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Data Exfiltration The second module Irdsnhrxxxfery98.~ is responsible for a vast amount of information stealing, and is able to collect information through hooking, clipboard usage, and monitoring the keystate | ['T1115'] |
Cadelspy’s main payload contains its back door functionality, allowing the threat to carry out the following activities: Log keystrokes and the titles of open windows Gather clipboard data and system information Steal printer information and any documents that were sent to be printed Record audio Capture screenshots and webcam photos Cadelspy compresses all of the stolen data into a .cab file and uploads it to the attacker’s C&C servers | ['T1115'] |
Scan the network environment of the infected machine; checks for availability of specific ports on servers that share the same internal and external subnet mask (i.e 255.255.0.0\16) | ['T1046'] |
Mimikatz The threat actors also uploaded tools to scan for and exploit potential vulnerabilities in the network, such as the well-known SMB vulnerability patched in commonly exploited by EternalBlue to move laterally to other systems on the network. | ['T1046'] |
What changes in the code can we see in such short time intervals that would not be present in a build tool? In one case, one build was programmed to execute the runmem command for a file named wi.exe while the other was not | ['T1036'] |
Filename SHA256 Description 7za.exe dd6d7af00ef4ca89a319a230cdd094275c3a1d365807fe5b34133324bdaa0229 7-Zip 17.01 beta nbt.exe c9d5dc956841e000bfd8762e2f0b48b66c79b79500e894b4efa7fb9ba17e4e9e nbtscan 1.0.35 rx.exe a6a0fbfee08367046d3d26fb4b4cf7779f7fb6eaf7e60e1d9b6bf31c5be5b63e IntelliAdmin Remote Execute v1.0 Table 5 | ['T1036'] |
Filename SHA256 Description 7za.exe dd6d7af00ef4ca89a319a230cdd094275c3a1d365807fe5b34133324bdaa0229 7-Zip 17.01 beta hb.exe 3ca3a957c526eaeabcf17b0b2cd345c0fffab549adfdf04470b6983b87f7ec62 Hobocopy nbt.exe c9d5dc956841e000bfd8762e2f0b48b66c79b79500e894b4efa7fb9ba17e4e9e nbtscan 1.0.35 rx.exe a6a0fbfee08367046d3d26fb4b4cf7779f7fb6eaf7e60e1d9b6bf31c5be5b63e IntelliAdmin Remote Execute v1.0 tardigrade.exe fe1b011fe089969d960d2dce2a61020725a02e15dbc812ee6b6ecc6a98875392 Tardigrade application | ['T1036'] |
In one instance, the threat actor gained remote access to a high-value system in a compromised network, ran quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on the device, immediately ran a command to compile a RAR archive that specified file types the threat actor did not want, and used a password to encrypt the archive: YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss quser YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe a -m5 -v2000m -hp{password} -inul -r "{destination_file.rar}" "{multiple user directories linked to the victim's projects}" -x*.exe -x*.msi -x*.cab -x*.inc -x*.dll -x*.db -x*.mdb -x*.htm -x*.html -x*.css -x*.jar -x*.js -x*.tmp -x*.bak -x*.dat -x*.log -x*.xml -x*.dmp -x*.dbf -x*.avi -x*.mp3 -x*.mp4 -x*.mpg -x*.mpeg -x*.asp -x*.aspx -x*.gif -x*.jpg -x*.mpp -x*.pst The threat actors typically rename the encrypted RAR archives | ['T1036'] |
SHA256 a77f9e441415dbc8a20ad66d4d00ae606faab370ffaee5604e93ed484983d3ff MD5 1ff40e79d673461cd33bd8b68f8bb5b8 Compiled 2017.08.06 11:32:36 (GMT), 2.22 Type I386 Windows Console EXE Size 101 888 Instead of implementing this auxiliary module in the form of a dynamic linked library with its corresponding exported functions, the developers decided to use a standalone executable started by events.exe with the following parameters: Parameter Description -scr Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration | ['T1036'] |
The file is named netwf.dat | ['T1036'] |
The account names visually look similar to legitimate government organization names or other trusted third-party entities | ['T1036'] |
The initial overlap was based on the filename wmssl.exe, which was seen as an executable name that Cannon would move the wmssl.txt attachment to install and execute a secondary payload | ['T1036'] |
Writing executables to a randomly-selected directory under Program Files, and naming the EXE to match the chosen directory name, or, if that fails, writing the executable to a system-generated temporary file name, using the EXE extension 3 | ['T1036'] |
The malware drops the Windows batch file dx.bat, which attempts to kill the task daumcleaner.exe; a Korean security program | ['T1036'] |
The “VPN Client” is a legitimate Juniper VPN software bundled with Helminth, a malware in use by the OilRig threat agnet: JuniperSetupClientInstaller.exe 6a65d762fb548d2dc56cfde4842a4d3c (VirusTotal link) If the victim downloads and installs the file, their computer would get infected, while the legitimate VPN software is installed | ['T1036'] |
For example, we analyzed a DropIt sample (SHA256: cca268c13885ad5751eb70371bbc9ce8c8795654fedb90d9e3886cbcfe323671) that dropped two executables, one of which was saved to “%TEMP%\flash_update.exe” that was a legitimate Flash Player installer | ['T1036'] |
Figure 10: Network traffic to download final payload (words.exe) Once executed, the file performs the following activities: Drops a copy of itself in %AppData%\svchost.exe\svchost.exe and drops an XML file, which contains configuration information for Task Scheduler (as shown in Figure 11) | ['T1036'] |
Firstly, the reason this has been named MirageFox instead of just Mirage, is because in the Export directory for the modules, the name field is filled with a string MirageFox_Server.dat | ['T1036'] |
The wave against the government entity (June 26) also involved a simple PE file attachment (SHA256: d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520) using the filename tafahom.exe | ['T1036'] |
After the .NET PE file has been run, we observed the same behavior as the above QUADAGENT sample of dropping a PowerShell script with the filename SystemDiskClean.ps1 alongside a VBScript file with the same name | ['T1036'] |
The Downloader After the exploit or script executes, the system downloads install.exe, which has the following metadata: MD5 5a0c4e1925c76a959ab0588f683ab437 Size 46592 bytes Compile Time 2014-11-19 08:55:10Z Import Hash 6b8611f8148a6b51e37fd68e75b6a81c The file install.exe attempts to write two files (doc.exe and test.exe) to the hard-coded path “C:\Users\Public”, which fails on Windows XP because that path is not present by default | ['T1036'] |
One example of these samples is given below: SHA256:6500636c29eba70efd3eb3be1d094dfda4ec6cca52ace23d50e98e6b63308fdb The file is a self-extracting RAR, which is a common delivery mechanism for PlugX particularly when the eventual payload will be sideloaded by a legitimate executable | ['T1036'] |
Filename qrat.exe File Size 1093120 bytes MD5 c05e5131b196f43e1d02ca5ccc48ec0e SHA1 f28c592833f234c619917b5c7d8974840a810247 Notes Dropper that installs QuasarRAT file microsoft_network.exe and scheduled task wrapper file Microsoft.Win32.TaskScheduler.dll | ['T1036'] |
Filename Part-I.doc File Size 11349102 bytes MD5 92942c54224cd462dd201ae11a560bb8 SHA1 85a21624df2211af3daf05c86a3fbea8271059d3 Notes Malicious RTF document that exploits CVE-2017-8570 and drops QuasarRAT file qrat.exe | ['T1036'] |
Filename Part-II.doc File Size 10156713 bytes MD5 e32668e569362c96cc56db368b7e821e SHA1 dadc493abbe3e21610539e1d5a42f523626a6132 Notes Malicious RTF document that exploits CVE-2017-8570 and drops QuasarRAT file mico-audio.exe | ['T1036'] |
When the shellcode embedded within the malicious EPS is executed, the following three files are dropped: %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\DeviceSync\VMwareCplLauncher.exe %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\DeviceSync\vmtools.dll %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\DeviceSync\MSBuild.exe In the list of dropped files, VMwareCplLauncher.exe is a legitimate, signed VMware executable that serves to ultimately deliver the BADNEWS payload | ['T1036'] |
The vmtools.dll file is a modified DLL that both ensures persistence and loads MSBuild.exe, which is the BADNEWS malware renamed to spoof a legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio tool | ['T1036'] |
These digital certificates are often issued in the name of rogue and legitimate companies to avoid arousing suspicion from researchers and incident responders | ['T1036'] |
In one instance we observed, one of the initial malware delivered to the victim, RATANKBA (TROJ_RATANKBA.A), connects to a legitimate but compromised website (eye-watch[.]in:443, a mobile application-selling site) from which a hack tool (nbt_scan.exe) is also downloaded | ['T1036'] |
One archive sample analyzed by CTU researchers contained a legitimate PDF file, a benign image of interest to targets (see Figure 8), and an HttpBrowser installer disguised as an image file | ['T1036'] |
The legitimate owaauth.dll file resides in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Auth\ while CTU researchers have observed the backdoor using the same filename in the %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\bin\ directory | ['T1036'] |
It was pretending to be an Adobe flash player update installer on a compromised website to lure users to click for the execution | ['T1036'] |
Whitefly frequently delivers Vcrodat as a malicious DLL that has the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors. | ['T1036'] |
likely in an attempt to masquerade as a red-teaming tool rather than an advanced actor | ['T1036'] |
Using a custom User Agent string or the system's User Agent string derived from urlmon.dll 7 | ['T1543.001'] |
Persistence Once started, the Keydnap backdoor installs a plist file in /Library/LaunchAgents/ if it has root privileges or $USER/Library/LaunchAgents/ otherwise to achieve persistence across reboots | ['T1543.001'] |
Figure 6 shows the Glimpse server responding to an inbound beacon from the Glimpse agent and sending a command whoami | ['T1033'] |
The screenshot also shows the Glimpse server receiving the results of the whoami command executed by the agent | ['T1033'] |
The webshell will save the archives locally to the server in the C:\Users\Public\Libraries\Recorded\Files folder, each with a filename with the following structure: [IP address]_c$_Users_[username]__[Desktop-Documents-Downloads]_[year]-[month]-[day]-[hours]-[minutes]-[seconds].7z It is likely that the threat actors use this functionality to rapidly check for new files created by users on the network | ['T1033'] |
This document was also the first of the mid-November cluster which used the user/USER author name instead of Joohn, further supporting the scenario of the document being copied between systems | ['T1033'] |
The same code snippets are combined into a second stage JavaScript in “C:\Users\<User Name>\” | ['T1033'] |
The username appears to be attacker specified and has occurred in 2017 Bankshot samples | ['T1033'] |
This links the previous samples with this unique username | ['T1033'] |
Note that the username could be a small joke on the attackers’ part regarding the attribution to FIN7 | ['T1033'] |
The magic value 0xFEEDFACF that belongs to Mach-O Executable (64 bit) Methods GET_LAUNCHNAME and GET_LABELNAME will return the hardcoded name of the property list “.plist” for the root user (com.apple.screen.assistantd.plist) and for the regular user (com.apple.spell.agent.plist) | ['T1033'] |
The executable obtains an embedded PowerShell script, decrypts it using RC4, then decompresses it using ZLIB, and saves the cleartext to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Out.jpg | ['T1033'] |
code(2343)", MsgBoxStyle.Critical, null); The dropper then writes the content of the payload which resides as plaintext in a resource within the .NET assembly to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\SystemDiskClean.ps1 | ['T1033'] |
File is dropped to C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft Network\microsoft_network\1.0.0.0\microsoft_network.exe | ['T1033'] |
File starts as mico-audio.exe and installs to C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\google-chrome\crome.exe | ['T1033'] |
For example, in the previous variant of BADNEWS, the victim’s unique identifier was stored under a variable named ‘uid’, the username was stored in a variable named ‘u’, etc | ['T1033'] |
Unique User-Agents The unique User-Agents used in the HTTP communication between SpeakUp to the C&C are a possible path to the identity of the threat actor behind this campaign | ['T1033'] |
(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Further research revealed additional tools containing the same username (see Figure 21) | ['T1033'] |
The SP variable is a string containing the victim's username | ['T1033'] |
It also attempts to issue the following SQL query on the “signons.sqlite” file: “SELECT hostname, encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword FROM moz_logins WHERE timePasswordChanged/1000 BETWEEN ? AND ?” 117 ftpUpload Uses FTPManager:uploadFile method and a supplied server name, username and password | ['T1033'] |
The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com. | ['T1033'] |
Command ID 17 indexes to a function that collects the system information and sends it to the C2 server. | ['T1033'] |
According to the server’s code, the default command that it would issue to newly infected systems was a batch script contained in a file named 0000000000.bat | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
After execution, the malware will use the Dropbox API to make an HTTP GET request using HTTPS over TCP port 443 for the files: MD5 Filename d76261ba3b624933a6ebb5dd73758db4 WmiApCom 79b68cdd0044edd4fbf8067b22878644 WmiApCom.bat The “WmiApCom.bat” file is simply used to start “WmiApCom”, which happens to be the exact same file as the one dropped by the malicious Word documents | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Attackers using Comnie are leveraging malicious macros that initially hide decoy documents and shows them when the victim enables macros | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Comnie allows the attacker to provide and subsequently execute a batch script (BAT), executable file (EXE), or dynamic-link library (DLL) | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
While all payloads can be dynamically updated, at the time of delivery, this task launched a COM scriptlet (“.sct” file extension) that downloaded and executed Meterpreter hosted on images.chinabytes[.]info | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
VBScript #1 The dropped script “58d2a83f7778d5.36783181.vbs” acts as a launcher | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
For example, they stated DROPSHOT uses more advanced anti-emulation techniques, utilizes external scripts for self-deletion, and uses memory injection versus external drivers for deployment | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The following are the three files: Defender.sct – The malicious JavaScript based scriptlet file | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Users can protect themselves from such attacks by disabling Office macros in their settings and also by being more vigilant when enabling macros (especially when prompted) in documents, even if such documents are from seemingly trusted sources | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
While we have not been able to obtain a secondary payload from the Unicorn generated PowerShell script, we believe that this group uses the script to deliver Metasploit’s Meterpreter as a potential payload as well | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Via WMI (winmgmt), the JavaScript or VBscript code in the SCT file spawns a PowerShell one-liner which finally consumes the text file | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Character Description 0 File contains batch commands, it executes the batch commands 1 Rename the temporary file as .ps1 extension 2 Rename the temporary file as .vbs extension Table 2: BONDUPDATER Actions Figure 8 is a screenshot of BONDUPDATER’s DGA implementation | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
To run persistently on the system, the Trojan will first create a VBScript file:SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData\srvResesponded.vbs that contains:CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run(“%app%”) The Trojan replaces the %app% string in the above VBScript with the path to its executable | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The group often uses the trial version of Cobalt Strike, a publicly available commercial software for “Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.” Other public tools used by the group are Metasploit, a well-known free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine; Mimikatz, a post-exploitation tool that performs credential dumping; and Empire, “a PowerShell and Python post-exploitation agent.” For detection and exploitation of internet-facing web servers, CopyKittens use Havij, Acunetix and sqlmap | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The second file is a PowerShell script which appears to be based on a Rapid7 Ruby Exploitation script that loads arbitrary shellcode | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Next, it will copy the first stage shellcode in memory and create a new thread with the shellcode running in it, the code responsible for this execution is shown in Figure 1 | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
For that we can use a Python script, included in Appendix B – Python Scripts | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Essentially, we are discussing ongoing activity revolving around several malware families: KopiLuwak and IcedCoffeer Carbon Mosquito WhiteBear Technical Rattle Turla’s Shifting to Scripting KopiLuwak and IcedCoffee, WhiteBear, and WhiteAtlas Since at least 2015 Turla has leveraged Javascript, powershell, and wsh in a number of ways, including in their malware dropper/installation operations as well as for implementing complete backdoors | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The image is downloaded directly, and the shellcode is loaded and executed in memory | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
(On the left is NavRAT, and on the right is the shellcode of ROKRAT): We performed the same analysis for the shellcode located in the downloaded image file and the shellcode is not exactly the same, but the design is very similar | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Figure 3: Script code embedded in 29[.]html used to download and run Revenge RAT The script shown in Figure 4 is almost identical to the one used by the script contents of 29[.]html (in Figure 3), the only difference being the absence of a sleep command and the usage of the “forfiles” utility | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The downloaded document template contains the malicious macro codes, which executes a VBScript (VBS). | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The attackers typically distribute Netwalker ransomware with the use of a reflective PowerShell loader script that has been protected from casual analysis with several layers of obfuscation. | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The attackers orchestrate attacks using batch or PowerShell scripts that are executed, with the help of domain controllers, on any machine the DC can reach. | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
The files uploaded to this webshell included the same compiled python script that would scan remote systems that were vulnerable to CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue) that we saw uploaded to the other errr.aspx webshell. | ['T1059', 'T1064'] |
Screenshot provided in leak showing administrative panel for hosting provider Berbid Server The screenshot showed the administrative panel for a VPS account on DeltaHost with four different virtual servers, as seen in Figure 20 | ['T1113'] |
Screenshot in leak of administrative panel for an account at DeltaHost If we use the filename of this screenshot and assume that it was taken on March 29, 2019 and subtract 194 days from this date, it is possible that this server had been operational since at least September 16, 2018 | ['T1113'] |
This screenshot is via an RDP session as indicated by the tab located at the top of the screen and is located at 164.132.67[.]216 which is hosted by OVH | ['T1113'] |
The malware can exfiltrate keystrokes, screenshots, browser-related data like cookies and history, decrypted when possible | ['T1113'] |
Malware features Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, and execute remote commands | ['T1113'] |
SCREEN Takes a PNG screenshot of the main screen and names the file with timestamps, then uploads it to the C2 server using POST at the path “/FeedBack.php” | ['T1113'] |
While sending to the C2 server, the data is formatted as follows: @{SYSINFO = $get.ToString(); ACTION = "REGISTER";} Ability to take screenshots | ['T1113'] |
The “screenshot” command takes a screenshot that is saved as a.PNG file in “ProgramData“ | ['T1113'] |
The screen capture below shows the decryption function.It then calls the StartAndPatchRegAsm function.This function tries to find the original Microsoft RegAsm executable path | ['T1113'] |
Figure 3: Screen capture of the downloader executed on OS X El Capitan | ['T1113'] |
Interestingly, we’ve seen recent samples embedding decoy documents that are screenshots of botnet C&C panels or dumps of credit card numbers | ['T1113'] |
POWRUNER will send the captured screenshot image file to the C2 server if the “fileupload” command is issued | ['T1113'] |
The command handle looks for the following command strings in Table 3: Command Description $fileDownload Uploads the contents of a specified file to C2 $importModule Adds a specified PowerShell module to the current script $screenshot Executes the contents of the command, which should be the string ‘$screenshot’ | ['T1113'] |
23 Take screenshot, temporarily store it as TPX499.dat, and upload it to the C2 | ['T1113'] |
SpyNote RAT captured the device’s screen activities along with audio using the MediaProjectionCallback functionality (available with Lollipop, the Android 5.0 release, and later) and saved the output in a file named "video.mp4" as shown in the following screenshot: Figure 5 : Output File SMS stealing SpyNote RAT was also observed stealing SMS messages from the affected devices, as shown in screenshot below: Figure 6: Reading SMS messages Stealing contacts The ability to steal contacts is a favorite feature for spyware developers, as the stolen contacts can be used to further spread the spyware | ['T1113'] |
[Screenshot 1] Encrypted Login Packet sent by Gh0stRAT infected PC In addition to a standard malware analysis blog post, I’d also like to take this time to document and describe my methods for analysis, in the hopes that you as a reader will use these techniques in the future | ['T1113'] |
Returns the screenshot to the C2 via: <img src=’data:image/jpeg;base64,[base64 of screenshot]’ width=800 height=500 /><br> 111 startTakeScreenShot Creates a thread to take a screenshot at a set interval (default: every 10 seconds) | ['T1113'] |
This simply acts as cleanup to ensure original file artifacts no longer reside on the infected machine | ['T1070'] |
This is a guest post by independent security researcher James Quinn. This will be Part 1 of a series titled Reversing Gh0stRAT Variants. As 2018 drew to a close and 2019 took over, I began to see a different behavior from SMB malware authors. Instead of massive, multi-staged cryptocurrency miners, I began to see more small, covert RATs serving as partial stage1’s. Of these samples, there was one specific sample that stood out to me. A Gh0stRAT variant, this sample not only changed the Gh0stRAT header from “Gh0st” to “nbLGX”, it also hid its traffic with an encryption algorithm over the entire TCP segment, in addition to the standard Zlib compression on the Gh0stRAT data. Some key functionality is below: Can download more malware Offline Keylogger Cleans Event logs | ['T1070'] |