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Experimental design to persuade
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Kolotilin, Anton
Anton Kolotilin
A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender optimally discloses only whether the receiver's utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sender's and receiver's welfare to be monotonic in information. In particular, the sender's welfare increases with the precision of the sender's information and decreases with the precision of public information.
Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:215-226
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006
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Information disclosure; Persuasion; Stochastic orders;
C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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