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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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remedy under state law for employment discrimination claims. Hunt v. Wyle Lab., 997 F.Supp. 84, 91 (D.Mass.1997). Fortucci responds that her claim is not precluded because M.G.L. c. 151B, § 9 states that a claim can be brought in a civil action 90 days after the claim was filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Even if, for the moment, the Court assumes that Section 9 authorized her to bring a claim, it would be time barred. Under that section, an aggrieved party may bring a civil action “not later than three years af benefit when she is deprived of compensation for services rendered or when the intended purpose of the termination was to benefit the employer at the employee’s expense. Siles v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 13 Mass.App.Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103, 106 (1982) . Fortucci contends that she was deprived of a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions
B. holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed
C. holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy
D. recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions
E. holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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caused Nova to stop offering abortions to minors without parental involvement. Therefore, it is at best merely speculative whether these defendants caused Nova’s decision to require parental consent, with a concomitant prospective loss of patients that flowed from that decision. The plaintiffs burden of demonstrating causation is not satisfied when “[speculative inferences are necessary to connect [its] injury to the challenged actions.” See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). In other words, Nova has “confus[ed] the statute’s immediate coercive effect on the plaintiff! ] with any coercive effect that might be applied by the defendants.” See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc) (emphasis in original) . Nothing in the record distinguishes these
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that legislation governing classification of employees in the governors office did not confer certain authority on the governor and lacking this power the governor could not change the legislative will through a set of regulations
B. holding that the governor erred in considering evidence that was not before the board
C. holding that a states governor and attorney general were not proper defendants when they had no power to enforce the challenged statute
D. holding that amendment to the challenged statute mooted the claim when the state had expressed no intention to reenact the prior law
E. holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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pays the costs of the condemnation as required by 21 U.S.C. § 334(e). For example, in United States v. Articles of Drug. . .Penapar VK, 458 F.Supp. 687 (D.Md.1978), the court found that because there was “no longer any dispute [between the government and claimant] concerning condemnation and destruction of the drugs,” the claimant’s motion to withdraw should be granted. Id. at 689. The only remaining dispute in that case was over costs, and the court found that § 334(e) required the claimant to pay them. Id. See also United States v. 302 Cases, of Frozen Shrimp, 25 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1357 (M.D.Fla.1998) (stating that a claimant may withdraw from a case, but withdrawal does not waive liability for costs); United States v. 374/100 Pound Burlap Bags, 1989 WL 36948 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1989) . Thus, the Court finds that although
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs
B. holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs
C. holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla
D. holding that the issue of whether the plaintiffs claim was barred by an intervening cause was not an affirmative defense but merely an assertion that the plaintiff cannot prove a necessary element of its claim
E. holding that an intervening claimant in a civil forfeiture case may withdraw its claim but is still liable for costs of condemnation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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DWI effectuated and detention should have ended when officer determined driver was merely tired). 31 . See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64; Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398 (continued questioning on unrelated matter and computer check on warrants and criminal history impermissible where officer’s suspicions on which stop was based had already been dispelled); Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 432 (once reason for stop has been satisfied, detained individual must be free to leave). 32 . Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting Robinette, 519 U.S. at 41, 117 S.Ct. at 422 (Ginsberg, J., concurring)). 33 . See id. at 244; Perales v. State, 117 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref'd); see also United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5t 286-87 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (passenger reeked of marijuana sm . 45 . Gearing, 685 S.W.2d at 329 (citing
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution
B. holding asking passenger for identification not improper
C. holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous
D. holding officers request for passengers identification not unreasonable although unrelated to reason for stop where it did not prolong detention and passenger was under no obligation to answer
E. holding that an officers request of a passenger who was present solely by virtue of the coincidence he was a passenger for the passengers identification just because the officer wanted to know who he was dealing with for safety purposes constituted an unlawful detention
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Board’s decision. She states that the text of Section 402(b) of the Law does not mention marital status of a claimant, and Section 1704 of the Marriage Law does not apply because Procito and her partner are not seeking recognition of a marriage. After restating equal protection and due process arguments, she contends that the Board made no alternate holding, when in fact the Board did determine that Procito failed to prove that she quit due to a necessitous and compelling cause. She asserts, as well, that the Court should conclude that any arguments concerning the adequacy of the reasons for Procito’s partner's relocation were waived by virtue of the employer’s failure to raise the issue. She cites Wing v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 436 A.2d 179 (1981) . Procito’s argument lacks merit as it is her
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
B. holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived
C. holding that an employers theory of termination for willful misconduct rather than voluntary quit raised for the first time before the commonwealth court was waived
D. holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
E. holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Alleged Error in Computing Criminal History Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that his New Hampshire conviction for selling cocaine on October 30, 1992, was a “prior sentence” resulting in an additional two points being added to his criminal history computation pursuant to section 4A1.2(a)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(l). Appellant argues that his conduct in violation of section 1326(b)(2) came to light only through his arrest for selling cocaine. Since “he was found in this country in the process of committing that [state] offense”, Appellant argues that the offense conduct of selling cocaine should be viewed as part of the instant offense and not counted as a prior sentence. See Trial Transcript (Aug. 30, 1993) at 29-30. T 1) . Whether or not the “prior sentence” and the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
B. holding that defendants state court conviction for possessing a stolen car was severable from federal offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm even though firearm was found in cars trunk at time of defendants arrest for state stolen vehicle charge
C. holding that possession of a firearm by a felon is a serious offense for 3162a2 purposes
D. holding district court lacked discretion to permit defendant to stipulate to prior conviction in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm
E. holding that in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon defendants assault with the firearm the evening before the charged offense was necessary to complete the story and prove that brown possessed the gun
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the policy’s termination. The premium adjustment endorsement does not affect coverage, as Continental argues, and its adjustment process is not applicable for the losses here, which were reported long after the policy terms expired. See id. at 222, 133 N.W.2d at 36 (construing premium adjustment endorsement to avoid consequences that would have been drastic to the insured). b. Primary liability under missing policies. Canadian General was Domtar’s primary insurer from October 1956 to, February 1965. The actual Canadian General policies were lost for periods during that time. Although Lloyd’s did not otherwise dispute the existence or language of the lost policies, it was Lloyds’ position that the policies could have contained additional endorsements. See id. at 219, 133 N.W.2d at 35 . Lloyd’s argues that if Domtar has not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy
B. recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions
C. holding that an insured was not entitled to recover through their endorsement coverage where the policy actually required the insureds to repair rebuild or replace their covered property before the endorsement would be triggered
D. holding it is settled that in construing an endorsement to an insurance policy the endorsement and the policy must be read together and the words of the policy remain in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement
E. recognizing that judicial estoppel might not be applicable if inconsistent positions result from change in public policy statutory provisions or facts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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other evidence the effect upon the jury would be the same as if no redaction had occurred at all.”). As the Government pointed out, the Supreme Court in Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206-07, 107 S.Ct. at 1706-07, explained that Bruton was a “narrow exception” to the assumption that juries can and generally do follow limiting instructions. Government Brief at 29-30 & n. 9. The Richardson Court explained: The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process. On th 8 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir.1991) ; United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 701
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that admission of nontestifying oodefendants statement to police that murder defendant came to his apartment and went in bathroom and stayed there for awhile did not violate bruton rule because statement standing alone did not clearly incriminate defendant but only became incriminating when linked with other evidence
B. holding that testimony of two experts was unreliable because they relied on the testimony of two other experts which was also unreliable
C. holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights
D. holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face
E. holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CURIAM: Roderick L 8, 285-86 (4th Cir.2005) . Moreover, Lattimore did not challenge any
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that application of career offender enhancement falls within exception for prior convictions where facts are undisputed making it unnecessary for district court to engage in further fact finding about prior convictions
B. holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury
C. holding that fact of prior conviction is not subject to booker requirements that convictions cannot be severed from their essential components including the integral facts such as the statutory violation and date of offense and that these facts are inherent to convictions not extraneous to them
D. holding that prior convictions could not be severed from their essential components and these components include integral facts such as the statutory violation and date of offense therefore these facts were inherent to convictions not extraneous to them
E. holding that prior convictions could not be severed from their essential components such as separateness location and dates of of fenses and that therefore no finding of fact is made with respect to these inherent facts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Proxy Statement and more than two years before the enactment of the statute. Thus, the extended statute of limitations under Sarbanes-Oxley does not revive Plaintiffs’ time-barred claims. In support of their retroactivity argument, Plaintiffs cite to an SEC amicus brief, filed in connection with a non-prece-dential case, AIG Asian Infrastructure v. Chase Manhattan, 122 Fed.Appx. 541, 2005 WL 435406 (2d Cir.2005), which urged the Second Circuit to retroactively apply the new limitations period under Sarbanes-Oxley based on the plain meaning of Section 804(b). See Pls.App. G; Pls. Opp. at 15. However, not only did the AIG Asian court refuse to adopt the SEC’s position, but the retroactivity argument was explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage, 391 F.3d at 406 . The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have also
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the act is retroactive
B. holding that sarbanesoxley is not retroactive and that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of section 804 indicate that congress clearly favored retroactive application
C. holding retroactive application
D. holding that the act is not retroactive
E. holding no retroactive application
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Plaintiffs have not specifically alleged which representations they saw, heard, or read, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled which affirmations or promises formed the “basis of their bargain.” Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to Plaintiffs’ express warranty claim. 2. Breach of Warranty Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants breached any express or implied warranty. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the Products did not work for them or that they suffered any injury arising from use of the products. The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument. Although Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts regarding the express promises and affirmations of fact made by Defendants, the gist of their , at *14 . The cases cited by Defendants are
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiff failed to allege breach of a valid and enforceable contract but stated a claim for promissory estoppel
B. holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
C. holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of express warranty where plaintiff alleged that align did not have proven digestive health benefits as advertised by procter gamble and was nothing but sugarfilled capsules injected with a small amount of unremarkable bacteria
D. holding plaintiff lacked standing to challenge small business status of awardee because plaintiff was not a small business
E. holding that although the express warranty claim was not federally preempted the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts for the claim to survive dismissal under rule 8 where the pjlaintiff alleged no facts demonstrating that defendants made any affirmations specifically to plaintiff or her physician so as to form the basis of the bargain
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The judgment is affirmed. All concur. 1 . RSMo Cum.Supp.2004. All other statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise noted. 2 . RSMo Cum.Supp.2004. 3 . Citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Hoffa, 242 F.Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C.1965) ("New York allows a corporation to expend funds in defense of a derivative action presumptively brought in its behalf when some interest of the corporation is threatened."); Fuller v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 91 F.Supp. 710, 711 (S.D.N.Y.1950) ("The corporation can actively defend where the interests of the corporation are threatened with injury by the relief sought in the complaint.”); Leven v. Birrell, 92 F.Supp. 436, 444 (S.D.N.Y.1949); Otis & Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 57 F.Supp. 680, 682 (E.D.Penn.1944) ; Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
B. recognizing the cause of action
C. recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation
D. recognizing cause of action
E. holding that corporation can file an answer when the plaintiffs cause of action is such as to endanger rather than advance corporate interests but not where the cause of action is fraud against the corporate directors
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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trial is mandatory only when: (1) it is requested; (2) the matters raised in the motion and accompanying affidavit are not determinable from the record; and (3) the motion and affidavit establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could potentially be entitled to relief. Id. (citing Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339; Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 21-22 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Edwards v. State, 37 S.W.3d 511 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd)). Even if the defendant meets the requirements for obtaining a hearing, however, the trial court is not required to allow live testimony at the hearing. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Instead, that decision lies within the discretion of the trial court. See id. . We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action
B. holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits
C. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction
D. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling
E. holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify an attorney based on a matter not raised by the opposing party until only weeks prior to trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Corp., 97 B.R. at 180. 31. The retention of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court after confirmation is particularly appropriate where, as here, the bankruptcy court expressly retains jurisdiction under the plan. Hospital and Univ. Property Damage Claimants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 7 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir.1993) (“The bankruptcy court’s post-confirmation jurisdiction ... defined by reference to the Plan”); Mueller Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 1992 WL 116314, *2 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“[T]he bankruptcy court as a branch of .the district court is empowered to oversee the reorganization and issue orders necessary to ensure that it proceeds in' compliance with the terms of the approved plan”); In re Hardwicke Cos., Inc., 64 B.R. 113, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y.1986) . 32. Thus, this Court expressly retained
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a plan provision purporting to provide jurisdiction over any and all actions involving the debtor postconfirmation was invalid as beyond the scope of the bankruptcy code
B. holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction postconfirmation to adjudicate adversary proceeding concerning asset purchases at bankruptcy sale notwithstanding inclusion of language in the plan purporting to retain such jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court
C. holding that postconfirmation jurisdiction was proper in light of plan provision retaining such jurisdiction
D. recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims
E. holding that the clause at issue granted jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a default final judgment, the moving party must show three things: (1) the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of excusable neglect; (2) the moving party has a meritorious defense; and (3) the moving party acted with due diligence in seeking relief from the default.”), review denied, 969 So.2d 1011 (Fla.2007); Geer v. Jacobsen, 880 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (A meritorious defense “must be asserted either by a pleading or in an affidavit, and a general denial is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense.”); Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (finding that a seven-week delay in seeking relief from default judgment was unreasonable); Herrick v. Se. Bank, 512 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) ; see also Fischer v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding action did not arise under the patent laws
B. holding that excusable neglect cannot arise from negligence of counsel
C. holding that parties to contract cannot prevent borrowed employee status from arising by providing in contract that it cannot arise
D. holding that a bailment may arise from an oral contract
E. holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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out of the Commonwealth’s coffers. Consequently, we need not address the more nuanced issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Greenless v. Almond, 277 F.3d 601, 606-08 (1st Cir.2002) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment issues, like other constitutional issues, should be avoided whenever a case can be disposed of on other grounds); Parella v. Retirement Bd., 173 F.3d 46, 56-57 (1st Cir.1999) (similar). Thus, partial judgment will be entered DISMISSING the § 1983 claims against movants in their official capacities. However, we note that plaintiffs’ parallel action against them in their individual capacities is not barred by either the definition of “person” contained in § 1983 or the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) . Movants next argue that plaintiffs have
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity
B. holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc 1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity
C. holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity
D. holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity
E. holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under 1983
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in domestic law. Although a dismissal of the family court action certainly may have an effect on whether Stone pursues the circuit court action against Thompson, the two actions are completely separate. Therefore, the family court’s order, which retains subject matter jurisdiction over this case, does not deprive Thompson of a mode of trial to which she may speculatively be entitled to as a matter of right in another case. See Flagstar Corp., 341 S.C. at 72, 533 S.E.2d at 333 (stating the traditional analysis of subsection (2) is whether “a party is erroneously denied a trial by jury in a law case, or is erroneously required to proceed before a jury in an equity case”); see also, e.g., Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., 319 S.C. 240, 242-43, 243 n.2, 460 S.E.2d 392, 393-94, 394 n.2 (1995) , overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. S.C.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
B. holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable
C. holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a 1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable
D. holding an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable because it does not fall into one of the enumerated categories of section 143330 and such order does not finally determine anything
E. holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service .... 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998) (bold emphasis added). In the leading case on Section 230 immunity, the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.1997), noted that: By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exerci 206 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir.2000) . And even those courts which have not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an online dating service provider was not liable when an unidentified party posted a false online profile for a popular actress leading her to receive sexually explicit phone calls letters and faxes at home
B. holding that a defamation claim based on statements in a written disciplinary notice was preempted
C. holding that a provider of software and hardware was not an information provider and thus could not be charged with negligent misrepresentation
D. holding that online service provider was immune from defamation claim based on inaccurate stock information
E. holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to prison term of twenty-five-years to life under California’s “three strikes law” for a recidivist who was convicted of stealing golf clubs worth $1,200). While it was previously unclear to lower courts whether the proportionality requirements of the Eight portionality review is one of several respects in which we have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides.”) (citations omitted). For non-capital cases, it is only an “extraordinary case” where “the gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 68, 77, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001 ; Weems, 217 U.S. at 349, 30 S.Ct. 544
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it was a violation of the eighth amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for 10000
B. holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprisonment for passing a bad check by a convicted felon
C. holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy
D. holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence
E. holding that sentence was erroneous but not void where sentence of life imprisonment without parole was imposed for first degree murder under unconstitutional penalty statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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attorney fees given absence of prejudice to opposing party resulting from extension of time limit). Nor did the court abuse its discretion by failing to specify its reasons for extending the time for filing the motion. Cf. Nat’l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, ¶ 38, 119 P.3d 477, 485 (App.2005) (trial court does not abuse discretion “by summarily overruling objections to an untimely statement of costs”). ¶ 14 Bingham further argues the trial court committed reversible error in awarding-attorney fees in the quiet title action pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1103 because Cain did not tender five dollars along with a request for the execution of a quit claim deed as required by § 12-1103(B). See Lange v. Lotzer, 151 Ariz. 260, 262, 727 P.2d 38, 40 (App.1986) . We review a fee award under this statute for
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute
B. recognizing that the party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to those fees
C. holding that the absence of a formal injunction does not preclude the plaintiff from recovering costs and attorney fees under mcl 152714
D. holding payment of five dollars to other party prerequisite for recovering attorney fees pursuant to 121103b
E. holding that a violation of 221973 may subject the insurer to penalties in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars whichever is greater attorney fees though are not recoverable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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S.Ct. 1544 — is equally applicable whether the reversal occurs in the defendant’s own appeal or in someone else’s appeal, so long as it occurs before the decision in the defendant’s appeal is rendered. If the appellate court’s opinion determines the law and finds error, the error by definition is plain “at the time of appellate consideration,” id., and clear “under current law.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. (Emphases added.) It would be anomalous and arbitrary to hold otherwise, for as soon as the opinion were to issue, it would be precedent that would establish both “error” and “plainness” in all other pending direct appeals by similarly situated appellants raising the same plain error claim. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) . We conclude that the Crawford error in this
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception
B. holding that all newly declared rules must be applied retroactively to all criminal eases pending on direct review
C. holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final
D. holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past
E. holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review
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Waeranty. The plaintiffs claim against Ser-vinsky for breach of .implied warranty does not survive the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. A claim for breach of implied warranty is not distinct from a claim for breach of contract, because any implied warranties arise out of the contract. See, e.g., Cent. Park Drive, LLC v. Rinker Design Assocs., No. CL-2008-4207, 2008 WL 4376203 (Va.Cir.Ct. Aug. 19, 2008) (“Because RDA’s implied warranty of care arises out of its contract with the Plaintiff, any breach of the implied warranty would also constitute a breach of the contract itself.”). The impediment to the plaintiffs claim for breach of implied warranty is that he cannot establish privity of contract 'with Servinsky. See Gravely v. Providence P’ship, 549 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.1977) . C. Claim foe Breach of Implied Contract. The
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under virginia law an implied warranty claim was not actionable against the plaintiff because there was no privity
B. holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california
C. holding that subse quent purchaser was entitled to protections of express written warranty but could not assert claim for implied warranty because complaint did not allege privity between purchaser plaintiff and defendant honda
D. holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty
E. holding that lower court erred in dismissing express warranty claim but properly granted motion to dismiss implied warranty claims due to lack of privity between the plaintiff an enduser of a pos system and the manufacturer of the system
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absence of an element of fraudulent conduct from the definition of the crime has been sufficient to find that the crime was not one involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S.Ct. 147, 149-50, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960) (breach of peace not a crime involving moral turpitude, because no “fraudulent conduct” was involved). Courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though it has no intent element, because such a crime is “usually classed as rape,” which “manifestly involves moral turpitude.” See, e.g., Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1025 (citing cases so holding). So, too, courts have expressed similar certainty that theft crimes involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Dashto v. INS, 59 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir.1995) ; United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public
B. recognizing prior decision holding that theft has always been held to involve moral turpitude regardless of the sentence imposed or the amount stolen quoting soetarto v ins 516 f2d 778 780 7th cir1975
C. recognizing that a criminal prosecution is not complete until a sentence has been imposed
D. recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard
E. recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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then think that the Mobile Desk may be produced by the same company (or a company affiliated with the company) that makes the Lap .Traveler. To answer this question, it is helpful to review “the basic objectives of trademark law,” which the United States Supreme Court has described as follows: In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item — the item with this mark — is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitat ntertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.1999) . But these courts have all relied on the fact
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there is nothing improper about the use of a trademark to communicate that goods bearing that mark were actually sold on defendants website
B. holding that defendants use of domain names such as peterbilttruckscom and kenworthnewtruckscom violated plaintiffs trademark rights in the marks peterbilt and kenworth
C. holding that the defendants use of the domain name moviebuffcom violated plaintiffs trademark rights in the mark moviebufp
D. holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark
E. holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law
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admissible in evidence”). 29 . Admittedly, this inference is weak in light of the fact that the Mejias have provided no explanation of why Airborne’s Bezmen would vouch for the existence of such a call on behalf of the other defendants. (See, e.g., Luis Mejia Dep. at 351 ("I don’t know what was going on between them and Brenda Tipton. For all I know, they were having an affair. Who, God knows what was going on.”).) Still, the weakness of the inference that there was no call from "Luis” to Airborne is ultimately immaterial, for, as detailed below, a reasonable juror could conclude that probable cause was lacking at the time of the arrest even if there was such a call. 30 . See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 31 . Airborne's characteriza d 397, 405-06 (7th Cir.1993) (pre-Richardson) ; Rodrigues v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 815 (1st
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court
B. holding that a private physician contracting with a county psychiatric hospital was liable as a state actor but was not entitled to qualified immunity
C. holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine
D. holding that private psychiatric facility that had been involved in emergency involuntary detention and treatment of arrestee pursuant to state court order was entitled to assert qualified immunity in light of policy considerations that underlie doctrine
E. holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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test to determine substantial and sustained contacts pursuant to FRE 701). Further, Van Meter’s testimony’s probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect resulting in no violation of FRE 403. See United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 327-28 (9th Cir.1995). Third, the district court did not err in denying appellant’s request to represent himself, finding that such requests were delaying tactics. See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) . Fourth, we reject appellant’s request for a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied
B. holding that a university regulation entitled the substitute motion which denied admission or readmission iranian students to new mexico state university was unconstitutional because the true purpose in enacting the substitute motion was to make a political statement
C. holding that batson challenge raised for the first time after trial was untimely in part because only remedy after trial is vacating the conviction
D. holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement
E. holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(10th Cir.1993)). “[T]he application of an enhancement ... does not implicate the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey.” United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, No. CR 11-2563 JB, 2012 WL 2574810, at *3 (D.N.M. June 26,. 2012) (Browning, J.). • The Tenth Circuit applies Apprendi v. New Jersey’s requirement that a fact be submitted to a jury only where the fact would increase a defendant’s sentence “above the statutory maximum permitted by the statute of conviction.” United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 847 (10th Cir.2005). Accord United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d at 1314. A-defendant may. assert an error under Apprendi v. New Jersey only where the fact at issue increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum. See United States v. O’Flanagan, 339 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003) ; United States v. Hendrickson, 592 Fed.Appx.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding apprendi is not implicated by an application of the sentencing guidelines that increases the sentencing range so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum
B. holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum
C. holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted
D. holding apprendi is not implicated where sentence does not exceed statutory maximum sentence authorized for the offense in its simplest form
E. holding that a defendant could not assert an error under apprendi v new jersey because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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passion of the community.” Id. Most of the newspaper articles about the case did not mention Mills, but rather reported the progress of the search for Les Lawhon. Moreover, the articles that mentioned Mills did so in the context of reporting on an unfolding case. No editorials sounded the call for justice, nor did any county officials make public, blatantly prejudicial comments. See Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1538-40 (finding presumed prejudice partially based on the widespread reporting of the county sheriffs statement that he would like to “pre-cook” the defendants in an oven before they were executed). Finally, the disclosure that Mills was in jail for a parole violation did not suggest that juror prejudice should have been presumed. See Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1543 (11th Cir.) , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that petitioner had failed to establish presumed prejudice despite a substantial number of jurors exposure to newspaper articles disclosing inadmissable evidence
B. holding the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when the petitioner presented a long list of newspaper articles and references to the state department country reports but failed to explain how these developments would affect the petitioner and demonstrate the individualized fear of persecution required for asylum
C. holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim
D. holding that a principal did not impinge students first amendment rights by censoring articles in a high school newspaper
E. holding that prejudice is only presumed if there is proof of an actual conflict of interest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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officer. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir.) ([T]he speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment attaches not when a sealed indictment is filed but when it is unsealed), on reh’g op. replaced, 690 F.2d 15 (1979), modified, en banc, sub nom. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 1522, 67 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); see also United States v. Vaughn, 510 F.Supp. 206, 209 (D.N.J.1981) ("The [speedy trial] statute ... plainly and unambiguously require^] that trial commence within seventy days of the indictment being made public (i.e. unsealed) or the defendant's appearance before a judicial officer of this District, whichever date last occurs") (emphasis in original); cf. United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.1986) . Thus, the current speedy trial figure may be
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statute of limitations does not run on a debtorinpossession
B. holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged
C. holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired
D. holding that a sealed indictment handed down before statute of limitations has run is valid even if it is not unsealed until after the limitations period has expired
E. holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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28 at 9. 12 . 18 U.S.C. § 4013; Doc. 17 at 6. 13 . See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (setting forth offense of "escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (setting forth offense of sexual assault against a person in a "prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency”) (emphasis added). 14 .Doc. 28 at 7-9. 15 . 18 U.S.C. § 4013. 16 . 565 U.S. 118, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012). 17 . Id. at 626. 18 . Id. at 623-26. 19 . Id.; see Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-74, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001); Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir.2005) ; but see DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency
B. holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility
C. holding that because of statutory remedial scheme court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution
D. holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility
E. holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970) (amended 1976). The words “such person” were interpreted to permit the impoundment of an infringing work only when it was possessed by a defendant who had himself infringed the plaintiffs copyright. See Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2nd Cir.1952) (finding impoundment improper when sought against a purchaser of copyrighted material because the “remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only against an infringer” and “one does not infringe a copyright by buying an infringing copy” of a work); Jewelers’ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y.1921) ; Matenciot, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 422
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that acceptance of payments under the louisiana state compensation act does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the longshoremens act
B. holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation
C. holding that the commission could not rely on generic analysis where it expressly found that only a limited segment of the industry was affected by the problem it sought to address while the remedy adopted would necessarily impact other segments
D. holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession
E. holding that impoundment could not interrupt a bailees possession because under the 1909 act the remedy was expressly limited to infringers
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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157 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1354-55 (S.D.Fla.2001). Although the Sinaltrainal court interpreted a claim of failure to exhaust as a chal lenge to subject matter jurisdiction, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1357, other district courts have treated the same claim as non-jurisdictional. See Abiola, 267 F.Supp.2d at 910 (finding that the TVPA “is not a jurisdictional statute, such that failure to comply with its requirements strips the Court of jurisdiction” and that the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement did not apply to claims raised under the ATCA); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1347 n. 30 (N.D.Ga.2002) (noting that the burden is on defendant to raise non-exhaustion and defendant in that case had not met the burden); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., 2002 WL 319887, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.2002) ; Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp. 1189,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court
B. holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted
C. holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint
D. holding that defendant raising exhaustion defense did not meet initial burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs had not exhausted alternative and adequate remedies in nigeria
E. recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CWOF entered for that first offense was vacated and replaced with a conviction as of the date that the admission to sufficient facts and CWOF was entered (May 1, 2000). A CWOF is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. “Failure to comply with the conditions does not require the matter to be relitigated, because the defendant has already admitted to facts sufficient to prove guilt. A guilty verdict enters upon proof of failing to comply with the conditions, and the defendant is sentenced as if a guilty verdict had originally entered.” Commonwealth v. Berrios, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 521, 526 (2013). See also, Paquette v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, Hampden Superior Court (Moriarty, J.), CA No. 10-909 (2011) (found at p. 127 of the Administrative Record) (c)(4)). Finally, Burke’s argument flies in the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime
B. holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes
C. holding that a prior conviction obtained in violation of a defendants constitutional rights cannot be used as the underlying conviction in a prosecution under colorados felon with a gun statute
D. holding that once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it
E. holding that violation of probation imposed on a cwof caused a replacement of the cwof with a conviction that qualified as a prior conviction for purposes of glc 90 24l
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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remand the case and direct the FCC to supplement the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (the court of appeals may “order ... additional evidence ... to be taken by the agency’’ where requested to do so by one of the parties). 3) The court may transfer the case to the district court for a full hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3). 4) The court may appoint a special master pursuant to F.R.A.P. 48 to hold hearings and gather any additional information the court needs to decide the just compensation issue. 5) The court may fashion any other “appropriate modes of procedure” to gather the evidence it needs to conduct its factual inquiry pursuant to its authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C § 1651. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090-91, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) . Depending on the particular facts of a case,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act
B. holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc 1651a
C. recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody
D. recognizing that courts may rely on them authority under the all writs act in issuing orders appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries
E. holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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3583(e)(2).” Id; at 712, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (emphasis added). In short, by thus recognizing the possibility for both extension and revocation, the Supreme Court did not construe the numbered subsections of § 3583(e) as mutually exclusive. Harris characterizes this part of Johnson as dictum and emphasizes that Justices Kennedy and Thomas objected to this language in brief concurrences. See id. at 713-15, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 715, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Thomas, J., concurring). The observation, however, only underscores that a six-justice majority (excluding Justice Scalia, who dissented from this aspect of the decision, see id. at 715-27, 120 S.Ct. 1795 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) deliberately chose to retain it. Thus, even if the statement is fairly charact 2d Cir. 2009) ; see also id. at 624 n.6 (rejecting double
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses
B. holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release
C. holding that even in the absence of a new violation district court may extend supervised release after prior revocation
D. holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release
E. holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release
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in part by the court’s observation that the Legislature had delegated “considerable deference and broad discretion” to the Tennessee DOC, from which it concluded that “[t]his broad grant of discretion also envisions that those persons intimately involved with the intricacies of the prison system and not the voting public are best equipped to establish policies and procedures for inmate discipline.” Mandela, supra, 978 S.W.2d at 534. With due respect to the Tennessee court, that is not the issue. Clearly, control over prison management is vested in DOC, subject to the Secretary’s overall supervision, and not the “voting public” or, indeed, the Judiciary. See State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 134, 297 A.2d 265, 277 (1972); see also Lumumba v. Morton, 280 N.J.Super. 400, 655 A.2d 487 (1995) . The question is simply whether inmate
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety
B. holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms
C. holding that prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the constitution
D. holding that prison rule prohibiting inmates from wearing shirts that could show military rank or group membership was not subject to formal apa rulemaking requirements
E. holding that prison officials failure to accommodate inmates meal requirements during ramadan violated his free exercise rights
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(1979). In Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (1987), reconfirmed, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo.1988), we answered the narrower question of whether res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses can be sustained on a motion to dismiss. We concluded: This court follows the modern trend * * *, that if the information necessary for decision is available to the court by judicial notice, defendant can raise res judicata or collateral estoppel for consideration by a motion to dismiss. Id. at 858. These principles control the disposition of this case. Despite the fact that motions to dismiss are generally not favored, we hold that the district court properly decided that appellant’s petition to disestablish paternity was barre 2 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) ; and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a superior court can adjudicate a child as a child in need of aid based on the acts of just one parent
B. holding that the word tort is not technically construed and hence a fathers breach of the statutory duty to pay child support for his illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of the statute
C. holding that penalizing the illegitimate child for the acts of the parent is an unconstitutional and ineffective deterrent and does not serve any state interest
D. recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party
E. holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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this assertion and appellant has failed to offer other relevant authority concerning his point of error. See Tex.R.App.Proc. 38.1(f)-(h) (formerly Tex.R.App.Proc. 74(f)). MEYERS, Judge, concurring. The majority either assumes the trial court had the foresight to consider factors this Court would, more than two years later, recognize as important in assessing admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment in a capital murder case or undertakes the appropriate consideration of such factors itself in a kind of silent de novo review to which no one is privy. In either case, I decline to join them. At the time of appellant’s trial admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment was, at the very most, questionable. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d at 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). A majority of the Court in Mosley rendered
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing this rule
B. recognizing that in the context of the open fields doctrine ajlthough the decisions in this state may be somewhat more restrictive than those in other states or than federal decisions no compelling reason has been demonstrated in this case for modifying or overruling them
C. recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area
D. recognizing that individualized sentencing has long been a cornerstone to wisconsins criminal justice jurisprudence
E. recognizing our jurisprudence in this area has been somewhat inconsistent and confusing
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spir uestion: whether the Plaintiff-Appellant could argue the (undisputedly) correct legal standard to the jury, when it appeared that the shift would be a matter of law and jury instruction rather than a re-opening of discovery, and when the relevant facts underpinning the correct legal standard were already in the record. It was therefore essential in this case that the court give a specific account of its decisionmaking, and to clearly set forth its account of what harm would result from the shift in the legal standard. This it failed to do. A district court that gives “insufficient reasons” for its equitable decision abuses its discretion. See Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 792-93 (7th Cir.2004) . Equities that may be considered include
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay
B. holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint
C. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice
D. holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party
E. holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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652-53, 75 S.E. 930 (1912); In re Hart, 8 Pa. 32, 37 (1848); Cupp v. Frazier’s Heirs, 239 Ark. 77, 81-83, 387 S.W.2d 328 (1965). 18 Annot., Rights of Inheritance in Ancestral Property as Between Kindred of Whole and Half Blood, 141 A.L.R. 976, 982 (1942). See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and Distribution § 84, at 820; 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 11, at 543; and Comment, Statutory Treatment of Ancestral Estate and the Half Blood in Intestate Succession, 42 Yale L.J. 101, 103 (1932). 19 See, e.g., Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 94, 7 L. Ed. 347 (1829); Dale v. Connolly, 10 N.J. Misc. ); In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 1978); McDonnall v. Drawz, 212 Minn. 283, 3 N.W.2d 419, 141 A.L.R. 970 (1942); In re Estate of Belshaw, 190 Cal. 278, 212 P. 13 (1923). But see Rotenbach v. Young, 119 Misc. 267, 196 N.Y.S.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a portion of a district courts summary judgment order that determines which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not appealable
B. holding that an employer seeking modification must show a change in claimants physical condition
C. holding that halfblood claimants may not inherit
D. holding that it may not
E. holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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An employer, however, is not an insurer of its employees’ safety. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794; Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.1996); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993). Whataburger does not dispute that it owed a duty to Dean, as its employee, but observes that its duty is to protect its employees from foreseeable harms. The issue in this case, whether analyzed' as a part of the duty element of negligence or the causation element, is the foreseeability of the criminal conduct that led to Dean’s murder. As the Texas cases that discuss the foreseeability of intervening criminal conduct do so, in the main, in the context of the element of duty, we do so as well. See, e.g., Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex.1998) ; Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no private right of action exists
B. holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error
C. recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts
D. holding that such a duty exists
E. holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Seligmann, A Diller A Dollar: Section 1983 Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 Ga. L.Rev. 465, 525-26 (2002) ] (noting that measuring available relief at the time when the injury occurred ensures that "the IDEA process is not ... ignored, with the potential consequence of more educational harm being done to the child until no remedy but damages remain”). Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1067. 5 . "Hurting him” here refers to the general emotional trauma the Muskrats reported to the school, not the medical consequences they now attribute to the timeouts. Cf. App. 1063-65 (deposition of Mrs. Muskrat in which she admits the Muskrats never told school officials that timeouts were producing severe stress symptoms in J.M.). 6 . See Doe v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir.2003) ; Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force deadly or not in the course of an arrest investigatory stop or other seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the fourth amendment and its reasonableness standard
B. holding that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force deadly or not in the course of an arrest investigatory stop or other seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the fourth amendment and its reasonableness standard
C. holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment
D. holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment
E. holding that excessive force by a school official should be analyzed under the fourth amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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third issue, which faults trial counsel for failing to ensure a complete record was made of the voir dire. The present record includes only part of the voir dire proceedings, that is, the individual voir dire strikes and final jury selection. During the motion for new trial hearing, counsel said it was his typical practice to have the voir dire recorded and that there was no trial strategy associated with the failure to ensure that a full record was made of voir dire. Mere failure of counsel to request recordation of the voir dire examination is not ineffective assistance of counsel per se. Ybarra v. State, 890 S.W.2d 98, 112 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd); Wills v. State, 867 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); see also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 . “Some injury resulting from the failure to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing reluctance to designate any error as per se ineffective assistance
B. holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis
C. holding that criminal defense counsels failure to file notice of appeal when requested to do so is per se ineffective assistance
D. holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se
E. recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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three-year sentences on the two armed criminal action counts to be served concurrent with each murder sentence, and a ten-year sentence on the robbery count to be served concurrent with the first murder sentence. Id. On April 11, 2001, after serving over seventeen years in prison, Dixon’s convictions for the two counts of murder and two counts of armed criminal action “were set aside by a Jackson County, Missouri, Circuit Judge, on grounds that the Jackson County Prosecutor violated the due process clause which forbids a state from using inconsistent irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against two or more defendants in prosecution for the same offense arising out of the same event.” Presentence Report (PSR) at ¶ 31. See also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000) . The only conviction left intact- was Dixon’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the power to regulate the business of another and especially of a competitor is a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause
B. holding that use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process
C. holding the due process rights of one acquitted by insanity are not violated when he or she is committed on a determination of risk of danger to self or the person or property of others by a preponderance of the evidence
D. holding that circuit rule that prosecutions use of contradictory theories violates due process would fall within teagues watershed exception
E. holding the prosecutor also violated the due process rights of one of dixons accomplices jon smith by using inherently contradictory theories to obtain the convictions of smith and another of dixons accomplices anthony lytle
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Auer, that being whether an employer’s policy of requiring deductions from a salaried employee’s vacation, personal leave or other paid benefits accounts when he or she works less than the required forty hours per week violates the “salary basis” test for exempt executive employees. Again there is a split in the circuits on this issue. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test. Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits the salary basis concept is not violated
B. holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa
C. holding that the payments accrued
D. holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits
E. holding despite not finding undue hardship that it would be equitable to reduce the amount of nondischargeable liability by the amount of the accrued interest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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or whether it indicates that compliance with the request for information might be compelled; (7) whether the officer physically touches the person of the citizen; (8) whether an officer's show of authority or exercise of control over an individual impedes that individual's ability to terminate the encounter; (9) the duration of the encounter; and (10) whether the officer retains the citizen's identification or travel documents. Id. (citing People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73-75 (Colo.1998)). In addition to these factors, we have considered whether, and under what cireum-stances, a police officer's request for a citizen's identification and subsequent check for outstanding warrants transforms a consensual encounter into an investigatory stop. See Martinez, 200 P.3d at 1058-59 ; Padgett, 932 P.2d at 814 (holding that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant was not free to leave when officer directed defendant to stay while he conducted a warrants check
B. holding officers had reasonable suspicion to identify passengers and check for outstanding warrants after traffic stop when the officers previously had been notified that car contained named felony parole violator
C. holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest
D. holding that the defendant had been subjected to an illegal arrest when after detectives requested and did not return his airline ticket and drivers license he was asked to come with the officers from the concourse into an interrogation room approximately 40 feet away where his suitcases were searched
E. holding that the police subjected the defendant to an investigatory stop when they directed the de fendant to come out of the bathroom and into a separate room and then ran a clearance check to determine whether the defendant had any outstanding warrants
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of discussion of discriminatory intent based upon race. The provision of 1968 did more than reflect mere “cosmetic” changes but contained substantially revisions to the 1885 law. The framers and ratifiers of the 1968 Constitution deliberately chose to change the prohibition on voting by felons in order to achieve a different and new result in terms of the persons who would be disqualified. The 1968 Constitution altered Article VI, Section 4, of the 1885 Constitution to categorically disqualify felons not only from voting but also from holding office. Additionally, it changed Article VI, Section 5, of the 1885 Constitution by deleting specific crimes that would have triggered disqualification included some misdemeanors. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267 (1881) . Thus, the legislature in 1986 disqualified a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding without the benefit of argument by the parties that a petty larceny conviction was properly admitted for impeachment purposes
B. holding misdemeanor conviction for petty larceny triggered disenfranchisement
C. holding alabamas disenfranchisement for commission of petty crime or misdemeanor provision unconstitutional
D. holding alabamas petty crime and misdemeanor disenfranchisement provisions unconstitutional under equal protection clause based on evidence of discriminatory intent
E. holding that no person may be imprisoned for any offense whether classified as petty misdemeanor or felony unless he was represented by counsel at his trial
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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respect of NRDC’s challenge to the 2009-10 specifications. The Fifth Amended Complaint challenged specifications for the first time in this case as to the 2009-10 specifications and quotas, rather than in a separate action as NRDC had done before without exception. Indeed, because NRDC did not file a separate action to challenge the 2009-10 specifications, the Fifth Amended Complaint challenged those specifications for the first time ever, in this case or any other. The magistrate judge therefore had not engaged — much less substantially engaged — the 2009-10 specifications in any prior proceeding in this case. At the time WCSPA moved to intervene, this case was not “at issue;” NMFS had not even filed a responsive pleading to the Fifth Amended Complaint. See LULAC, 131 F.3d at 1303 . Thus, this case entered a new stage with the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record
B. holding party may raise jurisdictional issue at any stage of proceedings
C. holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage
D. holding the stage of the proceedings supported a finding of untimeliness of the proposed intervention where the defendant had filed an answer
E. holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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review de novo questions of law, Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.2008). We dismiss in part, deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and we remand. We lack jurisdiction to consider Liang’s contention that his former attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not exhaust this claim before the BIA. See Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2000). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Liang’s inconsistency regarding whether or not he lived in Venezuela for three years before coming to the United States was not a minor discrepancy, see Chebchoub, 257 F.3d at 1043, and he failed to provide corroborating evidence of his identity, see Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090-92 (9th Cir.2000) . We conclude that in his brief to the BIA,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required
B. recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question
C. recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question
D. holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies
E. holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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prescription drug use and Keating’s positive urine test that day. Moreover, once inside 90 Market Street, Lombardo’s flight and Keating’s presence in the upstairs bathroom provided additional justification for the search of the residence. We find the search reasonable. C. The Strip Search of Keating Was Reasonable. We also agree with the District Court that the strip search of Keating was reasonable under the circumstances. The reasonableness of a strip search or visual cavity search is assessed by considering the totality of the circumstances, including “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 620, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed,2d 447 (1979) . We reiterate that Keating, as a parolee, had
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that prison officials may conduct visual body cavity searches in a reasonable manner
B. holding probable cause to be required for strip and visual body cavity searches
C. holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches
D. holding unconstitutional city policy of subjecting all females arrested and detained to strip and visual body cavity searches
E. holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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negligence action is a question of law air traffic control had been notified that a flight was going to involve a group of parachutists jumping at high altitude, the air traffic controller knew or should have known that any mistake pertaining to the plane’s position could be disastrous. Freeman, 509 F.2d at 629. Thus, the court held that the controller owed a duty to the jumpers to exercise due care under Ohio law. Id. FAA air traffic controllers’ duties include giving “all the information and warnings specified in [their] manuals, and in certain situations [they] must give warnings beyond the manuals.” Davis, 824 F.2d at 550. These duties include reporting certain weather conditions, as specified in the ATC manual. See Worthington v. United States, 21 F.3d 399, 406-07 (11th Cir.1994) ; see also Ingham, 373 F.2d at 234 (“The issue
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the failure to maintain the facility in a safe condition or to warn of hazards was an operational failure following the planning decision to operate and maintain the public landing
B. recognizing that when a beneficiary requests information from an erisa fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiarys status and situation the fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstance even if that requires conveying information about which the beneficiary did not specifically inquire
C. recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect
D. holding that faa controllers failure to provide accurate and timely information about foggy weather conditions when an airplane pilot approached the landing strip caused the spatial disorientation of the pilot which was the type of harm the controllers should have expected
E. holding that although the defendantattorney did not disclose to the plaintiff his failure to file a claim in a timely manner the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim began to run when the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendants conduct
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(unpublished) (affirming the district court’s decision that the lawsuit was barred by the AIA, but remanding the case “for the district court to revise the- judgment to clarify that the petition was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). While the minority’s analysis in Hobby Lobby on the jurisdictional nature of the AIA may be compelling, it does not change the fact that this Court is bound by U.S. Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit case law holding the opposite. Therefore, the Court concludes the AIA applies in this case and operates to strip the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s lawsuit. The same conclusion applies with respect to the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). See Wyo. Trucking Ass’n v. Bentsen, 82 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir.1996) . The DJA does not provide this Court with
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision
B. holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the djas federal tax exception over an action seeking a declaration as to the rights of litigating parties with respect to federal taxes
C. holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine
D. holding that where discretionary function exception of 2680a applied district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over cause of action
E. holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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invocation of his right to counsel was certainly unfortunate, it does not merit habe-as relief. I will deny Pursell’s claims under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and deny him a certificate of appealability on these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). (b) Testimony About Pursell’s Prior Criminal Record and Counsel’s Withdrawal of Motion for Mistrial Pursell’s second claim concerning Krahe’s testimony focuses on Krahe’s statement that Pursell had a prior criminal record. When asked by the court for the name of Pursell’s lawyer, Krahe said the following: “He said Gary Skiba. ‘He got me out of jail before.’ ” (Tr. 1/21/82, at 121). Pursell’s counsel objected to this statement and moved for mistrial. He later withdrew that motion when the governmen .Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) . The Commonwealth concedes the inadmissibility
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver
B. holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses
C. holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open
D. holding that petitioners videotaped statement made after he invoked his right to counsel was wrongfully admitted at trial and not harmless error
E. recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(2d Cir.2006) (upholding administrator’s determination that plaintiff was not a participating employee under the plan where “ample evidence” suggested that he had been terminated, though there was “also evidence that [he] was not terminated”), and Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 89-90 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting argument that administrator erred in concluding that the claimant was not disabled based on its weighing of competing medical evaluations), with McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir.2008) (concluding that administrator’s “reliance on one medical report ... to the detriment of a more detailed contrary report without further investigation was unreasonable”), and Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2010) . Put differently, if the administrator has
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family
B. holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds
C. holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds
D. holding that funds reasoning was inappropriately onesided where funds summarily dismissed a report by the claimants vocational expert which was vastly more detailed and particularized than the report on which the funds relied
E. holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 24 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Martinez, 144 F.3d 189, 190 (1st Cir.1998). In this Circuit, the types of evidence relied upon by district courts to determine that a particular substance is crack cocaine under the Guidelines include: (1) a chemist’s testimony that the substance was cocaine base, combined with an investigator’s testimony that the substance was crack, and the defendant’s own admission that he sold “rock,” see Robinson, 144 F.3d at 109; (2) a chemist’s testimony that the substance was cocaine base and that sodium bicarbonate (usually used in processing crack cocaine) was present, together with the testimony of three different law enforcement agents that the substance was crack, see Richardson, 225 F.3d at 50. Accord Martinez, 144 F.3d at 190 id.; see also Charles, 213 F.3d at 24-25
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under 856 where premises contained two white envelopes containing thirtytwo packs of crack cocaine equipment required for the manufacture and packaging of crack cocaine fortyone white envelopes containing particles of crack cocaine and crack cocaine stored in a laundry bag in the bathroom
B. holding that the term cocaine base in 21 usc 841b1 refers to cocaine in its chemically basic form which includes but is not limited to crack cocaine
C. holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack
D. holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional
E. holding distinction between penalties for crimes involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine lacked rational basis and thus violated equal protection clause of state constitution
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in question required no ‘distinctive knowledge’ or ‘specialized skill.’ ” Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876. Ramon-Sepulveda, the sole case on which the government relies, noted that plaintiffs “legal claim against the INS involved established principles of res judicata-principles with which the majority of attorneys are, or should be, familiar. Additionally, there is no shortage of attorneys in Los Angeles qualified to assist aliens in deportation proceedings.” Ramon-Sepulveda, 863 F.2d at 1463. See Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876 (declining to apply an upward adjustment for representation of an alien in connection with the review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding applications for asylum and withholding of removal); Ruedar-Menicucci v. I.N.S., 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir.1997) ; see also Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no specialized skill or distinctive knowledge was needed to represent an alien at asylum and withholding of deportation hearings
B. holding that the standard of care applicable to a reasonable pharmaceutical company marketing product after minimum testing and without a warning does not entail specialized knowledge or skill unique to a scientific discipline and beyond the knowledge and experience of the average jury
C. recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate
D. holding that the clear probability standard applies in withholding of deportation actions
E. holding that to qualify for a special factor increase the attorney must have some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to defraud the banks of the full face amount of the worthless checks.” Id. at 188. The fraudulent check amount that Dul-lum argues should not be included in the total loss for purposes of determining his enhancement was the $10,000 rental check he cashed, which served as the basis for the bank fraud count. He admitted, however, that he intended the money to “help out some of [his] financial burdens,” including a withdrawal of $7,000 to pay back his home equity line and his intention to use the money to cover any outstanding payments on the rental property if necessary. He only repaid to the bank the fraudulent check amount after a Secret Service investigation had begun and his accounts were frozen. Dullum did not pre-vide any evidence to the contrary at sentencing. See id. at 194 ; United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 285
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an intended loss cannot exceed the loss a defendant could have occasioned if his or her fraud had been entirely successful
B. holding that a court should consider pledged collateral when determining the amount of the intended loss
C. holding that a sentencing judge may consider the face value of deposited checks as sufficient evidence that it was the intended loss although it cannot mechanically be assumed and the defendant can then produce evidence of his or her own in an attempt to convince the court that another figure was intended
D. holding that intended loss applies to attempt crimes only and that outofpocket loss is the relevant figure under 2f11 for fully realized crimes
E. holding the defendant responsible for the greater of the actual or intended loss
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and resources it expended in 2013.” Applying the well-known principle of “the time value of money” means that spending money on other priorities in 2013 — and reaping the benefits of those investments between 2013 and 2015 — would financially benefit Kawa even if it eventually expends money in 2015 to comply with the mandate. Construing Kawa’s complaint liberally, I understand Kawa to have easily alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing in its complaint. Of course, my view on the issue of standing has nothing to do with the merits of Kawa’s complaint challenging the employer mandate’s delayed enforcement under the APA. In fact, any discussion of the merits here would be inappropriate. See, e.g., Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 855, 618 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir.2010) . However, I would hold that Kawa has alleged
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district court appropriately dismissed suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the case was moot
B. holding that courts lack jurisdiction to address merits of a claim where party raising the claim is found to lack standing to maintain suit
C. holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims
D. holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal
E. holding after we found standing following a district courts dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the merits will be for the district court to decide on remand
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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for all the world like there’s not much of a future for the Debtors’ case because they can’t even pay their own way, normal on-going operating expenses, to keep their heads above water. They’re falling further in the hole. Given this, I find that the Debtors’ .failure to pay their post-petition income taxes as and when due constitutes cause for the conversion or the dismissal of this case.... (December 14, 1994, Hearing Transcript, pp. 7-8.) On December 20, 1994, the Debtors filed a notice of appeal with the Bankruptcy Court. The appellants/Debtors filed their brief on February 8,1995, and the United States filed its brief on March 10, 1995. This court heard oral arguments on May 25, 1995, and, after considering both the briefs and the arguments advanced by the parties, affirms the , affd, 949 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.). Also,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion
B. holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
C. holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute
D. holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion
E. holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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both the legal issues and the facts involved in this action are extraordinarily complex. Because the court finds that the Tofel Firm is not prepared to continue the Porzio Firm's representation, any counsel replacing the Porzio Firm would face insurmountable obstacles in attempting to prepare for the January 8, 1996 trial of the common law claims in this action. On the one hand, failure by this court to grant such replacement counsel a continuance of that trial would result in prejudice to the Laga Defendants. On the other hand, any further delay of that trial would result in prejudice to the other litigants in this matter. Such prejudice weighs heavily in the court's determination of whether to deny the Porzio Firm's motion. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 V.I. 466, 477 (D.V.I. 1977) ; Jacobs, 236 A.2d at 890 (attorney requesting
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding plaintiff could withdraw admissions despite pending motion by defendants for summary judgment
B. holding that the state had standing to oppose motions to withdraw filed by the public defender
C. holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment
D. holding that it was inappropriate to allow petitioner to withdraw while motions were pending before the court and ready to be argued
E. holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it was received by the government, which filed a response, Rl-330, prior to Garrison’s sentencing and that it was reviewed by the district court because it is referenced in the sentencing transcript, R4-4. Accordingly, we have considered Garrison's sentencing memorandum and the representations therein. We reiterate, however, that it is the responsibility of the parties to see that the appellate record is complete and that documents from which they quote on appeal were docketed in the district court and are part of the record on appeal. 30 . The lack-of-notice cases relied upon by Garrison are inapposite because either the PSR did not indicate the possibility of an upward departure or did not specify the reason for an upward departure. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 131-32, 111 S.Ct. at 2184 ; United States v. Valentine, 21 F.3d 395,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court violated fedrcrimp 32 by departing upward in sentence without notice and the psr identified no grounds for departure
B. holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure
C. holding that uncharged conduct described in psr and which was discussed by the court at sentencing was sufficient to support an upward departure under 5k221
D. holding harmless any error in departing upward under ussg 4a13 where district court alternatively imposed reasonable sentence as an upward variance
E. holding that the requisite notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it was so out of whack, it was repaid in conformance with the business that conducts — I mean, it’s not something you see every day, but it was paid in conformance with the business that conducts a massive fraud and has lots and lots of victims, including Apple Fund. Transcript 2 at 163-165. This court notes that the exception to preference liability applies to payments made by a legitimate business, not payments made by a fraudulent business. The measure of business conduct for purposes of this defense should be limited to the legitimate practices of legitimate businesses. This court declines to apply the Defendants’ reasoning; ordinary businesses do not pay fictitious profits or systematically defraud their customers or their lenders. See, e.g., M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 84 F.3d at 1340 . This court finds that Apple Fund’s collection
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action
B. holding statute of limitations for discriminatory pay practices begins when initial pay decision was made
C. holding state wrongful refusal to pay claim barred by exclusivity and penalty provisions of lhwca and distinguishing martin from cases of ordinary refusals to pay
D. holding that ordinary businesses do not pay fictitious profits
E. holding that the employees of government contractors do not have a cause of action for back pay against employers who violate the davisbacon act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it is executed for the uses and purposes it expresses.” Hawaiian Trust & Inv. Co. v. Barton, 16 Haw. 294, 300 (1904) It has also been held that even without recordation, “ ‘[a] deed apparently valid upon its face carries with it a presumption of validity’” as between the parties to a deed. Chun Chew Pang v. Chun Chew Kee, 49 Haw. 62, 71, 412 P.2d 326, 332 (1966) (quoting McElroy v. Calhoun, 177 Okla. 38, 57 P.2d 827, 828 (1936)). “Even if the deed had no acknowledgment, or its equivalent, at all, it would still be good between the parties. As between the parties acknowledgment of a deed is not necessary.” Meheula v. Pioneer Mill Co., 17 Haw. 56, 58 (1905) (citing Laanui v. Puohu, 2 Haw. 161 (1859)). See also In re Nelson, 26 Haw. 809, 820 (1923); Aiau v. Kupau, 4 Haw. 384, 385 (1881) . Id. at 281-82, 909 P.2d at 609-10 (some
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that agency is bound by its regulations
B. holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error
C. holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner
D. holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city
E. holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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119 S.Ct. 1307). Because Jimarez refused to testify at Defendant Rivas-Macias’ trial, the proceeding at issue here, Defendant cannot establish that Jimarez engaged in a testimonial waiver of the privilege. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. The privilege against self-incrimination protects against a party forcing an individual to adopt, at trial, “his unsworn out-of-court confession.” Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1347; see also United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 45 (2d Cir.1979) (ruling that an individual “had not waived his privilege” by making “previous statements to the FBI and the grand jury” because a “waiver of the privilege in one proceeding does not affect a witness’ rights in another proceeding”); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir.1979) . That is exactly what Defendant Rivas-Macias
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the right to waive a jury trial
B. holding an individuals admission to a government agent prior to trial that he had previously committed perjury did not waive his privilege to invoke the fifth amendment as to that matter at trial
C. holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial because it is settled that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs
D. holding that the perjury by a key government witness irrespective of whether the government knew of the perjury at the time of trial infected the trial proceedings and required reversal
E. holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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punishing those who give false information in order to obtain drivers’ licenses or identification cards from the. office of motor vehicles of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to limit the issuance of such documentation to correspond to the time limits placed by the federal Immigration and Naturalization Service on documentation, and to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime. Congress has exercised its power over immigration in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. (the “INA”). The INA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme which regulates the authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation of aliens. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir.1983) . The INA delegates enforcement duties to the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that this created a cooperative scheme
B. recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public
C. recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration
D. holding that a breach of contract action by the department of health for the commonwealth of puerto rico did not qualify as an exercise of police or regulatory power even if related to the departments general regulatory power
E. holding a pervasive regulatory scheme shows that the legislature intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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venue as to a nonresident co-defendant would vanish and the court would lose personal jurisdiction over the remaining nonresident co-defendant. Ross v. Battle, 117 Ga. 877, 880, 45 S.E. 252, 254 (1903). Defendant argues that the Final Judgment cannot be enforced against him, and that plaintiff should be required to reassert her now eighteen-year-old claim, although defendant argues that the reasserted claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant’s argument is without merit. The defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and venue are waived as a matter of law if not raised “at the earliest opportunity.” See Euler-Siac S.P.A. v. Drama Marble Co., 274 Ga.App. 252, 254-55, 617 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2005); Maalouf v. Knight, 237 Ga.App. 509, 510, 515 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1999) ; McDonough Contractors, Inc. v. Martin &
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead
B. holding that the defense of lack of venue must be made at the earliest opportunity to plead or it is waived
C. holding that defendants waived defense of personal staff exception to title vii by failing to plead same
D. holding that the plaintiff waived an objection to the defendants failure to plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
E. recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is well settled that representations are construed to be fraudulent when made by one who either knows the assurances to be false or else not knowing the verity asserts them to be true.... Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an element of constructive fraud. Lane v. Rachel, 239 Ark. 400, 389 S.W.2d 621, 624 (1965) (emphasis in original); see also South County, Inc. v. First West. Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325, 327 (1994) (describing constructive fraud as the “making of misrepresentations by one who, not knowing whether they are true or not, asserts them to be true without knowledge of their falsity and without moral guilt or evil intent”); Cardiac Thoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. Profit Sharing Trust v. Bond, 310 Ark. 798, 840 S.W.2d 188, 191 (1992) . To establish constructive fraud under
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a cause of action for constructive fraud will lie even when the misrepresentations were made innocently and their false nature is not discovered until well after the representations are made
B. holding that rule does not apply where defendant made false representations
C. holding that defendants false representations that concealed cause of action preclude statute of limitations defense
D. recognizing that where the looting is complete before the mailing is made a claim for mail fraud will not lie
E. holding that the bespeaks caution doctrine does not apply to representations of present facts that were false when made
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(46). The plain language of the statute therefore defines serious bodily injury in terms of bodily injury; though some forms of bodily injury are not “serious bodily injury,” all forms of “serious bodily injury” include bodily injury. Moreover, death is also bodily injury under the plain meaning of the Penal Code because it is an “impairment of physical condition.” See Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(8). In proving appellant caused the complainant’s death, the State necessarily had to prove that appellant caused bodily injury to the complainant. See Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) , overruled on other grounds by Almanza v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress
B. holding that divorced parent could not stack their separate um policies for the wrongful death of their son because the insured referred to in the antistacking statute is the person who suffers bodily injury or bodily injury which results in death
C. holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury
D. holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury
E. holding that death necessarily involves bodily injury as defined in the penal code
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Kraus v. County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1571, 94 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987). If the investigatory stops of motorcyclists continued for an extended period of time, probable cause that the motorcyclists knew about the helmet’s non-compliance could be required. “Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But [Supreme Court] cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1575. See also Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). However, the possibility
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law
B. holding that an unlawful stop may invalidate an ensuing arrest and that without a valid arrest there can be no request to take a breath test which may lead to a lawful suspension
C. holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest
D. holding that an initially lawful terry stop can be converted into a fullfledged arrest for which probable cause is required but noting that there is no bright line rule for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and becomes an arrest
E. holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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appellate precedent.” Id. at 201. Specifically, at the time of the GPS tracking in Fisher, “the Supreme Court had strongly indicated, and the Sixth Circuit and three other circuits had held, that the warrantless use of electronic tracking devices was permissible.” Id. at 203. Also, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “circuits that did not have their own GPS precedent prior to Jones have uniformly concluded that [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Knotts is binding appellate precedent for the purpose of Davis’s good-faith exception, even when police officers’ GPS monitoring lasted for a longer period of time.” United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 518 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing cases); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) . Here, the GPS tracking took place during
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not
B. holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises
C. holding that monitoring of a signal from a beeper was not a search
D. holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search
E. holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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be made as to whether death was a probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 541. In other words, the Court apparently looked beyond the requirements of the underlying offense, ordinary negligence, to determine if the death was “a probable consequence” of this particular defendant’s action. As we note later, this view has been expressed by a few other jurisdictions, and it represents a minority view that has merit— as long as the jury is properly instructed that the probable consequences of the defendant’s actions were obvious. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575, 579 (1987), decided after Jumper, held the contrary view that a showing of criminal negligence is required for vehicular homicide. 11. —The misdemeanor -29 (1992) ; but see United States v. Walker, 380 A.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge
B. holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense
C. holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay
D. holding that the state must prove criminal negligence for its homicide by vehicle statute even though the statute specifically states that any traffic violation is sufficient
E. holding that a careless driving statute could not be used as a predicate for vehicular homicide because careless driving can occur without criminal negligence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Claim Constr. Reply 2. Thus Aspex’s own reasoning acknowledges that, if the magnetic members of claim 18 of the '545 patent are limited to horizontal orientation, as the court held that they are, Aspex IV, 2007 WL 2984673, at *23, the scope of claim 18 of the '545 patent is not the same as that of claim 2 of the '207 patent, because the former’s magnetic members are limited to horizontal orientation while the latter’s do not contain this limitation. Because claim 18 of the '545 reissue patent contains a limitation not present in claim 2 of the original '207 patent — that the magnetic members possess horizontal orientation and thus engage vertically— and this limitation affects the scope of the claims, these two claims are not substantially identical. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1348 ; Bloom Eng’g, 129 F.3d at 1251 (holding that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that original claim was not substantially identical to reissue claim because original claim covered printer that generated any quality of alphanumeric characters while reissue claim covered printer that generated a particular kind of alphanumeric characters type quality alphanumeric characters
B. holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim
C. holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint
D. holding that defendants were not prejudiced by amendments to an employment discrimination claim because the original claim gave notice of the nature of the case
E. holding plaintiffs claim barred because she failed to take the minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim by either requesting a stay pending administrative proceedings or amending her original claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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arguments advanced for the first time on appeal applies to sentencing proceedings.... [If] a party is silent or fails to state the grounds for objections, the objections are waived.” (citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted)); id. (“On this appeal Maurice makes three arguments in support of his objection; .... [Maurice] waived [two of] these arguments by not presenting them at the sentencing hearing and we will only consider them under a plain error standard.”); cf. United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir.2009) (“At trial, Emmanuel made a hearsay objection to the evidence, but did not mention the Confrontation Clause. A hearsay objection to testimony at trial, standing alone, does not preserve a constitutional challenge under the (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) ; cf. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (“In
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under 3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices
B. holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under 3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs
C. holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under 3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
D. holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under 3blla because the defendant recruited and instructed coconspirators
E. holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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assess whether the goals are indeed worth the risks. (Id. at 386). “[T]o be confident in its Solicitor’s advice on matters ‘intimately related’ to Authority policy,” the Court explained, “the Board must have the right to demand that his loyalties lie with it and its agenda.... Given the political ramifications of any attendant legal advice, confidence sometimes may come only with the assurance that the Solicitor shares the same political ideology as the Board.” (Id.), quoting Ness, 660 F.2d at 522). The Court of Appeals concluded: “These situations are exactly the types for which the Supreme Court created the Elrod/Bmnti exception.” {Id.; see also, Battaglia v. Union County Welfare Board, 88 N.J. 48, 438 A.2d 530 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2045, 72 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) The position of assistant county counsel is
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an agencys rulings with respect to whether a party was afforded the process it is due under the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution are subject to de novo review
B. holding that assistant united states attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by the united states attorney
C. holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution
D. holding termination of legal assistant to county welfare board based on political party affiliation was permissible under first amendment to the united states constitution
E. holding that the constitutional rights in a termination proceeding are derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution and not the sixth amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the district court’s judgment as a matter of law for Monroe County on the state law negligence claim. Mississippi waives sovereign immunity for itself and its political subdivisions in § 11-46-5 of the Mississippi Code, but subjects this blanket waiver to numerous exceptions, including those listed in § 11-46-9. In pertinent part, § 11-46-9 provides: (l) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of any detention center, jail, workhouse, pena d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir.1994) . For these reasons, we find that the district
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is inappropriate to reach constitutional issues when a case can be decided on other grounds
B. holding that issues decided by an intervening supreme court case need not be identical to be controlling
C. holding that constitutional issues need not be decided where narrower grounds exist for according relief
D. recognizing in a takings case that issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment
E. holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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have failed to make a showing of exceptional circumstances. Neither the parties nor the issues are identical or substantially similar. The Swiss action identifies Pablo as the lone Defendant; by contrast, Ms. Madanes names ten Defendants in this action. See id. In addition, this action concerns activity that is not part of the Swiss action. Consider, for instance, the allegations concerning $7.5 million worth of fraudulent transfers from the New York Account, which are not part of the Swiss complaint The mere fact that “a number of similar issues need to be resolved” in both actions does not mandate dismissal; indeed, this is so even where “the circumstances out of which the two actions arise are identical.” Eskofot A/S v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 872 F.Supp. 81, 90 (S.D.N.Y.1995) . The Court further notes that any
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where the trial court has recently taken action mandamus relief was not warranted
B. holding that cause of action for malpractice had accrued before underlying actions dismissal
C. holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts
D. holding that although underlying circumstances of two actions were identical dismissal was not warranted where american company was not party to english action and plaintiff has stated claims relating to american antitrust law that would not be resolved in english action
E. holding that the proper ground for dismissal of a 1983 action in which the plaintiff has failed to establish state action is lack of jurisdiction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Admission Agreement would be equally vulnerable. {39} Additionally, we disagree with the district court’s comments in the present case that a written power of attorney or an enumerated list authorizing Ms. Chapman to take each specific step was required to indicate the scope of her agency. Rather, Ms. Barron, as the principal, was in a position to limit her agent’s authority if she so chose. Cf. Comstock, 110 N.M. at 132, 793 P.2d at 262 (stating that “[i]t is always competent for a principal to limit the authority of his agent, and if such limitations have been brought to the attention of the party with whom the agent is dealing, the power to bind the principal is defined thereby”); Morris Oil Co. v. Rainbow Oilfield Trucking, Inc., 106 N.M. 237, 240, 741 P.2d 840, 844 (Ct.App.1987) . Furthermore, the law in New Mexico is that an
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant
B. holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party
C. holding that even in a multiple claimant situation a court can lift the stay and allow state court suits if the claimants enter a stipulation that the court determines will adequately protect the limitation plaintiff under the limitation act including a stipulation that will protect the limitation plaintiff against third party indemnification claims
D. recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation
E. holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The Town then invoked the Williamson County state-litigation requirement and asserted that the Owners’ taking claim was unripe. Although “[r]ipeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate ‘Article III limitations on judicial power,’ as well as ‘prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction,’ ” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1767 n. 2, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57, n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)), the Williamson County state-litigation requirement involves only prudential considerations, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 2610 . Because Williamson County is a prudential
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county
B. holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional
C. holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional
D. holding that williamson county is not jurisdictional
E. recognizing county officers as those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to buck when the first shot was fired, Appellant continued firing his pistol from atop an uncontrolled horse. Indeed, it was under the circumstances just described that Samantha, seated only a few feet from Jonathan and Gabe, was shot. It is therefore easily seen that if the horse had bucked in a slightly different way as Appellant continued to fire his gun, any of the shots could have hit Jonathan or Gabe as surely as the one that hit Samantha. Appellant’s conduct, as indicated by the Commonwealth’s evidence, exhibited an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to Jonathan and Gabe. Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on these two charges. See Port v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327, 334 (Ky.1995) ; Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859, 860-61
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that evidence was sufficient where appellant verbally threatened victim and pointed gun at him and then at a group of people causing everyone to scatter
B. holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun
C. holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where defendant pointed a gun and fired two shots while in a crowded restaurant thereby creating dangerous atmosphere for other diners
D. holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander
E. holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where evidence established that the victim was in a back bedroom behind a closed door and hiding under a bed when three shots were fired in the front living room
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to § 164(a), they must first qualify as real property taxes, which are defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.164r-3(b) (as amended in 1964) as “taxes imposed on interests in real property and levied for the general public welfare. ...” Treas. Reg. § 1.164—3(b); Black v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 108, 113 (U.S.Tax Ct.1973). Thus under Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3(b), deductions pursuant to § 164(a)(1) may only be taken on taxes actually imposed on interests in real property. Furthermore, Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1 (as amended in 1978), which states that generally, “taxes are deductible only by the person upon whom they are imposed,” reinforces the notion that real property taxes must first be imposed before they may be deducted for federal income tax purposes. See Hynes v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1266, 1289 (U.S.Tax Ct.1980) . In order to determine upon whom local
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that 18 percent interest on delinquent real property taxes under florida law is not in nature of penalty
B. holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable
C. holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him
D. holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction
E. holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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providing rights to “persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), only protects persons within the United States’ territorial jurisdiction. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir.1985) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ADEA prior to the 1991 amendments, see ante at 302-303, because “[t]he normal basis of national sovereignty is territorial”). Second, the mere decision by a defendant in the United States to discriminate against employees abroad cannot serve as the basis for a claim pursuant to Section 1981. The statute prohibits acts of discrimination committed against “persons who are within the jurisdiction of United States,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (emphasis added). See Ortiz-Bou, 382 F.Supp.2d at 296-97 ; Theus, 738 F.Supp. at 1253 (“A decision to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that claims against a state under 1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment
B. holding that an atwill employee may sue under 1981 for racially discriminatory termination
C. holding that discriminatory acts that manifested themselves in a foreign country are not covered by section 1981
D. recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
E. holding that a divorce obtained in a foreign country is recognized by comity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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utility which here provides both regulated (interLATA service) and deregulated (PBX and software) services. Sprint’s regulated service is not at issue in this case. Hence, the PUC has no jurisdiction here over the DOC, and its jurisdiction over Sprint is not implicated. A. Jurisdiction Over the DOC We begin by noting that the Safebloek system was provided as a privilege to inmates for the purpose of making personal telephone calls. Powell does not argue, and this court has never held, that inmates have a constitutional right to use the phone for personal and social purposes. Although prisoners do have a right of access to the courts, which can include telephonic access upon occasion, such access is not at issue in this case. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582-85 (10th Cir,1980). The record in this case indicates that a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts
B. recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings
C. holding that reasonable access includes general facility access without notice and patient access with twentyfour hour notice
D. holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to courts and examining the facility as a whole to determine whether such access was sufficient
E. holding that a plaintiff has no absolute unconditional right of access to the courts and no constitutional right of access to prosecute frivolous or malicious actions
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(Golden Pacific). The Federal Circuit held in Golden Pacific that bank seizures do not constitute regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, because investors in banks do not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that regulators will not seize banks that are deemed to be in trouble. Id. at 1074 (“Given the highly regulated nature of the banking industry, ... the [federal regulators’ seizure of the bank] could not possibly have interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation on the part of Golden Pacific.”). The principle that a bank seizure does not provide the basis for a valid takings claim in this court is set forth in numerous eases in this circuit, and remains good law. See, e.g., Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed.Cir.1992) ; Castle v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. 187, 220
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank
B. holding the use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure the alleged unreasonableness of the officers conduct cannot serve as a basis for a 1983 cause of action
C. holding that the seizure and subsequent liquidation of the bank in question cannot constitute a physical fifth amendment taking because neither the bank nor its owner could have developed a historically rooted expectation of compensation for such a seizure
D. recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check
E. holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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cocaine doses. The investigators further searched Defendant’s car and found neither drugs nor paraphernalia. The State’s meager evidence of intent to sell cannot be considered “substantial evidence” supporting the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. See State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 294-95, 235 S.E.2d 265, 268, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977) (A relatively small drug quantity alone, “without some additional evidence, is not sufficient to raise an inference that the [drug] was for the purpose of distribution.”). We therefore reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine. See State v. Simmons, 165 N.C. App. 685, 689, 599 S.E.2d 109, 112 (2004) ; State v. Robinson, 160 N.C. App. 564, 565,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609
B. holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
C. recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell
D. holding that in prosecution for possession of a controlled substance cocaine possession of cutting reagents used to dilute cocaine and heroin was not other crimes evidence because possession of these substances is legal
E. holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the circuit court agreed with Corcoran’s due process argument related to BTO Betham and further concluded that the issue was disposi-tive of the entire proceeding. The circuit court concluded in pertinent part: A driver is entitled to request subpoenas for witnesses identified in the documents pertaining to the license suspension and has the right to present evidence relevant to the issues, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, to impeach any witness, and to rebut the evidence presented against the driver. §§ 822.2615(2) and 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2012); Rules 15A-6.012(1) and 15A-6.013(5), Fla. Admin. Code. Also, in support of his argument, Cor-coran cites cases, Auzenne v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1056a (Fla. 9th Cir.Ct.2010) and Amodeo v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver
B. holding that it was error for the hearing officer to refuse to issue a subpoena for the breath test operator who was a relevant witness as he had contact with the driver at or near the time of arrest
C. holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision
D. holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge
E. holding that a hearing officer may not quash a subpoena for a fact witness pursuant to section 32226152 florida statutes and rule 15a60135 florida administrative code and the defense has the absolute right to subpoena other witnesses to testify as to whether or not the defendant exhibited any signs of impairment at or near the time of arrest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(Jan. 9, 1985), 1st Dist. No. C-840263. 59 . State v. Key (Feb. 2, 1994), 1st Dist. Nos. C-930205 and C-930206, 1994 WL 25313. 60 . See, e.g., State v. Ford, 9th Dist. No. 24286, 2009-Ohio-3864, 2009 WL 2383002 (unauthorized suspended sentence); State v. Kendrick, 180 Ohio App.3d 662, 2009-Ohio-380, 906 N.E.2d 1174 (unauthorized lifetime suspension of hunting and fishing license); State v. Lisboa, 8th Dist. No. 89283, 2008-Ohio-571, 2008 WL 384141 (unauthorized term of community control); State v. Ehlert, 11th Dist. No. 2007-P-0032, 2008-Ohio-529, 2008 WL 351661 (unauthorized sanctions for minor misdemeanor). 61 . (Citation omitted.) State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 20; accord State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422 . 62 . State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence
B. holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide
C. holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants motion to withdraw guilty plea filed beyond term of court in which defendant was sentenced
D. holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty or nocontest plea is a presenlence motion if the sentence was void for lack of postreleasecontrol notification
E. holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of this Policy.” (Ad min. Record at 29; see also id. at 31.) Next, the Policy elsewhere states that the proof of loss submitted in support of a claim for benefits “must be satisfactory” to Defendant. (Id. at 16.) As Defendant observes, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that plan language of this sort confers sufficient discretionary authority to warrant judicial review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See Frazier v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 725 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.2013) (“This Court has found ‘satisfactory proof,’ and similar phrases, sufficiently clear to grant discretion to administrators and fiduciaries.”); Calvert v. Firstar Finance, Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir.2005) . In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan
B. holding that plan language granting the plan administrator the sole discretion to construe the terms of a long term disability policy and to determine eligibility under the policy triggered arbitrary and capricious review
C. holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions
D. holding that plan fiduciary is entitled to deferential review if empowered by the plan to construe its terms in order to determine benefit eligibility
E. holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of this statute was to require the federal courts to fashion a uniform body of federal law for the enforcement of national labor laws. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-06, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576-78, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). 3 . See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 1288 (West 1982). This statute of limitations is not applicable except to the extent that it may be applicable in state court to other than section 301 claims. See Del Costello v. Teamsters Union,-U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) . 4 . The second cause of action for
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs title vii claims were not preempted by section 301 despite collective bargaining agreement and stating that the purposes of 301 are not subverted when a federal court hears a claim brought under a federal statute
B. holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union
C. holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
D. holding that 301 preempts state claims against nonsignatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution
E. holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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existence of state created liberty interests compare such evidence on summary judgment or at trial, rather than at the, pleading stage, as in the instant case. See Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418; Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174; Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935; Bass, 170 F.3d 1312; Rodgers, 142 F.3d 1252; Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam). In contrast, in close cases courts are less willing to dismiss claims for failure to allege a state-created liberty interest at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. See Spaulding, 551 Fed.Appx. 984; Wallace, 229 Fed.Appx. at 830; Magluta, 375 F.3d at 1282-83; but see Morales v. Chertoff, 212 Fed.Appx. 888, 889-90 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) ; Smith v. Regional Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that early release statutes can create a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees
B. recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection
C. holding that neither the due process clause nor florida statutes bestowed a liberty interest in prisoners position as a law clerk
D. holding that prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and identifying procedures which comported with due process
E. holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to proceed. On these facts, we hold, first, that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for a second evaluation. A defendant is not automatically entitled to a second evaluation simply because, after the first evaluation, he raises the defense of mental defect or mental incapacity or contests the first evaluation. Whether a second mental evaluation is necessary is within the trial court’s discretion to determine. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001); Dirickson v. State, 329 Ark. 572, 953 S.W.2d 55 (1997). Moreover, it is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to deny a second examination to a defendant who fails to act diligently to secure the necessary information on which to establish the defense of mental disease or defect. Dirickson, supra . Appellant here did not act with diligence to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding claim of deprivation of right to competent mental health evaluation was procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal
B. holding that a defendant who did not raise the issue of incompetency at the first opportunity and who waited over one month after receiving notice of the mental evaluation to request supporting documents was not entitled to a second mental evaluation
C. holding that the failure to appoint the department of health and rehabilitative services diagnosis and evaluation team to perform the mental evaluation pursuant to section 91611ld florida statutes 1997 was harmless if the defendant re ceived a constitutionally adequate hearing regarding his competency
D. holding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the issue of the defendants mental health at trial
E. holding that because claimants mental impairnlent might have manifested itself before she was no longer insured the alj should have included the mental impairment in his evaluation of disability
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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“[a] person may not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has ... filed a workers’ compensation claim in good faith.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001(1). Several Texas courts have held that, where employees both suffered an actual injury and reported the injury to the employer, this is sufficient to invoke the statutory protection against retaliatory discharge. See Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 596, 603 (S.D.Tex.1996) (noting before company terminated employee, employee sustained an on-the-job back injury for which company sent him to doctor and chiropractor and company filed its first report of injury regarding incident); Duhon v. Bone & Joint Physical Therapy Clinics, 947 S.W.2d 316, 317-18 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ) ; Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under 523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury
B. holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness
C. holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination
D. holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under 510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination
E. holding employee invoked protection of statute when she sustained an onthejob injury and reported it to her employer the next day
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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withdraw guilty pleas. See Rules 4.1-4.4 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 19 . King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 532 (Okla.Crim.App.1976) ("We have, in the past, repeatedly emphasized the serious remifications [sic] of an accused’s plea of guilty and the necessity of an adequate record reflecting compliance with procedures articulated by this Court to insure an accused’s plea of guilty is voluntarily and intelligently entered as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 20 . Although Crofford filed his petition pro se, yet another new attorney (his fourth by our calculation) entered his appearance and filed a brief in support of Crofford’s original § 2254 petition. 21 . Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) . 22 . In addition, Crofford contends the first
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea
B. holding defendant must have a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences
C. holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea
D. holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial
E. holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Miranda warnings was coercive. Notably, Sturdivant does not claim that the officers failed to advise him of the Miranda warnings before any of the interviews, nor does he claim that he did not understand his rights or that his waivers were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Rather, he takes issue with the fact that Sandoval gave him his Miranda warnings orally during the unrecorded interviews, using a written Miranda waiver only after he confessed. Sturdivant does not direct our attention to any case law, from this court or any other court, in support of his position. At any rate, the absence of a written Miranda waiver did not render Sturdi-vant’s oral waivers or subsequent confessions involuntary products of coercion. See United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2007) . Sturdivant next claims that Sandoval promised
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary
B. holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary
C. holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later
D. holding that comment by officer that case was not deatheligible did not render confession involuntary because comment did not cause defendant to confess
E. holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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98 & n.17, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2959 & n. 17, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-44, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, grants a private right of action to, inter alia, a person “injured in his business or property” by a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) ; Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible
B. holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests
C. holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property
D. holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not arise from the purchase or sale of limited partnership interests where the wrongful conduct occurred after the sale of those interests
E. holding that restrictive covenants disallowing commercial or industrial ventures or business of any type from being maintained on any lot in the subdivision were not ambiguous and that according to their plain meaning clearly allow the rental of residential property whether shortterm or longterm because the use does not violate the prohibition on commercial and business activity as such terms are commonly understood
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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had been repealed for aliens placed in removal proceedings on or after April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA § 309(c)(1). At the hearing, the IJ informed Walker and the Huieoeheas that in light of the statutory amendments, the only relief even potentially available to them was a discretionary procedure known as “cancellation of removal.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). An alien must demonstrate ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States prior to applying for this new form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A). Furthermore, according to the “stop-time rule,” an alien’s continual presence in the United States is deemed to end once the INS begins removal proceedings by serving a Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) . Unaware of Huicochea-Gomez’s eleven-month
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that neither aedpa nor iirira expressly repeals the availability of habeas review of deportation or removal orders
B. holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation
C. holding that the new stoptime rule applies to all aliens applying for either suspension of deportation under the old law or cancellation of removal under the iirira amendments
D. holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review aliens eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal
E. holding that the procedural aspects of iirira 309c apply only to ongoing exclusion or deportation proceedings and are irrelevant in cases involving aliens whose orders of deportation or exclusion were final on the effective date
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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without implicating the First Amendment, even if newspapers themselves were not banned. First Amendment Reply at 4. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered because the statute bans the sale of something that at some level contains protected expression. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (invalidating tax on magazines, with exceptions b L.Ed.2d 118 (2000). While there is some disagreement over whether object code, as opposed to source code, is deserving of First Amendment protection, the better reasoned approach is that it is protected. Object code is merely one additional translation of speech into a new, and different, language. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445-49 (2d Cir.2001) ; Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d at 326-27; Bernstein
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech
B. holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech
C. holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association
D. recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue
E. recognizing that code is speech
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in two stages. “First, we determine whether the statements were improper.” Boyd, 640 F.3d at 669. Second, we determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks were “flagrant.” Id. Poandl contends that the prosecutor made two types of improper arguments. First, Poandl argues that the government made inflammatory appeals to sympathy for David Harper and played on jurors’ fears that Poandl would hurt other children. Appellant Br. at 52. Second, Poandl argues that the government minimized the burden of proof. Id. at 58-62. I agree with my colleagues that the second category of comments was not improper or flagrant. I. IMPROPRIETY A. Inflaming the Passions and Prejudices of Jurors It is well established that prosecutors “must obey the cardinal rule that a prosecutor cannot m th Cir.1977) . And it is improper for the government to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is not vouching for prosecutor to say that jury should come to believe on the evidence that the events occurred the way the governments witnesses said they did
B. holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant
C. holding that comments that if jurors acquit then they are accomplices to future murders were improper
D. holding that comments that implied that the drug trade would continue if the jury did not convict the defendant were improper
E. holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to tell the jury that if they acquit the defendant of bank robbery that is like opening all the banks and saying come on and get the money boys because well never be able to convict them
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the [plaintiffs] allege Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. ... If they are not, and if the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the [plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson’s qualified immunity. 483 U.S. at 641, 646-47, n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, 3042, n. 6. See also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 n. 11 (3d Cir.1992) ; Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 929
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the availability of summary judgment based on absolute prosecutorial immunity
B. holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity
C. holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to civil forfeiture proceedings
D. holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity
E. holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under 1983
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to strike are pending. In such circumstances, the trial court is given the limited jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion in order to decide if it should award attorney fees and costs to the defendants.”). The reasoning for this retention of limited jurisdiction makes intuitive sense.’As the court in Col-train v. Shewalter explained, a voluntary dismissal should not automatically preclude an award of attorneys’ fees to a defendant because [ojtherwise, SLAPP plaintiffs could achieve most of their objective with little risk — by filing a SLAPP suit, forcing the defendant to incur the effort and expense of preparing a special motion to strike, then dismissing the action without prejudice. The specter of the action being refiled (at ptr.2d 807 (1999), as modified (Feb. 5, 1999) ; eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient
B. holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion
C. holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate
D. holding that a defendant who is voluntarily dismissed with or without prejudice after filing a section 42516 motion to strike is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the defendants motion for attorneys fees and costs under subdivision c of that section
E. holding that because the finality of judgment is effectively postponed by the timely filing of a motion under rule 59 the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys fees is tolled until the postjudgment motion is resolved
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the magistrate judge’s finding. Instead, the Millers argue that they are entitled to a less stringent standard because they are not attacking the validity of the foreclosure sale but, rather, are seeking only compensatory damages arising from the sale. The Millers are correct that the above three-part standard — in particular the requirement to show a grossly inadequate selling price — does not apply to all wrongful foreclosure claims* under Texas law. However, the cases on which the Millers rely establish only a particularized exception whereby the plaintiff-mortgagor may avoid showing a grossly inadequate selling price if he or she alleges that the defendant-mortgagee (lender) deliberately “chilled” the bidding at the foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Charter Nat’l Bank, 781 S.W.2d at 371 . The cases do not stand for the Millers’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a mortgagor is not required to prove a grossly inadequate selling price in a situation where the bidding at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was deliberately chilled by the affirmative acts of a mortgagee and the injured mortgagor seeks a recovery of damages rather than a setting aside of the sale itself emphasis omitted
B. holding that a nonstatutory postponement does not constitute an irregularity in the foreclosure proceeding itself that could justify setting aside a foreclosure sale
C. holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default
D. holding that an insurers defenses against the mortgagor could not be asserted against the mortgagee
E. holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the bankruptcy act even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |