only the very narrow view. Not acknowledging that default might occur for various reasons and within various context will create problems for registrants residing in developing nations, for registrants with limited Internet access and for registrants who are not familiar with the ICANN administrative proceedings and need to find a lawyer to assist them. And, if the time for the response gets to 14 days, then all URS default cases (and they will be many but not for the reasons the trademark community suggests) will be automatically deemed as in bad faith.
The Post Delegation Dispute Resolution System (PDDRP)
This has been a great victory for Registries, which, in any case, they were not particularly thrilled with the concept of the PDDRP. The Board did not seem to agree with most of the GAC's recommendations regarding the PDDRP, and asked for further clarification in some particular issues.
GAC's URS Recommendations follow the flawed and biased path of the UDRP.
The long-awaited GAC 'scorecard' on the protection of trademarks was released yesterday and, unfortunately, it did not come as much of a surprise. Following the direction that the USG 'scorecard' set in the beginning of the month, the recommendations of the GAC focus primarily on three rights protection mechanisms: the Trademark Clearinghouse (TMC), the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) and the Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Process (PDDRP). Although the recommendations for the TMC can objectively be negotiated as long as the official line remains that the creation of such a database will not confer any additional rights to right owners, it is the attempt of the GAC to change the substantive and procedural aspects of the URS that is of more concern.
The GAC's advice in relation to the URS consists of the following elements:
· The complaint should be simplified by replacing the 5000 word free text limit + unlimited attachments with a simple pro forma standardised wording with the opportunity for not more than 500 words of freeform text and limit the attachments to copies of the offending website.
The idea of providing a standardised wording is not a good one, especially when it comes to disputes concerning two conflicting rights. Disputes vary both in nature and content and, despite the fact that the URS is meant to be used for those clear-cut cases of abuse, this recommendation is based on the arbitrary assumption that all types of disputes will inherently be the same. A standardised format will be detrimental in the delivery of justice. We need to bear in mind that a URS examination (in a similar manner to the UDRP) is based solely based on the documents submitted by the parties and panels make their determinations based on the content of these very submissions. How will a panel be allowed to make conclusive determinations if a standardised format is only permitted? I appreciate that the URS is meant to be used for those types of activities that on their face they appear egregious, but for the panel to determine the harmful activity parties should be permitted to produce their contentions, which will not be able to do if a standardised form is adopted.
· Decisions should be taken by a suitably qualified 'Examiner' and not require panel appointments.
Have we not learned anything from the UDRP and the potential bias that this recommendation will invite? If one thing is clear after ten years of UDRP adjudication is that the way panels are assigned to decide individual cases is highly problematic and that there is not a mechanism to hold panels accountable for the decisions they reach. When the same panellists are used, the possibility for bias becomes rife (http://www.dncrunch.com/?p=3199). But, at least the UDRP still operates on the basis that panels are assigned from a pool of panellists. Now, the GAC wants to make this rule redundant and suggests that a suitably qualified 'Examiner' will be deciding the case. This recommendation will make someone very rich and will allow the trademark community to 'play' and abuse the notion of adjudicators' impartiality and independence.
· Where the complaint is based upon a valid registration, the requirement that the jurisdiction of registration incorporate substantive examination should be removed
This recommendation is reasonable to the extent that all trademark registrations, despite whether the jurisdiction granting them provides substantial review or not, can be subject to a URS process. This can prove to be disadvantageous for mark owners, whose jurisdiction requires a more substantive review, but at the same time respects the individuality of every trademark registration system. As long as mark owners that fail to get their trademarks in their own jurisdiction do not seek to play the system by attempting to register them in less-demanding jurisdictions, then this recommendation does not add much.
· If, as expected in the majority of cases, there is no response from the registrant, the default should be in favour of the complainant and the website locked. The examination of possible defences of default cases according to para. 8.4 (2) would otherwise give an unjustified privilege tot eh non-cooperating defendant.
This recommendation has two problems: first of all, it designs a system based on the presumption of default ("as expected in the majority of cases"). No one, including the GAC, can determine whether or how many defaults will take place; similarly, no one can possibly pre-determine the reasons for the default, which brings me to the second problem. Default does not always mean bad faith. Despite the efforts of UDRP panels to establish such a normative rule, the simple fact remains that default can be attributed to a variety of reasons and, unless they are exhausted, bad faith is not to be considered the main reason behind default. This provision will be highly problematic for those registrants that are located in remote and isolated areas, where Internet connections are neither as available nor as inexpensive. Especially, governments of developing countries should object to this provision, as their registrants might find it difficult to receive the complaint and respond in the limited time of 14 days, which is currently recommended.
· The standard of proof should be lowered from 'clear and convincing evidence' to a preponderance of evidence.
This recommendation makes me wonder whether the GAC has really considered its potential implications. A preponderance of evidence means that it is most likely that not that the fact that the complainant asserts is true. This means that even if there is an indication that a domain name might be infringing a trademark, then the URS can be activated; but, there also might be a possibility that this is not the case. Why then drag the registrant into this process based only on a possibility and not on a fact? This provision, coupled with the standardised form and the default, will ensure that a trademark owner will always prevail in the URS.
· The 'bad faith' requirement in paras 1.2(f), 1.2(g) and 8.1(c) is not acceptable. Complainants will in only rare cases prevail in URS proceedings if the standards to be fulfilled by registrants are lax. Correspondingly, the factors listed in paras 5.7(a) ('bona fide') and b) 'been commonly known by the domain name' can hardly allow a domain name owner to prevail over the holders of colliding trademarks.
What the GAC seems to be suggesting here is that no standards should apply for the determination of cybersquatting. If this is the case (and it appears to be so), then we are talking about a dispute resolution mechanism that will afford intolerable levels of discretion to the 'Examiner' to make final determinations. The GAC misunderstands the nature of the bad faith provisions. In the UDRP (and in similar proceedings) the complaining party carries the burden of proof, who has to prove that all three elements (identical or confusingly similar, no rights and legitimate interests and bad faith registration and use) are applicable. The list of bad faith factors is only indicative and is meant to provide the panel with some guidance as to how to determine bad faith. Now, the GAC wants to abandon this direction and give the freedom to the Examiner to make any determinations it wants without any guidance. This does not assist in the creation of a 'Uniform' system, but contributes to a system that will be based on arbitrary justifications and reasoning.
Similarly, the GAC wants to jettison the 'fair use' provisions within the URS, the only tool at the disposal of domain name holders to prove legitimate rights on the domain name. And, the justification offered by the GAC is simply nonsensical.
· A 'loser pays' mechanism should be added.
This recommendation is problematic for various reasons. First and foremost, the URS is a rapid review process. It is not a full and robust review of the underlying facts. Conclusions are rapid, thus mistakes will inevitably be made. Losing the domain name is bad, but the financial consequences of a URS action on the registrant can be disastrous.
The STI anticipates that a URS action will run about $500 — far cheaper than court, and about a third the price of a UDRP action. While this is considered a small amount of money for a large trademark owner, it is an enormous amount of money for a small businesses, an NGO, and an individual in any part of the world. A loss, even for a good faith registration, could be financial disastrous.
The 'Loser Pays' is inherently pro-complainant, and would especially favor big brand complainants who can outspend any individual legitimate registrant.
· There should be a clear rationale for appeal by the complainant. The time for filing an appeal in default cases must be reduced from 2 years to not more than 6 months. In addition, the examination of possible defences in default cases according to para 8.4 (2) means an unjustified privilege of the non-cooperative defendant.
There are three issues that the GAC addresses here and all three seek to work only to the advantage of the trademark owner.
a. The GAC suggests that the complainant should be given the right of an appeal: This would be fine, if both parties were subjected to the same deadlines and limitations. But, the truth is that complainants and domain name holders are asked to operate on completely different timeframes. The complainant, for instance, has all the time in the world to prepare the complaint before submitting it; the respondent has only 14 days to do what the complainant might have taken months to prepare. Moreover, the appeal process is meant to provide relief to the losing party and this is what the Applicant Guidebook suggests (12.1 Either party shall have a right to seek a de novo appeal of the Determination based on the existing record within the URS proceeding for a reasonable fee to cover the costs of the appeal). Why is it necessary to make such an explicit mention to the right of the Complainant to appeal?
b. The time for filing an appeal in default cases must be reduced from 2 years to not more than 6 months: This reduction is arbitrary and too short. A good compromise would suggest for the filing of an appeal in default cases to be reduced from 2 years to not more than 1 year.
c. In addition, the examination of possible defences in default cases according to para 8.4 (2) means an unjustified privilege of the non-cooperative defendant: Once again, the GAC here operates on the assumption that the reason for default is bad faith. Many respondents appear non-cooperative not because they are acting in bad faith, but because there are such provisions that indiscriminately equate default with bad faith, thus limiting the chances of a successful response. At the same time, what the GAC deems as non-cooperative, can be reasons for the respondent not being able to respond on time due to various technical or personal reasons.
· A successful complaint should have the right of first refusal for transfer of the disputed domain name after the suspension period so that the complainant is not forced to pursue a UDRP proceeding to secure a transfer.
The original justification of the URS as introduced by the IRT was that the distinct feature of the URS was its remedies. According to the IRT report:"The URS is intended to supplement and not replace the UDRP. They are separate proceedings with distinct remedies. The URS is designed to provide a faster means to stop the operation of an abusive site. The UDRP is designed to result in the transfer of the abusive domain name."
Seeking to allow the transfer of the domain name under the URS becomes problematic at various levels. First of all, the whole foundation of the URS's justification (and the way it was 'sold' to the Internet community) collapses. Secondly, by allowing transfer under the URS a variety of issues emerge: what will be the compatibility between the URS and the UDRP? What will the differences be between the two mechanisms?
If the URS is not meant to be a process that invites substantive evaluation but rather seeks to examine superficially the alleged infringement, then allowing a remedy that seeks transfer of the domain name is against due process and basic principles of justice.
Finally, transfer of the domain name under the URS was never part of the original IRT recommendation.
A Fairness 'Scorecard' for Trademark Protection Under the New gTLDs
In the last few years, ICANN has made huge strides in Protecting Trademarks within new generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). Now much more is being asked. Is it right? Is it appropriate? Will these changes make the new gTLDs unusable for the very communities we most hope will want them: developing countries, developing communities, new businesses, growing organizations and all the people born in the future?
Since the beginning of the new gTLD discussion, protection of trademarks has been a priority, a goal, and an accomplishment. Prior to the new gTLD process, as trademark protection we had:
• Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).
Now, with the most recent Applicant Guidebook, we have multiple, new trademark protection mechanisms — far more than have ever existed before in any other context:
• Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP);
• Trademark Clearinghouse — an enormous efficiency mechanism for trademark owners, allowing them to register their trademarks in one location, rather than reaching out to all new gTLD registries individually. The Registries must now work with this single source of trademarks, and ALL must have Sunrise Periods in the New gTLD;
• Uniform Rapid Suspension system. The UDRP is much faster and cheaper than courts. But trademark owners wanted a system even faster and cheaper than the URDP. The Internet Community agreed to the URS, which is primarily designed to be faster and cheaper than the UDRP. But in its bottom-up, grassroots policy-making process, the ICANN Community required clear protections for registrants, including a fair time to respond (before a registrant loses its new business, product launch or human rights website).
On demand from trademark owners, ICANN has already slashed response time to 14 days (making responses very difficult for non-English speakers and those without access to legal assistance). Now the current proposals for a "loser pays" model will break the system. Why would registrants even think to register in the new gTLD system when a $400 fee (approximately) could be a life-deteriorating result? This result will drive registrants away from new gTLDs, and the new opportunities they are designed to provide.
• Post-delegation Dispute Process — This is the first time, we get to see a dispute resolution policy that will provide trademark owner with the ability to challenge the registry itself for abuse of the TLD.
We, the ICANN Community, negotiated in good faith and at great length to balance the rights of trademark owners with the rights of all in commercial and noncommercial sectors, with the rights of all, now and in the future, to use normal, basic words and common last names, and new combinations thereof.
Here are the problems associated with the existing proposals concerning trademark protection under the new gTLDs.
I. Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) procedure:
This mechanism is designed to give trademark holders a cost effective, expedited process in instances of clear cut instances of trademark abuse. It was created by a group of trademark attorneys in the ICANN arena organized into a group called the "IRT Team." It was edited by a group representing all of the constituencies of ICANN, and the At-Large Community (ALAC) called the STI Team (Special Trademarks Issues). The STI accepted the URS concept, but added to it fairer notice and process.
A. What did the STI Team add?
• The STI increased the time of an answer from the registrant to 20 days (from 14). The concern is was that people need time to respond. Emails get lost in spam filters, non-English speakers need time to translate, registrants may need to seek out Counsel or assistance in responding to legal issues. Also, the ability of trademark owners to file their complaint at any time meant that many filings may take place at busy times of the year (Christmas, summer vacation). We hated to see a new businesses, much-publicized product launch, or timely human rights intervention taken down because the registrant did not have adequate time to respond.
• This timing received 'unanimous consensus' within the STI and from ICANN's GNSO Counsel.
• Unfortunately, ICANN staff has since cut the response time to 14 days, which will mean many registrants will "default" and not respond — likely losing their domain name.
Now the current recommendations in the USG 'scorecard' propose a Loser Pays Model. This recommendation is problematic for various reasons. First and foremost, the URS is a rapid review process. It is not a full and robust review of the underlying facts. Conclusions are rapid, thus mistakes will inevitably be made. Losing the domain name is bad, but the financial consequences of a URS action on the registrant can be disastrous.
Why transfer of the domain name should not be part of the URS.
The original justification of the URS as introduced by the IRT was that the distinct feature of the URS was its remedies. According to the IRT report: "The URS is intended to supplement and not replace the UDRP. They are separate proceedings with distinct remedies. The URS is designed to provide a faster means to stop the operation of an abusive site. The UDRP is designed to result in the transfer of the abusive domain name."
Finally, transfer of the domain name under the URS was never part of the original IRT recommendation. The STI contemplated on this issue, but decided against it.
III. Trademark Clearinghouse
One thing that deserves attention in relation to the Trademark Clearinghouse was that it was never meant to be characterized as a protection mechanism, at least in the same way the URS is meant to provide relief to trademark owners. The Trademark Clearinghouse was originally conceived as a means to provide efficiency in the domain name registration culture for both trademark owners, Registrars and Registries.
One of the main features of the Trademark Clearinghouse is that it is not meant to allocate trademark rights where none exist in the offline world. Moreover, the Clearinghouse is expected to 'understand' and 'accept' the differences of trademark law across jurisdictions and respect them to the extent that it will not create more chaos than already exists.
What Trademark + Keyword means: In the STI, we heard about many variations of domain names, and the addition of letters and stings to existing trademarks. The concern expressed was when the addition or removal of a letter changes the entire string — e.g., ENOM (a registrar), add "v" for VENOM (clearly unrelated). Similarly with GOOGLE and GOGGLE, two entirely different and distinct words. We stayed with, what I think was the IRT recommendation, of an exact match.
IV. The Post Delegation Dispute Resolution System (PDDRP)
The PDDRP is a novel and additional tool for trademark owners to protect their marks. The model is designed to allow trademark owners to turn against Registries, which appear to be encouraging or contributing cybersquatting activities.
This new mechanism is extraordinary. It is the first time that we get to experience a mechanism that can potentially terminate an entire business, taking with it both legitimate and non-legitimate users. The PDDRP provides potentially the greatest weapon to the trademark community and, if not implemented and operated carefully, it can upset and work to the detriment of the whole registration culture.
More importantly, though, the PDDRP manifests beyond any reasonable doubt that trademark protection in the Internet is more than secure.
Why the recommendations of the Special Trademark Issues Team (STI) are good.
Originally, the URS was conceived by the Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT) and when the STI was formed, the URS continued to constitute part of the Rights Protection Mechanisms. The STI was a multi-stakeholder group, which also included intellectual property owners and ICANN's Intellectual Property Constituency (IPC). The recommendations of the STI, therefore, sought to reflect all the various commercial and non-commercial interests and the recommendations it produced constitute a reflection of all the various positions.
ICANN and the ICANN Community listened, and spent more time on this issue than issue than any other one in the new gTLD process. Balances were carefully crafted; interests were carefully weighed. The STI had outstanding lawyers and non-lawyers: from the Intellectual Property and Business Communities, from the Non-commercial and At-Large (individual) Communities, from the Registries and Registrars. We reached a fair and balanced compromise — one dramatically expanding the rights protection of trademark owners, yet balancing their rights with the rights of others. It is the way trademark law has always protecting existing TM owners, without infringing the rights of all who will follow. It is a good and a fair compromise. A way forward that will allow new gTLDs to succeed, not ensure their failure.
It is the job of trademark owners to be vigilant, but it also is the responsibility of governments, ICANN and the entire Internet community to create a friendly environment for new entrants, to respect the fundamental principles of free speech, to provide choices and competition, and open new TLD options and possibilities to developing countries and communities, small businesses and entrepreneurs, and all the new services and products to follow.
DAG4: Comments on the Trademark Clearinghouse, the Uniform Rapid Suspension System and the Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Process
Comments on the Trademark Clearinghouse, Uniform Rapid Suspension System and Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution ProcedureFirst of all, I would like to welcome the opportunity of submitting comments in relation to the Trademark Clearinghouse, the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) and the Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Policy (PDDRP).
Trademark ClearinghouseOverall, the Trademark Clearinghouse (TMC) is a good step towards a more efficient, centralised and coherent registration culture and I would like to congratulate ICANN for adhering to the vision and respecting the work of the Special Trademark Issues (STI) team in relation to the Trademark Clearinghouse. However, at the same time, there are some points within the Draft Applicant Guidebook (DAG4) that, if not addressed, could potentially create various problems for ICANN, the non-commercial users and the wider Internet community.
To this end, I would like, in general, to draw your attention to some concerns I feel should be either clarified, be re-worded or omitted.First of all, the initial and original purpose of the TMC was neither to create nor to confer any new rights upon trademark owners. Yet, according to the version that is incorporated in DAG4, the TMC will also be validating marks and this validation will subsequently be used as a justification in both the URS and the PDDRP. The TMC should not be allowed to be used as a validator for marks, which informally allows the TMC to acquire the same status as that of courts. Such an allowance gives the TMC power beyond its intended purpose and original mandate. I would, therefore, like to recommend that the term 'Trademark Clearinghouse- validated marks' is removed from all the various parts that is being mentioned in the TMC, the URS and the PDDRP.Another crucial issue that is missing from the TMC is a provision that allows trademarks to be classified in classes, mirroring the International Classes of Goods and Services. This is a crucial element, as this service will compensate for similar and identical trademarks that under traditional law co-exist harmoniously. It will especially be important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and for trademark owners in developing countries. The International Classes of Goods and Services is mentioned in the Trademark Notice, but should be inserted within the main body of the TMC. I suggest that it is incorporated in section 5, "Criteria for Trademark Inclusion in Clearinghouse" before the paragraph beginning with "Registrations that include top level extensions … would not be permitted in the Clearinghouse)".Other, more specific issues that we would like to draw your attention to include:
Page 2: "For Sunrise services – Registries must recognize all text marks: […] iii) that are protected by a statute or Treaty currently in effect on or before 26 June 2008".
I would like to ask ICANN to clarify to which marks 'protected by Treaty' it refers. The only Treaty that I can think of in relation to the protection of marks is the 1981 Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol. This Treaty, however, does not seek to protect the name 'Olympic' per se rather the whole icon of the Olympic mark along with its symbol and its association with games. ("Any State party to this Treaty shall be obliged, subject to Articles 2 and 3, to refuse or to invalidate the registration as a mark and to prohibit by appropriate measures the use, as a mark or other sign, for commercial purposes, of any sign consisting of or containing the Olympic symbol, as defined in the Charter of the International Olympic Committee, except with the authorization of the International Olympic Committee. The said definition and the graphic representation of the said symbol are reproduced in the Annex." Article 1 of the Treaty). I would like to state that the term of Olympic, by itself and without any association to the Games, is a word associated with the tradition and culture of Greece and this should be taken into consideration when seeking to protect it beyond its original scope. (http://www.komaitis.org/1/post/2010/06/olympic-a-greek-word-the-mistake-the-international-olympic-committee-makes.html)
Page 3: "As set forth more fully below, there had been some suggestions that the role of the Clearinghouse be expanded beyond trademarks rights and the data that can be submitted be expanded beyond trademarks and service marks. As described below, there is no prohibition against the Trademark Clearinghouse Service Provider providing ancillary services, as long as those services and any data used for those services are kept separate from the Clearinghouse database".
This is contrary to what the STI recommended; although it was accepted that the TMC provider may provide ancillary services, the STI envisioned and made clear that such services should be directly related only to trademarks (common law marks, etc). It was decided that all other intellectual property rights fall outside the scope of the Clearinghouse and therefore should not be included. ("As set forth more fully below, although there has been some suggestion that the role of the Clearinghouse be expanded beyond trademark rights and that the data which can be submitted be expanded beyond trademarks and service marks, after careful consideration, these suggestions are not part of this proposal largely because they are at odds with the core purpose of the Clearinghouse, which is to facilitate cost effective and efficient data validation, maintenance and transmission, STI RECOMMENDATION, pp.4-5). I would like to recommend therefore the removal of this section.Page 5: "Registrations that include top level extensions such as "icann.org" as part of the trademark or service mark will not be permitted in the Clearinghouse regardless of whether a trademark registration has issued or it has been otherwise validated or protected as a trademark (e.g., if a trademark existed for icann.org, icann.org would not be permitted in the Clearinghouse)".
This provision appears to be discriminating against valid trademark registrations and fails to take into account contemporary business trends. Many businesses, especially SMEs, are established and they operate solely online. Such businesses hold valid trademark registrations and national Trademarks Offices (including those of the US and the UK) have acknowledged and have produced guidelines for such trademarks. I do not see the rationale behind such an exclusion and I would request ICANN to provide the community with some clarification on why such trademarks cannot be included in the TMC.
The Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS)Overall, the URS model adheres to the vision of the STI to create a rapid system for the resolution of blatant and clear-cut cybersquatting cases. However in some instances, the new document incorporated in DAG4 departs from the language and wording of the STI model.
One of the issues that is of great concern, is the replacement of the phrase "Safe Harbors" with "Defenses". The February 2010 revised URS document, mentioned the following: "The GNSO-STI Model called these Safe Harbor Provisions. Further independent analysis suggests these bullets may be more accurately termed as defenses". I would request ICANN to produce to the community this independent analysis and elaborate on the change of terminology. I would like to further recommend that the term 'defenses' be substituted by the term 'absolute or complete defenses', which etymologically is closer to the original term "Safe Harbors".
On more specific issues, I would like to draw your attention to the following issues and suggest some new wording and/or deletions in the current language of the URS.
Paragraph 1.2 (f) states: "A description of the grounds upon which the Complaint is based setting forth facts showing that the Complaining Party is entitled to relief, namely: (i) that the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the Complainant holds a valid registration issued by a jurisdiction that conducts a substantive examination of trademark applications prior to registration; (ii) and that the Registrant has no legitimate right or interest to the domain name and; (iii) the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.".
I recommend this section to be amended as follows: "A description of the grounds upon which the Complaint is based setting forth facts showing that the Complaining Party is entitled to relief, namely: (i) that the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the Complainant holds a valid registration issued by a jurisdiction that conducts a substantive examination of trademark applications prior to registration; and (ii) that the Registrant has no legitimate right or interest to the domain name; and (iii) the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith."Paragraph 2 "Fees", paragraph 2 states: "A 'loser pays' model has not been adopted for the URS. Given the nature of expected disputes through this mechanism, it is thought, more often than not, that no response to complaints will be submitted and the costs of recovering the fees actually will exceed their value".
The way this sentence reads appears as if the URS is instructing its Examiners to view URS disputes under a presumption of guilt for the Respondents, which is totally unfair and against due process. We really cannot anticipate the volume of responses that will be filled under the URS. I, therefore, strongly recommend that the wording "it is though, more often than not, that no response to complaints will be submitted" is removed.
Paragraph 4 "Notice and Locking of the Domain": This section requires Registry Operators to respond to the decision of a URS panel by 'locking' the domain name.Asking Registry Operators – instead of Registrars – to perform such an action is highly problematic. The registration system is hierarchical and involves Registrants, Registrars and Registries. Registries are not directly related with Registrants and use Registrars as their intermediaries to provide domain name services. Under the current language of section 4, it is not the job of Registries to proceed to the 'locking' of the infringing domain name, rather that of Registrars (who will naturally notify Registries). The current language bypasses one significant layer in the Registration hierarchy – that of Registrars and is contrary to the way the UDRP operates in this respect. We believe that Registrars should be the point of contact of the URS Examiners for the following reasons: (i) Registrars have existing procedures (as used in the context of the UDRP) in place to perform similar functions; (ii) Registrars have a direct relationship with Registrants, whereas Registry Operators have not; (iii) Registrars already have customer services that seek to assist Registrants.
Paragraph 4.3. states: "All Notices to the Registrant shall be sent through email, fax (where available) and postal mail. The Complaint and accompany exhibits, if any, shall be served electronically. The URS Provider shall also notify the registrar of record for the domain name at issue via the addresses the registrar has on file with ICANN".
For purposes of clarity, this section should be split in two sections, namely: Paragraph 4.3.: All Notices to the Registrant shall be sent through email, fax (where available) and postal mail. The Complaint and accompany exhibits, if any, shall be served electronically." And, Paragraph 4.4.: "The URS Provider shall also notify the registrar of record for the domain name at issue via the addresses the registrar has on file with ICANN."
Paragraph 5 "The Response" section 5.4 (c) states: "Any defense which contradicts the Complainant's claims".This is a mistake. Domain name rights might exist independently and separately from the Complaint's rights and, thus, there is no need to respond to such a defense. Section 5.4. (c) should be removed.
Paragraph 5 "The Response" section 5.4: We suggest that we add here another section (e) entitled: Absolute/Complete Defenses.Paragraph 5 "The Response" section 5.8 (b) states: "The domain name sites operated solely in tribute to or in criticism of a personal or business that is found by the Examiner to be fair use".Fair use constitutes an affirmative defense and as long as the Registrant is able to provide evidence of such use, the Examiner should accept it unwittingly. The language of this section implies that the proof of fair use lies to the discretion of the URS Examiner. This is against due process and gives URS Examiners with too much discretionary power. I, therefore, recommend that the phrase: "that is found by the Examiner" be removed.Paragraph 5.9: It appears that there is a grammatical error and the word 'NOT' is missing. The sentence should read: "Other considerations that are not examples of bad fair for the Examiner".Paragraph 12 "Appeal" in section 12.2. states: "The fees for an appeal shall be borne by the appellant. A limited right to introduce new admissible evidence that is material to the Determination will be allowed upon payment of an additional fee […]".Making the introduction of new evidence contingent upon an additional fee is unfair and there is no rationale behind it. As long as the appellant pays the required fees for an appeal, there is really no justification for making new evidence contingent upon the payment of a fee. ICANN should waive this additional fee requirement.Trademark Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure (Trademark PDDRP)On the issue of the PDDRP, I would like to stress that the process of implementing such a dispute resolution model has not been discussed to the extent that other trademark protection mechanisms have and there are some crucial questions that are still awaiting answers. The PDDRP has not been part of the same consultation process as compared to the Trademark Clearinghouse and the URS; rather, it was a proposal submitted by the Implementation Recommendation Team (IRT), it was not part of the STI's mandate and, therefore, it is not part of ICANN's multi-stakeholder model.
One of the most important issues concerning the PDDRP, which is also of great concern, is the following: Considering that a PDDRP action is successful and that the ultimate sanction is imposed upon a Registry, i.e. its termination, what will be the processes allowing Registrants to vindicate their rights? How do ICANN and the PDDRP envision that the rights of legitimate Registrants will be secured? What mechanisms are in place? What about the future of Registrars? We believe that failure to provide sufficient answers to this question indicates that the PDDRP is pre-mature and should not be adopted.
Turning on the more substantive issues of the PDDRP, my concerns are the following:
Paragraph 3 "Language" states: "The language of all submissions and proceedings under the procedure will be English".
This is too unfriendly and there is simply no justification why the language of the proceedings should be conducted in English, especially within ICANN's multi-cultural and multi-language framework. What about IDN Registry Operators? What about Registry Operators in the developing world? ICANN should be striving towards creating procedures that are welcoming to all its participants and this achieves completely the contrary. I urge you to remove this rule and expand the availability of languages.
Paragraph 5 "Standing" states: "The mandatory administrative proceeding will commence when a third-party complainant ("Complainant") has filed a Complaint with a Provider asserting that the Complainant is a trademark holder (which may include either registered or unregistered marks as defined below) claiming that […]".Although in the Trademark Clearinghouse there is distinction between registered and unregistered marks (in the latter case allowing only common law court-validated marks), in the context of the PDDRP such a distinction is not made. I would like to draw ICANN's attention to the danger that such an inclusive provision will create. Almost every word is or can be a common law trademark. Allowing such trademarks to be part of the PDDRP dispute gives the trademark community the opportunity to turn against Registries for every single word that is part of our vocabularies. It is unrealistic to expect Registry Operators to provide due care to terms such as 'fortune', 'people', 'time' etc, which are common words and in some very few jurisdictions happen also to be trademarked terms. We recommend, therefore, that the same distinction that is part of the TMC be incorporated in the PDDRP.
Paragraph 9 "Threshold Review" section 2 states: "The Complainant has asserted that it has been materially harmed as a result of trademark infringement".Although we understand the rationale behind it, we believe that the definition of material harm may prove challenging. By using this term, the PDDRP is recognizing abuse that does not require actual trademark infringement or threats of trademark infringement. I would like to ask ICANN to provide the wider Internet community with information as to the interpretational boundaries of material harm.
Paragraph 11 "Reply" states: "The Complainant is permitted ten (10) days from Service of the Response to submit a Reply addressing the statements made in the Response showing why the Complaint is not "without merit" […]".
We would like to ask ICANN to explain what is the rationale for the PDDRP to provide two opportunities to trademark owners for a reply. On its face, this provision appears not to follow the paradigms of ICANN's dispute resolution mechanisms, i.e. the UDRP and the URS.
Paragraph 14 "Expert Panel": According to the PDDRP, one-member panels will be the default rule for PDDRP disputes (unless either of the parties requests a 3-member one). Given the importance and seriousness of such disputes, I would like to suggest that a three-member panel default rule should be enforced.
Paragraph 16 "Discovery" states: "Whether and to what extent discovery is allowed is at the discretion of the Panel, whether made on the Panel's own accord, or upon the request from the Parties".
Discovery is an important aspect of every adjudication process. Considering the seriousness of this dispute, discovery should not be vested upon the discretion of the panels, but should be an option that operates irrespective of the views of PDDRP panels.
Paragraph 20 "The Expert Panel Determination" states: "While the Expert Determination that a registry operator is liable under the standards of the Trademark PDDRP shall be considered, ICANN will have the authority to impose the remedies, if any, that ICANN deems appropriate given the circumstances of each matter".
Why is ICANN afforded such discretion, especially given the fact that ICANN is not a party of the PDDRP dispute? This raises significant issues concerning privity of contract that we have already raised with ICANN and we have not received any response.We, generally, believe that the PDDRP is an issue that should be discussed further and to more detail. This is a dispute that can have considerable impact and potentially upset the whole registration culture. To a certain extent, it also raises issues of intermediary liability and directs the registration of domain names towards a more controlled system of content. Free speech and expression might be in jeopardy, unless due consideration is paid to the effect that such a dispute can have.
Konstantinos Komaitis, the individual!
Views are my own and my own only!
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