Centre of Policy Studies
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Alternative Approaches to Fee Flexibility: Towards a Third Way in Higher Education Reform in Australia
The Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS), incorporating the IMPACT project, is a research centre at Victoria University devoted to quantitative analysis of issues relevant to economic policy. Address: Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, Victoria, 8001home page: www.vu.edu.au/CoPS/ email: copsinfo@vu.edu.au Telephone +61 3 9919 1877
Comparing the Impacts of Financial Regulation in Australia and the United States via Simulation with Country-specific Financial CGE Models
The Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS), incorporating the IMPACT project, is a research centre at Victoria University devoted to quantitative analysis of issues relevant to economic policy. Address: Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University, PO Box 14428, Melbourne, Victoria, 8001 home page: www.vu.edu.au/CoPS/ email: copsinfo@vu.edu.au Telephone +61 3 9919 1877
Evidence-based Trade Policy Decision Making in Australia and the Development of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling
Section 5 contains a brief trade-relevant application of CGE modelling. My aim is to give an impression of the power of CGE modelling: (a) to handle detail; (b) to identify and quantify indirect effects; and (c) to produce explainable plausible results. The application I have chosen is the effects on the U.S. of cuts in their tariffs and easing of their quota restrictions. The model is the 500 sector USAGE model with a 51 region extension. This model has been built along the lines of Australia's ORANI and MONASH models by researchers at Australia's Centre of Policy Studies in collaboration with the U.S. International Trade Commission. There are three reasons for choosing a U.S. application rather than an Australian application. First, the USAGE model is now the state of the art with respect to relevant detail for evidence-based trade policy decision making. Second, while CGE modelling in Australia is currently producing important results on a wide range of issues, trade is not one of them. This is because the protection debate has essentially been won in Australia with a political consensus in favour of low protection. Third, international readers of this paper will more readily understand results for California and New York than for Western Australia and Victoria.
The Food Aid Debate in Trade and Development. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 89, 1 December 2005
CEPS Policy Brief Centre for European Policy Studies No 89/December 2005 The Food Aid Debate in Trade and Development Andreas Schneider* Thinking ahead for Europe It is generally agreed that making pr[.]
Climate Change in the US Government Budget – Funding for Technology and Other Programmes, and Implications for EU-US Relations. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 77, 1 July 2005
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. Goals
Protection of Personal Data and Citizens' Rights of Privacy in the Fight against the Financing of Terrorism. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 67, 1 March 2005
CEPS Policy Brief Centre for European Policy Studies THE EUROPEAN PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN | 1 No 67/March 2005 Protection of Personal Data and Citizens' Rights of Privacy in the Fight against the Financ[.]
What values for Europe? The Ten Commandments. CEPS Policy Briefs No.65, 1 February 2005
* Michael Emerson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the CEPS Annual Conference on "What Values for Europe?", 23-24 February 2005. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated.
Multilateralism or Regionalism? Trade Policy Options for the European Union. CEPS Paperback. December 2005
abstain – not even temporarily – from bilateral deals. For the EU, this political-economic rationale possibly plays less of a role, because classical foreign policy involving diplomacy still lies to a great extent in the hands of the member states, while the EU itself governs WTO-related matters. Thus it is not surprising that the EU gives top priority to the multilateral process. The complex situation surrounding negotiations by no means implies that the EU must accept the state of the WTO as a given. It can contribute substantially to politically stimulating the Doha Round, in particular by being willing to offer a forceful and comprehensive liberalisation of the agricultural sector. The EU already took some steps in this direction, concerning the proposals to completely eliminate export subsidies, to substantially reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies and to cut agricultural tariffs. It seems appropriate that the EU now waits particularly for emerging countries to table significant offers concerning a reduction of their relatively high industrial tariffs and concerning the more open service markets. But given this progress, in the following months more rigour in reducing agricultural protectionism will be required from the EU. In this context a French veto would effectively terminate the Doha Round and must thus be rigorously rejected by more liberal EU-members.
The Black Sea as Epicentre of the Aftershocks of the EU's Earthquake. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 79, July 2005
While the new situation will cause disappointment and bitterness in Turkey, its democracy is probably no longer at risk. Turkey seems to have ratcheted itself up to a higher quality and maturity of its democracy these last years, with the important leverage of EU political conditionality. Turkish society has taken over. It is democratic and does not want to stop being so. This view may be plausible, but it is not rock solid. One may point to the still-fragile monetary/public debt situation, and speculate that a new financial crisis could lead to renewed political instability. For the Western Balkans, there are continuing pleas coming from politicians experienced in the region that dangerous scenarios should be expected in a regional ghetto of semi-failed states. For the Western CIS states, also the Orange and Rose revolutions are still fragile and incomplete, even if there seem to have been decisive breaks in the mindsets, expectations and demands of the population in these countries. Something of a ratchet effect seems to have happened there too. It is certainly the case that the Orange and Rose revolutions were driven by domestic politics. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova are candidates for following in the manner of the Rose and Orange revolutions, and Moldova and Armenian societies are especially sensitive to the idea of 'joining Europe'. EU did nothing to encourage the Rose and Orange revolutions, except for the fundamental point that it had moved its frontiers massively to the East, but this movement is now on 'pause'. To this one can add the likelihood that Russia will feel newly emboldened in its near abroad policy, just as it had begun to concede that they had lost their periphery.
European Neighbourhood Policy in the Mashreq Countries: Enhancing Prospects for Reform. CEPS Working Documents No. 229, 1 September 2005
• If progress can be made on articulating a vision of EU-Jordan relations that emerges as having an important place in the National Agenda, both parties will need to make a real prioritisation from the all-embracing agenda of the Action Plans. Taking the prioritised areas to the stage of operational policy recommendations will require a great deal of analytical work and staff capacity (the case studies for this exercise provide a flavour of what such analysis might involve). For this to be feasible, collaboration with others, including member states but also the World Bank and other agencies, is certain to be required. The Commission and the World Bank can build on their prior cooperation to take the lead together in such work, with procedures to link to the work of the sub-committees. Jordan is even more of a service economy than most (70% of GDP), which makes reform of the services sector not just a sector case study, but potentially the strategic key to its economic development prospects, although the generally fragmented and conservative nature of the private sector, particularly in the services sector, may pose an obstacle to more dynamic change. This presents an opportunity for the EU to negotiate a comprehensive services agreement bilaterally with Jordan as a strategic implementation measure of the Action Plan. This is hinted at in the Action Plan, but ought to be brought to the top of the economic policy priorities, provided that government commitment in this area has clearly developed. A services agreement would go alongside or follow more ambitious multilateral commitments by Jordan in the WTO/GATS framework as part of the Doha round. Jordan is hesitant over this for the moment. It needs to be persuaded through the processes of dialogue and incentives, including the chance here to be the 'first' among ENP partner states, which would be a positive signal to the international investor community.
Parties of Power as Roadblocks to Democracy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 81, 1 August 2005
At the 2002 general party conference, these calls for change eventually culminated in the implementation of a set of internal reforms that were intended to reconnect the party with the Egyptian electorate and to enhance its position within the power structure of the state. Under the direction of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the incumbent president and leader of a reformist camp within the party, several structural changes were introduced to the party statutes. Propagating greater internal democracy, for instance, the party introduced the direct election of its top positions and the grass-roots participation in the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections (see Brownlee, 2002). Under the captivating slogan 'new thinking', the congress also debated and adopted a new programme for the party, which was meant to better reflect the changing socio-economic realities in Egypt. Most crucially, however, attempts were made to reverse the NDP's junior position within the party-government relationship. Realising that a party without a programme and command of government policy could not survive in the long run, Gamal Mubarak, who in 2002 took over the NDP's powerful policy committee, stated clearly:
What Could be Saved from the European Constitution if Ratification Fails? The Problems with a 'Plan B'. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 70, 1 May 2005
• Political obstacles: High. The change of the voting system was one of the most contested elements during the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference and the main reason agreement could not be reached in December 2003. In fact, two countries – Poland and Spain – will lose significant veto power under the double-majority voting system. Agreement was only reached when the government of former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar lost the Spanish national elections and was replaced by the current socialist government under Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, which was more inclined to reach a compromise. The Polish then found themselves isolated on this issue and agreed to the new system. In the meantime, although the Spanish public approved the Constitution on 20 February 2005, it could well be that the government is not ready to accept the unfavourable element if it is singled out of the Constitution's 'package deal'. This sensitive issue may also be linked to the negotiations about the EU's budget if no agreement on the financial perspective is reached beforehand, because the Spanish will be very anxious to safeguard regional funds. The even bigger obstacle, however, is more likely to be the Polish government, which had a very difficult time in accepting the deal. By the time this issue re-emerges on the European agenda, it looks as if the Polish government might have changed (elections are to be held in October 2005), and the Civic Platform, whose parliamentary leader Jan Rokita uttered the famous words: "Nice or Death", may be in power. Again budgetary negotiations on regional policy could open up a way forward, which would most probably entail countries such as Germany, the UK and France having to agree to an overall boost of the EU's budget. That, however, is far from likely.
Britain's Future in Europe: The known Plan A to remain or the unknown Plan B to leave CEPS Paperback 2nd Ed , March 2016
Going beyond these developments in the EU-wide system, eurozone member states have been driven to take more radical steps to defend their financial system. Under the heading 'banking union', these initiatives comprise a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) run by the European Central Bank, and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) to handle emergency cases of failing banks. The UK has negotiated for itself (and any other non-euro member state) provisions for it not to participate in the banking union, and at the same time to protect its interests against possible discriminatory measures taken by the eurozone. These protections concern the role of the EBA in relation to the Single Resolution Mechanism, and the EBA's relations with the European Central Bank as bank supervisor. The detail of these provisions is about avoiding discrimination, sticking to common EU competition policy rules and voting practice in the EBA (p.18). Given the volume of interactions between the functioning of EU financial markets and that of the eurozone, the key point to note here for the UK is that with good will on both sides it proved possible to successfully negotiate both non-participation in the banking union and non-discrimination against the non- participating member states.
Men and women next frontiers
a Men's as well as Women's Roles: not Modifying the System of Sex Roles but Radically Changing it.. Centre for Studies in Social Policy, London.[r]
Transforming think tanks into 'policy hubs': The creation of research−policy networks
While the Centre has utilised multiple avenues and channels to inform policy makers and become part of the policy process, it is evident that the divide between research and policy still exists. Given this divide, the interviews explored whether the Centre considered there was any value in having a mediating or an integrating entity, such as a think tank, that could facilitate the creation of a tripartite network, bringing together researchers and policy makers. Where a strong relationship between researchers and policy makers exists, the value such an entity could offer would be minimal. There was broad consensus on this general statement. Nevertheless, in situations where resources (human, physical and funding) are constrained, could think tanks organise resources and improve the structure to boost research−policy engagements? Can think tanks take on a new role as an integrator, bringing in relevant non-state actors such as the community or businesses to deliberate over policy issues? Of course, for such tripartite or multipartite network relationships to be successful, individuals who work within integrating entities like think tanks would have to be strong negotiators, relationship managers and enthusiastic communicators, underpinned by a strong ethic of collaboration. The creation of an effective research−policy network within a policy context can only occur where collaborative relations between government and researchers exist.
The EU as an 'Intergovernmental' Actor in Foreign Affairs: Case Studies of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. CEPS Working Documents No. 228, 1 August 2005
Whereas the UK and France could have their own policy positions before and during the 1998 Rome Conference, this has become less accepted by other member states today. As the group of representatives from EU member states dealing with ICC matters remained largely the same also after the Rome conference, representatives developed a close identification with the issue of the ICC. They continued to work together in the framework of the meetings of the preparatory commission for the ICC and later also in the Council framework (see below). Moreover, they had frequent informal contacts, for instance in the margins of the many conferences, workshops and seminars (organised mostly by NGOs) on the establishment of the ICC. As a result, national representatives developed a common understanding on the issues involved in the establishment of the ICC. This development was reinforced by the novel and pioneering character of the work. Most of the representatives had never dealt with a similar issue before, simply because the ICC was the first ever permanent international criminal court to be created.
From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues. CEPS Working Documents No. 220, 1 March 2005
Standard European commentaries have until recently suggested that this transatlantic harmony could hardly be extended to the Middle East. Following the period of profound disagreements over the Iraqi war, with most Europeans apparently convinced that the war would be politically counterproductive, for example in boosting radical Islamic tendencies, there now emerges a more mixed picture. While the growth of radical Islam seems undeniable, at the same time the cause of Arab democracy also seems to advance. The Iraqi elections in early 2005 passed far less badly than many had feared. Minor but still interesting openings towards electoral democracy emerged in February 2005 with the decision in Egypt to allow some (restricted) competition for the next presidential election and with the municipal elections actually held in Saudi Arabia. And then came the dramatic 'cedar revolution' in Lebanon in response to the assassination of the former prime minister, which seemed to be taking inspiration from the 'orange revolution' in Ukraine, and with the US and France working in conspicuous alliance to pressure Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. The Lebanese-Ukrainian-Georgian comparisons become all the more evocative for the EU, since the neighbourhood policy was initially much criticised for grouping European and Arab neighbours together, the objection being that while the former are all Council of Europe members, the Arab states seemed deeply resistant to democratic change.
Think Tank Review Issue 45 April 2017
The Indian Ocean today is critical for the future of the EU and India. Two deeply entrenched myths explain the absence of a dialogue and the consequent lack of cooperation: Indian perceptions of the EU as a strategic non-entity and irrelevant strategic actor beyond its borders; and similarly, European perceptions of an introverted India that is hesitant to take on a leadership role beyond South Asia and unwilling to work together with other middle powers. Based on consultations with policymakers and experts under the EU-India Policy Dialogue on Global Governance and Security, this brief emphasises that, despite such perceptions, in practice the EU and India's initiatives in the Indian Ocean are widely congruent and complementary.
The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. CEPS Working Documents No. 217, 1 January 2005
The same arguments are beginning to apply to other aspects of EU-Israel relations. A key area is that of research. As in the case of trade, only legal entities within the territory of the State of Israel are intended to benefit from funds available in EU Framework Programmes. Yet Israel, in line with its public policy, has considered as eligible Israeli entities within the OTs. An informal search of the Fifth Framework database has revealed that two settlement companies (one from the Golan Heights and one in the Jordan Valley) have benefited from EU funds. 91 As in the case of trade, the Union has taken no effective action to ensure Israel's respect with its rules and principles. Without special attention paid to the sui generis problems posed by Israel, there is little scope within the EU's Framework Programmes to exercise effective control. DG Research, in charge of managing research programmes, has stated that these problems are of a 'political' nature and thus fall under the competence of DG External Relations. Future problems are likely to emerge in other areas as well. In 1997, Israel signed an agreement on public procurement with the Union. But the Union has taken no precautionary action to prevent the possibility of European companies participating in Israeli tenders for the construction of infrastructure in the OTs (settlements or the barrier). Another example is in the area of grants and loans. As of 2007, Israel will be eligible for EIB loans. Israel will also be eligible for funds under the European Neighbourhood Instrument. But how can and will the Union ensure that these funds will not be directed to support Israeli policies in the OTs?
A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 68, 1 April 2005
Foreign responses to the conflict in Chechnya have too often been marked by ignorance, bad faith, and the projection of other agendas. Western politicians have repeatedly let their own political aims vis-à-vis Russia shape their reaction to events in Chechnya. In 1994–1996, for example, Western support for Boris Yeltsin in his purported struggles with the remnants of the Communist Party constantly softened Western criticism of Russian brutalities in Chechnya. More recently, two other agendas – the war on terror and a growing campaign to try to limit Russian influence in the states of the former Soviet Union – have further distorted Western thinking about Chechnya. On the other hand, much of Western public comment on Chechnya has been uninformed or biased against Russia. Both media and policy elites disregarded the real threats to Russian security and to the stability of the North Caucasus emanating from Chechnya during its period of quasi- independence between 1997 and 1999. In those years, the
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