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gao_GAO-08-294

gao_GAO-08-294_0

On the 11 weapon systems GAO reviewed, these problems have resulted in billions of dollars in cost overruns, years of schedule delays, and reduced weapon system availability. Prime contractors’ poor systems engineering practices related to requirements analysis, design, and testing were key contributors to these quality problems. Quality problems occurred despite the fact that each of the prime contractors for these programs is certified to commercial quality standards and most provided us with quality plans that address systems engineering activities such as design, as well as manufacturing, and supplier quality. The contractor also experienced major problems with the aircraft canopy. This problem was discovered in March 2000 and temporarily grounded the flight test aircraft. Two examples are the Wideband Global SATCOM and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 programs. Cummins officials noted that these activities allow them to catch problems earlier in development, when problems are less costly to fix. Leading commercial companies we met with set high expectations for supplier quality. Boeing Commercial Airplanes categorizes its suppliers by rates of defective parts per million. Officials with Space Systems/Loral discussed how they adopted a more disciplined product development process following quality problems in the 1990s with some of its satellites. During systems development, DOD usually pays for a contractor’s best efforts, which can include efforts to achieve overly optimistic requirements. This environment provides little incentive for contractors to utilize the best systems engineering, manufacturing, and supplier quality practices discussed earlier in this report to ensure manageable requirements, stable designs, and controlled manufacturing processes to hold costs down. For example, DOD as the customer for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle signed a cost reimbursement contract with the prime contractor, General Dynamics, to develop a new weapon system that would meet performance and reliability requirements that had not yet been adequately informed by systems engineering analysis. The F-22A program illustrates this point. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure that the department is taking steps to improve the quality of weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions related to recent initiatives highlighted in DOD’s Defense Acquisition Transformation and Program Manager Empowerment and Accountability reports to Congress to improve its focus on setting achievable requirements and oversight: As a part of the concept decision review initiative, have contractors perform more detailed systems engineering analysis to develop sound requirements before DOD selects a prime contractor for the systems development contract, which would help ensure that weapon system requirements, including those for reliability, are achievable with given resources. Specifically, we (1) determined the impact of quality problems on selected DOD weapon systems and defense contractors’ practices that contributed to the problems, (2) identified practices used by leading commercial companies that can be used to improve the quality of DOD weapon systems, (3) identified problems DOD faces in terms of improving quality, and (4) identified recent DOD initiatives that could improve quality. To determine the impact of quality problems on selected DOD weapon systems and defense contractors’ practices that contribute to the problems, we selected and reviewed 11 DOD weapon systems with known deficiencies from each of the military services and identified the quality problems associated with each deficiency. To identify practices used by leading commercial companies that can be used to improve the quality of DOD weapon systems, we selected and visited five companies based on several criteria: companies that make products similar to DOD weapon systems in terms of complexity; companies that have been recognized in quality management literature or by quality-related associations/research centers for their high-quality products; companies that have won quality-related awards; and/or companies that have close relationships with customers when developing and producing products. To identify recent DOD initiatives that could improve weapon system quality, we reviewed DOD’s formal response to Sections 804 and 853 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Most of the programs had problems in more than one of these categories. DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change.

Why GAO Did This Study A Senate report related to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 asked GAO to compare quality management practices used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and its contractors to those used by leading commercial companies and make suggestions for improvement. To do this, GAO (1) determined the impact of quality problems on selected weapon systems and prime contractor practices that contributed to the problems; (2) identified commercial practices that can be used to improve DOD weapon systems; (3) identified problems that DOD must overcome; and (4) identified recent DOD initiatives that could improve quality. GAO examined 11 DOD weapon systems with known quality problems and met with quality officials from DOD, defense prime contractors, and five leading commercial companies that produce complex products and/or are recognized for quality products. What GAO Found Problems related to quality have resulted in major impacts to the 11 DOD weapon systems GAO reviewed--billions in cost overruns, years-long delays, and decreased capabilities for the warfighter. For example, quality problems with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program were so significant that DOD extended development 4 years at a cost of $750 million. The F-22A fighter aircraft experienced cracks in the plane's canopy that grounded the flight test aircraft, and initial operating capability for the Wideband Global SATCOM satellite was delayed 18 months because a supplier installed some fasteners incorrectly. GAO's analysis of 11 DOD weapon systems illustrates that defense contractors' poor practices for systems engineering activities as well as manufacturing and supplier quality problems contributed to these outcomes. Reliance on immature designs, inadequate testing, defective parts, and inadequate manufacturing controls are some of the quality problems that GAO found. Senior prime contractor officials GAO met with generally agreed with GAO's assessment of the causes of the quality problems. In contrast, leading commercial companies GAO contacted use more disciplined systems engineering, manufacturing, and supplier quality practices. For example, rather than wait to discover defects after the fact, Boeing Commercial Airplanes tries to design parts that can be assembled only one way. Effective use of many systems engineering practices has helped Space Systems/Loral, a satellite producer, improve overall quality, for example, by allowing the company to operate its satellites for more than 80 million consecutive hours in orbit with just one failure. Companies also put significant effort into validating product design and production processes to catch problems early on, when problems are less costly to fix. They conduct regular audits of their suppliers and hold them accountable for quality problems. DOD faces its own set of challenges--setting achievable requirements for systems development and providing effective oversight during the development process. In conducting systems development, DOD generally pays the allowable costs incurred for the contractor's best efforts. These conditions contribute to an acquisition environment that is not conducive for incentivizing contractors to build high-quality weapon systems and DOD, which typically uses cost-reimbursement contracts to develop weapon systems, assumes most of the risks and pays contractors to fix most of the problems. DOD has taken steps to improve its acquisition practices by experimenting with a new concept decision review practice, selecting different acquisition approaches according to expected fielding times, and establishing panels to review weapon system configuration changes that could adversely affect program cost and schedule. None of these initiatives focus exclusively on quality issues, and none specifically address problems with defense contractors' practices.

gao_GAO-13-43

gao_GAO-13-43_0

As shown in figure 3, the number of complaints submitted through these mechanisms fluctuated somewhat from October 2009 through June 2012. The volume of complaints that TSA received through each of its five main mechanisms varied from October 2009 through June 2012. However, TSA does not have a policy requiring that customer service representatives track these comment card submissions or report them to one of TSA’s five centralized mechanisms for receiving complaints if the card includes a complaint. According to TSA, the purpose of this scorecard is for FSD management and staff to monitor operational effectiveness of airport security checkpoints and make changes as needed, such as to improve screening operations and customer service. Moreover, a process to systematically collect information on air passenger complaints from all mechanisms, including standardization of the categories of air passenger complaints to provide a basis for comparison, would give TSA a more comprehensive picture of the volume, nature, and extent of air passenger screening complaints and better enable the agency to improve screening operations and customer service. TSA Has Several Methods to Inform Air Passengers about Making Screening Complaints, but Does Not Consistently Implement Them TSA has several methods to inform air passengers about its processes for making screening complaints; however, as with receipt and use of screening complaint data, it does not have an agencywide policy, guidance, and a focal point to guide these efforts, or mechanisms to share information on guidance and best practices among TSA airport staff to ensure consistency in making air passengers aware of TSA processes for submitting complaints about the screening process. TSA has developed standard signs, stickers, and customer comment cards that can be used at airport checkpoints to inform air passengers about how to submit feedback to the agency; however, in the absence of agencywide policy and guidance to inform air passengers, FSDs have discretion in how and whether to use these methods. Also, as previously discussed, at two of six airports we contacted, customer comment cards were displayed at the checkpoint, while at two other airports customer comment cards were provided only to air passengers who specifically ask for the cards or TSA contact information or who request to speak with a screening supervisor or manager, according to TSA airport officials. The Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, directed TSA to make every effort to ensure members of the traveling public are aware of the procedures and process for making complaints about passenger screening. TSA officials at four of the six airports we contacted also said that the agency could do more to share best practices among customer service representatives for addressing passenger complaints, including for informing air passengers about complaint processes. An agencywide policy to inform the public about the processes for making complaints, a focal point for developing this policy and guiding TSA’s efforts to implement it, and mechanisms for sharing best practices among local TSA officials could help provide TSA reasonable assurance that these activities are being conducted in a consistent manner across commercial airports and help local TSA officials better inform the public by learning from one another about what practices work well. TSA’s Complaint Resolution Processes Lack Independence, but TSA Is Taking Steps to Increase Independence TSA’s complaint resolution processes do not fully conform to standards of independence established to help ensure that these types of processes are fair, impartial, and credible. Specifically, at the airport level, TSA officials who are responsible for resolving air passenger complaints (referred to in this report as complaint investigators) are not independent of the TSA airport staff who are the subjects of the complaints. However, recognizing the importance of independence in the complaint processes, TSA is developing a new process for referring air passenger complaints directly to this office from airports and for providing air passengers an independent avenue to make complaints about airport checkpoint screening. Because this program has not yet been approved by the TSA Administrator or implemented, it is too early to assess the extent to which passenger advocates will help mitigate possible concerns about impartiality and objectivity in the complaint processes. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve TSA’s oversight of air passenger screening complaint processes, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA take the following four actions, consistent with standards for internal control, to establish a consistent policy to guide agencywide efforts for receiving, tracking, and reporting air passenger screening complaints; establish a process to systematically compile and analyze information on air passenger screening complaints from all complaint mechanisms; designate a focal point to develop and coordinate agencywide policy on screening complaint processes, guide the analysis and use of the agency’s screening complaint data, and inform the public about the nature and extent of screening complaints; and establish agencywide policy to guide TSA’s efforts to inform air passengers about the screening complaint processes and establish mechanisms, particularly at the airport level, to share information on best practices for informing air passengers about the screening complaint processes.

Why GAO Did This Study TSA, which screens or oversees the screening of over 650 million air passengers per year, has processes for addressing complaints about air passengers’ screening experience at checkpoints, but concerns have been raised about these processes. The Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, directed TSA to ensure the traveling public is aware of these processes and GAO to review TSA’s policies and procedures for resolving passenger complaints. This report addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) policies and processes to guide the receipt of air passenger screening complaints and use of this information to monitor or enhance screening operations, (2) a consistent process for informing passengers about how to make complaints, and (3) complaint resolution processes that conform to independence standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed TSA documentation, analyzed complaint data from October 2009 through June 2012, and interviewed TSA officials from headquarters offices and six airports selected for type of security, among other things. The airport interviews are not generalizable but provide insights. What GAO Found The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) receives thousands of air passenger screening complaints through five mechanisms, but does not have an agencywide policy or consistent processes to guide receipt and use of such information. For example, from October 2009 through June 2012, TSA received more than 39,000 screening complaints through its TSA Contact Center (TCC). However, the data from the five mechanisms do not reflect the full nature and extent of complaints because local TSA staff have discretion in implementing TSA's complaint processes, including how they receive and document complaints. For example, comment cards are used at four of the six airports GAO contacted, but TSA does not have a policy requiring that complaints submitted using the cards be tracked or reported centrally. A consistent policy to guide all TSA efforts to receive and document complaints would improve TSA's oversight of these activities and help ensure consistent implementation. TSA also uses TCC data to inform the public about air passenger screening complaints, monitor operational effectiveness of airport security checkpoints, and make changes as needed. However, TSA does not use data from its other four mechanisms, in part because the complaint categories differ, making data consolidation difficult. A process to systematically collect information from all mechanisms, including standard complaint categories, would better enable TSA to improve operations and customer service. TSA has several methods to inform passengers about its complaint processes, but does not have an agencywide policy or mechanism to ensure consistent use of these methods among commercial airports. For example, TSA has developed standard signs, stickers, and customer comment cards that can be used at airport checkpoints to inform passengers about how to submit feedback to TSA; however, GAO found inconsistent use at the six airports it contacted. For example, two airports displayed customer comment cards at the checkpoint, while at two others the cards were provided upon request. Passengers may be reluctant to ask for such cards, however, according to TSA. TSA officials at four of the six airports also said that the agency could do more to share best practices for informing passengers about complaint processes. Policies for informing the public about complaint processes and mechanisms for sharing best practices among local TSA officials could help provide TSA reasonable assurance that these activities are being conducted consistently and help local TSA officials learn from one another about what practices work well. TSA's complaint resolution processes do not fully conform to standards of independence to ensure that these processes are fair, impartial, and credible, but the agency is taking steps to improve independence. Specifically, TSA airport officials responsible for resolving air passenger complaints are generally in the same chain of command as TSA airport staff who are the subjects of the complaints. TSA is developing a new process that could help ensure greater independence by TSA units referring air passenger complaints directly to its Ombudsman Division and by providing passengers an independent avenue to make complaints to that division. TSA also plans to initiate a program by January 2013 in which selected TSA airport staff are to be trained as passenger advocates as a collateral duty. It is too early to assess the extent to which these initiatives will help mitigate possible concerns about independence. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that TSA, among other actions, establish (1) a consistent policy for receiving complaints, (2) a process to systematically analyze information on complaints from all mechanisms, and (3) a policy for informing passengers about the screening complaint processes and mechanisms to share best practices among airports. TSA concurred and is taking actions in response.

gao_GAO-03-39

gao_GAO-03-39_0

Small Proportion of Taxpayers Use Business Tax Credits In 1999, a small proportion of corporate taxpayers or individual taxpayers with a business affiliation reported the work opportunity credit and the disabled access credit on their tax returns. Whereas taxpayers in the retail and service industries accounted for most of the dollar amount of work opportunity credits, those providing health care and other social assistance services accounted for most of the dollar amount of the disabled access credits. The two studies we identified showed that some employers participating in the program modified their recruitment, hiring, and training practices to increase their hiring and retention of disadvantaged workers. Studies of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, the precursor to WOTC, showed that it increased hiring and earnings of the eligible workers; however, it also provided credits to employers for hiring workers who would have been hired in the absence of these incentives.These studies indicate that from 50 to 92 percent of the credits claimed were for workers employers would have hired anyway. For example, the WOTC studies are limited in that they did not measure (1) the extent to which employers would have made these hires in the absence of the incentive; (2) the effect of the incentive on the retention and salaries of WOTC hires compared to similar employees who were not certified for the program; or (3) the effect of the incentive on SSI recipients and vocational rehabilitation referrals, who are represented in two eligibility categories for the work opportunity credit. Existing data limitations preclude a conclusive determination of how effective the three tax incentives are in increasing the employment of workers with disabilities. Options May Increase Tax Incentives’ Usage and Cost, but Their Impact on Workers with Disabilities Is Uncertain Business representatives and experts on disability issues and tax incentives suggested options for increasing the usage and effect of existing employer tax incentives. To further increase the use and effect of the incentives, they also suggested increasing the dollar value of the incentives and expanding the types of workers, businesses, and accommodations that qualify a business to receive the credits or deduction. Finally, increasing outreach, eligibility, or the maximum dollar amount allowed to be claimed for the incentives may increase their usage; however, it is not known whether the costs of such changes would be offset by improvements in the employment and accommodation of workers with disabilities. They generally concurred with our findings. Other recent legislation, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement (TWWIIA) Act of 1999 created four new federal programs for persons with disabilities, as well as incentives to encourage persons with disabilities to work.

Why GAO Did This Study More than 17 million working-age individuals have a self-reported disability that limits work. Their unemployment rate is also twice as high as for those without a work disability, according to recent Census data. In the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, the Congress mandated that GAO study and report on existing tax incentives to encourage businesses to employ and accommodate workers with disabilities. This report provides information on (1) the current usage of the tax incentives, (2) the incentives' ability to encourage the hiring and retention of workers with disabilities, and (3) options to enhance awareness and usage of the incentives. What GAO Found A very small proportion of corporate and individual taxpayers with a business affiliation use the two tax credits that are available to encourage the hiring, retention, and accommodation of workers with disabilities, according to IRS data. Taxpayers in the retail and service industries accounted for the largest share of the work opportunity credits reported in 1999, while providers of health care and social assistance services accounted for the largest share of the disabled access credits. Information on the effectiveness of the incentives is limited and inconclusive. Only the work opportunity credit has been studied and these studies, along with those of a prior hiring credit, showed that some employers revised their recruitment, hiring, and training practices to increase the number of disadvantaged workers hired and retained, but that credits have also have been claimed by employers for workers they would have hired anyway. However, these studies have not focused on workers with disabilities and data limitations preclude conclusively determining their effectiveness for these workers. To increase the awareness and usage of the tax incentives, business representatives and experts on disability issues and tax incentives suggested (1) improving government outreach and education efforts; (2) increasing the maximum dollar amount of the incentives; and (3) expanding the types of workers, businesses, and accommodations that are eligible for the incentives. While these options may increase incentive usage, it is uncertain whether the potential loss in tax revenues would be offset by improvements in the employment of workers with disabilities. Commenting agencies generally concurred with GAO's findings.

gao_GAO-14-60

gao_GAO-14-60_0

Background In May 2010, the DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide a standard methodology for DOD components to follow in developing an audit strategy and implementing FIPs. The Army Did Not Fully Follow FIAR Guidance in Determining the Scope of Its General Fund Budget Execution Audit Readiness Efforts To help prioritize and guide its efforts, the Army developed its FIP for budget execution emphasizing the implementation of effective GFEBS processes for achieving SBR audit readiness. For example, the Army’s analysis identifying Army and service provider business processes and systems supporting its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution was incomplete. Risks associated with these scope limitations, if not properly addressed, could adversely affect the Army’s ability to achieve audit readiness goals as highlighted below. Legacy systems. However, we found that it did not always follow the FIAR Guidance in performing tasks required for these phases. For example, we found that the Army’s documentation and assessment of internal controls were not always complete or accurate and that extensive deficiencies had not been remediated prior to an IPA firm’s examination of its audit readiness efforts. Overall, the gaps and deficiencies we identified throughout the various phases of the Army’s efforts to develop and implement its FIP for budget execution were largely due to its focus on (1) an approach that emphasizes establishing audit-ready GFEBS-based processes and (2) meeting scheduled dates and asserting audit readiness before correcting extensive control deficiencies. However, this approach raises serious concerns regarding the reliability of the Army’s readiness assertions, the likelihood that SBA and full SBR audit readiness will occur as planned, and the Army’s ability to ensure the accuracy of financial information used to monitor budgetary resources to achieve its mission. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the Army’s implementation of the FIAR Guidance for its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution and facilitate remaining efforts to achieve SBR auditability, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, take the following 10 actions: identify activity attributable to assessable units associated with service provider systems and business processes having a significant impact on the Army’s SBR; coordinate efforts with service providers to obtain and document within MOUs a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities for processing Army data; identify and document qualitative risks and other factors, including those associated with the Army’s reliance on service provider readiness efforts as well as other processes and systems supporting significant portions of its SBR that the Army excluded from the scope of its readiness efforts and assess their potential impact on SBA and full SBR auditability and established timelines required to effectively achieve audit readiness; update the Army’s determination for achieving SBR audit readiness included in DOD’s FIAR Plan Status Report to address NDAA requirements; completely and accurately document the linkage of financial reporting objectives to control activities; document criteria and processes for identifying key information technology systems that have a significant impact on the Army’s SBR audit readiness; obtain and assess the results of service provider SSAE No. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the Army developed and implemented its General Fund Statement of Budget Resources (SBR) financial improvement plan (FIP) for budget execution in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance with regard to (1) determining the scope of activities included in the FIP and (2) completing those activities included in the scope of the FIP. To address our objectives, we reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) FIAR Guidance and selected provisions of the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for fiscal years 2013 and 2010 to understand the methodology the Army is required to use, and related responsibilities, for achieving audit readiness. We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to May 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Why GAO Did This Study The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to describe how its SBR will be validated as ready for audit by September 30, 2014. The DOD Comptroller issued the FIAR Guidance to provide a standard methodology for DOD components to use to develop and implement FIPs, improve financial management, and achieve audit readiness. The Army's FIP for budget execution provides a framework for planning, executing, and tracking essential steps with supporting documentation to achieve audit readiness of its General Fund SBR. GAO is mandated to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, including activities of executive branch agencies such as DOD. This report identifies the extent to which the Army developed and implemented its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution in accordance with the FIAR Guidance with regard to (1) determining the scope of activities included in the FIP and (2) completing those activities included in the scope of the FIP. GAO reviewed the Army's FIP to determine whether it contained the elements required by the FIAR Guidance and reviewed test results, status reports, and other deliverables. What GAO Found The Army has made important progress in developing its financial improvement plan (FIP) for budget execution to help guide its General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) audit readiness efforts. This FIP covers current year activity associated with the recently deployed General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) emphasizing the implementation of effective business processes. However, the Army did not fully complete certain tasks in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance to ensure that its FIP adequately considered the scope of efforts required for audit readiness. For example, the Army did not consider the risks associated with excluding current year activity associated with legacy systems and did not adequately identify significant SBR activity attributable to service provider business processes and systems. These activities may continue to represent material portions of future SBRs and, if not auditable, will likely affect the Army's ability to achieve audit readiness goals as planned. For GFEBS-related audit readiness activities within the scope of its FIP for budget execution, the Army documented controls in narratives and flowcharts and performed monthly tests to assess their effectiveness. Based on test results from June 2012 through May 2013, the Army identified extensive deficiencies, such as lack of appropriate reviews or approvals, and had an average failure rate of 56 percent. The Army did not fully follow the FIAR Guidance in performing the tasks required. For example, the Army's documentation and assessment of controls were not always complete or accurate. Further, extensive deficiencies identified by Army had not been remediated prior to an independent public accountant's (IPA) examination of its audit readiness efforts. Overall, the gaps and deficiencies identified above are largely due to the Army's focus on (1) the audit readiness of new GFEBS processes despite continued reliance on legacy systems and service providers and (2) asserting audit readiness before correcting extensive control deficiencies. Army officials cited adherence to assertion and IPA examination milestones as essential. However, this approach raises serious concerns regarding the likelihood that SBR audit readiness will occur as planned and the Army's ability to ensure the accuracy of financial information used to monitor budgetary resources to achieve its mission. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that among other things, the Army take steps to improve implementation of the FIAR Guidance for its General Fund SBR FIP for budget execution and ensure that all significant SBR processes, systems, and risks are adequately considered and identified deficiencies are resolved. The Army concurred with GAO's recommendations.

gao_NSIAD-99-32

gao_NSIAD-99-32_0

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In response to the request of the Chairmen of the National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations, and of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House Committee on National Security, we sought to determine whether the services’ plans for developing and/or procuring guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets, the number of guided weapons the services plan to buy are consistent with projected threats and modernization requirements, the current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap each other, and DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and procurement of deep attack weapons. According to their procurement plans, the services plan to spend an average of $1.7 billion a year to procure guided weapons over the next 10 years—doubling the $848-million average yearly spending during fiscal years 1993-97. DOD’s planned procurement spending for guided weapon programs is projected to increase about 169 percent during the same period. As a result, the quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated, particularly in today’s budgetary and security environments. Each of the services uses its own battle simulation models and other tools to determine the number of weapons needed to meet the CINCs war objectives. When reviewing the services’ currently planned programs in the aggregate, we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate weapons rather than for other options that may be as effective and less costly. However, the study stopped short of recognizing overlap and duplication and did not recommend curtailment or cancellation of any programs. Questionable Acquisition Plans for Guided Weapons DOD reviews and justifies its guided weapon acquisition programs on a case-by-case basis and does not assess its existing and projected capabilities in this area on an aggregate basis. Coupled with our findings of optimistic funding projections, inflated weapon requirements, duplicative guided weapon programs, and questionable quantities, we believe that DOD does not yet have a sound basis to ensure that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs. Some DOD officials believe improved oversight is needed, and DOD is considering a proposal to expand the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office’s responsibilities to include the coordination of air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs. To the contrary, DOD’s oversight approach to the services’ weapon acquisition and procurement has had very limited effect on guided weapon programs. DOD has had more success in providing oversight of air-to-air missile programs. This report focuses on DOD’s plans to acquire additional guided weapons for deep attack missions within the context of the existing inventory of deep attack weapons.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) major guided weapon programs, focusing on whether: (1) the services' plans for developing or procuring guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets; (2) the number of guided weapons the services plan to buy is consistent with projected threats and modernization needs; (3) the current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap each other; and (4) DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and procurement of deep attack weapons. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) DOD's planned increase in procurement spending for guided weapons is based on overly optimistic funding projections; (2) to acquire all the guided weapons now planned over the next 10 years, DOD plans to spend more than twice as much as it has on average between fiscal years 1993 and 1997; (3) without an increase in overall defense spending, increased resources may not be available as expected; (4) for the past several years, DOD has been unable to increase its procurement budgets as planned, and other programs could more than absorb any available increases; (5) while DOD has enough deep attack weapons in its inventory today to meet national objectives, the services plan to add 158,800 additional guided weapons to the inventory; (6) each of the new weapons has been justified by the services on a case-by-case basis and is projected to provide significant advantages in accuracy, lethality, delivery vehicle safety, and control of unintended damage; (7) in calculating the number of weapons needed, the services use assumptions which overstate the potential threat and target base; (8) as a result, the quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated, particularly in today's budgetary and security environment; (9) when reviewing the services' planned programs in the aggregate, GAO found: (a) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types and capabilities; (b) questionable quantities being procured for each target class; and (c) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate weapons when other options may be as effective and less costly; (10) in contrast, DOD's Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and Quadrennial Defense Review suggested only minor changes in guided weapon programs and did not address possible instances of duplication and overlap; (11) GAO believes that DOD does not yet have a sound basis to ensure that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs; (12) DOD's oversight of the services' guided weapons programs has not prevented inflated requirements or program overlap and duplication; (13) the central oversight bodies and mechanisms already in place do not address requirements and capabilities on an aggregate basis and have had a very limited effect on guided weapon programs; and (14) some DOD officials believe improved oversight is needed, and a proposal is under consideration to expand the purview of the Joint Tactical Air-To-Air Missile Office to include the coordination of air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs.

gao_GAO-06-164T

gao_GAO-06-164T_0

SRS’s plutonium storage plans originally called for the construction of a state-of-the-art Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility that would have provided long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a secure environment. SRS further estimated that it could save more than $120 million by not using Building 235-F for storage and therefore decided in April 2005 to consolidate plutonium storage in Building 105-K. DOE Cannot Currently Consolidate Its Plutonium at SRS DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Second, even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS would still be unable to accommodate some of Hanford’s plutonium because Hanford’s accelerated cleanup plans and SRS’s storage plans are inconsistent with one another. Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE standard 5-inch- wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Hanford and SRS currently lack the capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a facility to process the plutonium for disposition. The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the department’s failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium consolidation could offer. However, according to Hanford officials, continued storage at Hanford could cost approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing security requirements and will threaten the achievement of the goals in the site’s accelerated cleanup plan. DOE Cannot Currently Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium Under DOE’s plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a monitoring capability that can detect whether storage containers are at risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment. Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building 235-F at SRS. In addition, Building 235-F faced several other challenges that would have affected its ability to monitor plutonium. Because of changes in the design basis threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store Category I quantities of plutonium.

Why GAO Did This Study Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security and reduce storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium there until it can be permanently disposed of. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. What GAO Found As GAO reported in July 2005, DOE cannot yet consolidate its surplus plutonium at SRS for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the plutonium from DOE's Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about 20 percent of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to cleanup and demolish its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS's storage plan assumed Hanford would package all of its plutonium in DOE's standard storage containers. Until a permanent disposition plan is developed, more plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer. In particular, continued storage at Hanford will cost approximately $85 million more annually because of increasing security requirements and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. In addition, DOE lacks the necessary capability to fully monitor the condition of the plutonium to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment. DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that already had safety systems needed to work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct all of the required monitoring activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium monitoring.

gao_GAO-08-75

gao_GAO-08-75_0

VA performs disability reevaluations for disabilities required by regulation and whenever it determines that it is likely that a disability has improved, or if evidence indicates there has been a material change in a disability or that the current rating may be incorrect. VBA’s Operational Controls Do Not Ensure That Disability Reevaluations Occur, but VBA Is Planning to Update Some of Its Processes and Procedures VBA’s operational controls do not adequately ensure that staff schedule or conduct disability reevaluations as necessary. VBA’s claims processing software does not ensure that diary dates are established. VBA plans on improving some of its control mechanisms through its new claims management system, VETSNET. The diary date is the only VBA procedural trigger that alerts regional offices that a claim needs to be reviewed. Some Disability Reevaluations Not Tracked or Reviewed Once the regional office receives the paper notice that a reevaluation is due, staff perform a preliminary assessment of the veteran’s claim file to determine if more comprehensive reevaluation should be conducted. If staff determine during this preliminary assessment that a reevaluation is no longer needed, they can cancel the reevaluation. Also, cancelled reevaluations are not subject to quality assurance reviews. VBA plans on improving its ability to track cancellations using VETSNET. VBA Lacks Adequate Program Information to Effectively Manage the Disability Reevaluation Process VBA cannot effectively manage the disability reevaluation process because some of the data it collects are not consistent and it does not systematically collect and analyze key management data. While VBA collects data on the amount of time regional offices take to conduct disability reevaluations, these data are not reliable. Also, VBA does not know the number of reevaluation diary dates that mature in a year or the types of disabilities being reevaluated, the length of time before reevaluations are conducted, or if the reevaluation decisions result in an increase, decrease, or no change in the severity of veterans’ disabilities. Timeliness Data Are Inconsistent VBA’s disability reevaluation timeliness data are inconsistent because regional offices use different starting points for measuring how long it takes to complete reevaluations. VBA should develop a plan to collect and analyze data on the results of disability reevaluations.

Why GAO Did This Study To help ensure that veterans are properly compensated for disabilities, VA is required to perform disability reevaluations for specific disabilities. VA also performs reevaluations whenever it determines there is a need to verify either the continued existence or current severity of veterans' disabilities. VBA completed about 17,700 reevaluations in fiscal year 2005. GAO was asked to review the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) disability reevaluation program. This report assesses (1) the operational controls VA uses to ensure the effectiveness of the disability reevaluation process and (2) the management information VA collects and uses to manage the disability reevaluation process. To conduct this study, GAO analyzed VBA data, reviewed federal regulations and VBA procedures, conducted site visits, and interviewed VBA officials. What GAO Found VBA's operational controls do not adequately ensure that staff schedule or conduct disability reevaluations as necessary; however, VBA is planning to improve some of the controls. VBA claims processing software does not automatically establish or prompt regional office staff to schedule a time - known as a diary date - to determine whether a disability reevaluation should proceed. Consequently, some cases that require a reevaluation may never receive it. After the diary date matures, staff perform a preliminary review of a veteran's claim file to determine if a more comprehensive reevaluation should be conducted. If staff determine during this review that a reevaluation is no longer needed, the reevaluation is cancelled. However, cancellations are not tracked or subject to quality assurance reviews to ensure adherence to program policies and procedures. VBA plans on improving some of its control mechanisms through its new claims management system, the Veterans Service Network (VETSNET), including developing the ability to track cancellations. However, VBA has no plans to include a prompt for scheduling reevaluation diary dates in VETSNET. VBA cannot effectively manage the disability reevaluation process because some of the data it collects are inconsistent and it does not systematically collect and analyze key management data. While VBA collects data on the amount of time regional offices take to conduct disability reevaluations, these data are not consistentbecause regional offices use different starting points for measuring timeliness. Also, VBA does not know the types of disabilities being reevaluated, the length of time before reevaluations are conducted, or the results of the reevaluations. As a result, VBA cannot ensure that it is effectively and appropriately using its resources.

gao_GAO-01-872T

gao_GAO-01-872T_0

Adopting a results-orientation requires transforming organizational cultures to improve decisionmaking, maximize performance, and assure accountability—it entails new ways of thinking and doing business. For example, in 1998, the Congress chartered the Office of Student Financial Assistance as a performance- based organization, and required it to implement performance agreements. However, we reported in April 2001 that, overall, agencies’ fiscal year 2001 performance plans reflected different levels of attention to strategic human capital issues. Very few of the agencies’ plans addressed succession planning to ensure reasonable continuity of leadership; performance agreements to align leaders’ performance expectations with the agency’s mission and goals; competitive compensation systems to help the agency attract, motivate, retain, and reward the people it needs; workforce deployment to support the agency’s goals and strategies; performance management systems, including pay and other meaningful incentives, to link performance to results; alignment of performance expectations with competencies to steer the workforce towards effectively pursuing the agency’s goals and strategies; and employee and labor relations grounded in a mutual effort on the strategies to achieve the agency’s goals and to resolve problems and conflicts fairly and effectively. In the 4 years since the governmentwide implementation of GPRA, we have seen more agencies make more explicit links between their annual performance plans and budgets. If GPRA is effectively implemented, the governmentwide performance plan and the agencies’ annual performance plans and reports should provide the Congress with new information on agencies and programs addressing similar results.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. What GAO Found During the last decade, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and executive agencies have worked to implement a statutory framework to improve the performance and accountability of the executive branch and to enhance executive branch and congressional decisionmaking. The core of this framework includes financial management legislation, especially GPRA. As a result of this framework, there has been substantial progress in the last few years in establishing the basic infrastructure needed to create high-performing federal organizations. The issuance of agencies' fiscal year 2000 performance reports, in addition to updated strategic plans, annual performance plans, and the governmentwide performance plans, completes two full cycles of annual performance planning and reporting under GPRA. However, much work remains before this framework is effectively implemented across the government, including transforming agencies' organizational cultures to improve decisionmaking and strengthen performance and accountability.

gao_GAO-13-470

gao_GAO-13-470_0

Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. DOD Projects Its Military and Civilian Workforce to Decrease, but Comparable Data on DOD’s Contractor Workforce Are Not Available DOD’s data shows that since fiscal year 2001, its combined active, reserve, and civilian workforce peaked in fiscal year 2011 at 3.1 million personnel, and is projected by DOD to gradually decrease over the next five years to below its fiscal year 2001 level. In its inventory for fiscal year 2011, DOD reported that about 710,000 contractor FTEs were performing various functions under contracts for services—which is equal to about 90 percent of the size of DOD’s civilian workforce of 807,000 FTEs for that same fiscal year. Our analysis of DOD’s obligations for contracted services using fiscal year 2013 constant dollars shows DOD’s spending peaked in fiscal year 2010 at about $195 billion, more than twice the amount spent in fiscal year 2001. Such spending decreased to about $174 billion in fiscal year 2012. DOD Has Taken Some Steps Useful for Determining the Appropriate Mix of Its Workforce, but Shortcomings Remain DOD has taken some steps to improve its understanding and management of its workforce, including service-specific efforts to obtain better data about the workforce; however, several shortcomings remain. Further, DOD has not updated its policies and procedures to reflect the most current statutory requirements to use its civilian strategic workforce plan and the inventory of contracted services to help determine the appropriate mix of personnel in its workforce. § 115b), and to determine the appropriate workforce mix necessary to perform its mission. DOD Defines the Core Missions of the Department, but Current Policy Does Not Fully Reflect the Need to Identify Critical Functions DOD clearly identifies the core mission areas of the armed forces, which cover broad areas of military activity that the department is statutorily required to identify, but given the wide range of missions and responsibilities of its various components, DOD has not developed a list of “core or critical functions” for the department as a whole, nor is it required to do so. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Policy Letter 11-01 (OFPP 11-01), issued in September 2011, requires agencies to identify “critical functions” to ensure that they have sufficient internal capability, in DOD’s case civilian and military personnel, to maintain control over functions that are core to the agency’s mission and operations, but are otherwise permissible to contract out to the private sector.would help ensure that DOD can accomplish its mission even if contractors are unable to perform or otherwise default on their contractual responsibilities. Absent specific policies and procedures that delineate requirements relating to critical functions and explain how components should identify these functions, DOD may lack assurance that it properly identifies and retains the ability to maintain control over critical functions. DOD Components Used the Inventory of Contracted Services and Other Data in Budget Submissions, but the Projections Have Significant Limitations DOD components we reviewed used various methods and data sources, including their inventories of contracted services, to project contractor FTEs for their fiscal year 2013 and 2014 budget submissions, but our analysis found that the components’ contractor FTE projections have significant limitations. Among the challenges encountered by the DOD components in using the inventory of contracted services, however, are the use of estimating techniques based on inventory data that may not be accurate or current, and the lack of a crosswalk between the inventory of contracted services and specific budget lines of accounting. While the Army has a process that addresses these challenges, it may be several years before the remaining DOD components are able to do the same. DOD is taking steps to help the remaining components address these challenges, but, in the meantime, the budget does not provide an explanation of how the contractor FTE estimates are derived and what limitations apply. DOD is required by law to establish policies and procedures that require the use of the strategic workforce plan when making determinations of the appropriate mix of total workforce personnel necessary to perform its mission, and to include in the strategic workforce plan an assessment of the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities, which it has not included to date. Further, we reported that the guidance similarly does not reflect federal requirements for the identification of critical functions as required by Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s Policy Letter 11-01. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology To determine the historical trends and future projections of the levels of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, we obtained relevant data and performed trend analysis. We also interviewed DOD and military service officials to assess the actions DOD has taken to ensure it is employing the appropriate workforce mix. We compared federal policy concerning the identification of critical functions to DOD’s efforts to date, and noted any differences.

Why GAO Did This Study The federal government’s growing fiscal challenges underscore the importance of DOD employing a strategic approach to determining the appropriate mix of its military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform its mission, and determining the functions that are critical for the department to achieve its missions. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to assess the measures DOD is taking to balance its workforce against its requirements. GAO examined (1) historical and projected workforce trends, (2) the actions DOD has taken to determine an appropriate workforce mix, (3) the analysis DOD performs to identify core or critical functions, and (4) how DOD used its inventory of contracted services to inform budget submissions. GAO performed trend analysis to determine historical and future workforce levels. GAO also reviewed relevant statutes, DOD and military department guidance, and budgetary submissions, and interviewed officials from DOD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). What GAO Found Since fiscal year 2001, the Department of Defense's (DOD) military and civilian workforces peaked in fiscal year 2011 at 3.1 million personnel combined, and is projected to decrease over the next five years to below the fiscal year 2001 level of 2.9 million. Comparable historical data on DOD's contractor workforce are not available. In fiscal year 2011, DOD reported that it contracted for services performed by an estimated 710,000 contractor full time equivalents (FTEs)--a workforce equal to about 90 percent of the size of DOD's civilian workforce of 807,000 FTEs. Using fiscal year 2013 constant dollars, GAO's analysis of DOD spending on contracted services shows obligations peaked in fiscal year 2010 at about $195 billion, more than twice the amount spent in fiscal year 2001. This spending decreased to about $174 billion in fiscal year 2012. DOD has taken some steps to improve its understanding and management of its total workforce; however, several shortcomings remain. Specifically, DOD has yet to assess the appropriate mix of its military, civilian, and contractor personnel capabilities in its strategic workforce plan as required by law. Further, DOD has not updated its policies and procedures to reflect current statutory requirements to use its civilian strategic workforce plan and the inventory of contracted services to determine the appropriate mix of personnel to perform DOD's mission. Moreover, DOD's strategic human capital plan does not contain certain required elements and information and several factors limit the accuracy of its inventory of contracted services. As a result, the department is hampered in making more informed strategic workforce mix decisions, which is crucial to meeting DOD's congressional mandate to manage its total workforce. Although DOD is not required to perform analysis to identify a list of core or critical functions across the department as a whole, DOD has identified broad core mission areas of the department. However, its current policies do not fully reflect federal policy concerning the identification of critical functions. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Policy Letter 11-01 requires agencies to identify and ensure that they retain control over critical functions that are core to the agency's mission, but may be contracted out to the private sector. DOD's policies and procedures predate the publication of this requirement, and consequently contain no reference to it. Absent specific policies and procedures on this process, DOD may lack assurance that it retains enough government employees to maintain control over these important functions. DOD components used various methods and data sources, including their inventories of contracted services, to estimate contractor FTEs for budget submissions, but GAO's analysis found that the contractor FTE estimates have significant limitations and do not accurately reflect the number of contractors providing services to DOD. Components encountered challenges, to include the use of estimating techniques based on inventory data that may not be accurate and the lack of a crosswalk between the inventory and specific budget codes. While the Army has a process that addresses these challenges, it may be several years before the remaining DOD components are able to do the same. DOD is taking steps to help the remaining components address these challenges, but, in the meantime, the budget does not provide an explanation of how the contractor FTE estimates are derived and what limitations apply. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD revise its policies and procedures to incorporate (1) legislative requirements for workforce planning and (2) federal requirements for the identification of critical functions. GAO also recommends that DOD provide better information regarding contractor FTEs used in budget submissions. DOD noted actions that it has underway or planned to respond to these recommendations.

gao_AIMD-95-20

gao_AIMD-95-20_0

In this context, effective IRM is key to successful accomplishment of State’s critical missions. These elements include top-level management commitment to improving IRM; a strategic IRM planning process that is based on mission and business needs and that integrates the planning and budgeting functions; an acquisition process in accordance with legal requirements and applicable policy guidance; and an organizational framework that includes leadership and authority for IRM, an executive-level review process to prioritize and oversee investment projects, and an IRM organization that provides adequate guidance and support for agencywide customers. Recently, however, the Under Secretary for Management, recognizing that effectively managing State’s information resources is critical for the Department to meet its various missions, initiated several efforts to address the Department’s information management problems. State has also not had a mechanism to ensure adequate funding for initiatives to address long-standing IRM problems. As a result of its failure to follow the best IRM practices, major IRM improvement initiatives remain at risk of failure. Recommendations To institute modern information resources management practices in support of departmentwide mission and business needs, we recommend that the Secretary of State designate a Chief Information Officer, above the Assistant Secretary level, with the authority necessary to oversee the implementation of departmentwide IRM initiatives and standards, and strengthen the recently established new IRM investment review board by (1) increasing regional and functional bureau representation and (2) ensuring that the board’s determinations are implemented. The Department has a number of initiatives aimed at addressing these weaknesses. State has consequently embarked on a program to modernize its aging information technology infrastructure.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of State's information resources management (IRM) program and ongoing IRM improvement efforts. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) State has poorly managed its information resources and continues to use inadequate and obsolete information technology, which has resulted in critical information shortfalls and interrupted operations; (2) although State has a number of initiatives to improve IRM, its failure to follow the best IRM practices and commit top-level management to IRM jeopardizes its improvement efforts; (3) State lacks an adequate mechanism to prevent IRM duplication and ensure sufficient funding; (4) State needs a chief information officer (CIO) to provide leadership and guidance for IRM and an investment and oversight process involving senior regional and functional bureau managers; and (5) State needs to address long-standing fundamental barriers to effective IRM and commit to a departmentwide IRM approach to meet its critical mission and business functions.

gao_GAO-06-97

gao_GAO-06-97_0

Some Climate Leaders and Climate VISION Participants Have Not Completed Program Steps as Soon as Expected, and Both Agencies Lack a Written Policy for Dealing with Such Participants According to EPA officials, all program participants agree to complete four program steps, and EPA guidelines suggest that these steps generally be completed within about 1 year, although the goal negotiation process can take as long as 2 years. Neither agency has written criteria detailing expected time frames for meeting expectations or the consequences of not meeting expectations. According to agency officials, after establishing its goal to reduce emissions, each industry group is asked to develop a work plan following a standard template developed by DOE, generally within 1 year of joining the program. DOE Plans to Track Participants’ Progress in Completing Program Steps, but It Lacks a Written Policy For Dealing with Those That Do Not Progress as Expected Program officials told us that they do not have a system for tracking participants’ actions, including completing work plans, reporting, and the other steps identified in its work plan, but they said a contractor is working to establish a reporting system for 2006. DOE or another federal agency conducted discussions with the industry groups on establishing their goals, and all participating groups had established a goal before joining Climate VISION. Finally, many groups qualified their goals based upon their stated need for reciprocal federal actions, such as tax incentives or regulatory relief. More Than Half of the Participants in Climate Leaders Have Set Goals, and These Goals Vary As of November 2005, 38 of the program’s 74 firms had set emissions or emissions intensity reductions goals. For example, Cinergy Corporation pledged to reduce its total domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 5 percent from 2000 to 2010, while Miller Brewing Company pledged to reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 18 percent per barrel of production (a unit of production intensity goal) from 2001 to 2006, and Pfizer, Inc., pledged to reduce its worldwide emissions by 35 percent per dollar of revenue (a monetary intensity goal) from 2000 to 2007. Preparing such estimates will be challenging because there is considerable overlap between these two programs and other voluntary programs. Emissions Generated by Current Program Participants EPA estimated in 2005 that participating firms accounted for at least 8 percent of U.S. emissions on average for the years 2000 through 2003. However, a program manager told us that EPA has not tried to estimate the share of U.S. emissions that the 200 firms might account for because it is difficult to predict with any accuracy the size and types of firms that may join the program in the future and the firms’ emissions reduction goals. While Both Agencies Are Working to Estimate Program Impacts, It Will Be Challenging to Determine Specific Emissions Reductions Attributable to Each Program EPA and DOE are working, as part of an interagency program, to estimate their programs’ effect on reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the emissions reductions claimed by firms participating in Climate Leaders who are also members of trade groups participating in Climate VISION may be counted twice—the individual firm’s achievement may be credited under the Climate Leaders program, while the same achievement may be counted toward the trade group achieving its goal under Climate VISION. For example, although EPA expects that firms will generally take about 2 years to establish their emissions reduction goals, of the 51 firms that joined in 2002 and 2003, the first 2 years of the program, 18 firms had not done so as of November 2005. EPA is developing a system for tracking firms’ progress in completing key steps under Climate Leaders, but DOE does not have a system for tracking trade group’s progress under Climate VISION. Both agencies are working this year to estimate the emissions reductions attributable to their programs. Although DOE agreed with our statement that Climate VISION participants account for at least 40 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, it noted that the program covers about four-fifths of total U.S. industrial- and power-related greenhouse gas emissions, which makes the potential impact of the program substantial. We included programs that are supported by the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and Transportation, as well as EPA. Specifically, it depends on actions and policies to expand wholesale electric competition and rationalize regulations, such as Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s standard electric market design and Regional Transmission Organization initiatives; advance market-based multi-emissions legislation; streamline current regulatory programs, and seek better disclosure and market transparency.” The Nuclear Energy Institute states that, “The nation’s ability to realize the promise of nuclear energy after 2012 will depend on actions and policies we undertake in the next one to two years, particularly new policy initiatives designed to stimulate investment in technologies that require large capital investments and long lead times.” As part of the SIA Memorandum of Understanding with EPA, EPA’s responsibilities include: (1) participating in and supporting conferences to share information on emission reduction technologies; (2) addressing regulatory barriers that may impede voluntary, worldwide emission reduction strategies; (3) recognizing SIA and the participating companies for their emission reduction commitment, technical leadership, and achievements over time.

Why GAO Did This Study To reduce greenhouse gas emissions linked to climate change, two voluntary programs encourage participants to set emissions reduction goals. The Climate Leaders Program, managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), focuses on firms. The Climate VISION (Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) Program, managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) along with other agencies, focuses on trade groups. GAO examined (1) participants' progress in completing program steps, the agencies' procedures for tracking progress, and their policies for dealing with participants that are not progressing as expected; (2) the types of emissions reduction goals established by participants; and (3) the agencies' estimates of the share of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that their programs account for and their estimates of the programs' impacts on U.S. emissions. What GAO Found EPA expects Climate Leaders firms to complete several program steps within general time frames, but firms' progress on completing those steps is mixed. For example, EPA asks firms to set an emissions reduction goal, generally within 2 years of joining. As of November 2005, 38 of the program's 74 participating firms had set a goal. Of the 36 firms that had not set a goal, 13 joined in 2002 and thus took longer than expected to set a goal. EPA is developing a system for tracking firms' progress in completing these steps, but it has no written policy on what to do about firms that are not progressing as expected. Trade groups generally established an emissions reduction goal before joining Climate VISION, and DOE generally expects them to develop a plan for measuring and reporting emissions within about 1 year of joining. As of November 2005, 11 of the 15 participating groups had such a plan, but 2 of the groups without a plan joined in 2003, the program's first year. DOE has no means of tracking trade groups' progress in completing the steps in their plans and no written policy on what to do about groups that are not progressing as expected. A tracking system would enable the agency to ascertain whether participants are meeting program expectations in a timely manner, thereby helping the program to achieve its goals. By establishing a written policy on the consequences of not progressing as expected, both agencies could better ensure that participants are actively engaged in the programs, thus helping to achieve the programs' goals. The types of emissions reduction goals established by Climate Leaders firms and Climate VISION groups vary in how reductions are measured and the time periods covered, among other things. For example, one Climate Leaders firm's goal is to reduce its domestic emissions by 5 percent over 10 years; another's is to reduce its worldwide emissions per dollar of revenue by 35 percent over 7 years. Similarly, one Climate VISION group's goal is to reduce emissions of one greenhouse gas by 10 percent, while another's is to reduce its emissions per unit of output by 12 percent. GAO noted that some Climate VISION groups said meeting their goals may be linked to reciprocal federal actions, such as tax incentives or regulatory relief. EPA officials estimated that the first 50 firms to join Climate Leaders account for at least 8 percent of U.S. greenhouse emissions. DOE estimated that Climate VISION participants account for at least 40 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. EPA and DOE are working through an interagency process to quantify the emissions reductions attributable to their programs; the process is expected to be completed in 2006. However, determining the reductions attributable to each program will be challenging because of the overlap between these programs and other voluntary programs, as well as other factors.

gao_GAO-11-237

gao_GAO-11-237_0

The state and local agencies are responsible for the planning, development, and coordination of an array of home- and community-based services within each state, though states also provide services to older adults through other funding, such as Medicaid, and through separate programs and departments. Funding for the program generally increased in small increments over the past 5 years, while the number of people age 60 and over increased from 48.9 million in 2004 to 55.4 million in 2009. Estimates Show That Many Older Adults Likely Needed but Did Not Receive Meals and Home-Based Care Many Older Adults with Low Incomes Who Were Likely to Need Meals Programs Did Not Receive Them The meals services provided in 2008 did not serve most of the low-income older adults likely to need them. Many People Age 60 and Older Who Had Difficulties with Daily Activities Received Limited or No Home-Based Care While most older adults who had difficulties with daily activities such as walking or bathing received at least some help completing such tasks, many received limited help and some did not receive any help. Likely Need for Transportation Services Is Significant Many older adults were likely to need transportation services like those provided by Title III programs due to circumstances such as being unable to drive or not having access to a vehicle. Agencies Transfer Funds among Programs and Use Funds from Multiple Sources to Provide Services Agencies Transfer Funds among Title III Programs to Meet Needs, but Some Want Additional Flexibility Most state and some local agencies utilize the flexibility provided by the OAA to transfer funds among Title III programs. According to AoA data, 45 state agencies transferred funds among congregate meal programs, home- delivered meal programs, and support services in fiscal year 2008, and, according to our survey results, an estimated 45 percent of local agencies did so in fiscal year 2009. Agencies most commonly transferred funds from congregate meals to home-delivered meals or support services. In addition to receiving funds from governments and private sources, clients can also contribute to the cost of services. While the OAA allows for cost sharing for some OAA services wherein clients are asked to pay a portion of the cost of services based on their income, 5 of the 14 states we spoke with actually permit cost sharing. In fact, according to our survey, an estimated 47 percent of local agencies experienced reductions to their budgets in fiscal year 2010. Alternatively, in response to these funding cuts, many local agencies said they took steps to reduce administrative and operations costs. Of the 10 state agencies we spoke with in early fall 2010, 5 told us that they will have to cut back services, 2 told us that they reserved funds from other sources to compensate for some of the lost Recovery Act funds, 2 states had not decided how to make up for the lost Recovery Act funds, and 1 state will maintain services. Lack of Federal Guidance and Data Make It Difficult for States to Fully Estimate Need and Unmet Need States Lack Specific Guidance on How to Evaluate Need and Unmet Need The OAA requires AoA to design and implement uniform data collection procedures that include procedures for states to assess the receipt, need, and unmet need for Title III services. State Agencies Assess Need and Some Assess Unmet Need, but None Fully Estimate the Number of Older Adults Likely in Need of Services Without standardized definitions and measurement procedures, states use a variety of approaches to measure need and measure unmet need to varying extents. Overall, AoA and state agency officials noted that there are various challenges to fully estimating need and unmet need. As the number of older adults grows, demand for services will also grow. To help ensure that agencies have adequate and consistent information about older adults’ needs and the extent to which they are met, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services partner with other government agencies that provide services to Older Americans and, as appropriate, convene a panel or work group of researchers, agency officials, and others to develop consistent definitions of need and unmet need and to propose interim and long-term uniform data collection procedures for obtaining information on older adults with unmet needs for services provided from sources like Title III. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to identify: (1) what is known about the need for home- and community-based services like those funded by the Older Americans Act (OAA) and the potential unmet need for these services; (2) how have agencies used their funds, including Recovery Act funds, to meet program objectives; and (3) how have government and local agencies measured need and unmet need. By this definition, an estimated 21 percent of older adults age 65 and over were likely to need transportation services.

Why GAO Did This Study The Older Americans Act (OAA) was enacted to help older adults remain in their homes and communities. In fiscal year 2008, about 5 percent of the nation's adults 60 and over received key aging services through Title III of the OAA, including meals and home-based care. In fiscal year 2010, states received $1.4 billion to fund Title III programs. Studies project large increases in the number of adults who will be eligible for services in the future and likely government budget constraints. In advance of program reauthorization scheduled for 2011, GAO was asked to determine: (1) what is known about the need for home- and community-based services like those funded by OAA and the potential unmet need for these services; (2) how have agencies used their funds, including Recovery Act funds, to meet program objectives, and (3) how government and local agencies measured need and unmet need. To do this, GAO analyzed national self-reported data; surveyed a random sample of 125 local agencies; reviewed agency documents; and spoke with officials from the Administration on Aging (AoA) and state and local agencies. What GAO Found National data show many older adults likely needed meals or home-based care in 2008, but they did not all receive assistance from Title III programs or other sources, like Medicaid. For instance, while about 9 percent of low-income older adults received meals services, many more were likely to need them due to financial or other difficulties obtaining food. Also, while most older adults who were likely to need home-based care because of difficulties with activities such as walking or bathing received at least some help completing such tasks, many received limited help and some did not receive any. Finally, an estimated 21 percent of people age 65 and older were likely to need transportation services due to their inability to drive or lack of access to a vehicle. Some aspects of need and receipt could not be captured with existing data. For example, GAO could not identify whether the meals and home-based care older adults received was adequate or estimate the number of individuals with transportation needs who did and did not receive such services. Many agencies utilize the flexibility afforded by the OAA to transfer funds among programs and use funds from multiple sources to provide services in their communities. State agencies annually transferred an average of $67 million from congregate meals to home-delivered meals and support services over the past 9 years. Agencies also use funds from other sources, such as Medicaid, state and local governments, and client contributions, to fund Title III services for clients. While client donations are common, formal arrangements with clients to pay a portion of the cost of services are limited. These payments by individuals with higher incomes could help defray the costs of serving others, as the demand for services increases in the future. The recent economic downturn affected agency resources and funding, with about 47 percent of local agencies reporting budget reductions in fiscal year 2010. To cope, many agencies cut administrative and operational costs and some reduced services. The Recovery Act temporarily replaced some lost funding by providing $97 million for meals, but ended in 2010. GAO spoke to 10 state agencies about how they will adjust to lost Recovery Act dollars and found 5 plan to cut services, 2 reserved funds from other sources, 2 are not sure how they will adjust, and 1 will maintain services. The OAA requires AoA to design and implement uniform data collection procedures for states to assess the receipt, need, and unmet need for Title III services. While AoA provides uniform procedures for measuring receipt of services, it does not provide standardized definitions or measurement procedures for need and unmet need that all states are required to use. Within this context, states use a variety of approaches to measure need and measure unmet need to varying extents. No agencies that GAO spoke with fully estimate the number of older adults with need and unmet need. AoA and state agency officials noted that there are various challenges to collecting more information, such as cost and complexity. However, as a result of limited and inconsistent information, AoA is unable assess the full extent of need and unmet need nationally, and within each state. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Department of Health and Human Services study the effectiveness of cost-sharing and definitions and measurement procedures for need and unmet need. The agency said they would explore options for implementing the recommendations.

gao_GAO-01-740T

gao_GAO-01-740T_0

U.S. Assistance Has Had; Limited Results Project Sustainability in Question Despite some positive developments, U.S. rule of law assistance in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union has achieved limited results, and the sustainability of those results is uncertain. Although the United States has succeeded in exposing these countries to innovative legal concepts and practices that could lead to a stronger rule of law in the future, we could not find evidence that many of these concepts and practices have been widely adopted. At this point, many of the U.S.-assisted reforms in the new independent states are dependent on continued donor funding to be sustained. These data, among others, have been used by USAID and the State Department to measure the results of U.S. development assistance in this region. In the two new independent states where the United States has devoted the largest amount of rule of law funding—Russia and Ukraine—the situation appears to have deteriorated in recent years. Furthermore, a major assistance project aimed at making the Ukrainian parliament more active, informed, and transparent has not been successful, according to U.S. and foreign officials we interviewed. However, U.S. efforts we reviewed to help retool the judiciary have had limited impact so far. USAID assistance efforts aimed at improving training for judges have had relatively little long-term impact.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses the U.S. government's rule of law assistance efforts in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. What GAO Found GAO found that these efforts have had limited impact so far, and results may not be sustainable in many cases. U.S. agencies have had some success in introducing innovative legal concepts and practices in these countries. However, the U.S. assistance has not often had a major, long-term impact on the evolution of the rule of law in these countries. In some cases, countries have not widely adopted the new concepts and practices that the United States has advocated. In other cases, continuation or expansion of the innovations depends on further funding from the U.S. or other donors. In fact, the rule of law appears to have actually deteriorated in recent years in several countries, including Russia and Ukraine, according to the data used to measure the results of U.S. development assistance in the region and a host of U.S. government and foreign officials. This testimony summarizes an April 2001 report (GAO-01-354).

gao_T-GGD-96-153

gao_T-GGD-96-153_0

Pennies are then coined by the U.S. Mint, a unit of the Treasury Department, at its Denver and Philadelphia facilities. We examined the government’s cost to produce and distribute the penny; the public’s attitude toward the penny; the budgetary and operational impact on the Mint of eliminating the penny; other economic impacts associated with eliminating the penny; the environmental impact of producing and disposing of pennies; and how prices for cash transactions could be rounded. This adjustment increased the total cost of penny production in fiscal year 1994 by $9.6 million. According to Americans for Common Cents, an organization that has been formed to encourage the continued production of the penny, the discontinuation of penny production could result in the loss of (1) 356 jobs in the zinc refining and smelting industry, (2) $700,000 in sales of chemicals used for penny production, (3) $1.2 million in wages for truck drivers who transport penny blanks to the Mint, and (4) an unknown number of railroad jobs from a decrease in rail shipments from Alltrista to the Denver Mint and in transportation of slab zinc to refining and smelting operations. We did not verify these estimates. Officials from both states said that rounding sales taxes to the nearest nickel would not be a problem. One of the five charitable organizations said that eliminating the penny could negatively affect donations. lost if the penny were eliminated, it is not known what portion of the pennies in circulation would be returned and whether the Mint would incur a substantial cost.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the continued production of the U.S. penny. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) Congress needs to address several issues in deciding the future of the penny; (2) the government spent $8.5 million to $9.2 million in fiscal year (FY) 1994 distributing and handling pennies; (3) public attitudes towards the penny are mixed, but the majority of the public supports retaining the penny; (4) in FY 1995, almost 66 percent of pennies did not circulate compared to almost 12 percent of quarters; (5) it could not determine the full budgetary impact of eliminating the penny, but the U.S. Mint would be negatively impacted if billions of pennies were returned; (6) eliminating the penny would result in the loss of jobs for the two contractors who produce zinc penny blanks and for other related businesses; (7) states' ability to collect sales taxes would not be affected by the elimination of the penny, but charitable donations might be affected; (8) penny production and disposal cause no significant environmental problems; (9) proposed legislation would provide a framework for rounding to the nearest nickel and would exempt noncash transactions from the rounding requirement; and (10) military facilities in Europe eliminated the penny in 1980 and received few complaints.

gao_GAO-13-17

gao_GAO-13-17_0

ADA Paratransit Requirements DOT issued final regulations to implement the ADA’s public transportation provisions on August 22, 1991.how transit agencies are to provide paratransit service; rather, they require such agencies to offer a level of service that is “comparable” to the level of service offered to the general public without disabilities. 1). Data. However, as a condition of receiving federal funds, every transit agency has to self-certify and assure that it is complying with the DOT ADA regulations. According to FTA, this certification and assurance is its starting point for assessing transit agencies’ compliance with ADA requirements. FTA’s specialized ADA paratransit compliance reviews examine multiple aspects of a transit agency’s paratransit service. According to FTA officials, there are approximately 628 urbanized area fixed-route transit agencies that could be eligible for ADA compliance reviews. While the factors that FTA currently uses may be appropriate for selecting transit agencies for an ADA compliance review, FTA’s informal process does not adhere to our guidance on internal control standards related to the communication of policy, documentation of results, and monitoring We have previously and reviewing of grantee activities and findings.reported that these standards are critical to maintaining the thoroughness and consistency of compliance reviews. According to FTA, all finalized ADA compliance review reports are publicly available documents. Demand for ADA Paratransit Has Increased for Some Transit Agencies, and Costs Remain High Demand According to our survey of transit agencies, demand for ADA paratransit trips increased from 2007 to 2010. From 2007 to 2010, the average number of individuals registered to use ADA paratransit service at a transit agency increased by 12 percent, and the average number of ADA paratransit trips provided by a transit agency increased 7 percent (see fig. Increases in demand for ADA paratransit services were driven by the 10 largest transit agencies. Costs and Fares ADA paratransit trips are much more costly to provide than fixed-route trips. Based on our survey results, the average cost of providing an ADA paratransit trip in 2010 was $29.30, an estimated three and a half times more expensive than the average cost of $8.15 to provide a fixed-route trip (see fig. Transit Agencies Are Taking a Number of Actions to Address Paratransit Demand and Costs Transit agencies have implemented a number of actions aimed at addressing the growing demand for ADA paratransit trips and reducing the costs of ADA paratransit services. According to our survey of transit agencies, about 59 percent of transit agencies are coordinating with health and human services providers in order to improve ADA paratransit services or address the costs of providing service. Also, about 44 percent of transit agencies are coordinating with other local transit agencies, including 6 of the 10 largest transit agencies. Improving the Accessibility of Fixed- Route Service Our survey results showed that over 62 percent of transit agencies reported making accessibility improvements to their fixed-route systems since 2007. However, nine final review reports—conducted from 2004 to 2010—have not been posted to FTA’s website. To help ensure that FTA’s ADA paratransit compliance reviews adhere to GAO recommended internal controls and grantee oversight best practices, document and make publicly available a formal selection approach for selecting transit agencies for review. 2. To help transit agencies and stakeholders have access to up-to-date ADA paratransit compliance reviews and compliance findings, post the backlog of ADA compliance review final reports on FTA’s website and establish processes for the timely posting of future compliance review reports. 3. To improve NTD data collection for ADA paratransit, provide guidance to transit agencies on how to accurately complete existing ADA paratransit fields. (2) What changes have occurred in ADA paratransit demand and costs since 2007? (3) What actions are agencies taking to help address changes in the demand for and costs of ADA paratransit service? To determine what is known about the extent of compliance with ADA paratransit requirements, we reviewed ADA regulations, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) guidance on the regulations, and FTA’s ADA compliance reports from 2005 to 2011. Appendix II: Reliability of ADA Paratransit Data in FTA’s National Transit Database We conducted an analysis to determine whether ADA paratransit data in the NTD were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of identifying changes that have occurred in ADA paratransit demand and costs since 2007. We found data discrepancies, such as incomplete data, that may understate or overstate the number of ADA trips and amount of ADA expenses. We found that the NTD does not contain a data field that asks transit agencies whether they are required to provide ADA paratransit services. In addition, transit agencies may misunderstand the definition of ADA paratransit service and make reporting errors as a result—they may report ADA trips and ADA expenses erroneously one year because they think their specialized, demand-responsive service counts as ADA paratransit service, even though the service is not provided in order to comply with the ADA.

Why GAO Did This Study The ADA, a civil rights law enacted in 1990, provided that it shall be considered discrimination for a public entity that operates a fixed-route transit system to fail to offer paratransit service to disabled individuals that is comparable to services provided to those without disabilities. FTA is responsible for overseeing compliance with ADA requirements for paratransit services. As requested, GAO examined: (1) the extent of compliance with ADA paratransit requirements, (2) changes in ADA paratransit demand and costs since 2007, and (3) actions transit agencies are taking to help address changes in the demand for and costs of ADA paratransit service. GAO analyzed FTA's ADA compliance reports; conducted a generalizable web-based survey of 145 transit agencies; interviewed federal officials; and interviewed officials from 20 transit agencies, chosen based on a variety of characteristics, including geographic diversity. What GAO Found Little is known about the extent of transit agencies' compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) paratransit service requirements. FTA does receive some assurance that agencies are complying with federal statutes and regulations, including ADA paratransit requirements, because transit agencies that receive FTA funding are required to self-certify and assure that they are complying with the Department of Transportation's ADA regulations. Additionally, FTA conducts specialized ADA paratransit compliance reviews that examine multiple aspects of an agency's paratransit services; however, few transit agencies are selected for review each year. FTA generally relies on complaints, media reports, experience with an agency, and other information to select agencies for review, but does not have documented criteria for selecting agencies. This informal selection process does not align with federal guidance on internal controls related to communication, documentation, and monitoring. Lastly, according to FTA officials, all finalized ADA paratransit compliance review reports are to be available on FTA's website, but GAO identified nine final review reports--conducted from 2004 to 2010--that have not been posted to FTA's website. Based on GAO's survey, the demand for ADA paratransit trips increased, since 2007 for some transit agencies, and costs for providing the trips remain high. The average number of annual ADA paratransit trips provided by a transit agency increased 7 percent from 2007 to 2010; from 172,481 trips in 2007 to 184,856 trips in 2010. Increases in demand for ADA paratransit services were driven by the 10 largest transit agencies, measured according to the population size of their service areas. Also, ADA paratransit trips are much more costly to provide than fixed-route trips. Similarly, the average cost of providing an ADA paratransit trip in 2010 was $29.30, an estimated three and a half times more expensive than the average cost of $8.15 to provide a fixed-route trip. The average cost of providing an ADA paratransit trip increased 10 percent from 2007 to 2010. GAO's analysis of ADA paratransit data available in FTA's National Transit Database (NTD) found that, according to GAO standards for data reliability, the data are not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of assessing changes in ADA paratransit demand and costs. For example, GAO found discrepancies, such as incomplete data, that may understate or overstate the number of ADA trips and amount of ADA expenses. According to FTA officials, some transit agencies fail to report these data, while others misunderstand the data fields and make reporting errors as a result. Transit agencies are taking actions such as coordinating with other transportation providers, offering travel training, and improving accessibility to address changes in ADA paratransit demand and costs. According to GAO's survey, about 59 percent of transit agencies are coordinating with health and human services providers to improve ADA paratransit services or address the costs of providing such services. About 44 percent of transit agencies are coordinating with other local transportation providers. Additionally, about 55 percent are using travel training to help paratransit riders' transition to fixed-route services. Furthermore, GAO's survey results showed that over 62 percent of transit agencies have made accessibility improvements to their fixed-route systems since 2007. What GAO Recommends The Secretary of Transportation should direct the FTA Administrator to (1) document and make publicly available a formal approach for selecting transit agencies for ADA paratransit compliance reviews, (2) post the backlog of ADA's compliance-review final reports and establish a process for the timely posting of future reports, and (3) provide guidance to transit agencies on how to accurately complete existing ADA paratransit data fields in the NTD.

gao_GAO-13-581

gao_GAO-13-581_0

MTW agencies are not required to expend a specific proportion of their HUD funds on activities that encourage work and self-sufficiency. The total number of families in either of the two FSS programs cannot be reliably assessed based on available PIC data for fiscal years 2006-2011 because of missing program start dates, exit dates, and annual updates. Participation data for the ROSS SC program from fiscal years 2008 (the year the current version of this program started) through 2011 also were limited, primarily because of the lack of reporting guidance for the program and the difficulty of aggregating the data. Without developing a reliable process for collecting and analyzing data on the number of residents assisted through the ROSS SC program, HUD lacks basic information needed to manage the program. Programwide data on residents’ participation in MTW activities related to increasing self-sufficiency from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 generally were unavailable. HOPE VI. MTW. HUD Has Lacked a Strategy for Using Collected Data to Evaluate the Impact of Four Programs HUD has performed limited analyses—to assess outcomes for the programs as a whole—of data related to self-sufficiency outcomes that FSS grant recipients must report into its information systems. Additionally, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) emphasizes the need for information on the effectiveness of federal programs to improve congressional decision making. Where HUD had data, the data suggest positive changes in income and employment for families that participated in the two FSS programs, but these results are not conclusive. We observed these changes for the families that started an FSS program in 2006 and completed it in 5 years or less.based on the 25 percent of families for which HUD data indicated completed the programs in 5 years or less. Conclusions HUD’s housing assistance programs serve millions of low-income residents. First, it does not have reliable data on participation in self- sufficiency activities across PHAs. Federal internal control standards state that program managers need operational data to determine whether they are meeting their agencies’ strategic plans and meeting their goals for the effective and efficient use of resources. As stated above, internal control standards underline the importance not only of collecting but also using information to achieve programmatic goals—helping families increase self-sufficiency. A strategy for using these data could inform overall management review, congressional oversight, and planning for these programs. For instance, using such data could help HUD identify from which PHAs to draw lessons to help improve HUD management of the grant programs as well as PHA management of self- sufficiency-related activities. Recommendations for Executive Action To better inform Congress and improve what is known about residents’ participation in key grant programs designed to facilitate resident self- sufficiency, and their progress towards self-sufficiency, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development should develop and implement a process to better ensure that data on FSS participant grants are complete; such a process should include steps for identifying missing data, identifying the reasons for missing data, and taking steps to help ensure data are complete; a process to better ensure that PHAs awarded ROSS SC grants annually report required participation and outcome data that are comparable among grant recipients; this process should include the issuance of program-specific reporting guidance; a strategy for regularly analyzing FSS participation and outcome data; such a strategy could include identification of PHAs from which lessons could be learned and PHAs that may need assistance improving completion rates or outcomes; and a strategy for regularly analyzing ROSS SC participation and outcome data; such a strategy could include identification of PHAs from which lessons could be learned and PHAs that may need assistance improving participation rates or outcomes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) discuss what is known about the costs of and residents’ participation in Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant programs that encourage work and self-sufficiency, (2) determine what is known about the effect on residents of HUD grant programs to promote self-sufficiency, and (3) describe steps HUD has taken to coordinate with other federal agencies and increase residents’ access to non-HUD programs that encourage work and self-sufficiency. Based on these criteria, we identified the following programs: Public Housing Family Self-Sufficiency (PH FSS) Housing Choice Voucher Family Self-Sufficiency (HCV FSS) Resident Opportunity and Self-Sufficiency Service Coordinators (ROSS SC) Moving to Work (MTW) HOPE VI HUD officials agreed that we had identified the key grant programs that encourage work and self-sufficiency.

Why GAO Did This Study HUD reported in 2011 that nearly 8.5 million lower-income families paid more than half their monthly income for rent, lived in substandard housing, or both. As the number of those needing assistance is greater than existing federal programs can serve, if families were able to increase their income and no longer require housing assistance, spaces could become available for other needy families. HUD offers several competitive grants that PHAs can use to hire staff who link residents to services or implement programs that encourage self-sufficiency. GAO was asked to examine the effectiveness of HUD's efforts to promote self-sufficiency among residents. Among its objectives, this report describes (1) costs and resident participation in HUD grant programs for PHAs that encourage work and self-sufficiency and (2) available information on the programs' effects on residents. GAO reviewed HUD's goals for encouraging self-sufficiency, program descriptions, and regulations; analyzed grant award data for fiscal years 2006-2011 and available outcome information; and interviewed HUD and PHA officials. What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds five key grant programs that encourage resident self-sufficiency. In fiscal year 2011, HUD awarded $113 million to the Housing Choice Voucher Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS), Public Housing FSS, and Resident Opportunity and Self-Sufficiency Service Coordinators (ROSS SC) programs. Public housing agencies (PHA) with HOPE VI grants or designated as Moving to Work (MTW) agencies spent a portion of their funds on activities that encourage self-sufficiency, but the amounts MTW agencies spent are not known for the program as a whole. Additionally, data on resident participation in the five programs were limited. The number of families that participated in the FSS programs and ROSS SC cannot be reliably assessed due to missing start dates, end dates, and annual updates, and a lack of reporting guidance. HOPE VI data on residents' participation does not include information on the elderly or persons with disabilities. Programwide MTW data on participation generally were unavailable. Internal control standards for the federal government state that program managers need operational data to determine whether they are meeting goals for accountability (effective and efficient use of resources). Without complete participation data, HUD lacks key information to effectively manage and evaluate its programs and Congress lacks data needed to oversee the programs. HUD lacks a strategy for using data it requires of PHAs to expand what is known about outcomes in four of the programs. HUD has performed limited analysis of the data related to self-sufficiency outcomes for both types of FSS grants reported into its information systems. HUD has not analyzed similar data reported for ROSS SC and MTW activities. However, for HOPE VI HUD collects consistent, outcome-based measures for participation in self-sufficiency activities and uses the data to track residents' progress towards self-sufficiency. Internal control standards underline the importance not only of collecting but also using information to achieve programmatic goals. Also, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) emphasizes the need for information on the effectiveness of federal programs to improve congressional decision making. A strategy for using these data could inform overall management review, congressional oversight, and planning for these programs. Using such data could help HUD identify from which PHAs to draw lessons to help improve HUD management of the programs as well as PHA management of self-sufficiency-related activities. GAO's analysis of available data on residents who participated in the FSS programs suggests positive changes for those who completed the programs, but the results are not conclusive because data indicating whether a family exited FSS or subsidized housing were missing for 35 percent of families that started an FSS program in 2006. What GAO Recommends For three of its self-sufficiency programs, HUD should develop processes and program-specific reporting guidance to better ensure required data on participation and outcomes are complete. HUD agreed with three recommendations but disagreed that it should analyze data for the ROSS SC program. GAO believes that analysis of program data is critical for assessing outcomes.

gao_GAO-09-980

gao_GAO-09-980_0

For example, through a cooperative agreement with AED, USAID is funding the FANTA-2 project to initiate the following multiyear studies in 2009: a study of exit strategies in Bolivia, Honduras, and Kenya, which will produce recommendations for effective ways to sustain program benefits after U.S. nonemergency food aid programs have been phased out; a study to identify key components of success in Preventing Malnutrition in Children Under 2 Approach (PM2A) programs in Guatemala and Burundi; a study to improve the early warning and response capacity in FFP’s multiyear assistance programs in Haiti, Niger, and Uganda; an update of the 2002 Food Aid and Food Security Assessment, which will evaluate progress made under FFP’s Strategic Plan for 2006-2010; and a study testing the efficacy and safety of emergency food products (EFP) that is co-funded by USAID’s Bureau for Global Health and FFP. However, USAID has determined that the Food for Peace Act precludes the agency from using the newly authorized funding for monitoring and evaluation of nonemergency food aid for grants and cooperative agreements. USAID’s Monitoring and Evaluation of Nonemergency Food Aid Are Not Fully Integrated with Program Management USAID’s monitoring and evaluation of its nonemergency food aid programs are consistent to varying degrees with some of the principles established by AEA to integrate evaluation into program management. We found that USAID’s actions were (1) generally consistent with the AEA principles for policies and procedures and for independence; (2) partially consistent with the principles for scope and coverage, dissemination of results, professional competence, and resources; and (3) not consistent with the principles for monitoring and evaluation plans. As FFP does not have reliable data on the number of its field staff that perform monitoring and evaluation functions, and the specific skills and competencies of those staff, it is not possible to determine their overall competence. Greater Resources Are Now Available for Monitoring and Evaluation, but Their Sufficiency Is Difficult to Determine Absent a Needs Assessment The Food for Peace Act provides FFP with a stable source of new funding of up to $22 million annually for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2012 to improve, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of nonemergency food aid programs. USAID’s Actions Were Not Consistent with the AEA Principles for Monitoring and Evaluation Plans According to FFP officials, FFP plans some of its monitoring and evaluation activities, but lacks an overall plan that integrates its monitoring and evaluation with program management. Conclusions Nonemergency food aid programs are an essential component of the U.S. strategy to reduce global food insecurity, and Congress has authorized new funding for USAID to improve its oversight of these programs. However, weak planning could impede these efforts, including the upgrade of FFP’s information technology system. As a result, planned actions that are essential to effective program management, such as the expansion of a computerized monitoring system for food aid programs and cross-cutting evaluations, could be jeopardized. It would also describe system characteristics for a proposed system from a user’s point of view and include high-level descriptions of information systems, their interrelationships, and information flows. USAID concurred with our first recommendation to develop a concept of operations document to help reduce the risks associated with upgrading FFP’s information technology system. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In passing the Food for Peace Act in 2008, Congress required the Comptroller General of the United States to review the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Report to Congress on the agency’s efforts to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of its nonemergency food aid programs and provide recommendations for improvement. To address this congressional mandate, we reviewed (1) USAID’s plans and actions to improve its monitoring and evaluation of nonemergency food aid programs provided under the Food for Peace Act and (2) the extent to which USAID has integrated its monitoring and evaluation of nonemergency food aid with program management, particularly with regard to established principles.

Why GAO Did This Study In passing the Food for Peace Act in 2008, Congress authorized up to $22 million annually for fiscal years 2009 to 2012 to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to improve, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of nonemergency food aid programs. Congress also required USAID to report on its oversight of these programs and the Comptroller General to review and report to Congress on USAID's report. Through analysis of agency documents; interviews with agency officials, experts, and partners; and visits to Bangladesh and Haiti, this mandated report reviews (1) USAID's plans and actions to improve its monitoring and evaluation of nonemergency food aid programs and (2) the extent to which USAID has integrated its monitoring and evaluation of nonemergency food aid with program management. What GAO Found USAID's actions to improve its monitoring and evaluation of these programs could be hindered by weak planning. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that USAID's nonemergency food aid programs in developing countries are implemented as intended, and evaluation helps to assure that these programs achieve their goal of reducing global food insecurity. First, with funding from the Food for Peace Act, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) plans to increase the number of field staff responsible for the monitoring of nonemergency food aid programs, has provided funding for the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, and has initiated an upgrade of its information technology system. However, FFP's plans for the information technology upgrade lack a concept of operations document, which describes system characteristics for a proposed system from a user's point of view and includes high-level descriptions of information systems, their interrelationships, and information flows. Second, with funding from other sources, USAID plans to carry out additional actions in an effort to improve its oversight of food aid, including the expansion of a computerized system for monitoring the implementation and management of nonemergency food aid programs. However, USAID has not determined a stable source of funding for these initiatives beyond the first year of operations due to legal restrictions that preclude the agency from using the newly authorized funding for grants and cooperative agreements. USAID's monitoring and evaluation of its nonemergency food aid programs are consistent to varying degrees with some of the principles established by the American Evaluation Association's Task Force on Evaluation Policy to integrate evaluation into program management. GAO found that (1) FFP's actions were generally consistent with the principles for policies and procedures and for independence. For example, FFP has issued policies and procedures for monitoring and evaluating food aid programs and generally uses external evaluators to assess its multiyear assistance programs. (2) FFP's actions were partially consistent with the principles for scope and coverage, dissemination of results, professional competence, and resources. For example, FFP relies on a range of staff to perform its monitoring and evaluation, but does not have reliable data on the numbers of field staff who have competencies in monitoring and evaluation, or their specific skills. (3) FFP's actions were not consistent with the principles for monitoring and evaluation plans. While FFP plans some of its monitoring and evaluation activities--such as final evaluations for multiyear assistance programs--it lacks an integrated plan to ensure that monitoring and evaluation results will be used to improve program management.

gao_GAO-09-71

gao_GAO-09-71_0

Nonmilitary assistance efforts are implemented by USAID, Justice, and, State, which oversee a diverse range of social, economic, and justice initiatives. In January 2007, the government of Colombia announced a 6-year follow- on strategy, the PCCP. Colombia’s security climate has improved as a result of progress in a number of areas, but U.S. and Colombian officials cautioned that current programs must be maintained for several years before security gains can be considered irreversible. Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Fully Achieved From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine production increased over the period. To put Colombia’s 6-year drug reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs to increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate drug crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and cocaine did not become operational until 2001 and later. 8 through 10) reported by the government of Colombia. U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics and Security Objectives State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2000 to 2008 to the Colombian military and police to support Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics and security objectives (see table 2). This support has led to a range of accomplishments since 2000 including increasing the cost of doing business for both coca farmers and drug traffickers by eradicating illicit drug crops and seizing finished product; destroying hydrochloride laboratories; demobilizing, capturing, and killing thousands of combatants; and the capture or killing of several high-profile leaders of FARC and other illegal armed groups. Army Ground Forces Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $104 million to advise, train, and equip Colombian ground forces, which grew by almost 50 percent during this period. U.S. funded counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying, did not achieve Plan Colombia’s overarching goal of reducing the cultivation, production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in part because coca farmers responded with a series of effective countermeasures. U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug Production Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided nearly $1.3 billion for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, focusing on the promotion of (1) economic and social progress and (2) the rule of law, including judicial reform. To support social and economic progress, the largest share of U.S. nonmilitary assistance has gone toward alternative development, which has been a key element of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and has bettered the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. Other social programs have assisted thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 30,000 former combatants. For example, the geographic areas where alternative development programs operate are limited by security concerns, and programs have not demonstrated a clear link to reductions in illicit drug cultivation and production. In response to this guidance and budget cuts to fiscal year 2008 military assistance to Colombia instituted by Congress, State and Defense have accelerated efforts to nationalize or partly nationalize the five major Colombian military and National Police aviation programs supported by the United States. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia’s drug reduction and enhanced security objectives; (2) program support provided to the Colombian military and National Police, including specific results and related challenges; (3) nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia, including specific results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if any, these efforts face. At the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, we met with U.S. officials with the Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as U.S.-funded contractor representatives assisting with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, the National Police Air Service, and the police aerial eradication program. However, the fact that the majority of coca is cultivated outside of USAID’s economic corridors poses challenges for USAID’s strategic goal of reducing the production of illegal drugs. 4. 6. State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for Managing Its Aviation Fleet.

Why GAO Did This Study In September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy, known as "Plan Colombia," to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to "nationalize" or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia. What GAO Found Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent, respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by degrading these groups' finances. U.S. Embassy Bogot? officials cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring only police attention. Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, over 130 U.S.-funded helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly $1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia's justice sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development, which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results. In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the largest--the Army Aviation Brigade--slated for turnover by 2012. Two National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established. State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies.

gao_GAO-04-685T

gao_GAO-04-685T_0

The Court Was Timely in Transferring Cases and Conducting Other Court Proceedings The Family Court met established timeframes for transferring cases into the Family Court and decreased the timeframes for resolving abuse and neglect cases. While the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001 generally required the transfer of abuse and neglect cases to the Family Court by October 2003, it also permitted judges outside the Family Court to retain certain abuse and neglect cases provided that their retention of cases met criteria specified in the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001. Specifically, these cases were to remain at all times in full compliance with ASFA, and the Chief Judge of the Superior Court must determine that the retention of the case would lead to a child’s placement in a permanent home more quickly than if the case were to be transferred to a judge in the Family Court. The median days to begin disposition hearings for children removed from their homes declined by 202 days to 39 days, or about 84 percent, between 2001 and 2003. Despite declines in timeframes to begin adjudication and disposition hearings, the Family Court has not achieved full compliance with the ASFA requirement to hold permanency hearings within 12 months of a child’s placement in foster care. The percentage of cases with timely permanency hearings increased from 25 percent in March 2001 to 55 percent in September 2002, as shown in figure 4. The Family Court and CFSA Have Improved Their Working Relationship, but Hindering Factors Still Exist The working relationship between the Family Court and CFSA has improved; however, Family Court judges and CFSA officials noted several hindrances that constrain their working relationship. For example, although CFSA caseworkers are responsible for identifying and arranging services needed for children and their families, some caseworkers said that some Family Court judges overruled their service recommendations. According to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court, the new space will consolidate all public functions of the Family Court and 76 percent of the support functions and associated personnel. The Superior Court and the District Are Making Progress Toward Exchanging Data among Their Computer Systems, but the District Has Not Resolved Several Critical Issues The Superior Court and the District of Columbia are exchanging some data and making progress toward developing a broader capability to share data among their respective information systems. In August 2003, the Superior Court began using IJIS to automate the exchange of data with District agencies, such as providing CFSA and the Office of the Corporation Counsel with information on the date, time, and location of scheduled court proceedings. CFSA managers said that scheduling of court hearings has improved. Conclusions While the Superior Court, the Family Court, and the District have made progress in implementing the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001, several issues continue to affect the court’s progress in meeting all requirements of the act. Related GAO Products D.C. Family Court: Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Its Transition. D.C. Child and Family Services: Key Issues Affecting the Management of Its Foster Care Cases. Foster Care: States’ Early Experiences Implementing the Adoption and Safe Families Act.

Why GAO Did This Study The Family Court, established by the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001, was created in part to transition the former Family Division of the D.C. Superior Court into a court solely dedicated to matters concerning children and families. The act required the transfer of abuse and neglect cases by October 2003 and the implementation of case management practices to expedite their resolution in accordance with timeframes established by the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA); a plan for space, equipment, and other needs; and that the Superior Court integrate its computer systems with those of other D.C. agencies. The act also reformed court practices and established procedures intended to improve interactions between the court and social service agencies in the District. One such agency, the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), is responsible for protecting children at risk of abuse and neglect and ensuring that services are provided for them and their families. Both social service agencies and the courts play an important role in addressing child welfare issues. Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, asked GAO to assess the Family Court's efforts to comply with ASFA requirements and the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001, and its efforts to improve communication with CFSA. What GAO Found The Family Court met timeframes for transferring cases and decreased the timeframes for resolving abuse and neglect cases. As of October 2003, only 34 of the approximately 3,500 cases that were to be transferred to the Family Court from other divisions of the Superior Court remained outside the Family Court. For children removed from their homes, the median days to begin disposition hearings declined by 202 days to 39 days, or about 84 percent between 2001 and 2003. However, the Family Court has not met the ASFA requirement to hold permanency hearings within 12 months of a child's placement in foster care for all cases. Timely permanency hearings were held for 25 percent of cases in March 2001 and 55 percent in September 2002. Support from Family Court judges and top CFSA management has been a key factor in improving the working relationship between CFSA and the Family Court. However, Family Court judges and CFSA officials noted several hindrances that constrain their working relationship. For example, some CFSA caseworkers said that some Family Court judges overruled their service recommendations. Progress has also been made in acquiring permanent space for the Family Court and exchanging data with District agencies. According to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court, all public functions of the Family Court and 76 percent of the support functions will be consolidated in the new space. The construction project is scheduled for completion in 2009 and will require timely renovations in existing court buildings. To comply with the D.C. Family Court Act of 2001, the Superior Court and the District are exchanging some data and making progress toward developing the ability to exchange other data. In August 2003, the Superior Court began using a new computer system and is providing CFSA with information on scheduled court proceedings. Further, the District has developed a model to enable the exchange of data among several District agencies, but it has not yet resolved many critical systems issues.

gao_GAO-14-747

gao_GAO-14-747_0

For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) surveys federal workers with the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). Agencies’ Reported Use of Performance Information Generally Has Not Improved Since 2007 Few federal agencies showed improvement in managers’ use of performance information for decision making between 2007 and 2013, as measured by our use index. Specifically, our analysis of the average use index score at each agency found that most agencies showed no statistically significant change in use during this period. During the same time period, four agencies—the Departments of Energy and Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—experienced a statistically significant decline in managers’ use of performance information as measured by our index. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Survey Questions Addressing Key Practices Significantly Related to the Use of Performance Information Using the data from our 2013 survey of federal managers, we found that specific practices identified in our previous work on the use of performance information to enhance or facilitate the use of performance information for decision making were significantly related to the use of performance information as measured by our use index. We have highlighted those questions and responses that we found to have a statistically significant and positive relationship with the use of performance information index.performance information index for agencies increased when managers reported that their agencies engaged to a greater extent in these practices as reflected in the survey questions. For example, in 2013, OPM managers responded more favorably than the government-wide average on several of the survey questions related to these practices. OPM was one of the two agencies that experienced an increase in use of performance information from 2007 to 2013, as measured by our index. Concluding Observations Our analyses of agency-level results from our periodic surveys of federal managers in 2007 and 2013 reinforce that there are several leading practices and related survey questions that significantly influenced agencies’ use of performance information for management decision making. Departments of Commerce (Commerce) and the Treasury (Treasury), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA and Treasury raised concerns about the findings and conclusions in our report, including the design of the surveys. They said that it did not adequately provide agency-wide perspectives that fully represented the agencies’ use of performance information. We also did additional statistical testing to determine whether or not the changes between the 2007 and 2013 use indexes were statistically different among agencies. To clarify this point, we added the definition of performance information from the 2013 managers survey in the report. These practices include: aligning agencywide goals, objectives, and measures; improving the usefulness of performance information; developing the capacity to use performance information; demonstrating management commitment; and communicating performance information frequently and effectively. Each increase in the extent to which a manager felt their agency leadership was committed to results was associated with a .08 increase in the performance use index, or up to a .32 increase in the five-point performance use index when comparing managers who reported “no extent” of leadership commitment to those that reported “a very great extent.” Two questions related to communicating performance information frequently and effectively were significantly and positively associated with manager’s perceptions of an agency’s use of performance information, controlling for other factors.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO has long reported that agencies are better equipped to address management and performance challenges when managers effectively use performance information for decision making. However, GAO's periodic surveys of federal managers indicate that use of performance information has not changed significantly. GAO was mandated to evaluate the implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. GAO assessed agencies' use of performance information from responses to GAO's surveys of federal managers at 24 agencies. To address this objective, GAO created an index to measure agency use of performance information derived from a set of questions from the most recent surveys in 2007 and 2013, and used statistical analysis to identify practices most significantly related to the use of performance information index. What GAO Found Agencies' reported use of performance information, as measured by GAO's use of performance information index, generally did not improve between 2007 and 2013. The index was derived from a set of survey questions in the 2007 and 2013 surveys that reflected the extent to which managers reported that their agencies used performance information for various management activities and decision making. GAO's analysis of the average index score among managers at each agency found that most agencies showed no statistically significant change in use during this period. As shown in the table below, only two agencies experienced a statistically significant improvement in the use of performance information. During the same time period, four agencies experienced a statistically significant decline in the use of performance information. Legend statistically significant decrease statistically significant increase GAO has previously found that there are five leading practices that can enhance or facilitate the use of performance information: (1) aligning agency-wide goals, objectives, and measures; (2) improving the usefulness of performance information; (3) developing agency capacity to use performance information; (4) demonstrating management commitment; and (5) communicating performance information frequently and effectively. GAO tested whether additional survey questions related to the five practices were significantly related to the use of performance information as measured by the index. GAO found that the average use of performance information index for agencies increased when managers reported their agencies engaged to a great extent in these practices as reflected in the survey questions. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was one of the two agencies that experienced an increase in use of performance information from 2007 to 2013, as measured by the GAO index. In 2013, OPM managers responded more favorably than the government-wide average on several of the survey questions related to these practices. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Office of Management and Budget staff generally agreed with the report. Four agencies (the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)) provided comments that are addressed. Commerce and GSA agreed with the report. Treasury and NASA raised concerns about the findings and conclusions in this report, including the design of the surveys. GAO continues to believe its findings and conclusions are valid as discussed in the report. Twenty other agencies did not have comments.

gao_GAO-04-76

gao_GAO-04-76_0

When SBA embarked on this current transformation effort, it planned its implementation in three phases. SBA Has Made Some Progress in Implementing Transformation, but Budget Constraints and Staffing Challenges Could Continue to Impede Progress As part of the first phase of SBA’s transformation, the agency began implementing pilot initiatives to test a new marketing focus for its district offices and centralizing some of its loan functions. SBA’s centralization efforts could also be impeded by the challenge of realigning staff from multiple field offices so that it can operate its central locations with experienced employees. SBA officials also told us that centralization results in faster processing times. These practices and implementation steps are shown in table 1. The SBA Administrator has provided a rationale behind the purpose of the agency and the goals of the transformation by addressing district directors and visiting field offices to discuss the importance and goals of transformation—to increase awareness of SBA’s services and to make SBA a better trained, better equipped, and more efficient organization. SBA has dedicated an implementation team to manage the transformation process, but it has experienced leadership changes that were not made apparent to employees and stakeholders. As a result, the scorecard may be limited in measuring success that could be directly attributed to the pilot efforts for marketing and outreach. SBA did not communicate sufficiently with its employees. SBA stated that it clearly lays out its funding requests for transformation in the Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request and Performance Plans. To determine SBA’s progress in implementing its transformation effort and challenges that have or could impede progress, we analyzed planning, budget, and implementation documents related to SBA’s transformation and interviewed key officials at SBA headquarters involved in the transformation planning and implementation processes. To assess whether SBA applied practices that are important to organizational change and human capital management in the federal government, we reviewed the literature and our previous work on reorganizations, organizational change, and human capital management to identify key practices that have been recognized as contributing to successful organizational transformation.

Why GAO Did This Study The Small Business Administration (SBA) has recognized that it needs to realign its current organizational structure and processes to improve its ability to fulfill its primary mission--supporting the nation's small businesses. In July 2002, SBA announced that it was initiating a transformation effort to increase the public's awareness of SBA's services and products and make its processes more efficient. GAO evaluated SBA's progress in implementing its transformation initiatives and challenges that have impeded or could impede implementation and whether SBA's transformation incorporates practices GAO has identified in previous work that are important to successful organizational change. What GAO Found SBA has made some progress in transforming its organization, although efforts could be impeded by budgetary and staffing challenges. SBA started three district office pilots to test marketing and outreach techniques and two pilots to centralize loan processes. However, SBA officials told us that their plans for expanding the pilots and implementing additional initiatives have changed because the agency did not receive any funding for transformation in fiscal year 2003 and may not receive any in fiscal year 2004. GAO found that SBA did not provide consistent, clear budget requests with a detailed plan for transformation results. The challenge of staffing its centralization initiatives, including relocating employees and avoiding undue disruptions to operations, could further complicate SBA's progress. When SBA initially planned and began implementing transformation, it gave some attention to practices important to successful organizational change. SBA drafted a plan and created an implementation team to manage the transformation. However, significant weaknesses in implementation could impede further progress and exacerbate the challenges noted above. The transformation could fail if practices and implementation steps focusing on transparency and communication are not given more attention.

gao_GAO-07-412

gao_GAO-07-412_0

Steps Taken Include Port- Specific and Industry-Wide Actions As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters, port authorities report taking many steps to mitigate vulnerabilities. Acting as a forum for port officials to share their experiences with natural disasters, these working groups were able to develop a manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts. Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats have also responded to these lessons learned by other ports. Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate disaster planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their current plans. Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery Efforts Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken steps to help port authorities strengthen ports’ ability to recover from future natural disasters. These efforts have focused on increased coordination and communication with stakeholders and also on building stakeholders’ knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. The Maritime Administration began updating the guidebook after the 2005 hurricane season. For example, district U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff have (1) organized and chaired yearly hurricane planning forums to which all ports in the region are invited; (2) organized prestorm teleconferences for port stakeholders, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Navy, and in some instances, the media; (3) participated in the Coast Guard’s Partner Emergency Action Team, which specifically address disaster preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard to better facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5) implemented informational training on planning for hurricanes to ports and other maritime stakeholders. DHS, which through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an example of how to incorporate a wider of scope of committee activity. Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted Separately from Other Threats Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for natural disasters separately from plans that address security threats. In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the Coast Guard. Unified disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural and man-made, be considered together. This is referred to as an all-hazards approach. The Coast Guard directs the Area Maritime Security Committee to use MSRAM in the development of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security measures, and ports in particular have been targeted due to their vulnerability and their criticality to the U.S. economy. To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report, initiated under the Comptroller General’s authority to examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and (3) the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and the effect of this approach on their ability to share information with port stakeholders and access federal resources. To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S. ports. Experience with recent natural disasters. To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and the effects of that approach on information-sharing among port stakeholders and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and federal disaster planning documents collected from various port stakeholders at each of the seven ports we visited in person.

Why GAO Did This Study U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports. What GAO Found Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as their biggest challenges. Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports' natural disaster planning efforts including: (1) the level of participation in disaster forums, and (2) the level of information sharing among port stakeholders In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.

gao_GAO-17-12

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These systems are intended to provide secure, reliable, mission-critical voice communications in a variety of environments, scenarios, and emergencies. In written responses to our survey, agencies reported that they prefer to continue to use equipment from the same manufacturers for various reasons, including ensuring compatibility of new LMR equipment with existing system requirements and reducing the need for training on new equipment and systems. Not all federal agencies that responded to our survey reported a need for LMR interoperability with one another, but most agencies mutually and independently agreed whether or not they require it. About 68 percent of the ratings from agencies that mutually agreed on the need to communicate with each other using LMR reported having good or excellent LMR interoperability. While Standardized Equipment and Training Help, Proprietary Features and Other Factors Continue to Hinder Interoperability Standardized Technology and Training Help Enhance Interoperability The use of standards-based and multi-band LMR equipment and training and exercises have helped to enhance interoperability, according to agencies we surveyed. With respect to standards-based equipment, almost all of the agencies that use LMR equipment to communicate with other agencies have partially or fully implemented the use of P25- compliant LMR devices, according to our survey. Another LMR technology—the multiband radio (including dual, tri- and quad-band devices)—operates on multiple public-safety radio bands and can help to enhance interoperability across users on different parts of the radio spectrum. In particular, the following factors continue to limit agencies’ progress in achieving interoperability with partner agencies: (1) the use of proprietary features and encryption in devices, (2) the limited use of interoperability channels, (3) the lack of standard operating procedures, and (4) the limited investments in LMR systems and devices. For example, 13 agencies reported using two or more different vehicles, and three agencies reported using four different vehicles. A Category Management Approach to Procurement Could Lower LMR Costs and Improve Interoperability While some agencies that responded to our survey reported using contract vehicles, many reported that they do not coordinate with other agencies before purchasing new LMR equipment. However, in response to our survey, nearly 40 percent of agencies (22 of 57) reported that they have not coordinated procurement activities of LMR devices and related equipment with other federal agencies within the past 5 years, such as by identifying common technical requirements before purchasing new LMR equipment. These items make up more than half of the federal government’s overall expenditures and agencies often purchase and manage these items in a fragmented and inefficient manner, according to OMB. However, OMB officials acknowledged that a category management approach to LMR procurement may save the government money while also supporting the goal of enhanced LMR interoperability among agencies, largely because it would require agencies to identify their common technical requirements and purchase equipment in larger quantities through fewer transactions. Including LMR equipment in OMB’s category management initiative may enable the federal government to more fully leverage its aggregate buying power to obtain the most advantageous terms and conditions for LMR procurements and realize cost savings. For example, many of the agencies that engage in coordinated procurement also reported a better general level of LMR interoperability. This duplication of procurement efforts for similar goods and services imposes significant costs to agencies. To address this issue, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy directs agencies to implement category management as a way to manage spending across government for commonly purchased goods and services. By including LMR equipment in the category management initiative, the federal government may be able to more fully leverage its aggregate buying power to save money and obtain the most advantageous terms and conditions for LMR procurements while also helping agencies to more effectively communicate in their day-to-day operations and when responding to emergencies. Specifically, we reviewed (1) LMR systems and devices used by selected federal agencies and the state of LMR interoperability among these agencies; (2) factors that help and hinder interoperability among agencies that use LMR; and (3) selected agencies’ practices for procuring LMR systems. The initial list of federal agencies was identified by the civilian participating members of the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) and confirmed by e-mail; we did not survey agencies from the Department of Defense. We interviewed officials from federal agencies with responsibilities related to emergency communications and procurement of LMR equipment, including DHS; the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, within the Department of Commerce; the Federal Communications Commission; the General Services Administration; the Office of Management and Budget; and administrators of the ECPC.

Why GAO Did This Study Public safety personnel across the nation rely on LMR to share information and coordinate their emergency response efforts. LMR systems are intended to provide secure, reliable, mission-critical voice communications in a variety of environments, scenarios, and emergencies; however, LMR interoperability—the ability to communicate across agencies—has been a long-standing challenge at all levels of government. GAO was asked to examine federal agencies’ LMR interoperability and procurement practices. GAO examined (1) LMR equipment used by federal agencies and the state of LMR interoperability among these agencies; (2) factors that help and hinder LMR interoperability among agencies; and (3) agencies’ LMR procurement practices. GAO surveyed civilian federal agencies, identified through their membership in the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (57 agencies fully responded to the survey and one agency provided a partial response); reviewed Department of Homeland Security planning documents related to interoperability; and interviewed federal agency officials with responsibilities related to emergency communications and procurement of LMR equipment. GAO also reviewed OMB initiatives to improve federal procurement. What GAO Found Federal agencies GAO surveyed generally use land mobile radio (LMR) equipment to meet their core missions, such as public safety, emergency management, or firefighting. More than two-thirds of the 57 agencies GAO surveyed reported using equipment from the same manufacturer because, for example, they believe doing so will help ensure compatibility of new LMR equipment with existing system requirements. Most agencies GAO surveyed were consistent in identifying each other as agencies with which they have or have not needed LMR interoperability over the past 5 years. Of the agencies that identified the need to communicate with each other, about two-thirds reported generally having a good or excellent level of LMR interoperability. The use of standards-based and multi-band LMR equipment has helped to enhance interoperability among agencies, but the use of proprietary features and other factors continue to hinder interoperability. Almost all of the agencies that GAO surveyed reported using LMR equipment that meets voluntary technical standards, which have improved interoperability. Further, almost half of these agencies reported using multiband radios, which operate on multiple public-safety radio bands, to enhance interoperability. However, agencies reported several factors continue to limit their progress in achieving interoperability with other federal agencies. These factors include the use of proprietary features and encryption in devices and limited investments in LMR systems and devices. For example, about half of the agencies surveyed reported that the use of proprietary features within LMR devices has hindered interoperability. Nearly half of the agencies GAO surveyed reported using pre-approved vendors with established prices to acquire LMR equipment, mainly through contracts sponsored by the Departments of Homeland Security and the Interior. While this approach can facilitate cost savings and interoperability, many of these agencies reported purchasing equipment through multiple agreements, a practice that can reduce these benefits. About 40 percent of agencies GAO surveyed reported using sole-source procurement or independent approaches. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in general, agencies often purchase and manage items in a fragmented and inefficient manner. This approach can result in duplication of effort, which imposes significant costs on federal agencies. OMB has directed agencies to implement “category management” as an improved way to manage spending across government for commonly purchased goods and services. This approach enables the government to leverage its purchasing power and realize cost savings. However, OMB’s category management initiative does not include LMR equipment even though federal agencies spend millions of dollars annually purchasing such equipment. By including LMR equipment in OMB’s category management initiative, the government could more fully leverage its aggregate buying power to obtain the most advantageous terms and conditions for LMR procurements. OMB officials agreed that a category management approach to LMR procurement might save the government money while supporting the goal of enhanced interoperability among agencies that require it, but OMB has not examined the feasibility of applying this approach to the procurement of LMR equipment. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that OMB examine the feasibility of including LMR in its category management initiative. OMB generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations.

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Treasury has taken several steps to increase participation, such as extending the program deadline, expanding program eligibility criteria through HAMP Tier 2, and providing funding to counseling agencies to assist homeowners with completion and submission of application packages (intake project). However, as shown in figure 1, participation in HAMP, as measured by trial and permanent modifications started each month, peaked in early 2010, generally declined in 2011, and has remained relatively steady through November 2013. Originally the project was scheduled to end in December of 2013, but Treasury extended the project through September of 2014. Initially, Treasury allocated $18.3 million in TARP funds for the MHA Outreach and Borrower Intake Project. Treasury Has Not Assessed Servicers’ Internal Controls or Borrower Data Related to Fair Lending Treasury requires MHA servicers to develop an internal control program to monitor compliance with fair lending laws. Our analysis of HAMP loan-level data, which focused on four large MHA servicers, identified some statistically significant differences within these servicers’ portfolios for certain protected groups in denials and cancellations of trial modifications and in the potential for redefault of permanent modifications, which might indicate a need for further review. Treasury Requires Servicers to Develop and Maintain Systems to Monitor Compliance with Fair Lending Laws The MHA Servicer Participation Agreement and MHA Handbook require that servicers have an internal control program to monitor compliance with relevant consumer protection laws, including ECOA and the Fair Housing Act, and that the servicers review the effectiveness of their internal control program quarterly. By evaluating the extent to which servicers have developed and maintained internal controls to monitor compliance with fair lending laws, Treasury could gain additional assurance that servicers are implementing the MHA program in compliance with fair lending laws. However, the MHA program provides direct outlays of taxpayer dollars to servicers and is intended to provide benefits to eligible borrowers. As such, it is important that Treasury take appropriate steps to help ensure that all eligible borrowers, including those whose primary language is not English, have access to the MHA program benefits. Finally, despite an executive order issued in 2000 to improve access to federal programs for people with limited English proficiency and a 2011 memorandum by the Attorney General renewing the federal government’s commitment to that executive order, Treasury officials have only recently developed a written plan that covers the Making Home Affordable programs as of November 2013. Housing counselors and housing advocacy groups that work with LEP borrowers have questioned the ability of servicers to assist LEP borrowers. Recommendations for Executive Action As part of Treasury’s efforts to continue improving the transparency and accountability of MHA, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take actions to require that its compliance agent take steps to assess the extent to which servicers have established internal control programs that effectively monitor compliance with fair lending laws that apply to MHA programs; issue clarifying guidance to servicers on providing effective relationship management to limited English proficiency borrowers; and ensure that the compliance agent assess servicers’ compliance with LEP relationship management guidance, once established. In its comment letter, Treasury noted that it was still considering our findings and recommendations, and agreed that it should continue to strengthen its program in order to help as many homeowners as possible avoid foreclosure. We clarified the text to acknowledge the actions taken to raise awareness and outreach to LEP borrowers, but that Treasury has not provided guidance to servicers on its requirement to have a relationship management policy for their LEP borrowers or assessed the effectiveness of its own or its servicers’ LEP practices. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives in this report were to examine (1) the status of Making Home Affordable (MHA) and steps Treasury is taking to increase participation in the program, (2) Treasury’s oversight of the MHA-related fair lending internal controls of participating servicers, and (3) Treasury’s and MHA servicers’ policies and practices for ensuring that borrowers with limited English proficiency (LEP) have equal access to the program. These checks were consistent with the reported key findings of differences between the fair lending and other selected populations and their comparison populations. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Home Affordable Modification Program Continues to Face Implementation Challenges.

Why GAO Did This Study Treasury introduced MHA in February 2009 and indicated that up to $50 billion would be used to help 3 to 4 million struggling homeowners avoid potential foreclosure. Since then, questions have been raised about participation rates and the overall success of the program. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 requires GAO to report every 60 days on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) activities. This 60-day report examines (1) the status of MHA and steps Treasury has taken to increase program participation, (2) Treasury's oversight of the MHA-related fair lending internal controls of servicers, and (3) Treasury's and MHA servicers' policies and practices for ensuring that LEP borrowers have equal access to the program. For this work, GAO reviewed program documentation, analyzed HAMP loan-level data, and interviewed officials from Treasury, fair lending supervisory institutions, and the five largest MHA servicers. What GAO Found Participation rates in the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a key component of the Making Home Affordable program (MHA), peaked in early 2010, generally declined during 2011, and remained relatively steady from 2012 through November 2013. As of November 2013, about 1.3 million borrowers had entered into a HAMP permanent modification. Treasury has made several efforts to increase participation, such as extending the program deadline through December 2015, expanding program eligibility requirements, and initiating the MHA Outreach and Borrower Intake Project. This project provides funding to counseling agencies to help borrowers complete and submit MHA application packages. The project was scheduled to end in December 2013 but was recently extended through September 2014. Treasury requires MHA servicers to develop internal control programs that monitor compliance with fair lending laws (the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act) but has not assessed the extent to which servicers are meeting this requirement. Treasury noted that it shares HAMP loan-level data with the federal agencies responsible for fair lending enforcement. GAO's analysis of HAMP loan-level data for four large MHA servicers identified some statistically significant differences in the rate of denials and cancellations of trial modifications and in the potential for redefault between populations protected by fair lending laws and other populations. Such analysis by itself cannot account for all factors that could explain these differences. Reviewing the fair lending internal controls of MHA servicers could give Treasury additional assurance that servicers are complying with fair lending laws. Despite an Executive Order issued in 2000 and a 2011 Attorney General's memorandum regarding improving access to federal programs for limited English proficiency (LEP) persons, Treasury only recently developed LEP-related written guidelines and procedures for the MHA programs. Treasury has taken measures to reach out to these borrowers and requires servicers to have a policy for “effective relationship management” with LEP borrowers. However, Treasury has not provided any clarifying guidance to servicers on what such a policy should contain or assessed servicer compliance with this requirement. Housing counselors have noted that LEP borrowers continue to encounter language-related barriers in obtaining access to MHA program benefits. Without a comprehensive strategy that includes guidance for servicers on engaging with LEP borrowers and monitoring of servicers, Treasury cannot ensure that all potential MHA participants have equal access to program benefits. Because the MHA program provides direct outlays of taxpayer dollars, it is important that Treasury take appropriate steps to ensure that all eligible borrowers, including those whose primary language is not English, have access to MHA program benefits. What GAO Recommends Treasury should (1) assess the extent to which servicers have established internal control programs to monitor compliance with fair lending laws, (2) issue guidance to servicers on working effectively with LEP borrowers and (3) monitor servicers' compliance with the guidance. Treasury noted that it was considering GAO's recommendations and agreed that it should continue to strengthen its program. Treasury also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report as appropriate.

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Background Prevalence and Characteristics of Medicaid Managed Long- Term Services and Supports Programs States’ increasing use of managed care for Medicaid beneficiaries needing long-term services and supports is a significant change from how states have historically met the needs of these vulnerable populations. CMS uses these elements to review and approve states’ MLTSS programs. In addition to state-specific requirements, states with MLTSS programs are also subject to broader quality requirements that apply to all Medicaid managed care programs. A beneficiary can file an appeal in response to an MCO’s decision to, among other things, reduce services, terminate services, or deny payment for services. A beneficiary can file a grievance with an MCO to express dissatisfaction about any matter not covered by appeals. Selected States Used Multiple Methods to Oversee MLTSS Care, and Varied in the Extent to Which They Used Beneficiary Appeals and Grievances to Monitor Access and Quality Selected States Used a Range of Methods, Including External Reviews, to Oversee MLTSS Access and Quality The six states we reviewed used a range of methods to oversee MLTSS beneficiaries’ access to and quality of care. Reviews of provider networks: Officials in all six states reported conducting their own assessments of MLTSS provider networks or requiring MCOs to report on their MLTSS provider networks. Selected States Varied in the Extent to Which They Used Appeals and Grievances to Monitor Beneficiaries’ Concerns about MLTSS Access and Quality The six states we reviewed varied in the extent to which—and how—they used appeals and grievance data to monitor beneficiaries’ concerns about quality and access in their MLTSS programs. While CMS has specified certain parameters for state oversight of MLTSS, the agency did not always require the six selected states to report the information needed to monitor this oversight. CMS’s 2013 guidance for MLTSS programs highlights the 10 elements that it deems essential for developing and maintaining high-quality programs, which CMS uses when reviewing or approving state MLTSS programs. In our review of the reporting required of our selected states, however, we found that CMS did not require all states to report on certain areas related to those key elements—namely network adequacy, that is, the sufficiency in the number and types of long-term care providers serving beneficiaries in the managed care plans; critical incidents, which are events or situations that cause or may cause harm to a beneficiary’s health or welfare, such as abuse, neglect, or exploitation; and appeals and grievances. As a result, we found cases where state reporting did not allow CMS to assess state adherence with federal guidance and oversight of MLTSS access and quality. CMS did not require three of our six selected states—Arizona, Minnesota, and Tennessee—to regularly report information on network adequacy, but it did require Delaware, Kansas, and Texas to report such information. Critical incidents reports. For example, CMS used the same, or similar, statement to indicate that all states should report on quality assurance efforts: “Identify any quality assurance and monitoring activities in the quarter.” In response to this, we found that four states reported general descriptions of their planned and ongoing quality assurance activities for MLTSS or their comprehensive managed care programs as a whole, and often repeated the same or similar information in subsequent quarterly reports. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Onsite Review of KanCare. external quality review, CMS does not have one consistent approach for monitoring MLTSS programs. However, any gaps in reporting requirements, and gaps in state reporting from what CMS has required, may mean that CMS does not always have the data to monitor key aspects of MLTSS access and quality among selected states and may be unable to reliably detect state or MCO practices that do not meet CMS’s guidance. Conclusions Using managed care to deliver long-term services and supports offers states an opportunity to allow Medicaid beneficiaries with significant health needs to live and receive care in the setting of their choice, expand access to home and community-based care, and provide such care at a potentially lower cost than institutional care. Recommendation To improve CMS’s oversight of states’ MLTSS programs, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take steps to identify and obtain key information needed to oversee states’ efforts to monitor beneficiary access to quality services, including, at a minimum, obtaining information specific to network adequacy, critical incidents, and appeals and grievances.

Why GAO Did This Study Twenty-two states use MLTSS programs to provide care for Medicaid beneficiaries who need long-term support. Using managed care to deliver long-term services and supports can be a strategy for states to expand home- and community-based care, which many beneficiaries prefer, and to lower costs. However, given the potential vulnerability and needs of beneficiaries in these programs, oversight is crucial to ensure their access to quality care. GAO was asked to review states' implementation and CMS's oversight of MLTSS programs. In this report, GAO (1) described how selected states monitored MLTSS access and quality, and (2) examined the extent to which CMS oversees MLTSS access and quality in selected states. GAO reviewed federal regulations, guidance, and internal control standards. For six states selected for variation in location, program size and duration, and other factors, GAO reviewed reporting requirements, reports to CMS, and other documents. GAO also reviewed data from these states on beneficiary appeals and grievances from 2013 through 2015—the most recent data available—and interviewed state and CMS officials. What GAO Found In Medicaid, long-term services and supports are designed to promote the ability of beneficiaries with physical, cognitive, or mental disabilities or conditions to live or work in the setting of their choice, which can be in home or community settings, or in an institution such as a nursing facility. States are increasingly delivering such services through managed care, known as managed long-term services and supports (MLTSS). In MLTSS, as with most Medicaid managed care programs, states contract with managed care organizations (MCO) to provide a specific set of covered services to beneficiaries in return for one fixed periodic payment per beneficiary. In addition, beneficiaries have the right to appeal an MCO decision to reduce, terminate, or deny their benefits, or file a grievance with an MCO regarding concerns about their care. The six states GAO reviewed—Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas—used a range of methods for monitoring access and quality in MLTSS programs. To oversee beneficiaries' care, GAO found that states used—to varying levels—external quality reviews, beneficiary surveys, stakeholder meetings, and beneficiary appeals and grievances data. For example, while all six states used external quality reviews and beneficiary surveys, GAO found that states varied in the extent to which—and how—they used appeals and grievances data to monitor beneficiaries' concerns about quality and access in their MLTSS programs. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal agency responsible for overseeing Medicaid—did not always require the six selected states to report the information needed to monitor access and quality in MLTSS programs. CMS primarily relied on its reviews of state-submitted reports to monitor MLTSS programs for compliance with federal regulations and state-specific reporting requirements, and what states are required to report to CMS can vary by state. Although CMS highlighted certain elements that it deemed essential to developing and maintaining high quality MLTSS programs in its 2013 guidance, GAO found that CMS did not require all selected states to report on these elements—namely, provider network adequacy; critical incidents, which are events that may cause abuse, neglect or exploitation of beneficiaries; and appeals and grievances. CMS did not require three of the six states that GAO reviewed to regularly report on network adequacy or provide summaries of critical incidents. Further, although CMS requires all selected states to report on their quality assurance efforts, GAO found that states often report general descriptions of their planned and ongoing quality assurance activities for MLTSS or their entire comprehensive managed care programs. Consequently, state reporting did not always provide CMS with information needed to assess state oversight of key elements. Gaps in reporting requirements may mean that CMS does not always have information needed to monitor key aspects of MLTSS access and quality among selected states and it may not be able to reliably detect state or MCO practices that do not meet CMS's guidance. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CMS take steps to identify and obtain information to oversee key aspects of MLTSS access and quality, including network adequacy, critical incidents, and appeals and grievances. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.

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MTS: Navigable Waterways, Ports, and Port Connectors The MTS is integral to the efficient movement of the nation’s freight. A Variety of Corps and DOT Programs Can Be Used to Maintain or Improve Some Segments of the MTS The Corps and DOT have programs that can be used to address three key infrastructure segments of the MTS. Specifically, the Corps is responsible for navigable waterways’ infrastructure and provides funding through its navigation program. Projects that improve or maintain ports and port connectors can receive federal funding or financing through a variety of programs administered by the DOT. As shown in Table 1 below, our analysis of Corps data found that the Corps’ total obligations for these accounts have decreased from over $3 billion in fiscal year 2009 to about $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2011, a reduction of approximately 41 percent.funds in each fiscal year are obligated for operation and maintenance activities. Several Challenges Exist to Maintaining and Improving the MTS We identified three key challenges to maintaining and improving MTS infrastructure. Aging MTS Infrastructure Navigable Waterways and Supporting Structures The Corps is facing challenges maintaining and improving navigation infrastructure, such as dredging channels and repairing locks. DOT has a more limited ability to prioritize funding for port infrastructure projects given the structure of federal surface transportation funding. The vast majority of DOT funding goes directly to state DOTs through formulas where decisions about transportation priorities are made at the state and local level. DOT’s competitive grant and credit programs provide one opportunity for the agency to prioritize funding for port infrastructure, yet funding for these projects is relatively limited compared to formula funding. Involving the Corps in the development of that plan is particularly important given the nexus between freight and the entire MTS, since the vast majority of the nation’s freight is imported and exported via navigable waterways through our nation’s ports. The CMTS does not have a process for reporting the extent to which the Strategy’s recommended actions have been addressed. The recently passed MAP-21 will focus efforts on improving freight mobility and the surface infrastructure that supports it, but it also provides an opportunity to better coordinate MTS investments system-wide. Besides establishing a framework for a national freight policy, MAP-21 requires DOT to develop a National Freight Strategic Plan in consultation with appropriate state DOTs and other appropriate private and public stakeholders. While the National Freight Strategic Plan requirements do not specifically mention consultation with the Corps and its plans to maintain and develop the nation’s navigable waterways, consideration of these waterside infrastructure investments is important to strategically investing in the MTS system-wide. Recommendations for Executive Action To help ensure coordination of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Transportation infrastructure investments in the Marine Transportation System, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two actions: 1) Direct the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration to inform the development of the National Freight Strategic Plan with information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ planned investments in the nation’s navigable waterways. In ensuring the review and update of the National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System, the Secretary should: establish accountability mechanisms—such as developing clear and desired results, specific milestones, and outcome-related performance measures—for the recommended actions of the National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System, and establish and implement a schedule for regular reporting of progress made in addressing the recommended actions of the National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System. DOT agreed to consider the report’s recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report are to (1) identify programs the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) administer to maintain or improve the Marine Transportation System (MTS); (2) determine the key challenges to maintaining and improving the MTS; and (3) discuss opportunities that may exist for the federal government to improve the effectiveness of its role in the MTS. To identify and assess opportunities for the federal government to improve the effectiveness of its role in the MTS, we reviewed documentation from the Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), including the CMTS Charter and the National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System (Strategy). During interviews with Corps and DOT officials, and industry associations, we also asked about their perspectives on the federal government role in maintaining and improving the MTS.

Why GAO Did This Study The MTS is integral to the efficient movement of the nation's freight. The MTS includes navigable waterways, ports, and port connectors, such as roads and railways that provide access to the Interstate highway system and the national rail network. According to DOT, approximately 90 percent of America's overseas imports and exports by tonnage move by ship. Consequently, the continued maintenance and improvement of the MTS is essential to sustaining the nation's competitive position in the global economy. This report examines (1) Corps and DOT programs that can be used to maintain or improve the MTS, (2) key challenges to maintaining and improving the MTS, and (3) opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the federal role in the MTS. GAO analyzed information from the Corps and DOT, interviewed relevant agency officials and industry associations, and conducted site visits to six ports--selected based on tonnage, geographic representation, and other factors--to discuss federal, state, and local investment in MTS infrastructure. What GAO Found The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) use a variety of programs to maintain and improve Marine Transportation System (MTS) infrastructure. The Corps is the lead federal agency responsible for maintaining and improving navigable waterways. Corps data show that obligations for navigable waterways have decreased from over $3 billion in fiscal year 2009 to about $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2011. Most annual DOT funding is provided to states through formulas, and states determine which projects to fund. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the Surface Transportation Program provided $9.5 billion to states for a variety of transportation projects, which may have included port improvements. However, because DOT does not specifically track formula funding used to maintain or improve ports or port connectors, officials were unable to provide GAO the extent to which these funds were used for port improvements, although the officials stated that the number of port-specific projects was likely small. Several DOT grant and credit programs can also provide specific funding to ports, though ports are primarily responsible for maintaining and improving infrastructure on port property. Aging MTS infrastructure, a growing backlog of projects, and the lack of an MTS system-wide prioritization strategy represent key challenges for the Corps and DOT to maintain and improve MTS infrastructure. For example, some structures that support navigation, such as locks, are over 100 years old, and their condition has resulted in deteriorating performance and costly delays to shippers. The Corps and DOT have taken some steps to prioritize their individual funding decisions, but none of these efforts consider MTS infrastructure system-wide. While the Corps is prioritizing projects within its navigation program, DOT has a more limited ability to prioritize funding for port infrastructure projects because the majority of DOT's funding goes to the states where decisions about transportation priorities are made at the state and local level. Two efforts in particular provide opportunities to improve the effectiveness of federal support to MTS infrastructure. First, the recently enacted Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act requires DOT to develop a National Freight Strategic Plan and to consult with appropriate transportation stakeholders. However, DOT and the Corps have historically had limited coordination involving system-wide MTS investments. Involving the Corps in the development of the National Freight Strategic Plan is particularly important given the critical role navigable waterways play in freight movement. Second, the Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS), a partnership of federal agencies chaired by DOT, has the opportunity to take further actions to help ensure that its 2008 National Strategy for the Marine Transportation System is reviewed and updated to reflect new and emerging challenges, and that its 34 recommendations to improve the MTS are implemented. One recommendation included studying approaches to allocate federal dollars among competing transportation priorities. However, the Strategy has not been reviewed and updated since the CMTS published it in 2008 and it does not incorporate accountability mechanisms, such as identifying desired results or performance measures, for the recommended actions. Such mechanisms would help ensure that the actions CMTS recommended to improve the MTS are indeed implemented. What GAO Recommends DOT should (1) inform the development of the National Freight Strategic Plan with the Corps' planned investments in the nation's navigable waterways and (2) ensure the review and update of the National Strategy for the MTS to include accountability mechanisms for the Strategy's recommended actions. DOT agreed to consider the report's recommendations.

gao_GAO-05-613

gao_GAO-05-613_0

As requested, this report addresses EPA’s actions related to Titles I, III, and IV: Title I establishes a detailed and graduated program for the attainment and maintenance of the national ambient air quality standards; Title III expands and modifies regulations of hazardous air pollutant emissions and establishes a list of 189 hazardous air pollutants to be regulated; Title IV establishes the acid deposition control program to reduce the adverse effects of acid rain by reducing the annual emissions of pollutants that contribute to it. The numerous actions required to meet the objectives of Titles I, III, and IV of the 1990 amendments vary in scope and complexity. In contrast, under Title III, EPA is required to implement technology-based standards for 174 separate categories of sources of hazardous air pollutants, involving many industries. Of the 256 requirements that EPA met late, 162 were met within 2 years of their statutory deadline and 94 were completed more than 2 years after their deadlines (see table 3). Consequently, improvements in air quality associated with some of these requirements may have been delayed. EPA officials cited several factors to explain why the agency missed deadlines for so many requirements. Among these factors was an emphasis on stakeholders’ review and involvement during regulatory development, which added to the time needed to issue regulations. In addition, EPA officials mentioned the need to set priorities among the tremendous number of new requirements for EPA resulting from the 1990 amendments, which meant that some of these actions had to be delayed. Moreover, competing demands caused by the workload associated with EPA’s responses to lawsuits challenging some of its rules caused additional delays. Thus, any improvements in air quality that would result from EPA meeting these requirements remain unrealized. The majority of the unmet requirements related to Title I are activities involving promulgating regulations that limit the emissions of volatile organic compounds from different groups of consumer and commercial products. According to EPA officials, these rules were never completed because EPA shifted its priorities toward issuing the Title III technology-based standards. EPA completed its first review and issued the first set of these risk-based amendments in March 2005. Observations The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 constituted a significant overhaul of the Clean Air Act, and notable reductions in emissions of air pollutants have been attained as a result of the many actions these amendments required of EPA, states, and other parties. EPA generally agreed with the findings presented in the report and provided supplemental information about the air quality, public health, and environmental benefits associated with implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and comments related to its future challenges. There are 21 requirements under Title III that EPA had not met as of April 2005, most of which involve the residual risk reviews required after EPA has set technology-based standards (see table 9). Specifically, EPA has not yet reviewed residual risk for 19 MACT standards with deadlines prior to April 2005. As of April 2005, EPA had completed 42 of the 44 requirements to meet the objectives of Title IV. These titles, which respectively address national ambient air quality standards, hazardous air pollutants, and acid deposition control, are the most relevant to proposed legislation and recently finalized regulations that address emissions of air pollutants by power plants. To obtain information on the status of EPA’s implementation of requirements related to Titles I, III, and IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990—both those with and without statutory deadlines— we obtained lists of these requirements used for GAO’s 2000 report, Air Pollution: Status of Implementation and Issues of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (GAO/RCED-00-72) and held discussions with EPA officials knowledgeable about EPA’s workload required to meet the objectives of these titles. As background, our report states that while air quality in the United States has steadily improved over the last few decades, more than a hundred million Americans continue to live in communities where pollution causes the air to be unhealthy at times, according to EPA.

Why GAO Did This Study While air quality in the United States has steadily improved over the last few decades, more than a hundred million Americans continue to live in communities where pollution causes the air to be unhealthy at times, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Clean Air Act, first passed in 1963, was last reauthorized and amended in 1990, when new programs were created and changes were made to the ways in which air pollution is controlled. The 1990 amendments included hundreds of requirements for EPA, as well as other parties, to take steps that will ultimately reduce air pollution. The amendments also established deadlines for many of these requirements. Since the 1990 amendments, various actions have been proposed to either amend the Clean Air Act or implement its provisions in new ways. GAO was asked to report on the current status of EPA's implementation of requirements under Titles I, III, and IV of the 1990 amendments. These titles, which address national ambient air quality standards, hazardous air pollutants, and acid deposition control, respectively, are the most relevant to proposed legislation and recently finalized regulations addressing emissions of air pollutants by power plants. What GAO Found As of April 2005, EPA had completed 404 of the 452 actions required to meet the objectives of Titles I, III, and IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Of the 338 requirements that had statutory deadlines prior to April 2005, EPA completed 256 late: many (162) 2 years or less after the required date, but others (94) more than 2 years after their deadlines. Consequently, improvements in air quality associated with some of these requirements may have been delayed. The numerous actions required to implement these titles varied in scope and complexity. For example, these actions included reviewing numerous state plans to comply with national health- and welfare-based air quality standards for six major pollutants, setting technology-based standards to reduce emissions from sources of hazardous air pollutants, and developing a new program to reduce acid rain. EPA officials cited several reasons for the missed deadlines, including the emphasis on stakeholders' involvement during regulatory development, which added to the time needed to issue regulations; the need to set priorities among the tremendous number of new responsibilities EPA assumed as a result of the 1990 amendments, which meant that some actions had to be delayed; and competing demands caused by the workload associated with EPA's response to lawsuits challenging some of its rules. Of the 48 requirements EPA had not met as of April 2005, 45 had associated deadlines, and 3 did not. The unmet requirements include 15 Title I requirements to promulgate regulations to limit the emissions of volatile organic compounds from a number of consumer and commercial products, such as household cleaners and pesticides. According to EPA officials, these rules were not completed because EPA shifted its priorities toward issuing standards related to the emissions of hazardous air pollutants regulated under Title III. However, the unmet requirements also include actions under Title III to periodically assess whether EPA's emissions standards for sources that emit significant amounts of hazardous air pollutants appropriately protect public health. These "residual risk" assessments are to be made within 8 years of the setting of each of the emissions standards, and 19 of these assessments are now past the 8-year mark. EPA completed the first of these residual risk assessments in March 2005. Any improvements in air quality that would result from EPA meeting these requirements remain unrealized. In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA generally agreed with our findings and provided supplemental information, primarily on the benefits of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the reasons for implementation delays.

gao_GAO-02-251

gao_GAO-02-251_0

FAA’s airport design standards regulate how an airport must be configured to safely serve aircraft with certain characteristics, such as wingspan and weight. 1). Determining the cost to serve NLA is difficult because a number of issues are unresolved including whether and the extent to which FAA revises NLA’s design standards or which airlines actually buy NLA and the frequency of NLA service at U.S. whether NLA will begin service in the United States as early as 2006, as planned; and the extent to which the cost estimates reported by the airports are attributable to NLA instead of changes to accommodate growth in air traffic. The 14 airports that expect to serve NLA by 2010 collectively reported that their cost estimate for infrastructure changes is $2.1 billion. With these issues resolved, airports will have a clearer understanding of the infrastructure changes that must be made and their costs. However, the company said that the estimates from these airports overstated the costs to accommodate NLA. Design Group V standards serve the Boeing 747, while Design Group VI standards will serve NLA.

What GAO Found Airbus Industrie plans to introduce the New Large Aircraft (NLA) to U.S. airports in 2006. The Boeing 747 (B-747)is currently the largest commercial aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sets standards that govern how an airport must be configured to safely serve aircraft with certain wingspans and weight. A B-747 operates under Design Group V standards, while FAA has determined that NLA will operate under Design Group VI standards. Determining the cost to serve NLA is difficult because several possible infrastructure changes at airports are unresolved. These include (1) whether and the extent to which FAA revises the standards or grants modifications, (2) which airlines buy NLA and the frequency of NLA service at U.S. airports, (3) when NLA begin serving these airports, and (4) the extent to which the cost estimates reported by the airports are attributed to NLA instead of changes to accommodate growth in air traffic. The 14 airports that expect to serve NLA by 2010 collectively report that their cost estimate for infrastructure changes is $2.1 billion; however, the ultimate cost will depend on how issues that affect cost will be resolved. As these issues are resolved, airports will have a clearer understanding of what infrastructure changes must be made at their costs.

gao_GAO-13-644

gao_GAO-13-644_0

We have found that the TPCC and its member agencies have improved coordination in several areas, but we also found shortcomings in the committee’s response to the budget-related portions of its mandate. The TPCC agreed with our findings and recommendation. The TPCC Does Not Report or Collect Information on How Resources Align with Priorities National Export Strategies Outline Priorities, but Do Not Identify Associated Resources The Export Enhancement Act states that the TPCC’s strategies should establish a set of priorities for federal export promotion activities and propose a unified federal trade promotion budget that supports the plan. Despite the current emphasis on export promotion as a high-priority goal, the level of detail on agencies’ budgets presented in the TPCC’s National Export Strategies has decreased. TPCC secretariat officials acknowledged that the amount of budget information presented in the National Export Strategies has declined and that the TPCC members currently place little emphasis on displaying or discussing agencies’ resources. The Budget Data the TPCC Collects Are Not Useful for Assessing Resource Allocations The TPCC Collects Some High- Level Budget Data The TPCC periodically collects summary data on agencies’ total budget authority for export promotion activities with OMB’s assistance. To be useful for assessing how agencies’ resources are allocated, data should, among other things, be consistent and sufficiently comprehensive for the intended purpose. Some TPCC member agencies conduct activities in more than one priority area. Among its many activities, USDA supports the goals of increasing exports by small and medium-sized enterprises and increasing export credit available to U.S. businesses. The data are not current: The TPCC’s data are not comprehensive because they do not include current information about agencies’ resources. However, the TPCC does not provide decision makers—including Congress and the Export Promotion Cabinet—with information that provides a clear understanding of how resources are currently allocated across the country and around the world among its member agencies or across federal export promotion priorities. The TPCC has responded to the National Export Initiative by reporting on efforts to address established priorities and working to improve interagency coordination, but the committee currently places almost no emphasis on understanding the federal resources dedicated to implementing the National Export Strategy, as is called for in good practices. In the absence of clear guidance, the data the TPCC collects are not comparable across agencies and not comprehensive enough to allow the TPCC to determine how resources are currently allocated in support of priority activities. Without consistent and comprehensive information on export promotion resources—presented transparently through the TPCC’s annual strategies—decision makers in Congress and the administration cannot determine whether the return on the federal investment in export promotion is adequate or make informed decisions about future resource allocations. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the consistency, comprehensiveness, and transparency of information provided to Congress and policymakers on the federal investment in export promotion programs, the Secretary of Commerce, as chair of the TPCC, should 1. develop and distribute guidance for member agencies on what information they should provide the TPCC on the resources they spend on export promotion activities, and 2. report in its National Export Strategies on how resources are allocated by agency and aligned with priorities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology This report assesses the extent to which the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) currently compiles and reports information on how budgetary resources are aligned with established export promotion priorities. We also interviewed staff of the TPCC Secretariat, which is housed in the Department of Commerce, and staff of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Why GAO Did This Study In 2010, the President launched the NEI with the goal of doubling U.S. exports over 5 years. More than 2 decades ago, Congress directed the President to establish the TPCC to provide a unifying framework for federal efforts in this area. Among other things, Congress directed the TPCC to assess the appropriate levels and allocations of resources and develop a government-wide strategic plan that identifies federal export promotion priorities, reviews current programs in light of these priorities, and proposes to the President a federal trade promotion budget that supports the plan. Congress also required the TPCC to submit annual reports to Congress describing the required strategic plan. This report assesses the extent to which the TPCC compiles and reports information on how federal export promotion resources are aligned with export promotion priorities. GAO reviewed the laws governing the TPCC and good practices for interagency initiatives, analyzed TPCC budget data and documents, and interviewed TPCC secretariat and Office of Management and Budget staff. What GAO Found The interagency Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) neither reports nor compiles information on how federal export promotion resources align with government-wide priorities. As a result, decision makers lack a clear understanding of the total resources dedicated across the country and around the world by TPCC member agencies to priority areas, such as increasing exports by small- and medium-sized businesses. GAO has previously reported that effective national strategies should address costs and has found shortcomings in the committee's response to the budget-related portions of its mandate. While the TPCC's National Export Strategy reports issued since initiation of the National Export Initiative (NEI) outline government-wide priorities and progress in achieving them, they do not discuss how resources are allocated in support of these priorities. Despite the current emphasis on export promotion as a high-priority goal, recent strategies have provided less information on budget resources than have previous strategies, as shown below. The TPCC last publicly reported a summary budget table in 2008. TPCC secretariat officials acknowledged that the TPCC agencies currently place little emphasis on displaying or discussing agencies' resources in the National Export Strategy. The TPCC last compiled high-level data on member agencies' budget authority in 2011, but this information is not useful for assessing resource allocations. To be useful, data should, among other things, be consistent and sufficiently complete for the intended purpose. However, the TPCC's data are inconsistent across agencies and not detailed enough to facilitate an understanding or comparison of how resources are allocated among priorities. TPCC agencies do not use a common definition of export promotion, so it is unclear why some agencies are included in the TPCC's data and others are not, and the TPCC's data are not current. Although agency accounting systems and budget processes differ, which presents challenges, clear guidance for agencies on what information they should provide the TPCC could improve the quality of the data. Without better information on agencies' export promotion resources, decision makers cannot determine whether the federal investment in export promotion is being used effectively or make informed decisions about future resource decisions. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that TPCC (1) develop and distribute guidance for member agencies on what information they should provide the TPCC on the resources they spend on export promotion activities; and (2) report in its National Export Strategies on how resources are allocated by agency and aligned with the strategy's priorities. The TPCC secretariat agreed with our recommendations and stated it plans to take steps to address them.

gao_GAO-08-713T

gao_GAO-08-713T_0

Boarding schools (also called academies) are generally advertised as providing academic education beyond the survival skills a wilderness therapy program might teach. Cases of Death and Abuse at Selected Residential Programs In the eight closed cases we examined, ineffective management and operating practices, in addition to untrained staff, contributed to the death and abuse of youth enrolled in selected programs. The practice of physical restraint figured prominently in three of the cases. The restraint used for these cases primarily involved one or more staff members physically holding down a youth. On one occasion, while he was staying with a host family and other patients, he attempted to escape from the program. Deceptive Marketing and Questionable Practices in Selected Programs and Services Posing as fictitious parents with fictitious troubled teenagers, we found examples of deceptive marketing and questionable practices related to 10 private residential programs and 4 referral services. In addition, we identified examples of questionable practices related to the health of youth enrolled in programs and the method of convincing reluctant parents to enroll their children. A representative of the foundation explained that their “most popular” method of fund-raising involved the friends and relatives of the enrolled youth making tax-deductible donations to the foundation, which in turn credited 90 percent of these “donations” specifically to pay for tuition in a program the child was attending. Case 2: The program representative at a Montana boarding school told our fictitious parent that they must submit an application form before their child can be accepted to the school. However, after a separate undercover call made to this school by one of our fictitious parents, the program representative e-mailed us stating that our fictitious daughter had been approved for admission into the program and subsequently sent an acceptance letter. We did not fill out an application form for the school. Case 9: On its Web site, referral service “B” invites parents to call a toll- free number and states: “We will look at your special situation and help you select the best school for your teen with individual attention.” Our undercover investigators called this referral service pretending to be three separate fictitious parents and described three separate fictitious children to the agents who answered the phone. Despite these three different scenarios, we found the referral service recommended the same residential program all three times—a Missouri boot camp. Our investigation into this referral service revealed that the owner of the referral service is the husband of the boot camp owner. Appendix I: Private Residential Program Locations In our examination of case studies for this testimony and our prior testimony, we found that the victims of death and abuse came from across the country and attended programs that were similarly located in numerous states. Figure 2 illustrates the types of programs and the states in which they are located, excluding boot camps.

Why GAO Did This Study In October 2007, GAO testified before the Committee regarding allegations of abuse and death in private residential programs across the country such as wilderness therapy programs, boot camps, and boarding schools. GAO also examined selected closed cases where a youth died while enrolled in one of these private programs. Many cite positive outcomes associated with specific types of residential programs. However, due to continuing concerns about the safety and well-being of youth enrolled in private programs, the Committee requested that GAO (1) identify and examine the facts and circumstances surrounding additional closed cases where a teenager died, was abused, or both, while enrolled in a private program; and (2) identify cases of deceptive marketing or questionable practices in the private residential program industry. To develop case studies of death and abuse, GAO conducted numerous interviews and examined documents from eight closed cases from 1994 to 2006. GAO used covert testing along with other investigative techniques to identify, for selected cases, deceptive marketing or questionable practices. Specifically, posing as fictitious parents with fictitious troubled teenagers, GAO called 14 programs and related services. GAO did not attempt to evaluate the benefits of private residential programs and its results cannot be projected beyond the specific programs and services that GAO reviewed. What GAO Found In the eight closed cases GAO examined, ineffective management and operating practices, in addition to untrained staff, contributed to the death and abuse of youth enrolled in selected programs. The practice of physical restraint also figured prominently in three of the cases. The restraint used for these cases primarily involved one or more staff members physically holding down a youth. Posing as fictitious parents with fictitious troubled teenagers, GAO found examples of deceptive marketing and questionable practices in certain industry programs and services. For example, one Montana boarding school told GAO's fictitious parents that their child must apply using an application form before they are admitted. But after a separate call, a program representative e-mailed an acceptance letter for GAO's fictitious child even though an application was never submitted. In another example, the Web site for one referral service states: "We will look at your special situation and help you select the best school for your teen with individual attention." However, GAO called this service three times using three different scenarios related to different fictitious children, and each time the referral agent recommended a Missouri boot camp. Investigative work revealed that the owner of the referral service is married to the owner of the boot camp. GAO also called a program established as a 501(c)(3) charity that advocated a potentially fraudulent tax scheme. The scheme involves the friends and family of a child making tax-deductible "donations" to the charity, which are then credited to an account in the program the child is enrolled in. GAO referred this charity to the Internal Revenue Service for criminal investigation.

gao_GAO-14-344

gao_GAO-14-344_0

More specifically, FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and provide an information security program that includes the following components: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in implementing agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Selected Small Agencies Have Made Mixed Progress in Implementing Federal Information Security and Privacy Requirements Although the small agencies we reviewed have taken steps to develop information security and privacy programs, weaknesses existed that threatened the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and systems. For example, while most of the six agencies designated a privacy official, not all the agencies completed privacy impact assessments. In a separate report for limited official use only, we are providing specific details on the weaknesses in the six selected agencies’ implementation of information security requirements. Specifically, OMB and DHS are not overseeing all small agencies’ implementation of cybersecurity and privacy requirements. However, the agencies in our review have faced challenges in using the guidance and services, and additional efforts could better position smaller agencies to take advantage of guidance and services offered. OMB and DHS Are Not Overseeing All Small Agencies on Information Security and Privacy Implementation FISMA, the Privacy Act, and the E-Government Act include provisions that require OMB to oversee the implementation of the various information security and privacy requirements at all federal agencies. In overseeing small agencies’ implementation of information security and privacy requirements, OMB and DHS have instructed the agencies to report annually on a variety of metrics, which are used to gauge implementation of the information security programs and privacy requirements established by the various acts. OMB and DHS Provide Information Security and Privacy Guidance and Services to Federal Agencies, but Small Agencies Face Challenges in Using Them OMB has provided guidance to federal agencies, including small agencies, on information security and privacy. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are also making detailed recommendations to the selected agencies in our review to correct weaknesses identified in their information security and privacy programs. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) selected small agencies are implementing federal information security and privacy laws and policies, and (2) the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are overseeing and assisting small agencies in implementing their information security and privacy programs.

Why GAO Did This Study Small federal agencies—generally those with 6,000 or fewer employees—are, like larger agencies, at risk from threats to information systems that support their operations and the information they contain, which can include personally identifiably information. Federal law and policy require small agencies to meet information security and privacy requirements and assign responsibilities to OMB for overseeing agencies' activities. OMB has assigned several of these duties to DHS. GAO was asked to review cybersecurity and privacy at small agencies. The objectives of this review were to determine the extent to which (1) small agencies are implementing federal information security and privacy laws and policies and (2) OMB and DHS are overseeing and assisting small agencies in implementing their information security and privacy programs. GAO selected six small agencies with varying characteristics for review; reviewed agency documents and selected systems; and interviewed agency, OMB, and DHS officials. What GAO Found The six small agencies GAO reviewed have made mixed progress in implementing elements of information security and privacy programs as required by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance (see figure). *Agency 5 was not required to complete a privacy impact assessment. In a separate report for limited official use only, GAO is providing specific details on the weaknesses in the six selected agencies' implementation of information security and privacy requirements. OMB and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took steps to oversee and assist small agencies in implementing security and privacy requirements. For example, OMB and DHS instructed small agencies to report annually on a variety of metrics that are used to gauge implementation of information security programs and privacy requirements. In addition, OMB and DHS issued reporting guidance and provided assistance to all federal agencies on implementing security and privacy programs. However, 55 of 129 small agencies identified by OMB and DHS are not reporting on information security and privacy requirements. Further, the agencies in GAO's review have faced challenges in using the guidance and services offered. Until OMB and DHS oversee agencies' implementation of information security and privacy program requirements and provide additional assistance, small agencies will continue to face challenges in protecting their information and information systems. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that OMB report on all small agencies' implementation of security and privacy requirements. GAO also recommends that DHS develop services and guidance targeted to small agencies' environments. GAO is making recommendations to the six agencies reviewed to address their information security and privacy weaknesses in a separate, restricted report. OMB and DHS generally concurred with the recommendations.

gao_GAO-08-1155T

gao_GAO-08-1155T_0

EPA Has Not Proactively Used the Children’s Health Protection Advisory Committee in the Development of Regulations, Guidance, and Policies While EPA has convened the committee for dozens of presentations and discussions with EPA and non-EPA officials, the agency has made few requests for the committee’s advice or recommendations on regulations, guidance or policies to address the disproportionate risks to children’s health. Nonetheless, the committee has sent more than 70 letters to the Administrator offering hundreds of recommendations on a wide range of children’s health concerns. For example, the committee has heard from representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Academy of Sciences. EPA Has Rarely Sought the Advisory Committee’s Advice on Regulations, Guidance, and Policies that Address Children’s Health Despite convening the Advisory Committee more than 30 times over the last 10 years for discussions with a variety of speakers, EPA has rarely sought out the committee’s advice and recommendations to assist it in developing regulations, guidance, and policies that address children’s health. The clearest example is EPA’s request in October 1997—prior to the committee’s first meeting—that the committee identify five regulations or standards for the agency to re-evaluate in order to better protect children. EPA Has Largely Disregarded Key Recommendations from the Children’s Health Protection Advisory Committee The process that EPA initiated to carry out the Administrator’s commitment, in a June 2007 letter, to address the Advisory Committee’s key recommendations has stalled. As illustrated in figure 6, the areas of concern to the committee included the need for EPA to (1) eliminate environmental health disparities among low- income and minority children, (2) strengthen the national approach to regulating toxic chemicals, and (3) provide necessary leadership and infrastructure to protect children’s health. However, a new acting office director stopped the process in late 2007, opting instead to hold individual meetings with EPA’s assistant administrators. Advisory Committee Recommendations on Air Quality Standards Have Not Been Substantially Addressed We also examined the Advisory Committee’s recommendations related to three air quality standards—the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter, ozone, and lead, which EPA recently reviewed. Specifically, we identified seven letters containing 23 recommendations with respect to EPA’s proposed revisions to the particulate matter, ozone, and lead standards. While EPA provided the Advisory Committee with official response letters to six of its seven NAAQS-related letters, we found that the agency generally did not acknowledge or was noncommittal to the committee’s recommendations, or that it offered merely to consider them as part of the public comment process. In one instance, EPA rejected a committee recommendation. President’s Task Force on Children’s Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks Expired in 2005, Eliminating An Important Opportunity for EPA Leadership and Interagency Coordination The President’s Task Force was authorized by executive order in April 1997 for a period of 4 years to provide high-level leadership and interagency coordination on children’s environmental health. At the urging of the EPA Administrator in April 2003, the President ordered the task force to be extended for a final 2 years. However, this order eliminated the provision for reassessing the need for continuance of the task force, which was not convened after October 2001. The President’s Task Force identified four major environmental and safety threats to children—asthma, developmental disabilities (including lead poisoning), cancer, and unintentional injuries, and it recommended national strategies for each of them. According to the children’s health experts with whom we spoke, the task force provided critical leadership on several important initiatives such as the National Children’s Study and the Healthy Schools Environments Assessment Tool (Healthy SEAT). Since the task force’s expiration, EPA and HHS no longer have a high-level infrastructure or mandate to coordinate federal strategies for children’s environmental health and safety. Based on our review of EPA’s use of the Advisory Committee and the agency’s general unresponsiveness to the committee’s key recommendations, coupled with the expiration of the President’s Task Force, we believe the agency needs to reinvigorate its focus and leadership on children’s environmental health in order to meet current and emerging challenges facing the nation’s children.

Why GAO Did This Study According to EPA, children face disproportionate risks from contaminants such as air pollution and lead paint. The health consequences to the country's 74 million children are significant. In 2006, 55 percent of children lived in counties exceeding allowable levels for at least one of the six principal air pollutants such as ozone which causes or aggravates asthma. Asthma is the third-most common cause of childhood hospitalization, resulting in $3.2 billion in treatment costs and 14 million lost school days annually, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In 1997, EPA created the Office of Children's Health and convened the Children's Health Protection Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) to provide advice and recommendations to assist in developing regulations, guidance, and policies to address children's health. In April 1997, the President signed Executive Order 13045, creating an interagency Task Force to recommend federal strategies for protecting children. Our testimony is based on ongoing work on the extent to which EPA has used the Advisory Committee and addressed the committee's key recommendations. It also includes information about the Task Force. We met with numerous EPA officials and analyzed the committee's letters. GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA expeditiously complete its review of the Advisory Committee's key recommendations. What GAO Found EPA has not proactively used the Advisory Committee to ensure that the agency's regulations, guidance, and policies address the disproportionate risks that environmental contaminants pose to children. Our analysis found that the Advisory Committee met more than 30 times and discussed a variety of environmental health issues with dozens of officials from EPA offices such as Pesticides and Toxic Substances, and Research and Development. However, we identified just three instances where EPA specifically asked the committee for recommendations and advice on regulations--most notably an October 1997 request that the committee identify five regulations or standards for EPA to re-evaluate in order to better protect children. In the absence of focus and direction from EPA, the Advisory Committee has taken the initiative to write more than 70 letters to the Administrator since 1998 containing hundreds of recommendations on a wide variety of children's health concerns. EPA has not addressed key recommendations from its Advisory Committee, particularly those in a major April 2007 letter and in recent letters advising EPA on proposed revisions to national air quality standards. The April 2007 letter, which marked the 10th anniversary of the Executive Order, provided recommendations in seven key areas. These included the need for EPA to eliminate environmental health disparities among low-income and minority children. While EPA generally responds to the Advisory Committee's letters, the agency has not fulfilled the Administrator's commitment in his response to the 10th anniversary letter to collaboratively review recommendations from the advisory committee. The Office of Children's Health had begun forming internal workgroups, but a new acting director stopped the process in late 2007 to hold individual meetings with EPA's assistant administrators, and the process remains stalled. We also analyzed EPA's responses to the committee's specific recommendations on three recently-considered EPA air quality standards--the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for particulate matter, ozone, and lead--and we found that EPA either offered to consider the committee's recommendations as part of the public comment process or rejected them. The President's Task Force, which was authorized in April 1997, provided high-level interagency leadership and coordination on children's environmental health, but it expired in April 2005. According to the children's health experts with whom we spoke, the task force provided important leadership on initiatives such as the National Children's Study and the Healthy Schools Environmental Assessment Tool. The task force also developed federal strategies to address four threats to children--asthma, developmental disorders, cancer, and unintentional injuries. In 2003, the President ordered the task force to be extended by 2 years, but the order eliminated the provision for reassessing the task force. Since the task force's expiration, EPA no longer has a high-level infrastructure or mandate to coordinate federal strategies for children's environmental health and safety.

gao_GAO-15-364

gao_GAO-15-364_0

In addition, DOD’s acquisition strategy called for high levels of concurrency between development, testing, and production. Recent Technical Challenges Will Likely Result in Cost Growth and Schedule Delays The F-35 program continued to experience development and testing discoveries over the past year, largely due to a structural failure on the F- 35B durability test aircraft, an engine failure, and more mission system test growth than expected. Need to Improve Engine Reliability Presents Additional Challenges The program has a long way to go to achieve its engine reliability goals. Improving engine reliability will likely require additional design changes and retrofits. Affordability Challenges Will Likely Continue to Affect Program Plans to Increase F-35 Procurement As of December 2014, the program office estimated that the total acquisition cost of the F-35 will be $391.1 billion, or $7.4 billion less than DOD reported in December 2013. From fiscal years 2015 to 2019, DOD plans to increase annual development and procurement funding for the F- 35 from around $8 billion to around $12 billion, an investment of more than $54 billion over that 5-year period, while competing with other large programs for limited acquisition resources. Funding needs will remain between $14 and $15 billion for nearly a decade and peak at $15.1 billion in 2029 (see figure 4). Although this action may reduce near-term funding requirements as well as concurrency risks, it will likely increase the average unit cost of the aircraft purchased over that time and may increase funding liability in the future. DOD policy requires affordability analyses to inform long-term investment decisions. The consistent changes in F-35 procurement plans, made during the annual DOD budget process, indicate that the analysis done to support the program’s 2012 baseline did not accurately account for future technical risks or funding realities. Supplier performance has been mixed as late deliveries have resulted in increases to part shortages. The contractor has delivered a total of 110 aircraft since 2011—9 in 2011, 30 in 2012, 35 in 2013, and 36 in 2014. The number of major engineering design changes has also continued to decline over time, and is currently tracking to the program’s plan. Supplier deliveries requiring scrap, rework, and repair averaged 1.3 percent of the hours spent building an aircraft over the last 2 years. Conclusions The F-35 remains DOD’s most costly and ambitious programs and one of its highest priority acquisition programs. At the same time, DOD plans to steeply increase its procurement funding requests over the next 5 years and projects that it will need between $14 and $15 billion annually for nearly a decade. It is unlikely that the program will be able to receive and sustain such a high and unprecedented level of funding over this extended period, especially with other significant fiscal demands weighing on the nation. Recommendations As DOD plans to significantly increase F-35 procurement funding over the next 5 years, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense conduct an affordability analysis of the program’s current procurement plan that reflects various assumptions about future technical progress and funding availability. Independent review teams evaluated aircraft and engine manufacturing processes. Operating and support cost estimates may not be reliable. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology To assess the program’s ongoing development and testing we reviewed the status of software development and integration and contractor management improvement initiatives. We compared test progress against the total program plans to complete. We analyzed reliability data and discussed these issues with program and contractor officials. To assess manufacturing and supply chain performance we obtained and analyzed data related to aircraft delivery rates and work performance data through the end of calendar year 2014. GAO-12-525T. Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time. Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis.

Why GAO Did This Study With estimated acquisition costs of nearly $400 billion, the F-35 Lightning II—also known as the Joint Strike Fighter—is DOD's most costly and ambitious acquisition program. The U.S. portion of the program will require annual acquisition funding of $12.4 billion on average through 2038 to complete development and procure a total of 2,457 aircraft. GAO's prior work has found that the program has experienced significant cost, schedule, and performance problems. In 2009, Congress mandated that GAO review the F-35 acquisition program annually for 6 years. This report, GAO's sixth, assesses the program's (1) development and testing progress, (2) cost and affordability, and (3) manufacturing and supply chain performance. GAO reviewed and analyzed the latest available manufacturing, cost, testing, and performance data through December 2014; program test plans; and internal DOD analyses; and interviewed DOD, program, engine and aircraft contractor officials. What GAO Found The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program had to make unexpected changes to its development and test plans over the last year, largely in response to a structural failure on a durability test aircraft, an engine failure, and software challenges. At the same time, engine reliability is poor and has a long way to go to meet program goals. With nearly 2 years and 40 percent of developmental testing to go, more technical problems are likely. Addressing new problems and improving engine reliability may require additional design changes and retrofits. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DOD) has plans to increase annual aircraft procurement from 38 to 90 over the next 5 years. As GAO has previously reported, increasing production while concurrently developing and testing creates risk and could result in additional cost growth and schedule delays in the future. Cost and affordability challenges remain. DOD plans to significantly increase annual F-35 funding from around $8 billion to nearly $12 billion over the next 5 years (see figure) reaching $14 billion in 2022 and remaining between $14 and $15 billion for nearly a decade. Over the last year, DOD reduced near-term aircraft procurement by 4 aircraft, largely due to budget constraints. While these deferrals may lower annual near-term funding needs, they will likely increase the cost of aircraft procured in that time frame and may increase funding liability in the future. It is unlikely the program will be able to sustain such a high level of annual funding and if required funding levels are not reached, the program's procurement plan may not be affordable. DOD policy requires affordability analyses to inform long-term investment decisions. The consistent changes in F-35 procurement plans indicate that DOD's prior analyses did not adequately account for future technical and funding uncertainty. Manufacturing progress continued despite mixed supplier performance. The aircraft contractor delivered 36 aircraft as planned in 2014, despite a fleet grounding, added inspections, and software delays. In contrast, the labor hours needed to manufacture an aircraft and the number of major design changes have continued to decline over time. Because supplier performance has been mixed, late aircraft and engine part deliveries could pose a risk to the program's plans to increase production. The contractors are taking steps to address these issues. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOD assess the affordability of F-35's current procurement plan that reflects various assumptions about technical progress and future funding.

gao_GAO-10-795T

gao_GAO-10-795T_0

The Primary Burden of Liability for the Costs of Oil Spills Is on the Responsible Party, up to Specified Limits OPA establishes a “polluter pays” system that places the primary burden of liability for the costs of spills on the party responsible for the spill in return for financial limitations on that liability. Under this system, the responsible party assumes, up to a specified limit, the burden of paying for spill costs—which can include both removal costs (cleaning up the spill) and damage claims (restoring the environment and payment of compensation to parties that were economically harmed by the spill). The range derives from a statutory division of liability for mobile offshore drilling units. OPA also provides that the Fund can be used to pay for oil spill removal costs and damages when those responsible do not pay or cannot be located. OPA defines the costs for which responsible parties are liable and the costs for which the Fund is made available for compensation in the event that the responsible party does not pay or is not identified. These emergency funds may be used for containing and removing oil from water and shorelines, preventing or minimizing a substantial threat of discharge, and monitoring the removal activities of the responsible party. Officials said they began using emergency funds at the beginning of May to pay for removal activities in the Gulf of Mexico. 1). Several Factors, including Location, Time of Year, and Type of Oil, Combine in Unique Ways and Affect the Cost of Each Oil Spill Location, time of year, and type of oil are key factors affecting oil spill costs of noncatastrophic spills, according to industry experts, agency officials, and our analysis of spills. Given the magnitude of the current spill, however, the size of this spill will also be a factor that affects the costs. In ways that are unique to each spill, these factors can affect the breadth and difficulty of the response effort or the extent of damage that requires mitigation. Lighter oils such as jet fuels, gasoline, and diesel fuel dissipate and evaporate quickly, and as such, often require minimal cleanup. Heavier oils, such as crude oils and other heavy petroleum products, are less toxic than lighter oils but can also have severe environmental impacts. These spills can require intensive shoreline and structural clean up, which is time-consuming and expensive. Another factor affecting spills’ costs is the type of oil. In recent testimony, the EPA Deputy Administrator described the Deepwater Horizon spill as a “massive and potentially unprecedented environmental disaster.” The Fund Has Been Able to Cover Costs Not Paid by Responsible Parties, but Risks and Uncertainties Remain To date, the Fund has been able to cover costs from major spills that responsible parties have not paid, but risks and uncertainties remain. In addition, the Fund faced other potential risks to its viability, including ongoing claims from existing spills and the potential for a catastrophic oil spill. The current spill in the Gulf of Mexico could result in a significant strain on the Fund, which currently has a balance of about $1.6 billion. If the responsible party’s costs exceed the limit of liability, the responsible party can make a claim against the Fund for the amount above the limit. In our 2007 report, we reported that 10 of the 51 major oil spills that occurred from 1990 through 2006 resulted in limit-of-liability claims on the Fund. Specifically, the Coast Guard reported that liability limits for tank barges and cargo vessels with substantial fuel oil may not sufficiently account for the historic costs incurred by spills from these vessel types. A catastrophic spill could strain the Fund’s resources: In 2007, we reported that since the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, which was the impetus for authorizing the Fund’s usage, no oil spill has come close to matching its costs—estimated at $2.2 billion for cleanup costs alone, according to the vessel’s owner. Increasing the per-barrel tax. It includes, among other things, proposals to increase the statutory limitation on expenditures from the Fund for a single oil spill response from $1 billion to $1.5 billion for spill response and from $500 million to $750 million per spill for natural resource damage assessments and claims.

Why GAO Did This Study On April 20, 2010, an explosion at the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon resulted in a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The spill's total cost is unknown, but may result in considerable costs to the private sector, as well as federal, state, and local governments. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) set up a system that places the liability--up to specified limits--on the responsible party. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), administered by the Coast Guard, pays for costs not paid for by the responsible party. GAO previously reported on the Fund and factors driving the cost of oil spills and is beginning work on the April 2010 spill. This testimony focuses on (1) how oil spills are paid for, (2) the factors that affect major oil spill costs, and (3) implications of major oil spill costs for the Fund. It is largely based on GAO's 2007 report, for which GAO analyzed oil spill cost data and reviewed documentation on the Fund's balance and vessels' limits of liability. To update the report, GAO obtained information from and interviewed Coast Guard officials. What GAO Found OPA places the primary burden of liability for the costs of oil spills on the responsible party in return for financial limitations on that liability. Thus, the responsible party assumes the primary burden of paying for spill costs--which can include both removal costs (cleaning up the spill) and damage claims (restoring the environment and compensating parties that were economically harmed). To pay both the costs above this limit and costs incurred when a responsible party does not pay or cannot be identified, OPA authorized use of the Fund, up to a $1 billion per spill, which is financed primarily from a per-barrel tax on petroleum products. The Fund also may be used to pay for natural resource damage assessments and to monitor the recovery activities of the responsible party, among other things. While the responsible party is largely paying for the current spill's cleanup, Coast Guard officials said that they began using the Fund--which currently has a balance of $1.6 billion--in May 2010 to pay for certain removal activities in the Gulf of Mexico. Several factors, including location, time of year, and type of oil, affect the cleanup costs of noncatastrophic spills. Although these factors will certainly affect the cost of the Gulf spill--which is unknown at this time--in this spill, additional factors such as the magnitude of the oil spill will impact costs. These factors can affect the breadth and difficulty of recovery and the extent of damage in the following ways: (1) Location. A remote location can increase the cost of a spill because of the additional expense involved in mounting a remote response. A spill that occurs close to shore can also become costly if it involves the use of manual labor to remove oil from sensitive shoreline habitat. (2) Time of year. A spill occurring during fishing or tourist season might carry additional economic damage, or a spill occurring during a stormy season might prove more expensive because it is more difficult to clean up than one occurring during a season with generally calmer weather. (3) Type of oil. Lighter oils such as gasoline or diesel fuels dissipate and evaporate quickly--requiring minimal cleanup--but are highly toxic and create severe environmental impacts. Heavier oils such as crude oil do not evaporate and, therefore, may require intensive structural and shoreline cleanup. Since the Fund was authorized in 1990, it has been able to cover costs not covered by responsible parties, but risks and uncertainties exist regarding the Fund's viability. For instance, the Fund is at risk from claims resulting from spills that significantly exceed responsible parties' liability limits. Of the 51 major oil spills GAO reviewed in 2007, the cleanup costs for 10 exceeded the liability limits, resulting in claims of about $252 million. In 2006, Congress increased liability limits, but for certain vessel types, the limits may still be low compared with the historic costs of cleaning up spills from those vessels. The Fund faces other potential risks as well, including ongoing claims from existing spills, claims related to sunken vessels that may begin to leak oil, and the threat of a catastrophic spill--such as the recent Gulf spill.

gao_GAO-05-548

gao_GAO-05-548_0

The Joint Forces Command is DOD’s lead in providing joint warfighting capability through joint training. According to the 2004 Training Transformation Implementation Plan, these three capabilities, or initiatives, are designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for the new strategic environment, and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. DOD’s Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational Capability Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and collective training focused on the combatant commanders’ needs and linked to readiness assessments. Through its 2003 Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the department established program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and oversight roles and responsibilities. According to a DOD official, DOD’s approach to developing and implementing the training transformation initiatives follows a “build a little, test a little” philosophy that is unlike a more traditional development approach, where initiatives within a program are developed sequentially with planning, development, implementation, and assessment phases. DOD’s Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant Management Challenges at This Time DOD’s Training Transformation Program will likely face some significant management challenges throughout its implementation. Two significant challenges that have emerged early and will require continued focus are (1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such as the services and combatant commands, through comprehensive communication and coordination; and (2) developing joint training requirements that meet combatant commands’ mission needs. Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the Training Transformation Program at risk. These include DOD’s combatant commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives from the federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national security interagency community. DOD Is Communicating and Coordinating with External Stakeholders, but Efforts to Engage Senior Non-DOD Leaders Have Been Limited to Date While DOD has been proactive in engaging interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners in identifying common areas for potential joint training opportunities, their outreach has not yet been elevated to senior-level leadership to ensure their full cooperation. Developing Joint Training Requirements That Meet Combatant Commands’ Needs Is a Significant Challenge Joint Forces Command’s new process for developing tactical-level joint training requirements—and the specific training tasks that support the requirements—does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect combatant command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal stakeholders—combatant commanders, services, and training commands. Recommendations for To promote effective partnerships and mitigate the risk of implementing Executive Action Training Transformation Program components that are not fully supported by the combatant commands, services, and other federal agencies, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take additional steps to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the program’s goals and initiatives; direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DOD agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders’ full understanding, buy-in, and commitment; and direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to promote widespread participation and better opportunities for stakeholders’ acceptance of the requirements.

Why GAO Did This Study U.S. forces are conducting more complex operations, requiring increased interoperability between the military commands, services, and other organizations. Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance calls for transforming military training by increasing the jointness in training. The overall intent of DOD's Training Transformation Program is to assure commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not experiencing joint operations for the first time. Therefore, the program's strategic goals focus on providing joint training that meets commanders' needs and links to readiness assessments. Given the significant investment planned in the program and the impact it will have on the military, this report provides a program overview, including (1) DOD's overall management approach and status of key initiatives, and (2) some significant management challenges that have emerged early in the program's implementation. What GAO Found Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and unit training focused on combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness assessments. Thus far, the department has established program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has also established three training transformation initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for joint operations and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. The initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through the "build a little, test a little" philosophy. DOD plans to complete its first program assessment later this year. One significant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD has taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these stakeholders, which include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand the overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in engaging external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training opportunities. However, DOD's outreach to the senior-level leadership of external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their full commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training. Anothersignificant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is developing joint training requirements--and the specific training tasks that support the requirements--that meet combatant command mission needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD's established process called the "Joint Training System" that is used to translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the department is developing some joint tasks through a working group process that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant commands' and services' representatives. As a result, the department risks developing joint training requirements that combatant commands and services may not fully support. Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the Training Transformation Program at risk.

gao_GAO-16-392

gao_GAO-16-392_0

The CHIMP Act Amendments of 2013 authorized appropriations for NIH to continue supporting chimpanzees in research facilities and at Chimp Haven. NIH-Owned and NIH- Supported Chimpanzees Are No Longer Used for Invasive Biomedical Research, but Most Have Not Yet Retired to the Federal Sanctuary No NIH-owned or NIH-supported chimpanzees are eligible for use in invasive biomedical research. As a result of NIH’s recent decision to no longer maintain a colony of chimpanzees for future invasive research, none of the 561 chimpanzees it owned or supported as of January 15, 2016, were considered eligible for such research, and three of the facilities reported that they had not used chimpanzees in invasive research during the period of our review, consistent with NIH’s efforts to phase out invasive biomedical research projects. However, all 561 chimpanzees were eligible for non-invasive research, even if retired to the federal retirement sanctuary, Chimp Haven. As a result, as of January 15, 2016, the 179 chimpanzees housed at Chimp Haven were considered to be retired, and NIH considered the remaining NIH-owned chimpanzees housed at the other facilities to be eligible for retirement to Chimp Haven as space becomes available there. The average per-chimpanzee per-day costs that NIH incurred for care provided to chimpanzees during the time period covering federal fiscal years 2013 through 2015 ranged from a low of $41 at Chimp Haven to a high of $61 at Alamogordo. Factors associated with the characteristics of each facility likely contributed to the variation in the costs. NIH’s Goal to Consolidate Chimpanzee Population to Chimp Haven Should Result in Savings, but the Lack of Long-Term Planning Could Diminish Potential Savings NIH’s Goal to Consolidate Chimpanzees to Chimp Haven Should Result in Cost Savings Because the costs incurred by NIH to care for its owned or supported chimpanzees have generally been lowest at Chimp Haven compared to the costs at the other three facilities that house them, NIH’s goal to transfer its chimpanzees to Chimp Haven should result in cost savings for NIH. NIH officials reported that, in the short-term, they plan to transfer to Chimp Haven all 19 NIH-owned chimpanzees from SNPRC. NIH Has Not Fully Developed or Communicated a Clear Long-Term Implementation Plan, Diminishing the Potential Savings That Could be Achieved through Consolidation Efforts While NIH has informed the facilities of its plan to transfer 19 chimpanzees in the near future, it has not finalized or communicated details on the timing of this transfer, and it has not developed or communicated a clear long-term implementation plan for transporting the remaining chimpanzees that would continue to be housed outside of Chimp Haven. According to agency officials, it has not developed such a plan, in part because of uncertainties about the available space at Chimp Haven. In the absence of this long-term plan, the four facilities that house NIH- owned or NIH-supported chimpanzees do not have the information they need to plan for the care of the NIH-owned or NIH-supported chimpanzees in a cost-effective way that also considers the timing of chimpanzee transfers as well as the welfare needs of the chimpanzee population. If facility officials have an estimate of the number of chimpanzees that are expected to be transferred into or out of their facility within a given timeframe, they can then plan for appropriate increases or decreases in staffing levels. Moreover, the absence of this plan is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that call for the effective internal and external communication of the quality information necessary to help an entity achieve its objectives. Because knowledge about the anticipated transfers of chimpanzees into and out of the four facilities that currently house NIH-owned and NIH-supported chimpanzees will affect the ability for each of these facilities to manage their costs, and because those costs are paid for in full or in part by NIH, it is important for NIH to clearly communicate its plans with the facilities to ensure that the facilities can take actions that will maximize cost-effective planning for the care of these chimpanzees in the future. Appendix III: Characteristics of the Chimp Haven Federal Chimpanzee Retirement Sanctuary Overview: Chimp Haven is the federal chimpanzee retirement sanctuary and is located in Louisiana.

Why GAO Did This Study For over 50 years, the federal government has supported the use of chimpanzees in research; however, NIH recently suspended the use of chimpanzees in agency-supported invasive research. As of January 15, 2016, NIH owned or supported 561 chimpanzees in four facilities, including Chimp Haven, which was established as a federal chimpanzee retirement sanctuary in accordance with the Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act. In late 2015, NIH announced that all NIH-owned chimpanzees were eligible for retirement to Chimp Haven. In 2013, Congress amended the Act authorizing appropriations for NIH's Chimpanzee Management Program through FY2018, with a provision for GAO to evaluate certain aspects of this program. In this report GAO examines: (1) the research and retirement status of chimpanzees owned or supported by NIH; (2) the costs for their care and transfers; and (3) potential cost savings associated with NIH's goal to transfer chimpanzees to Chimp Haven. GAO analyzed laws, regulations, and agency and facility policies, procedures, and data. GAO also visited the facilities, interviewed NIH and facility officials, and reviewed federal internal control standards. What GAO Found NIH-owned and NIH-supported chimpanzees are no longer used in invasive biomedical research, which is research that involves medical treatment outside of normal veterinary care. However, all NIH-owned and NIH-supported chimpanzees are eligible for use in non-invasive research, such as observational and behavioral research, even at the federal chimpanzee retirement sanctuary, Chimp Haven. Most of the 561 chimpanzees that NIH owned or supported as of January 15, 2016, had not been retired to Chimp Haven, which housed179 NIH-owned chimpanzees at that time. The costs NIH incurred to care for these chimpanzees varied among the facilities. For example, for the care provided from federal fiscal year 2013 through 2015, the average cost per-chimpanzee per-day incurred by NIH at the four facilities ranged from a low of $41 to a high of $61. The characteristics of each facility contributed to cost variations. For example, NIH's costs were lowest at Chimp Haven, which was likely attributable to matching fund requirements Chimp Haven must meet as defined in federal statute. Since FY2013, NIH has transferred 121 chimpanzees to Chimp Haven and incurred a total of $49,760 (or $411 per transferred chimpanzee) for those transfers. NIH's goal to consolidate chimpanzees to Chimp Haven should result in savings, but the lack of long-term planning could diminish savings potential. Savings should occur largely because NIH's costs are lowest at Chimp Haven. NIH has communicated short-term plans to transfer to Chimp Haven 19 of the 382 chimpanzees that continue to be housed at other facilities, but according to agency officials, it has not developed or communicated a clear implementation plan to transfer the remaining chimpanzees, in part because of uncertainties about the available space at Chimp Haven. However, NIH has information about Chimp Haven's current capacity and about anticipated space that will become available as a result of chimpanzee mortality. Absent a clear implementation plan, the four facilities that care for NIH-owned or NIH-supported chimpanzees may not have the information they need to care for the chimpanzees in the most cost-effective way that considers the timing of the transfers and the welfare needs of the chimpanzees. For example, if facility officials have estimates of the number of chimpanzees that are expected to be transferred into or out of their facility within a given timeframe, they can then plan for appropriate increases or decreases in staffing levels. Moreover, the absence of such a plan is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that call for effective communication of quality information. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Health of Human Services direct NIH to develop a clear implementation plan to meet its goal for the transfer of chimpanzees to Chimp Haven that considers both costs and chimpanzee welfare. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.

gao_GAO-09-563

gao_GAO-09-563_0

In the greater New Orleans area, the Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority serves Jefferson Parish, and the Metropolitan Human Services District serves Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. SAMHSA, which has the primary federal responsibility for children’s mental health services, works to improve the availability of effective mental health services, substance abuse prevention and treatment services, and related services through formula grant programs—such as the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant— and discretionary grant programs—such as the National Child Traumatic Stress Initiative and the Child Mental Health Initiative. CMS also administers additional grant programs related to Hurricane Katrina, including the Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant (PCASG), a program intended to assist in the restoration and expansion of outpatient primary care services, including mental health services, in the greater New Orleans area; the Professional Workforce Supply Grant, intended to address shortages in the professional health care workforce; and the Provider Stabilization Grants, a program intended to assist health care facilities that participate in Medicare to recruit and retain staff. Lack of Providers Was Most Frequently Identified Barrier to Providing Children’s Mental Health Services, and Lack of Transportation Was Most Frequently Identified Barrier to Obtaining Services Stakeholder organizations that participated in our structured interviews and responded to our DCI most frequently identified lack of mental health providers and sustainability of funding as barriers to providing mental health services to children in the greater New Orleans area. These organizations most frequently identified a lack of transportation, competing family priorities, and concern regarding stigma as barriers to families’ obtaining mental health services for children. Fifteen of the 18 organizations identified a lack of mental health providers—including challenges recruiting and retaining child psychiatrists, psychologists, and nurses—as a barrier. Sustainability of funding—including difficulty securing reliable funding sources and limitations on reimbursement for services—was the second most frequently identified barrier to providing services for children. Thirteen of the 18 organizations identified sustainability of funding as a barrier. Three organizations identified a lack of coordination between mental health providers or other providers serving children as a barrier. Lack of Transportation, Competing Family Priorities, and Concern Regarding Stigma Were Most Frequently Identified Barriers to Obtaining Services for Children A lack of transportation in the greater New Orleans area was the most frequently identified barrier to obtaining mental health services for children among the stakeholder organizations that participated in our structured interviews. Federal Programs Address Barriers by Supporting State and Local Efforts to Hire Providers; Assist Families; and Deliver Care through School- Based Health Centers A range of federal programs address the most frequently identified barriers to providing and obtaining mental health services for children, but much of the funding for these programs is temporary. Since Hurricane Katrina, SBHCs have emerged as a key approach to addressing barriers to obtaining services, and state agencies have used federal funding to support these clinics. For example, Louisiana designated $150,000 in the fiscal year 2009 Community Mental Health Services Block Grant state plan for transportation for children in the greater New Orleans area, and funding from ACF’s 2006 SSBG supplemental grant and SAMHSA’s Child Mental Health Initiative has also been used to supply transportation to mental health appointments for children. However, much of this funding is temporary. For example, three hurricane-related grant programs—CMS’s PCASG and Professional Workforce Supply Grant and ACF’s 2006 SSBG supplemental funding— will no longer be available to grantees after 2010. Louisiana’s SBHCs receive their funding from several sources. There is no federal program whose specific purpose is to support SBHCs, but LDHH and local providers have used funding from various federal sources to support SBHCs. The location of SBHCs in schools or on school grounds also reduces the need for a parent to take time off from work to accompany a child to appointments. In addition, colocation of mental health and other primary care services may reduce concern regarding stigma because the type of service the child is receiving at the SBHC is generally not apparent to an observer. HHS provided comments on two key issues. In addition, both HHS and Education provided technical comments. We incorporated HHS and Education comments as appropriate. HHS commented that our draft report minimized housing problems faced by children and families in the greater New Orleans area in our discussion of barriers to obtaining mental health services; HHS also stated that the lack of stable housing in the area is one of the greatest barriers to children’s mental health recovery. 1.) Appendix II: Selected Federal Programs That Have Supported the Provision of Mental Health Services in Greater New Orleans Table 3 is a list of the federal programs in our review that have been used to support the provision of mental health or related services to children in the greater New Orleans area.

Why GAO Did This Study The greater New Orleans area--Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes--has yet to fully recover from the effects of Hurricane Katrina. As a result of the hurricane and its aftermath, many children experienced psychological trauma, which can have long-lasting effects. Experts have previously identified barriers to providing and obtaining mental health services for children. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies have supported mental health services for children in greater New Orleans through various programs, including grant programs initiated in response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO was asked to study the federal role in addressing barriers to these services in greater New Orleans. In this report, GAO (1) identifies barriers to providing and to obtaining mental health services for children in greater New Orleans, and (2) describes how federal programs, including grant programs, address such barriers. To do this work, GAO used a structured interview and a written data collection instrument to gather views on barriers from 18 state and local stakeholder organizations selected on the basis of experts' referrals and the organizations' roles in children's mental health. To learn how federal programs address these barriers, GAO reviewed documents from and interviewed federal, state, and local officials involved in providing mental health services to children. GAO's work included a site visit to greater New Orleans. What GAO Found Stakeholder organizations most frequently identified a lack of mental health providers and sustainability of funding as barriers to providing mental health services to children in the greater New Orleans area; they most frequently identified a lack of transportation, competing family priorities, and concern regarding stigma as barriers to families' obtaining services for children. Fifteen of the 18 organizations identified a lack of mental health providers--including challenges recruiting and retaining child psychiatrists and psychologists--as a barrier to providing services to children. Thirteen organizations identified sustainability of funding, including difficulty securing reliable funding sources, as a barrier to providing services. A lack of transportation was most frequently identified--by 12 organizations--as a barrier to families' ability to obtain services for their children. The two second most frequently identified barriers to obtaining services were competing family priorities, such as housing problems and financial concerns, and concern regarding the stigma associated with receiving mental health services. A range of federal programs, including grant programs, address some of the most frequently identified barriers to providing and obtaining mental health services for children, but much of the funding they have supplied is temporary. Several federal programs support state and local efforts to hire or train mental health providers. For example, HHS's Professional Workforce Supply Grant has resulted in recruitment and retention incentives to mental health providers in the greater New Orleans area. Several HHS programs allow funding to be used to transport children to mental health services, including Medicaid and the 2006 Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) supplemental funding provided to Louisiana. However, much of the funding, including that from the Professional Workforce Supply Grant and the supplemental SSBG, is hurricane-related and will no longer be available after 2010. School-based health centers (SBHC) have emerged as a key approach in the area to address barriers to obtaining mental health services for children, and although there is no federal program whose specific purpose is to support SBHCs, state programs have used various federal funding sources to support them. For example, a Louisiana official told us funds from HHS's Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant and Community Mental Health Services Block Grant support SBHCs in greater New Orleans. SBHCs address the transportation barrier because they are located on school grounds, and they help families by reducing the need for a parent to take time off from work to take a child to appointments. In addition, because SBHCs provide both mental health and other primary care services, the type of service a child receives is not apparent to an observer, which may reduce concern about stigma. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided additional information on mental health services provided in schools other than through SBHCs and emphasized the effect of a lack of stable housing on children's mental health. HHS also provided technical comments. GAO incorporated HHS's comments as appropriate.

gao_NSIAD-96-103

gao_NSIAD-96-103_0

Early Deploying Units Lack Required Equipment During the Gulf War, units and individuals often deployed without all the chemical and biological detection, decontamination, and protective equipment they needed to operate in a contaminated environment. Numerous other activities also dependent on operation and maintenance funding are being given a higher priority than chemical defense equipment by all the early deploying active Army divisions we visited. Research and Development Progress Is Slower Than Planned At the beginning of the Gulf War, U.S. forces were vulnerable because the services lacked such things as (1) effective mobile systems for detecting and reporting chemical or biological agents; (2) a decontaminate solution suitable for use in sensitive interior areas of aircraft, ships, and vehicles; and (3) a suitable method for decontaminating large areas such as ports and airfields. Since the Gulf War, the services have acted to improve their chemical and biological training. Conclusions Although DOD has improved chemical and biological defense capability since the Gulf War, many problems of the type experienced during this war continue to exist. Recommendations We could not determine whether increased emphasis on chemical and biological warfare defense is warranted at the expense of other priorities. Direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure that all combat training centers routinely emphasize and include chemical and biological training, and that this training is conducted in a realistic manner. Our objectives were to determine (1) DOD’s actions to address chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified during the Gulf War and (2) the current preparedness of these forces to operate in a contaminated environment. To determine the preparedness of U.S. ground forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment, we focused on three areas: the availability of critical chemical and biological defense equipment, such as protective suits, masks, and alarms; the adequacy of chemical and biological training, including the extent to which tasks are conducted in joint and service training; and the availability of medical countermeasures to prevent and treat chemical and biological casualties, including supplies of critical vaccines and medical procedures to decontaminate and evacuate casualties. 4.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed U.S. chemical and biological warfare defense capabilities, focusing on: (1) the chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified during the Gulf War; and (2) the preparedness of early-deploying ground forces to survive and fight in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to improve the readiness of U.S. forces to operate in chemically or biologically contaminated environments, but equipment, training, and medical shortcomings persist and could cause needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. combat capability; (2) during the Gulf War, many early-deploying units did not have all of the chemical and biological detection, decontamination, and protective equipment they needed; (3) the services continue to place lower emphasis on chemical and biological defense activities than on other high-priority activities; (4) research and development efforts to improve the detection and decontamination of biological and chemical agents have progressed slower than planned because of other priorities and personnel shortages; (5) the Army and Marine Corps have acted to improve their biological and chemical training, but many problems encountered during the Gulf War persist; (6) there was little biological or chemical defense training included in joint training exercises because regional commanders in chief (CINC) believe that this training is the responsibility of the individual services and have assigned other types of training a higher priority; (7) medical units often lack adequate biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans, appropriate defense equipment, and sufficient instruction on how equipment is to be used; and (8) the lower emphasis the services give to chemical and biological defense activities is reflected in the funding, staffing, monitoring, and mission priority levels dedicated to these activities.

gao_GAO-08-1169T

gao_GAO-08-1169T_0

The Overall Number and Rate of Incursions Increased This Fiscal Year Runway safety is a long-standing major aviation safety concern. 1). Thus, the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008 represent a 10 percent increase in the rate over both the first three quarters of fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2001, an earlier peak year for the number and rate of incursions. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, the number of serious incursions—incidents in which collisions are narrowly or barely avoided— decreased from 53 to 24, or by about 55 percent. The number of serious incursions, which is not affected by FAA’s adoption of a new incursion definition, has decreased from 24 in fiscal year 2007 to 23 in fiscal year 2008 as of September 16, 2008, but the rate has increased. The rate of serious incursions for fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008 was 0.41 per 1 million tower operations, compared with 0.39 for fiscal year 2007, an increase of 5 percent. FAA Has Increased Efforts to Oversee Runway Safety, but Collision Risk Remains During fiscal year 2008, FAA has given higher priority to improving runway safety than it did during the previous 2 years, when the agency did not have a permanent director for its Office of Runway Safety. FAA’s recent actions to improve runway safety include continuing to deploy and test new technology designed to prevent runway collisions; promoting changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and issuing new air traffic procedures. FAA is currently reviewing runway incursions at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International Airport and is planning reviews at 8 additional airports based on the frequency of runway incursions. However, an official from the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) said that FAA had not made progress in addressing air traffic controller overtime and fatigue issues over the last year. In November 2007, we reported that FAA’s Office of Runway Safety had not carried out its leadership role to coordinate and monitor the agency’s runway safety efforts. Addressing Human Factors Issues Could Help Improve Runway Safety FAA could further improve runway safety by addressing human factors issues, which aviation safety experts identified as the primary cause of incursions. To address these issues, FAA could encourage the development of new technology, revise additional procedures, and adopt best practices. In November 2007, we reported that, according to experts we surveyed, encouraging the development of a runway incursion warning system in the cockpit would be among the most effective actions that FAA could take to improve runway safety. Appendix I: Data on Runway Incursions and Deployment of Related Safety Technology Not yet available.

Why GAO Did This Study Despite a recent reduction in air traffic due to economic factors, congestion on airport runways remains a safety concern. The nation's aviation system is still expected to grow and become more crowded in the coming years, exacerbating concerns about ground safety issues, including runway incursions, which occur when aircraft enter runways without authorization. This statement addresses (1) recent trends in runway incursions, (2) steps taken to improve runway safety, and (3) what more could be done. This statement is based on GAO's November 2007 report issued to this Subcommittee on runway safety. GAO's work on that report included surveying experts on the causes of runway incidents and accidents and the effectiveness of measures to address them, reviewing safety data, and interviewing agency and industry officials. This statement also contains information from FAA on recent incursions and actions taken since November 2007. What GAO Found While the number of serious incursions this fiscal year is slightly lower than last year, the rate (measured by the number of incidents per 1 million takeoffs and landings) has increased. The number of serious runway incursions--incidents in which collisions were narrowly or barely avoided--decreased from 24 in fiscal year 2007 to 23 in fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008. The rate of serious incursions increased by 5 percent during fiscal year 2008 through September 16, 2008, compared with fiscal year 2007. For all categories of severity, the total number and rate of incursions increased at a slightly slower pace during fiscal year 2008, compared with the prior year. The total number of incursions during the first three quarters of fiscal year 2008 increased by 7 percent and the rate increased by 10 percent, compared with the same period during fiscal year 2007. During fiscal year 2008, FAA has given higher priority to improving runway safety than it did during the previous 2 years when it did not have a permanent director for its Office of Runway Safety, which it created to lead and coordinate the agency's runway safety efforts. FAA's recent actions to improve runway safety include continuing to deploy and test new technology designed to prevent runway collisions; promoting changes in airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and issuing new air traffic procedures. FAA could further improve runway safety by ensuring the timely deployment of technology, encouraging the development of new technology, and increasing its focus on human factors issues, which aviation safety experts identified as the primary cause of incursions. For example, experts said that technology such as the FAA's planned installation of runway status lights at 22 major airports and the development of an incursion warning system in the cockpit are promising technologies and that increased training for pilots and air traffic controllers could help address human factors issues.

gao_GAO-15-184

gao_GAO-15-184_0

Specifically, DOD increased the number of providers across the MHS from 4,608 providers in fiscal year 2009 to 6,186 providers in fiscal year 2013. This increase was in response to a requirement in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 that DOD increase its mental health capabilities. Specifically, social workers and psychologists were the most frequently added types of mental health providers during this period, while psychiatrists and mental health nurses were the least frequently added. DOD Created a Model for Developing Mental Health Provider Staffing Needs, but the Military Services Do Not Use It Consistently DOD created the Psychological Health Risk-Adjusted Model for Staffing (PHRAMS) to show current and estimate future mental health provider staffing needs of the MHS. In fiscal year 2014, PHRAMS was used for a common purpose by the military services for the first time—the development of the fiscal year 2016 DOD budget request for mental health programs. Military Services Mental Health Provider Estimates Are Not Based Mainly on PHRAMS Despite all military services agreeing to use PHRAMS to generate their estimates of mental health provider staffing needs for the fiscal year 2016 budget request, the military services either did not use PHRAMS as the main basis for their mental health provider staffing estimates or supplemented PHRAMS results using other service-specific methods prior to submitting their fiscal year 2016 budget requests. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies’ control activities should ensure that management’s directives are carried out.The military services reported making these adjustments because PHRAMS does not account for several factors that are crucial to their assessment of mental health provider staffing needs, specifically the following: Army. Each military service and the NCR Medical Directorate submits quarterly staffing reports to DHA through the OASD HA human capital office that include information on three areas of mental health provider staffing: (1) the number of mental health providers each military service needs to fulfill the needs of their beneficiaries, referred to as requirements; (2) the number of authorized positions each military service has for various types of mental health providers, referred to as authorizations; and (3) the actual number of mental health providers each military service has working within their MTFs and subordinate clinics that quarter, referred to as on-board providers. Recommendations for Executive Action To ensure DHA can accurately and consistently assess mental health provider staffing needs across each of the military services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to take the following two actions: Require the medical commands of each military service to report any additional service-specific methods they use to determine their final estimates of mental health provider staffing needs; and Require the medical commands of each military service to include its estimated mental health provider staffing needs generated through PHRAMS in the requirements fields of DHA’s quarterly mental health staffing reports. In its comments, DOD generally concurred with two of our four recommendations. Bonuses for mental health providers. Appendix III: Mental Health Provider Staffing Increases by Military Service This appendix provides results from our analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) quarterly mental health staffing reports for fiscal years 2009 and 2013.

Why GAO Did This Study Mental health providers are essential to DOD's delivery of health care to servicemembers and other beneficiaries. DOD's need for these providers has grown as increasing numbers of servicemembers experience life-threatening combat situations. This led to congressional attention—such as the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, which included provisions to help DOD increase the number of mental health providers it employs. GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to increase its mental health provider workforce. Among other objectives, GAO examined (1) how staffing levels changed in response to congressional direction and (2) how DOD and the military services assess current and future needs for mental health providers. GAO reviewed DOD's mental health staffing estimation model and the military services' quarterly mental health provider staffing reports for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the latest information available. GAO also interviewed DOD and military service officials responsible for assessing mental health staffing needs. What GAO Found In response to the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) military health system (MHS) increased its mental health provider staffing level by 34 percent. Specifically, DOD increased the number of mental health providers across the MHS from 4,608 providers in fiscal year 2009 to 6,186 providers in fiscal year 2013. Social workers and psychologists were the most frequently added types of mental health providers during this period. In 2007, DOD created the Psychological Health Risk-Adjusted Model for Staffing (PHRAMS) to assess the MHS's current and future mental health provider staffing needs and DOD annually revises this model. Fiscal year 2014 marked the first time the model was used by the three military services responsible for providing health care—the Army, Air Force, and Navy—for a common purpose, which was the development of DOD's fiscal year 2016 budget request for mental health services. However, GAO found that the military services either were not using PHRAMS as the main basis of their mental health provider staffing needs estimates or were supplementing PHRAMS results with other service-specific methods. The services reported making these adjustments because PHRAMS does not account for factors that are crucial to assess mental health provider staffing needs, such as mental health providers needed for deployments. As a result, the military services' estimates of mental health provider staffing needs may not consistently reflect the beneficiary demand for mental health providers across the military services, and the current version of PHRAMS may not fully capture the military services' needs. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the military services report on service-specific or supplemental processes for generating mental health provider staffing estimates and that DOD continue to refine its staffing estimation model. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations, but did not concur with two others related to the use of PHRAMS that are also included in the report. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid as discussed further in the report.

gao_GAO-06-144

gao_GAO-06-144_0

Progress Limited in Implementing Key NAVSUP Recommendations While VA agrees with the NAVSUP report’s recommendations, limited progress has been made in implementing the seven key recommendations of the report. Until VA establishes well-defined procedures for completing action on the NAVSUP recommendations, the benefits of this study may not be fully realized. Range of Actions on Recommendations The status of the seven key recommendations we identified is summarized in Table 1: Action taken by VA on the seven key recommendations in the NAVSUP report has varied from no action, to initial steps, to more advanced efforts in specific areas. During the course of our review, however, we found that no action has been taken to develop a long-term improvement plan with established milestones for specific actions. Adequate management metrics. VA had not revised the strategic plan by the time we finished our review. Process to review contract files at key acquisition milestones. NAVSUP recommended that AOS establish a contract review board to improve management of the agency’s contract function. Postaward contract management. Customer relationships. VA has taken several actions related to employee morale. Factors Contributing to Limited Progress Discussions with VA officials indicate that the agency believes its limited progress has largely been due to the absence of permanent leadership and insufficient staffing levels. For example, positions for two key VA acquisition managers—Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions and the Director for AOS—were unfilled for about 25 months and 15 months, respectively. Recommendations for Executive Action We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Materiel Management to identify specific time frames and milestones for completing actions on the key NAVSUP recommendations, and establish a method to measure progress in implementing the recommendations. Appendix I: NAVSUP’s Report Recommendations In September 2004, the Naval Supply System Command (NAVSUP) issued a report, Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program on its review of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Acquisition and Materiel Management, Acquisition Operations Service.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is among the largest federal acquisition agencies, spending $7.3 billion on product and service acquisitions in 2004 alone. Recent reports by VA and other organizations identified weaknesses in the agency's acquisition function that could result in excess costs to the taxpayer. One report by the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) made 24 recommendations to improve VA's acquisition function. VA has accepted these recommendations. GAO was asked to review the progress VA has made in implementing the key NAVSUP recommendations. GAO identified 7 of the 24 recommendations as key, based primarily on its professional judgment and prior experience. What GAO Found Progress made by the Department of Veterans Affairs in implementing the key recommendations from the NAVSUP report has been limited. In fact, a year after the report was issued, VA has not completed actions on any of the seven key recommendations GAO identified. While VA agrees implementation of the key recommendations is necessary, the steps it has taken range from no action to partial action. No action has been taken on three key recommendations: to develop a long-term improvement plan, adequate management metrics, and a supplement to the agency's strategic plan. No more than partial action has been taken on four others: establishment of a contract review board for reviewing files at key milestones along with improvement of postaward contract management, customer relationships, and employee morale. A lack of permanent leadership in key positions has contributed to the lack of further progress in revising acquisition policies, procedures, and management and oversight practices, according to VA officials. For example, two key VA acquisitions management positions were unfilled--one for 15 months and the other for 25 months. In addition, VA has neither set time frames for completing actions on the NAVSUP recommendations nor established a method to measure progress. Until VA establishes a process for completing action on the NAVSUP recommendations, the benefits of the study may not be fully realized.

gao_GAO-01-304

gao_GAO-01-304_0

It would remove premium pay, including night differential pay, from the annual pay cap that Customs officers cannot exceed. Had H.R. However, other Customs field managers and supervisors we interviewed supported this provision. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology We were requested to review selected aspects of the U.S. Customs Service officers’ premium pay and determine how night differential pay, in particular, would be affected by proposed legislation introduced in the 106th Congress. 1833: section 123 (a), which would prohibit Customs from paying night differential pay to officers when they take annual, sick, or other leave and do not actually work those premium pay hours; section 123 (b), which would reduce the number of available hours in a day for which night differential pay could be earned; and section 121, which would remove premium pay, including night differential pay, from the calculation of the $30,000 fiscal year overtime and premium pay cap. 1833 had been in effect during the year. With this information, we were able to determine the amount of night differential pay officers earned in fiscal year 1999, the amount they would have made if each of the relevant provisions of H.R. Appendix II: Effects of Proposed Changes on Officers’ Night Differential Pay at JFK Of the five ports we used for analysis, Customs officers at JFK would have been the most affected by the changes in the proposed legislation.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the effects of proposed legislation--H.R. What GAO Found 1833--on the pay of officers at the U.S. Customs Service. The proposal would amend the 1911 Act governing Customs officers' overtime and premium pay, and it would more closely align Customs differential pay with that of other federal agencies. Should the provision be enacted, Customs officers would be limited to the amount and times for which they would be eligible for night differential pay. In addition, another section of the proposed law would remove premium pay from the calculation of the $30,000 fiscal year overtime and premium pay cap that Customs officers may not exceed. GAO's analysis of Customs data showed that had the provisions of H.R. 1833 been in effect during fiscal year 1999, many officers would have experienced significant pay decreases. Managers and supervisors asked to analyze the proposal had mixed reviews, but those not in favor of the proposal were concerned that less eligibility for night differential pay would lead to low morale and staffing problems.

gao_GAO-10-768

gao_GAO-10-768_0

Of these eight agencies, the Corps, the Forest Service, and NPS did the most extensive work to identify their NAGPRA items, and therefore they have the highest confidence level that they have identified all of them and included them in summaries and inventories (see table 3). In contrast, relative to the top three agencies, BLM, BOR, and FWS were moderately successful in identifying their items and including them in summaries and inventories, and BIA and TVA have done the least amount of work. 1). Additionally, we found that a number of federal agencies have not fully complied with NAGPRA’s requirement to publish notices of inventory completion for all of their culturally affiliated human remains and associated funerary objects in the Federal Register, thereby complicating efforts of Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations to make repatriation requests for those items (see table 5). National NAGPRA Has Taken Actions Consistent with the Act, such as Publishing Notices, Administering a Grants Program, and Supporting the Review Committee National NAGPRA has taken a number of actions that are consistent with the act. In the other case, a nomination was made by a non-federally recognized tribe. Many NAGPRA Items Have Been Repatriated, but Repatriations Are Not Tracked or Reported Governmentwide According to agency data and our survey results, a total of 55 percent of human remains and 68 percent of associated funerary objects have been repatriated as of September 30, 2009. While agencies are required to permanently document their repatriations, they are not required to compile and report that information to anyone. These three agencies, however, along with other federal agencies that have published notices of inventory completion, do not regularly report comprehensive data on their repatriations to National NAGPRA, the Review Committee, or Congress. However, as noted in the data above only three of the eight key agencies with significant historical collections presently consolidate agencywide data on the extent of their repatriations. Similarly, Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations do not have readily available information on which human remains and objects have been culturally affiliated with them but have not been repatriated. Repatriations did not occur for a variety of reasons. Conclusions After passage of the act, many federal agencies faced a monumental task in trying to identify all of their NAGPRA items and culturally affiliating them, to the extent possible, within the statutory deadlines. Despite the fact that key federal agencies have now had almost 20 years to comply with the act, they still have not fully complied. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making the following five recommendations to improve NAGPRA implementation: To enhance federal agency NAGPRA compliance, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, and the Interior, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Tennessee Valley Authority direct their cultural resource management programs to develop and provide to Congress a needs assessment listing specific actions, resources, and time needed to complete the inventories and summaries required by NAGPRA sections 5 and 6 for their historical collections; and a timetable for the expeditious publication in the Federal Register of notices of inventory completion for all remaining Native American human remains and associated funerary objects that have been culturally affiliated in inventories. To provide policymakers with information to assess the overall effectiveness of the act and to provide Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations readily accessible information on items that are available for repatriation, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Tennessee Valley Authority direct their cultural resource management programs to report their repatriation data to National NAGPRA on a regular basis, but no less than annually, for each notice of inventory completion they have or will publish. In their written comments, officials from Agriculture’s U.S. Forest Service, Interior, and TVA agreed with the report’s conclusions and recommendations. The Department of Defense did not provide comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This appendix details the methods we used to examine the implementation of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). We were asked to determine: (1) the extent to which federal agencies have complied with NAGPRA’s requirements for their historical collections; (2) the activities taken by the Review Committee to fulfill its role under NAGPRA and what challenges, if any, it faces; (3) the actions taken by National NAGPRA to fulfill its responsibilities under NAGPRA; and (4) the extent to which federal agencies reported repatriating Native American human remains and objects. We examined NAGPRA implementation in detail for eight federal agencies with significant historical collections: the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National Park Service (NPS); the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); the Department of Agriculture’s U.S. Forest Service; and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Appendix III: National NAGPRA’s Lack of Authority to Ensure Federal Agency Compliance with NAGPRA National NAGPRA is charged with assisting federal agencies and others with the NAGPRA process.

Why GAO Did This Study The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) required federal agencies and museums to (1) identify their Native American human remains and other objects, (2) try to culturally affiliate them with a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization, and (3) repatriate them under the terms in the act. The National NAGPRA office, within the Department of the Interior's National Park Service (NPS), facilitates the government-wide implementation of NAGPRA. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, the (1) extent to which agencies have complied with their NAGPRA requirements, (2) actions taken by National NAGPRA, and (3) extent of repatriations reported by agencies. GAO reviewed records for eight key agencies with significant historical collections, surveyed agencies to obtain repatriation data, and interviewed agency, museum, and tribal officials. What GAO Found Almost 20 years after NAGPRA, key federal agencies still have not fully complied with the act for their historical collections acquired on or before NAGPRA's enactment. GAO examined NAGPRA implementation in detail for eight key federal agencies with significant historical collections: Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and NPS; Agriculture's U.S. Forest Service; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). First, all of the agencies acknowledge that they still have additional work to do to fully comply with the act's requirements to identify all of their NAGPRA items, establish cultural affiliations when possible, and create summaries and inventories of the items. Overall, the Corps, the Forest Service, and NPS did the most work to identify their NAGPRA items. BLM, BOR, and FWS did some work, and BIA and TVA have done the least amount of work. Second, some of the eight agencies, along with some other federal agencies, have not fully complied with NAGPRA's requirement to publish notices of inventory completion for all of their culturally affiliated human remains and associated funerary objects in the Federal Register. Until agencies (1) identify all of the possible NAGPRA items in their historical collections, (2) establish cultural affiliations to the extent possible, and (3) publish the required notices, they cannot repatriate their Native American human remains and objects. To fulfill the Secretary of the Interior's responsibilities under NAGPRA, National NAGPRA has taken some actions consistent with the act, such as publishing notices in the Federal Registerand administering a grants program. However, GAO identified some actions of concern. National NAGPRA developed a list of Indian tribes eligible under NAGPRA that was inconsistent with BIA's official list of federally recognized tribes and departmental policy. Furthermore, National NAGPRA did not always screen nominations for Review Committee positions properly and, in a few cases, inappropriately recruited nominees for Review Committee positions. Through fiscal year 2009, 55 percent of the human remains and 68 percent of the associated funerary objects that have been published in notices of inventory completion had been repatriated, according to agency data and GAO's survey results. Agencies are required to permanently document their repatriations, but they are not required to compile and report that information to anyone. Only three agencies--the Corps, the Forest Service, and NPS--centrally track their repatriations. These three agencies, however, along with the other federal agencies that have published notices, generally do not report any of their data on repatriations to National NAGPRA or to Congress. As a result, policymakers, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiians organizations do not have access to readily available information about culturally affiliated NAGPRA items that have not been repatriated. According to officials, the remaining items have not been repatriated for a variety of reasons, such as a lack of repatriation requests and financial constraints. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends, among other things, that the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and the Interior as well as TVA report to Congress the actions that they need to take to fully comply with the act and that they report the status of their repatriations to National NAGPRA. GAO is also recommending that National NAGPRA make improvements in its facilitation of the act. Agriculture, Interior, and TVA agreed with GAO's recommendations. The Department of Defense did not provide comments on the report.

gao_GAO-10-293T

gao_GAO-10-293T_0

In the SSO program, state oversight agencies are responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. FTA’s role in overseeing safety and security of rail transit is relatively limited. Rail transit has been one of the safest modes of transportation in the United States. Our 2006 Report Found Most Participants Stated That the State Safety Oversight Program Was Worthwhile but FTA Faced Several Challenges in Administering the Program Effectively Our 2006 report found that officials from the majority of oversight and transit agencies with whom we spoke stated that the SSO program enhances rail transit safety. Officials at several state oversight agencies we spoke with stated that since FTA provided little to no funding for rail transit safety oversight functions, and because of competing priorities for limited state funds, they were limited in the number of staff they could hire and the amount of training they could provide. Staffing levels varied across oversight agencies. For example, we found that 13 oversight agencies dedicated less than one full- time equivalent (FTE) staff member to oversight. To help ensure that oversight agency staff were adequately trained for their duties, we recommended that FTA develop a suggested training curriculum for oversight agency staff and encourage those staff to complete it. Enforcement powers of oversight agencies varied. In our 2006 report, we stated that 19 of 27 oversight agencies had no punitive authority, such as authority to issue fines, and those that did have such authority stated that they rarely, if ever, used it. Preliminary Observations on DOT’s Plans For Revamping Rail Transit Safety Oversight and Key Issues Congress May Need to Consider DOT is planning to propose major changes in FTA’s role that would shift the balance of federal and state responsibilities for setting safety standards for rail transit agencies and overseeing their compliance with those standards. Based on information provided to us by DOT, the department plans to propose a new federal safety program for rail transit, at an unspecified future date, with the following key elements: FTA, through legislation, would receive authority to establish and enforce minimum safety standards for rail transit systems not already regulated by FRA. In determining whether to approve state safety programs, FTA would consider a state’s capability to undertake rail transit oversight, including staff capacity, and its financial independence from the transit systems it oversees. DOT would provide federal assistance to approved state safety programs. These changes would give FTA the authority to directly regulate rail transit safety and, in cooperation with the states, to oversee and enforce compliance by rail transit systems with these regulations. The new program DOT is planning to propose has the potential to address some challenges and issues we cited in our 2006 report. Requiring that participating states not receive funds from transit agencies would make the state agencies more independent of the transit agencies they oversee. Providing FTA and participating states with the authority to enforce minimum federal safety standards across the nation’s transit systems could help ensure compliance with the standards and improved safety practices, and might prevent some accidents as a result. While the new program, as envisioned by DOT, may have some potential benefits, our work on the SSO program, other transit programs, and regulatory programs suggests there are a number of issues Congress may need to consider in deciding whether or how to act on DOT’s proposal. These include finding the appropriate level of FTA oversight of state programs and allocating costs between the federal government and the states. Enforcement.

Why GAO Did This Study Rail transit generally has been one of the safest forms of public transportation. However, several recent notable accidents are cause for concern. For example, a July 2009 crash on the Washington Metro Red Line resulted in nine deaths. The federal government does not directly regulate the safety of rail transit. Through its State Safety Oversight program, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requires states to designate an oversight agency to directly oversee the safety of rail transit systems. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that made recommendations to improve the program. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is planning to propose legislation that, if passed, would result in a greater role for FTA in regulating and overseeing the safety of these systems. This statement (1) summarizes the findings of GAO's 2006 report and (2) provides GAO's preliminary observations on key elements DOT has told us it will include in its legislative proposal for revamping rail transit safety oversight. It is based primarily on GAO's 2006 report, an analysis of the Administration's proposal through review of documents and interviews with DOT officials, and GAO's previous work on regulatory programs that oversee safety within other modes of transportation. GAO's 2006 report was based on a survey of the 27 state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program. GAO provided a draft of this testimony to DOT officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate. What GAO Found GAO's 2006 report found that officials from the majority of the state oversight and transit agencies stated that the State Safety Oversight program enhances rail transit safety but that FTA faced several challenges in administering the program. For example, state oversight agencies received little or no funding from FTA and had limited funding for staff. In fact, some required that the transit agencies they oversaw reimburse them for services. Also, expertise, staffing levels, and enforcement powers varied widely from agency to agency. This resulted in a lack of uniformity in how oversight agencies carried out their duties. As of 2006, 13 oversight agencies were devoting the equivalent of less than one full-time employee to oversight functions. Also, 19 oversight agencies GAO contacted lacked certain enforcement authority, such as authority to issue fines, and those that did have such authority stated that they rarely, if ever, used it. DOT is planning to propose major changes in FTA's role that would shift the balance of federal and state responsibilities for oversight of rail transit safety. According to DOT officials, under this proposal, the agency would receive authority to establish and enforce minimum standards although states still could maintain an oversight program. States could become authorized to enforce these standards if FTA determines their program capable and financially independent of the transit system they oversee. FTA would provide financial assistance to approved programs. Such changes would have the potential to address challenges GAO cited in its 2006 report. For example, providing funding to participating state agencies could help them maintain an adequate number of trained staff, and providing FTA and participating states with enforcement authority could help better ensure that transit systems take corrective actions when problems are found. Congress may need to consider several issues in deciding whether or how to act on DOT's proposal. These include determining whatlevel of government has the best capacity to oversee transit safety, ensuring that FTA and state oversight agencies would have adequate and qualified staff to carry out the envisioned program, and understanding the potential budgetary implications of the program.

gao_GAO-16-62

gao_GAO-16-62_0

CFPB was established as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System. For example, in January 2014, CFPB management reached agreement with the employee union to develop a new performance management system. Employees Reported Positive Aspects about CFPB but Also Concerns about Personnel Management, Fairness, and Trust CFPB employees who responded to our survey for nonexecutive employees identified strengths and areas for improvement related to personnel management and organizational culture at CFPB. For several questions in these areas, more than 25 percent of respondents had unfavorable views and the proportion of unfavorable responses was above 35 percent in some CFPB offices and for some minority respondents, female respondents, respondents 40 years of age and over, and respondents who did not specify a race. In addition, about 81 percent of respondents agreed that their immediate supervisor respects and values differences among individuals and that their work teams make them feel included. CFPB’s 2015 annual employee survey also showed higher dissatisfaction among black respondents. As shown in table 3, about a third of all respondents disagreed that success at CFPB is based more on merit than on personal connections to managers or favoritism. About 18 percent of employees who responded to our survey reported that they felt they had experienced discrimination at CFPB, and perceptions of discrimination were around 25 percent or more for some demographic groups and in the Office of Consumer Response and in a small office in SEFL. CFPB Has Taken Steps to Improve Personnel Practices in the Past 2 Years, but It Is Too Soon to Assess Their Effect Partly in response to employees’ expressed concerns about favoritism or unfair treatment in certain personnel practices—such as hiring, performance management, promotions, and detail opportunities—as well as recommendations from the Inspector General and other external reviews, CFPB has taken steps to review and strengthen its policies and practices in these areas. Expanding management training related to personnel practices. CFPB has adopted several practices that are consistent with leading diversity management practices for measurement. In addition, CFPB’s diversity and inclusion strategic plan cites the need for performance measures and for CFPB to communicate its progress and effectiveness on its diversity and inclusion initiatives. CFPB Does Not Comprehensively Report on Progress Related to Its Diversity, Inclusion, Fairness, and Culture Initiatives CFPB’s efforts to address employee concerns about diversity, inclusion, fairness, and culture together represent a significant change management initiative. However, without a strategy for comprehensively reporting on its progress across these initiatives, CFPB may miss opportunities to provide greater transparency and build the employee commitment needed to sustain progress. CFPB Has Strengthened Its Complaints Processes, but Feedback Mechanisms Do Not Fully Address Employees’ Concerns CFPB has taken steps to improve its management of employee complaint processes, such as offering new training to managers and addressing problems with its tracking of complaints, However, our survey indicated that as of spring 2015, over half of the respondents who reported experience with at least one of CFPB’s complaint processes had concerns that could affect employees’ confidence in using the processes. While CFPB has made progress in strengthening its management of complaint processes, employee views collected through our survey and interviews suggest that many employees with experience with CFPB’s complaint processes lack confidence and trust in CFPB’s management of these processes. Recommendations for Executive Action In order to ensure sustained leadership commitment to and accountability for CFPB’s efforts to promote a diverse, inclusive, and fair workplace, we recommend that the Director take the following two actions: Develop and implement a strategy for comprehensively reporting on the bureau’s implementation goals and progress on its range of initiatives related to promoting diversity, inclusion, fairness, and a stronger organizational culture. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology This report examines (1) the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) early efforts as a new agency to establish personnel practices and organizational culture and challenges it encountered in promoting a diverse, inclusive, and fair workplace; (2) employees’ views on personnel management and organizational culture at CFPB; and (3) CFPB’s efforts to strengthen its personnel management practices and organizational culture. To assess CFPB’s efforts to strengthen its processes for addressing employee complaints, we reviewed policies, procedures, and guidance related to Equal Employment Opportunity complaints and grievances.

Why GAO Did This Study The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created CFPB to regulate the provision of consumer financial products and services. In 2014, congressional hearings included testimony from CFPB employees about allegations of discrimination and retaliation, which raised concerns about CFPB's management practices and culture. GAO was asked to review personnel management and organizational culture issues at CFPB. This report examines (1) CFPB employees' views on these issues and (2) CFPB's efforts to strengthen personnel management and culture, among other objectives. GAO reviewed relevant CFPB reports, policies, procedures, and other documents; surveyed CFPB employees and executives (with 62 and 63 percent response rates, respectively) to gather their views on CFPB's personnel practices and organizational culture; spoke with CFPB employees who contacted GAO through its phone and email hotlines; interviewed CFPB officials; and reviewed reports and recommendations from the Office of the Inspector General for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and CFPB. What GAO Found Nonexecutive employees at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) who responded to GAO's survey identified strengths and areas for improvement in CFPB's personnel practices and culture. Most respondents agreed that enthusiasm for CFPB's mission is high and that immediate supervisors respect and value differences among individuals. However, GAO's survey found heightened concerns related to fair treatment, trust that employees can raise concerns without fear of reprisal, confidence in complaint processes, and other matters. For survey items on these issues, more than 25 percent of respondents bureau-wide had unfavorable views, and dissatisfaction was above 35 percent in some CFPB offices and demographic groups. For example, about one-third of respondents disagreed with the statement that success at CFPB is based more on merit than on personal connections or favoritism. Disagreement was 40 percent or more for a few offices that focus on examining institutions and among black respondents. As part of ongoing improvement efforts and in response to challenges it identified in late 2013 and early 2014, CFPB has worked to strengthen personnel management practices and enhance its diversity and inclusion efforts. In part to address weaknesses in personnel practices that may have contributed to perceptions of unfair treatment, CFPB has expanded management training, developed new guidance on personnel practices, and developed a new performance management system. CFPB has made progress in adopting leading diversity management practices identified in prior GAO work, such as finalizing a diversity strategic plan, creating employee diversity groups, and expanding diversity training. In addition, CFPB launched a new initiative to strengthen its organizational culture that includes obtaining employee input on ideas for improving CFPB's culture and addressing employee concerns. Finally, CFPB has strengthened its employee complaint processes by providing new training and guidance and creating feedback mechanisms to help evaluate progress in some areas. CFPB has taken steps to measure and communicate progress on these efforts, such as through its process for analyzing feedback from employee surveys. However, without additional steps in these areas, CFPB may miss opportunities to help ensure sustained commitment and accountability for its initiatives. CFPB's diversity, inclusion, fairness, and culture efforts represent a significant change management initiative, but CFPB does not comprehensively report on its implementation goals and progress across these efforts. CFPB has created some feedback mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of its equal employment opportunity complaint process, but has not done the same for its employee grievance processes. What GAO Recommends GAO makes two recommendations to improve CFPB's personnel management efforts, including developing a strategy for reporting on progress and creating feedback tools on its grievance processes in coordination with its employee union. CFPB concurred with both recommendations.

gao_GAO-01-189

gao_GAO-01-189_0

Conclusion IRS must significantly improve telephone assistance if it is to meet its long- term goal of providing world-class customer service to the tens of millions of taxpayers that call. While IRS has undertaken efforts to analyze its performance and identify ways to improve, these efforts have been incomplete. IRS’ analyses did not cover all of the key management decisions and other key factors that affect telephone performance. Designing and conducting a comprehensive analysis of the key management decisions and other key factors that affect telephone performance in each filing season will be a difficult task because the factors that affect performance are multiple and interrelated. However, without a more comprehensive analysis of the factors that affect performance, IRS management lacks the information it needs to make decisions to improve performance.

What GAO Found The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must significantly improve telephone assistance if it is to meet its long-term goal of providing world-class customer service to the tens of millions of taxpayers who call. Although IRS has tried to analyze its performance and identify ways to improve, these efforts have been incomplete. IRS' analyses did not cover all of the key management decisions and other key factors that affect telephone performance. Designing and conducting a comprehensive analysis of the key management decisions and other key factors that affect telephone performance in each filing season will be difficult because the factors that affect performance are multiple and interrelated. However, without a more comprehensive analysis of the factors that affect performance, IRS lacks the information it needs to make decisions to improve performance.

gao_GAO-02-18

gao_GAO-02-18_0

The most significant difference between the equity listing requirements of Amex and those of other U.S. stock markets was that Amex was one of only two markets that retained the discretion to initially list companies that did not meet all of its quantitative requirements. Quantitative Listing Requirements Generally Addressed the Same Factors, Although Minimum Thresholds Varied Amex’s quantitative initial listing guidelines for equities have generally addressed factors that are the same as or similar to those addressed by the initial listing standards of the other U.S. stock markets, including factors such as minimum share price, stockholders’ equity, income, market value of publicly held shares, and number of shareholders. However, the minimum thresholds for meeting the requirements of each market have varied to reflect the differences in the characteristics—such as size—of the companies that each market targeted for listing. As a result, Amex might approve a listing application even if the company did not meet all the exchange’s quantitative guidelines. Reflecting the seriousness of their concerns about the open recommendations related to Amex’s use of its discretionary authority in making initial and continued listing decisions, OCIE officials told us that in the absence of an Amex agreement to adequately address these recommendations, OCIE would include them among the open significant recommendations to be reported annually to the SEC Commissioners. Amex Did Not Prepare Management Reports That Demonstrated the Effectiveness of Its Listing Program Amex officials told us that the exchange was fulfilling its SRO responsibilities related to its equity listing operations in part by individually monitoring the status of companies that did not meet its continued listing guidelines and, beginning in January 2001, by summarizing related information in monthly reports to management.

What GAO Found The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has indicated that one-third of Amex's new listings did not meet the exchange's equity listing standards. Amex's listing guidelines address factors that are the same or similar to those addressed by other U.S. stock markets. Quantitative requirements addressed share price, stockholders' equity, income, and market value of publicly held shares. However, the minimum thresholds for meeting these requirements varied to reflect the differences in the companies that each market targeted for listing. The most significant difference between Amex's guidelines and the listing standards of other U.S. stock markets was that Amex was one of only two markets that retained discretion to initially list companies that did not meet all of its quantitative requirements. Amex had not implemented the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations' (OCIE) recommendations on the exchange's discretionary listing decisions. OCIE officials told GAO that in the absence of an Amex agreement to address the recommendations, they would include them among the open significant recommendations to be reported to the SEC Commissioners as a result of a 1998 GAO recommendation. The Commission can require Amex to implement OCIE's recommendations. Amex officials said that the exchange was fulfilling its self-regulatory organization responsibilities by individually monitoring the status of companies that did not meet its continued listing guidelines and by summarizing information in monthly reports to management.

gao_GAO-05-794T

gao_GAO-05-794T_0

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and several amendments to the law since its passage, established minimum funding requirements for sponsors of pension plans in order to try to ensure that plans have enough assets to pay promised benefits. Under ERISA, the termination of a single-employer DB plan may result in an insurance claim with the single-employer program if the plan has insufficient assets to pay all benefits accrued under the plan up to the date of plan termination. The recent decline of PBGC’s single-employer program has occurred in the context of the long-term stagnation of the DB system. Furthermore, because of leeway in the actuarial methodology and assumptions sponsors can use to measure plan assets and liabilities, underfunding may actually have been more severe and widespread than reported at the end of the period. Although as a group, funding levels among the 100 largest plans were reasonably stable and strong from 1996 to 2000, by 2002, more than half of the largest plans were underfunded (see fig. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation in 2002 reported that its plan was 85.2 percent funded on a current liability basis; yet, the plan terminated later that year with assets of less than half of the value of promised benefits. Most Sponsors of Large Plans Did Not Make Annual Cash Contributions, but Satisfied Funding Requirements through Use of Accounting Credits For the 1995 to 2002 period, the sponsors of the 100 largest plans each year on average made relatively small cash contributions to their plans. Even though the plan no longer had this $1 million in assets, the sponsor could still use that credit balance (plus interest on the credit balance) to reduce this year’s contribution to the plan. The interaction between the FFL rule and the annual maximum tax- deductible contribution also has implications on the amount that plan sponsors can contribute. 3). Very Few Sponsors of Underfunded Large Plans Paid an AFC from 1995 to 2002 Funding rules dictate that a sponsor of a plan with more than 100 participants in which the plan’s actuarial value of assets fall below 90 percent of liabilities, measured using the highest allowable interest rate, may be liable for an AFC in that year. All of these plans were assessed an AFC more than once. Large Plans’ Sponsors’ Credit Ratings Appear Related to Certain Funding Behavior and Represent Risk to PBGC The recent funding experiences of large plans, especially those sponsored by financially weak firms, illustrate the limited effectiveness of certain current funding rules and represent a potentially large implicit financial risk to PBGC. Plans sponsored by speculative grade- rated firms were also more likely to be underfunded. PBGC’s claims experience shows that financially weak plans have been a source of substantial claims. Conclusions Widely reported recent large plan terminations by bankrupt sponsors and the financial consequences for PBGC have pushed pension reform into the spotlight of national concern. Our analysis here suggests that certain aspects of the funding rules have contributed to the general underfunding of pensions and, indirectly, to PBGC’s recent financial difficulties. Further, the rules appear to lack strong mechanisms to compel sponsors to make regular contributions to their plans, even those that are underfunded or subject to an AFC. Ideally, effective reform would improve the accuracy of plan asset and liability measurement while minimizing complexity and maintaining contribution flexibility; develop a PBGC insurance premium structure that charges sponsors fairly, based on the risk their plans pose to PBGC, and provides incentives for sponsors to fund plans adequately; address the issue of severely underfunded plans making lump-sum distributions; resolve outstanding controversies concerning cash balance and other hybrid plans by safeguarding the benefits of workers regardless of age; and improve plan information transparency for PBGC, plan participants, unions, and investors in a manner that does not add considerable burden to plan sponsors. As I noted in my opening remarks, PBGC’s challenges parallel the challenges facing our Social Security system. Further, timely action to address both private pension and Social Security reform is needed. However, consideration must be given to the interactive effects of any such reforms and how they contribute to addressing our nation’s large and growing fiscal challenge, key demographic, economic and workforce trends, and the economic security of Americans in their retirement years. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses our recent report on the rules that govern the funding of defined benefit (DB) plans and the implications of those rules for the problems facing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and the DB pension system generally. In recent years, the PBGC has encountered serious financial difficulties. Prominent companies, such as Bethlehem Steel, U.S. Airways, and United Airlines, have terminated their pension plans with severe gaps between the assets these plans held and the pension promises these plan sponsors made to their employees and retirees. These terminations, and other unfavorable market conditions, have created large losses for PBGC's single-employer insurance program--the federal program that insures certain benefits of the more than 34 million participants in over 29,000 plans. The single-employer program has gone from a $9.7 billion accumulated surplus at the end of fiscal year 2000 to a $23.3 billion accumulated deficit as of September 2004, including a $12.1 billion loss for fiscal year 2004. In addition, financially weak companies sponsored DB plans with a combined $96 billion of underfunding as of September 2004, up from $35 billion as of 2 years earlier. Because PBGC guarantees participant benefits, there is concern that the expected continued termination of large plans by bankrupt sponsors will push the program more quickly into insolvency, generating pressure on the Congress, and ultimately the taxpayers, to provide financial assistance to PBGC and pension participants. Given these concerns, we placed the PBGC's single-employer program on GAO's high-risk list of agencies and programs that need broad-based transformations to address major challenges. In past reports, we identified several categories of reform that the Congress might consider to strengthen the program over the long term. We concluded that the Congress should consider comprehensive reform measures to reduce the risks to the program's long-term financial viability and thus enhance the retirement income security of American workers and retirees. More broadly, pension reform represents a real opportunity to address part of our long-term fiscal problems and reconfigure our retirement security systems to bring them into the 21st century. This opportunity has many related pieces: addressing our nation's large and growing long-term fiscal gap; deciding on the appropriate role and size of the federal government--and how to finance that government--and bringing the wide array of federal activities into line with today's world. Continuing on our current unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. We therefore must fundamentally reexamine major spending and tax policies and priorities in an effort to recapture our fiscal flexibility and ensure that our government can respond to a range of current and emerging security, social, economic, and environmental changes and challenges. The PBGC's situation is an excellent example of the need for the Congress to reconsider the role of government organizations, programs, and policies in light of changes that have occurred since PBGC's establishment in 1974. What GAO Found Our recent work on DB pension funding rules provides important insights in understanding the problems facing PBGC and the DB system. To summarize our findings, while pension funding rules are intended to ensure that plans have sufficient assets to pay promised benefit to plan participants, significant vulnerabilities exist. Although from 1995 to 2002 most of the 100 largest DB plans annually had assets that exceeded their current liabilities, by 2002 over half of the 100 largest plans were underfunded, and almost one-fourth of plans were less than 90 percent funded. Further, because of leeway in the actuarial methodology and assumptions that sponsors may use to measure plan assets and liabilities, underfunding may actually have been more severe and widespread than reported. Additionally, on average over 60 percent of sponsors of these plans made no annual cash contributions to their plans. One key reason for this is that the funding rules allow a sponsor to satisfy minimum funding requirements without necessarily making a cash contribution each year, even though the plan may be underfunded. Further, very few sponsors of underfunded plans were required to pay an additional funding charge (AFC), a funding mechanism designed to reduce severe plan underfunding. Finally, our analysis confirms the notion that plans sponsored by financially weak firms pose a particular risk to PBGC, as these plans were generally more likely to be underfunded, to be subject to an additional funding charge, and to use assumptions to minimize or avoid cash contributions than plans sponsored by stronger firms.

gao_GAO-11-401

gao_GAO-11-401_0

Characteristics of State Economic Downturns States are affected differently by national recessions. States can also experience an economic downturn not associated with a national recession. The federal government may have an interest in providing fiscal assistance to state and local governments during recessions because doing so could reduce actions taken by these governments that could exacerbate the effects of the recession. States have been affected differently during each of these recessions. For example, unemployment rates, entry into, and exit out of economic downturns have varied across states during past recessions. State and Local Governments’ Revenue and Expenditure Patterns during National Recessions Reflect Variations in Economic Circumstances and Policy Choices State and Local Government Revenue Declines in National Recessions Vary in Magnitude, over Time, and across States General revenues collected by state and local governments over the past three decades are procyclical—typically increasing when the national economy is expanding and decreasing during national recessions, relative to their long-run trend. Revenue fluctuations during national recessions vary substantially across states. Analysts have reported that this is due in part to states’ differing tax structures, economic conditions, and industrial bases. State and Local Government Spending Increases during Economic Expansions and Decreases during National Recessions Relative to Long-Run Trends While Spending on Safety Net Programs Displays the Opposite Pattern General expenditures by state and local governments are procyclical (table 2). Furthermore, the finding that current expenditures on health and hospitals and on public welfare tend to increase relative to trend during recessions does not definitively indicate the extent to which these increases are meeting increased demand during recessions. State Governments Raise Taxes and Fees, Tap Reserves, and Use Other Budget Measures to Address Revenue Declines during National Recessions As revenues decline and demand increases for programs such as Medicaid and unemployment insurance during national recessions, state governments make fiscal choices within the constraints of their available resources. Strategies to Respond to National Recessions Require Decisions on Whether, When, and How to Provide Federal Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments GAO and Other Evaluations of Prior Federal Fiscal Assistance Strategies Identify Design Considerations Including Effective Timing and Targeting of Aid Evaluations of prior federal fiscal assistance strategies have identified considerations to guide policymakers as they consider the design of future legislative responses to national recessions. Since it takes time for state and local government revenues and service demands to return to pre-recession levels, fiscal assistance that continues beyond the end of a recession may help state and local governments avoid similar actions that slow the economic recovery. Targeting—If federal fiscal assistance to state and local governments is targeted based on the magnitude of the recession’s effect on each state’s economy, this approach can facilitate economic recovery and moderate fiscal distress at the state and local level. For example, policymakers could use a national labor market indicator to begin assistance and a state-level indicator to halt assistance. Policymakers could select indicators with the intent of responding to the effects of a particular recession. Timely, state-level, publicly available indicators can be found primarily in labor market data, but are also found in housing market and personal income data. Federal responses to prior recessions have included providing various forms of federal fiscal assistance directly to state and local governments as well as decisions not to provide fiscal assistance in response to national recessions. However, the Recovery Act did not allocate assistance based on state variation in the ability to generate revenue. Objectives and Scope The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) required GAO to evaluate how national economic downturns have affected states over the past several decades. Finally, we interviewed analysts at associations and think tanks familiar with the design and implementation of federal fiscal assistance legislation. This includes indicators of fiscal stress, such as declines in tax receipts or budget gaps. For example, tax receipts reflect states’ policy choices, as states may change tax rates in response to declining revenues able in a recession. Depending on the specific policy strategy used, policymakers may want to combine the indicators with other information, such as data on increased demand for specific programs, to target assistance for specific programs or state circumstances. We contacted representatives of state and local government organizati ons and public policy and research organizations to (1) gain insight into publicpolicy strategies and potential indicators for timing and targeting assistance to states; (2) validate our selection of strategies and discuss considerations for designing federal fiscal assistance to state and local governments during national recessions; and (3) obtain views regard the feasibility and potential effects of these strategies. 1. Medicaid: Strategies to Help States Address Increased Expenditures during Economic Downturns.

Why GAO Did This Study The most recent recession, which started in December 2007, is generally believed to be the worst economic downturn the country has experienced since the Great Depression. In response to this recession, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), which provided state and local governments with about $282 billion in fiscal assistance. The Recovery Act requires GAO to evaluate how national economic downturns have affected states since 1974. In this report, GAO (1) analyzes how state and local government budgets are affected during national recessions and (2) identifies strategies to provide fiscal assistance to state and local governments and indicators policymakers could use to time and target such assistance. This report is being released in conjunction with a companion report on Medicaid and economic downturns to respond to a related statutory requirement in the Recovery Act. GAO analyzed economic data and states' general fund budget data; reviewed past federal fiscal assistance and related evaluations; and interviewed analysts at key associations and think tanks. GAO shared relevant findings with policy research organizations and associations representing state and local officials, who generally agreed with our conclusions. We incorporated technical comments from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. GAO identifies strategies for Congress to consider but does not make recommendations in this report. What GAO Found Understanding state and local government revenue and expenditure patterns can help policymakers determine whether, when, where, and how they provide federal fiscal assistance to state and local governments in response to future national recessions. In general, state and local governments' revenues increase during economic expansions and decline during national recessions (relative to long-run trends). State and local revenue declines have varied during each recession, and the declines have been more severe during recent recessions. Additionally, revenue fluctuations vary substantially across states, due in part to states' differing tax structures, economic conditions, and industrial bases. State and local government spending also tends to increase during economic expansions, but spending on safety net programs, such as health and hospitals and public welfare, appears to decrease during economic expansions and increase during national recessions, relative to long-run trends. These trends can exacerbate the fiscal conditions of state and local governments given that demand for health and other safety net programs increases during recessions, and these programs now consume larger shares of state budgets relative to prior decades. This implies that, during recessions, state and local governments may have difficulties providing services. To mitigate the effect on services from declining revenues, state and local governments take actions including raising taxes and fees, tapping reserves, and using other budget measures to maintain balanced budgets. Although every recession reflects varied economic circumstances at the national level and among the states, knowledge of prior federal responses to national recessions provides guideposts for policymakers to consider as they design strategies to respond to future recessions. Considerations include (1) Timing assistance so that the aid begins to flow as the economy is contracting, although assistance that continues for some period beyond the recession's end may help these governments avoid actions that slow economic recovery; (2) Targeting assistance based on the magnitude of the recession's effects on individual states' economic distress; and (3) Temporarily increasing federal funding (by specifying the conditions for ending or halting the state and local assistance when states' economic conditions sufficiently improve). Policymakers also balance their decision to provide state and local assistance with other federal policy considerations such as competing demands for federal resources. Policymakers can select indicators to identify when the federal government should start and stop providing aid, as well as how much aid should be allocated. Timely indicators are capable of distinguishing states' economic downturns from economic expansions. Indicators selected for targeting assistance are capable of identifying states' individual circumstances in a recession. In general, timely indicators capable of targeting assistance to states can be found primarily in labor market data. Indicators such as employment, unemployment, hourly earnings, and wages and salaries also offer the advantage of providing information on economic conditions rather than reflecting states' policy choices (a limitation of data on state revenue trends). In some cases, it may be appropriate for policymakers to select multiple indicators or select indicators to reflect their policy goals specific to a particular recession. States have been affected differently during each of these recessions. For example, unemployment rates, entry into, and exit out of economic downturns have varied across states during past recessions. Federal responses to prior recessions have included various forms of federal fiscal assistance to these governments as well as decisions not to provide direct fiscal assistance to these governments.

gao_NSIAD-95-150

gao_NSIAD-95-150_0

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this review were to (1) assess the status and progress of Poland’s economic restructuring in the key areas of macroeconomic stabilization, foreign trade and investment, privatization, and banking, (2) describe impediments to these restructuring efforts, (3) discuss the role donors have played in the transformation process, and (4) identify lessons learned that could be useful to other transition countries. Foreign investment is considered essential to Poland’s economic restructuring efforts. 3.2.) Privatization laws have set the framework for reducing the rest of the state sector, but the pace of privatization for larger state-owned enterprises has been slower than expected, and significant portions of the Polish economy remain in the hands of the government. The United States and other donors are actively supporting Poland’s efforts to restructure enterprises and implement the country’s Mass Privatization Program; however, persistent delays threaten continued donor support. 4.1.) Reforms in Poland’s Banking Sector Over the last 5 years, Poland has fundamentally reformed its banking sector. Early problems with donor technical assistance have been resolved. The government has recapitalized the country’s state-owned banks and has made significant progress in restructuring their problem loan portfolios. Donors Provide Technical Assistance and Training According to Polish government officials, some early technical assistance to Poland’s financial sector was of limited value, but many of these problems have been resolved and donors are now providing more useful assistance. Polish officials told us that donor technical assistance and training is now addressing some of the most important needs remaining in this area, such as bank supervision and credit analysis. While Poland continues to face a number of impediments to its restructuring efforts, the country has made significant progress toward economic restructuring in key areas such as macroeconomic stabilization, foreign trade and investment, privatization, and banking. After 5 years of reforms, Poland’s experience in transitioning to a market-oriented system offers some lessons that could be of interest to countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and others not as far along the reform path as Poland. The first is that Poland’s own efforts in coupling tough reform measures with consistent macroeconomic policy over several years were critical to the country’s current economic recovery. Some of the most important factors for improvement in these areas require Polish or donor government actions beyond the confines of assistance. Poland has achieved dramatic increases in its exports to the West, and a number of U.S. and other foreign companies have recently made significant investments in the country. However, Poland continues to run a large trade deficit, trade barriers hamper its exports of certain products to the EU, and a number of obstacles continue to impede foreign investment. Poland’s experience suggests that the ultimate success or failure of reform efforts is far more dependent upon the actions of the transition country than it is upon those of outside participants.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed economic restructuring and donor assistance in Poland, focusing on: (1) the status of Poland's economic restructuring efforts in the areas of macroeconomic stabilization, foreign trade and investment, privatization, and banking; (2) impediments to these restructuring efforts; (3) the role donors have played in the transformation process; and (4) lessons learned that could be useful to other transition countries. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) Poland has made major progress in stabilizing and restructuring its economy and has one of Europe's fastest growing economies but is still struggling to overcome relatively high rates of inflation and unemployment; (2) the International Monetary Fund and other major donors played an important role in the early stages of the reform process by requiring Poland to adopt tough macroeconomic reforms in return for receiving substantial donor assistance, but Poland's efforts to implement tough reform measures and apply consistent macroeconomic policy have been critical factors in the country's economic recovery; (3) Poland has achieved significant increases in its exports to the West, a number of foreign companies have made significant investments there; (4) trade barriers hamper Poland's exports of certain products to the European Union, internal obstacles continue to impede foreign investment; (5) donor assistance has had only a marginal impact in facilitating trade and investment, some of the most essential improvements require Polish government or donor actions beyond the confines of assistance programs, such as removing bureaucratic and tax obstacles to foreign investment and making markets more accessible to Polish exports; (6) progress toward privatizing Poland's economy has been mixed, economic reforms have resulted in a rapidly growing private sector, but significant portions of the economy remain in the hands of the government; (7) the United States and other donors are actively supporting Poland's efforts to restructure enterprises and implement its Mass Privatization Program but persistent delays threaten continued donor support; (8) Poland has fundamentally reformed its banking sector, but several major problems remain, including delays in bank privatizations, unclear policies regarding the licensing of foreign banks, and inadequate banking expertise and bank supervision skills; (9) donors provided key financial support for recapitalizing the state-owned banks and restructuring their problem loan portfolios; (10) some problems with donor technical assistance were encountered but have been resolved, donors are now addressing some of the sector's more important remaining needs, such as the need for improved banker training and enhanced bank supervision; (11) while the situations of other transition countries vary greatly, Poland's experience offers lessons that merit consideration by countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and others not as far along the reform path; and (12) the lessons suggest that, while donor assistance can be important in supporting economic restructuring efforts in certain key areas, the ultimate success or failure is more dependent on the actions of the transition country than those of outside participants.

gao_GAO-04-811T

gao_GAO-04-811T_0

This agreement also established FHIE as a joint activity that would allow the exchange of health care information in two phases. The revised strategy also envisioned achieving a longer term, two- way exchange of health information between DOD and VA. The joint effort is expected to result in the secured sharing of health data required by VA’s and DOD’s health care providers between systems that each department is currently developing—DOD’s Composite Health Care System (CHCS) II and VA’s HealtheVet VistA. The record will be updated as the service member receives medical care. Progress Toward Achieving HealthePeople (Federal) Faces Continued Challenges and Risks As we have noted, achieving the longer term capability to exchange health data in a secure, two-way electronic format between new health information systems that VA and DOD are developing is a challenging and complex undertaking, in which success depends on having a clearly articulated architecture, or blueprint, defining how specific technologies will be used to deliver the capability. Currently, VA and DOD are proceeding with the development of their new health information systems and with the identification of standards that are essential to sharing common health data. In addition, as we reported in March, the departments have continued essential steps toward standardizing clinical data, having adopted data and message standards that are important for exchanging health information between disparate systems. Although department officials consider the pharmacy data prototype to be an initial step toward achieving HealthePeople (Federal), how and to what extent the prototype will contribute to defining the electronic interface for a two-way data exchange between VA’s and DOD’s new health information systems are unclear. Yet VA and DOD have not developed a strategy to articulate the integration approach, time frames, and resource requirements associated with implementing the prototype results to define the technological features of the two-way data exchange capability under HealthePeople (Federal). The relationships among the management entities involved with the initiative have not been clearly established, and no one entity has authority to make final project decisions binding on the other. Further, although the departments have designated a project manager and established a project plan defining the work tasks and management structure for the pharmacy prototype, they continue to lack a comprehensive and coordinated project plan for HealthePeople (Federal), to explain the technical and managerial processes that have been instituted to satisfy project requirements for this broader initiative. In discussing their management of HealthePeople (Federal), VA and DOD program officials stated this week that the departments had begun actions to develop a project plan and define the management structure for this initiative. Given the significance of readily accessible health data for improving the quality of health care and disability claims processing for military members and veterans, we currently have a draft report at the departments for comment, in which we are recommending to the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense, a number of actions for addressing the challenges to, and improving the likelihood of, successfully achieving the electronic two-way exchange of patient health information. In summary, VA’s and DOD’s pursuit of various initiatives to achieve the electronic sharing of patient health data represents an important step toward providing more high-quality health care for active duty military personnel and veterans. However, the continued absence of an architecture and defined technological solution for an electronic interface for their new health information systems, coupled with the need for more comprehensive and coordinated management of the projects supporting the development of this capability, elevates the uncertainty about how VA and DOD intend to achieve this capability and in what time frame.

Why GAO Did This Study Providing readily accessible health information on veterans and active duty military personnel is highly essential to ensuring that these individuals are given quality health care and assistance in adjudicating disability claims. Moreover, ready access to health information is consistent with the President's recently announced intention to provide electronic health records for most Americans within 10 years. In an attempt to improve the sharing of health information, the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Defense (DOD) have been working, since 1998, toward the ability to exchange electronic health records for use by veterans, military personnel, and their health care providers. In testimony before Congress last November and again this past March, GAO discussed the progress being made by the departments in this endeavor. While a measure of success has been achieved--the one-way transfer of health data from DOD to VA health care facilities--identifying the technical solution for a two-way exchange, as part of a longer term HealthePeople (Federal) initiative, has proven elusive. At Congress's request, GAO reported on its continuing review of the departments' progress toward this goal of an electronic two-way exchange of patient health records. What GAO Found VA and DOD are continuing with activities to support the sharing of health data; nonetheless, achieving the two-way electronic exchange of patient health information, as envisioned in the HealthePeople (Federal) strategy, remains far from being realized. Each department is proceeding with the development of its own health information system--VA's HealtheVet VistA and DOD's Composite Health Care System (CHCS) II; these are critical components for the eventual electronic data exchange capability. The departments are also proceeding with the essential task of defining data and message standards that are important for exchanging health information between their disparate systems. In addition, a pharmacy data prototype initiative begun this past March, which the departments stated is an initial step to defining the technology for the two-way data exchange, is ongoing. However, VA and DOD have not yet defined an architecture to guide the development of the electronic data exchange capability, and lack a strategy to explain how the pharmacy prototype will contribute toward determining the technical solution for achieving HealthePeople (Federal). As such, there continues to be no clear vision of how this capability will be achieved, and in what time period. Compounding the challenge faced by the departments is that they continue to lack a fully established project management structure for the HealthePeople (Federal) initiative. As a result, the relationships between the departments' managers is not clearly defined, a lead entity with final decision-making authority has not been designated, and a coordinated, comprehensive project plan that articulates the joint initiative's resource requirements, time frames, and respective roles and responsibilities of each department has not yet been established. In discussing the need for these components, VA and DOD program officials stated this week that the departments had begun actions to develop a project plan and define the management structure for HealthePeople (Federal). In the absence of such components, the progress that VA and DOD have achieved is at risk of compromise, as is assurance that the ultimate goal of a common, exchangeable two-way health record will be reached. Given the importance of readily accessible health data for improving the quality of health care and disability claims processing for military members and veterans, we currently have a draft report at the departments for comment, in which we are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense for addressing the challenges to, and improving the likelihood of successfully achieving the electronic two-way exchange of patient health information.

gao_HEHS-96-101

gao_HEHS-96-101_0

Nonreporting of Reserve Income Results in Large UI Benefit Overpayments Our analysis of Reserve payroll and UI benefit data for seven states that account for 27 percent of all Reserve personnel shows that UI claimants who have been active participants in the Reserve did not report over $7 million in fiscal year 1994 program-covered Reserve income. This nonreporting resulted in estimated UI benefit overpayments of $3.6 million to over 11,500 Reserve personnel during fiscal year 1994. Thirty-two percent or $1.2 million were federal trust fund losses primarily from the UCX program. According to state and federal program officials we interviewed, the integrity of the UI system is adversely affected whenever claimants are improperly paid benefits, either through oversight or fraud. These unnecessary payments erode the UI system’s ability to provide benefits to those workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own. They contribute, if only marginally, to higher state employer payroll taxes and federal outlays and possibly lower claimant benefit levels than would otherwise prevail. Why Claimants Do Not Always Report Reserve Income State officials cited various reasons why claimants may not be reporting their Reserve income while receiving UI benefits. UI Claimants Not Specifically Asked to Report Reserve Income Most UI programs throughout the nation require prospective claimants to report all expected earnings—including Reserve income—received during the benefit period as well as all earnings received during the base period.However, state program claims processors in the states included in our review told us that they do not specifically ask claimants whether they are receiving Reserve income and most do not inform claimants of the Reserve income-reporting requirement in writing. These options focus on more effective ways to inform claimants about their reporting responsibilities and proposals to improve the detection of nonreported income. Thus, state access to federal wage and personnel information could significantly reduce the amount of nonreported income and the associated benefit overpayments by claimants separated from any federal employer. As a result, the average overpayment per reservist is about $13 per year.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined the amount of unemployment insurance (UI) paid to military reservists, focusing on: (1) why UI claimants do not report reserve income; (2) the administrative and legislative options available to prevent future trust fund losses; and (3) how these options will affect reservists' retention rates. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) active UI claimants did not report more than $7 million in reserve income for fiscal year 1994; (2) the average amount of nonreported income varied from $273 to $959 per claimant, and resulted in UI benefit overpayments of $3.6 million; (3) most UI benefit overpayments went to Army Reserve personnel; (4) federal trust fund losses from the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemen Program totalled $1.2 million; (5) the UI system paid over $25 billion in benefits and received over $26 billion in state and federal unemployment tax revenues; (6) the integrity of the UI system is adversely affected by improperly paid benefits; (7) these overpayments hinder the UI system's ability to provide unemployment benefits, contribute to high state employer payroll taxes and federal outlays, and lower claimants' benefit levels; (8) UI claimants do not report their reserve income because they do not understand the reporting requirements, receive improper information regarding their reporting responsibilities, and have incentives not to report reserve income; (9) claimants are rarely penalized for not reporting their reserve income; (10) states can withhold a portion of a reservists' future benefits until applicable overpayments are repaid; (11) it is difficult to verify reservists' benefit levels without online access to federal wage data; and (12) nonreporting of reserve wage income will not affect the military's retention rates.

gao_GAO-01-1005T

gao_GAO-01-1005T_0

To develop a strategy to reduce such risks, in 1996, the President established a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Specifically, evaluating the NIPC’s progress in developing analysis and warning capabilities is difficult because the federal government’s strategy and related plans for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures from computer-based attacks, including the NIPC’s role, are still evolving. The entities involved in the government’s critical infrastructure protection efforts have not shared a common interpretation of the NIPC’s roles and responsibilities. In our report, we recommend that, as the administration proceeds, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in coordination with pertinent executive agencies, establish a capability for strategic analysis of computer-based threats, including developing related methodology, acquiring staff expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data; require development of a comprehensive data collection and analysis framework and ensure that national watch and warning operations for computer-based attacks are supported by sufficient staff and resources; and clearly define the role of the NIPC in relation to other government and private-sector entities. Progress in Establishing Information-Sharing Relationships Has Been Mixed Information sharing and coordination among private-sector and government organizations are essential for thoroughly understanding cyber threats and quickly identifying and mitigating attacks. Similarly, the NIPC and the FBI have made only limited progress in developing a database of the most important components of the nation’s critical infrastructures—an effort referred to as the Key Asset Initiative. The NIPC has been more successful in providing training on investigating computer crime to government entities, which is an effort that it considers an important component of its outreach efforts.

Why GAO Did This Study The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) is an important element of the U.S.' strategy to protect the nation's infrastructures from hostile attacks, especially computer-based attacks. This testimony discusses the key findings of a GAO report on NIPC's progress in developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threats and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and establishing information-sharing relationships with governments and private-sector entities. What GAO Found GAO found that progress in developing the analysis, warning, and information-sharing capabilities has been mixed. NIPC began various critical infrastructure protection efforts that have laid the foundation for future governmentwide efforts. NIPC has also provided valuable support and coordination related to investigating and otherwise responding to attacks on computers. However, the analytical and information-sharing capabilities that are needed to protect the nation's critical infrastructures have not yet been achieved, and NIPC has developed only limited warning capabilities. An underlying contributor to the slow progress is that the NIPC's roles and responsibilities have not been fully defined and are not consistently interpreted by other entities involved in the government's broader critical infrastructure protection strategy. This report summarized an April report (GAO-01-323).

gao_GAO-10-671T

gao_GAO-10-671T_0

DHS Has Begun Implementing Border Control Customs and Border Protection. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Since November 28, 2009, 10 ICE officials detailed to Saipan have identified aliens in violation of U.S. immigration laws and have processed or detained aliens for removal proceedings. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. For calendar year 2009, USCIS processed 515 CNMI applications for permanent residency and 50 CNMI applications for naturalization or citizenship, more than doubling the number of interviews conducted for applications for residency or citizenship from calendar year 2008, according to data provided by USCIS officials. To facilitate implementation of CNRA in the CNMI, DHS led meetings with the other departments charged with implementing CNRA; reported to Congress on the budget and personnel needed by the DHS components; and initiated outreach to the CNMI government. However, DHS has not finalized an interdepartmental agreement with other U.S. departments regarding implementation of CNRA and has not specified changes in its resource requirements as directed by Congress. U.S. Agencies’ Implementation of CNRA Programs for Workers, Visitors, and Investors Is Incomplete DHS Has Taken Steps to Create CNMI-Only Work Permit Program, but Program Is Not Yet Available DHS issued an interim rule for the CNMI-only work permit program on October 27, 2009, but a court injunction has prevented implementation of the rule. On November 25, 2009, the federal District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order prohibiting implementation of the interim rule, stating that DHS must consider public comments before issuing a final rule. nt In developing the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program, DHS officials consulted with representatives of the CNMI and Guam governments, both of which sought the inclusion of China and Russia in the program. On October 21, 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced to Congress and the Governors of the CNMI and Guam the decision to parole tourists from China and Russia into the CNMI on a case-by-case basis for a maximum of 45 days, in recognition of their significant economic benefit to the commonwealth. DHS plans to issue a final rule for the program in November 2010. Proposed DHS Rule to Provide CNMI-Treaty Investor Status to Foreign Investors Is Not Yet Final In September 2009, DHS proposed a rule to allow a large proportion of CNMI foreign investor permit holders to obtain U.S. CNMI-only nonimmigrant investor treaty status during the transition period. DHS Components Have Been Unable to Negotiate Solutions to Certain Operational Challenges with the CNMI Government Long-Term Occupancy Agreements for Airport Space CBP and the CNMI government have not yet signed long-term occupancy agreements that would allow CBP to reconfigure space that the CNMI government has provided in CNMI airports. As a result, the agency is operating in facilities that do not meet its standards for holding cells and secondary inspections. To obtain needed detention space, ICE proposed to either amend the 2007 U.S. However, since November 2009, ICE has released 43 detainees into the CNMI community under orders of supervision, including 27 with prior criminal records. Direct Access to CNMI Immigration and Border Control Data As of March 1, 2010, DHS components lacked direct access to CNMI immigration and border control data contained in two CNMI databases, the Labor Information Data System (LIDS) and the Border Management System (BMS). DHS component officials have expressed concerns about the reliance on a single CNMI point of contact. Concluding Remarks and Prior Recommendation DHS components have taken a number of steps since November 28, 2009, to ensure effective border control procedures in the CNMI. Additionally, DHS and other agencies have taken steps to implement CNRA provisions for workers, visitors, and investors, although the programs for workers and investors are not yet available to eligible individuals in the CNMI. To enable DHS to carry out its statutory obligation to implement federal border control and immigration in the CNMI, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the heads of CBP, ICE, and USCIS to establish strategic approaches and timeframes for concluding negotiations with the CNMI government to resolve the operational challenges related to access to CNMI airport space, detention facilities, and information about the status of aliens. Appendix I: Key Provisions for Foreign Workers, Visitors, and Foreign Investors in Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 and Other U.S. Immigration Provisions Exemptions from certain visa caps for nonimmigrant workers Begins with transition period start date and ends December 31, 2014, under P.L. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

Why GAO Did This Study This testimony discusses our work on the status of efforts to establish federal border control in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and implement the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA) with regard to foreign workers, visitors, and investors in the CNMI. In May 2008, the United States enacted CNRA, amending the U.S.-CNMI Covenant to establish federal control of CNMI immigration. CNRA contains several CNMI-specific provisions affecting foreign workers and investors during a transition period that began in November 2009 and ends in 2014. In addition, CNRA amends existing U.S. immigration law to establish a joint visa waiver program for the CNMI and Guam by replacing an existing visa waiver program for Guam visitors. During the transition period, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, and State and the U.S. Attorney General, has the responsibility to establish, administer, and enforce a transition program to regulate immigration in the CNMI. CNRA requires that we report on the implementation of federal immigration law in the CNMI. This testimony summarizes findings from our recent report regarding (1) steps that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken to establish federal border control in the CNMI; (2) actions that DHS has taken to implement programs for workers, visitors, and investors; and (3) unresolved operational challenges that DHS has encountered. What GAO Found DHS and its components have taken a number of steps to secure the border in the CNMI and to implement CNRA-required programs for foreign workers, visitors, and foreign investors. However, the components face certain operational challenges that they have been unable to resolve with the CNMI government. Steps taken to establish border control: DHS and its components have taken the following steps, among others, to establish federal border control in the CNMI. (1) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Since November 2009, CBP has inspected arriving travelers in Saipan and Rota. (2) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Also since November 2009, ICE has identified individuals who may be in violation of U.S. immigration laws and has begun processing some aliens for removal. (3) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In March 2009, USCIS opened an application support center. For calendar year 2009, USCIS processed 515 CNMI applications for permanent residency and 50 CNMI applications for naturalization or citizenship. (4) DHS. DHS has taken several department-level actions to facilitate implementation of CNRA but has not finalized an interdepartmental agreement regarding implementation of CNRA and has not yet specified its resource requirements for this effort as directed by Congress. Actions taken to implement worker, visitor, and investor programs: DHS has begun to implement CNRA-required programs for foreign workers, visitors, and foreign investors but has not yet finalized key regulations. As a result, certain transition programs remain unavailable. (1) Foreign workers. On October 27, 2009, DHS issued an interim rule to implement a CNMI-only work permit program required by CNRA for foreign workers not otherwise admissible under federal law. However, a November 2009 U.S. District Court ruling, responding to an amended lawsuit by the CNMI government, prohibited implementation of the interim rule, stating that DHS must consider public comments before issuing a final rule. As a result, CNMI-only work permits are not currently available. (2) Visitors. DHS has established the Guam-CNMI visa waiver program. However, the program does not include China and Russia, two countries that provide significant economic benefit to the CNMI. (3) Foreign investors. DHS has proposed a rule to allow a large proportion of investors holding CNMI foreign investor permits to obtain U.S. CNMI-only nonimmigrant treaty investor status during the transition period. DHS plans to issue a final rule in July 2010; until then, the program is not available. Unresolved operational challenges: DHS components and the CNMI government have not yet negotiated solutions to operational challenges regarding access to CNMI airport space, detention facilities, and databases. (1) Airport space. Lacking long-term occupancy agreements and adequate space at CNMI airports, the agency is operating in facilities that do not meet its standards for holding cells and secondary inspections. (2) Detention facilities. Lacking an agreement with the CNMI government regarding detention space, ICE has released a number of aliens with criminal records into the community under orders of supervision and has paid to transport several detainees to Guam and Hawaii. (3) Databases. Lacking direct access to the CNMI's immigration and border control databases, ICE officials have instead directed data requests to a single CNMI point of contact, limiting their ability to quickly verify the status of aliens and potentially compromising the security of ongoing operations.

gao_GAO-17-701

gao_GAO-17-701_0

DOD Included Information in Its Report on the ADM Facility That Addressed the Six Required Elements Congress Requested DOD addressed each of the required six elements in its October 2016 report to Congress on the department’s ADM facility. Moreover, this additional information may be particularly useful as DOD makes decisions on whether and how to renew its contract for 2-year option periods with the private-sector biopharmaceutical company that constructed the ADM facility. Table 2 summarizes the elements required in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 and the additional information that we analyzed from DOD, HHS, and their contractors regarding information that may be useful to Congress. Program Goals, Metrics, and Costs Additional Information Regarding DOD’s Stated Goals and Metrics DOD included in its report to Congress the program goals and performance metrics articulated in presidential memorandums to establish “agile and flexible advanced development and manufacturing capabilities to support the development, licensure, and production of Medical Countermeasures that address the needs of our military and the Nation.” With respect to performance metrics, DOD has established metrics in the contract for the ADM facility that it monitors periodically in conjunction with the contractor. DOD’s sustainment payments for priority access to the ADM capability will be budgeted for as a cost of developing medical countermeasures (e.g., vaccines), according to officials from DOD’s ADM program office, a funding structure similar to the model used with DOD-owned laboratories. Based on our discussions with DOD and ADM contractor officials, the total costs to ADM capability contractor Nanotherapeutics, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Nanotherapeutics, to operate and maintain the ADM facility—which are separate from and in addition to the costs in the initial contract with DOD for building the facility—were not fully known at the time of this report and were not fully covered by the DOD-provided sustainment payments. During our review, we learned that the contractor and DOD have taken some initial steps toward bringing additional funded work to support the DOD ADM capability, which may help to reduce DOD’s sustainment payments under the contract options. DOD’s Analysis of Alternatives and Additional Information on ADM Alternatives In its report to Congress, DOD included results from the 2009 analysis of alternatives for the Secretaries of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services, which informed the federal government’s decision to create both DOD’s ADM capability and HHS’s CIADM capabilities. However, even though the HHS CIADMs were not analyzed as alternatives to the DOD ADM capability, HHS officials said that DOD could separately contract for medical countermeasures with any of HHS’s CIADMs either independently or through existing HHS CIADM contracts. Although officials from DOD’s ADM program office stated that the HHS CIADMs are not appropriate for DOD’s needs—with one official noting that they are large dedicated facilities designed primarily to address pandemic influenza threats—the cost-benefit analysis for DOD’s ADM capability conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, as well as our own observations, suggest otherwise. In addition, an official from one CIADM informed us that the CIADM’s contractor currently is producing medical countermeasures for DOD. An official with the ADM program office said that DOD is represented on the governing board for the CIADMs and is aware of what HHS is doing there, so CIADM information can be taken into consideration along with ADM performance and utilization metrics as DOD considers future contract extensions for the ADM capability. DOD’s contracted analysis compared the cost and benefits, schedule, and performance of continued DOD investment in the DOD-dedicated ADM capability with a set of available alternatives. Agency Comments We are not making any recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued in May 2017. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about DOD’s advanced development and manufacturing (ADM) facility and HHS’s three Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing (CIADM) facilities. In this report, we (1) describe the information that DOD included in its report to address the six elements required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and (2) present additional information related to each element that may be useful to Congress in its oversight role regarding DOD’s ADM capability. Some initial capabilities came online in August 2016, and DOD officials said that the facility became fully operational in March 2017.

Why GAO Did This Study DOD has long expressed concerns about its ability to acquire and maintain the capability to research, develop, and manufacture medical countermeasures (e.g., vaccines) against biological warfare threat agents, toxins, and endemic diseases. In 2013, DOD partnered with a private-sector biopharmaceutical company to develop an ADM facility with the capability to use disposable equipment enabling timely changes in a production line for medical countermeasures. The facility was fully operational in March 2017, and DOD can now renew its contract for 2-year periods through 2024. Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that DOD, among other things, submit a report to Congress addressing six required elements regarding DOD's ADM facility. DOD submitted its report in October 2016. The act also contained a provision that GAO review the report. GAO describes (1) the information that DOD included in its report to address the six required elements and (2) presents additional information related to the elements that may be useful to Congress in its oversight role. GAO compared DOD's report and cost-benefit analysis with the legislatively required elements and analyzed documents from DOD, HHS, and their private-sector partners. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in May 2017. Information DOD and HHS deemed sensitive has been omitted. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) included in its October 2016 report to Congress information that addressed each of the six required elements regarding the department's public-private partnership to construct a facility with an advanced development and manufacturing (ADM) capability. In its report to Congress, DOD addressed the six elements that included, among other things: (1) a description of the ADM facility and its capabilities and an explanation of the origin of the ADM capability requirement; (2) information on some of the program goals, high-level performance metrics, and estimated completion costs along with a statement that DOD is not requesting procurement or operations and maintenance funds in the future years defense program for the ADM facility and that sustainment costs will come from existing medical countermeasure programs; (3) a copy of a 2009 analysis of alternatives conducted for the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services (HHS) that DOD stated justifies the ADM capability; (4) and (5) combined, an independent analysis of the incremental cost and benefits, schedule, and performance of continued DOD investment in its ADM facility; and (6) the department's medical countermeasures production plans for the ADM facility. GAO identified additional information related to these elements that may be useful for congressional oversight. This information may be particularly useful as DOD decides whether and how to renew its contract for 2-year option periods with the contractor that constructed the ADM facility. First, DOD's sustainment payments for priority access to the ADM capability will be budgeted as a cost of developing medical countermeasures (e.g., vaccines), a funding structure similar to the model used with DOD-owned laboratories, according to DOD officials. Second, discussions with officials indicate that the total costs to the ADM capability contractor to operate and maintain the ADM facility, which are separate from and in addition to the costs in the initial contract with DOD for building the facility, were not fully known at the time of DOD's report and are not fully covered by the DOD-provided sustainment payments. However, GAO learned that the contractor and DOD have taken some initial steps toward bringing additional funded work to the DOD ADM capability, which may help to reduce DOD's sustainment payments under the contract options. Third, the three HHS facilities were not analyzed as alternatives to the DOD ADM facility, although HHS officials said that DOD could separately contract for medical countermeasures with any of HHS's facilities, either independently or through existing HHS contracts. Officials from DOD's ADM program office stated that the HHS facilities are not appropriate for DOD's needs—because they are large dedicated facilities designed primarily to address pandemic influenza threats. However, an official from one of the three HHS facilities informed us that they currently produce medical countermeasures for DOD. An official with the ADM program office said that DOD is represented on the governing board for the HHS Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing and is aware of what HHS is doing there, so this information can be taken into consideration along with ADM performance and utilization metrics as DOD considers future contract extensions for the ADM capability. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO incorporated agency technical comments, as appropriate.

gao_GAO-07-709

gao_GAO-07-709_0

Further, DOD is not well positioned to demonstrate to Congress how it considered risks and made difficult trade-offs among its capabilities to balance investments within future budgets, given the nation’s fiscal challenges. According to senior DOD officials, these areas identified for post-QDR study were generally complex and involved multiple organizations, such as developing interoperable strategic communications. Weaknesses in Assessment of Force Structure, Personnel Requirements, and Risk Limited the QDR’s Usefulness in Linking Force Structure to the Defense Strategy and Addressing Affordability Challenges Weaknesses in the assessment of three key areas—force structure, personnel requirements, and risk—significantly limited the review’s usefulness in reassessing the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk, which is a key requirement of the review. Since DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, data-driven assessment of force structure alternatives during the QDR, it is not in the best position to assure itself or Congress that it has identified the force best suited to execute the national defense strategy. DOD Did Not Conduct a Thorough Review of Personnel Requirements Although DOD concluded in the 2006 QDR report that the size of today’s forces—both the active and reserve components across all four military services—was appropriate to meet current and projected operational demands, it did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot ensure that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. DOD Did Not Conduct an Analytically Sound Risk Assessment of Its Proposed Force Structure During the 2006 QDR, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not fully apply DOD’s risk management framework to demonstrate how risks associated with its proposed force structure were evaluated. Further, DOD may be unable to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. Without an analytically based risk assessment, DOD may not be able to prioritize and focus the nation’s investments to combat 21st century security threats efficiently and wisely. Options to improve the usefulness of future QDRs include (1) clarifying expectations for how the QDR should address the budget plan, (2) eliminating some reporting elements for the QDR legislation that could be addressed in different reports, (3) eliminating some reporting elements in the QDR legislation for issues that may no longer be as relevant due to changes in the security environment, and (4) establishing an independent advisory group to work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide alternative perspectives and analyses. Sustained DOD leadership facilitated decision making, and extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allies provided a range of perspectives on threats and capabilities. As a result of this change in demand since the 2006 QDR, according to DOD’s comments, DOD has responded by increasing Army and Marine Corps end strength. To determine whether changes to the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of future reviews including any changes needed to better reflect the security conditions of the 21st century, we examined a wide variety of studies that discussed the strengths and weaknesses of DOD’s 2006 QDR and prior reviews. (b) Conduct of review.—Each quadrennial defense review shall be conducted so as— (1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.404a); (2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy; (3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and (c) Assessment of risk.—The assessment of risk for the purposes of subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views of defense analysts within and outside of DOD. What GAO Found DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths, but several weaknesses significantly limited the review's usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities. Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk. Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century. Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the unified command plan is also required and reported under other legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of DOD's new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and analyses.

gao_GAO-15-191

gao_GAO-15-191_0

Agencies Have Multiple Avenues Available to Address Employee Performance In general, agencies have three means to address employees’ poor performance, with dismissal as a last resort: (1) day-to-day performance management activities (which should be provided to all employees, regardless of their performance levels), (2) dismissal during probationary periods, and (3) use of formal procedures. Formal Procedures Are Required to Dismiss Poor Performing Permanent Employees, but Related Processes Are Time and Resource Intensive Generally, once an employee has completed a probationary period, if that employee is a poor performer who does not voluntarily leave, an agency is required to follow the procedural requirements under either 5 U.S.C. Overall, it can take six months to a year (and sometimes significantly longer) to dismiss an employee. Employees Facing Dismissal for Performance Reasons Have Certain Protections In addition to the procedural requirements agencies must adhere to, federal employees have additional protections designed to ensure that they are not subject to arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel actions, such as discrimination and reprisal for whistleblowing. If the employee is unsatisfied with the final decision of the MSPB, the employee may seek judicial review of that decision, generally with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). Various Considerations Can Reduce Willingness to Deal with Poor Performance A number of agency supports and constraints may reduce a supervisor’s willingness to pursue dismissal or other action against a poor performing employee. As depicted earlier in figure 1, the time commitment for removing an employee under chapter 43 can be substantial. Legal concerns. However, according to experts we interviewed, such separations happen “all the time.” One CHCO we interviewed estimated that a large majority of his agency’s performance-related separations would be considered voluntary retirements or resignations and other CHCOs agreed that employees with performance issues are more likely to voluntarily leave than go through the dismissal process. OPM Provides a Range of Tools and Guidance to Address Poor Performance but This Assistance May Not Meet All Agency Needs Taking action to address poor performance is challenging for agencies, due to time and resource intensity, lack of supervisory skill and training, and other factors (as described earlier). However, agencies are not always aware of this material and in some cases it falls short of their needs. Going forward, it will be important for OPM to fully leverage existing information sources (such as survey results) to inform decisions on what material to develop and how best to distribute it. Effectively addressing poor performance has been a long-standing government-wide challenge. To help supervisors make effective use of the probationary period for educate agencies on the benefits of using automated notifications to notify supervisors that an individual’s probationary period is ending and that the supervisor needs to make an affirmative decision or otherwise take appropriate action, and encourage its use to the extent it is appropriate and cost-effective for the agency; and determine whether there are occupations in which—because of the nature of work and complexity—the probationary period should extend beyond 1-year to provide supervisors with sufficient time to assess an individual’s performance. For those recommendations OPM concurred or partially concurred with, OPM described the steps it planned to take to implement them. OPM concurred with our recommendation to assess the adequacy of leadership training for supervisors. We agree and have clarified the recommendation accordingly. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology We were asked to examine the rules and trends relating to the review and dismissal of employees for poor performance. Our objectives were to (1) describe and compare avenues for addressing poor performance, including the formal procedures required when dismissing employees for poor performance; (2) describe issues that can affect an agency’s response to poor performance; (3) determine trends in dismissals and other agency actions taken for poor performance since 2004; and (4) assess the extent to which OPM provides the policy, guidance, and training that agencies say they need to address poor performance. To determine how agencies are addressing poor performance and to understand the practical issues various agency employees consider when addressing poor performance, we interviewed OPM officials from the Merit System Accountability and Compliance Office, Office of Employee Services, and other offices that work with agencies to address poor performance; the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) including the Executive Director, representatives from the Office of Regional Operations, the Office of Appeals Counsel, and an administrative judge; selected chief human capital officers (CHCO) chosen for their particular expertise in the issue area as identified through the Executive Director’s Office of the CHCO Council and previous GAO work on related topics, the National Treasury Employees Union, American Federation of Government Employees, the Federal Managers Association, individual members of the Federal Employees Lawyers Group, the Partnership for Public Service and the Senior Executives Association. We also conducted a literature review. Agencies are to use this information to make strategic decisions about management.

Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies' ability to address poor performance has been a long-standing issue. Employees and agency leaders share a perception that more needs to be done to address poor performance, as even a small number of poor performers can affect agencies' capacity to meet their missions. GAO was asked to examine the rules and trends relating to the review and dismissal of federal employees for poor performance. This report (1) describes and compares avenues for addressing poor performance, (2) describes issues that can affect an agency's response to poor performance, (3) determines trends in how agencies have resolved cases of poor performance since 2004, and (4) assesses the extent to which OPM provides guidance that agencies need to address poor performance. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OPM data, and interviewed, among others, OPM and MSPB officials, selected CHCOs, and selected union officials. What GAO Found Federal agencies have three avenues to address employees' poor performance: Day-to-day performance management activities (such as providing regular performance feedback to employees) can produce more desirable outcomes for agencies and employees than dismissal options. However, supervisors do not always have effective skills, such as the ability to identify, communicate, and help address employee performance issues. Probationary periods for new employees provide supervisors with an opportunity to evaluate an individual's performance to determine if an appointment to the civil service should become final. According to the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs) that GAO interviewed, supervisors often do not use this time to make performance-related decisions about an employee's performance because they may not know that the probationary period is ending or they have not had time to observe performance in all critical areas Formal procedures —specifically chapters 43 and 75 of title 5 of the United States Code and OPM implementing regulations—require agencies to follow specified procedures when dismissing poor performing permanent employees, but they are more time and resource intensive than probationary dismissals. Federal employees have protections designed to ensure that they are not subject to arbitrary agency actions. These protections include the ability to appeal dismissal actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or to file a grievance. If employees are unsatisfied with the final decision of the MSPB or an arbitrator decision, they may seek judicial review. The time and resource commitment needed to remove a poor performing permanent employee can be substantial. It can take six months to a year (and sometimes longer) to dismiss an employee. According to selected experts and GAO's literature review, concerns over internal support, lack of performance management training, and legal issues can also reduce a supervisor's willingness to address poor performance. In 2013, agencies dismissed around 3,500 employees for performance or a combination of performance and conduct. Most dismissals took place during the probationary period. These figures do not account for those employees who voluntarily left rather than going through the dismissal process. While it is unknown how many employees voluntarily depart, the CHCOs that GAO interviewed said voluntary departures likely happen more often than dismissals. To help agencies address poor performance, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) makes a range of tools and guidance available in different media, including its website, in-person training, and guidebooks. However, CHCOs and other experts said agencies are not always aware of this material and in some cases it fell short of their needs. Going forward, it will be important for OPM to use existing information sources, such as Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey results, to inform decisions about what material to develop and how best to distribute it. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to OPM to strengthen agencies' ability to deal with poor performers including working with stakeholders to assess the leadership training agencies provide to supervisors. OPM concurred or partially concurred with all but one recommendation noting that GAO's recommendation to explore using an automated process to notify supervisors when a probationary period is about to end is an agency responsibility. GAO agrees and has clarified the recommendation.

gao_OSI-98-10

gao_OSI-98-10_0

Customers can voluntarily change their long-distance company—or Primary Interexchange Carrier (PIC)—by contacting, or submitting an “order” to, the local exchange carrier. The three types of long-distance providers are facility-based carriers such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint; switching resellers; and switchless resellers. According to representatives of the FCC, numerous state regulatory agencies, and the industry, those who most frequently engage in intentional slamming are switchless resellers. In addition, the cost of filing the required tariff—or schedule of services, rates, and charges—with the FCC to initiate a business is inexpensive; and an unscrupulous individual can avoid that cost altogether. How Is Slamming Accomplished? As an FCC Commissioner stated before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, “slamming scenarios involve [, among other methods,] deceptive sweepstakes, misleading forms, forged signatures and telemarketers who do not understand the word no.” What Have the FCC, State Regulators, and the Industry Done to Curtail Slamming? Although the FCC, most states, and the telecommunications industry have some antislamming rules and practices in place, each relies on the others to be the main forces in the antislamming battle. And no FCC regulation discusses what preventive measures the FCC should take to ensure that long-distance-provider applicants have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics. According to representatives from state regulatory agencies, facility-based carriers, resellers of long-distance services, and others in the industry, they view an entity’s possession of an FCC tariff as a key credential for a long-distance provider. However, according to knowledgeable FCC officials, the FCC merely accepts a tariff filing and does not review a filed tariff’s information, including that regarding the applicant. For example, we easily filed a tariff with the FCC through deceptive means during our investigation when testing FCC’s oversight of the tariff-filing procedure. Thus, with a tariff on file, our fictitious company—PSI Communications—is able to do business and slam consumers as a switchless reseller with little chance of adverse consequences. The telecommunications industry also attempts to weed out companies involved in slamming. Conclusions Neither the FCC, the states, nor the telecommunications industry have been effective in protecting the consumer from telephone slamming. Further, the industry approach to slamming appears to be largely market-driven rather than consumer-oriented. The most effective action that consumers can take to eliminate the chance of intentional slamming is to have their local exchange carrier freeze their choice of long-distance providers. On the basis of the 1996 suit in Pennsylvania, Atlas obtained a $10-million judgment against the Fletcher-controlled PCI because, according to the court, PCI fraudulently obtained customers to switch their long-distance telephone service to Atlas’ network; identified customers to Atlas, for Atlas’ placement on its network, in states within which PCI was not certificated as a long-distance service provider; failed to supply customer service to those customers it had caused Atlas to place on its network; and failed to supply customers, Atlas, or regulatory agencies with those customers’ LOAs upon request. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) which entities or companies engage in telephone slamming violations; (2) the process by which the providers defraud consumers; and (3) what the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), state regulatory entities, and the telecommunications industry has done to curtail slamming. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) all three types of long-distance providers--facility-based carriers, which have extensive physical equipment, switching resellers, which have one or more switching stations, and switchless resellers, having the least to lose and the most to gain, most frequently engage in intentional slamming, according to the FCC, state regulatory agencies, and the telecommunications industry; (2) intentional slamming is accomplished by deceptive practices; (3) these include falsifying documents that authorize a switch and misleading customers into signing such a document; (4) the FCC, state regulatory agencies, and the telecommunications industry rely on the others to be the main forces against intentional slamming; (5) however, with regard to the FCC, its antislamming measures effectively do little to protect consumers from slamming; (6) although representatives of state regulatory agencies and the industry view a provider's FCC tariff--a schedule of services, rates, and charges--as a key credential, the FCC places no significance on the tariffs that long-distance providers are required to file with it before providing service; (7) although the FCC in 1996 attempted to regulate tariffs out of existence, a circuit court stayed that FCC regulation in 1997 as a result of a lawsuit; (8) the FCC now accepts tariffs; however, it does not review the tariff information; (9) thus, having a tariff on file with the FCC is no guarantee of a long-distance provider's integrity or of FCC's ability to penalize a provider that slams consumers; (10) as part of GAO's investigation and using fictitious information, GAO easily filed a tariff with the FCC and could now, as a switchless reseller, slam consumers with little chance of being caught; (11) state regulatory measures that could preclude slamming range from none in a few states to extensive in others; (12) industry's antislamming measures appear to be more market-driven; and (13) however, a Primary Interexchange Carriers freeze--an action that consumers can take by contacting their local exchange carrier and freezing their choice of Primary Interexchange Carriers, or long distance providers--effectively reduces the chance of intentional slamming.

gao_T-NSIAD-98-101

gao_T-NSIAD-98-101_0

Third, the authorization act also provides special procedures for the public-private competitions for the San Antonio and Sacramento workloads. Finally, the act requires that DOD report on the procedures established for the Sacramento and San Antonio competitions and on the Department’s planned allocation of workloads performed at the closing depots as of July 1, 1995. Our lack of access to information is seriously impairing our ability to carry out our reporting responsibilities under this act. We experienced this problem in doing our work for our recent report to Congress concerning DOD’s determination to combine individual workloads at the two closing logistics centers into a single solicitation. Processes for the C-5 Aircraft Competition Appear Reasonable In response to congressional concerns regarding the appropriateness of its plans to privatize-in-place the Sacramento and San Antonio maintenance depot workloads, the Air Force revised its strategy to allow the public depots to participate in public-private competitions for the workloads. After assessing the issues required under the act relating to the C-5 aircraft competition, we concluded that (1) the Air Force provided public and private offerors an equal opportunity to compete without regard to where work would be performed; (2) the procedures did not appear to deviate materially from applicable laws or the FAR; and (3) the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government, based on Air Force assumptions and conditions at the time of award. Under the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, DOD issued the required determinations that the workloads at these two depots “cannot as logically and economically be performed without combination by sources that are potentially qualified to submit an offer and to be awarded a contract to perform those individual workloads.” As required, we reviewed the DOD reports and supporting data and issued our report to Congress on January 20, 1998.We found that the accompanying DOD reports and supporting data do not provide adequate information supporting the determinations. The Air Force has not provided us the information supporting its briefing charts. These participants raised several concerns that they believe may affect the competitions. Preliminary data indicates that using the revised criteria, about 47 to 49 percent of the Air Force’s depot maintenance workload is currently performed by the private sector. During the recent C-5 workload competition evaluation, the Air Force included a $153-million overhead savings estimate for the impact that the added C-5 workload would have on reducing the cost of DOD workload already performed at the military depot’s facilities. In response to private sector concerns, the Air Force is considering limiting the credit given for overhead savings in the Sacramento and San Antonio competitions. The second year savings, if reasonable, will be allowed but discounted. GAO Letters on Access to Records Regarding Public-Private Competitions The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the public-private competitions for workloads at two maintenance depots identified for closure, focusing on: (1) the problems GAO is having in obtaining access to Department of Defense (DOD) information; (2) the recent competition for C-5 aircraft workload and GAO's assessment of it; (3) the adequacy of DOD's support for its determination that competing combined, rather than individual workloads of each maintenance depot is more logical and economical; and (4) concerns participants have raised about the upcoming competitions for the workloads at the air logistics centers in Sacramento, California, and San Antonio, Texas. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) its lack of access to information within DOD is seriously impairing its ability to carry out its reporting requirements; (2) GAO completed, with difficulty, its required report to Congress concerning DOD's determination to combine individual workloads at two closing logistics centers into a single solicitation at each location; (3) if DOD continues to delay and restrict GAO's access to information it needs to do its work, GAO will be unable to provide Congress timely and thorough responses regarding the competitions for Sacramento and San Antonio depot maintenance workloads; (4) in assessing the competition for the C-5 aircraft workloads, GAO found that: (a) the Air Force provided public and private sources an equal opportunity to compete for the workloads without regard to where the work could be done; (b) the Air Force's procedures for competing the workloads did not appear to deviate materially from applicable laws or the Federal Acquisition Regulation; and (c) the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government, based on Air Force assumptions at the time; (5) much remains uncertain about the upcoming competitions for the Sacramento and San Antonio depot maintenance workloads; (6) potential participants have raised several concerns that they believe may affect the conduct of the competitions ; (7) one concern is the impact of the statutory limit on the amount of depot maintenance work that can be done by non-DOD personnel; (8) the Air Force has not yet determined the current and projected public-private sector workload mix using criteria provided in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, but is working on it; (9) nonetheless, preliminary data indicates there is little opportunity to contract out additional depot maintenance workloads to the private sector; (10) another concern is the Air Force's proposed change in the overhead savings the Department may factor into the cost evaluations; (11) for the C-5 workload competition, overhead savings were considered for the duration of the performance period; and (12) however, for the Sacramento and San Antonio competitions, the Air Force is considering limiting overhead savings to the first year and possibly reducing the savings for the second year.

gao_GAO-10-447T

gao_GAO-10-447T_0

Space Acquisition Challenges Persist A long-standing problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, while in some cases, the capability that was to be produced goes down. This will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as well as planned coverage. Some Acquisition Programs Have Overcome Problems and Have Satellites Ready for Launch DOD has made progress on several of its high-risk space programs and is expecting significant advances in capability as a result. Moreover, though it has had long-standing difficulties on nearly every space acquisition program, DOD now finds itself in a position to possibly launch the first new satellite from four different major space acquisition programs over the next 12 months that are expected to significantly contribute to missions and capabilities. Table 1 further describes the status of these efforts. Other Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space acquisition programs face challenges that could further increase cost and delay targeted delivery dates. Delays in both the NPOESS and MUOS programs have resulted in critical potential capability gaps for military and other government users. Overall, we found the alignment of space system components proved to be challenging to DOD. Launch Manifest Issues Another risk facing DOD space programs for the next few years is the potential for increased demand for certain launch vehicles. DOD Is Taking Actions to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems DOD has been working to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies. Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. Congress has also acted on a broader scale through the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which was signed into law on May 22, 2009. However, there are still more significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure that reforms can take hold. Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization, and management of national security space have all found that there is no single authority responsible below the President and that authorities and responsibilities are spread across the department. While these studies have made recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years. Diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to be dedicated. In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies.

Why GAO Did This Study The majority of large-scale acquisition programs in the Department of Defense's (DOD) space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up costs by billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years, and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or terminating major space systems acquisitions. Moreover, along with the cost increases, many space acquisitions are experiencing significant schedule delays--as much as 8 years--resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. This testimony focuses on (1) the status of space acquisitions, (2) causal factors of acquisition problems, and (3) efforts underway to improve acquisitions. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its body of work, including GAO reports on best practices, assessments of individual space programs, common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and the DOD's acquisition policies. We have made numerous recommendations to the DOD in the past on matters relating to overall best practices as well as on individual space program acquisitions. DOD often concurred with our findings and recommendations and has efforts underway to adopt best practices. What GAO Found A long-standing problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, while in some cases, the capability that was to be produced declines. This problem persists. However, DOD has made progress on several of its high-risk space programs and is expecting to launch new generations of satellites across various missions over the next 12 months that should significantly advance some capabilities, particularly protected communications and space surveillance. While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space acquisition programs currently in development face challenges that could further increase costs and delay targeted delivery dates. Another risk facing DOD space programs over the next few years is the potential for launch delays because of changes being made in the launch sector and an increase in the demand for certain DOD launch vehicles. Our past work has identified a number of causes for the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies. Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has been working to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Some actions DOD and others have adopted or are pursuing include: the Acquisition Improvement Plan, which lists five initiatives for improving how the Air Force obtains new capabilities; changes in cost estimating that are in line with earlier GAO recommendations; and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which was signed into law in May 2009. However, there are still significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold. Recent studies and reviews that have examined national security space have all found that diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable, and there is no single authority to resolve conflicts among the many organizations involved in space programs. Moreover, DOD continues to face gaps in critical technical and program expertise for space. Until both issues are resolved, commitment to reforms may not be sustainable.

gao_T-GGD-98-8

gao_T-GGD-98-8_0

Neither BEP nor the Federal Reserve know specifically how many flawed notes are among the 217.6 million redesigned notes produced before September 8, 1997. How Did the Production of Flawed Notes Come About? BEP viewed the problem as a start-up issue to be expected with production of a completely new note design. The Federal Reserve has identified three options that it is considering: destroy all 217.6 million phase I and phase II $50 notes and replace them; inspect the 217.6 million phase I and phase II $50 notes and destroy and replace only those notes that are found to be flawed; or circulate the 217.6 million phase I and phase II $50 notes after the higher quality new notes have been in circulation for a few years.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed issues related to the Treasury's recent production of flawed, newly redesigned $50 notes. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) neither the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) nor the Federal Reserve know specifically how many flawed notes are among the 217.6 million redesigned notes produced before September 8, 1996; (2) BEP views the problem as a start-up issue to be expected with production of a completely new note design; and (3) Federal Reserve officials have not decided what to do with the flawed notes, but have identified three options: (a) destroy all 217.6 million redesigned notes and replace them; (b) inspect the 217.6 million notes and destroy and replace only those notes that are found to be flawed; or (c) circulate the 217.6 million notes after the higher quality new notes have been in circulation for a few years.

gao_GAO-10-277

gao_GAO-10-277_0

EPA screens technologies on the basis of the following three criteria: effectiveness: the potential effectiveness of technologies in meeting the cleanup goals, the potential impacts on human health and the environment during implementation, and how proven and reliable the technology is with respect to the contaminants and conditions at the site; implementability: the technical and administrative feasibility of the technology, including the evaluation of treatment requirements and the relative ease or difficulty in achieving operation and maintenance requirements; and cost: the capital and operation and maintenance costs of a technology (i.e., each technology is evaluated to determine whether its costs are high, moderate, or low relative to other options within the same category). EPA’s Risk Assessment, Remedy Selection, and Prioritization Decisions for the Federal Creosote Site Were Primarily Influenced by the Extent of the Contamination in a Residential Area The extent of the contamination in a residential area at the Federal Creosote site was the primary factor that influenced EPA’s risk assessment conclusions, remedy selection decisions, and site work priorities. The officials said that EPA considered what level of waste could be left on-site while still allowing for unrestricted residential use of properties; however, they noted that, with unrestricted residential use, there is a very low threshold for the level of waste that can be left on-site. Ultimately, EPA determined that off-site thermal treatment and disposal of the soil contamination would best achieve its cleanup goals and were consistent with residential use of the site. For the groundwater contamination, Region 2 officials said that EPA tried to determine how to clean up the contaminated groundwater in the fractured bedrock but ultimately concluded that none of the options would be effective; moreover, many of the options would be expensive and take a long time to implement. For example, EPA determined it was unlikely that such technologies as bioremediation of contaminated material in place would achieve the agency’s soil remediation goals, because EPA was uncertain whether the bioremediation microbes could be distributed evenly in contaminated areas since some of the contamination was under residents’ homes. EPA Placed a High Priority on Cleaning Up the Federal Creosote Site EPA placed a high priority on scheduling and funding the Federal Creosote site work because the contamination was in a residential area. EPA also took steps to shorten the time needed to select, design, and implement the remedial actions. As a result of these efforts to prioritize and expedite site cleanup work, the Federal Creosote site reached key cleanup milestones in less time than some other site cleanups. Total Site Costs Exceeded Early Construction Cost Estimates Largely because of the Nature of these Estimates and the Discovery of Additional Contamination Total site costs exceeded construction estimates at the Federal Creosote site by roughly $233 million, primarily because (1) EPA’s early construction estimates were not designed to include all site-related expenses and (2) additional quantities of contaminated material were discovered during the cleanup effort. contractor fraud. EPA prepares these preliminary estimates during the remedy selection process to compare projected construction costs across different remedial action alternatives. Additionally, sampling during the site investigations for the residential area as well as the Rustic Mall was limited by the location of buildings and access restrictions, according to EPA’s RPM. EPA Managed the Cleanup and Communicated with Residents According to a 1984 interagency agreement between EPA and the Corps for the cleanup of Superfund sites, EPA maintains statutory responsibility for implementing the Superfund program. To fulfill its project management and community outreach responsibilities, EPA dedicated a full-time RPM to the Federal Creosote site, according to Region 2 officials. According to site documents and a local official, EPA’s community relations efforts were successful at reducing residents’ anxieties. The Corps Selected and Oversaw Contractors’ Design and Implementation of the Remedy but Had a Limited Role in the Subcontracting Process At the Federal Creosote site, the Corps selected and oversaw private contractors’ design and implementation of the remedial action; however, the Corps was less involved in the subcontracting process. For example, the prime contractor was responsible for selecting and overseeing subcontractors. The Secretary, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers, had no comments on the draft report. However, our objective was, more broadly, to identify what factors contributed to the difference between the estimated remedial construction costs ($105 million) and the actual total site costs ($338 million). We found that the difference between these two amounts was $141 million in remedial construction cost increases—which were largely due to increases in the amount of contaminated material requiring remediation—and $92 million in other response costs that were not included in EPA’s original estimates. Prime Contractor Civil Suit Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This appendix provides information on the scope of work and methodology used to examine (1) how EPA assessed the risks and selected remedies for the Federal Creosote site, and what priority EPA assigned to site cleanup; (2) what factors contributed to the difference between the estimated and actual remediation costs of the site; and (3) how responsibilities for implementing and overseeing the site work w divided between EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corp also discusses our methodology for summarizing criminal and civil litigation related to the Federal Creosote site. However, because some costs incurred prior to early May 2009 may not have been processed through the Corps and EPA’s cost-tracking systems at the time of data collection, site cost data in this report are considered to be approximate. work.

Why GAO Did This Study In the 1990s, creosote was discovered under a residential neighborhood in Manville, New Jersey. Creosote, a mixture of chemicals, is used to preserve wood products, such as railroad ties. Some of the chemicals in creosote may cause cancer, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA found that creosote from a former wood-treatment facility (known as the Federal Creosote site) had contaminated soil and groundwater at the site. Under the Superfund program--the federal government's principal program to clean up hazardous waste--EPA assessed site risks, selected remedies, and worked with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to clean up the site. As of May 2009, construction of EPA's remedies for the site had been completed; however, total site costs were almost $340 million and remedial construction costs had exceeded original estimates. In this context, GAO was asked to examine (1) how EPA assessed risks and selected remedies for the site, and what priority EPA gave to site cleanup; (2) what factors contributed to the difference between the estimated and actual costs; and (3) how EPA and the Corps divided responsibilities for site work. GAO analyzed EPA and Corps documents and data on the cleanup effort and its costs, and interviewed officials from these agencies. This report contains no recommendations. EPA generally agreed with GAO's findings on the agency's cleanup costs and actions, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had no comments. What GAO Found The extent of the contamination in a residential area at the Federal Creosote site was the primary factor influencing EPA's risk assessment conclusions, remedy selection decisions, and how EPA prioritized site work, according to site documents and agency officials. EPA assessed site contamination through multiple rounds of evaluation and concluded that soil and groundwater contamination levels were high enough that EPA needed to take action. Then, EPA evaluated remedies to achieve cleanup goals that it had established for the site and that were consistent with its residential use. EPA selected off-site treatment and disposal of the contaminated soil and long-term monitoring of the groundwater contamination as the remedies for the site. In selecting these remedies, EPA considered a range of alternatives but ultimately determined that certain options would be potentially infeasible or ineffective due to the residential setting. For example, EPA chose not to implement certain alternatives on-site because the agency found that there was insufficient space and they would be too disruptive to nearby residents. In addition, EPA chose not to implement certain alternatives because the agency found that they would be unlikely to achieve the cleanup goals for the site, especially considering the high level of treatment required to allow for unrestricted residential use of the area and the high levels of contamination found at the site. EPA made cleanup of the site a high priority because the contamination was in a residential area. For example, EPA took steps to shorten the cleanup period and prioritized the use of regional Superfund resources on the Federal Creosote site over other sites in the region. The $338 million in total site costs exceeded EPA's estimated remedial construction costs of $105 million by about $233 million, primarily because EPA's estimates focused only on construction costs, and EPA discovered additional contamination during the cleanup effort. EPA prepared preliminary cost estimates during the remedy selection process; however, EPA requires that these estimates include only the costs associated with implementing different remedies it was considering, not all site costs. Also, as a result of the movement of contamination in the ground and sampling limitations during EPA's site investigation, a greater-than-expected amount of contamination was discovered during the cleanup effort, which increased costs. Other factors, such as contractor fraud, affected total site costs to a lesser extent. EPA was responsible for managing the overall site cleanup and community relations, while the Corps was responsible for implementing the cleanup. EPA dedicated a full-time staff member to manage the site cleanup who, according to EPA, maintained a significant on-site presence to ensure that the project remained on schedule and was adequately funded and to work with residents. EPA also oversaw the work of the Corps and its costs. To conduct the actual cleanup work, the Corps hired contractors to design or implement cleanup activities who, in turn, hired subcontractors for some tasks. The Corps oversaw the activities and costs of its primary contractors but, according to Corps officials, was less involved in selecting and overseeing subcontractors.

gao_GAO-15-435

gao_GAO-15-435_0

As of year-end 2014, over 7,300 financial institutions were members of the FHLBank System. In 2014, the size of the FHLBank boards ranged from 14 to 19 directors, for a total of 189 board directors across all 12 FHLBanks. Second, HERA added skill requirements for independent directors, removed compensation caps, and changed directors’ terms from 3 to 4 years. Most significantly, HERA required that independent directors be elected rather than appointed by the regulator. According to FHFA officials, these two rules fully implemented HERA’s governance changes. Boards Have Limited Representation of Women and Minorities but Reflect Some Diversity in Skills and Education In 2014, women represented about 16 percent of board directors and racial or ethnic minorities around 10 percent of board directors, and the majority of FHLBank board directors were non-Hispanic white males. Among member directors (who by statute represent member financial institutions), when compared to the overall representation, member board directors from commercial banks had the most representation, thrifts and credit unions had some representation, and insurance companies and community development financial institutions had the least or no representation on any FHLBank board. Representation of Women and Racial or Ethnic Minorities on FHLBank Boards Was Limited and Most Were Independent Directors Women represented roughly 16 percent of all FHLBank board directors in 2014. One of the 12 FHLBank boards’ chair was a woman (Atlanta). We found that these processes generally followed several commonly cited practices for improving board diversity, such as making diversity a priority and disclosing diversity practices. FHLBanks Have Used Some Commonly Cited Practices for Improving Board Diversity Since HERA’s enactment, FHLBanks and their boards have developed and refined new processes to help them identify and nominate independent directors and respond to new requirements for their board directors. The steps the FHLBanks take are assessing the boards’ needs as well as the makeup of the current identifying any skill or experience gaps among the current directors; discussing the number of seats that will be on the board (determined by FHFA) and determining how many board seats will be open to new candidates during the election cycle; discussing upcoming elections and potential nominees for independent directorships with their advisory councils and seeking advisory councils’ help with candidate outreach; opening the election cycle with a call for nominees for member directors and applications for independent directors; interviewing candidates for independent directorships and discussing their attributes to determine which candidate(s) to select for the ballot; verifying the eligibility of candidates for independent directorships and submitting candidates’ materials to FHFA for review; providing a ballot to each member institution listing the candidates who will run in the upcoming election cycle; and declaring the results of the election to members, nominees, and FHFA. In rules issued in 2009 and 2010, FHFA urged FHLBanks to consider the importance of board diversity. The rule states the FHLBanks are required to report on board diversity data and outreach efforts in their annual reports to OMWI, beginning September 30, 2015. Use of system-wide programs varied, with some FHLBank member institutions using the community lending advances under the voluntary CICA program more than others. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology This report examines (1) the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008’s governance changes and their implementation; (2) diversity on Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) boards and challenges the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the FHLBanks have faced in trying to increase it; (3) efforts that FHLBanks and FHFA have taken to improve diversity; and (4) FHLBanks’ community lending programs and the boards’ oversight of them. To help ensure that we collected a range of perspectives, we selected these locations based on several criteria, including asset size, number of member institutions, female and minority representation on boards, community and economic development lending activity, and location. The interviews with FHLBank management and staff were conducted jointly. We also reviewed publicly available documentation from FHLBanks, including community lending plans, advisory council reports, and annual reports, as well as information on each FHLBank’s website, to determine if the FHLBank offered a unique community lending program in addition to their system-wide community lending programs. Appendix II: Federal Home Loan Bank Affordable Housing and Community and Economic Development Committees, 2014 Each of the 12 Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) boards have a committee that addresses affordable housing and community and economic development programs and policies for their respective FHLBank (see table 6).

Why GAO Did This Study In 2014, the FHLBank System had over 7,300 member institutions and approximately $570 billion of loans (advances) outstanding. The system consists of 12 regionally based banks that are cooperatively owned by member institutions. Its mission is to serve as a reliable source of liquidity for members to support housing finance and community lending. In 2014, each FHLBank had a board of 14 to 19 directors that includes elected directors from member institutions and independent directors from outside the system, including at least 2 with consumer or community interests. GAO was asked to review legislative changes to FHLBank governance and the diversity of the FHLBanks' boards of directors. This report discusses (1) the governance changes and their implementation; (2) FHLBank boards' diversity; (3) FHLBank and FHFA efforts to improve diversity; and (4) community lending programs and boards' oversight of them. GAO analyzed FHLBank data and reviewed bylaws, policies, board meeting minutes, and regulations. GAO also reviewed previous work on diversity in the financial services industry, as well as literature on governance and diversity, and surveyed all 189 FHLBank directors serving in 2014 (with a 94 percent response rate). GAO interviewed FHLBank management and staff, board directors, and advisory councils at six FHLBanks selected by number of member institutions, asset size, volume and type of community lending activities, and location. What GAO Found The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 changed several aspects of the Federal Home Loan Bank System's (FHLBank System) governance. Among other things, HERA required that independent directors on the FHLBank boards be elected by member institutions (for example, commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, and insurance companies) rather than appointed by the regulator. HERA also added certain skill requirements, removed compensation caps, and created a new regulator for the system, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). FHFA fully implemented the governance changes through two rules in 2009 and 2010. Board directors, FHLBank representatives, and others generally view HERA's governance changes as positive because the changes give FHLBank boards' greater control over nominees and help ensure that candidates have specific skills and experience. Women and minority representation on FHLBank boards is limited (see figure). A woman chaired 1 of 12 FHLBank boards in 2014, but no racial or ethnic minorities did. Most women and racial or ethnic minorities were independent directors rather than member directors. Directors' skill sets were more diverse. For example, member directors responding to GAO's survey were more likely than independent directors to report having skills in accounting and banking. Independent directors were more likely to report having skills in project development, community and economic development, and affordable housing. Women and Minority Representation on Federal Home Loan Bank Boards, 2014 FHLBanks and FHFA have taken steps to increase board diversity. Since HERA's enactment, FHLBanks and their boards have developed processes to identify and nominate independent directors. GAO found that these processes generally followed several commonly cited practices for improving diversity, such as diversifying the applicant pools for directors. A 2009 FHFA rule encourages FHLBanks to consider diversity when selecting candidates, and a 2015 rule requires the FHLBanks to report information on board diversity in their annual reports. FHFA plans to begin evaluating board data and other information on outreach activities related to board diversity. Community lending varies across the FHLBanks. For example, 6 of the 12 FHLBanks offer unique community lending programs in addition to the system-wide programs. Under the Community Investment Program, which provides funds for housing and economic development, 4 of the 12 FHLBanks used the funds for economic development in 2014. FHLBanks have committees that are responsible for overseeing these activities, and, according to GAO survey results, directors serving on these committees have greater responsibility for overseeing community lending programs.

gao_GAO-02-985T

gao_GAO-02-985T_0

In addition, some weight loss supplements have potentially dangerous interactions with prescription or over-the-counter medications or foods. In fact, multiple-ingredient products account for 85 percent of the weight loss supplement market. Limited Federal Efforts Have Focused More on Oversight of Advertising and Labeling than on Oversight of Safety Federal oversight, research, and education efforts to protect and inform consumers about the potential risks associated with the use of some weight loss supplements have been limited. Two publications, “Tips for the Savvy Supplement User” and “An FDA Guide to Dietary Supplements,” together provide a general overview of the dietary supplement industry. State Statutes and Regulations States have adopted statutes and regulations specific to the sale of certain weight loss supplements. State, Local, and Private Lawsuits Some state attorneys general and local district attorneys have sued marketers or manufacturers of weight loss supplements over marketing claims. Consequently, little is known about whether weight loss supplements are effective, but many of them have been reported to be associated with the potential for physical harm. However, as the upward trend in sales and use is expected to continue, more consumers may be at risk of adverse events related to use of the supplements.

What GAO Found Since the enactment of the Dietary Enactment Supplement Health and Education Act in 1994, U.S. sales of weight loss supplements have increased steadily. The sales of weight loss supplements--reported to be the fastest growing segment of the dietary supplement industry--increased 10 to 20 percent annually from 1997 to 2001, and industry officials expect that rate of increase to continue. Little is known about the effectiveness of weight loss supplements, but some supplements have been associated with the potential physical harm. Health consequences may result from the use of the supplement itself or from the interaction of the supplement with medications or foods. Federal and state activities related to weight loss supplements have been limited and have focused on oversight of marketing rather than on oversight of safety. In addition, several states have statutes or regulations in effect or pending to restrict the sale of some weight loss supplements. Some state attorneys general and local district attorneys have sued the manufacturers of supplements marketed with weight loss claims, and individuals have sued over injuries.

gao_GAO-15-19

gao_GAO-15-19_0

Claims at all levels for which the claimant is determined to be eligible for DI or SSI, also called favorable claims, are forwarded to other SSA offices for payment. Referral processes can vary by DDS. Once a case is referred to the SSA OIG, that office determines whether it will investigate the case.with other federal, state, and local agencies. Despite Anti-Fraud Policies and Procedures, SSA Remains Vulnerable to Potential Physician-Assisted Fraud Staff Reported Difficulty Identifying Potential Fraud and Lack Sufficient Incentives and Training SSA relies heavily on front-line staff in DDS offices—those who are responsible for reviewing medical evidence—to detect and prevent The employees in the five DDS potential physician-assisted fraud.offices we visited, however, said that they are not well-positioned to identify signs of potential fraud, such as similar medical evidence across multiple claims. Instead of systematically using data systems or analytics to detect patterns of potential fraud, SSA’s guidance instructs front-line staff to identify suspicious patterns of medical evidence—such as boilerplate or similar language from the same physician across multiple claims—as well as other factors that may indicate potential fraud. However, SSA regional officials, DDS management, and front-line staff said that it is difficult to detect these patterns because staff may review claims originating anywhere in the state or across a large geographic area, leaving it in part to chance that staff would see evidence from a single physician on more than one claim. However, staff in three of the five DDSs we visited said they may not always report potentially fraudulent information to the OIG if there is already sufficient evidence to make a denial because of the additional time required to process the fraud referral. Lack of Training on How to Identify or Report Potential Fraud Staff from four of the five DDSs we visited stated that the anti-fraud training they received was infrequent, insufficient, and that additional training was needed. For instance, SSA does not require DDSs to routinely and uniformly record the names and addresses of physicians who submit medical evidence on behalf of claimants. SSA Has Launched Several Initiatives to Better Detect Fraud but Faces a Number of Implementation Challenges SSA Is Developing a Fraud Analytics Model, but Lacks an Implementation Plan Recognizing that it must do more to systematically detect potential fraud, SSA is in the early stages of exploring the use of computerized tools to enhance its efforts. In the first stage, SSA developed its initial computer model and identified existing sources of data within the agency. In its early efforts, SSA has so far followed some key practices. Disability Fraud Prevention Units: SSA established a centralized fraud prevention unit based in New York City to identify instances of potential fraud and look for trends nationwide. However, the agency could be exposing itself to risk by using medical evidence from physicians who are sanctioned by either federal or state governments. To address potential disincentives for staff to detect and prevent physician-assisted fraud, SSA should review the standards used to assess DDS performance; and develop and distribute promising practices to incentivize staff to better balance the goal of processing claims promptly with the equally important goal of identifying and reporting evidence of potential fraud. 5. SSA agreed with the remainder of our recommendations and provided additional information about the actions it has taken in the past year to enhance its fraud detection and prevention efforts and steps they will take going forward. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In conducting our review of potential physician-assisted fraud in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) disability programs, our objectives were to examine (1) SSA’s policies and procedures for detecting and deterring physician assisted fraud, and (2) the steps SSA is taking to improve its ability to detect physician-assisted fraud. We reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, as well as SSA program documentation including policies, procedures, training manuals, and performance plans, as well as reports and testimonies from SSA and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on fraud detection and prevention efforts. These organizations included: American Academy of Disability Evaluating Physicians (a professional organization serving physicians involved in disability management and evaluations) Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (an anti-fraud alliance that includes public and private insurers) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector Elder Research Inc. (a consulting company focused on predictive analytics and data mining) The Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board Unum (a private insurer that uses predictive analytics to identify potential fraud) Analysis of Medical Provider Data We conducted data matching using information from California and Illinois to help determine the extent to which sanctioned medical providers submitted evidence in disability decisions.

Why GAO Did This Study SSA relies on medical evidence to determine whether the millions of new claimants each year qualify for disability benefits. This evidence—and those who provide it—have been the subject of intense scrutiny as questions have been raised about the potential for fraud schemes that include falsified medical evaluations. GAO was asked to study physician-assisted fraud in SSA's disability programs. GAO reviewed (1) how well SSA's policies and procedures are designed and implemented to detect and prevent physician-assisted fraud, and (2) the steps SSA is taking to improve its ability to prevent physician-assisted fraud. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, visited 5 of the 54 DDS offices that were selected to obtain geographic and office structure variation, and analyzed DDS data to identify whether federally sanctioned physicians (as of the end of January 2014) may have submitted evidence on behalf of claimants. GAO also interviewed SSA officials, as well as private disability insurers and others knowledgeable about SSA's programs to identify key practices for fraud prevention. What GAO Found The Social Security Administration (SSA) has policies and procedures in place for detecting and preventing fraud with regard to disability benefit claims. However, GAO identified a number of areas that could leave the agency vulnerable to physician-assisted fraud and other fraudulent claims: SSA relies heavily on front-line staff in the offices of its disability determination services (DDS)—which have responsibility for reviewing medical evidence—to detect and prevent potential fraud. However, staff said it is difficult to detect suspicious patterns across claims, as directed by SSA policy, given the large number of claims and volume of medical information they review. Moreover, DDS offices generally assign claims randomly, so staff said it would only be by chance that they would review evidence from the same physician. SSA and, in turn, DDS performance measures that focus on prompt processing can create a disincentive for front-line staff to report potential fraud because of the time it requires to develop a fraud referral. Four of the five DDS offices GAO visited count time that staff spend on documenting potential fraud and developing fraud referrals against their processing time. Some staff at these DDS offices said this creates a reluctance to report potential fraud. The extent of anti-fraud training for staff varied among the five offices GAO visited and was often limited. SSA requires all DDSs to provide training to newly hired staff that includes general information on how to identify potential fraud, but does not require additional training. The five DDS offices GAO visited varied in whether staff received refresher training and its content—such as how to spot suspicious medical evidence from physicians—and staff at all levels said they needed more training on these issues. SSA has not fully evaluated the risk associated with accepting medical evidence from physicians who are barred from participating in federal health programs. Although information from these physicians is not necessarily fraudulent, it could be associated with questionable disability determinations. SSA has launched several initiatives to detect and prevent potential fraud, but their success is hampered by a lack of planning, data, and coordination. For instance, SSA is developing computer models that can draw from recent fraud cases to anticipate potentially fraudulent claims going forward. This effort has the potential to address vulnerabilities with existing fraud detection practices by, for example, helping to identify suspicious patterns of medical evidence. However, SSA has not yet articulated a plan for implementation, assigned responsibility for this initiative within the agency, or identified how the agency will obtain key pieces of data to identify physicians who are currently not tracked in existing claims' management systems. Furthermore, SSA is developing other initiatives, such as a centralized fraud prevention unit and analysis to detect patterns in disability appeals cases that could indicate fraud. However, these initiatives are still in the early stages of development and it is not clear how they will be coordinated or work with existing detection activities. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends SSA identify ways to remove potential disincentives for detecting and referring potential fraud, enhance its training efforts, evaluate the threat of physician-assisted fraud, and ensure that new and existing fraud efforts are coordinated. SSA agreed with four of our five recommendations, partially agreed with one, and noted plans to address all of them.

gao_GAO-04-281

gao_GAO-04-281_0

Clearly, any service that is creditable towards a CSRS or FERS benefit but is rendered while employed by an entity other than the Postal Service has no direct relationship to the Service’s operations. This feature is one of many that collectively constitute a plan of benefits that defers a portion of an employee’s total compensation until retirement. With respect to the Postal Service’s assertion that approximately 90 percent of the cost of military service was earned before the Service was created in 1971, we asked OPM to calculate the additional cost to the Treasury of making it responsible for the entire cost of benefits attributable to all military service estimated to have been rendered before 1972 by both former and current employees of the Postal Service. The PMAs agreed to do so in response to a series of reports we issued. One might reasonably argue that the Postal Service should be treated like other agencies with respect to its funding of pension costs. However, our previous recommendations and observations did not specifically address whether the cost of military service benefits should be included as part of a dynamic normal cost factor. Yet, for purposes of estimating the Postal Service’s share of the CSRS portion of CSRDF assets and the actuarial present value of future benefits, OPM allocated the years of creditable military service of former and current Postal Service employees proportionally over the employees’ civilian career. Should the Congress decide that the Postal Service should be responsible for funding CSRS military service benefits attributable to its employees, the Congress should then decide the extent to which these benefits should be attributed to the Postal Service and perhaps to other self-supporting agencies. The OPM and Treasury proposal provided five alternative allocation approaches; however, none of their approaches included an allocation alternative that reflects the extent to which the Postal Service’s current and former employees had, by the time the Service commenced operations in 1971, completed the 5 years of civilian service needed to be entitled to have their past military service credits used in the computation of an annuity. Matters for Congressional Consideration To help promote full and consistent funding of CSRS benefits among self- supporting federal agencies, we suggest that the Congress consider requiring all self-supporting federal entities to pay the dynamic cost of employee pension benefit costs not paid for by employee contributions and deposits, excluding military service costs, and treating all self-supporting federal entities consistently with regard to whatever decision is made on Postal Service funding of the military service component of CSRS employee benefits. OPM and Treasury In written comments on a draft of this report, the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of OPM disagreed with our statement that there is no direct relationship between an employee’s prior military service and the operations of the Postal Service. However, we continue to view the relationship between military service and postal operations as indirect because the activities performed while serving in the military did not directly contribute to the daily operations of the Postal Service at the time the military service was rendered. As stated in our report, our position is that the Congress needs to decide whether the Postal Service should fund the cost of military service attributable to military service of its current and former employees.

Why GAO Did This Study The Postal Civil Service Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003 (the Act) required the United States Postal Service, Department of the Treasury, and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to prepare proposals detailing whether and to what extent the Treasury and Postal Service should fund the benefits attributable to the military service of the Postal Service's current and former Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) employees. The Act required GAO to evaluate the proposals. Our objective in doing so was to assess the agencies' positions and provide additional information where it may be useful. What GAO Found The positions taken by OPM and Treasury and the Postal Service were driven in part by differing views on the nature and extent of the relationship between military service and an entity's operations. The Postal Service favors returning the responsibility for funding benefits attributable to military service to the Treasury, making arguments that include Treasury's historic responsibility for these benefits, the legislative history surrounding the Postal Service's funding of retirement benefits, the fact that the majority of military service by CSRS employees was rendered before the current Postal Service was created, and that military service has no connection to the Postal Service's functions or operations. OPM and Treasury favor the recently enacted law, arguing that the Postal Service was intended to be self-supporting, military service is a benefit like other CSRS benefits that should be allocated proportionally over an employee's career, and the current law is one in a series that developed today's approach to funding the Postal Service's CSRS costs. GAO observed that there is no direct relationship between an employee's military service and an entity's operations, but an indirect relationship is established once an employee is hired into a position whose retirement plan provisions credit military service when computing a civilian benefit. GAO has long held the position that federal entities should be charged the full costs of retirement benefits not covered by employee contributions in the belief that it enhances recognition of costs and budgetary discipline at the same time it promotes sounder fiscal and legislative decisions. However, our previous recommendations and matters for congressional consideration did not specifically address whether the cost of military service benefits should be included in CSRS employee benefit costs. Currently there is inconsistency in how various self-supporting government entities treat these costs. The military service of many Postal Service retirees was already creditable to a civilian pension when the Postal Service began operations in 1971. OPM's current approach, however, allocated the years of creditable military service of these employees over their entire civilian careers. If Congress decides that the Postal Service should be responsible for military service costs applicable to its employees, then consideration of an allocation alternative reflecting the extent to which the military service of current and former employees was already creditable towards a civilian pension when the Postal Service began operating would enhance the decision-making process.

gao_T-GGD-99-99

gao_T-GGD-99-99_0

To balance the facilitation of trade through ports with the interdiction of illegal drugs being smuggled into the United States, Customs initiated and encouraged its ports to use several programs to identify and separate low-risk shipments from those with apparently higher smuggling risk. At each of the three ports we visited, we identified internal control weaknesses in one or more of the processes used to screen Line Release applicants for entry into the program. According to officials at the three ports, they lost confidence in the program’s ability to distinguish high- from low-risk shipment because of two operational problems. Customs is evaluating the Automated Targeting System for expansion to other land-border cargo ports. Customs has been using traditional law enforcement measures to evaluate the aviation program (e.g., number of seizures, weight of drugs seized, number of arrests). These measures, however, are used to track activity, not measure results or effectiveness. Until 1997, Customs also used an air threat index as an indicator of its effectiveness in detecting illegal air traffic. However, Customs has discontinued use of this indicator, as well as some other performance measures, because Customs determined that they were not good measures of results and effectiveness. Customs, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Ancore Corporation—the inspection system inventor—recently began planning to field test PFNA. While Customs, DOD, and FAA officials acknowledge that laboratory testing has proven the technical feasibility of PFNA, they told us that the current Ancore inspection system would not meet their operational requirements. Among their other concerns, Customs, DOD, and FAA officials said that a PFNA system not only is too expensive (about $10 million to acquire per system), but also is too large for operational use in most ports of entry or other sites. Customs officials were not aware of any formal agencywide efforts prior to 1995 to determine the need for additional cargo or passenger inspectional personnel for its 301 ports. However, in preparation for its fiscal year 1997 budget request and a new drug enforcement operation called Hard Line,Customs conducted a formal needs assessment. We concluded that these limitations could prevent Customs from accurately estimating the need for inspectional personnel and then allocating them to ports. We reported that these weaknesses could affect the reliability of Customs’ performance data. The first action plan was issued in February 1999 and has since been updated three times. According to the plan, it is Customs’ intention to implement all action items included in the plan by 2000. Overall, use of this kind of management tool can be very helpful in communicating problems and proposed solutions to executives, managers, and the Customs Service workforce, as well as to other groups interested in Customs such as this Committee and us.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed efforts by the Customs Service to interdict drugs, allocate inspectional personnel, and develop performance measures, including information on Customs' action plan for resolving management problems. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) Customs initiated and encouraged its ports to use several programs to identify and separate low-risk shipments from those with apparently higher smuggling risk; (2) GAO identified internal control weaknesses in one or more of the processes used to screen Line Release program applicants for entry into the program; (3) the Three Tier Targeting program was used at the Southwest border ports where officials say they lost confidence in the program's ability to distinguish high- from low-risk shipments; (4) Customs is evaluating the Automated Targeting System for expansion to other land-border cargo ports; (5) Customs has been using traditional law enforcement measures to evaluate the Aviation program; (6) these measures, however, are used to track activity, not measure results or effectiveness; (7) Customs has discontinued the use of the threat index as an indicator of its effectiveness in detecting illegal air traffic, as well as some other performance measures, because Customs determined that they were not good measures of results and effectiveness; (8) Customs, Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Ancore Corporation recently began planning to field test the pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) inspection system; (9) while Customs, DOD, and FAA officials acknowledge that laboratory testing has proven the technical feasibility of PFNA, they told GAO that the Ancore inspection system would not meet their operational requirements; (10) agency officials said that a PFNA system not only is too expensive, but also is too large for operational use in most ports of entry or other sites; (11) Customs officials were not aware of any formal agencywide efforts prior to 1995 to determine the need for additional cargo or passenger inspectional personnel for its 301 ports; (12) in preparation for its fiscal year 1997 budget request, Customs conducted a formal needs assessment; (13) GAO concluded that the assessments had limitations that could prevent Customs from accurately estimating the need for inspectional personnel and then allocating them to ports; (14) GAO found that Customs' strategic plan contained weaknesses that could affect the reliability of Customs' performance data; (15) Customs' first action plan was issued in February 1999 and has since been updated three times; (16) it is Customs' intention to implement all action items included in the plan by 2000; and (17) use of this kind of management tool can be very helpful in communicating problems and proposed solutions to executives, managers, and the Customs Service workforce.

gao_GAO-12-956

gao_GAO-12-956_0

Given our findings, we recommended that Defense reconsider the acquisition approach based on a meaningful analysis of all viable alternative acquisition approaches. However, in response, we pointed out that DON planned to assess only the status quo and the current approach in the economic analysis, not other alternatives such as those that had been included in the AOA, and we maintained that without a meaningful analysis of alternatives, the department would be unable to determine the most cost-effective solution. Additionally, we reported that NGEN acquisition decisions were not always performance- and risk-based. DON Has Not Reevaluated Alternatives to Ensure It Is Pursuing the Most Cost-Effective NGEN Acquisition Approach According to cost estimating and acquisition guidance, cost effectiveness is shown by a comparative analysis of all life-cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits among the competing alternatives. Even after having revised its acquisition approach, DON has not yet shown that it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities because it did not revisit the AOA to address the nor did it conduct any other weaknesses we previously identified, analysis that would show that the current approach is the most cost effective. Without a meaningful analysis of acquisition alternatives, DON does not know whether its approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities and meeting NGEN goals is the most cost effective among other viable alternatives. DON Is Proceeding with the NGEN Acquisition, but Is Experiencing Schedule Delays and Not Adequately Mitigating Risks Notwithstanding the lack of assurance that it is pursuing the most cost- effective acquisition, DON nonetheless has moved forward with its revised approach for acquiring NGEN. However, the program’s schedule for acquiring NGEN capabilities has been delayed, resulting in a compressed timeline for transitioning to the new network and increased risks associated with transitioning to the new network before the end of the continuity of services contract. Compounding this situation is the fact that identified risks that can further impact schedule delays are not being adequately mitigated. Execution of the NGEN Program Is Proceeding, but Major Milestones Have Slipped DON has undertaken activities to support its acquisition and transition to NGEN, prepared plans and analyses required for program initiation at milestone C, and conducted oversight reviews to support the release of the request for proposals for transport and enterprise services. Finally, the revised acquisition strategy, which was required prior to release of the transport and enterprise services request for proposals, was approved in April 2012. While DON is working to mitigate seven of the eight program risks, its mitigation plans did not always include all the elements of an effective plan (e.g., identification of resources needed, responsible parties, and period of performance). According to program officials, weaknesses in these mitigation plans were due, in part, to the lack of a priority in establishing and maintaining comprehensive and current plans. Conclusions Even though DON does not know whether it is pursuing the most cost- effective approach to acquiring NGEN capabilities, it has proceeded to implement its revised acquisition approach, completed various plans and analyses including the first official program life-cycle cost estimate, and held oversight reviews to support the issuance of the request for proposals for the two primary NGEN segments. Recommendation for Executive Action To strengthen risk mitigation activities for the NGEN program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop comprehensive mitigation plans and strategies for program-wide critical risks that identify the mitigation period of performance, resources needed, and responsible parties, and that fully reflect the current status of the program. In its comments, the department agreed with our recommendation and noted that the program office will continue to build on efforts to improve NGEN’s risk management and mitigation process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the Department of the Navy’s (DON) selected approach to acquiring the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) is the most cost effective and (2) the current status of and plans for acquiring NGEN.

Why GAO Did This Study DON, a component of the Department of Defense (Defense), is replacing its existing network system with NGEN. Capabilities for the new system include secure transport of voice and data, data storage, and e-mail, at a cost of about $38 billion through fiscal year 2024. In March 2011, GAO reported that the approach for acquiring NGEN was not grounded in a reliable analysis of alternatives, the execution of NGEN was not based on a reliable schedule, and acquisition decisions were not always performance- and risk-based. GAO recommended that Defense, among other things, reconsider its approach. The department has not yet fully implemented GAO’s recommendations but revised its approach to include acquiring certain NGEN services simultaneously instead of staggering their implementation. GAO was asked to review the revised approach to determine (1) the extent to which DON’s selected approach to acquire NGEN is the most cost effective and (2) the current status of and plans for acquiring NGEN. To do this, GAO reviewed analyses supporting the cost effectiveness of the acquisition approach, the program’s revised acquisition strategy, integrated master schedule, key milestone decisions, and other relevant documents. What GAO Found While the Department of the Navy (DON) has revised its acquisition approach for its new network system, the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN), it still has not shown that it has selected the most cost-effective approach for acquiring NGEN capabilities. Cost effectiveness is shown by comparing life-cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits among alternatives, which can be accomplished by conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives. GAO previously identified weaknesses with the NGEN analysis of alternatives related to cost estimates and analysis of operational effectiveness and made associated recommendations. However, DON did not revisit the analysis of alternatives to address the weaknesses previously identified, nor did it conduct any other analysis that would show whether its revised approach is the most cost effective. For example, while DON developed a draft economic analysis in February 2012, the analysis assessed only the status quo and revised approach, and not other alternatives. As a result, GAO remains concerned with the analysis measuring NGEN cost effectiveness and DON does not know whether its revised approach for acquiring NGEN is the most cost effective. Even though DON lacks assurance that it is pursuing the most cost-effective approach to acquiring NGEN capabilities, it has moved forward with implementing its revised approach. For example, the agency has completed activities to support the acquisition and transition to NGEN, prepared plans and analyses required for program initiation, and conducted oversight reviews to support the release of the request for proposals for transport and enterprise services (secure data and e-mail services, among other things). However, the program’s schedule for acquiring NGEN capabilities has been delayed, thus making it more likely that DON will not be able to fully transition by the end of the continuity of services contract in April 2014. For example, the release of the request for proposals was delayed, and upcoming milestones, such as contract award and program initiation, have slipped (see table for major delays). Program officials attributed the delays to the need for additional planning and to revisions to the request for proposals. Compounding this situation is that identified risks are not being adequately mitigated. For example, not all mitigation plans are comprehensive because they do not always include all the elements of an effective plan (e.g., identification of resources needed) nor do they always contain the current status of the mitigation actions. According to program officials, weaknesses in these mitigation plans were due, in part, to the lack of a priority in establishing and maintaining comprehensive and current mitigation plans. As a result, the program faces an increased probability that transition from its existing system to NGEN will face further delays and cost overruns. What GAO Recommends GAO is recommending that Defense develop comprehensive risk mitigation plans for program-wide risks. In its comments, Defense concurred with GAO’s recommendation and noted that it will continue to build on efforts to improve NGEN risk mitigation.

gao_GAO-13-685T

gao_GAO-13-685T_0

OMB is responsible for working with agencies to ensure investments are appropriately planned and justified. As reported to OMB, federal agencies plan to spend more than $82 billion on IT investments in fiscal year 2014, which is the total expenditure for not only acquiring such investments, but also to operate and maintain them. Opportunities to Reduce Duplication and Achieve Cost Savings Exist in Critical IT-related Areas Over the past several years, we have reported that overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities could be harbingers of unnecessary duplication.of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation could potentially save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. Many of the government programs or activities with opportunities to reduce duplication and the cost of government operations are related to critical IT areas, including the following: Thus, the reduction or elimination IT Dashboard. OMB and agencies need to address potentially duplicative IT investments to avoid investing in unnecessary systems. The Department of Defense (Defense) reported the largest number of IT investments (2,383 investments at $37 billion), followed by the Department of Energy (Energy) (876 investments and $2 billion). In March 2012, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which requires agencies to conduct an annual agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending and demonstrate how their IT investments align with the agency’s mission and business functions. PortfolioStat is designed to assist agencies in assessing the current maturity of their IT investment management process, making decisions on eliminating duplicative investments (such as geospatial information), and moving to shared solutions (such as cloud computing) in order to maximize the return on IT investments across the portfolio. OMB believes that the PortfolioStat effort has the potential to save the government $2.5 billion over the next 3 years by, for example, consolidating duplicative systems. GAO Has Previously Reported on IT Investment Management at Selected Agencies During the past few years, we have reported on IT investment management—an important mechanism for identifying and analyzing duplicative investments—at key agencies. More recently, in July 2012, we reported that DHS was making progress in developing and implementing a new IT governance process that focused on portfolio management and eliminating duplication. PortfolioStat and found that key performance metrics were not yet fully defined. We also reported that, although OMB had previously stated that PortfolioStat was expected to result in savings of approximately $2.5 billion through 2015, its March 2013 memorandum did not establish a new cost savings goal that reflected the integration of the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative. OMB agreed with our recommendation. In summary, while OMB and agencies have taken steps to improve their ability to identify and categorize IT investments, duplicative IT investments still exist at federal agencies. Because these investments account for billions of dollars in spending, it will be important for OMB and agencies to implement our prior recommendations to better ensure that duplicative investments are identified and eliminated. To help agencies better address duplicative IT investments, OMB established PortfolioStat as a means of assisting agencies with the assessment of the maturity of their IT investment management processes and eliminating areas of duplication and waste.

Why GAO Did This Study With the federal government poised to reportedly spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014, the magnitude of these expenditures highlights the importance of avoiding duplicative investments to ensure the most efficient use of resources. In a series of reports over the last few years, GAO has identified federal programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists. In particular, GAO has identified opportunities to reduce duplication and the cost of government operations in critical areas, such as federal data centers and IT investment management. To help address IT duplication, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative. As part of this initiative, agencies are required to conduct an annual review of their IT investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication, among other things. GAO was asked to testify on the results and recommendations from its selected reports that focused on IT duplication. To prepare this statement, GAO relied on previously published work. What GAO Found GAO has identified a number of issues related to information technology (IT) duplication across the federal government. For example, GAO has previously reported that hundreds of investments provide similar functions. Specifically, agencies reported 1,536 information and technology management investments, 777 supply chain management investments, and 622 human resource management investments. GAO further reported that while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have undertaken several initiatives to address potentially duplicative IT investments, such as consolidating similar functions through "line of business" initiatives, most of OMB's recent initiatives had not yet demonstrated results. Further, agencies were not routinely assessing operational systems to determine if they were duplicative. GAO recommended that OMB require federal agencies to report the steps they were taking to ensure that their IT investments were not duplicative as part of their annual budget and IT investment submissions. OMB agreed with the recommendation. In addition, GAO reported on potentially duplicative investments at selected federal agencies. More specifically, although the Departments of Defense and Energy used various investment review processes to identify duplicative investments, GAO found that 37 of its sample of 810 investments were potentially duplicative. These investments accounted for about $1.2 billion in total IT spending for fiscal years 2007 through 2012. For example, GAO identified four Department of the Navy personnel assignment investments--one system for officers, one for enlisted personnel, one for reservists, and a general assignment system--each of which is responsible for managing similar functions. GAO recommended that the agencies report on the progress of efforts to identify and eliminate duplication, where appropriate; the agencies agreed with the recommendations. In part to address duplicative IT investments, in March 2012 OMB launched PortfolioStat. Specifically, PortfolioStat is designed to assist agencies in assessing the current maturity of their IT portfolio management process, making decisions on eliminating duplication, and moving to shared solutions in order to maximize the return on IT investments across the portfolio. In March 2013, OMB reported that through this effort, agencies had identified and committed to nearly 100 opportunities to consolidate or eliminate commodity IT investments. OMB also believes that PortfolioStat may save the government $2.5 billion by 2015. GAO has ongoing work looking at PortfolioStat, including determining whether agencies are completing key actions. What GAO Recommends GAO has issued numerous recommendations to OMB and selected agencies to utilize existing transparency mechanisms and report the steps taken to avoid making duplicative investments.

gao_GAO-09-898

gao_GAO-09-898_0

The Army is changing the missions of some Army organizations and retraining soldiers to produce more soldiers and units with high-demand skills. The Army does not plan to make any decision on full-time support resource levels until after this study is completed in September 2009. lization As a result of the challenges faced in achieving desired personnel readiness levels, the Army and its reserve components have had to continue taking steps to improve individual and unit readiness late in the force-generation cycle and after mobilization. Such steps include addressing medical and dental issues and transferring personnel from nondeployed to deploying units to fill shortages. Despite the magnitude of the Army’s projected investment in its reserve components, until operational demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to achieve DOD’s goal of a sustainable mobilization cycle for its reserve forces or fully implement the train-mobilize-deploy model. The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to Transition Its Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but Has Not yet Finalized an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy The Army has estimated and budgeted for some costs that relate to the transition of its reserve components to an operational force, but the full cost of the transition remains uncertain and could vary widely from the initial estimates depending on Army decisions. However, the Army continued to examine the estimates for pre- and postmobilization validation, training support, and installation support. The most recent Army estimates show a cost range from $12.7 billion to $27 billion over a 6-year period. The Army Plans to Include the Majority of Estimated Transition Costs in Its Fiscal Year 2012 to 2017 Projected Spending Plans, but It Has Not Finalized an Implementation Plan and a Funding Strategy for Achieving Its Goals According to Army officials, The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget Request includes some funding that supports the reserves’ operational role, but the Army plans to include the majority of funding for transition costs in its fiscal year 2012-2017 projected spending plans after it obtains more information on the resources needed to support the operational role. Additionally, best practices for strategic planning have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, defined metrics and timelines to measure progress, a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy, and communication of key information to decision makers. States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of National Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic Requirements Remain Undefined The deployment of National Guard units as a federal operational force has reduced their availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states have mitigated shortfalls through mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions, such as responding to large multistate events, remain undefined. Complete a cost estimate for the transition that, at a minimum, should a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider to be related to the transition to an operational force; estimates for key cost drivers; and identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending changes to the reserve components’ force structure, personnel, training, and equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect costs, and updates to the plan as these decisions are made. To identify the extent to which the Army has made progress but faces challenges in modifying the force structure, manning, and equipping strategies of its reserve components to meet the requirements of the operational role, we reviewed prior GAO work, reports of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, reports to Congress on related initiatives and issues, current Army plans and policy documents, including the Army Campaign Plan, Army Structure Memorandums, Army Forces Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4 (transition the reserve components to an operational force), Army Forces Command’s 4 + 1 Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team Comprehensive Review, the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, DOD Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, and Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order 150-18 Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy. To determine the effect of the National Guard’s federal operational role on its availability to state governors for domestic missions, we reviewed relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and DOD directives regarding management of the reserve components as an operational force and National Guard homeland defense activities. Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages.

Why GAO Did This Study Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve components--the Army National Guard and Army Reserve--for ongoing operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army have concluded the Army will need to continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This report provides additional information on (1) progress and challenges the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3) the effect of the operational role on the Guard's availability to state governors for domestic missions. GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DOD, Army, reserve component, and state officials. What GAO Found The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operations. The Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match their active counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made plans to add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 billion for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between mobilizations. To make the most of the limited mobilization time available, DOD directed the services to provide sufficient resources to support reserve forces to be nearly ready to deploy before mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the reserves. The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the costs it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24 billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives, and installation support, among others. However, because the Army has not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve, it is difficult to assess the estimate's validity. The Army established a task force to develop an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other studies, such as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending the results of these studies and agreement on an implementation plan, the Army does not expect to budget for such costs until 2012. Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan and fully estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army's progress in transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable operational force. The operational role has reduced the Guard's availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states mitigate shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions remain undefined.

gao_NSIAD-95-154

gao_NSIAD-95-154_0

Best management practices refer to the processes, practices, and systems identified in public and private organizations that performed exceptionally well and are widely recognized as improving an organization’s performance and efficiency in specific areas. Successfully identifying and applying best practices can reduce business expenses and improve organizational efficiency. Best practices we have identified in our work resulting in recommendations to the defense community include: (1) relying on established commercial networks to manage, store, and directly deliver defense electronic items more efficiently; (2) using private sector food distributors to supply food to the military community faster and cheaper; and (3) adopting the use of supplier parks to reduce maintenance and repair inventories. Most of the Defense Management and NASA’s (DMN) best practices reports have focused on using best management practices to improve a specific the Department of Defense (DOD) process. Deciding whether to use a best practices approach involves considering a number of factors. Our experience shows that the following questions can serve as a guide in making the decision. Have GAO and others reported on the acknowledged problem areas before, and to what extent has there been attempts to make the process work as designed? Is there a process with similar requirements that can be compared to the one being examined but is implemented in a way that provides significantly better results? Do the areas being considered have an established counterpart in the private or public sector that will provide evidence of the benefits of a new process? A best practices review can be applied to a variety of processes, such as payroll, travel administration, employee training, accounting and budgeting systems, procurement, transportation, maintenance services, repair services, and distribution. objectives. Ask questions like (1) What drives the costs in a particular process? and (2) Is the process effective in achieving its goals? It is important that the entire process be considered, rather than just part of the process. If you fail to capture the entire process then you may push costs into another section of the process or create an improvement that is inhibited by trying to marry old ways with new ways that are in conflict with each other. At least initially, select a process which is about ready to accept change. organizations.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed best management practices to make government operations more efficient and less costly, focusing on those approaches adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) that other federal agencies could use to improve their operations. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) best management practices refer to the processes, practices, and systems identified in public and private organizations that performed exceptionally well and are widely recognized as improving an organization's performance and efficiency in specific areas; (2) successfully identifying and applying best practices can reduce business expenses and improve organizational efficiency; (3) best practices GAO has identified in its work resulting in recommendations to the defense community include: (a) relying on established commercial networks to manage, store, and directly deliver defense electronic items more efficiently; (b) using private sector food distributors to supply food to the military community faster and cheaper; and (c) adopting the use of supplier parks to reduce maintenance and repair activities; (4) deciding to use a best practices approach involves considering a number of factors and several questions can serve as a guide in making the decision, including: (a) Have the acknowledged problem areas been reported on before and to what extent has there been attempts to make the process work as designed? (b) Is there a process with similar requirements that can be compared to the one being examined but is implemented in a way that provides significantly better results? and (c) Do the areas being considered have an established counterpart in the private or public sector that will provide evidence of the benefits of a new process? (5) a best practices review can be applied to a variety of processes such as payroll, travel administration, employee training, accounting and budget systems, procurement, transportation, maintenance services, repair services, and distribution; (6) the decision to use a best practices review should be made in a larger context that considers the strategic objectives of the organization and then look at the processes and operating units that contribute to those objectives asking questions like: what drives the costs in a particular process; and is the process effective in achieving its goals; (7) it is important that the entire process be considered rather than just part of the process; (8) failing to capture the entire process may push costs into another section of the process or create an improvement that is inhibited by trying to marry old ways with new ways that are in conflict with each other; and (9) not everything can be looked at so, at least initially, a process which is about ready to accept change should be selected.

gao_GAO-16-373

gao_GAO-16-373_0

VCL Workload and Funding Obligations The number of calls reaching the VCL has increased substantially since the VCL’s first full year of operation. Extended Call Wait Times Were Uncommon in July and August 2015, but VA Did Not Meet Its Call Response Time Goals and Some Text Messages Did Not Receive Responses VA Responded to Most Calls within 30 Seconds in July and August 2015, but Did Not Meet Its Goal to Answer 90 Percent of Calls within 30 Seconds at the VCL Primary Center To determine how well VA performed against its goal for responding to VCL callers, we covertly tested the VCL’s call response time in July and August 2015. On the basis of our test calls, we estimate that during July and August 2015 about 73 percent of all VCL calls were answered at the VCL primary center within 30 seconds. These VA-reported results indicate that about 65 to 75 percent of VCL calls were answered within either 30 or 60 seconds. VA officials told us that they do not monitor and test the timeliness and performance of the VCL text messaging system, but rather rely solely on the VCL’s text messaging service provider for such monitoring and testing. They said that the provider had not reported any issues with this system. According to the provider, no routine testing of the VCL’s text messaging system is conducted. Without routinely testing its text messaging system, or ensuring that its provider tests the system, VA cannot ensure that it is identifying limitations with its text messaging service and resolving them to provide consistent, reliable service to veterans. VA Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Monitoring of VCL Primary Center Performance but Has Not Established Targets and Time Frames for VCL Key Performance Indicators VA Established a Call Center Evaluation Team, Implemented Revised Responder Performance Standards, and Analyzed VCL Caller Complaints VA has sought to enhance its capabilities for overseeing VCL primary center operations through a number of activities—including establishing a call center evaluation team, implementing revised performance standards for VCL primary center responders, implementing silent monitoring of VCL primary center responders, and analyzing VCL caller complaints. In October 2014, VA created a mechanism for tracking complaints it receives from VCL callers and external parties, such as members of Congress and veterans, about the performance of the VCL primary and backup call centers. For example, for VA’s key performance indicator for the percentage of calls answered by the VCL, the department did not include a date by which it would expect the VCL to complete this action. For example, the contract did not include any information on several key aspects of VCL backup call center performance, including: (1) the percentage of VCL calls routed to each VCL backup call center that should be answered, (2) VA’s expectations on whether or not VCL backup call centers could use voice answering systems or caller queues for VCL calls, and (3) VA’s documentation requirements for VCL calls answered at the VCL backup call centers. VA and SAMHSA Do Not Collect Information Needed to Assess How Often and Why Callers Do Not Reach the VCL We found that when callers do not press “1” during the initial Lifeline greeting, their calls may take longer to answer than if the caller had pressed “1” and been routed to either the VCL primary center or a VCL backup call center. In addition, SAMHSA officials said that they also do not collect this information. VA has developed additional plans to address other concerns with VCL operations. VA officials said they anticipate that the second phase will be completed in fiscal year 2017. In February 2016, VA officials told us that they are considering implementing this type of queue. Despite efforts to coordinate the operations of the VCL and Lifeline through an interagency agreement, VA and SAMHSA have not collected information necessary to determine how often and why veterans intending to reach the VCL reach Lifeline instead. As a result, neither VA nor SAMHSA can assess the extent this occurs and the underlying causes that may need to be addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action To improve the timeliness and quality of VCL responses to veterans and others, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions: regularly test the VCL’s text messaging system to identify issues and correct them promptly; and document clearly stated and measurable targets and time frames for key performance indicators needed to assess VCL performance. We further recommend that under the applicable terms of their interagency agreement, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Under Secretary for Health and the Administrator of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), respectively, to collaborate and take the following two actions: collect information on how often and why callers intending to reach the VCL instead reach Lifeline local crisis centers; and review the information collected and, if necessary, develop plans to address the underlying causes. These VA and HHS actions, if implemented effectively, would address the intent of our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Testing VCL Response Times To determine the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) meets response-time goals for calls, online chats, and text messages received through the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), we conducted several tests of VCL services during July and August 2015. The VCL is accessed by calling a single national toll-free number—1-800-273-TALK (8255)—shared by both the VCL and the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (Lifeline).

Why GAO Did This Study VA established the VCL in July 2007 to provide support to veterans in emotional crisis. Between fiscal years 2008, its first full year of operation, and 2015, the number of calls received by the VCL increased almost 700 percent, exceeding VA's expectations. As VA began to address increasing numbers of requests for assistance, reports of dissatisfaction with VCL's service periodically appeared in the media. GAO was asked to review VA's administration of the VCL. This report, among other issues, examines (1) the extent to which VA meets response-time goals for VCL calls and text messages, (2) how VA monitors VCL primary center call center operations, and (3) how VA works with VCL service partners to help ensure veterans receive high-quality service. GAO visited the VCL's primary center and two backup call centers; tested VCL response time through a generalizable sample of covert telephone calls and a nongeneralizable sample of text messages in July and August 2015; reviewed internal reports and policies and plans; and interviewed VA and SAMHSA officials. What GAO Found GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) did not meet its call response time goals for the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), although extended call wait times were not common. VA's goal is to answer 90 percent of VCL calls at the VCL primary center within 30 seconds. Currently, calls not answered within 30 seconds route to VCL backup call centers; however, for 5 months of fiscal year 2015, calls were routed to VCL backup call centers after 60 seconds. VA officials told GAO that VA data show about 65 to 75 percent of VCL calls were answered at the VCL primary center in fiscal year 2015 within either 30 or 60 seconds. GAO's covert testing in July and August 2015 confirms VA's data. Specifically, 119 covert test calls show that an estimated 73 percent of calls made during this period were answered within 30 seconds. GAO also estimates that 99 percent of all VCL calls during this period were answered within 120 seconds. GAO also covertly tested the VCL's text messaging services and found that 4 of 14 GAO test text messages did not receive responses. VA officials said they do not monitor or test the timeliness and performance of the VCL text message system and instead rely solely on the VCL's text messaging provider for these functions. VA officials told GAO that the provider had not reported any issues with the system, but the provider told GAO that routine testing of the VCL system is not conducted. Without routinely testing its text messaging system or ensuring that its provider does so, VA cannot identify limitations to this service. While VA has taken a number of steps to improve its monitoring of the VCL primary center operations, VA has not developed measurable targets and time frames for its key performance indicators, such as the program's percentage of abandoned calls. VA established a permanent VCL call center evaluation team and created a mechanism for tracking complaints about the performance of the VCL primary center from VCL callers or external parties. However, GAO found that VA has not specified quantifiable or otherwise measurable targets and has not included dates for when it would expect the VCL to complete actions covered by each key performance indicator. This is inconsistent with guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, VA cannot ensure that the VCL is providing consistent, high-quality services to callers and cannot effectively track and publicly report progress or results. VA established an interagency agreement with its service partner, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), to manage the shared operations of the VCL and the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (Lifeline), which include a single national toll-free number used by both. Despite these efforts to coordinate, VA and SAMHSA do not collect information needed to assess how often and why callers intending to reach the VCL do not follow voice prompts and instead reach Lifeline local crisis centers. VA officials told GAO that the type of information that would be needed to do so is not collected because VA has focused on addressing the concerns of those callers who did reach the VCL. In addition, SAMHSA officials said that they do not require Lifeline local crisis centers to collect this type of information, noting that it would be possible to collect it. As a result, VA and SAMHSA do not know the extent to which this occurs and cannot determine the underlying causes that may need to be addressed. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that VA regularly test VCL's text messaging system and document targets and time frames for key performance indicators. GAO also recommends that VA and SAMHSA collect information on how often and why callers reach Lifeline when intending to reach the VCL, review this information, and, if necessary, develop plans to address the causes. VA and HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and described planned actions to address them.

gao_GAO-09-584

gao_GAO-09-584_0

Free and Reduced-price School Meals for Low- Income Students The majority of the meals served through the NSLP and SBP are provided for free or at a reduced price to low-income students. Student Meal Fees and Federal Reimbursements in a District ERP Program While a typical school district participating in the NSLP or SBP collects fees from eligible students who receive reduced-price meals, districts with ERP programs have chosen to provide free meals to reduced-price-eligible students and bear the cost of the reduced-price fees that these students otherwise would have paid (for a comparison of fees and reimbursements for districts with and without an ERP lunch program, see fig. Some States and Districts Eliminated the Reduced-price Fee to Increase Participation or Reduce Hunger Acting on their own initiative, at least 5 states and 35 school districts eliminated the reduced-price fee for breakfast, lunch, or both meals in school year 2008-2009, primarily to increase participation or reduce hunger. One State and Most Districts That Eliminated the Reduced-price Fee Reported Increased Participation, Which Partially Offset Program Costs One State and Most Districts with ERP Programs Reported Increased Participation, and Most Districts Observed No Effect on Administrative Errors One state official and SFA officials in most districts we surveyed reported that their ERP programs have increased the rate of participation among students who are eligible for reduced-price meals. Further, in the four districts that implemented their ERP programs in school year 2007-2008 and provided participation data—2 of these districts had ERP programs for breakfast and lunch, and 2 districts limited their ERP programs to breakfast—the increase in the breakfast participation rate (2 to 11 percentage points) and lunch participation rate (7 to 10 percentage points) among reduced-price-eligible students was greater than the national change in these participation rates (less than a 1 percentage point change each for breakfast and lunch). While increased federal reimbursements partially offset program costs for the state and district ERP programs that experienced increased participation, all 5 state ERP programs used state appropriations to cover their remaining program costs, and districts used a variety of revenue sources to manage their remaining program costs. Supportive State Legislators and District School Boards Helped Establish ERP Programs, but Fiscal Challenges Could Hinder Program Continuation Support from State Legislators, Nonprofit Organizations, District School Boards, and Superintendents Helped Establish ERP Programs Supportive legislators and nonprofit organizations played a major role in establishing ERP programs at the state level, and support from school boards and superintendents was a major factor in establishing programs at the district level. Officials from all 5 state programs indicated that dedicated state appropriations were a primary source of ERP funding, and officials from four of these states indicated that a loss of state funding would be a threat to the continuation of their programs. USDA did not provide written comments. However, FNS provided us with technical comments that helped clarify our report’s findings, which we incorporated where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To provide a better understanding of the experiences of states and school districts with programs that eliminated the reduced-price fee (known as ERP programs), this report presents information on the following questions: (1) What is known about the state and local jurisdictions that have eliminated the reduced-price fee for the school lunch or breakfast programs? Survey of District-level SFA Officials We also conducted a Web-based survey of SFA officials in 51 school districts initially identified as having implemented these programs. Because the universe of districts with ERP programs is unknown, the results of our survey cannot be generalized to all districts with ERP programs. The questionnaire asked SFA officials about the number of students eligible for reduced-price meals; the meals and grades covered by the ERP programs; the reasons they implemented these programs; the duration of these programs; the effects of the programs on participation, errors, and costs; the factors that helped or hindered program implementation; and whether or not they plan to continue the ERP programs in the future.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2008, about 31 million children participated in the National School Lunch Program and more than 10 million children participated in the School Breakfast Program each school day. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) spent $11.7 billion on the school meal programs in that year. The majority of school meals are provided for free or at a reduced price to low-income students. Some states and school districts have chosen to implement programs that eliminate the reduced-price fee (known as ERP programs) and instead provide free meals to students eligible for the reduced fee. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) what is known about the states and districts that have eliminated the reduced-price fee for school meals, (2) the experiences of states and districts that have ERP programs with respect to participation, errors, and costs, and (3) the factors that may help or hinder the establishment or continuation of ERP programs. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed FNS officials, interviewed officials from state- and district-level programs, and conducted a Web-based survey of the 35 districts identified as having ERP programs. However, because the universe of ERP programs is unknown, survey results cannot be generalized to all districts with ERP programs. USDA did not provide formal written comments, but FNS provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. What GAO Found GAO identified 5 states and an additional 35 school districts in 19 other states that eliminated the reduced-price fee for school meals, primarily to increase participation or reduce hunger. States and districts eliminated reduced-price fees for either breakfast or lunch or, in some cases, for both meals. Further, some ERP programs included all grades, and some covered only the early school years. One state- and most district-level officials GAO interviewed or surveyed reported that ERP programs have increased the rate of participation among students who are eligible for reduced-price meals. Participation may increase for a number of reasons; however, for those districts that implemented ERP programs in the most recently completed school year (2007-2008) and provided participation data, their average increase in the participation rate among reduced-price-eligible students was greater than the national change in this rate over the same year. ERP programs involve additional costs to states and districts, as they bear the cost of the reduced-price fees that these students otherwise would have paid. For the state and district ERP programs that experienced increased participation, FNS reimbursements, and thus federal costs, also increased. While the increased reimbursements partially offset program costs, state ERP programs covered their remaining costs with state funds and districts used a variety of revenue sources. The majority of district-level officials reported that their districts experienced benefits from the ERP programs, such as a decrease in the burden on staff to collect unpaid meal fees from reduced-price-eligible students who received school meals but who charged these meals and built up a balance of unpaid meal fees. State officials GAO interviewed cited support from legislators and nonprofit organizations in establishing ERP programs in state law. Supportive school boards and superintendents were a major factor in establishing district-level programs. Most state officials indicated that a loss of state funding would threaten program continuation, while some district-level officials indicated they would try to raise additional revenue or reduce expenditures to cover program costs. As of late 2008, officials from all 5 states and most district-level ERP programs planned to continue their programs.

gao_GAO-05-611

gao_GAO-05-611_0

1). To conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and force-on-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are ready to perform their mission of protecting the site’s special nuclear material. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment Requirements We Reviewed As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported problems with their radio communications systems. Site security officials at two sites acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio communications equipment. DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008 To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the transformation of current protective forces into an “elite force,” the development and deployment of new security technologies, the consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. The department believes technologies can reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and provide additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Such an approach will need to include a comprehensive plan for all of the initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to be supported by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have Category I special nuclear material. To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting DOE’s existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to determine current requirements. We conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at the five ESE sites. To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE’s implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and associated guidance documents.

Why GAO Did This Study A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008. What GAO Found Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"--modeled on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.

gao_GAO-05-968

gao_GAO-05-968_0

Background To be eligible for Medicaid, individuals must be within certain eligibility categories, such as children or those who are aged or disabled. In most states, to be financially eligible for Medicaid long-term care services, an individual must have $2,000 or less in countable resources ($3,000 for a couple). For all elderly households, the higher their asset levels, the more likely they were to have reported transferring cash to another individual. Overall, severely disabled elderly households—those reporting three or more limitations in ADLs—were less likely to transfer cash than nondisabled elderly households. Greatest Proportion of Elderly Had Incomes of $50,000 or Less and Nonhousing Resources below $100,000 According to data from the 2002 HRS, total income for the nation’s approximately 28 million elderly households was $1.1 trillion and total nonhousing resources were $6.6 trillion. Approximately 80 percent of elderly households had annual incomes of $50,000 or less. Elderly Households’ Level of Assets Varied Depending on Level of Disability, Marital Status, and Gender Disabled elderly households—which are at higher risk of needing long- term care—had lower levels of assets than nondisabled elderly households. Approximately 6 million, or about 22 percent, of all elderly households reported transferring cash during the 2 years prior to the HRS survey. Other methods, however, could result in a penalty period, depending on the specific arrangements made and the policies of the individual state. Other Methods to Reduce Assets Could Delay Medicaid Coverage for Long-Term Care Services Some of the other methods elderly individuals use to reduce their countable assets could result in a penalty period and thus could delay Medicaid coverage for long-term care services, according to the elder law attorneys and state and federal officials we contacted. Gifts. Financial Instruments. Transfer of Property Ownership. The nine states we reviewed generally relied on applicants’ self-reporting of financial information and varied in the amount of documentation they required and in the extent to which they verified the assets reported. According to officials in these states, transfers that were not reported by applicants were difficult to identify. States Reviewed Did Not Systematically Track and Analyze Applicants’ Transfers of Assets Although officials from the nine states reviewed reported that some individuals transferred assets for purposes of qualifying for Medicaid, these states did not systematically track and analyze data on the incidence of asset transfers or associated penalties. Nationwide, States Request Information on Assets and Transfers of Assets as Part of the Medicaid Application Process Nationwide, states used the application process—application forms, interviews, or both—to determine the level of assets held by Medicaid applicants and whether applicants transferred assets. CMS Provides Guidance on Transfers of Assets through the State Medicaid Manual and in Response to Specific Questions from States To help states comply with requirements related to asset transfers and Medicaid, CMS has issued guidance primarily through the State Medicaid Manual. The portion of the manual relating to asset transfers and trusts generally includes definitions of relevant terms, such as assets, income, and resources; information on look-back periods; penalty periods and penalties for transfers of less than fair market value; exceptions to the application of such penalties; and spousal impoverishment provisions. CMS has provided additional guidance to states about asset transfers through conferences and one special study: Conferences. In 2005, the agency released a report that examined the use of annuities as a means for individuals to shelter assets to become Medicaid-eligible. CMS central office officials said that the agency faces challenges in issuing guidance that would be applicable to all situations given the constantly changing methods individuals use to transfer assets in a manner that avoids the imposition of a penalty period. CMS acknowledged, however, the difficulty of gathering data on the extent and cost of asset transfers to the Medicaid program.

Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2004, the Medicaid program financed about $93 billion for long-term care services. To qualify for Medicaid, individuals' assets (income and resources) must be below certain limits. Because long-term care services can be costly, those who pay privately may quickly deplete their assets and become eligible for Medicaid. In some cases, individuals might transfer assets to spouses or other family members to become financially eligible for Medicaid. Those who transfer assets for less than fair market value may be subject to a penalty period that can delay their eligibility for Medicaid. GAO was asked to provide data on transfers of assets. GAO reviewed (1) the level of assets held and transferred by the elderly, (2) methods used to transfer assets that may result in penalties, (3) how states determined financial eligibility for Medicaid long-term care, and (4) guidance the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has provided states regarding the treatment of asset transfers. GAO analyzed data on levels of assets and cash transfers made by the elderly from the 2002 Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a national panel survey; analyzed states' Medicaid applications; and interviewed officials from nine states about their eligibility determination processes. What GAO Found In 2002, over 80 percent of the approximately 28 million elderly households (those where at least one person was aged 65 or over) had annual incomes of $50,000 or less, and about one-half had nonhousing resources, which excluded the primary residence, of $50,000 or less. About 6 million elderly households (22 percent) reported transferring cash, with amounts that varied depending on the households' income and resource levels. In general, the higher the household's asset level, the more likely it was to have transferred cash during the 2 years prior to the HRS study. Overall, disabled elderly households--who are at higher risk of needing long-term care--were less likely to transfer cash than nondisabled elderly households. Certain methods to reduce assets, such as spending money to pay off debt or make home modifications, do not result in penalty periods. Other methods, such as giving gifts, transferring property ownership, and using certain financial instruments, could result in penalty periods, depending on state policy and the specific arrangements made. None of the nine states GAO contacted tracked or analyzed data on asset transfers or penalties applied. These states required applicants to provide documentation of assets but varied in the amount of documentation required and the extent to which they verified the assets reported. These states generally relied on applicants' self-reporting of transfers of assets, and officials from these states informed GAO that transfers not reported were difficult to identify. To help states comply with requirements related to asset transfers, CMS has issued guidance primarily through the State Medicaid Manual. CMS released a special study in 2005 to help states address the issue of using annuities as a means of sheltering assets. Additionally, CMS officials provide ongoing technical assistance in response to state questions, but noted the challenge of issuing guidance applicable to all situations given the constantly changing methods used to transfer assets in an attempt to avoid a penalty period. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS noted the complexity of the current law and commented that data on the precise extent and cost of asset transfers to the Medicaid program have been difficult to gather.

gao_AIMD-98-93

gao_AIMD-98-93_0

FAA Has Fielded Some Equipment but Key Projects Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems The Congress has appropriated over $25 billion for ATC modernization between fiscal years 1982 and 1998. FAA has fielded some equipment, most recently a new voice communications system. However, delays in other projects have caused the agency to implement costly interim projects. III for data on changes in their cost and schedules.) Major Acquisitions Continue to Face Delays and Cost Increases Two key components of the modernization effort—the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)—have encountered delays and cost increases. In developing WAAS, FAA has also encountered delays. FAA Has Begun to Implement Recommendations to Correct Root Causes of Modernization Problems Our reviews have identified some of the root causes of long-standing problems with FAA’s modernization and have recommended solutions to them. A Complete Systems Architecture Is Key to Guiding and Constraining ATC Modernization Investments FAA has proceeded to modernize its many ATC systems without the benefits of a complete systems architecture, or overall blueprint, to guide their development and evolution. We identified shortcomings in two main areas. FAA concurred with part of our recommendation and has initiated efforts to improve its software acquisition processes. FAA Is Revising the Modernization Program and Implementing Acquisition Reform but Faces New Challenges While FAA is involving external and internal stakeholders in revising its approach to the modernization program, it will need to stay focused on implementing solutions to the root causes of past problems, ensure that all aspects of its acquisition management system are effectively implemented, and quickly address the looming crisis with the year 2000 date requirements. FAA faces both opportunities and challenges as it revises the modernization program. Urgent Action Needed to Ensure Computers Recognize the Year 2000 On January 1, 2000, computer systems worldwide could malfunction or produce inaccurate information simply because the century has changed.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) program to modernize its National Airspace System (NAS), focusing on: (1) the status of key modernization projects; (2) FAA's actions to implement recommendations to correct modernization problems; and (3) the opportunities and challenges facing FAA as it embarks upon its new modernization approach. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) since 1982, Congress has appropriated over $25 billion to the modernization program; (2) while FAA has fielded some equipment, historically, the agency has experienced considerable difficulty in delivering systems with promised cost and schedule parameters; (3) as a result, FAA has been forced to implement costly interim projects; (4) meanwhile, two key systems--the Wide Area Augmentation System and the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System--have encountered cost increases and schedule delays; (5) GAO's work has pinpointed the root causes of FAA's modernization problems and has recommended actions to overcome them; (6) most recently, GAO found shortcomings in the areas of systems architecture or the overall modernization blueprint, cost estimating and accounting, software acquisition, and organizational culture; (7) although FAA has begun to implement many of GAO's recommendations, sustained management attention is required to improve the management of the modernization program; (8) FAA is collaborating with and seeking commitment from users in developing a new approach to make the modernization less costly and to provide earlier user benefits; (9) the challenge for FAA is to have disciplined processes in place in order to deliver projects as promised; and (10) FAA will also need to quickly address the looming year 2000 computer crisis to ensure that critical air traffic control systems do not malfunction or produce inaccurate information simply because the date has changed.

gao_GAO-02-927T

gao_GAO-02-927T_0

Under the proposed legislation, the Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating the federal government’s civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. In our view, the proposed legislation should also specify that a role of the new department will be to develop collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—to ensure that users’ needs and research efforts are linked. Moreover, the proposed legislation, as written, is unclear about the new department’s role in developing standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies to address terrorist threats. Opportunities to Improve Existing Legislative Proposal Although the proposed legislation states that the new department will be responsible for developing national policy and coordinating research and development, it has a number of limitations that could weaken its effectiveness. The proposed transfer of some DOE research and development efforts to the Department of Homeland Security also does not eliminate potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration. Transferring Certain Activities of DOE to the Department of Homeland Security Raises Concerns Under Title III of the proposed legislation, a number of DOE programs and activities would be transferred to the new department. Another program that we believe could be appropriately transferred to the new department is the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML), located in New York City. Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities.

What GAO Found Title III of the proposed Department of Homeland Security legislation would task the new department with developing national policy and coordinating the federal government's research and development efforts for responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and development programs and other activities, including those of the Department of Energy (DOE). If properly implemented, this proposed legislation could lead to a more efficient, effective and coordinated research effort that would provide technology to protect our people, borders, and critical infrastructure. However, the proposed legislation does not specify that a critical role of the new department will be to establish collaborative relationships with programs at all levels of government and to develop a strategic plan for research and development to implement the national policy it is charged with developing. In addition, the proposed legislation is not clear on the role of the new department in setting standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies so that users can be confident that the technologies they are purchasing will perform as intended. Some of the proposed transfers of activities from DOE to the new department are appropriate, such as the DOE's nuclear threat assessment program and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory. However, the transfer of some DOE research and development activities may complicate research now being done to accomplish multiple purposes.

gao_GAO-05-571T

gao_GAO-05-571T_0

In that budget, OMB stated that, of approximately 1,200 major IT projects, about half—621 projects, representing about $22 billion—were on a Management Watch List. OMB Established Processes and Criteria for Identifying Weak Projects, but It Did Not Use an Aggregate List to Perform Its Analysis or Oversight According to OMB officials, including the Deputy Administrator of OIRA and the Chief of the Information Technology and Policy Branch, OMB staff identified projects for the Management Watch List through their evaluation of the exhibit 300s that agencies submit for major IT projects as part of the budget development process. According to OMB management, individual analysts were responsible for evaluating projects and determining which projects met the criteria to be on the Management Watch List for their assigned agencies. To derive the total number of projects on the list that were reported for fiscal year 2005, OMB polled the individual analysts and compiled the numbers. OMB officials said that they did not aggregate these projects into a single list describing projects and their weaknesses, because they did not see such an activity as necessary in performing OMB’s predominant mission. Nevertheless, OMB has not fully exploited the opportunity to use its Management Watch List as a tool for analyzing IT investments on a governmentwide basis. OMB’s Monitoring of Projects Was Inconsistent, and Agency Follow- up Activities Were Not Tracked Centrally OMB asked agencies to take corrective actions to address weaknesses associated with projects on the Management Watch List, but it did not develop a structured, consistent process or criteria for deciding how to follow up on these actions. Accordingly, OMB could not readily tell us which of the 621 watch list projects for fiscal year 2005 were followed up on, nor could it use the list to describe the relationship between its follow-up activities and the changes in the numbers of projects on the watch list between fiscal year 2005 (621 projects) and fiscal year 2006 (342 projects). In addition, major projects with significant management deficiencies may have continued to absorb critical agency resources. Without tracking specific follow-up activities, OMB could not readily ascertain whether the risks that it identified through its Management Watch List were being managed effectively; if they were not, funds were potentially being spent on poorly planned and managed projects. However, the office has not taken the next step—to develop a single, aggregate list identifying the projects and their weaknesses—and it has not developed a structured, consistent process for deciding how to follow up on corrective actions. Developing an aggregated list would help OMB to realize more fully the potential benefits of using the Management Watch List as a tool for monitoring and analyzing IT investments governmentwide. ● Analyze the prioritized list to develop governmentwide and agency assessments of the progress and risks of IT investments, identifying opportunities for continued improvement. ● Report to the Congress on progress made in addressing risks of major IT investments and management areas needing attention. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB’s Administrator of the Office of E-Government and Information Technology expressed appreciation for our review of OMB’s use of its Management Watch List. Nonetheless, based on OMB’s inability to easily report which of the 621 investments on the Management Watch List remained deficient or how much of the $22 billion cited in the President’s Budget remained at risk, we continue to believe that an aggregate list would facilitate OMB’s ability to track progress.

Why GAO Did This Study Federal spending on information technology (IT) is over $60 billion this year and is expected to continue to rise. Accordingly, it is essential that federal IT investments are managed efficiently. Of the 1,200 major IT projects in the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, OMB stated that it had placed about half--621 projects, representing about $22 billion--on a Management Watch List to focus attention on mission-critical IT investments that need management improvements. GAO was asked to testify on the findings and recommendations made in a report that it recently completed (GAO-05-276), which describes and assesses OMB's processes for (1) placing projects on its Management Watch List and (2) following up on corrective actions established for projects on the list. What GAO Found For the fiscal year 2005 budget, OMB developed processes and criteria for including investments on its Management Watch List. In doing so, it identified opportunities to strengthen investments and promote improvements in IT management. However, it did not develop a single, aggregate list identifying the projects and their weaknesses. Instead, OMB officials told GAO that to identify projects with weaknesses, individual analysts used scoring criteria that the office established for evaluating the justifications for funding that federal agencies submit for major projects. These analysts, each of whom is typically responsible for several federal agencies, were then responsible for maintaining information on these projects. To derive the total number of projects on the list for fiscal year 2005, the office polled its individual analysts and compiled the result. However, OMB officials told GAO that because they did not see such an activity as necessary, they did not compile a single list. Accordingly, OMB has not fully exploited the opportunity to use its watch list as a tool for analyzing IT investments on a governmentwide basis. OMB asked agencies to take corrective actions to address weaknesses associated with projects on the Management Watch List, but it did not develop a structured, consistent process for deciding how to monitor agency corrective actions. According to OMB officials, decisions on monitoring of progress were typically made by the staff with responsibility for reviewing individual agency budget submissions, depending on the staff's insights into agency operations and objectives. Because it did not consistently require or monitor agency follow-up activities, OMB did not know whether the project risks that it identified through its Management Watch List were being managed effectively, potentially leaving resources at risk of being committed to poorly planned and managed projects. In addition, because it did not consistently monitor the follow-up performed on projects on the Management Watch List, OMB could not readily tell GAO which of the 621 projects received follow-up attention. To help enable OMB to take advantage of the potential benefits of using the Management Watch List as a tool for analyzing and following up on investments, GAO's report included recommendations that OMB develop a single, aggregate Management Watch List and that it develop and use criteria for prioritizing and monitoring the projects on the list. GAO also recommended that the office use the prioritized list for reporting to the Congress as part of its statutory reporting responsibilities. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB did not agree that the aggregated governmentwide list recommended by GAO is necessary for adequate oversight and management. However, GAO continues to believe that an aggregated Management Watch List would contribute to OMB's ability to analyze IT investments governmentwide and track progress in addressing deficiencies.

gao_T-NSIAD-98-88

gao_T-NSIAD-98-88_0

They found that research efforts to determine the causes of the veterans’ illnesses were hampered by incomplete data on (1) the names and locations of deployed personnel, (2) the exposure of personnel to environmental health hazards, (3) changes in the health status of personnel while deployed, and (4) immunizations and other health services for personnel while deployed. Subsequently, in May 1997, we reviewed the actions DOD had taken since the Gulf War to improve its medical surveillance capabilities. DOD and VA Had No Systematic Approach to Monitoring Gulf War Veterans’ Health After Initial Examination DOD and VA officials claimed that regardless of the cause of Gulf War veterans’ illnesses, the veterans had received appropriate and effective symptomatic treatment. Beyond the initial examination, neither DOD nor VA had mechanisms for monitoring the quality, appropriateness, or effectiveness of these veterans’ care or clinical progress, and they had no plans to establish such mechanisms. Aside from the hypotheses being emphasized in the research being done, we found that the bulk of ongoing federal research on Gulf War veterans’ illnesses was focused on the epidemiological study of the prevalence and cause of the illnesses. Support for Key Government Conclusions Was Weak or Subject to Alternative Interpretations Six years after the war, little was conclusively known about the causes of Gulf War veterans’ illnesses. The magnitude of exposures to chemical agents has not been fully resolved. Third, many Army personnel did not receive required postdeployment medical assessments. In our report on the deployment and medical records for servicemembers deployed to Bosnia, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, along with the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands, as appropriate, to expeditiously complete and implement a DOD-wide policy on medical surveillance for all major deployments of U.S. forces, using lessons learned during Operation Joint Endeavor and the Gulf War; develop procedures to ensure that medical surveillance policies are implemented, to include emphasizing (a) the need for unit commanders to ensure that all servicemembers receive required medical assessments in a timely manner and (b) the need for medical personnel to maintain complete and accurate medical records; and develop procedures for providing accurate and complete medical assessment information to the centralized database. It is important to note that GAO has not evaluated DOD’s, VA’s, and the PGVCB’s proposed plans regarding the treatment and research for Gulf War veterans’ illnesses.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed two of its recent reports on health care issues of military personnel deployed for military operations overseas, focusing on the: (1) adequacy of the mechanisms used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to monitor the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of Gulf War veterans' care and to follow up on their clinical progress over time; (2) government's research strategy for studying Gulf War veterans' illnesses and the methodological problems posed in its studies; (3) consistency of key officials conclusions with available data on the causes of the Gulf War veterans' illnesses; and (4) extent to which DOD's efforts for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia were successful in overcoming the medical surveillance problems encountered during the Gulf War. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) in it's report on Gulf War veterans' illnesses, GAO noted that while DOD and VA had provided care to eligible Gulf War veterans, they had no system for following up on their health to determine the effectiveness of their care after initial treatment; (2) also, because of methodological problems and incomplete medical records on the veterans, research has not come close to providing conclusive answers on the causes of the illnesses; (3) given the data needed versus what is available, which is primarily anecdotal, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine the causes of the illnesses; (4) the support for some official conclusions regarding stress, leishmaniasis, and exposure to chemical agents were weak or subject to other interpretations; and (5) regarding GAO's report on the medical surveillance of servicemembers deployed in Bosnia, while GAO found that DOD had improved its capability to monitor and assess the effects of deployments on servicemembers' health since the Gulf War, certain problems remained: (a) the database containing deployment information was inaccurate; (b) not all troops received postdeployment medical assessments; and (c) many of the medical records GAO reviewed were incomplete.

gao_GAO-10-84

gao_GAO-10-84_0

The Trust Has Taken Steps to Achieve the Preservation Act’s Goals but Has Made Less Progress Than Expected Although the Trust has taken steps to establish and implement a number of programs and activities to achieve the goals of the Preservation Act, it is behind the schedule it set for itself in 2004. A number of factors, such as high turnover among Board members and key management staff, have contributed to this slow progress, according to former and current Board members and staff. 2). The Trust Has Taken Its First Steps toward Becoming Financially Self-Sustaining The Preservation Act’s findings and purposes section states, among other things, that the Baca Ranch could serve as a model for sustainable land development and use of timber, grazing, and recreation and that management of the ranch through a trust would eventually allow the ranch to become financially self-sustaining. Over its existence, the Trust recognized it had no marketable timber, but it has experimented with a number of grazing options and expanded recreational opportunities. Thus, at the close of fiscal year 2009, the Trust continued to work mostly on phase 1 of its programs and activities—at least 5 years behind its anticipated schedule (see fig. In addition, according to the Trust’s Board and staff, they discovered upon assuming their responsibilities that the preserve’s cultural and natural resources and infrastructure were not as healthy or robust as they had expected or as described in the opening to the Preservation Act. The Trust Has Failed to Put in Place Key Elements of an Effective Management Program As of September 2009, the Trust had yet to develop and put in place several key elements of an effective management control program for a government corporation, as required under GPRA and as we recommended in our previous report. Additionally, the Trust’s financial management has been weak. Consequently, it has been difficult for Congress and the public to understand the Trust’s long- term goals and objectives, annual plans and performance, or progress. Nevertheless, the Trust is continuing to explore opportunities for becoming financially self-sustaining. Identifying, developing, or expanding revenue-generating activities that would enable the Trust to raise sufficient funds to become financially self- sustaining. Obtaining funding for major capital investments to construct and preserve facilities and other infrastructure needed to generate revenues. Legal constraints. Provisions of the Preservation Act—specifically, that the Trust expires in 2020 and that it is prohibited from entering into leases lasting longer than 10 years—limit the Trust’s ability to attract concessionaires or other enterprises desiring to establish long-term businesses on the preserve that could generate revenue for the Trust. We therefore reiterate the need for the Trust to fully implement recommendations from our 2005 report, specifically, continue to develop—and systematically implement—the following elements of effective management: a formal strategic plan that includes measurable goals and objectives; a plan, including planned timelines, for becoming financially self- mechanisms for periodic monitoring and reporting of the Trust’s performance to Congress and other stakeholders.

Why GAO Did This Study In creating the Valles Caldera National Preserve from a unique parcel of land in north-central New Mexico, and by creating the Valles Caldera Trust as a wholly owned government corporation to manage the preserve, the Valles Caldera Preservation Act of 2000 established a 20-year public-private experiment to operate the preserve without continued federal funding. The Trust is charged with achieving a number of goals, including becoming financially self-sustaining by the end of fiscal year 2015. This report, GAO's second and last mandated by the Preservation Act, examines (1) the Trust's progress since 2000; (2) the extent to which the Trust has fulfilled certain of its obligations as a government corporation; and (3) the challenges the Trust faces to achieve the Preservation Act's goals. GAO analyzed documents, financial records, and other Trust information and interviewed current and former members of the Trust's Board and staff, as well as representatives of local interest groups and stakeholders. What GAO Found The Trust has taken steps to establish and implement a number of programs and activities to achieve the goals of the Preservation Act. It has rehabilitated roads, buildings, fences, and other infrastructure; created a science program; experimented with a variety of grazing options; taken steps to manage its forests; expanded recreational opportunities; and taken its first steps toward becoming financially self-sustaining. Nevertheless, it is at least 5 years behind the schedule it set for itself in 2004. According to Trust officials, a number of factors--including high turnover among Board members and key staff and cultural and natural resources and infrastructure that were not as healthy or robust as originally believed--have delayed its progress. Through fiscal year 2009, the Trust had yet to develop and put in place several key elements of an effective management control program for a government corporation. Specifically, the Trust lacked a strategic plan and annual performance plans, and it had not systematically monitored or reported on its progress--elements called for by the Government Performance and Results Act and recommended by GAO in its first report in 2005. The Trust's financial management has also been weak. Consequently, it has been difficult for Congress and the public to understand the Trust's goals and objectives, annual plans and performance, or progress. According to current Trust officials, becoming financially self-sustaining, particularly by the end of fiscal year 2015 when federal appropriations are due to expire, is the Trust's biggest challenge. Most of the Trust's other challenges follow from this one, including identifying, developing, or expanding revenue-generating activities that would enable the Trust to raise sufficient funds; obtaining funds for major capital investments; and addressing a number of legal constraints--such as its authority to enter into long-term leases or acquire property--which potentially limit its ability to attract long-term businesses that could generate revenues. Nevertheless, the Trust is continuing to explore opportunities for becoming financially self-sustaining.

gao_GAO-09-996T

gao_GAO-09-996T_0

Cities and States Would Likely Request Federal Assistance for Cleanup of Radiation- Contaminated Areas after RDD and IND Incidents, but Limited Federal Planning Exists for Recovering from Such Incidents While state and local government responders would be expected to respond first to a terrorist incident within their jurisdiction, they would also expect that the federal government would be prepared to provide the necessary assistance for them to expedite the recovery from such an incident. Emergency management officials from 13 cities and the majority of their respective states indicated in our survey that they would rely on the federal government to conduct and fund all or almost all analysis and cleanup activities associated with recovering from an RDD or IND incident of the magnitude described in the National Planning Scenarios. Despite the anticipated reliance by city and state governments on the federal government for analysis and cleanup activities following an RDD or IND incident, FEMA has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy or related plans to guide involvement of federal agencies in these recovery activities, as directed by federal law and executive guidance. To date, much federal attention has been given to developing a response framework, with less attention to recovery. Moreover, DOE, EPA and DOD are developing more detailed operational guidance on their own based on the existing federal guidance. For example, DOE has supported research on operational guidelines for implementation of protective actions described in the FEMA guidance, EPA has drafted guidance for the optimization process following RDD and IND incidents, and DOD has established operational plans for consequence management following terrorist incidents, including RDD and IND attacks. Federal agencies and local jurisdictions have been using the available guidance as a basis for planning RDD and IND exercises to test the adequacy of their plans and skills in a real-time, realistic environment to evaluate their level of preparedness. However, officials with FEMA’s National Exercise Directorate told us that only three of the RDD response exercises had a recovery component. Insufficient Knowledge and Capability to Use Available Approaches for Cleanup of Radiation- Contaminated Areas Could Impede Efforts to Recover from RDD and IND Incidents Although some federal agencies, such as DOE and EPA, have substantial experience using various cleanup methods and technologies to address radiation-contaminated areas, little is known about how these approaches might be applied in an RDD or IND incident. According to a decontamination expert at Idaho National Laboratory, for example, experience has shown that not selecting the appropriate decontamination technologies can generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create more debris requiring disposal—leading to increased costs. For example, we found that limitations in federal capabilities to complete some analysis and cleanup activities might slow the recovery from an RDD or IND incident, including: (1) characterizing the full extent of areas contaminated with radioactive materials; (2) completing laboratory validation of contaminated areas and levels of cleanup after applying decontamination approaches; and (3) removing and disposing of radioactive debris and waste. City, State, and Federal Emergency Management Officials Have Several Suggestions to Improve Federal Recovery Preparedness for RDD and IND Incidents Respondents from nearly all the cities and states we surveyed expressed the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in current federal guidance. For example, respondents from some of the cities sought better guidance on monitoring radioactivity levels, acceptable cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. We found that actions the United Kingdom reported taking to prepare for recovery from RDD and IND incidents are similar to many of the suggestions for improvement in federal preparedness that we obtained through our survey of city, state, and federal regional office emergency management officials in the United States. Issued a national handbook for radiation incidents in 2008. Conducted a full-scale RDD recovery exercise in 2008. The lessons learned from this exercise were incorporated into the United Kingdom’s recovery strategy.

Why GAO Did This Study A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. The timely cleanup of contaminated areas, however, could speed the restoration of normal operations, thus reducing the adverse consequences from an incident. This testimony examines (1) the extent to which federal agencies are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and their states in cleaning up areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the federal government's capability to effectively cleanup areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, and (3) suggestions from government emergency management officials on ways to improve federal preparedness to provide assistance to recover from RDD and IND incidents. We also discuss recovery activities in the United Kingdom. This testimony is based on our ongoing review of recovery preparedness issues for which we examined applicable federal laws and guidance; interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Energy (DOE), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and surveyed emergency management officials from 13 large cities and their states, as well as FEMA and EPA regional office officials. What GAO Found DHS, through FEMA, is responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system to respond to and recover from natural disasters and terrorists attacks, including RDD and IND attacks. The response phase would involve evacuations and providing medical treatment to those who were injured; the recovery phase would include cleaning up the radioactive contamination from an attack in order to permit people to return to their homes and businesses. To date, much federal attention has been given to developing a response framework, with less attention to recovery. Our survey found that almost all cities and states would be so overwhelmed by an RDD or IND incident that they would rely on the federal government to conduct almost all analysis and cleanup activities that are essential first steps towards recovery. However, we found that the federal government has not sufficiently planned to undertake these activities. For example, FEMA has not issued a national disaster recovery strategy or plans for RDD and IND incidents as required by law. Existing federal guidance provides only limited direction for federal agencies to develop their own recovery plans and conduct exercises to test preparedness. Out of over 70 RDD and IND exercises conducted in the last 5 years, only three have included interagency recovery discussions following a response exercise. Although DOE and EPA have experience in the cleanup of small-scale radiation-contaminated areas, their lack of knowledge and capability to apply approaches to address the magnitude of an RDD or an IND incident could increase recovery costs and delay completion. According to anexpert at Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that not selecting the appropriate decontamination technologies can generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create more debris requiring disposal--leading to increased costs. Limitations in laboratory capacity to rapidly test thousands of material samples during cleanup, and uncertainty regarding where to dispose of radioactive debris could also slow the recovery process. At least two-thirds of the city, state, and federal respondents expressed concern about federal capability to provide the necessary analysis and cleanup actions to promote recovery after these incidents. Nearly all survey respondents had suggestions to improve federal recovery preparedness for RDD and IND incidents. For example, almost all the cities and states identified the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in federal guidance. All but three cities wanted additional guidance, for example, on monitoring radioactivity levels, cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most cities wanted more interaction with federal agencies and joint exercising to test recovery preparedness. Finally, our review of the United Kingdom's preparedness to recover from radiological terrorism showed that that country has already taken actions similar to those suggested by our survey respondents, such as issuing national recovery guidance, conducting a full-scale recovery exercise, and publishing a national handbook for radiation incidents.

gao_T-NSIAD-98-124

gao_T-NSIAD-98-124_0

What Corrective Actions Has DOD Taken to Improve Its Readiness Assessment System? This automated system, which functions as the central listing for more than 9,000 military units, is the foundation of DOD’s unit readiness assessment process and is a primary source of information used for reviews at the joint and strategic levels. For example, prior reviews by our office and others have found: SORTS represents a snapshot in time and does not signal impending changes in readiness. They, however, will not address some of the inherent limitations to the system. Another step DOD has taken to improve its readiness assessment capability is to institute a process known as the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. Do Military Readiness Reports Provided to Congress Effectively Support Congressional Oversight? DOD bases its quarterly reports on briefings to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. 482 because they lacked the specific detail on deficiencies and planned remedial actions needed for congressional oversight. Last month, DOD provided Congress with an implementation plan for meeting the expanded reporting requirements for the quarterly report. Lastly, the plan does not present a clear picture of how the additional indicators will be incorporated into the quarterly report. Are Further Improvements to DOD’s Reporting Process Needed? Mr. Chairman, there are two areas where we think DOD has an opportunity to take further actions to improve its readiness reporting. 482 by providing (1) supporting data on key readiness deficiencies and (2) specific information on planned remedial actions in its quarterly readiness reports. Adding more specific detail should enhance the effectiveness of the reports as a congressional oversight tool. The second area where DOD can improve its readiness reporting concerns DOD’s plan to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly report. Additional Readiness Indicators to Be Included in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress The following are the additional indicators the Department of Defense is required, under 10 U.S.C. 482, to include in its quarterly reports to Congress beginning in October 1998. 2. 4. 5. 7. Training 8. Training unit readiness and proficiency. 11.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) process for assessing and reporting on military readiness, focusing on: (1) what corrective action DOD has taken to improve its readiness assessment system; (2) whether military readiness reports provided quarterly to Congress effectively support congressional oversight; and (3) whether further improvements are needed to DOD's process. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) over the last few years, DOD has taken action to improve readiness assessment; (2) DOD has made technical enhancements to the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)--the automated system it uses to assess readiness at the unit level; (3) DOD also has established two forums--the Joint Monthly Readiness Review and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council--for evaluating readiness from a joint and strategic perspective; (4) however, SORTS remains the basic building block for readiness assessment, and inherent limitations to this system, such as its inability to signal impending changes in readiness and its imprecise ratings for unit resources and training, may be reflected in reviews at the joint and strategic levels; (5) DOD's quarterly reports to Congress, which are based on information provided to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, provide only a vague description of readiness deficiencies and planned remedial actions; consequently, in their present form they are not as effective as they could be as a congressional oversight tool; (6) DOD is required to expand on these reports beginning in October 1998 by adding indicators mandated by Congress; (7) GAO has concerns about DOD's current plans for implementing this expanded reporting requirement; (8) for example, current plans do not present a clear picture of how the additional readiness will be incorporated into the quarterly report; (9) GAO's work has identified two areas in which DOD can improve its readiness reporting to Congress; (10) DOD should provide more specific descriptions and supporting information for the key readiness deficiencies and planned remedial actions identified in its quarterly report; and (11) DOD can make improvements to its current plans for adding readiness indicators to the quarterly report.

gao_T-RCED-96-129

gao_T-RCED-96-129_0

The system’s costs will also depend on the Coast Guard’s decision about how sophisticated the system should be. For example, the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, which is on the Coast Guard’s “short list” for the first round of VTS 2000 systems, now has a VTS system, which cost about $1 million to build and meets nearly all of VTS 2000’s operational requirements, according to a Coast Guard study. A group is studying the feasibility of a more limited, privately-funded system. Among other things, this study will address the role of the public and private sectors in developing and operating VTS systems in the United States. Support for Vts 2000 Not Widespread Among Key Stakeholders Interviewed at Ports Most of the stakeholders we interviewed did not support installing a VTS 2000 system at their port. Interviewed Key Stakeholders Showed Greater Support for Alternative Vts Systems The stakeholders interviewed at six ports generally supported some form of VTS system that they perceived to be less expensive than VTS 2000. There is an acknowledged need to improve marine safety at a number of ports, but not much agreement about how it should be done. Additional copies are $2 each.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO discussed the Coast Guard's vessel traffic service (VTS) 2000 program. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) it is difficult to judge whether VTS 2000 is the best marine safety system because it is unknown how many ports need the system, how much it will cost, and whether other cost-effective alternatives are available; (2) most key stakeholders do not support VTS 2000 because they believe it will be too costly; (3) most key stakeholders oppose user fees or other funding methods that would shift the financial costs of VTS 2000 from the Coast Guard to users; (4) support for a VTS system of any kind varied among key stakeholders at different ports, but most favored the least expensive options available; and (5) issues affecting privately funded or privately operated VTS systems include the initial costs of a VTS system, the private sector's exposure to liability, and the Coast Guard's oversight role.

gao_GAO-03-606T

gao_GAO-03-606T_0

The program identifies flood-prone areas in the country, makes flood insurance available to property owners in communities that participate in the program, and encourages floodplain management efforts to mitigate flood hazards. The program has paid about $12 billion in insurance claims, primarily from policyholder premiums that otherwise would, to some extent, have increased taxpayer-funded disaster relief. The administration has estimated that the program’s standards for new construction are saving about $1 billion annually in flood damage avoided. When the program was created, the purchase of flood insurance was voluntary. However, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred this responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Over the years, the annual reporting of the program’s premium revenues and its claims losses and expenses has shown wide fluctuations in cash-based operating net income or losses. The focus on annual cash flows—the amounts of funds into and out of a program during a fiscal year—may not reflect the government’s cost because the time between the extension of the insurance, the receipt of premiums, the occurrence of an insured event, and the payment of claims may extend over several fiscal years. For the flood insurance program, cash-based budgeting may not provide the information necessary to signal emerging problems, make adequate cost comparisons, or control costs. Under current policy, the Congress has authorized subsidies to be provided to a significant portion of the total policies in force, without providing annual appropriations to cover the potential cost of these subsidies. The use of accrual-based budgeting for the flood insurance program has the potential to overcome a number of the deficiencies in cash-based budgeting. Policy Subsidies and Payments for Repetitive Losses Contribute to Program Losses The National Flood Insurance Program has raised financial concerns because, over the years, it has lost money and at times has had to borrow funds from the U.S. Treasury. First, the flood insurance program has sustained losses, and is not actuarially sound, largely because many policies in the program are subsidized. The average annual premium for a subsidized policy is $637, representing about 35-40 percent of the true risk premium for these properties. According to FEMA, about 38 percent of all claims historically, and about $200 million annually, represent repetitive losses—properties having two or more losses greater than $1,000 within a 10-year period. A 1998 study by the National Wildlife Federation noted that repetitive loss properties represented only 2 percent of all properties insured by the program, but they tended to have damage claims that exceeded the value of the insured structure and most were concentrated in special flood hazard areas. Participation in the Program May Be Low Not only does the National Flood Insurance Program face challenges with its financial condition, but also in achieving one of the purposes for which it was created—to make flood insurance the mechanism for property owners to cover flood losses. Participation rates—the percentage of structures in special flood hazard areas that are insured—provide a measure to indicate the degree to which the owners of properties vulnerable to flooding are protected from financial loss through insurance, the financial risk to the government from flood-related disaster assistance is decreasing, and the program is obtaining high levels of premium income. The level of noncompliance with this mandatory purchase requirement is unknown. While we have not fully analyzed these actions, on the basis of a preliminary assessment, they appear to address some of the challenges to the flood insurance program, including two of the key challenges—the program’s financial losses and the perceived low level of participation in the program by property owners in flood-prone areas.

Why GAO Did This Study Floods have been, and continue to be, the most destructive natural hazard in terms of economic loss to the nation. The National Flood Insurance Program is a key component of the federal government's efforts to minimize the damage and financial impact of floods. The program identifies flood-prone areas of the country, makes flood insurance available in the nearly 20,000 communities that participate in the program, and encourages flood-plain management efforts. Since its inception in 1969, the National Flood Insurance has provided $12 billion in insurance claims to owners of flood-damaged properties, and its building standards are estimated to save $1 billion annually. The program has been managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, but along with other activities of the agency, it was recently placed into the Department of Homeland Security. GAO has issued a number of reports on the flood insurance program and was asked to discuss the current challenges to the widespread success of the program. What GAO Found The program faces the following challenges in operating the program effectively and protecting property owners from loss from floods. Improving information on the program's financial condition: Cash-based budgeting, which focuses on the amount of funds that go in and out of a program in a fiscal year, obscures the program's costs and does not provide information necessary to signal emerging problems, such as shortfalls in funds to cover the program's risk exposure. Accrual-based budgeting better matches revenues and expenses, recognizes the risk assumed by the government, and has the potential to overcome the deficiencies of cash-based budgeting. Reducing losses to the program resulting from policy subsidies and repetitive loss properties: The program has lost money and is not actuarially sound because about 29 percent of the policies in force are subsidized but appropriations are not provided to cover the subsidies. Owners of structures built before the flood zone was included in the program pay reduced premiums that represent only about 35-40 percent of the true risk premium. Further, repetitive loss properties--properties with two or more losses in a 10-year period--add to program losses as they represent 38 percent of claims losses but account for 2 percent of insured properties. Increasing property owner participation in the program: The administration has estimated that less than 50 percent of eligible properties in flood plains participate in the program. Additionally, even when the purchase of insurance is mandatory, the extent of noncompliance with the mandatory purchase requirement is unknown and remains a concern. Actions have been initiated or proposed by the administration or in the Congress to address some of the challenges. However, the affect of some actions on the program is not clear. For example, reducing subsidies may cause some policyholders to cancel their policies, reducing program participation and leaving them vulnerable to financial loss from floods. Further, placement of the program within the Department of Homeland Security has the potential to decrease the attention, visibility, and support the program receives.

gao_GAO-14-500

gao_GAO-14-500_0

In recent years, private investors have claimed more than $1 billion in NMTCs annually. The Financial Structures of NMTC Investments Have Become More Complex and Less Transparent While Treasury Guidance Covers Only the Simpler Structures NMTC investors have developed financial structures that increase the amount of other funding from either private or public sources that are used with the NMTC—a process that is called increasing the leverage on the investment. However, they also increase the complexity of the financial structures by adding more parties and more transactions, which in turn reduces transparency and may increase the cost in terms of fees and other related transactions costs. The NMTC financial structures have become more complex over time. A Majority of NMTC Projects Used Other Public Funds in 2010-2012 Based on our survey of CDEs with projects originating in 2010-2012, the use of other public sources of funds with the NMTC is widespread (as shown in Table 1). As a result, 83 percent of the qualified equity investment on which an investor claimed NMTCs was provided by other federal and state tax credit programs. Guidance and Controls Do Not Exist to Prevent Above-Market Rates of Return or Unnecessary Duplication and Costs Internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that operations and use of resources are efficient. One NMTC control has been Treasury and IRS guidance on allowable financial structures. For the CDFI Fund, Treasury does not have controls to limit the risk of cases like the example from the Urban Institute study where other public funds were used to expand the NMTC base and apparently generate a 24 percent rate of return for the NMTC investor. Other controls that could be considered include caps on rate of returns and mechanisms to ensure competition among NMTC investors sufficient to prevent above-market rates of return. Without such complete information the Treasury is limited in its ability to analyze the final net financial benefit of NMTC investments to low-income community businesses. In this case, low fees may be offset by higher interest rates. Furthermore, the CDFI data on equity left in the business are not sufficiently reliable because they are incomplete and not accurate enough to capture program performance. As a result, it is not possible to determine from these data the amount of equity to remain in the low-income community businesses after the 7-year credit period. However, refinancing may not be an indicator of distress. In addition, the data were incomplete because reporting some information was optional. Similarly, the impact of a combination of assistance from government programs is diluted if in the same cases the combination of assistance is unnecessarily duplicative. These include the extent to which fees, interest rates, and other costs reduce the NMTC equity flowing to low-income community businesses, the amount of equity available to the low-income community businesses at the end of the 7- year compliance period, and the number of projects that failed or are at risk of failing. Treasury said that it is considering our recommendations to issue further guidance on how other government programs can be combined with NMTCs, and to ensure that adequate controls are in place to limit the risks of unnecessary duplication and above-market rates of return. Treasury reported that our recommendations would be reviewed in consultation with a recently formed working group that includes representatives from the IRS and the CDFI Fund to discuss potential administrative or regulatory changes. Treasury also agreed with our recommendation to clarify instructions to CDEs about reporting loan performance and make this data reporting mandatory. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of this report were to assess: (1) New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) financial structures in terms of their complexity, transparency, and effect on the size of the federal subsidies going to NMTC projects as well as controls to ensure that subsidies are not larger than necessary for the investment; (2) what is known about the types and amounts of fees and other costs that reduce the amount of equity reaching low-income community businesses; (3) what is known about the amount of equity left in the low-income community businesses after the 7-year credit period; and (4) what is known about NMTC projects that are at risk of failing by becoming economically nonviable. Appendix II: Other Federal Funding Used in New Markets Tax Credit Projects In our survey of New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) projects, we asked Community Development Entities (CDEs) what other federal sources of assistance were used (in addition to the NMTC) to fund the project.

Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, private investors have claimed more than $1 billion in NMTCs annually. The credits are combined with private loans and other public funds to support investments in low-income communities. GAO was asked to review the financial structure of NMTCs. This report assesses: (1) the complexity and transparency of NMTC financial structures and controls over the size of federal subsidies; (2) what is known about the types and amounts of fees and other costs of the financial structures; (3) what is known about the equity remaining in low-income community businesses after the 7-year credit period; and (4) what is known about NMTC project failure rates. GAO reviewed Treasury NMTC data and surveyed CDEs that allocated credits to 305 projects in 2010-2012. What GAO Found The financial structures of New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) investments have become more complex and less transparent over time. The increased complexity is due, in part, to combining the NMTC with other federal, state, and local government funds. Based on GAO's survey of Community Development Entities (CDEs) an estimated 62 percent of NMTC projects received other federal, state, or local government assistance from 2010 to 2012. While combining public financing from multiple sources can fund projects that otherwise would not be viable, it also raises questions about whether the subsidies are unnecessarily duplicative because they are receiving funds from multiple federal sources. In addition, in some cases the complexity of the structures may be masking rates of return for NMTC investors that are above market rates. For example, a study done for the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) found an investor apparently earning a 24 percent rate of return, which is significantly above market rates of return. In that case, the investor leveraged the NMTCs by using other public funds to increase the base for claiming the NMTC. Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service issued guidance about allowable financial structures in the early years of the NMTC program, but the guidance has not been updated to reflect the subsequent growth in complexity, such as the use of other public money to leverage the NMTC. Treasury also does not have controls to limit the risk of unnecessary duplication in government subsidies or above market rates of returns. Without such guidance and controls the impact of the NMTC program on low-income communities could be diluted. The costs of complex NMTC financial structures may not be fully reflected in fees charged by CDEs, and they could be reflected in other costs such as higher interest rates. Treasury has taken steps to ensure businesses are better informed about fees and other costs, but is not collecting these additional data itself. Without these data, Treasury is limited in its ability to analyze NMTC program benefits. GAO also found that the data on equity remaining in businesses after the 7-year credit period were unreliable because, in part, instructions on what to report are unclear. As a result, at this time it is not possible to determine how much equity remains in low-income community businesses after 7 years. Similarly, data on NMTC project failure rates were unavailable. GAO reviewed data of performance on loans from CDEs to low-income community businesses as an indicator of whether the businesses will be viable over the long term. However, data on loan performance were also incomplete because some reporting of this information by CDEs is optional. As a result, it is not possible to determine, at this time, the NMTC project failure rate with certainty. What GAO Recommends Treasury should issue further guidance on how other government programs can be combined with NMTCs; ensure adequate controls to limit the risks of unnecessary duplication and above-market rates of return; and ensure that more complete and accurate data are collected on fees and costs, the equity remaining in the business after 7 years, and loan performance. Treasury agreed with GAO's recommendations to improve data collection on equity remaining and loan performance. Treasury said that a recently formed working group, that includes representatives from the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund and the Internal Revenue Service, is considering GAO's other recommendations.

gao_NSIAD-00-214

gao_NSIAD-00-214_0

State’s Efforts to Develop and Implement a Common Overseas Information Technology Platform The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel was formed to consider the future of our nation’s overseas representation, to appraise its condition, and to develop practical recommendations on how best to organize and manage our overseas posts. The Panel recommended that all agencies with an overseas presence provide staff with a common network featuring Internet access, e-mail, a secure unclassified Internet website, and shared applications permitting unclassified communications among all agencies and around the globe. The Panel further recommended that agencies initiate planning for a similar common platform for classified information. In doing so, State intends to define user and system requirements; identify risks and assess technical feasibility; identify the major work elements that will be accomplished over the life of the project; analyze costs and benefits; establish project goals, performance measures, and resources; assign responsibilities; and establish milestones. The Panel estimated that the ultimate cost of a common solution for both classified and unclassified information will be over $300 million. The President’s FY2001 budget includes $17 million in support of the recommendation for a common information technology platform for overseas offices. Implementation Issues Will Prove Challenging As State is in the early stages of project planning, it faces considerable challenges in modernizing overseas information technology systems. First, State will need to obtain agreement among its various bureaus and the agencies in the foreign affairs community on such issues as requirements, resources, responsibilities, policies, and acquisition decisions. This will be a delicate task as these agencies have different needs, levels of funding, and ongoing agency-unique systems development. Second, State needs to complete its detailed information technology architecture–or blueprint–to guide and effectively control its own information technology acquisitions. Third, the security of the common system must be fully addressed before its deployment to ensure that sensitive data is not stolen, modified, or lost. The Panel recognized that security risks would be increased with this greater connectivity and indicated that solutions, such as the use of industry best practices and security software, would be required to mitigate these risks.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of State's efforts to improve the foreign affairs community's information technology infrastructure, focusing on: (1) State's efforts to implement the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel's recommendations; and (2) the challenges and risks it will face as it proceeds. What GAO Found GAO noted that: (1) the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel was formed to consider the future of the nation's overseas representation, to appraise its condition, and to develop practical recommendations on how best to organize and manage overseas posts; (2) the Panel recommended that all agencies with an overseas presence provide staff with a common network featuring Internet access, electronic mail, a secure unclassified Internet website, and shared applications permitting unclassified communications among all agencies and around the globe; (3) the Panel further recommended that agencies initiate planning for a similar common platform for classified information; (4) in developing its common platform initiative, State intends to: (a) define user and system requirements; (b) identify risks and assess technical feasibility; (c) identify the major work elements that will be accomplished over the life of the project; (d) analyze costs and benefits; (e) establish project goals, performance measures, and resources; (f) assign responsibilities; and (g) establish milestones; (5) the Panel estimated that the ultimate cost of a common solution for both classified and unclassified information will be over $300 million; (6) the President's fiscal year 2001 budget includes $17 million in support of the recommendation for a common information technology platform for overseas offices; (7) as State is in the early stages of project planning, it faces considerable challenges in modernizing overseas information technology systems; (8) State will need to obtain agreement among its various bureaus and the agencies in the foreign affairs community on such issues as requirements, resources, responsibilities, policies, and acquisition decisions; (9) this will be a delicate task as these agencies have different needs, levels of funding, and ongoing agency-unique systems development; (10) State needs to complete its detailed information technology architecture to guide and effectively control its own information technology acquisitions; (11) the security of the common system must be fully addressed before its deployment to ensure that sensitivity data is not stolen, modified, or lost; and (12) the Panel recognized that security risks would be increased with greater connectivity and indicated that solutions, such as the use of industry best practices and security software, would be required to mitigate these risks.

gao_GAO-08-89

gao_GAO-08-89_0

Background Under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, State regulates and controls arms exports by U.S. companies to help ensure that those exports are consistent with national security and foreign policy interests. Trends Indicate DDTC’s Licensing Process Is Under Stress Our analysis shows several trends have emerged in the processing of arms export cases, which indicate the system is under stress. Most of the increase was for licenses for permanent export. Second, processing times almost doubled from fiscal year 2003 to 2006. Open cases increased from about 5,000 in October 2002 to about 7,500 in April 2007, reaching a high of more than 10,000 open cases in September 2006 (see fig. Actions Taken by DDTC to Achieve Short-Term Gains Are Unsustainable At the beginning of fiscal year 2007, DDTC launched its “winter offensive,” a campaign to reduce the growing number of open cases. Through extraordinary measures—such as extending work hours; canceling staff training, meetings, and industry outreach; and pulling available staff from other duties to process cases—DDTC was able to reduce the number of open cases by 40 percent in 3 months. Systemic Inefficiencies Underlie Overall Trends in the Licensing Process While some blips in the trends can be attributed to onetime events or efforts, such as the winter offensive, the overall trends of increased processing times and open cases are affected by several factors, including procedural inefficiencies, electronic processing system shortcomings, and human capital challenges. Our analysis shows that DDTC has taken increasingly longer to refer cases. As shown in table 1, the median days from when the case was received to outside referral increased from 7 days in fiscal year 2003 to 20 days during the first 7 months of fiscal year 2007. Although 77 percent of cases are now received electronically through D-Trade, its implementation has been problematic and electronic processing has not been the promised panacea for improving processing times. For example, the number of licensing officers on board has fluctuated over recent years and was at the same level in fiscal years 2003 and 2006, yet the number of cases processed increased about 20 percent during the same period (see table 2). DDTC Does Not Conduct Systematic Assessments to Identify Root Causes of Problems and to Develop Sustainable Solutions DDTC management does not systematically assess licensing data to identify inefficiencies. Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense and for their review and comment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To determine trends in arms export case processing by State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), we obtained State’s arms export case data for fiscal year 2003 through April 30, 2007. To identify factors contributing to trends in processing times and open cases, we interviewed officials from DDTC, State bureaus to which cases are most frequently referred, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), and selected arms exporters. We obtained and analyzed data on DDTC funding and staffing levels.

Why GAO Did This Study To regulate the export of billions of dollars worth of arms to foreign governments and companies, the Department of State's (State) Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) reviews and authorizes export licenses and other arms export cases. While such reviews require time to consider national security and foreign policy interests, the U.S. defense industry and some foreign government purchasers have expressed concern that the U.S. export control process is unnecessarily time-consuming. In 2005, GAO reported that processing times for arms export cases had increased despite State efforts to streamline its process. GAO was asked to (1) describe recent trends in the processing of arms export cases and (2) identify factors that have contributed to these trends. To conduct its work, GAO obtained and analyzed State arms export case data for fiscal year 2003 through April 30, 2007; reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidelines, as well as DDTC funding and staffing information; and interviewed State and Department of Defense officials and selected arms exporters. What GAO Found Three key trends indicate that DDTC's arms export licensing process is under stress. First, the number of arms export cases processed by DDTC increased 20 percent between fiscal years 2003 and 2006. Most of this increase was for licenses for permanent export. Second, during the same period, median processing times almost doubled. Third, the number of open arms export cases increased 50 percent from about 5,000 in October 2002 to about 7,500 in April 2007, with a high of more than 10,000 cases in September 2006. At the beginning of fiscal year 2007, DDTC launched a campaign to reduce the growing number of open cases. Through extraordinary measures--such as canceling staff training, meetings, and industry outreach, and pulling available staff from other duties to process cases--DDTC was able to cut the number of open cases by 40 percent in 3 months. However, such measures are not sustainable in the long term, do not address underlying inefficiencies and problems, and may have negative unintended consequences for the mission. While some blips in the trends can be attributed to onetime events or efforts--such as DDTC's campaign to reduce open cases--procedural inefficiencies, electronic processing system shortcomings, and human capital challenges underlie the overall trends. For example, GAO's analysis shows that DDTC is taking increasingly longer to refer cases to other agencies or State bureaus for additional review--from 7 days in fiscal year 2003 to 20 days during the first 7 months of fiscal year 2007. In addition, implementation of DDTC's electronic system for submitting applications has been problematic, and electronic processing has not been the promised panacea for improving processing times. DDTC does not perform systematic assessments to identify root causes of increased workload, processing times, and open cases and, in turn, develop sustainable solutions.

gao_GAO-08-637T

gao_GAO-08-637T_0

Stakeholders Are Taking Steps to Improve Terrorism- Related Information Sharing, but Existing Gaps Present Challenges for Implementing the ISE and Measuring Its Progress ISE stakeholders are taking steps to improve terrorism-related information sharing, but work remains to define the scope of the ISE, roles and responsibilities, the desired results to be achieved—that is, how information sharing should be improved—and measures for assessing progress, all elements in establishing a road map for meeting information sharing needs and implementing the ISE. Phase 2, that was to commence in July 2007, covers design as well as implementation of the ISE. Second, the implementation plan did not clearly communicate and distinguish the role and responsibilities of the Program Manager from those of the key agencies in implementing the ISE and improving information sharing. Since the issuance of the implementation plan, the Program Manager and participating agencies have taken steps to assess progress and improve the ISE’s road map by issuing two annual reports and defining annual goals and performance measures, in part consistent with federal guidance for program planning and performance measurement. These measures are intended to improve reporting on progress in implementing the ISE and represent an important first step in providing quantitative data for assessing progress made in information sharing and in helping to inform Congress and other stakeholders of specific information sharing improvements. Therefore, to help ensure that the ISE is on a measurable track to success, we recommended that the Program Manager, with full participation of relevant stakeholders (e.g., agencies and departments on the ISE), (1) more fully define the scope and specific results to be achieved by the ISE along with the key milestones and individual projects or initiatives needed to achieve these results; and (2) develop a set of performance measures that show the extent to which the ISE has been implemented and sharing improved—including, at a minimum, what has been and remains to be accomplished—so as to more effectively account for and communicate progress and results. Fusion Centers Vary in Their Characteristics, and Federal Efforts Are Under Way That Address Many of the Challenges That Centers Reported Encountering After September 2001, state and local governments began to establish fusion centers to improve information sharing across levels of government and varying disciplines and to prevent terrorism or other threats. As we reported in October 2007, these centers varied in their level of maturity, capability, and characteristics. Among these challenges were managing the high volume of information and the multiple systems and networks, obtaining specific and clear guidance and training on operational issues, obtaining and retaining qualified personnel, and securing federal grant or state and local funding for center operations over the long term. The National Strategy for Information Sharing stated that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve a baseline level of capability. Legislation introduced in May 2008, and reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security July 10, 2008, seeks to clarify what constitutes allowable costs under these grants. A New Policy Is Intended to Streamline Processes for Sharing Sensitive but Unclassified Information In March 2006, we reported on a survey of 26 federal agencies that showed they were using more than 50 different designations to protect information that they deem critical to their missions—such as law enforcement sensitive, for official use only, and unclassified controlled nuclear information. In this absence, each agency determined what designations to apply. We reported that such inconsistency can lead to challenges in information sharing. In fact, more than half of the agencies reported encountering challenges in sharing sensitive but unclassified information. Consistent with our recommendations and the President’s December 2005 mandates calling for standardization of sensitive but unclassified information designations, on May 9, 2008, the President issued a memorandum that adopted CUI as the single categorical designation used for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the executive branch. Furthermore, the memo outlined a framework for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating information identified as CUI.

Why GAO Did This Study In 2005, GAO placed the issue of information sharing for homeland security on its high-risk list of federal functions needing broad-based transformation and since then has monitored the government's progress in resolving barriers to sharing. This testimony discusses three key information sharing efforts: (1) the actions that have been taken to guide the design and implementation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and to report on its progress, (2) the characteristics of state and local fusion centers and the extent to which federal efforts are helping to address some of the challenges centers reported, and (3) the progress made in developing streamlined policies and procedures for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating sensitive but unclassified information. This testimony is based on GAO's products issued from March 2006 through July 2008 and selected updates conducted in July 2008. What GAO Found In a report being released today, GAO concludes that the ISE, under the leadership of a designated Program Manager, has had a measure of success, but lacks a road map for guiding the ISE, ensuring accountability, and assessing progress. The Program Manager's Office issued an implementation plan in November 2006 to guide the design of the ISE, has carried out a number of steps in that plan, and has leveraged existing efforts and resources agencies independently pursued for improving information sharing. However, this plan lacks important elements essential to effectively implement the ISE. Gaps exist in (1) defining the ISE's scope, such as determining all the terrorism-related information that should be part of the ISE; (2) clearly communicating and distinguishing the role of the Program Manager and other stakeholders; and (3) determining the results to be achieved by the ISE (that is, how information sharing is improved) along with associated milestones, performance measures, and the individual projects. Two annual reports on progress have been issued. Each identifies annual goals and individual ISE efforts, but neither reports on the extent to which the ISE has improved information sharing. GAO reported in October 2007 that fusion centers, established by states and localities to collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing, vary widely but face similar challenges--especially related to funding and sustaining operations--that the federal government is helping to address but are not yet resolved. While the centers varied in their level of maturity, capability, and characteristics, most fusion centers focused on processing information on crimes and hazards, as well as terrorism-related information. Fusion center officials reported facing challenges such as obtaining specific, clear guidance and training; obtaining and retaining qualified personnel; and securing funding for center operations over the long term. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were helping to address these challenges by, for example, providing technical assistance and training, personnel, and grant funding. Also, legislation has been proposed to clarify how funding may be used to hire and retain intelligence analysts. Although the myriad of sensitive but unclassified designations has been a long-standing problem, progress has been made in establishing processes for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating this information. In March 2006, GAO reported that each federal agency determined sometimes inconsistent designations to apply to its sensitive but unclassified information and this could lead to challenges in information sharing, such as confusion on how to protect the information. Thus, GAO recommended that the Directors of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget issue a policy that consolidates sensitive but unclassified designations. In a May 2008 memorandum, the President adopted "controlled unclassified information" (CUI) to be the single categorical designation for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the executive branch and provided a framework for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating CUI.

gao_OCG-95-1

gao_OCG-95-1_0

The issues not covered by the NPR recommendations also represent significant additional opportunities to make the government “work better and cost less.” Executive- Congressional Partnership, Strong Leadership, and Attention to Agencies’ Capacities Still Needed In our December 1993 report, we emphasized three themes that we believed were crucial to the long-range success of the NPR effort: (1) the administration must work in partnership with Congress, (2) attention should be paid to agencies’ capacities to take on the additional responsibilities NPR envisions, and (3) sustained attention is needed from top political and career leadership. A number of NPR recommendations were intended to achieve more results-oriented management. First, agencies’ goals must be clearly stated in outcome-based terms and means developed to measure progress toward those goals. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, structures and processes need to be established and used to reinforce the focus on outcome-based management. The legal imperatives needed to bring about a great deal of government reinvention are already in place. For example, some agencies’ missions are legislatively defined in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways. The long-term success of GPRA and the movement to a new mode of government management and accountability depends on Congress having the requisite data and moving from a focus on inputs, outputs, and procedural issues to an emphasis on establishing clear agency missions and goals and focusing on outcomes and results. (2) Partially Implemented. (6) Other. We did not review the NPR’s estimated savings from implementing its recommendations.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of the National Performance Review's (NPR) management reform recommendations. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) although federal agencies have acted on or partially implemented most of the NPR recommendations, only 4 percent have been fully implemented; (2) additional actions on management issues not addressed by NPR are needed to achieve budgetary savings and improve government management; (3) the successful implementation of NPR recommendations depends on a legislative-executive partnership for action, attention to agencies' capacities, and sustained political and career leadership; (4) Congress and the Administration must shift the focus of government management and accountability to emphasize outcomes and results rather than inputs, outputs, and processes; (5) the Administration must clearly state agencies' goals in outcome-based terms, develop a means to measure progress toward goals, and establish structures and processes to reinforce outcome-based management; (6) the legal imperatives needed to spur government reinvention are already in place; (7) Congress needs to resolve some agencies' conflicting missions and reduce its micromanagement of agencies to give them the flexibility they need; and (8) the transition to a results-oriented government will take years to accomplish, but the potential benefits are enormous.

gao_AIMD-96-82

gao_AIMD-96-82_0

As of January 31, 1996, DOD reported that it had reduced the $37.8 billion of problem disbursement balances to $25.4 billion. The law directed the Secretary of Defense to require that each disbursement in excess of $5 million be matched to a particular obligation before the disbursement is made. On February 28, 1995, DOD submitted its plan—which was a general overview plan describing processes and milestones for automating the prevalidation process and lowering the prevalidation threshold to $1 million—to the Congress, and the DOD IG provided the defense congressional committees with its independent assessment, which generally agreed with the plan and DOD’s overall approach for implementation. The team leader also told us that the inflow of new problem disbursements has not slowed down because the same long-standing weaknesses regarding system problems and failure to comply with basic accounting procedures, which we previously reported in 1994, generally still exist. Description of the Prevalidation Process DOD had automated prevalidation to electronically process certain disbursement data between the DFAS Columbus Center’s disbursing system, known as the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS), and eight DOD primary contract accounting systems. Prevalidation Threshold Needs To Be Lowered Although section 8102 of DOD’s Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required DOD to prevalidate only disbursements in excess of $5 million, on October 1, 1995, DOD lowered the prevalidation threshold to $1 million at all activities except the DFAS Columbus Center. However, since prevalidation at DFAS Columbus is made only for payments exceeding $5 million, large numbers of transactions, amounting to tens of billions of dollars, are excluded from this important accounting control. This is less than one-fourth of one percent of the total payments and only about one-third of the total dollars. DOD’s problems with accounting for and reporting on disbursements will not be resolved until (1) weaknesses in control procedures that allow problem disbursements to occur are corrected and (2) improvements are made to DOD’s contract pay, disbursing, and accounting processes and systems.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed, in conjunction with the Department of Defense's (DOD) Inspector General (IG), DOD efforts to reduce problem disbursements and its implementation of a statutory requirement to match each disbursement exceeding $5 million to the appropriate obligation before the disbursement is made. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) DOD reduced its problem disbursements from $37.8 billion to $23.1 billion as of September 1995; (2) DOD disbursement problems persist due to long-standing system weaknesses and DOD failure to comply with basic accounting procedures for validating, reconciling, and reporting transactions; (3) DOD has automated the prevalidation process for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service's (DFAS) Columbus Center contract payment system and eight other primary contract accounting systems to handle their large volume of transactions; (4) there are deficiencies in the automated programs for prevalidating Army and Air Force disbursements; (5) DOD has lowered the prevalidation threshold to $1 million for all disbursement centers except DFAS-Columbus; (6) this limited implementation hampers DOD ability to resolve its disbursement problems, since DFAS-Columbus is responsible for about 40 percent of DOD contractor and vendor payments; (7) from July 1995 through January 1996, DFAS-Columbus prevalidated only about one-third of the total dollar amount of its disbursements; and (8) to resolve disbursement problems, DOD needs to prevalidate as many transactions as practical, further lower the prevalidation threshold, and follow basic accounting procedures until it has corrected serious weaknesses in its accounting and contracting systems.

gao_GAO-14-460

gao_GAO-14-460_0

This allows the Army to identify and evaluate systems without the need for large investments in development programs and without having to enter into procurement contracts. Past GAO work has found that the federal government can realize significant cost savings when awarding contracts competitively. The FAR outlines specific techniques for conducting market research. Army Utilizing Competition in Various Ways Across Nine Tactical Networking Systems The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the nine tactical networking acquisition programs we examined. As the Army decreases the amount of in-house system development it is doing for tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve industry in seeking items that the Army does not pay to develop to meet its needs. One such tool is the agile capabilities life cycle process and the associated semi-annual Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs), which serve as market research to identify potential solutions to meet capability gaps. This includes reaching out to industry to provide potential solutions, and competing the procurement of individual components. Eight of the nine systems we reviewed have either completed an acquisition strategy or have one in draft, and all include language that pertain to market research and competition as required by DOD policy. The Army has not developed an acquisition strategy for SRW-Appliqué because it does not meet the requirements of a formal acquisition program. Rather, the Army has developed a plan to deliver a radio waveform capability to satisfy a directed requirement, has used market research, and is seeking competition for this system, as discussed below. Table 2 presents the status of the acquisition strategy for the nine systems. Army Initiating Two New Systems Predicated on Competition and Off-the- shelf Acquisitions In two of the cases we examined, the Army is beginning new programs, structuring the acquisition strategies to focus on competition, and procuring directly from industry. One of these systems, the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR), will provide a subset of functionality the Army intended to get from the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radio (GMR), which was canceled in 2011. The Army used the initial delivery order from this contract to procure a limited number of radio systems to conduct risk reduction and requirements verification. The associated indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts were competitively awarded in April 2014 to four vendors. Army Modifying Approaches to Create Opportunities for Competition for Five Legacy Networking Systems AMF, Rifleman Radio, and Manpack were all part of the restructured JTRS program, which utilized competition early on to develop software- defined radios that would interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and networking capabilities. Consequently, the Army is now reaching out to industry for proposed solutions. For WIN-T Increments 2 and 3, the Army has determined that competition for the overall system is impractical, although aspects of competition are still being used on the programs. The Army’s market research led it to conclude that only one contractor, the incumbent, is capable of providing the WIN-T capability. Agency Comments We are not making recommendations in this report. We incorporated these and other technical comments in the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objective was to examine the Army’s progress in implementing competitive contracting strategies for its network-related systems, in particular for its radio capabilities. To address this objective, we selected nine of the Army’s 25 tactical networking systems as a non-generalizable sample for review. These systems are the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio, Soldier Radio Waveform—Appliqué, Rifleman Radio, Manpack, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station, Joint Battle Command—Platform, the Nett Warrior, Warfighter Information Network—Tactical Increment 2, and Warfighter Information Network—Tactical Increment 3. These systems exist on either the tactical network’s transport or applications level and the Army has indicated they are critical systems for ensuring soldiers are able to move mission-critical information between units. These nine programs also cover the breadth of operations from the warfighter at the tactical edge to the brigade command post. Background In May 2011, the Army issued a directed requirement for a soldier radio waveform capability. In response to the synopsis, another vendor indicated its interest in the acquisition. Program Status Acquisition category: ACAT ID, as part of HMS program System development contract award: July 2004 Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Inc. Competition History and Plans The Army continues to receive low rate units from the June 2011 contract; however, Army officials say that because of the Congressional direction for full and open competition, the full rate production decision has been delayed to allow for changes in the program acquisition strategy. According to Army officials, sole source is planned because the contract cannot be competitively awarded without unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Army’s requirements.

Why GAO Did This Study For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network—sensors, software, and radios—to give soldiers the exact information they need, when they need it, in any environment. The Army has declared its tactical network as its top modernization priority and estimated the modernization may cost up to $3 billion per year into the foreseeable future. The Army's current modernization approach is intended to leverage solutions developed by private industry. Given the costs and importance of the network, GAO was asked to examine aspects of the Army's effort to acquire network capabilities. This is the third report in response to the Subcommittee's requests. In this report, GAO examines the Army's progress in implementing competitive strategies for tactical networking systems. GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of 9 of these 25 systems that the Army indicated are critical for ensuring soldiers are able to send and receive mission-critical information between units, and that cover the breadth of warfighter operations. GAO reviewed acquisition strategies for evidence that the Army was seeking competition. What GAO Found The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the nine tactical networking acquisition programs GAO examined. To achieve the best return on the government's investment, federal agencies are generally required to award contracts competitively. As the Army has decreased the amount of in-house system development it is doing for tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve private industry to meet its needs. One such tool is the agile capabilities life cycle process whereby the Army determines the capabilities it needs and gaps in those capabilities, and uses market research and semi-annual evaluations, among other means, to involve industry. According to the Army, this agile process provides opportunities for enhancing competition. The Army acquisition strategy for eight of the nine systems discusses plans for competition and market research. An acquisition strategy is not required for the Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué system because it is not a formal acquisition program; however, the Army conducted market research and is seeking competition. GAO grouped the nine systems into three categories based on similarities in the competition strategy. Specifically, In two of the nine systems GAO examined—Mid-tier Networking Vehicular Radio and Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué—the Army is beginning new programs and structuring the acquisition approaches to competitively procure non-developmental capabilities directly from industry. The Army competitively awarded a procurement contract for its Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio, providing units for risk reduction and requirements verification. In April 2014 the Army competitively awarded contracts to four vendors to buy the Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué. Five of the nine systems GAO studied have been under development for many years. Three of those—the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station radio; the Rifleman Radio; and the Manpack Radio—were part of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which was previously competed and which the Army has restructured. The Army had been developing software-defined radios to interoperate with existing radios. The Army is now seeking non-developmental solutions through competition to provide the needed capability. For the other two systems, the Joint Battle Command–Platform and Nett Warrior, the Army reports that it plans to use full and open competition for individual subcomponents. In both cases, the Army conducted market research to identify vendors or seek feedback on requirements. The Army deemed competition impractical for the two remaining systems in GAO's review, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3. The Army considered acquisition strategies for more competition in the development and procurement of these systems but determined that only the incumbent contractor could satisfy the requirements without unacceptable delays. Nevertheless, the Army continues using market research to identify interested contractors and has awarded several competitive contracts for subcomponents under these two systems. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, as appropriate.

gao_GAO-16-355

gao_GAO-16-355_0

Background NLS operates a program that provides free reading materials for residents and citizens of the United States and its territories as well as U.S. citizens residing abroad who are generally unable to read standard print because of a visual or physical disability. 1). Administration of the NLS program is shared between NLS headquarters and a national network of libraries and outreach centers. NLS Users Are Primarily Older Adults with Visual Disabilities, but NLS Efforts Are Not Ensuring Full Access and Awareness Older Adults with Visual Disabilities Make Up the Majority of Users, though an Eligibility Requirement May Limit Access of Potential Users with Reading Disabilities In fiscal year 2014, about 430,000 individuals used the NLS program, with the majority being older individuals who were blind or had other visual disabilities. 2). The number of NLS users remained stable from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, according to NLS data. This eligibility requirement, which originated in 1974 and has remained largely unchanged since, creates additional steps and costs for applicants with reading disabilities in comparison to other groups, and may hinder some individuals’ access to services. NLS officials said that changing the eligibility requirement for reading disabilities may lead to more users and increased costs. Staff at 6 of the 8 network libraries told us they wanted more guidance and assistance from NLS on outreach efforts such as these. However, NLS has not developed a plan for assessing its outreach efforts, also a best practice we previously identified. NLS Offers Materials in a Range of Formats, but Statutory and Other Limitations Impede Adoption of Potentially Cost- Saving Technologies NLS Provides a Range of Reading Formats, but Most Users Choose to Receive Audio Materials Through the Mail NLS offers its users several options for receiving both audio and braille reading materials, and the vast majority of NLS users choose to receive audio materials, primarily in the form of digital cartridges sent through the mail. According to NLS administrative data, almost 90 percent of NLS users received digital cartridges during fiscal year 2014, with the majority playing these cartridges on specialized audio devices provided by NLS, and a much smaller number using other, commercially- available devices. The precise number of blind and visually impaired people who use braille in the United States is not known, according to a study on braille by LOC’s Federal Research Division, as well as officials from two national organizations that produce braille materials and an assistive technology company we contacted. NLS’s Efforts to Adopt New Technologies Are Hampered by Limitations in Its Statutory Authority and Analyses of Alternative Approaches NLS is considering whether to adopt several new technologies for delivering braille and audio content to its users which have the potential to improve services and reduce costs. However, the statute does not allow NLS to use such funds to provide users with devices for reading electronic braille files. The resulting report, delivered in July 2015, found that the total annual cost of NLS’s current approach—including the costs for NLS to produce hard copy braille documents, for network libraries to store them, and for USPS to deliver them—is about $17 million. Conclusions The NLS program provides accessible reading materials to those who cannot read standard print due to visual, physical, and other disabilities. Eighty-five years after the program was established, NLS is providing an important service to many older and visually-disabled adults, but it is also missing opportunities to meet the needs of all groups eligible for services. Looking ahead, NLS is considering emerging technologies to meet user needs. Similarly, absent a comprehensive comparison of adding text-to-speech materials to its audio collection versus continuing to rely only on human narration, NLS may not make an informed decision about whether to move forward with a technology that has the potential to decrease the time and costs of providing new materials to users. Matter for Congressional Consideration To give NLS the opportunity to provide braille in a modernized format and potentially achieve cost savings, Congress should consider amending the law to allow the agency to use federal funds to provide its users playback equipment for electronic braille files (i.e., refreshable braille devices). To ensure that it provides all eligible populations access to its services and that its eligibility requirements are consistent with currently accepted practices, the Library of Congress should re-examine and potentially revise its requirement that medical doctors must certify eligibility for the NLS program for those with a reading disability caused by organic dysfunction. To ensure funds are directed to the most cost-effective outreach efforts, NLS should evaluate the effectiveness of its outreach efforts, including the extent to which different outreach efforts have resulted in new users. For example, LOC agreed to reexamine and potentially revise its requirement that only medical doctors may certify NLS eligibility for people with reading disabilities to authorize other qualified persons to make such a certification. LOC also indicated that NLS is exploring the use of text- to-speech technology as a way to expand its offerings, and NLS will introduce this technology through a pilot program and solicit feedback from users and network libraries to assess their acceptance of this approach. In addition, this report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study NLS, within the Library of Congress (LOC), provides free audio and braille materials for U.S. citizens and residents who cannot read standard print due to visual and other disabilities. In fiscal year 2016, the NLS program received about $50 million in federal funds to provide these materials through a national network of libraries. The House report accompanying the fiscal year 2016 legislative branch appropriations bill included a provision for GAO to review NLS's users and the technology it employs to meet their needs. GAO examined (1) the characteristics of NLS users and the steps NLS is taking to ensure eligible individuals' access and awareness, and (2) how NLS provides materials and the extent to which it is considering emerging trends in technology. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, NLS documents, and administrative data; interviewed NLS officials, librarians from 8 of the 101 network libraries selected for geographic diversity and a range in the number of users, and officials from research and advocacy groups and assistive technology companies; and reviewed literature on NLS-eligible populations and trends in assistive technologies. What GAO Found The National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped (NLS) is primarily used by older adults with visual disabilities, and NLS has taken some steps to ensure eligible users' access to and awareness of available services. In fiscal year 2014, about 70 percent of the program's 430,000 users were age 60 and older and almost 85 percent had visual disabilities, according to the most recent NLS data available at the time of GAO's review. Federal regulations establish eligibility for NLS services for people with a range of disabilities. However, medical doctors must certify eligibility for people with reading disabilities such as dyslexia, which is not required for those with visual or physical disabilities. According to officials from network libraries and other stakeholder groups, the requirement for a doctor's certification is an obstacle to accessing services because of additional steps and costs to the individual. These officials and stakeholders said other professionals, such as special education teachers, are also positioned to certify eligibility for applicants with reading disabilities. GAO has previously noted the importance of disability programs keeping pace with scientific and medical advances. However, the certification requirement has remained largely unchanged for more than 40 years. NLS has taken steps to inform eligible groups about its services, such as partnering with other organizations that serve these groups, developing a new website, and distributing an outreach toolkit to network libraries. However, NLS has no plans to evaluate which outreach efforts have resulted in new users in order to ensure resources are used effectively—a key practice identified previously by GAO. NLS offers materials to its users in a range of formats, but its efforts to adopt new, potentially cost-saving technologies are hampered by limitations in both its statutory authority and its analyses of alternatives. Users may choose to receive, through the mail, audio materials on digital cartridges or hard copy braille documents. Users may also choose to download audio and braille files from an NLS-supported website. During fiscal year 2014, 86 percent of users chose to receive audio materials on digital cartridges, according to NLS data. NLS officials said they would like to provide users with devices for reading electronic braille files, a faster and less bulky approach than braille documents, and per the agency's July 2015 analysis, could become more cost effective with technological advances. However, federal statute does not authorize NLS to use program funds to acquire and provide braille devices as it does for audio devices, which prevents the agency from taking advantage of technology that has the potential to reduce costs. NLS is also examining new technologies for audio materials but has not fully assessed available alternatives. For example, NLS is considering supplementing its collection of human-narrated audio materials with text-to-speech (i.e., synthetic speech) materials, which some evidence suggests could be produced more quickly and at a lower cost. However, NLS has not comprehensively compared the text-to-speech option to its current approach in order to make a decision on whether to move forward, as called for by GAO best practices for alternatives analysis. Without this analysis, NLS may miss an opportunity to meet its users' needs more efficiently and cost effectively. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider authorizing NLS to provide its users devices for reading electronic braille files. In addition, GAO recommends that NLS re-examine its eligibility certification requirements, evaluate its outreach, and assess alternative approaches to delivering audio content. LOC generally agreed with these recommendations.

gao_GAO-05-136

gao_GAO-05-136_0

To determine how effectively DHS used its other transactions authority to attract nontraditional government contractors, we analyzed DHS’s reported results from using these authorities in the Counter-MANPADS and Chem-Bio programs. DHS relies on contractors to self-certify their status as a nontraditional government contractors during agreement negotiation. Other transactions were created to enhance the federal government’s ability to acquire cutting-edge science and technology. These solicitations used some commonly accepted acquisition practices and knowledge-based acquisition principles. DHS issued a management directive, drafted guidance, and recruited additional program and contracting staff, which now provide a foundation for using other transactions authority; however, refinements in these policies and attention to workforce issues are needed to promote success in the department’s future use of other transactions. DHS’s policy guidance does not specify when audit requirements should be included in its other transactions agreements to help ensure, for example, that payments to contractors are accurate. By not establishing other transactions training requirements and schedules for its contracting and program staff to complete them, DHS may not be equipping its staff to fully understand and leverage the benefits of other transactions. Acquisition Workforce Capacity May Limit DHS’s Ability To Manage A Growing Future Other Transactions Workload The S&T Directorate plans an increasing number of mission programs that could use its other transactions authority, but DHS’s current contracting workforce may not be sufficient to manage this workload. DHS is currently developing a plan to address contracting workforce issues. The use of other transactions may help attract high-tech commercial firms that have shied away from doing business with the government because of the requirements mandated by the laws and regulations that apply to traditional procurement contracts. We found that industry’s views vary on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach efforts. Lack of Systematic Assessment of Acquisition Activities Involving Other Transactions Impairs Ability to Capture and Use Knowledge The S&T Directorate’s capacity to build and sustain knowledge for use in its future acquisitions involving other transactions is in the early stages of development but the Directorate has not yet developed policies or procedures to ensure that program and portfolio managers are capturing and assessing critical information and knowledge gained from its acquisition activities, including the use of other transactions, for use in future projects. Recommendations To promote the efficient and effective use by DHS of its other transactions authority to meet its mission needs, we have three recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary should direct the Under Secretary for Management and the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to establish guidance on when it is appropriate to include audit provisions in develop a training program for DHS staff in the use of other transactions to help ensure the appropriate use of this authority, and capture knowledge obtained during the acquisition process for use in planning and implementing future other transactions projects.

Why GAO Did This Study The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a pilot program for the use of acquisition agreements known as "other transactions." Because they are exempt from many of the requirements that apply to government contracts, other transactions can be useful in acquiring cutting-edge technologies from entities that traditionally have declined to do business with the government. The act requires GAO to report to Congress on the use of other transactions by DHS. To fulfill this obligation, GAO (1) determined if DHS has developed policies and established a workforce to manage other transactions effectively and (2) evaluated how effectively DHS has used its other transactions authority to attract nontraditional government contractors. What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security has issued policy and is developing a workforce to implement its other transactions authority, but the department's policies need further development and its contracting workforce needs strengthening to promote the successful use of the authority in the future. Soon after it was established, DHS issued other transactions solicitations using some commonly accepted acquisition practices and knowledge-based acquisition principles. Subsequently, the department issued a management directive and drafted guidance for using other transactions, loosely modeled on the practices of the Department of Defense (DOD), one of several other agencies with other transactions authority and the one with the most experience with using these agreements. Unlike DOD, however, DHS has not specified in its policies or guidance when its contracting staff should consider the use of independent audits to help ensure, for example, that payments to contractors are accurate. Similarly, DHS has not established training requirements to aid staff in understanding and leveraging the benefits of other transactions. The DHS contracting workforce is limited in size and capacity, which could impede the department's ability to manage a potential increase in its other transactions workload. DHS is taking steps to enhance the capacity of its contracting workforce. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate included nontraditional government contractors in its first two other transactions projects. The Directorate engaged in extensive outreach efforts, such as conducting briefings on its mission and research needs to industry and academic institutions and using a number of Web-based tools to publicize its solicitations. But DHS has not yet developed mechanisms to capture and assess the knowledge gained about the use of other transactions. As a result, DHS may not be able to leverage information from current projects for use in future solicitations that use other transactions.

gao_GAO-15-674

gao_GAO-15-674_0

DOD uses naval distillate fuel, known as F-76, to power nonnuclear ships. DOD Guidance on Alternative Fuels DOD Directive 4180.01, DOD Energy Policy, among other things, establishes that DOD will diversify and expand its energy supplies and sources, including alternative fuels.responsibilities for various matters, including the following: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs for development, certification, qualification, field demonstration, and ongoing purchases of alternative fuels for operational platforms in accordance with the U.S. Code; is to develop policy and guidelines and provide oversight The Director, Defense Logistics Agency is to (1) manage energy commodities and related services to support the qualification of alternative fuels and support field demonstration activities; and ; and (2) provide energy expertise The Secretaries of the military departments are to develop and implement doctrine, guidance, and strategies consistent with the directive and implementing instructions. Promoting the development of alternative fuels—in the form of testing and approving them for use by existing military platforms, and helping to catalyze a competitive biofuels industry—constitutes one means for achieving this goal. The DPA fund manager is the Secretary of Defense. DOD Purchases Alternative Fuels to Test and Validate that the Fuel Can Meet Safety, Performance, and Reliability Standards DOD Has Purchased Small Quantities of Alternative Fuels DOD has purchased small quantities of alternative fuels for research, development, and demonstration purposes but not large quantities for military operations yet. The military departments purchased about 2.0 million gallons of alternative jet and naval distillate fuels from fiscal years 2007 through 2014 to conduct the department’s testing, approving, and demonstration activities, at a total cost of about $58.6 million (adjusted for inflation to fiscal year 2015 dollars using the gross domestic product price index). According to DOD officials, the By contrast, over the same period of time, the military departments purchased approximately 32.0 billion gallons of jet and naval distillate conventional petroleum fuel at a total cost of about $107.2 billion (adjusted for inflation to fiscal year 2015 dollars using the gross domestic product price index). DOD Has a Standard Process to Purchase All Fuels for Military Operations and is Currently Required to Ensure Alternative Fuel Purchases for Operational Purposes Are Cost-Competitive with Conventional Fuels DOD Uses a Standard Process to Purchase Large-Scale Volumes of Fuel for Military Operations DOD has a standard process in place for purchasing large-scale volumes of fuel, including alternative fuels, for military operations. DLA-E considers two primary factors—technical acceptability and price—when evaluating fuel vendors’ submitted proposals. The Department of Agriculture plans, under the authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, to contribute up to $161 million to alternative fuel purchases to help defray some of the extra costs—which may include the costs of feedstocks—that would have caused the final alternative fuel to be more expensive than the price of conventional fuels for DOD. DOD Has Used DPA Title III Authority for Two Biofuel Production Projects Bio-Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene Project DOD first used Title III authority in relation to alternative fuels in 2010, for the purpose of producing Bio-Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene, an alternative jet and naval distillate fuel made from the Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids production process. Alternative fuels made from this process can meet DOD’s technical fuel specifications when blended with conventional fuels. The Departments of Energy and the Navy plan to apply their funds through the DPA. Agency Comments We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on our findings, which we have incorporated where appropriate.

Why GAO Did This Study DOD is the single largest consumer of energy in the federal government, spending billions of dollars annually on petroleum fuels to support military operations. One of DOD's strategic operational energy goals is to expand its energy supply options. Investing in alternative fuels—liquid fuels, derived from non-petroleum feedstocks, whose use does not necessitate any modifications to platforms and equipment—represents one means of potentially achieving this goal. GAO was asked to examine aspects of DOD's investment in alternative fuels. GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD (1) has purchased alternative fuels, and has demonstrated these fuels can meet its safety, performance, and reliability standards; (2) has a process for purchasing alternative fuels for military operations that takes into consideration any cost differences between alternative and conventional fuels; and (3) has used the DPA authorities to promote the development of a domestic biofuel industry. GAO reviewed past alternative and conventional petroleum fuel procurements, as well as statutes, regulations, and DOD guidance related to fuel purchases. Also, GAO reviewed various documents on biofuel projects initiated under the DPA authority and interviewed cognizant DOD officials involved with purchasing and using fuel and administering the biofuel projects. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on the findings, which GAO has incorporated where appropriate. What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has purchased small quantities of alternative fuels—jet and naval distillate (known as F-76, to power ships)—for testing and demonstration purposes, but has not done so yet for military operations. DOD's testing process validates the ability of alternative fuels to meet safety, performance, and reliability standards for military equipment and platforms. From fiscal years 2007 through 2014, DOD purchased about 2.0 million gallons of alternative fuel for testing purposes, at a cost of about $58.6 million. Over the same period, it purchased about 32.0 billion gallons of petroleum fuel at a cost of about $107.2 billion. DOD has approved alternative fuels made from two production processes for use in certain items and is continuing to test others. DOD is currently required by law to ensure alternative fuel purchases for operational purposes are cost-competitive with conventional fuels and has a standard process to purchase large-scale volumes of all fuels. Proposals are evaluated according to technical acceptability and price. To help the Navy purchase alternative jet and naval distillate fuels blended with conventional fuels, the Department of Agriculture plans to provide funding directly to alternative fuel vendors that meet certain requirements and receive awards from DOD. These funds are intended to defray some of the alternative fuel producer's extra costs—such as costs of domestic feedstocks. Per DOD, no alternative fuel vendors have received awards so none of these funds have been paid out yet. DOD has used financial incentives provided for by Title III of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to help facilitate the development of commercially viable plants for producing biofuels for the military and commercial sectors. To date, DOD has used this authority for two ongoing projects: Bio-Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene and Advanced Drop-In Biofuels Production Project and the federal government's cost share for these projects was about $234.1 million.

gao_GAO-15-332T

gao_GAO-15-332T_0

Cost Increases and Schedule Delays at the Four Largest Projects Occurred for a Variety of Reasons Cost Increases and Schedule Delays In our April 2013 report, we found that costs increased and schedules were delayed for all four of VA’s largest medical-facility construction projects, when comparing November 2012 construction project data with the cost and schedule estimates first submitted to Congress. Since our 2013 report, these projects have experienced further increases and delays. For example, the cost for the New Orleans project increased by nearly $40 million. The delays now range from 14 to 86 months. For instance, the delays in Orlando have extended from 39 months to 57 months. Reasons for Cost Increases and Schedule Delays and Related Scope Changes In our April 2013 report, we found that different factors contributed to cost increases and schedule delays at each of the four locations we reviewed: Changing health care needs of the local veteran population changed the scope of the Las Vegas project. Decisions to change plans from a shared university/VA medical center to a stand-alone VA medical center affected plans in Denver and New Orleans. Unanticipated events in Las Vegas, New Orleans, and Denver also led to delays. VA Took Steps to Improve Its Construction Management Practices, But Did Not Implement Changes Early Enough to Impact Denver Project In our April 2013 report, we found that VA had taken steps to improve its management of major medical-facility construction projects, including creating a construction-management review council. In April 2012, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs established the Construction Review Council to serve as the single point of oversight and performance accountability for the planning, budgeting, executing, and delivering of VA’s real property capital-asset program. In our 2013 report we also found that VA had taken steps to implement a new project delivery method—called the Integrated Design and Construction (IDC) method. In response to the construction industry’s concerns that VA and other federal agencies did not involve the construction contractor early in the design process, VA and the Army Corps of Engineers began working to establish a project delivery model that would allow for earlier contractor involvement in a construction project, as is often done in the private sector. We found in 2013 that VA did not implement IDC early enough in Denver to garner the full benefits. VA Reports Taking Actions to Implement GAO Recommendations In our April 2013 report we identified systemic reasons that contributed to overall schedule delays and cost increases, and recommended that VA take actions to improve its construction management of major medical facilities: including (1) developing guidance on the use of medical equipment planners; (2) sharing information on the roles and responsibilities of VA construction project management staff; and (3) streamlining the change order process. VA has implemented our recommendations; however, the impact of these actions may take time to show improvements, especially for ongoing construction projects, depending on several issues, including the relationship between VA and the contractor. Since completing our April 2013 report, we have not reviewed the extent to which these actions have affected the four projects, or the extent to which these actions may have helped to avoid the cost overruns and delays that occurred on that specific project. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary of VA develop and implement agency guidance to assign medical equipment planners to major medical construction projects. This can cause confusion for contractors and architectural and engineering firms, ultimately affecting the relationship between VA and the general contractor. Participants from VA’s 2011 industry forum also reported that VA roles and responsibilities for contracting officials were not always clear and made several recommendations to VA to address this issue. Therefore, in our 2013 report, we recommended that VA develop and disseminate procedures for communicating—to contractors—clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects, particularly those in the change-order process. Streamlining the Change- Order Process On August 29, 2013, VA issued a handbook for construction contract modification (change-order) processing which includes milestones for completing processing of modifications based on their dollar value.

Why GAO Did This Study The VA operates one of the nation's largest health care delivery systems. In April 2013, GAO reported that VA was managing the construction of 50 major medical-facility projects at a cost of more than $12 billion. This statement discusses VA construction management issues, specifically, (1) the extent to which the cost, schedule, and scope for four selected major medical-facility projects has changed and the reasons for these changes, (2) actions GAO reported that VA had taken since 2012 to improve its construction management practices, and (3) VA's response to GAO's recommendations for further improvements in its management of these construction projects. This statement is based on GAO's April 2013 report ( GAO-13-302 ) and May 2013 ( GAO-13-556T ) and April 2014 ( GAO-14-548T ) testimonies. GAO included selected updates on VA projects--”located in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida--and documentation obtained from VA in April 2014 and January 2015. What GAO Found In April 2013, GAO found that costs substantially increased and schedules were delayed for Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) largest medical-facility construction projects, located in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida. As of January 2015, in comparison with initial estimates, the cost increases for these projects ranged from 66 percent to 144 percent and delays ranged from 14 to 86 months. Since the 2013 report, some of the projects have experienced further cost increases and delays. For example, the cost for the New Orleans project increased by nearly $40 million, and delays at the Orlando project has extended from 39 months to 57 months. Several factors, including changes to veterans' health care needs, site-acquisition issues, and a decision in Denver to change plans from a medical center shared with a local medical university to a stand-alone VA medical center, contributed to increased costs and schedule delays. In its April 2013 report, GAO found that VA had taken some actions since 2012 to address problems managing major construction projects. Specifically, VA established a Construction Review Council in April 2012 to oversee the department's development and execution of its real property programs. VA also took steps to implement a new project delivery method, called Integrated Design and Construction, which involves the construction contractor early in the design process to identify any potential problems early and speed the construction process. However, in Denver, VA did not implement this method early enough to garner the full benefits of having a contractor early in the design phase. VA stated it has taken actions to implement the recommendations in GAO's April 2013 report. In that report, GAO identified systemic reasons that contributed to overall schedule delays and cost increases at one or more of four reviewed projects and recommended ways VA could improve its management of the construction of major medical facilities. In response, VA has issued guidance on assigning medical equipment planners to major medical facility projects who will be responsible for matching the equipment needed for the facility in order to avoid late design changes leading to cost increases and delays; developed and disseminated procedures for communicating to contractors clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects to avoid confusion that can affect the relationship between VA and the contractor; and issued a handbook for construction contract modification (change-order) processing which includes milestones for completing processing of modifications based on their dollar value and took other actions to streamline the change order process to avoid project delays. VA has implemented GAO's recommendations; however, the impact of these actions may take time to show improvements, especially for ongoing construction projects, depending on several issues, including the relationship between VA and the contractor. What GAO Recommends In its April 2013 report, GAO recommended that VA (1) develop and implement agency guidance for assignment of medical equipment planners; (2) develop and disseminate procedures for communicating to contractors clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA officials; (3) issue and take steps to implement guidance on streamlining the change-order process. VA implemented GAO's recommendations.

gao_GAO-08-652T

gao_GAO-08-652T_0

NTSB Has Made Progress in Improving Many Management Practices, But Further Improvements are Needed in Training and Financial Management Overall, NTSB has made progress in following leading management practices in the eight areas in which we made recommendations in 2006. Among the areas that NTSB has made the most progress is improving communication from staff to management, which should help staff and management build more constructive relationships, identify operational and work-life improvements, and enable management to better understand and respond to issues faced by investigators and other staff. For example, NTSB has revised its strategic plan to follow some performance- based requirements, and it has developed strategic human capital and IT plans. Although these plans still offer room for improvement, they establish a solid foundation for NTSB to move forward, both broadly as an agency and specifically with respect to IT efforts. NTSB Has Made Improvements Related to Accident Investigation, But Its Safety Impact Could be Greater with More Safety Studies NTSB has improved the efficiency of activities related to investigating accidents, such as selecting accidents to investigate and tracking the status of recommendations, but it has not increased its use of safety studies (see fig. NTSB has improved its process for selecting accidents to investigate by developing transparent, risk-based criteria for selecting which rail, pipeline, and hazardous materials accidents to investigate and which aviation accidents to investigate at the scene, or remotely, in a limited manner. The completion of its effort to develop similar criteria for marine accidents will help provide assurance and transparency that the agency is managing investigative resources in a manner that ensures a maximum safety benefit. NTSB Has Made Progress in Increasing the Utilization of the Training Center, But the Facility Remains Underutilized While NTSB has taken steps to increase the utilization of the training center and to decrease the center’s overall deficit, the classroom space remains significantly underutilized. The agency increased utilization of classroom space in the training center from 10 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 13 percent in fiscal year 2007. The agency’s actions to increase utilization also helped increase training center revenues from about $630,000 in fiscal year 2005 to about $820,000 in fiscal year 2007. In addition, for fiscal year 2008, NTSB’s March 2008 business plan for the training center estimates that revenues will increase by about $570,000 to about $1.4 million and expenses will be $2.6 million, leaving a deficit of about $1.2 million. Going forward, however, the agency’s business plan for the training center lacks specific strategies to explain how further increases in utilization and revenue enhancement can be achieved. In addition to the weaknesses addressed in these recommendations, our limited review of NTSB’s information security controls identified two new weaknesses regarding unencrypted laptop computers and excessive access privileges on users’ workstations. Recommendations for Executive Action To assist NTSB in continuing to strengthen its overall management of the agency as well as information security, we are making three recommendations to the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. For example, the Chief Information Officer has documented prior recommendations and newly identified vulnerabilities in a plan of action and milestones and is monitoring corrective actions to implement the recommendations and mitigate the vulnerabilities. NTSB has completed a risk assessment of its general support system in February 2008. What an Independent Auditor Found The independent auditor identified several weaknesses in NTSB’s access controls. 3. The agency has procured and in some cases begun to implement automated software tools to help implement recommendations related to granting, removing, and recertifying users’ access permissions. In addition, agency officials have recently taken action to develop a formal privacy program; however, work remains before it is fully compliant with the requirements of the Privacy Act. The agency expects this training to be available in June 2008.

Why GAO Did This Study The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) plays a vital role in advancing transportation safety by investigating accidents, determining their causes, issuing safety recommendations, and conducting safety studies. To support its mission, NTSB's training center provides training to NTSB investigators and others. It is important that NTSB use its resources efficiently to carry out its mission. In 2006, GAO made recommendations to NTSB in most of these areas. In 2007, an independent auditor made information security recommendations. This testimony addresses NTSB's progress in following leading practices in selected management areas, increasing the efficiency of aspects of investigating accidents and conducting safety studies, increasing the utilization of its training center, and improving information security. This testimony is based on GAO's assessment of agency plans and procedures developed to address these recommendations. What GAO Found NTSB has made progress in following leading management practices in the eight areas in which GAO made prior recommendations. For example, the agency has improved communication from staff to management by conducting periodic employee surveys, which should help build more constructive relationships within NTSB. Similarly, the agency has made significant progress in improving strategic planning, human capital management, and IT management. It has issued new strategic plans in each area. Although the plans still leave room for improvement, they establish a solid foundation for NTSB to move forward. However, until the agency has developed a full cost accounting system and a strategic training plan, it will miss other opportunities to strengthen the management of the agency. NTSB has improved the efficiency of activities related to investigating accidents and tracking the status of recommendations. For example, it has developed transparent, risk-based criteria for selecting which rail, pipeline, hazardous materials, and aviation accidents to investigate at the scene. The completion of similar criteria for marine accidents will help provide assurance that NTSB is managing its resources in a manner to ensure a maximum safety benefit. Also, it is in the process of automating its lengthy, paper-based process for closing-out recommendations. Although NTSB has increased the utilization of its training center--from 10 percent in fiscal year 2006 to a projected 24 percent fiscal year 2008--the classroom space remains significantly underutilized. The increased utilization has helped increase revenues and reduce the center's overall deficit, which declined from about $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to about $2.3 million in fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2008, NTSB expects the deficit to decline further to about $1.2 million due, in part, to increased revenues from subleasing some classrooms starting July 2008. However the agency's business plan for the training center lacks specific strategies to achieve further increases in utilization and revenue. NTSB has made progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses. For example, in an effort to implement an effective information security program, the agency's Chief Information Officer is monitoring corrective actions and has procured and, in some cases, begun to implement automated processes and tools to help strengthen its information security controls. While improvements have been made, work remains before the agency is fully compliant with federal policies, requirements, and standards pertaining to information security, access controls, and data privacy. In addition, GAO identified new weaknesses related to unencrypted laptops and excessive user access privileges. Agency officials attributed these weaknesses to incompatible encryption software and a mission need for certain users. Until the agency addresses these weaknesses, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of NTSB's information and information systems continue to be at risk.

gao_GAO-10-406

gao_GAO-10-406_0

Background Since it started development in 2003, FCS was at the center of the Army’s efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. DOD directed the Army to transition to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles (GCV). In Implementing DOD Direction, the Army Is Moving Away from Many of Its FCS Approaches The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decision to significantly restructure the FCS program. It established a key task force to refine its future force concepts and modernization plans and has moved away from FCS as the centerpiece of ground force modernization. 2). The third acquisition program would develop a new GCV. Networking capabilities will be expected to meet specific standards and interface requirements. Acquisition Direction and FCS Lessons Learned Offer Opportunities to Increase the Likelihood of Successful Outcomes The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground force modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the right capabilities at the best value. However, in the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of one brigade set of Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that the systems are immature, are unreliable, and cannot perform as required. The Under Secretary also said that he was aware of the importance of fielding systems to the current warfighter and that the flexibility to deploy components as available would allow DOD to “best support” the Secretary of Defense’s direction to “win the wars we are in.” Because of that, the Under Secretary specified that a number of actions be taken over the next year or more and directed the Army to work toward having all components for the program fielded as soon as possible and to deploy components of the program as they are ready. As we have noted, at this time, detailed plans for these efforts are still being developed and may not be available until at least later in fiscal year 2010 as those plans are solidified and approved. Until late in the FCS program, DOD passed on opportunities to hold the FCS program accountable to more knowledge-based acquisition principles. For instance, at an October 2009 DOD review, the Army offered preliminary plans for post-FCS efforts. The Army’s fiscal year 2011 budget request does not provide sufficient details to allay all concerns. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology To outline the Army’s preliminary post–Future Combat System (FCS) plans, we obtained and reviewed proposed plans for the Army’s new modernization approach. To identify the challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army will need to address as they proceed with Army ground force modernization efforts, we reviewed relevant Army and DOD documents, including the Secretary of Defense’s April 6, 2009, announcement on restructuring FCS and the June 23, 2009, acquisition decision memorandum that implemented the Secretary’s proposed restructure; the Army Capstone Concept; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation’s Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report; the Comprehensive Lessons Learned White Paper; and the Army Modernization White Paper.

Why GAO Did This Study Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the program. As a result, the Army has outlined a new approach to ground force modernization. This report (1) outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS plans and (2) identifies the challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army must address as they proceed with Army ground force modernization efforts. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analyses, visited test facilities where the Army evaluated FCS equipment, and interviewed DOD and Army officials. What GAO Found With DOD having canceled the FCS acquisition program, the Army has moved away from FCS as the centerpiece of ground force modernization. Although the Army is still refining its post-FCS plans, it has already taken a number of actions to comply with DOD directions and define new modernization initiatives. For instance, the Army has terminated FCS vehicle development and is preparing for a new ground combat vehicle program. Also, Army officials convened a special task force to refine future force concepts and formulate an expedited fielding strategy. The Army also announced preliminary plans for new acquisition programs. With ground force modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the challenge of setting the emerging modernization efforts on the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. They have an opportunity to position these efforts for success by effectively implementing the enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms as well as lessons learned from the FCS program, including lessons that underscore the use of knowledge-based acquisition and disciplined contracting strategies. Preliminary plans suggest that the Army is moving in that direction, including expectations to begin future developments with mature technologies and utilizing competitive prototyping. However, DOD recently approved, with a number of restrictions, low-rate initial production of the first increment of FCS spinout equipment, such as new radios and sensors, despite having acknowledged that the systems were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. The restrictions include required DOD reviews of Army progress toward improving the systems' maturity and reliability. The spin out equipment was being developed within the FCS program, and the decision to approve production reflects DOD and Army emphasis on providing new capabilities quickly to combat units. However, this decision runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored. Detailed plans for most of the Army's new modernization efforts are still being developed and may not be available until at least later in fiscal year 2010. That will be a limiting factor as the Congress considers the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget request for these modernization efforts.

gao_NSIAD-96-9

gao_NSIAD-96-9_0

The military EO program applies only to military personnel. During our review, we identified many differences among the services’ complaint procedures. The following are three examples: Deadlines for filing complaints. Avenues for filing complaints. Complaint documentation. Most often, commands could not document that they had followed up to ensure complainants had not been subjected to reprisal. Some EO specialists who lacked direct access to the commander were dissatisfied with the visibility given the EO program. All the bases conducted a limited number of unit-specific climate assessments, but we found no evidence that the Social Actions Offices followed up to determine whether remedies to identified EO problems had been implemented. EO Training Is Incomplete and Undocumented Commanders do not receive training in managing the EO program, even though they are responsible for its success. Not All Complaints Are Reported Although DOD requires the collection of EO complaint data, some EO complaints and incidents are not reported up the chain of command. Among the reasons for these omissions were (1) units did not report complaints to the person or office responsible for gathering complaint data; (2) commands differed in their views about which complaints should be reported and when; and (3) incidents were resolved outside EO channels, such as incidents adjudicated through the military justice system. In its May 1995 report, DEOC found that enhanced data collection and reporting would improve DOD’s efforts to deal with EO complaints systematically. Copies also will be made available to others upon request. We asked the focus groups six basic questions concerning their respective service’s equal opportunity (EO) program and complaints process. However, we noted a prevailing sense that the military was a good EO employer and that although discrimination and harassment occurred, these were not major problems. In many of the focus groups—especially among the lower-ranked enlisted members—fear of reprisal and a lack of faith in the chain of command were cited as reasons they would be reluctant to use the EO complaints process. Scope and Methodology We reviewed the Department of Defense’s and the services’ policies and procedures governing the EO program, including the complaint process, and interviewed officials responsible for developing EO policies at the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and at the services’ headquarters.

Why GAO Did This Study Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military's equal opportunity (EO) program, focusing on: (1) the services' processes for handling EO complaints; and (2) whether there are opportunities for improving these processes. What GAO Found GAO found that: (1) in implementing the military EO program, the four military services have established different complaint processes; (2) among these differences are the deadlines for filing a complaint, the channels available for filing a complaint, and the documentation used to record complaint processing and followup reviews; (3) not all the commands GAO visited were following their service's prescribed complaint procedures; (4) most important, some commands could not document that they had followed up on complaints after they were resolved to determine whether the complainants had experienced reprisal or further discrimination; (5) GAO's review identified a number of areas that offer opportunities for improving the services' EO programs, specifically: (a) some EO specialists were not used effectively because they did not have direct access to the commander, served very large populations, or had too many other duties to perform; (b) some commands made no use or very limited use of climate assessments to evaluate and improve the health of the EO environment; (c) EO training for commanders, who are responsible for managing the EO program, and for servicemembers was incomplete and undocumented; and (d) some EO complaints and incidents were not reported up the chain of command; (6) the Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC), in its May 1995 report, stated that although no single complaint process would be workable for all the services, some common standards should be followed; (7) DEOC also identified a number of opportunities for improving the military EO program, including the need to reduce servicemembers' fear of reprisal for filing a complaint; (8) based on focus group sessions conducted with servicemembers, GAO noted an overall sense that the military was a good EO employer and that although discrimination and harassment occur, these were not major problems; and (9) however, the focus groups also reinforced DEOC's concerns about problems with EO complaint systems.

gao_NSIAD-96-199

gao_NSIAD-96-199_0

Javelin’s Design May Not Be Stable The Army has not demonstrated that Javelin’s design is sufficiently stable for a multiyear production contract. Operational Testing of Javelin Is Inadequate Even though it is making over 50 separate changes to Javelin’s original design, the Army does not plan to conduct any operational tests of missiles with all of the design changes until after full-rate production begins under a multiyear contract. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to (1) award annual (vice multiyear) Javelin contracts for the minimum quantity needed to sustain production until the Army demonstrates that the system’s design is stable, (2) operationally test the redesigned Javelin before proceeding to full-rate production, and (3) modify the third low-rate production contract to reduce command launch unit production from 125 to the contractor’s minimum production level of 3 units per month or 36 total units. To determine the adequacy of planned system testing, we obtained and reviewed test plans and reports from the Javelin Project Office. GAO Comments 1. 2. Javelin’s design has been in transition since it was operationally tested in 1993. 4.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO reviewed the Army's procurement of the Javelin missile system, focusing on whether the: (1) system meets established criteria for multiyear production contracts; (2) Army adequately tested the system to determine its suitability for full-rate production; and (3) Army's purchase of command launch units during limited production is appropriate. What GAO Found GAO found that the Army: (1) has not demonstrated that the Javelin's design is sufficiently stable for multiyear production; (2) does not plan to conduct operational testing of the missile until after full-rate production begins; (3) has extensively redesigned the system since it was operationally tested in 1993; (4) believes that its planned testing of the system will be adequate; (5) has conducted only limited testing, which may not be useful for predicting the system's reliability; and (6) could acquire fewer units under its low-rate initial production contract and still sustain the contractor's ability to produce the system.

gao_GAO-04-163

gao_GAO-04-163_0

Terrorists Use Various Alternative Financing Mechanisms to Earn, Move, and Store Their Assets Terrorists use an assortment of alternative financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store their assets. Terrorists Move Assets via Systems and Commodities That Allow Ease of Concealment and Liquidity To move assets, terrorists use mechanisms that enable them to conceal or launder their assets through nontransparent trade or financial transactions such as charities, informal banking systems, bulk cash, and commodities such as precious stones and metals. Extent of Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms Is Unknown The true extent of terrorist use of alternative financing mechanisms is unknown, owing to the criminal nature of the activity and the lack of systematic data collection and analyses. U.S. Law Enforcement Does Not Systematically Collect and Analyze Data on Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms U.S. law enforcement agencies—specifically, the FBI, which leads terrorist financing investigations and operations—do not systematically collect and analyze data on terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms. The Departments of the Treasury and of Justice have yet to produce their report on how money is being moved or value is being transferred via the trade in precious stones and commodities. This report was required by March 2003 under the 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy. The information gained in the report was to form the basis of an informed strategy for addressing this financing mechanism. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs’ Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia and the Chairman of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control asked us to assess (1) the nature of terrorists’ use of key alternative financing mechanisms for earning, moving, and storing terrorists’ assets; (2) what is known about the extent of terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms; and (3) the challenges that the U.S. government faces in monitoring terrorists’ use of alternative financing mechanisms.

Why GAO Did This Study Cutting off terrorists' funding is essential to deterring terrorist operations. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access and share financial information regarding terrorist investigations, but terrorists may have adjusted their activities by increasing use of alternative financing mechanisms. GAO was asked to assess (1) the nature of terrorists' use of key alternative financing mechanisms for earning, moving, and storing terrorists' assets; (2) what is known about the extent of terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms; and (3) challenges that the U.S. government faces in monitoring terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms. What GAO Found Terrorists use many alternative financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store assets. They earn assets by selling contraband cigarettes and illicit drugs, by misusing charitable organizations that collect large donations, and by other means. They move funds by concealing their assets through nontransparent mechanisms such as charities, informal banking systems, and commodities such as precious stones and metals. To store assets, terrorists may choose similar commodities that maintain their value and liquidity. The extent of terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms is unknown, owing to the criminal nature of terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms and the lack of systematic data collection and analysis of case information. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does not systematically collect and analyze data on these mechanisms. Furthermore, the Departments of the Treasury and of Justice have not yet produced a report, required under the 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy, which was to form the basis of a strategy to address how money is moved or value transferred via trade in precious stones and commodities. In monitoring terrorists' use of alternative financing mechanisms, the U.S. government faces a number of challenges, including accessing ethnically or criminally based terrorist networks, targeting high-risk financing mechanisms that the adaptable terrorists use, and sharing data on charities with state officials. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has committed to, but has yet to establish, procedures for such data sharing.