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How long do restrictive covenants apply on property willed to the state?

If I devise real property to the state of Texas in my will, and it specifies that the homeless can not be evicted on the property, how long will that restriction apply for? Assume the state accepts the gift. If the clause reads, this property is to be managed for the best interest of the homeless, and the homeless shall never be evicted from the premise. If the state violates this clause, the property is to return to the heirs of the estate of Evan Carroll. In the above there is a restrictive covenant tied to an express clause of reverter. How long would such a clause apply to the state for? Forever?

Transfer of title must eventually occur, otherwise the property was never willed to another because the willing of the property is perpetually incomplete. One can place conditions on the transfer of title, but those conditions cannot last forever. They can last quite long, but there is a rule against perpetuities , especially created due to clauses constraining the transfer of of title in wills. This rule applies to a person who is transferring title, with a conditional clause that bars the full use of the property. If such a clause is limited, then it does not exist in perpetuity. The rule specifically addressed the will's call to reassign title if the transfer's clauses were violated. The maximum limitation historically was the lifetime of some person alive when the will was executed, plus 21 years, to permit an unborn grandchild to inherit. The reason this rule came about was due to the will of Henry Frederick Howard , the Earl of Arundel and Surrey. It effectively left the dead Earl managing his estates after his death, shifting properties that were bequeathed, based on the possibility of a "more suitable" heir being born after the Earl's death. This will eventually created the most complicated bit of common law that exists to date. In my totally amatuer attempt to summarize it; it is a combination of at least two ideas: a "dead hand" (deceased person) cannot guide the activities of the living forever transfer of property (title) must eventually be fully transferred Exceptions to the rule exist for conditional transfer of title back to the person who originally owned the property, but these exceptions cannot apply when the transfer is to a third party. This clause in Evan's will, "If the state violates this clause, the property is to return to the heirs of the estate of Evan Carroll." would only be enforceable for a limited amount of time. First, the Estate of a dead Evan Carroll is not a lasting entity, eventually his estate would be closed. Finally, the transfer to the "heirs" of Evan Carroll would be a transfer to a third party, subject to the rule. Some states interpret their protections against the rule in different ways; but, nearly all states that have revoked the rule have done so by making a new rule (often with easier to manage time limits). A handful claim to have revoked the rule; but, they use other legal approaches to prevent this problem from occurring. Texas has extended the rule to 300 years while New South Wales, puts the limit at 80 years . Texas's extension seemed to be primarily to permit trust funds to operate legally long after the person establishing it had died. Consider what happens if such a rule doesn't exist. The title of the property could never be fully transferred, because the clause could never be proven to not have been violated. This would dramatically devalue the property, and clog the courts with suits claiming property held by one family for 100 years isn't theirs because of some evidence just uncovered about what happened 60 years ago. It also would massively complicate the selling of the property, because a clean title could never be proven. Note that this rule would have no bearing on a covenants not tied to the property's transfer of title. This rule even made it into a recent Disney case, which is explained far better than I can by the Legal Eagle, Devin James Stone

How long do restrictive covenants apply on property willed to the state?

If I devise real property to the state of Texas in my will, and it specifies that the homeless can not be evicted on the property, how long will that restriction apply for? Assume the state accepts the gift. If the clause reads, this property is to be managed for the best interest of the homeless, and the homeless shall never be evicted from the premise. If the state violates this clause, the property is to return to the heirs of the estate of Evan Carroll. In the above there is a restrictive covenant tied to an express clause of reverter. How long would such a clause apply to the state for? Forever?

Until revoked new-south-wales The fact that the land is state owned is irrelevant, a covenant lasts until it is deliberately removed. There are three ways to do this: By the person(s) (if any) nominated as being able to do so, By agreement of the parties benefitted by the covenant, By order of the Supreme Court. For your question, the last is likely to be the only relevant one. There are several grounds but the most likely is s89(1)(b1)(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 : that the obligation has become unreasonably expensive or unreasonably onerous to perform when compared with the benefit of its performance to the authority

Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

In light of the recent discovery of cocaine inside the West Wing of the White House, I am wondering if a person who either lives in, or works in, or makes a visit to the White House, is caught using an illegal drug within the White House by a member of the Secret Service, whether that Secret Service member can immediately arrest that person and then turn that person over the Washington D.C. police department for prosecution. Or, is arresting someone in the White House for drug possession/drug use not one of the job duties of the Secret Service? Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit : Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department. Corrected my answer above.

Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

In light of the recent discovery of cocaine inside the West Wing of the White House, I am wondering if a person who either lives in, or works in, or makes a visit to the White House, is caught using an illegal drug within the White House by a member of the Secret Service, whether that Secret Service member can immediately arrest that person and then turn that person over the Washington D.C. police department for prosecution. Or, is arresting someone in the White House for drug possession/drug use not one of the job duties of the Secret Service? Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(c)(1)(C) — Powers, authorities, and duties of United States Secret Service : (1) Under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, officers and agents of the Secret Service are authorized to — … (C) make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony;

Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

In light of the recent discovery of cocaine inside the West Wing of the White House, I am wondering if a person who either lives in, or works in, or makes a visit to the White House, is caught using an illegal drug within the White House by a member of the Secret Service, whether that Secret Service member can immediately arrest that person and then turn that person over the Washington D.C. police department for prosecution. Or, is arresting someone in the White House for drug possession/drug use not one of the job duties of the Secret Service? Can the Secret Service arrest someone who uses an illegal drug inside of the White House?

The Secret Service Uniformed Division has powers “similar to those of the members of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia” and routinely makes arrests for both violations of nationwide federal law and violations of the DC Code. Leaving aside that possession of drugs can generally be charged under the federal Controlled Substances Act, the Uniformed Division has full authority to arrest for it under DC Code drug provisions. For instance, here’s a case from 2000 where Uniformed Division officers arrested someone in northwest DC for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. There was no question of their authority to make the arrest. The Secret Service is actually one of a handful of uniformed federal police forces that regularly exercises DC Code authority on public streets (along with the Park Police), let alone inside the White House complex.

Is it illegal to obtain a travel agent license simply to get discounts in hotels and airfare?

My friend told me about how she got incredible discounts on hotels and airfare because she registered as a travel agent (Utah/USA) and many places offer high discounts to agents. She obtained her license by working through another agent in her neighborhood. I wasn't aware she was working, so I asked her more about what the job entailed and she told me that she doesn't actually provide her services as an agent, she only uses the license to get deep discounts for her own travels. I don't think I can convince her it's fraud, but I don't want to see her in jail. I couldn't find any sources online that said one way or another whether it is fraudulent behavior. Are there any referencable sources I can point her to that could be helpful? Or is what is she doing entirely legal? Also, unfortunately, I don't know any more details about her license or method of obtaining it as we spoke in casual passing about it. I can probably ask her though, if necessary.

The Utah Department of Professional Licensing does not issue licenses for travel agents, and there seems to be no evidence of a statutory requirement for licensing. Therefore it's unclear what status this license has. I did see a number of online places offering to train people to be travel agents, and perhaps one of them offers a certificate of training. There is such a thing as an IATA number, and some hotel might require providing one's IATA number. If a person does not have an IATA number and the hotel does not verify the IATA number, then it would be fraud to falsely make up a number in order to obtain a benefit. The person could be sued to recover the amount of the discount. If the person has an IATA number, then there nothing obviously fraudulent, but you would have to inspect the conditions for using an agent discount. IATA requires you to work at a registered agency to get an agent number, and the proof requirements are substantial enough that it would be surprising if a person could get away with just claiming to work at a travel agency. The organization would certainly be in a good position to sue a person for falsifying the application (note also that the application is subject to binding arbitration by the Travel Agency Commissioner). So it depends on who gave the discount, what the required, what if any accreditation was used to get that discount, and what the actual facts are (i.e. does the person actually work for an agency making at least $10,000 a year).

Is it illegal to obtain a travel agent license simply to get discounts in hotels and airfare?

My friend told me about how she got incredible discounts on hotels and airfare because she registered as a travel agent (Utah/USA) and many places offer high discounts to agents. She obtained her license by working through another agent in her neighborhood. I wasn't aware she was working, so I asked her more about what the job entailed and she told me that she doesn't actually provide her services as an agent, she only uses the license to get deep discounts for her own travels. I don't think I can convince her it's fraud, but I don't want to see her in jail. I couldn't find any sources online that said one way or another whether it is fraudulent behavior. Are there any referencable sources I can point her to that could be helpful? Or is what is she doing entirely legal? Also, unfortunately, I don't know any more details about her license or method of obtaining it as we spoke in casual passing about it. I can probably ask her though, if necessary.

I'm a fraudster too I am a licensed pesticide applicator. That means I can walk into any wholesale supply house in 5 states and get the most potent pesticides. The trade-off is I forfeit the right to claim honest mistake if I poison a creek or something. I only use it to spray my own properties. My buddy is a licensed real estate agent but doesn't practice. When buying houses to live in, my buddy gets the 3% kickback given to the buyer's agent. But has to follow professional rules. Then there's Doctor Steven Strange, a fully qualified brain surgeon whose day job is running a magic shop. So a lot of licensure is like that. You get access to The Good Stuff in exchange for agreeing explicitly to the rules of the trade, paying professional fees, or what have you. But is it fraud if it opens job paths? Consider a hypothetical world where an online booking site got caught out doing something horrible and everyone flocked back to real travel agents. Problem: the pipeline for qualifying travel agents is finite and cannot bear surge demand. In situations like that, they tend to fill surge demand with people like your friend. So yes, your friend does add value to society simply by being credentialed.

Is it illegal to obtain a travel agent license simply to get discounts in hotels and airfare?

My friend told me about how she got incredible discounts on hotels and airfare because she registered as a travel agent (Utah/USA) and many places offer high discounts to agents. She obtained her license by working through another agent in her neighborhood. I wasn't aware she was working, so I asked her more about what the job entailed and she told me that she doesn't actually provide her services as an agent, she only uses the license to get deep discounts for her own travels. I don't think I can convince her it's fraud, but I don't want to see her in jail. I couldn't find any sources online that said one way or another whether it is fraudulent behavior. Are there any referencable sources I can point her to that could be helpful? Or is what is she doing entirely legal? Also, unfortunately, I don't know any more details about her license or method of obtaining it as we spoke in casual passing about it. I can probably ask her though, if necessary.

Business licensing of this type has 3 different tiers, really. Let's talk about each one. Government certification Where it's needed to protect citizens, governments will directly certify people to certain jobs. A structural engineer or airline pilot will be government licensed. It wouldn't surprise me if the government is not involved in travel agent certification. NGO (non-profit) industry associations Who decides if you're a lawyer? Not the government - the Bar Association. The National Fire Protection Association writes the North American electrical code. When a responsible NGO is already in place and doing a good job, the government often defers the role to them. The NGO is at their discretion to make prudent decisions about who that is. They can then sign contracts with that person, and that contract binds the person to whichever reasonable thing it says. Private company networks. Some industry infrastructure is run by private companies. A travel agent needs SABRE, a lawyer needs Lexis-Nexis. The companies can give access to anyone they want, on contractual terms which they choose, consistent with their profit motive and health and happiness of their user base. These companies would be most interested in you keeping your contractual agreement, so they'd be more interested in your credit score than your test score. Hotels, airlines, and others within the travel industry can also grant discounts to anyone they please, on any contractual terms which they please. So they are free to "turn the knobs" on those agent perks - they could say "only travel agents who have made at least 100 bookings in the past year"... or not . In short: if these NGOs and private companies want to permit "anyone" to register and qualify as a travel agent, they are free to do that. A method to their madness? I suspect the industry is well aware of the "abuse" and tolerate it because at the scale it's happening now , it's more a benefit than a nuisance. (that could change if it became too popular). The benefit is such people are actually some of the most experienced candidates to be an actual travel agent. So they are "seeding" future agent candidates for the cost of some perks. It's hardly the strangest thing industries have done to recruit. Airlines cut the "number of flying hours" required to become a commercial pilot to a paltry number, degrading safety in the eyes of many.

In what sense is an Assured Tenancy “assured”?

Why was this term chosen for the standard type of tenancy brought in under the housing act 1988? Who is the one that is meant to have the assurance, and what is the assurance thought to be of?

The assurance benefits both parties. The tenant cannot be evicted before the minimum term expires, if they have adhered to the terms of the agreement (with some rare exceptions). The landlord can gain possession under the terms of the agreement (subject to a minimum term). The Housing Act 1988 ended the "sitting tenant" trap for new lettings, where the landlord could not sell the house at market value. In practice, since 1997 most ATs are Assured Shorthold Tenancies with a 6-month fixed period which the agent renews. Though there are some ruthless agents who like to move tenants on so that they don't get too settled (and they can charge the landlord a re-letting fee). OTOH some landlords will want to keep a trouble-free tenant. Before 1988 tenancy laws were heavily skewed towards the tenant. Practically the only way a lawful tenant could be evicted, was if the owner needed to live in the property, and owned no other property (i.e. an owner of multiple lettings could not just shuffle around between them, to evict tenants). So although the new style tenancies were called "Assured", basically new tenants lost their "security of tenure" and IMO this eventually created a huge inflation in domestic property value between 1995 and 2007, as residential property became a commodity which individuals were encouraged to invest in: the buy-to-let market.

In what sense is an Assured Tenancy “assured”?

Why was this term chosen for the standard type of tenancy brought in under the housing act 1988? Who is the one that is meant to have the assurance, and what is the assurance thought to be of?

In what sense is an Assured Tenancy “assured”? It is "assured" in the sense that it cannot be brought to an end by the landlord other than by the means set out in s. 5 : court order when the tenancy was fixed-term and provided powers to the landlord to end the tenancy at the end of that term disqualification of the occupants under the Immigration Act 2014, with notice

What provisions entitle a defendant in a possession claim to receive on-the-day representation/advice from a duty scheme?

Usually when facing a possession claim against oneself one is given access to a duty scheme advisor/representative. Suppose on one day there is no such representative present. Is a defendant who would have availed such advice had it been available seem to suffer any prejudice in the possession matter to which they are a party?

If no duty solicitor is available on the day, the defendant may make a Part 23 Application to the judge for an adjournment until they have had the opportunity to seek legal advice. The power to adjourn in these circumstances may be found at Rule 3.1(2)(b) Civil Procedure Rules: (2) ... the court may – ... (b) adjourn ... a hearing ... The only prejudice to the defendant that I can see with an adjournment is a prolonging of the process - but that needs to be balanced with ensuring the interests of justice are met. For awareness, Shelter have a handy " Free legal help from a court duty scheme " guide, and there are a number of Housing Possession Court Duty Schemes (HPCDS) , such as this from SWLLC .

In the USA, is it legal for parents to take children to sexually oriented events?

In this question I asked about parents taking children to strip clubs, answer showed what the law has to say in the case of sexually oriented businesses in general. But what about non-businesses, like sexually oriented events, like private or open to public parties, carnivals or any type of events where it has act(s) that might be considered sexual. Is it also illegal for parents to take children to them?

I would think that at that point, it would fall under federal obscenity laws. https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/obscenity Specifically from that page: "visual depictions, spoken words, or written text". If a minor was at a private event and exposed to either materials or live acts of a sexual nature, that seems like it would be a "visual depiction". Officially, the courts apply the Miller Test of Obscenity, but I would think a live sexual act would count just as much as a video. Per the same page: "Federal law strictly prohibits the distribution of obscene matter to minors. Any transfer or attempt to transfer such material to a minor under the age of 16, including over the Internet, is punishable under federal law." There may be specific case law that defines whether a live act qualifies as "matter" and/or whether viewing constitutes "transfer", but at the surface level, I don't see why they wouldn't.

Is it legal for a US military servicemember to disobey a lawful order that they reasonably believed was unlawful?

In the US military (and I would assume all militaries?) a servicemember must obey an order from a superior officer if the order is lawful; however, if complying would require the commission of a crime, the order is unlawful and must be disobeyed. Would a court-martial ever rule that it would have been legal to obey an order, but the servicemember reasonably believed it was unlawful and was therefore justified in refusing to comply? Has such a ruling ever actually happened?

united-kingdom 1 They would commit a prima facie offence contrary to section 12 Armed Forces Act 2006: 12 Disobedience to lawful commands (1) A person subject to service law commits an offence if— (a) he disobeys a lawful command; and (b) he intends to disobey , or is reckless as to whether he disobeys, the command. (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to any punishment mentioned in the Table in section 164 , but any sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of the offence must not exceed ten years. HOWEVER... Section 325 allows for the defence to prove there was a "lawful or reasonable excuse" to disobeying a lawful order: 325 Evidential burden as respects excuses (1) This section applies to an offence under any of sections 1 to 41, 93A, 93E, 93G, 107, 229, 232G and 266 which is such that a person who would otherwise commit the offence— (a) does not do so if he has a lawful excuse; or (b) does not do so if he has a reasonable excuse. (2) In proceedings for an offence to which this section applies, the defendant is to be treated as not having had a lawful excuse or reasonable excuse (as the case may be) unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he had such an excuse. 1 Although tagged united-states , I have answered in line with: we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag] " from the Help centre

Is it legal for a US military servicemember to disobey a lawful order that they reasonably believed was unlawful?

In the US military (and I would assume all militaries?) a servicemember must obey an order from a superior officer if the order is lawful; however, if complying would require the commission of a crime, the order is unlawful and must be disobeyed. Would a court-martial ever rule that it would have been legal to obey an order, but the servicemember reasonably believed it was unlawful and was therefore justified in refusing to comply? Has such a ruling ever actually happened?

Let's look at the UCMJ text. Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation Any person subject to this chapter who— (1)violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2)having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3)is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. There is a tremendous amount of case law contained in "lawful order." A key concept is that orders are presumed to be lawful, so the burden of proof for unlawfulness will be on the defendant. I could find no case (not that I know how to actually search federal military cases) that applied the defendant's state of mind ("mens rea") as to lawfulness of the law as a defense here. Basically the defendant will have to show that the order was unlawful; the member's belief in unlawfulness is not at issue. Mens rea issues tend to be if the defendant understood the order, or what the defendant's state of mind was when they were performing the activity they are charged for (like did the member know they were giving alcohol to an underage person). These are not choices to disobey an order due to perceived unlawfulness. Certainly I would not say that no Court-Martial would ever rule differently - these courts and juries have wide latitude to choose outcomes. I do however feel like this defense would be hard to pull off.

Why are formal accusations of crimes called “charges”?

How and when did it come to be called this? What are the origins of the term “criminal charges”?

Charge comes ultimately from a Latin word meaning "cart," the same source as "car." From https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charge#word-history Middle English, from Anglo-French charger, from Late Latin carricare, from Latin carrus wheeled vehicle — more at CAR The word was first used in the 13th century as a noun meaning "burden" and a verb meaning "to lay a burden upon," no doubt because carriages bear burdens. Many related senses followed, including those relating to financial burdens (how much does the service provider charge?) and other liabilities, including potential criminal liabilities.

Why are formal accusations of crimes called “charges”?

How and when did it come to be called this? What are the origins of the term “criminal charges”?

It is just the verb that describes the act of making an allegation against a person, and as a noun, the allegation itself. See James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Criminal Procedure (1883) [print edition]: ... the overt acts charged in the indictment Any number of accessories ... may be charged ... Each count must charge one offence and no more etc. See Chitty on Criminal Law (1826) [print edition] ... the charge must contain a certain description of the crime ... The Oxford English Dictionary's entry for " charge, v. " traces this usage to 1559 in the context of criminal accusations, and to around 1450 in the context of accusations more generally. This is closely related to the conception of charge as placing a burden or load upon something.

May I show a printed circuit board of a device on the internet?

Do I need a permission to show pictures of a printed circuit board of a device (consumer electronics) on my personal blog? I would like to show how certain modifications to the product can be made. I took some pictures during the process. Does sharing these pictures infringe any IP rights?

Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.

May I show a printed circuit board of a device on the internet?

Do I need a permission to show pictures of a printed circuit board of a device (consumer electronics) on my personal blog? I would like to show how certain modifications to the product can be made. I took some pictures during the process. Does sharing these pictures infringe any IP rights?

Circuit boards are not subject to copyright but circuit board designs are This case from Taiwan neatly explains the difference. However, since you are not reproducing the design, you can publish your photos.

Have open-source hardware licenses ever been enforced when distributing a physical product?

As I have found out , there are "open-source hardware" licenses which are written in the spirit of "open-source software" licenses and require the user to publish a modified design if they distribute a physical product based on that design. Examples are TAPR and Arduino license. However, unlike software which is subject to copyright in any form, circuit boards are not subject to copyright as they are not works of art. This makes me wonder whether open-source hardware licenses can actually provide the protection that they advertise. Are such licenses deemed legally enforceable? Have they ever been enforced?

Circuit boards are not subject to copyright but circuit board designs are This case from Taiwan neatly explains the difference. The licence presumably attaches to the design of the circuit board - the circuit diagram, circuit board layout, or integrated circuit layout. In order to use the design, one would almost surely need to make a copy of it or modify it. It is this step that requires adherence to the licence, not the actual manufacture of the circuit.

Does the Colorado Privacy Act apply to churches with memberships (ex: Jehovah’s Witnesses)?

Suppose a person living in Colorado is a registered member of a church. In this church, certain “blessings” are considered contingent on your membership. Membership is recorded on a digital system. This church also considers donations to it a commandment. It also has over 100,000 members. Suppose this person wanted to officially leave the church and request that this membership data be deleted. Is the church in question obligated under the Colorado Privacy Act to comply with said request?

Probably not. The Act applies to: (1) EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION, THIS PART 13 APPLIES TO A CONTROLLER THAT: (a) CONDUCTS BUSINESS IN COLORADO OR PRODUCES OR DELIVERS COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS OR SERVICES THAT ARE INTENTIONALLY TARGETED TO RESIDENTS OF COLORADO; AND (b) SATISFIES ONE OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING THRESHOLDS: (I) CONTROLS OR PROCESSES THE PERSONAL DATA OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSUMERS OR MORE DURING A CALENDAR YEAR; OR (II) DERIVES REVENUE OR RECEIVES A DISCOUNT ON THE PRICE OF GOODS OR SERVICES FROM THE SALE OF PERSONAL DATA AND PROCESSES OR CONTROLS THE PERSONAL DATA OF TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND CONSUMERS OR MORE. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1304(1). The Rules contain the following related definition: “Commercial product or service” as referred to in C.R.S. § 6-1-1304(1)(a) means a product or service bought, sold, leased, joined, provided, subscribed to, or delivered in exchange for monetary or other valuable consideration in the course of a Controller’s business, vocation, or occupation. There is no case law on point, but generally speaking a house of worship or a church is not considered a business, so it is probably not within the scope of the Act.

Is my employer allowed to make me work without pay?

As the title says: A coworker and I had recently made a mistake at work. In response to this, our manager decides we have to work for two extra hours on our next shifts unpaid. Is this legal? I work in the State of Georgia in the US, by the way.

This is illegal, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, assuming you are not an "exempt" employee, which is primarily a salaried employee (your pay isn't based on how many hours you work). There are details about the complaint process here . It is useful to know that retaliation against an employee filing a legal complaint is also illegal.

Is my employer allowed to make me work without pay?

As the title says: A coworker and I had recently made a mistake at work. In response to this, our manager decides we have to work for two extra hours on our next shifts unpaid. Is this legal? I work in the State of Georgia in the US, by the way.

"The Department of Labor (DOL) has rules for when employers must pay overtime to employees. The DOL assumes every worker must receive overtime pay if they work over 40 hours in a week, at a rate equal to 1.5 times their hourly rate (at a minimum).1 But some employees, because of the nature of their work, are considered to be "exempt" from overtime pay. It used to be that the terms "exempt" and "non-exempt" were clearly defined. But the DOL has more rules to protect lower-paid exempt employees from falling below the minimum wage, by requiring that they must be paid overtime." Source: https://www.thebalancemoney.com/exempt-vs-non-exempt-employees-overtime-rules-397359

What kinds of injuries are covered by Social Security?

I am injured ( by sports injury ) but was called schizophrenic . I am a bartender, otherwise I will not take fraud as income. For this I looked into the 2018 National Beneficiary Survey (next one estimated release 2023) that says of 4062 reporters 35.4% are mentally ill, 5.2% with developmental disability, and 14.9% are injured (or poisoned) in 2015. For a picture of the Musculoskeletally-disordered of 42.1% , we can use the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports to get an age-related image. So, other than age, what injuries constitute a proper claim? Is it only when something (1) falls on you (2) on the job?

The Social Security Administration only provides benefits for what has been termed as total disability , which can be broadly described as the long-term, indefinite ability to work. Short-term injuries, which impair your ability to work for a finite period, or impair your ability to perform your current job but would still allow you to work generally, are covered by benefits such as short-term disability insurance and/or unemployment. From the SSA web site : We consider you to have a qualifying disability under Social Security rules if all the following are true: You cannot do work and engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of your medical condition. You cannot do work you did previously or adjust to other work because of your medical condition. Your condition has lasted or is expected to last for at least one year or to result in death. This is a strict definition of disability. Social Security program rules assume that working families have access to other resources to provide support during periods of short-term disabilities, including workers' compensation, insurance, savings, and investments.

Is it legal for a business to give a discount for paying with cash vs. credit card?

I ate at a Croatian restaurant where I had the option to pay with cash with euros or pay with my credit card. If I chose to pay with cash, I would be given a 10% discount. As I have a VISA credit card issued in another EU country, this discount seems to be against the law. According to https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/finance-funding/making-receiving-payments/electronic-cash-payments/index_en.htm : Card surcharges are not allowed You're not allowed to charge your customers extra for using a credit or debit card. This applies to all card purchases (in shops and online) made throughout the EU. So, is it a legal loophole to give discounts for paying with cash instead of adding a surcharge for paying with a credit card? Or is this actually illegal?

Yes, its legal Economically, there is no difference between a cash discount and a card surcharge; legally, there is. That’s because the law prohibits charging more than the advertised price for a given payment method but doesn’t prohibit charging less . Of course, it’s likely there is some illegality here but it’s not against the customer. A business doesn't give a 10% discount to avoid paying a 1-2% fee. They do it because they are not reporting (some of) their cash sales to the tax authorities and are therefore saving the 25% VAT and 18% company tax.

Can I ask potential jurors in a prima facie state if speeding is legal?

In some jurisdictions, e.g., Texas, driving faster than the posted speed limit is only the prima facie evidence of an unreasonable speed, where, if charged with a violation, one could still argue in the court of law, in front of a jury of one's peers, that the speed was nonetheless safe, reasonable and prudent. Some potential jurors may be too conservative to appreciate the intricacies of the law (especially if such ideas are very new to them), or hold a grunge against people going over the posted speed limit. What would be the best way to determine such bias during Jury Selection (Voir Dire)? Can you ask potential jurors simple questions like: "Do you think exceeding the posted speed limit is illegal?" "Do you think that the posted speed limits should never be exceeded?" "Do you think that people exceeding the posted speed limit are guilty, and should pay a fine?"

It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State . The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" ( Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787 ). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay?   And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case ( Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715 ). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.

Can I ask potential jurors in a prima facie state if speeding is legal?

In some jurisdictions, e.g., Texas, driving faster than the posted speed limit is only the prima facie evidence of an unreasonable speed, where, if charged with a violation, one could still argue in the court of law, in front of a jury of one's peers, that the speed was nonetheless safe, reasonable and prudent. Some potential jurors may be too conservative to appreciate the intricacies of the law (especially if such ideas are very new to them), or hold a grunge against people going over the posted speed limit. What would be the best way to determine such bias during Jury Selection (Voir Dire)? Can you ask potential jurors simple questions like: "Do you think exceeding the posted speed limit is illegal?" "Do you think that the posted speed limits should never be exceeded?" "Do you think that people exceeding the posted speed limit are guilty, and should pay a fine?"

Questions of law aren't proper in jury voire dire . You could ask voire dire questions intended to get at the same point. But you can't ask them what the law actually says. Also, jury trials for speeding offenses are rare, although some states allow them. I don't know if Texas is among them.

What happens to an AST tenant when their landlord defaults on his mortgage?

Larry buys a property on a mortgage and then lets it to Tim on a AST. Larry then defaults on his mortgage and the bank proceeds to repossess the property that is housing Tim. What is the process and timeframes for this? Is there any reason why the bank would or could not repossess the property with Tim residing as a sitting tenant? In short, what happens to Tim’s AST?

See Brindley Twist Tafft & James LLP, " Focus on the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc.) 2010 [ sic ]". If the tenancy was an authorized tenancy under the terms of the mortgage: The Bank may still take possession of the property but they may have to do so subject to your occupation. The practical effect of this is that you would be allowed to remain living in the property subject to the terms of your tenancy agreement but you would see a change in the identity of the Landlord. It is possible for the tenancy to be brought to an end but in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement. If the tenancy was not authorized: Under the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc) 2010 [ sic ] (the “Act”) an unauthorised residential tenant is however entitled to request that possession be delayed for up to two months during which time they should try to find alternative accommodation.

How do laws against computer intrusion handle the modern situation of devices routinely being under the de facto control of non-owners?

Current versions of Microsoft Windows will automatically update themselves. That's usually great, but they also are designed to update themselves even if the owner of the device wants them to not do that. I could send them a certified letter revoking their authorization to install and run new software on my computer, and turn off all available update settings, and if I don't go turn the computer off it will still get updated when a new update comes out. Why, legally, can Microsoft (or any other device manufacturer or application developer) control my computer in excess of what I have authorized, but when I do it to their computer, that is "hacking" and I go to "jail"? Is Microsoft breaking any laws by forcing upgrades to windows 10? asks about Microsoft's Windows 10 rollout specifically, but I am more broadly asking about the standard Windows updates, and about updates or other remote control functions for other devices that do not have a technical mechanism allowing the owner to disable them.

You ask: Why, legally, can Microsoft (or any other device manufacturer or application developer) control my computer in excess of what I have authorized... ? It cannot. The Windows licence says: By accepting this agreement or using the software, you agree to all of these terms Even if your letter revoking authorization were effective, as soon as you use the Windows software again, you are again deemed to have agreed to all of the terms of the licence. One of the terms is: The software periodically checks for system and app updates, and downloads and installs them for you. You may obtain updates only from Microsoft or authorized sources, and Microsoft may need to update your system to provide you with those updates. By accepting this agreement, you agree to receive these types of automatic updates without any additional notice.

How do laws against computer intrusion handle the modern situation of devices routinely being under the de facto control of non-owners?

Current versions of Microsoft Windows will automatically update themselves. That's usually great, but they also are designed to update themselves even if the owner of the device wants them to not do that. I could send them a certified letter revoking their authorization to install and run new software on my computer, and turn off all available update settings, and if I don't go turn the computer off it will still get updated when a new update comes out. Why, legally, can Microsoft (or any other device manufacturer or application developer) control my computer in excess of what I have authorized, but when I do it to their computer, that is "hacking" and I go to "jail"? Is Microsoft breaking any laws by forcing upgrades to windows 10? asks about Microsoft's Windows 10 rollout specifically, but I am more broadly asking about the standard Windows updates, and about updates or other remote control functions for other devices that do not have a technical mechanism allowing the owner to disable them.

You own the computer but do not own Windows. Microsoft owns Windows and it is not for sale to anybody, so you never purchased it. What you have purchased is a permission to use it (a license) subject to terms and conditions. If you do not agree to them you have no right use Windows. You can use your computer without using Windows by using some other operating system, but in that case you would have to get a different operating system that works with your hardware and abide by the terms of use of those that wrote it. Specific software that you want to use might only have been developed for Windows, meaning you'd have to find an alternative to those as well. Aside 1: While there are concrete alternative options for actual computers (notably Linux, whose authors chose not to ask to abide by any terms and conditions for its use) the same is not true for other devices such as cellphones or smart TVs where there often is no choice other than the operating system/firmware that was preinstalled. Aside 2: A few years ago you could even get a refund on the cost of the Windows license if you clicked on "disagree" when you first powered up the computer. I don't know if that is feasible anymore but now it is easier to get a computer that does not have Windows installed by the manufacturer in the first place.

Burden of Proof for Reprinting a Book

You republish a book from 1923 without asking anyone. The original publisher (or its successor) sues you. Do you need to proof that the author is 70 years dead already, or lies the burden of proof on the publisher?

Short answer : §§ 64 ff. UrhG is not a defense ( Einwendung ) but an integral/constitutional component of copyright. Accordingly the party favoring the fact that a work is (still) copyrighted has the burden of proof. Long answer : Copyright cases are divided into four steps: Copyrightable work? ( Urheberrechtlich geschütztes Werk? ) Applicable exploitation rights? ( Tangierte Nutzungsrechte? ) Exceptions? ( Schrankenregelungen? ) Damages. ( Schadensersatz ) In a civil action suit parties need to present facts, § 282 ZPO ( Beibringungsgrundsatz ). The court/state does not investigate anything. That means the plaintiff contending that he has a claim for damages needs to demonstrate that it’s a copyrightable work, they are the copyright holder, and you infringed their rights. For the last item you may face an obligation to disclose certain evidence as per §§ 101 ff. UrhG. The plaintiff can actually simply claim anything; until you dispute their claims it is believed to be true, § 138 Ⅲ, 288 ZPO. Yet still, lying about hard facts is forbidden, § 138 Ⅰ ZPO ( Wahrheitspflicht ). Claiming the work’s creator was alive in 1952 even though they very well know he was not is illegal. On the other hand since you are relying on §§ 64/65 Ⅰ, 129 Ⅰ 1 UrhG, that is the circumstance copyright has expired 70 complete calendar years after the (last co)author’s death, § 69 UrhG, you will need to contest any claim copyright did not expire ( subjektive Behauptungslast ). No copyright protection → no damages. Otherwise it is believed there was no issue about this. The plaintiff will then again need to produce evidence that copyright has not expired. It is the plaintiff who seeks damages under § 97 Ⅱ 1 UrhG so they have the burden of proof regarding all requirements of this legal basis.

Burden of Proof for Reprinting a Book

You republish a book from 1923 without asking anyone. The original publisher (or its successor) sues you. Do you need to proof that the author is 70 years dead already, or lies the burden of proof on the publisher?

It depends on the argument The person suing (Plaintiff) needs to make a case that is prima facie reasonable and contains all needed details. This includes showing that they own a valid copyright/exclusive usage license - which is established by showing the trail of holders of the right from the work's creation to now. Because copyrights expire after the death of the author, a valid copyright upon which a descendent could sue would require showing that less than 70 years after the author's death have passed. They could show so trivially by showing the death certificate of the author, proving that the author died at most 70 years ago. If the defendant tries to claim that the copyright is expired, it is upon the defendant to prove this. It would be upon the defendant to prove that the work was made by someone that passed more than 70 years ago at the time of the alleged copyright violation. In general, in a civil claim, it is upon the moving party to offer up facts that support their claim.

Attorney Client Privilege: Disclosure within Evidence

Florida Statues Provides A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person, or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or makes the communication when he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any significant part of the matter or communication. This section is not applicable when the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. https://codes.findlaw.com/fl/title-vii-evidence/fl-st-sect-90-507.html Context A judge orders the defendant to provide evidence in Florida Nonbinding arbitration. The Defendant's administrative-contractor has provided Defense counsel with several emails as evidence. Defense attorneys submit pdf evidence: partially redacted email communication to the Arbiter and plaintiff. Said email starts with the partially redacted message, followed by the plaintiff's email. Evidence was published to a file sharing website for plaintiffs, to fulfill Florida procedural requirements. Prima facie review of the redaction includes some clearly visible sentences. Stakeholders are able to deduce the sender, at least one named recipient, and the nature of the request: the Defendant's administrative contractor requested counsel from a third-attorney, seeking advice as to how to proceed with undertaking a contested action, under the guise of pretextual claims set forth by the administrative-contractor. The sender is not an employee of the defendent, however, they are contracted to execute the Defendent's decisions. Despite the redaction failures, counsel attempted to redact the contractor's message. Plaintiff's attorney argued that based on what is visible, it is necessary to see the remainder of the message as "best evidence". Defense Counsel has vigorously asserted that the judge should not consider any of the information that is intended to be redacted under attorney-client privilege. The judge asked the defense if he should consider what is clearly already visible. Analysis of the evidence clearly revealed the fully unredacted message. Said analysis includes: Plaintiffs were able to "cut and paste" the partially redacted email to a basic text editor to reveal the complete message, without redactions. The message is an attempt to request counsel as to how to undertake the contested action and provides false information to counsel. The message is damaging to the Defense's case as the contractor admits plaintiff's claim. The unredacted message: provides a pretextual basis to the third-attorney, for which counsel provide an opinion-letter regarding why the defendant is able to undertake the its disputed action. The opinion letter is the foundation which the Defendent relies upon for the Business-Judgement rule. The unredacted message shows that Defendent's contractor admitting the absence of the defense claimed by Defendents. QUESTIONS I would be interested in hearing arguments for AND against admitting the plaintiff's version of the unredacted version of evidence and why you think the judge will / will not admit the unredacted version. I would like to understand (preferably with Florida case law examples): Is the disclosure of the evidence "as-is and subject to plaintiff "cut and paste" analysis?

The evidence would (normally) be inadmissible australia The authority is Reduction Analyst Group Pty Ltd & Ors v Armstrong Strategic Management & Ors (2013) 303 ALR 199. The High Court concluded that where a privileged document has been inadvertently produced during a court-ordered discovery, the court should ordinarily permit that mistake to be corrected and order the document’s return. However, relief may not be granted if (i) a party fails to act promptly or (ii) the party to whom the documents have been disclosed has been placed in a position, due to the disclosure, where it would be unfair to order the return of the documents. Their Honours concluded that to establish an intention to claim privilege, it was sufficient to prove that the ERA Parties intended to claim privilege and that the reviewers were carrying out the ERA Parties’ instructions. In your case, the defendant has clearly indicated an intention to claim privilege by attempting to redact parts of the documents. That the redaction was ineffective was clearly a mistake. Unless the exemption quoted above applies, the court should order the return of the documents and should not take them into evidence. Further, the solicitor who received the documents and reasonably concluded they were received in error was ethically bound to immediately raise this with the sender. This would have led to their return without involving the court. Forensically examining the documents, if done by the plaintiffs lawyers is nudging professional misconduct and censure.

Can a rape victim's DNA be used against them in criminal proceedings?

This question arose after a recent revelation from the San Francisco DA, who said that DNA of rape victims that were gathered when performing a rape kit test 1 was used to identify a criminal suspect through a match in the database. Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? violate any state constitutions or the US constituiton? When I say ‘state’ in this question, I'm not just referring to California: it could be any state in the US or DC. I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales. sources Articles on this story appeared in the guardian , the independent and daily mail 1 - A rape kit usually takes several samples of possible perpetrator DNA and a sample of the victim's DNA to separate their DNA from the perpetrator.

Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? Generally not. States could adopt a statute that says otherwise, but I'm not aware of states that do. States often have regulations limiting police use of biometric data for general, non-probable cause based searches for criminal suspects. For example, many states don't make fingerprints obtained for professional licensing background checks available for searched by law enforcement without a warrant and probable cause. I suspect that states may start to do so with rape kit DNA, but it hasn't previously been identified as an issue, so there aren't statutes that prohibit this in most cases (e.g. victim's rights bills have not thought to address the issue). The reason for concern that could lead to future statutes is two fold. First, including rape kit DNA in searches discourages people from reporting crimes because it might put them at a disadvantage in an unrelated criminal proceeding. Second, the risk of false positives is vastly higher in a random search of biometric data from people with no articulated connection to the crime than it is when isolated individual suspects who there is probable cause to believe committed a crime are investigated. The chance of a false positive for someone in a database with millions of people is non-negligible even if the risk of a false positive in any one isolated comparison is tiny. Even a 1 in 10,000,000 chance of a false positive in a database of 40 million people will routinely produce false positives in random searches. And, while DNA evidence is very accurate, partial forensic DNA samples aren't absolutely incapable of producing false matches to nearly the same extent as a comparison of two complete whole genome samples. So, states may adopt such statutes in the future now that the issue is in the spotlight. contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? No. violate any state constitutions or the US constitution? No. At least under current jurisprudence. The relevant provisions are vague legal standards that are applied with great discretion by courts. Evolving understandings of the situation could change that view in the future. Footnote: Does doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA control? There is a doctor-patient privilege recognized in every U.S. state and in the federal courts. Forensic DNA obtained from a rape kit from a potential suspect isn't protected by the privilege since the suspect isn't a patient of the medical provider in that medical procedure. There is an arguable case that the rape victim is a patient of the medical provider who gathers the DNA, including the rape victim's DNA for the rape kit, and that the patient has not waived the doctor-patient privilege merely by permitting the medical professional to use the rape victim's DNA profile to distinguish between sample material in the rape kit that is her own from material from a suspect. Moreover, such a waiver of doctor-patient privilege would probably not be legally valid unless the rape victim provided informed consent to that release. The rape victim might also have federal HIPPA protections for the privacy of her DNA profile collected as part of her medical records under a similar theory. Mostly, this hinges on how the relationship of the rape victim to the person administering the rape kit is characterized, and in particular, if gathering evidence in a rape kit is "medical treatment" that is privileged. To the best of my knowledge, there is no case law interpreting either the doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA in a rape kit DNA fact pattern. If it is considered to be a doctor-patient relationship for medical treatment within the meaning of the evidentiary privilege and HIPPA, and the DNA was shared on a database which law enforcement has access to without a warrant without the victim's informed consent, this evidence and all "fruit of the poisonous tree" derived from it, could probably be suppressed in a criminal proceeding against the rape victim, even if the evidence conclusively linked the rape victim to the crime. Under the circumstances, and given the policy considerations and the lack of other controlling law, this would be an attractive interpretation of the existing law for a court to adopt. If evidence completely independent of the blind database match provided probable cause that the rape victim committed a crime, and the crime was one in which there was forensic DNA evidence, law enforcement could probably get a search warrant to take a legally untainted DNA sample from the rape victim to compare to the forensically collected DNA evidence, however, just as it could with any other suspect.

Can a rape victim's DNA be used against them in criminal proceedings?

This question arose after a recent revelation from the San Francisco DA, who said that DNA of rape victims that were gathered when performing a rape kit test 1 was used to identify a criminal suspect through a match in the database. Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? violate any state constitutions or the US constituiton? When I say ‘state’ in this question, I'm not just referring to California: it could be any state in the US or DC. I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales. sources Articles on this story appeared in the guardian , the independent and daily mail 1 - A rape kit usually takes several samples of possible perpetrator DNA and a sample of the victim's DNA to separate their DNA from the perpetrator.

Can a rape victim's DNA be used against them in criminal proceedings? england-and-wales Yes But ... A victim's DNA is not routinely recorded on, or searched across, the DNA database. The process, in simple terms, is: A medical practitioner takes samples of biological material from the victim (using what some colloquially refer to as a rape kit). As those samples potentially contain a mixed profile, control samples are also taken from the victim - usually by drawing blood and plucking hair to avoid the potential for cross contamination. When both sets of samples are analysed, the control is used to isolate any unknown profile(s). Any unknown profiles are then available for recording on, or searching across, the database if the investigation warrants it - which is not always the case. The victim's control samples are not put on, or through, the database unless there is a specific and proportionate necessity to do so.  (And I cannot recall any cases that I have been involved in, or heard about, where this has actually happened.) If, for whatever reason, the victim's samples are used in this way and they get linked to an unrelated crime scene, it would depend on the circumstances and proportionately as to whether the prosecution of a(n alleged) victim of a serious assault would follow.  If it did, then the DNA evidence is prima facie admissible in the interests of justice, unless the defence successfully argue for its exclusion under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Can a rape victim's DNA be used against them in criminal proceedings?

This question arose after a recent revelation from the San Francisco DA, who said that DNA of rape victims that were gathered when performing a rape kit test 1 was used to identify a criminal suspect through a match in the database. Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? violate any state constitutions or the US constituiton? When I say ‘state’ in this question, I'm not just referring to California: it could be any state in the US or DC. I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales. sources Articles on this story appeared in the guardian , the independent and daily mail 1 - A rape kit usually takes several samples of possible perpetrator DNA and a sample of the victim's DNA to separate their DNA from the perpetrator.

I'm also curious as to whether it is a legal practice in England and Wales. If the sample is legally retained then it can be used. The rules in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Part 1 chapter 1 , which modify the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 , provide that a DNA profile must be destroyed unless it is specifically authorized to be retained under one of the enumerated powers (see PACE 63D(3)). The relevant ones here are: 63E: retain until the investigation or subsequent criminal proceedings have concluded 63N: retain material given voluntarily until it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken 63O: retain so long as the person consents in writing 63P: if the person is charged with a different offence, retain under the applicable power So long as the profile is in the National DNA Database, it's available for use for the investigation of crime. The original sample from which the profile was derived may be destroyed or retained, depending on circumstances; see 63R. Therefore, a victim of crime may find their DNA still in the database, if any of the conditions above apply. And 63P specifically means that 63E will apply in relation to the new investigation, even if the victim withdraws consent under 63O. If the original investigation were closed and the victim had asked for her profile to be removed from the database, then it would not be available in that way. Note that law enforcement is an exception to the GDPR , which would otherwise entitle the victim to certain rights over her personal data held by the police.

Downloading solution manual of books

For many textbooks solution manuals are available online. Is it copyright violation to download these manuals for studying?

It is copyright infringement unless the author of the solution manual gives permission. The author of the textbook has no say in the matter. A solution manual might happen to infringe the textbook's copyright, e.g is the manual included the question along with the solution, provided that the question itself is protected by copyright. If the author puts his manual of solutions out in the open on his web page, he would not succeed in suing you for downloading the book, since by putting the work out in the open, he has invited the compelling conclusion that you are permitted to see what he has shown (otherwise, one could never legally look at a web site). However, a work pirated by a third party and displayed on a pirate site like libgen conveys no implicit license from the author, which is why I framed this in terms of the manual author's own web page.

Is the executive branch obligated to enforce the Supreme Court's decision on affirmative action?

The Supreme Court ruled, on June 29, 2023, that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, universities are obligated to treat all applicants fairly and not discriminate on the basis of race. Does this compel the executive branch to actually implement the ruling in practice? I.e. could the Biden administration declare that they’ll ignore all affirmative action related violations and not take away funding from any institutions that engage in such practices? As a related example, marijuana is illegal in the US but this doesn’t mean that the government is forced to prosecute anyone for selling weed. Could a similar policy apply to colleges?

The judgment in Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President and Fellow of Harvard College , 600 U.S. ___ (2023) was in relation to relief sought by the plaintiffs against Harvard and University of North Carolina. This is more apparent by reading the judgments below. See e.g. 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) . SFFA seeks "declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs" against the defendant "President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard Corporation)." SFFA sought the same remedies against University of North Carolina: 567 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D.N.C. 2021) . Thus, there is no order against the federal executive. The federal executive can continue providing funding. It is Harvard and U.N.C. that are enjoined.

Is the executive branch obligated to enforce the Supreme Court's decision on affirmative action?

The Supreme Court ruled, on June 29, 2023, that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, universities are obligated to treat all applicants fairly and not discriminate on the basis of race. Does this compel the executive branch to actually implement the ruling in practice? I.e. could the Biden administration declare that they’ll ignore all affirmative action related violations and not take away funding from any institutions that engage in such practices? As a related example, marijuana is illegal in the US but this doesn’t mean that the government is forced to prosecute anyone for selling weed. Could a similar policy apply to colleges?

There is a private cause of action to enforce Title VI which is how the cases in question came up in the first place. It isn't enforced solely, or even primarily, by the executive branch.

Meaning of typical statement in the legal document of Stock option grant

I am reading a legal document related stock option agreement here https://media.orrick.com/Media%20Library/public/files/o/option-agreement.docx . One section reads like Termination upon Disability of Optionee. In the event of termination of Optionee’s Continuous Service Status as a result of Optionee’s Disability, Optionee may, but only within 12 month(s) following the Termination Date, exercise this Option to the extent Optionee is vested in the Optioned Stock. I could not understand what is the meaning of " Optionee is vested in the Optioned Stock "? An option is granted against some exercise price, based on some schedule, not the underlying stock, right? Therefore, as I understand, the holder is holding the option not the underlying stock itself, right? Therefore, should not be the right statement would be " Optionee is vested in the granted option "? Additionally, the vesting schedule looks like " <x%> of the Total Number of Shares shall vest and become exercisable.. " How exactly underlying shares will become exercisable? Should not this statement read as " <x%> of the Total granted options shall vest and become exercisable.. " I am not particularly from a legal background, so it is a bit difficult to understand above statement. Any insight will be very helpful

Typically, an employee stock option plan will come with a vesting schedule. The employee gets new stock options each year, but only really gets to own those stock options gradually over a period that is typically two to five years. This provides an incentive for an employee who receives stock options to stay with the company in order to obtain this form of deferred compensation. It is a type of "golden handcuffs" arrangement. Say that the company has a five year vesting period and the employee has worked there for six years. The employee's stock options from years one will be 100% vested and available to exercise. The employee's stock options from year two will be 80% vested. The employee's stock options from year three will be 60% vested. The employee's stock options from year four will be 40% vested. The employee's stock options from year five will be 20% vested. The employee's stock options from year six will not be vested at all. Usually, the higher up you are in the company, the more seniority you have, or the higher your base salary, the more initial pre-vesting grants of stock options you get in a year. So, if you are moving up the corporate ladder, this number will gradually increase. Maybe you got 100 options in year one, 200 in year two, etc. So, you do the math and that's how many stock options you can exercise. Year - Option Grants - Vesting Percentage - Vested Shares 1- 100 - 100% - 100 2- 200 - 80% - 160 3- 300 - 60% - 180 4- 400 - 40% -160 5- 500 - 20% -100 6- 600 - 0% - 0 Total Granted Share Options 2100 - Total Vested Share Options 700 It's really more complicated than this because the exercise price is probably different each year. The option price is probably lower in the earlier years and higher in the later years. Under this provision, if you are disabled, your stock options cease to continue to vest. But, the stock options which are not vested are forfeited if your employment is terminated by disability. The company does this since the company no longer needs to use unvested stock options as an incentive to keep you working for them. For some tax preferred incentive stock options , the delayed vesting is mandatory (at least if the tax benefit is to be realized) in order to create an incentive that Congress deemed desirable when writing the tax code to think about the long term, rather than the short term, as a result of receiving option grants.

Grounds For Divorce in Massachusetts

If my wife wants to divorce me, does she need my consent? Does she need grounds - like I cheated (which I didn't and would never do).

The State of Massachusetts has "no fault divorce" as does every other U.S. state. Either spouse may unilaterally petition for divorce without grounds for divorce that have to be proven with evidence in court. A statement of a spouse under oath that there are irreconcilable differences in the marriage conclusively establishes a right to file for divorce. What if my spouse wants a divorce but I don’t? It is nearly impossible to contest a divorce. Since this state allows divorce due to “irreconcilable differences” all your spouse needs to prove is that they cannot live with you or no longer love you. For many people, this is a sign that it is time to move on since courts are not in the business of forcing an unhappy individual to remain married. If your spouse files a divorce based on fault, you can dispute the reasons you are at fault. But this will likely convert your divorce to a “no fault” divorce rather than stop it completely. ( Source ) Marital fault is not considered on the merits of child custody, property division, or alimony in Massachusetts.

Legal challenges against age-restricted housing

It’s fairly common when looking for real estate to see “adults only,” “seniors only,” or “55+” restrictions for strata/condominium properties. I would expect this to be a cut and dried case of discrimination – one can imagine a “whites-only” townhouse complex (rightfully) going down like a lead balloon. In BC, this discrimination is explicitly allowed in the Strata Property Act : The strata corporation may pass a bylaw that requires one or more persons residing in a strata lot to have reached a specified age that is not less than 55 years. Has this kind of discrimination been tested in court or by a human rights tribunal before? Is it likely any such challenge would succeed? (I’m specifically thinking about British Columbia but I expect any Canadian jurisdiction would be similar.)

The B.C. Human Rights Code exempts age restrictions for 55+ in relation to tenancy. See Human Rights Code , s. 10. The subsection prohibiting discrimination in tenancy on the basis of age "does not apply": if the space is a rental unit in residential premises in which every rental unit is reserved for rental to a person who has reached 55 years of age or to 2 or more persons, at least one of whom has reached 55 years of age Further, as to condominium bylaws, in 2022, the Province enacted Bill 44, the Building and Strata Statutes Amendment Act , which makes any strata age restriction below the age of 55 invalid (which you have quoted a portion of). Human Rights Tribunal The Human Rights Tribunal can only provide remedies for claims arising under the Human Rights Code. Given that the Human Rights Code does not provide a basis for discrimination claims in tenancy when the age of distinction is 55+, any valid strata by-law relating to age of residents will by definition fall outside of the scope of a Human Rights Code complaint. And even when the Strata Property Act allowed all sorts of age restrictions, the BC Human Rights Code does not provide a remedy when the distinction is authorized by another act (see s. 41(2); Hallonquist v. Strata Plan NW307 and another , 2014 BCHRT 117 ): Nothing in this Code prohibits a distinction on the basis of age if that distinction is permitted or required by any Act or regulation. Constitutional challenge in a court You also ask about a challenge in a court. I assume you consider that the challenge would be based on s. 15(1) of the Charter (equality rights). There are three potential targets of the challenge: the strata by-law that restricts residency to people aged 55+; the provincial statute prohibiting strata by-laws from imposing any age restriction unless it is an age restriction based on an age not less than 55 years; the carve-out in the Human Rights Code for tenancy restrictions for ages 55+ The Charter challenge to the strata by-law itself would face the barrier that a British Columbia court has held that stratas are not "government" for the purpose of the Charter , so are not subject to Charter challenges: Strata Plan NW 499 v. Kirk , 2015 BCSC 1487 . I have quickly added this final portion in response to a clarification of the question, but there is more to say. I will return to explain the law relating to partially ameliorative legislation.

Can Meta create a Twitter clone?

Meta is about to release an app called Threads that has been labeled by news sources as a Twitter rival or Twitter clone. I don't know how similar Threads actually is to Twitter, but hypothetically if it were almost identical, would that be legal? More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? How similar do two websites or apps have to be before there's a legal/copyright issue?

More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts.

Can Meta create a Twitter clone?

Meta is about to release an app called Threads that has been labeled by news sources as a Twitter rival or Twitter clone. I don't know how similar Threads actually is to Twitter, but hypothetically if it were almost identical, would that be legal? More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? How similar do two websites or apps have to be before there's a legal/copyright issue?

Copyright applies to creative expressions, not abstract ideas. Copying the general functionality of an application is not a copyright violation. Only copying the code, art assets etc. is. However, under some circumstances, an idea can be patented . That is if that idea is a new "invention". It is possible for companies like Twitter or Instagram to protect certain features of their websites they invented using patents. In fact, Twitter does that . But patents have some limitations: They can only protect what's actually new. When someone did something like that before, then that is called "prior art" and it invalidates the patent. For example, you could not patent "A website that allows users to upload images" today, because websites that allow users to upload images have already been invented and exist for ages. And because you can't patent something that already exists, you have to be really specific in your patent description. Which means people can get around it by doing things slightly different than claimed in the patent. For example, if your patent says "Uploaded images are displayed on the left side of the screen", then someone could avoid infringing it by displaying uploaded images on the right side of the screen. Patents have a rather short expiration time. How long exactly depends on the country and the type of patent, but they are generally not longer than 20 years.

Could you be charged with manslaughter for obstructing an ambulance?

There was a recent incident in London that has been all over the news where protesters blocked a road and eventually ended up blocking an ambulance. It was stated that they were aware of the ambulance yet still refused to move. Assume a hypothetical scenario where this ambulance was responding to a time sensitive incident, i.e, a stabbing victim, who was therefore suffering from blood loss, and it could be conclusively proven that the delays caused by these protesters were the sole reason that this victim ended up dying from a survivable injury. Could the protesters be charged with manslaughter, assuming it was evident they were aware of the ambulance's presence?

Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe . Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.

What is the legal significance of explicitly designating an ingredient as a fruit oil?

A South African food item lists an ingredient as olive (fruit) oil. Another South African food item lists an ingredient as non-hydrogenated palm (fruit) oil. I’ve never seen such designations on ingredient listings and assume that it has some legal significance to specify that it is a fruit oil (as in an oil of the olive fruit, rather than the seed) in South African law.

This may be historical with a quasi-legal underpinning. Apparently, regulations that might have banned palm kernel oil were repealed, but they would not have banned palm fruit oil. It is most likely there to inform consumers that these are the fruit oils, and not palm kernel or olive seed oil (the latter would not be generally used in food, the former is almost universally what people outside Africa mean when they speak of "palm oil"). Palm kernel oil is regulated in the US in a way that palm fruit oil is not, and I can't find any evidence that olive seed oil is legal in food, in the US.

Different notice periods for employer and employee

On another site, someone was asking because it seems his employer doesn't need to give any notice during the three month probation period, while the employee has to give three months notice. Apart from being obviously most unfair, is that legal at all in the UK? (And information about other countries would likely be of interest to other people as well)

Referring to the UK company Citation Ltd : How much notice has to be given during probation periods? If an employee’s in their probation period and chooses to leave before it’s over, if you don’t have a set term in your contracts of employment, they must give the statutory minimum notice period – which is one week. However, you can set your own notice period specifically for probation periods in your contracts of employment. So, for example, if an employee’s notice period would ordinarily be four weeks outside of probationary periods, you can set it at two weeks during their probation period, providing it’s in writing in their contract of employment. Letting go of an employee during their probation period . . . it’s good practice to try to make it work by clearly setting out what’s expected of them, and holding regular reviews to monitor performance and further reiterate your expectations – particularly as you’ll have no doubt spent time and money during the recruitment and training process already. If, despite your efforts, things still aren’t working out, you’d be within your rights to dismiss the employee. Remember though, even in their probation period, employees still have certain rights – like the right to be accompanied by a work colleague or an accredited trade union official. It seems quite bizarre to expect 3 months notice from an employee who is on 3 months probation. That would be on the first day, and isn't legal unless agreed in the contract – in which case the employee has until the last day to withdraw their notice. Edit If the three months notice is contractual, it reminds me of UK (real) estate agents' T&C for sole agency vendor agreements, that the apparently fixed period agreement does not terminate unless the client provides the required notice. So in this case, if the probationer has not given the 3 months contractual notice, they cannot legally leave at the end of the probation period, unless they are dismissed.

Could cases regarding violations of the ECHR be heard before UK courts prior to the Human Rights Act 1998?

https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-convention-on-human-rights/ The above article that I have been reading suggests that an application to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg should only be made if domestic routes have been 'exhausted', seeming to imply that domestic courts had jurisdiction to hear cases regarding violations of the ECHR (see the section under 'How is it enforced?'). However, the article goes on to state that the HRA was introduced to 'bring rights home' and enable people to protect their rights in domestic courts, suggesting that this was not the case prior to the act. These two suggestions seem somewhat contradictory to me. Is there something that I have misunderstood? Thanks!

Before the Human Rights Act 1998 , you could not complain on European Convention on Human Rights grounds to domestic courts. The UK as a state was signatory to and therefore bound by the Convention. However, public authorities in the UK were not required by domestic law to comply with the Convention. In some circumstances domestic courts could take into account the Convention but nevertheless they were not bound by it. The fact that (generally) before making an application to the European Court of Human Rights you had to exhaust all available domestic processes just means that the state was entitled to the opportunity to make things right, there was some political leeway afforded to it, and the practical matter of cutting down the sheer number of cases to be heard by the European Court. It is a bit like having to exhaust a regulated company's complaints process before complaining to the regulator. The regulator will tend to reject the complaint if the complainant hasn't been through the company's (reasonable) steps. Among other things the Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect to the European Convention in Human Rights law. Now public authorities including the courts were bound by the Convention and complaints could be made domestically on Convention rights grounds. Chapter 1 of the White Paper for the-then Human Rights Bill may be of interest: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf Alternatively paragraphs 10-17 of The Government's Independent Review of the Human Rights Act https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5802/jtselect/jtrights/89/8905.htm .

How do war survivors claim damages?

A Modern Example: Numerous Ukrainians survivors have had their homes destroyed by Russian missiles. If the Russian prevail in this conflict, then I would think that said survivors can not claim damages against the victor. On the other hand for the purposes of the question, let us assume that the Ukrainians prevail in this conflict. How & in what forum would a Ukrainian survivor claim / recover damages from Russia for the destruction of his / her home?

Currently, there is no recourse The Russian state is sovereign. This means the Russian government has to tell the Russian courts that they allow people to sue Russia for specific, enumerated things. If the Kremlin has not done so, then Russia has total, sovereign immunity from such claims. In the united-states , the FTCA regulates how and when you can sue the USA or federal institutions for torts, while FSIA regulates how or when you can sue other countries in the USA. In russia , the Federal Law No. 297-FZ of November 3, 2015 "On Jurisdictional Immunities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State in the Russian Federation" seems to be a very similar law to FSIA. I could not determine if an equivalent to the FTCA exists. Reparations would be handled by a peace treaty with Ukraine Besides a law that allows claims against Russia, a Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty might contain a passus about reparations. There are three very traditional ways how such handle reparations: In one case, such a treaty could establish that Russia pays the reparations to Ukraine, and then claims against Russia are paid out by Ukraine. In the other case, the treaty provides a framework to sue Russia for compensation. And in the last variant, no compensation for civilians is agreed upon at all.

Vehicle owners not required to prove towing company negligence in Texas

Chapter 2308 of Title 14 of the Texas Occupations Code deals with towing and booting by towing companies. Section 2308.404(a)(2) reads "A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner who violates this chapter is liable to the owner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of the violation for ... towing, storage, or booting fees in connection with the vehicle's removal, storage or booting of the vehicle ..." But then 2308.404(b) reads "A vehicle's owner or operator is not required to prove negligence of a parking facility owner, towing company, or booting company to recover under Subsection (a)." What does this mean? If, for example, the owner claims that the towing company failed to observe the requirement that a towing company not tow a vehicle from a facility that fails to display proper signage (2308.301), is the burden of proof on the towing company and not the owner?

What does this mean? It means that proof of a violation of the statute is sufficient even if it wouldn't support a common law claim for negligence. If, for example, the owner claims that the towing company failed to observe the requirement that a towing company not tow a vehicle from a facility that fails to display proper signage (2308.301), is the burden of proof on the towing company and not the owner? It does not shift the burden of proof. It changes what has to be proved. The owner can prove a violation of the statute rather than proving negligence. But the burden of proof remains on the owner.

Is illegal for a civilian to shine a light into police officer&#39;s car?

Police officers often shine a light into your car or even your eyes. I find this very annoying. Their reasons of using such light is to "check if there is a hazard or any other safety issues in your car". I did some research and in general, there is no relevant clause prohibiting the usage a flashlight this way. My question is, in US and Canada, is it illegal for a citizen do the exactly same thing to a police officer: shine a light back at them out of your car or shine a light into their car? The reason is simple: before the officer show the police ID I cannot be sure that it is actually the real police that has been stalking me. I have to use a flashlight to examine if there is any hazard associated . The reason is safety and self-protection.

The police will order you to stop and then you have to obey. The moment you annoy the police in a way that is hindering their work (such as blinding them with a flashlight), they can demand you to stop. if you don't comply, then you are committing a misdemeanor. For example, Virginia calls this "refusal to aid [an] officer in execution of his office" and it is worded so widely, that the officer asking you to shut up and you don't, then you are guilty. If the order is in any way justifiable, then you not following the order is... well, criminal. Plus, if you did not comply and they pulled out their handcuffs and you still don't comply with their demand, you are now resisting arrest, which at least in Virginia is again, a misdemeanor.

UK: Good faith vs qualifying misrepresention

Consider the following in the context UK contract law, insurance and consumer rights. When you (a person or legal entity) buys insurance there is some expectation that you properly value the item or items insured. If at the time of a claim, the valuation is found to be incorrect (too low = underinsured) the insurer may avoid the claim or apply an averaging clause , effectively meaning they pay less than they would if you had valued the item(s) correctly and paid a higher premium as a result. This is I believe termed a qualifying misrepresentation . However, there is also an expectation from the consumer that if they acted in good faith they should not be penalised. Many complaints are made to the financial ombudsman and resolved by weighing these up. See for example: https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/decisions-case-studies/ombudsman-decisions/search?Keyword=buildings+insurance+underinsurance+&Sort=relevance How might this work in the context of changes to the insured value made over time? Specifically, if you consider a claim on buildings insurance with: A significant undervaluation is being made by the original managing agents. Different managing agents involved over time. Different insurance brokers used over time. Different underwriters used over time. The current managing agent claims that they acted in good faith to review the rebuild cost with various insurers. Some records of increases in rebuild costs significantly beyond inflation levels backing up the claim that this was discussed but nonetheless leaving the property undervalued. To my mind mistakes were made by multiple parties: Previous agents did not value the property correctly Subsequent actors acted in good faith assuming the valuation to be correct The client queried the valuation at least once and as a result the insured amount increased (but there may be no record of these conservations) However, no one made or asked for a proper valuation by the surveyor Has the client acted in "good faith" or made a "qualifying misrepresentation" and how could this be determined (by the ombudsman or anyone else)? Does it make a significant difference if the managing agent (client) is a 'professional' property management company that might be expected to know these things vs a right to manage company or owners association? Likewise would earlier claims made under a previous insurer where the under-insurance issue was not noted be factored in? (for example, if a loss adjustor visited in regards to say an escape of water claim would they be reasonably expected to note the under insurance issue at the time and would that even be relevant if it was for a different broker or underwriter). It is also unclear (to me) who is responsible for the valuation with buildings insurance. If you consider car insurance. The valuation of a car is typically determined by the insurer using a "glass" guide. A consumer might reasonably expect something similar to apply for building insurance based on property values. For items like jewelry, it appears the person taking out the insurance is expected to get it professionally valued.

If at the time of a claim, the valuation is found to be incorrect (too low = underinsured) the insurer may avoid the claim or apply an averaging clause, effectively meaning they pay less than they would if you had valued the item(s) correctly and paid a higher premium as a result. This is I believe termed a qualifying misrepresentation. A qualifying misrepresentation is the consumer's "misrepresentation for which the insurer has a remedy against the consumer" ( s4 Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 ). This is available when the consumer misrepresented a fact deliberately or recklessly, or carelessly ( s5 CIDRA ). s5 (4) It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless. (5) But it is to be presumed, unless the contrary is shown— (a) that the consumer had the knowledge of a reasonable consumer, and (b) that the consumer knew that a matter about which the insurer asked a clear and specific question was relevant to the insurer. If a qualifying misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, the remedy is that "the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, and need not return any of the premiums paid, except to the extent (if any) that it would be unfair to the consumer to retain them." ( Schedule 1 CIDRA ). At the time of application for or renewal or mid-term adjustment of a policy, the consumer must take reasonable care to answer the insurer's questions. Including what is the value at that time (not 15 years ago). s3 Reasonable care (1)Whether or not a consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation is to be determined in the light of all the relevant circumstances. (2)The following are examples of things which may need to be taken into account in making a determination under subsection (1)— (a)the type of consumer insurance contract in question, and its target market, (b)any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorised by the insurer, (c)how clear, and how specific, the insurer's questions were, (d)in the case of a failure to respond to the insurer's questions in connection with the renewal or variation of a consumer insurance contract, how clearly the insurer communicated the importance of answering those questions (or the possible consequences of failing to do so), (e)whether or not an agent was acting for the consumer. (3)The standard of care required is that of a reasonable consumer: but this is subject to subsections (4) and (5). (4)If the insurer was, or ought to have been, aware of any particular characteristics or circumstances of the actual consumer, those are to be taken into account. Necessarily the Financial Ombudsman makes its findings on a case-by-case basis. The Ombudsman corresponds with both parties about who said what when. If this case hinges on an insurer's question, the Ombudsman reads the question to determine if it was a clear question. The Ombudsman examines the evidence - letters, phone call recordings, emails, websites. A few of the case studies at the link you supplied involve changes to property or policy over time. https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/insight/insight-in-depth-underinsurance-misrepresentation-non-disclosure Case study 3: 15 years ago the consumer got cover for a watch valued at the time at £1,500; when she was asked at renewal times if she wanted to make any changes to her claim limit she said she didn't (and presumably paid for the policy on that basis). Years later she lost the watch; at the time of her claim it was valued at £5,000 and the insurer refused to offer her more than £1,500. The consumer complained she should have been offered more - the Ombudsman disagreed. Case study 5: there was no evidence to suggest the consumer knew that the previous owner of her car had added alloy wheels. The fact that the insurer's expert was able to spot the alloys was not a reasonable argument to "avoid" the policy on the grounds that the consumer claimed the car had not been modified in any way. The Ombudsman disagreed with the insurer's position that the consumer knew or didn't care that the information she provided was wrong. Case study 6: the consumer replaced his VW Polo with a VW Golf and contacted his insurer to make a mid-term adjustment. The insurer asked him if the VW Golf had been modified in any way from the manufacturer's original specification, for example with alloy or sports wheels. He said no, it hadn't been modified in any way at all. Subsequently he made a claim on the grounds his car was stolen; he told the insurer that the car had sports wheels fitted when he bought it that he thought added a minimum of £1,000 to its value. The insurer decided to "avoid" the policy because the consumer deliberately misrepresented the car had been modified. The Ombudsman agreed with the insurer that the policy could be "avoided". Buildings, contents, vehicle and jewelry policies tend to be provided on an annual basis and (among other things) what it could cost to replace them at application or renewal time. What it was worth 15 years ago is irrelevant (and might well be too little or too much). It is also unclear (to me) who is responsible for the valuation with buildings insurance. The consumer is responsible for taking "reasonable care" about it. If you consider car insurance. The valuation of a car is typically determined by the insurer using a "glass" guide. A consumer might reasonably expect something similar to apply for building insurance based on property values. Buildings insurance providers ask "how much it would cost if you had to rebuild your home?" They don't ask how much you could sell your home for. Some providers suggest you could hire a residential property surveyor or use their 'calculator' or 'comparison tool'. Expensive jewelry: if you bought it recently then have you got a receipt? If you haven't got a receipt then get it professionally valued. Car insurance: you answer the insurer's questions about your car, e.g. make, year of manufacture, transmission, modifications, the insurer puts your car into one of 50 insurance groups that are a factor insurers use to price your policy. Some providers go into much detail about this kind of thing.

What does German law say about online threats using Social Media (Youtube)?

I was watching a Youtube Video where a man calls on other people to kill a woman who burned the Quran and filmed it. I know it's not OK if you disrespect somone's religion, but no one has a right to kill you or call for other people to kill you just for burning a book, do they? I reported the video to YouTube and got the following response: Is this really accurate? Does this not constitute an illegal threat under German law?

YT has certain obligations under Germany’s hate speech law Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken . You can file complaints with a dedicated form . Per se, you are correct: The German penal code § 111 punishes public incitement to commit offences . However, as a prerequisite to any crime, German penal law must be applicable in the first place. Specifically, it is questionable whether the man (when shooting and/or uploading the video) is/was located in Germany at that time, § 3 StGB . Hence YT’s assessment was OK. Since January 1, 2021 , (cf. 2020 Federal Gazette Ⅰ p. 2600) posting the same kind of video could be a crime via § 5 No. 5a lit. a StGB if the woman was at that time in Germany, or the man is a German citizen or the man usually resides in the FRG. In your particular case, though, it is irrelevant, because you’re judged by the criminal law that was in effect at that time, § 2 ⑴ StGB .

Why &#39;Solicitor General&#39;, and not &#39;Barrister General&#39;?

In countries with this dichotomy of the legal profession, mostly barristers argue in courts. In the UK, solicitors with Higher Rights of Audience can argue in lower courts. However, if Solicitors General argue in courts, then ought they not be called 'Barristers General'? Does this nomenclature contradict the English definitions of 'barrister' vs 'solicitor'?

The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.

Why &#39;Solicitor General&#39;, and not &#39;Barrister General&#39;?

In countries with this dichotomy of the legal profession, mostly barristers argue in courts. In the UK, solicitors with Higher Rights of Audience can argue in lower courts. However, if Solicitors General argue in courts, then ought they not be called 'Barristers General'? Does this nomenclature contradict the English definitions of 'barrister' vs 'solicitor'?

The Solicitor General was the second Law Officer of the Crown , emerging during the reign of Edward IV (1461–1483). Over the centuries, the offices of Attorney and Solicitor General came to exercise a unique combination of political and legal functions, which evolved differently when adopted by other jurisdictions with different constitutions. The title predates the modern understanding of "solicitor" as a practising lawyer who is not a barrister. The critical feature of the office of Solicitor General is that it is junior to the Attorney General, not that it is occupied by a lawyer who would be qualified to practise as a solicitor. While the Attorney General exercises executive power directly and therefore holds a political office, the Solicitor General is more like an ordinary professional lawyer who deals with the government's biggest legal problems. This includes responsibility for advocacy in the highest courts. Therefore, in split profession jurisdictions, the Solicitor General looks more like a barrister than what is now understood by "solicitor." The historical background is traced in WS Holdsworth, The early history of the Attorney and Solicitor General 🔒 (1918–1919) 13 Illinois Law Review 602: [T]he offices of attorney and solicitor general only began to assume their modern shape in the course of the sixteenth century; and it was not till the end of the seventeenth century that they in substance attained it. By that date they had become legal advisers of the crown … How was it that the king came to appear in the courts, and to be advised on points of law by an attorney and a solicitor, at a time when the profession of attorney was becoming sharply divided from that of barrister, and at a time when a solicitor was approximating to an attorney, but was still regarded as inferior to him? In order to solve this problem we must, in the first place, consider the very large differences between the development of the king's attorney and solicitor and the development of the ordinary attorney or solicitor; and, in the second place, the great increase both in the amount and the character of the demands made upon the king's legal advisers in the new age which opened in the sixteenth century … We hear of a king's attorney in the thirteenth century, that is at a time when the legal profession had not yet taken its final form. Like the attorneys of other people, he is often only appointed for a particular court; like them he is sometimes formally admitted by the court; and like them he can both plead and take all the necessary steps in the action. But there are differences. The king could appoint an attorney general—an attorney to conduct any litigation that might arise—as he pleased, at a time when other persons could only do so by the express license of the king … By the beginning of the seventeenth century this development was practically complete. Hudson tells us that it was resolved in 1604 that the king's serjeant [barrister] could not, like the king's attorney, proceed on his own motion by information in the Star Chamber. He could apparently only act if he were specially instructed. In other words, the attorney general was the only person who could take the initiative in legal proceedings on behalf of the crown. Why was it that he had thus been able to gain so decisive a superiority to the serjeants? The order of the serjeants was essentially medieval; and the king's serjeants were medieval officials. Like many other medieval officials, they were obliged to give place to officials who had originally occupied a humbler position, because these officials were, for that very reason, more capable of adaptation to the needs of the modern state. Thus the rise of the king's attorney and solicitor, at the expense of the king's serjeants, is, in the legal sphere, a phenomenon of the same kind as the rise, in the political sphere, of the king's secretaries, at the expense of many older medieval functionaries. Further reading on the history of the Law Officers can be found in: JW Norton-Kyshe, The law and privileges relating to the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, with a history from the earliest periods, and a series of king's attorneys and attorneys and solicitors-general from the reign of Henry III to the 60th of Queen Victoria (1897) JLJ Edwards, The law officers of the Crown; a study of the offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, with an Account of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of England 🔒 (1964) (United States) SP Waxman, Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be (1998) (Australia) G Appleby, The Role of the Solicitor-General Negotiating Law, Politics and the Public Interest 🔒 (2018)

Can a university continue with their affirmative action program by rejecting all government funding?

As per Why did CJ Roberts apply the Fourteenth Amendment to Harvard, a private school? , the ban on affirmative action only applies to schools that receive federal funding. So... could a school continue with their affirmative action program if they just reject government funds? Or is there some sort of a 'gotcha' that prevents them from doing so in practice?

Short Answer Can a university continue with their affirmative action program by rejecting all government funding? Yes. The Status Quo There are twenty-two higher educational institutions in the United States that did this prior to the 2023 ruling (in all but one trivial case, in part, in order to affirmatively escape the requirements of Title VI, so that they could discriminate in furtherance of a religious mission). Most of the schools on the list refuse not only federal but also state and local government aid. Specifically, they are: Aletheia Christian College (Idaho) Bethlehem College & Seminary (Minnesota) Boyce College (Kentucky) Christendom College (Virginia) Faith Bible College (Maine) Grove City College (Pennsylvania) Gutenberg College (Oregon) Hildegard College (California) Hillsdale College (Michigan) Mid-America Baptist Theological Seminary (Tennessee) Monticello College (Utah) Mount Liberty College (Utah) New College Franklin (Tennessee) New Saint Andrews College (Idaho) Patrick Henry College (Virginia) Pensacola Christian College (Florida) Principia College (Illinois) Sattler College (Massachusetts) Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (Kentucky) Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (Texas) Weimar University (California) Wyoming Catholic College (Wyoming) There used to be more, but most of the hold outs eventually gave in, or ceased to be. Notably, the vast majority of parochial colleges and universities in the U.S. are subject to Title VI because they accept federal funds and federal financial aid. All of them, except Monticello College in Utah, are non-profit colleges or universities with a religious affiliation or mission. Several are partially, or entirely, seminaries devoted to training future clergy. Monticello College has only four teaching faculty (including its President) and two administrators, has no more than 30 students at any one time, was apparently established in 2010, was "for profit" until at least 2019, and is unconventional to the point of barely being recognizable as a conventional institution of higher education, for example, including a substantial manual labor component and teaching courses in blocks of two days to three weeks. Monticello also voluntarily adheres to a non-discrimination policy comparable to the one that applies to Title VI institutions. Only two of them, Grove City College and Hillsdale College, have 1,200 or more students. By comparison, there are 3,982 colleges and universities in the United States , so this is less than 0.6% of U.S. colleges and universities, and a far smaller percentage of U.S. college students as all of these institutions are all small by college and university standards. About half of private non-profit colleges and universities (about 800 of them) have 1,000 or fewer students, so about 2.5% of small private non-profit colleges do not receive federal funding, but only 0.25% of larger private non-profit colleges and universities do. All "for profit" colleges or universities in the U.S. (almost 700 of them) rely upon federal financial aid and/or federal funding. As a practical matter, almost all of the 99.4% of colleges and universities in the U.S. that rely upon federal financial aid and/or federal funding could not sustainably continue to operate with anything close to their current business models without this federal support. They would either have to close, or would have to radically restructure themselves. Non-Title VI Considerations Also, while not quite as stringent as Title VI, the U.S. tax code also denies tax-exempt status to certain non-profits that discriminate based upon race. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (social clubs). Most higher educational institutions are not subject to this requirement directly, but for example, the Rotarians could not do charitable work for a college that discriminated based upon race as interpreted by the 2023 SCOTUS ruling. Additional Considerations Regarding Impact Few private colleges and universities have much of a reason to withdraw from federal funding to allow them to continue affirmative action programs based upon race because not all that many of them have admissions policies which are strongly affected by affirmative action based upon race. Affirmative action really only has a big impact at colleges and universities that are highly selective, like Harvard and the University of North Carolina, whose admissions policies were litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court. But these universities are highly atypical. As noted in a recent article in the New York Times , while Harvard admits just 4% of applicants, and UNC admits 20%, just 6% of U.S. four year college students attend a college with an admissions rate of 25% or less (just 22 colleges and universities admit 10% or fewer of the prospective undergraduate students who apply). Another 10% of U.S. four year college students attend a college with an admissions rate of more than 25% but less than 50%. Meanwhile 56% of U.S. four year college students attend a college that admits at least 75% of its applicants. While the impact of ending affirmative action at highly selective institutions is likely to be significant, this is the exception rather than the rule. The impact of ending affirmative action based upon race in less selective institutions, while not zero, is barely noticeable. The effects of ending race based affirmative action at these school is also much more easily mitigated with race-neutral programs (like preferences for first generation college students, low income college students, or students with high class ranks in high school) with similar effects in student diversity, in less selective institutions, than it is at highly selective colleges and universities. Also, less selective colleges and universities already have a disproportionate share of students who currently tend to benefit from affirmative action as show in the chart from the same New York Times story below:

Why don&#39;t US courts use numbered paragraphs?

Many, if not indeed most, jurisdictions' (eg Germany, the UK, Australia, Canada, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights) courts make use of numbered paragraphs for easy citation across a variety of platforms. This avoids issues with citation and allows for (on platforms such as BAILII or AustLII) HTML pinpoint linking to specific parts of judgments. I know that US statutory provisions use paragraph numbering, and a google (I have no formal study of American law) seems to suggest that court papers such as written arguments often require numbered paragraphs. Yet, the US supreme court and (again, from a quick web search) the US state courts do not seem to use this easy and extremely simple innovation to aid citation. Is there a reason why? Or is this one of those things like inches and Fahrenheit where it's just an American practice that doesn't have a reason?

Many U.S. state courts do use numbered paragraphs, including Colorado. But the practice is fairly new and page numbers in privately published reporters was the historically established method of pinpoint citation. Most or all federal courts, and California appellate courts, for example, do not. The matter is not uniform because the stylistic aspects of appellate court opinion writing is not unified. Each court makes its own rules in that regard. For example, there are even different style rules between different circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in turn, also has its own style manual for drafting opinions.

Are wills that easily contested?

I've seen multiple situations in TV shows, fictional and nonfictional, where wills or other expressions of post-mortem wishes have been contested for reasons that seemed trivial. One was a man who named his friends, a successful married couple, who loved and were loved by this child, and who he believed would be better guardians than his parents (the child's grandparents) to be his daughter's guardians, but once he died there was a legal battle over custody as this man's parent, the child's grandparents, thought they could provide a slightly "better" life due to being more wealthy. Is this enough of an argument? Is a person's dying will not the final say unless extenuating circumstances are proven?

A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. in Washington ) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been "convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian", but such a person is not barred from inheriting property. There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will. Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.

Car Debt and the IRS

A certain tax payer is on a payment plan to the IRS. The tax payer owes $10,000. The tax payer has missed several payments and now the IRS is going to take away the tax payer's car. The car is worth about $11,000 however there is an outstanding loan on the car of about $4,000. Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off the car loan? Does the lender get stuck? Note: Assume the person is in the United States.

australia The lender is paid first Assuming the lender has properly registered a lien under the Personal Property Securities Act then they have first right to the proceeds of the disposal of the vehicle. Assuming it realises $11,000 (i.e. after the costs of seizure and sale), the lender gets $4,000, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) gets $7,000 and the taxpayer still owes $3,000 to the ATO. If the lender has (foolishly) not registered their interest then the ATO gets $10,000, the taxpayer gets $1,000 and still owes the lender $4,000.

Car Debt and the IRS

A certain tax payer is on a payment plan to the IRS. The tax payer owes $10,000. The tax payer has missed several payments and now the IRS is going to take away the tax payer's car. The car is worth about $11,000 however there is an outstanding loan on the car of about $4,000. Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off the car loan? Does the lender get stuck? Note: Assume the person is in the United States.

united-states Assuming the IRS takes the car for non-payment of taxes, who pays off the car loan? Does the lender get stuck? The lender does not get stuck. The U.S. Treasury takes the car subject to the car loan. It then sells the car at auction and keeps as a credit against the taxpayer's tax liability, the money that is left over from the auction sale price after the costs of sale and the payoff of the lender (including any penalties, attorney fees, and default interest accrued). Usually, the auction price is much less than the fair market value of the car sold by a used car dealer in the ordinary course. In the facts as given, a sales prices of $7,000-$8,000 might be typical, with costs of sale on the order of $1,000, and a payment $5,000 to the lender once penalties for having the car foreclosed upon are considered, resulting in a net credit against tax liability of $1,000-$2,000. What If The Auction Sale Price Less Costs Of Sale Doesn't Cover The Entire Car Loan? If the sale price were insufficient to pay the car loan with all penalties and interest and the costs of sale, the U.S. Treasury would get nothing, and the car loan lender could sue you for the balance which still remains unpaid after the auction, which is called a "deficiency judgment." This would be an open and shut lawsuit, since having the car seized is an event of default and any fault in how the sale was conducted couldn't be attributed to the bank. If the deficiency is small (e.g. $100-$500), the lender might send collection letters, or file a claim in a bankruptcy if there is one, but not bother to sue. What If The Lender's Lien Wasn't Filed With The DMV? All of this assumes that the car loan was property documented with a state Department of Motor Vehicles filing. If the loan wasn't properly documented on the certificate of title (or a certificate of title whose issuance is pending), the entire sales price, after the costs of sale, is a credit against taxes owed (probably $6,000-$7,000 in this example). In that case, the foreclosure is still an event of default under the car loan, and the car lender can sue the borrower for the entire amount of the loan plus interest, penalties, and usually attorney fees (probably $6,000 to $7,000 in all in this fact pattern, because a lawsuit has to be begun rather than relying on the IRS to do some of that work). Also, if that happens, the car lender fires its attorneys and sues them for malpractice if it can't collect the balance it is owed on its car loan. I'm familiar with a case where that happened in a $10 million transaction, for property much more valuable than a used car, and the lender prevailed.

Why did CJ Roberts apply the Fourteenth Amendment to Harvard, a private school?

In Justice Roberts's ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College overturning affirmative action in the United States, he holds that "Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Later, he writes (all emphases added): The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistakably clear: the right to a public education 'must be made available to all on equal terms'." Brown’s “fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.” For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause . Why would the Equal Protection Clause apply to private universities? The EPC restricts certain state actions. And other Constitutional amendments do not apply to private universities . The only opinion in this decision I could find that addressed this issue at all was Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in section II.B: Title VI says: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” ... The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In this way, Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal Protection Clause does not. ... Title VI bears independent force beyond the Equal Protection Clause. While Gorsuch is not explicitly clear on this point, I read this as saying that he believes that Harvard's policies are illegal, but under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S. Code § 2000d), not under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this seems like a pretty major departure from Roberts' position (which I don't understand) that the EPC applies to both Harvard and UNC.

Justice Gorsuch attempts to explain (at p. 20 of his concurrence): In the years following Bakke , this Court hewed to Justice Powell's and Justice Brennan's shared premise that Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause mean the same thing. ... As a result, for over four decades, every case about racial preferences in school admissions under Title VI has turned into a case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. A journalist's account on scotusblog also notes that the tests under Title VI and under the 14th amendment have been understood as identical: Private universities like Harvard are not subject to the 14th Amendment, but Title VI applies the same test to private universities that receive federal funds, as Harvard does. See also commentary from a law firm blog in 2022: Harvard, as a private university, is not explicitly regulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the case against Harvard relies on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits any entity receiving federal financial assistance – as Harvard does – from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, or national origin.” The Supreme Court has held that Title VI’s protections match those of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and thus, the analyses are essentially identical. I read the majority reasons to be a continuance of this conflated meaning. In footnote 2, Chief Justice Roberts is careful to say that the Court is evaluating Harvard's admissions program "under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause" (emphasis mine), rather than stating that the Equal Protection Clause applies against Harvard. Later, he does slip back into language that could be read as suggesting the Equal Protection Clause is being applied directly: "For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause," but a better reading is that he is merely recognizing that Title VI imports the same guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Gorsuch would prefer to re-introduce the analytical clarity about the source of the constraints.

Why did CJ Roberts apply the Fourteenth Amendment to Harvard, a private school?

In Justice Roberts's ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College overturning affirmative action in the United States, he holds that "Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Later, he writes (all emphases added): The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistakably clear: the right to a public education 'must be made available to all on equal terms'." Brown’s “fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.” For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause . Why would the Equal Protection Clause apply to private universities? The EPC restricts certain state actions. And other Constitutional amendments do not apply to private universities . The only opinion in this decision I could find that addressed this issue at all was Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in section II.B: Title VI says: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” ... The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In this way, Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal Protection Clause does not. ... Title VI bears independent force beyond the Equal Protection Clause. While Gorsuch is not explicitly clear on this point, I read this as saying that he believes that Harvard's policies are illegal, but under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S. Code § 2000d), not under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this seems like a pretty major departure from Roberts' position (which I don't understand) that the EPC applies to both Harvard and UNC.

TL;DNR: You are right. Roberts says Harvard should lose because it violates the 14th Amendment. But he does not say the 14th Amendment applies directly to Harvard. He says Title VI and the 14th Amendment impose the same requirements, so that the 14th Amendment's standards effectively apply to Harvard via Title VI . Justice Roberts explains the link between Harvard and the 14th Amendment clearly on page six of his opinion. In the body of the text, he points out that the two suits are based on different laws: The suit against UNC is based on the 14th Amendment, while the suit against Harvard is based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Then, in footnote 2 on that same page, he cites footnote 23 in Gratz to show that Title VI and the 14th Amendment impose the same requirements. Because the two laws impose the same requirements, he can "evaluate Harvard’s admissions program under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause itself." In other words, when Roberts says at the end of his opinion that, "the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause," he is leaving it to the reader to add, " and thus the Harvard admissions program violates Title VI. "

Why did CJ Roberts apply the Fourteenth Amendment to Harvard, a private school?

In Justice Roberts's ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College overturning affirmative action in the United States, he holds that "Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Later, he writes (all emphases added): The conclusion reached by the Brown Court was unmistakably clear: the right to a public education 'must be made available to all on equal terms'." Brown’s “fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.” For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause . Why would the Equal Protection Clause apply to private universities? The EPC restricts certain state actions. And other Constitutional amendments do not apply to private universities . The only opinion in this decision I could find that addressed this issue at all was Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in section II.B: Title VI says: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” ... The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In this way, Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal Protection Clause does not. ... Title VI bears independent force beyond the Equal Protection Clause. While Gorsuch is not explicitly clear on this point, I read this as saying that he believes that Harvard's policies are illegal, but under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S. Code § 2000d), not under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this seems like a pretty major departure from Roberts' position (which I don't understand) that the EPC applies to both Harvard and UNC.

Harvard university receives substantial money from the federal government. There is a federal law prohibiting racial discrimination in education, 42 USC 2000d , which says No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. A purely private educational institution that received no federal money (including processing federal student aid) is not subject to this restriction (though it would be subject to state analogs). See p. 6 of the opinion. Beyond that, I'm not sure what is unclear. The former policies plainly did discriminate by not protecting some people just as much as other people.

Inheritance tax on foreign gifts

Suppose that I as a UK citizen living in the UK am given money by an American who then dies. Do I have to pay inheritance tax to either the UK or US governments?

united-kingdom To extend on @ohwilleke's answer about US inheritance tax, I can answer the UK side of things. UK inheritance tax does not apply to inheritances from abroad, unless that person was domiciled in the UK or some of their assets were in the UK. If you are not a UK resident for tax purposes (which, from the context of your question is unlikely), then you wouldn't even have to pay tax on the interest you earned from depositing the inheritance. If the deceased were taxed for being domiciled in the UK, and the US taxed your inheritance, you'd actually qualify for tax relief from HMRC based on what you'd already paid the IRS. If you are not domiciled in the UK for tax purposes, and neither was the decedent you would owe precisely zero to HMRC in the UK. More info can be found here: https://www.taxoo.co.uk/uk-resident-receiving-inheritance-from-abroad/

Inheritance tax on foreign gifts

Suppose that I as a UK citizen living in the UK am given money by an American who then dies. Do I have to pay inheritance tax to either the UK or US governments?

united-states I can only answer half of the question. The U.S. has an estate tax that applies to U.S. citizens and U.S. residents who die on the property that they own at their death. So, if a U.S. citizen leaves an inheritance to a U.K. citizen, any death taxes are paid by the U.S. citizen's estate (and very few people pay it because the cutoff exceeds $12 million of taxable gifts made by the decedent during life plus the fair market value of the decedent's assets at death). Since this involves a gift made before death, the U.S. gift tax applies, rather than the U.S. estate tax, but the U.S. gift tax is imposed on donors, not recipients, and also has an annual exemption of $17,000 per person per year ($34,000 per person per year from a married couple). I do not know how the U.K. would tax receipt of a gift before death from a U.S. person. I suspect that, since this is a lifetime gift rather than an inheritance, that the only tax that would apply is a tax on gifts, not a tax on inheritances, since a lifetime gift isn't an inheritance.

Inheritance tax on foreign gifts

Suppose that I as a UK citizen living in the UK am given money by an American who then dies. Do I have to pay inheritance tax to either the UK or US governments?

united-kingdom I think you have misunderstood the requirements to pay inheritance tax, as it is... ...a tax on the estate (the property, money and possessions) of someone who’s died. Source: Gov.uk You, apparently, have not died. Instead, you are the beneficiary of a "cash gift from overseas" and as such... You won't have to pay Income Tax on cash gifts. Source: HMRC But... any profit it generates (e.g. from investing it, or interest gained from a bank account) may be taxable depending on your particular circumstances.

Is it legal for counties to defy the state supreme court?

I live in Pennsylvania. Recently, the counties of Lancaster, Dauphin, and I believe Schuylkill and Cumberland have expressed that they are going to violate the state supreme court and governor by moving to the next level of re-opening despite COVID-19 (i.e., transitioning from red to yellow). Is this legal? What are the repercussions of doing so? I've seen some cite the "doctrine of lesser magistrates" as a defense for this. The only information I could find about this practice was from Wikipedia. According to the wiki page this movement originated as a way for a lesser magistrate to overturn the decision of a higher court. It appeared that the direct reference was to something akin to feudalism. I read elsewhere (I forget where exactly) that this practice used to be use in times of violence and war, often citing tyranny as the reason for doing so. To me, this all sounds like the vote of "no confidence" in Chancellor Valorum from Star Wars Episode I. Thoughts? I'm not a lawyer but merely a legal enthusiast. Thanks!

Sending a letter to the Governor is legal You can do it, I can do it and the elected officials of Lancaster County can do it. Thanks to the first amendment, that letter can say pretty much anything you like subject to limits that themselves are subject to strict scrutiny - things like threats and defamation. Outlining a course of action that you propose to take is legal even if that course of action is itself illegal. I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean. However, that just begs the question ... This article explains what's going on and, more importantly, the actual letter is here . I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal. Apart from the first paragraph, the entire letter appears to be a case for why the county should be permitted to move from red to yellow on May 15 and they are asking for the Governor's support. Even the first paragraph is ambiguous; while it asks the Governor to move the county from "red" to "yellow" and states that they "intend to move forward with a plan" it is by no means clear that that plan is moving from "red" to "yellow" even though you could get that impression on a casual reading. Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not. Of course, just because something is illegal doesn't mean it can't be done. The USA is a free country and the fundamental freedom is to reap the consequences of your actions. If the county does something 1 then the state can take them to court - the court will decide if it's legal or not. 1 Or threatens to do something sufficiently concrete that an injunction against it could be issued.

Is it legal for counties to defy the state supreme court?

I live in Pennsylvania. Recently, the counties of Lancaster, Dauphin, and I believe Schuylkill and Cumberland have expressed that they are going to violate the state supreme court and governor by moving to the next level of re-opening despite COVID-19 (i.e., transitioning from red to yellow). Is this legal? What are the repercussions of doing so? I've seen some cite the "doctrine of lesser magistrates" as a defense for this. The only information I could find about this practice was from Wikipedia. According to the wiki page this movement originated as a way for a lesser magistrate to overturn the decision of a higher court. It appeared that the direct reference was to something akin to feudalism. I read elsewhere (I forget where exactly) that this practice used to be use in times of violence and war, often citing tyranny as the reason for doing so. To me, this all sounds like the vote of "no confidence" in Chancellor Valorum from Star Wars Episode I. Thoughts? I'm not a lawyer but merely a legal enthusiast. Thanks!

The doctrine of lesser magistrates has not been part of US law since we declared independence from the king of England. Whether or not the actions of some public official are legal depends on what that action is, and what the legality of the prohibition of that action is. I have seen that a group of officials in Lancaster county have written a letter dated May 9 to the governor, and that is entirely legal (protected by the First Amendment). On May 15, some official proclamation might be issued, and it is pointless to imagine all of the possible things that might be in such a proclamation. But for the sake of argument, assume that the county makes a declaration that essentially replicates the so-called yellow phase proclamation , applied to Lancaster county. It is legal to issue such a proclamation. That does not mean the proclamation would have legal force. Then the matter would have to be decided in court (unless it's decided politically). On both sides, the central question is whether the executive has the power under state law to tell people what to do. There is a statute that gives the governor broad emergency powers. There does not appear to be any provision of state law that allows a county official to declare a gubernatorial order null and void. Even if a law exists allowing county officials to issue legally-enforceable orders, county law is subordinate to state law, so individuals who open for business are not immune from legal action by the state.

How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?

Background I've been through the Windows 8.1 EULA and the EULA for computer manufacturers . I've also seen this question where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service. The EULA states this about ownership: "How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time" The EULA states this about transfer: "Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key." My question spans three scenarios: Scenario 1: I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price P . It cost me P because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows online. There are other laptops that cost less than P , because they are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online and use it? Scenario 2: The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC? Scenario 3: I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC, and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop. This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.

General The legal discussion hinges on the question whether the concept of copyright exhaustion applies to software. (The linked article also discusses the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling mentioned below in the EU part of this answer.) Copyright exhaustion, in simple terms, allows certain uses (like the ones in your scenarios) of copyrighted (books) or patented (e.g. devices) items for which the copyright or patent holder has the right to first sale . If and when that principle applies, the original seller cannot control further sales or other uses of that particular specimen. Their copyright is "exhausted" with the first sale. Situation in India I want to emphasize that I have exactly zero experience regarding India in any way. All I did was that I went to the google. It appears that the Indian Supreme Court recently ruled in Engineering Analysis Centre for Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT that the typical EULAs are valid. In particular, copyright exhaustion does not apply and the EULA can restrict re-selling and similar actions. The case is discussed in this article , including relevant quotes. This would make everything illegal which is forbidden by an EULA. As I read the EULA, creating a backup copy is allowed, as is restoring Windows from it, obviously; whether that has to happen on the same computer is unclear to me and may depend on the license type (OEM vs. standalone), although I have two remarks: Microsoft is the copyright owner; if they provide you with a license (for example because you called them after you re-installed Windows from a backup copy, and the internet license process didn't work) without you making false claims it is their prerogative. You are good. What constitutes a different computer? The SSD? The case? The mouse? We do have a case of the Ship of Theseus , or here for a funnier take: How much can you change before it becomes a different machine? The answer: Call Microsoft and find out. Situation in the EU The situation in the EU is fundamentally different from the one depicted with a misguided metaphor in the accepted answer . In Europe, all of your scenarios are legal. In July 2012, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the company usedSoft who is a license reseller. (I'm writing this text on a machine with a Windows license that cost me, together with a Microsoft Office Professional license, 30 Euros, from this store .) The title of the Court's press release couldn't be clearer: An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his ‘used’ licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet Not only can you re-install the software, provided it is the only installation, on the same or a different computer; you can even sell it. You can even sell OEM and bulk licenses. The full text of the decision can be found here . The court stressed that it doesn't make a difference whether the software was originally provided on a physical carrier like a DVD or as a download. Crucially, the seller is obligated to continue providing downloads and updates for the re-sold licensed software as if it were still owned by the first buyer. There is no legal difference between software provided on a physical medium or as a download. To quote the decision: 80 Since the copyright holder cannot object to the resale of a copy of a computer program for which that rightholder’s distribution right is exhausted under Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24, it must be concluded that a second acquirer of that copy and any subsequent acquirer are ‘lawful acquirers’ of it within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24. 81 Consequently, in the event of a resale of the copy of the computer program by the first acquirer, the new acquirer will be able , in accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24, to download onto his computer the copy sold to him by the first acquirer. Such a download must be regarded as a reproduction of a computer program that is necessary to enable the new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose. The court also examines the problem of how to prevent abuse of this permission for online copies (as opposed to physical media) and finds no substantial obstacles here. "79 As Oracle rightly observes, ascertaining whether such a copy has been made unusable may prove difficult. However, a copyright holder who distributes copies of a computer program on a material medium such as a CD‑ROM or DVD is faced with the same problem, since it is only with great difficulty that he can make sure that the original acquirer has not made copies of the program which he will continue to use after selling his material medium. To solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor — whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ — to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys. It seems noteworthy to me that the general question of how to prevent illegal copies is only loosely related to the question of reselling anyway. Even if it were illegal to resell, the seller's problem with illegal copies would not disappear. (It might be somewhat easier to enforce by "dongling" it to a specific hardware and not allow any re-installation whatsoever, but mainstream software producers don't appear to do that, generally.) Lastly it is noteworthy that the original seller may strong-arm the original buyer into signing an EULA that expressly forbids reselling; those restrictions are simply null and void in the EU. 1 1 The German EULA of Microsoft Windows does not forbid reselling. The EULA for MS Office has restrictions concerning transfer to third parties in point 3 but notes that those are not applicable if the software was bought in the EU or EFTA and the transfer is inside that region.

How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?

Background I've been through the Windows 8.1 EULA and the EULA for computer manufacturers . I've also seen this question where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service. The EULA states this about ownership: "How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time" The EULA states this about transfer: "Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key." My question spans three scenarios: Scenario 1: I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price P . It cost me P because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows online. There are other laptops that cost less than P , because they are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online and use it? Scenario 2: The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC? Scenario 3: I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC, and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop. This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.

How does licensing a software not imply ownership? Because it doesn’t. Don't I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it? No Scenarios 1 - 3: each and every one of these is a breach of the license and unlawful. A license is different from ownership Perhaps the most understandable analogy is a theme park. The theme park is owned by someone, let’s call them D. They sell you a day-ticket which is a license to access their property subject to certain conditions: access at certain times, to certain areas/rides and with restrictions on certain kinds of behavior. You can do only what D allows and nothing else. You certainly don’t own the theme park. Now, replace D with Microsoft and theme park with Windows and you have the same situation.

How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?

Background I've been through the Windows 8.1 EULA and the EULA for computer manufacturers . I've also seen this question where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service. The EULA states this about ownership: "How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time" The EULA states this about transfer: "Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key." My question spans three scenarios: Scenario 1: I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price P . It cost me P because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows online. There are other laptops that cost less than P , because they are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online and use it? Scenario 2: The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC? Scenario 3: I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC, and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop. This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.

Under standard contract law, all the negative replies listed here would be correct. HOWEVER- having in the past contacted Microsoft service about OS transfer under MS licensing, so long as the license is a full license, and not an OEM license (equipment manufacturers license is MUCH more restricted than full license, that's why it doesn't add as much cost to new hardware as a full version does), you can extract the license code from the registration, make your backup install copy, wipe the original HDD, restore the hardware chipset to factory wipe (there are instructions online, Microsoft will help find them) to remove any POST key, and at that point there is no active version of the OS. You can then install and activate the OS on another system, but you will likely have to contact MS service directly to clear the license for full Windows activation. Once done, that copy is exclusive to the now active system, and should be fine.

How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?

Background I've been through the Windows 8.1 EULA and the EULA for computer manufacturers . I've also seen this question where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service. The EULA states this about ownership: "How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time" The EULA states this about transfer: "Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key." My question spans three scenarios: Scenario 1: I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price P . It cost me P because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows online. There are other laptops that cost less than P , because they are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online and use it? Scenario 2: The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC? Scenario 3: I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC, and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop. This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.

Software is not a physical thing. It is not possible to "own" it, you can only own rights to it. You can own a copyright to the software, or you can own a license to the software. Obviously, when you "buy" software, you're not buying the copyright outright, you're buying a license. "License" is a synonym for "permission". You are buying a permission to use the software. And that permission is subject to the conditions that come with it.

How does licensing software not imply ownership? Don&#39;t I own a Windows operating system once I pay for it?

Background I've been through the Windows 8.1 EULA and the EULA for computer manufacturers . I've also seen this question where an answer says that Windows is sold as a software service. The EULA states this about ownership: "How can I use the software? The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one copy on the computer on which you acquired the software (the licensed computer), for use by one person at a time" The EULA states this about transfer: "Can I transfer the software to another user? You may transfer the software directly to another user, only with the licensed computer. The transfer must include the software, proof of purchase, and, if provided with the computer, an authentic Windows label including the product key." My question spans three scenarios: Scenario 1: I have a desktop computer on which I've installed only Linux. I purchased a new laptop for price P . It cost me P because it had Windows 8.1 pre-installed and I could register Windows online. There are other laptops that cost less than P , because they are sold without any operating system. Windows EULA allows me to take a backup of the operating system onto a pen drive. I registered Windows and took a backup on a pen drive. Now within a few days, if the laptop gets crushed under a truck, I've lost function of the hardware, but I still have a backup of the software. Since I paid for the software, can't I install it on my desktop PC, register it online and use it? Scenario 2: The laptop does not get crushed under a truck. After a few years of using the laptop, I choose to sell the laptop to a company that purchases old devices to recycle them. The company only cares about the hardware. They are going to pull apart the entire laptop and send the parts for recycling. Can I delete everything on the hard disk, hand over the laptop to the company and use the Windows backup to install it on my desktop PC? Scenario 3: I sell the laptop to someone who dislikes Windows. They'd rather use Linux. So I install only Linux on the laptop and explicitly tell the person that although this laptop came bundled with Windows, I'm going to use Windows for myself on my desktop PC, and he'd have to only use Linux on the laptop. This is for a situation where Windows installed on the desktop would be used solely for personal use. No commercial use at all. If I wanted, I could take some of the RAM or some other hardware from the laptop and use it with any other laptop, because I purchased the hardware and I own it. So given that I have also purchased a license to the software, if the laptop gets destroyed, shouldn't I have the right to utilize the fact that I paid for the software, and be able to use the software as a single installation on my desktop? This is by nature of the software being safe from physical destruction, and the fact that I'm not misusing the software.

The license is very clear. If you buy for example a Dell PC with a Windows license, what will happen is that Dell bought say a million OEM licenses from Microsoft at a very good price, and Dell has therefore a license to install Windows on one million computers that are sold to end users or companies. The licenses that Dell installs are specific to both Dell, and to that particular Dell computer. So if you sell the computer or give it away as a present, you sell it or give it away together with the license, so the next person can use Windows on the same computer. The license does not allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer. And that's about it. Now if we go through your three different scenarios... In scenario 1, your computer was crushed, very bad luck... You are actually allowed to make a backup copy of the license in US law - but you are not allowed to install that backup on any other computer, only on the one that the Windows license belonged to. The license does not allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer. On the positive side, if you are insured, the insurance company has to pay for your loss, which is one PC and one license. In the second case, where you sell your PC to a recycler, if the recycler takes it just for the parts and not to make a working computer, the license has lost its value. The license does not allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer. In scenario 3, if the buyer isn't interested in Windows, the license doesn't force him to install it or keep it installed anywhere. However, you can't install the software on another computer. The license does not allow you to install the Windows software on a different computer. That's the point in the end: The license allows you to use Windows on ONE particular computer. Not on any other computer. No argument of yours can get around that. You can buy Windows with a different license, that gives you more freedom what you can and can't do it. Windows with such a license is a lot more expensive. You got a license at the lowest possible price, which gives you fewer rights.

Have people been charged for obstructing evacuation?

When evacuating a vehicle or a building in distress, the evacuees are normally supposed to leave their belongings behind. This doesn't always happen . Technically, if actual harm comes to others through such action, it could count as endangerment or similar crimes of negligence. Of course, going after people who have been through an accident is unlikely to be a law enforcement priority, so has it ever happened? I'm aware of cases against building owners, operators, or staff, which have impeded or obstructed an evacuation, but all of them have a duty of care. Has a civilian not under the duty of care, such as a passenger, ever been criminally charged for obstructing an evacuation, in which they had been an evacuee? I'm interested in any jurisdictions, and particularly in the strongest charges that have been brought in such a case.

In germany , you are likely charged if you actively interfere. Let's preface this with the fact, that in Germany, people have a duty to aid in case of accidents, as long as you don't endanger yourself . The absolute minimum is to call the emergency service and not obstruct those that render aid. However, just not rendering aid is rarely charged. However, since a few years, people that slow down to make videos of crash sites or who stop to look at an accident, and in doing so block emergency helpers, are now almost routinely charged with obstruction of emergency workers, together with possibly other charges like assault and insult. One of the most prominent cases was in 2017 , where the person attacked emergency workers and police. He was sentenced to 4 months for the various assaults and bodily injury. Based on this case (where the person was just sentenced for resisting police and assault), it ultimately lead to a new law. One of many cases that started in 2023 had a similar pattern but the charge is based on the new law: § 323 c Abs. 2 StGB - not delivering aid and obstruction of aiding persons. This law allows up to one year of prison time for hindering any person rendering aid. Also, creating pictures at accident sites that depict people or corpses and sharing them in a manner that is humiliating to the victims in itself can be a breach of § 201 a StGB - injury of privacy by means of photography. This can get a sentence of up to two years, and would most likely be joined by a charge of not delivering aid and obstructing helpers. Do note that this is not covering photos that were made for example as evidence of the situation or not shared with third parties. Being in peril yourself... When you technically are in peril yourself, you don't have to render aid. Being stupid like grabbing your carry-on luggage isn't technically covered by the law, and because the person is in danger themselves, it will be very hard for the prosecution to decide if they want to prosecute. If Alice just grabs her carry-on in panic and nothing happens as she evacuates, charging will be extremely unlikely, as in, the chance is nigh nonexistent. Bob, who steps out of the way of others while he calmly takes his things is not interfering with the rescue, and thus charging him is most likely not going to happen. But Charly, who blocks the path of everybody because he wants to go to the other end of the plane to get his luggage and does not let anybody pass and thus increasing the danger of the situation (or even cause death) might break the threshold that the prosecution is willing to prosecute to make an example out of him. The more egregious his behavior was, the more they might look into if other charges can become applicable. However, those other charges are usually not from the blocking or inaction, but from an action against someone that is in the same peril as the actor. If Dora during the building fire grabbed a fire axe and smacked it over someone's head while he was trying to evacuate her, so she could get her items from another room, that would be dangerous mayhem (§ 224 StGB, Gefährliche Körperverletzung ).

Have people been charged for obstructing evacuation?

When evacuating a vehicle or a building in distress, the evacuees are normally supposed to leave their belongings behind. This doesn't always happen . Technically, if actual harm comes to others through such action, it could count as endangerment or similar crimes of negligence. Of course, going after people who have been through an accident is unlikely to be a law enforcement priority, so has it ever happened? I'm aware of cases against building owners, operators, or staff, which have impeded or obstructed an evacuation, but all of them have a duty of care. Has a civilian not under the duty of care, such as a passenger, ever been criminally charged for obstructing an evacuation, in which they had been an evacuee? I'm interested in any jurisdictions, and particularly in the strongest charges that have been brought in such a case.

It’s unlikely that there is any criminality here australia Failing to comply with the lawful order of police or emergency services allows the use of force to ensure compliance but is not itself an offence . Obstructing the Minister or a person acting under the authority of the Minister during a declared State of Emergency is an offence but taking things you are told not to take is not obstruction. Legally, obstruction requires wilful interference, not just making things harder than they might otherwise have been. It’s possible that failing to follow well defined and practiced emergency procedures might violate Work Health and Safety laws but that would only be for people who held a duty under them. Technically, this includes workers but their duty is slight and broad allowances are made - the assumption being that if a worker screws up this is due to inadequate training or supervision by the employer. Typically, for a worker to be charged, reckless disregard or wilfulness needs to be proved.

Are there any offences for which one does not have any right to elect a jury trial?

Certain offences are indictable only, some triable either way. Are there any that are considered so trivial as to be unworthy of the crown court’s resources?

england-and-wales In the UK, these are known as summary offences . In England & Wales, they are heard only in the magistrate's court, and they include : low level motoring offences minor criminal damage common assault being drunk and disorderly taking a motor vehicle without consent The Government maintains a spreadsheet with a detailed list of offences, which classifies them as indictable only, either way, summary non-motoring, and summary motoring. Of the summary non-motoring kind, the spreadsheet has 108 entries, though it appears that some of these entries cover multiple offences.

Are there any offences for which one does not have any right to elect a jury trial?

Certain offences are indictable only, some triable either way. Are there any that are considered so trivial as to be unworthy of the crown court’s resources?

All of them in germany There are no juries in Germany, there's no right to a jury trial, and as a result, no case is heard in front of a jury in the common law sense since 1924. many offenses are without Schöffen If you stretch the definition of a jury to include Schöffen, sometimes called "lay judges" , then there is a bright cutoff line: In the lower courts, as long as the typical punishment (not the sentencing range!) is less than 2 years, the case is in front of a single judge. If 2 to 4 years are typical for a case, Schöffen are required. Cases that require a punishment of above 4 years need to be handled in the upper courts, and Schöffen do play a role there too.

Are there any offences for which one does not have any right to elect a jury trial?

Certain offences are indictable only, some triable either way. Are there any that are considered so trivial as to be unworthy of the crown court’s resources?

canada For summary offences, and for hybrid offences where the Crown decides to proceed summarily, the offence is tried in a summary conviction court . This involves a judge sitting without a jury. See Part XXVII of the Criminal Code . There is also a list of offences that, even if charged as an indictable offence, must be heard by a provincial court judge, sitting without a jury. These are listed at s. 553 of the Criminal Code .

Are there any offences for which one does not have any right to elect a jury trial?

Certain offences are indictable only, some triable either way. Are there any that are considered so trivial as to be unworthy of the crown court’s resources?

australia s80 of the Constitution requires a jury for indictable offences The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence was committed, and if the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes. Australian law recognises three types of offences: indictable (requiring arraignment and a jury), summary (requiring a charge and a judge), and misdemeanour (a breach of law for which no specific penalty is set, requiring a charge and a judge). There is no right to a jury in civil trials and, while they are allowed, they are relatively uncommon. One of the fathers of Federation, Issac Issacs, pointed out: It is within the powers of the Parliament to say what shall be an indictable offence and what shall not. The Parliament could, if it chose, say that murder was not an indictable offence, and therefore the right to try a person accused of murder would not necessarily be by jury. Well, yes. However, more than 120 years later, Parliament has been reasonably well-behaved about this.

Is a company obligated to pay out vacation time lost due to a use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy?

Let's assume an employer has a use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy that allows employees to carry over 40 hours of vacation time from one year to the next. An employee ends the year with 60 hours of accrued vacation, and thus loses 20 of those hours. Given that Massachusetts law considers vacation time wages , and other circumstances require paying out those hours as if they were time worked (for example, on termination of employment ), is the company obligated to pay out the hours lost to the use-it-or-lose-it policy? Assume the employee in question was not prevented from taking vacation; they could have, but chose not to. (reposted here as requested from workplace.stackexchange)

Here is an extract about "use-it-or-lose-it" vacation policies from the Massachusetts Attorney General's Fair Labor division (Link goes to a Word document): An acceptable variation of an accrual cap is the vacation policy known as “use it or lose it.” Under this policy, employees must use all of their accumulated vacation time by a certain period of time or lose all or part of it. Some policies allow the employees to “carry over” a certain number of hours of vacation after the expiration of the designated time period. The “use it or lose it” policy effectuates a cap on accrual by limiting the total amount of vacation time that an employee may accrue during the term of their employment. Under such policies, the employer must provide adequate prior notice of the policy to employees and must ensure that employees have a reasonable opportunity to use the accumulated vacation time within the time limits established by the employer. Otherwise, a cap on accrual or a “use it or lose it” policy may result in an illegal forfeiture of earned wages. Accrual cap is explained earlier in the document. To paraphrase, a company could set max accrual of vacation at 3 weeks. Once you accrue 3 weeks, you will not accrue any more until you use some of the time.

Privileges of states &quot;now existing&quot; in contrast to other states, in importation of slaves

Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States says: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. My question is about the implications of the phrase "now existing." Would that mean that before the year 1808, Congress could forbid importation of slaves into states other than the 13 that existed when this was written? Did they?

This clause was included in order to attract the Southern states to join the union. For general context, see Federalist 42 , 1 Federalist 38 , 2 and Paul Finkelman, " How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War " (2013) 43:3 Rutgers Law Journal 405. 3 It originally appeared as if the "now existing caveat... empowered Congress to block slave traffic to and from any newly formed states" (James Pfander & Elena Joffroy, " Equal Footing and the States 'Now Existing' Slavery and State Equality Over Time " (2021) 89:5 Fordham Law Review). In 1819, John Jay wrote a letter saying: I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, that the power of the Congress, although competent to prohibit such migration and importation, was not to be exercised with respect to the then existing States (and only them) until the year 1808; but that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any new State, which might, in the mean time, be established, and further, that from that period , they were authorized to make such prohibition, as to all the States, whether new or old. However, in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the clause such that it required new states to be admitted on "equal footing with the other states" (p. 447) thus rejecting the interpretation I presented above. He also discreted the Northwest Ordinance as being beyond the power of Congress (pp. 435-38, 490-91). Four states joined the union between the ratification of the Constitution in 1790 and 1808: Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), and Ohio (1803). Vermont had already outlawed slavery before joining the union. Ohio was only allowed to join the union on the conditions established in the Northwest Ordinance , one of which was to prohibit slavery. Slavery and slave trade was allowed to continue in Tennessee and Kentucky after joining the union. 1. Note: the numbering on these has varied between the "Dawson" edition of the Federalist Papers and the now accepted numbering. In the Dawson edition, these were numbered 41 and 37. Federalist 42 : "It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government." 2. Federalist 38 : "It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. ... Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever." 3. "Given its economic importance and its vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that the Southerners at the Constitutional Convention demanded, and won, huge concessions to protect their 'peculiar institution,' as even they were beginning to call it. ... The clauses that Pinckney and other Southerners worked hard to create set the stage for a government that both protected slavery and was deeply influenced by it. ... In supporting a specific clause in the Constitution to prevent Congress from ending the African slave trade until 1800 (it was later amended to 1808), Sherman asserted that 'the public good did not require' an end to the trade."

Privileges of states &quot;now existing&quot; in contrast to other states, in importation of slaves

Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States says: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. My question is about the implications of the phrase "now existing." Would that mean that before the year 1808, Congress could forbid importation of slaves into states other than the 13 that existed when this was written? Did they?

No It was accepted by the early 19th century that a state was a state was a state. That is, there was legally no difference between original and subsequent states and that Congress could not make laws that (directly) discriminated on the states. What this clause is saying, is that the Federal government would not have a role in immigration until after 1808. In 1808, the only state still permitting international trade in slaves was South Carolina and the Federal government ended that as soon as it was able to. Smuggling through Spanish Florida remained a problem until it was acquired by the US in 1821. After that, smuggling continued on a smaller scale until the Civil War. Of course, smuggling slaves, then and now, is illegal. Modern slavery is still a problem.

Citing whole mailing list messages on the web

When I cite a complete message from a mailing list, omitting all personal information, if any, that is relatively concise (“Hi”, definition of problem, question, “Thank You”), can I cite the message publicly on a website? The message is a question related to computing and I cite the it because I answer it in the page. The mailing list has publicly available archives. Do I need consent of the original author to cite the message? Can I infringe copyright by embedding the whole message text on the page? (Assuming that the person did not give me any kind of permission explicitly.)

First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use" . This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.

Citing whole mailing list messages on the web

When I cite a complete message from a mailing list, omitting all personal information, if any, that is relatively concise (“Hi”, definition of problem, question, “Thank You”), can I cite the message publicly on a website? The message is a question related to computing and I cite the it because I answer it in the page. The mailing list has publicly available archives. Do I need consent of the original author to cite the message? Can I infringe copyright by embedding the whole message text on the page? (Assuming that the person did not give me any kind of permission explicitly.)

You can't delete all personal information Take this answer for example. If you were to copy just the text omitting my user ID, your user ID and the dates etc. it's still personal information! A simple Google search will bring you back here and voila - you will have my user ID. Personal information is any information that can be linked to a particular person. So the text of this answer is irrevokably PII of both you and me, just like the text of Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets is PII of J. K. Rowling. So, if you do this where PII is subject to privacy laws, you have to comply with those laws. Copyright You don't own the copyright in what you are copying, therefore you need permission or a fair use/dealing defence. For this answer, you have a licence for personal but not commercial use: You may download or copy the public Network Content, and other items displayed on the public Network for download or personal use provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained in such Public Content. While the licence requires you to include all copyright information, it does not require you to cite or otherwise acknowledge the author. Other sites will have other rules.

Is the Supreme Court&#39;s in-house citation style manual publicly available?

SCOTUS uses a distinct in-house citation style which, although it has a lot in common with the Bluebook , is not the same (differing in key places) and is as far as I know unique. Is the citation style manual used in house for SCOTUS publicly available? Either because the Court has published it, or via FOI requests? It is probably possible to reverse engineer the citation rules from the Opinions of the Court, but do we have the guide for it?

A version republishing the Reporter's style guide is available on SSRN and for purchase on Amazon. It was edited in 2016, purportedly based on a 2013 copy of the Court's private style guide that the editor (Jack Metzler) somehow obtained . The Court's internal style guide may have evolved since then.

Is the Supreme Court&#39;s in-house citation style manual publicly available?

SCOTUS uses a distinct in-house citation style which, although it has a lot in common with the Bluebook , is not the same (differing in key places) and is as far as I know unique. Is the citation style manual used in house for SCOTUS publicly available? Either because the Court has published it, or via FOI requests? It is probably possible to reverse engineer the citation rules from the Opinions of the Court, but do we have the guide for it?

The Reporter of Decisions' style guide is available on Amazon .

Finding citations

I’ve occasionally asked questions ( example ) that could be easily answered by Shepard’s Citations—if I still had access. How should I search for citations of a statute or case without paying Lexis or traveling to some place that has the print edition? I can search the Cornell LII for a particular citation, but if it has spaces, I get all the hits for any part.  But when I tried to get "exact phrase" by quoting 311 U.S. 32 , there were zero results, which I know is not correct.

How should I search for citations of a statute or case without paying Lexis or traveling to some place that has the print edition? There are no good free sources for this at this time for U.S. law. Essentially, this service is what legal publishers are now all relying upon to make money.

Can HOA apply state laws instead of By-Laws and CC&amp;Rs to write a citation?

HOA in Georgia. I have applied a removable sticker that said "this is not an HOA sponsored event" on a fundraising poster that was placed on the Common Property by another resident. Our HOA requires such disclaimer and this poster did not have it. Next thing I know , I received $600 citation from the Board for vandalism. I checked our By-Laws and CC&Rs and there is absolutely no regulation that addresses vandalism, the citation did not include which regulation was violated ( as required by our governing documents), it just said for vandalism. When I had a meeting with the Board about it and HOA attorney was present, he quoted some chapter from state law about vandalism. First of all, I did not damage anything because the sticker was removable and the poster was plastic, but most importantly : can HOA use state law or federal law instead of governing documents to give members citations?

State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply.

What is meant by &quot;through YYYY Leg Sess&quot; in universal citations of statutes/laws?

Question Let "YYYY" represent a variable for a given year, what does "through YYYY Leg Sess" at the end of a legal citation mean or signify? Background and Due Diligence In various legal documents, such as this one , there are citations that contain "Leg Sess" which I'm guessing is short for " Legislative Session " or " Legislature Session " but aside from probably being wrong, what I'm hoping to understand is what it means and what impact it has when it's used as a Universal Citation as reference on Justia such as here and here referenced below: Universal Citation: CA Com Code § 14103 through (2015) Leg Sess In reading the Code being cited (14103) there are plenty of dates being mentioned but none that seem to correlate with 2015 so I'm having trouble understanding if it might mean something significant to its usage whereby, for example, it doesn't apply after 2015 or if another statute is being inferred to take its place. Universal Citation: CA Civ Code § 1738 (through 2012 Leg Sess) In reading the Civil Code mentioned above, it's noted that the parenthesis encloses the entire phrase "through 2012 Leg Sess" as opposed to previously where it was only the (assumed to be year) "2015" that was in parenthesis. Whereas in this case, it was amended in 1994 and has an effective date of January 1, 1995 so I'm uncertain of what the 2021 is supposed to reference when included in the citation. Any attempt to search the meaning on Google results in pages and pages of other documents using the same citation and I had trouble finding a page that might simply explain what is meant by "Leg. Sess." The Problem at Hand The question originally being asked is to determine whether or not using any particular code cited in this way would be erroneous when attempting to present what code would be violated in present day.

It means the entire code compilation has been updated to include all legislative revisions to the code that occurred in the XXXX legislative session (and obviously earlier ones too). Of course, not every section of the code is amended every legislative session, but the compilation will still report that it is accurate through to the end of XXXX legislative session. This method of reporting currency isn't a good match for online compilations or compilations that receive updates multiple times per year, so you may see variants, like "through 2012 portion of 2011-2012 Reg. Sess." (however the publisher itself reports its currency information). The Bluebook citation standard had traditionally required this currency information to be cited for all statutes, but in the latest version, that requirement has essentially been removed for federal statutes. What Justia is calling a " Universal Citation " is probably better called a "media-neutral" citation, following the format of the AALL Universal Citation Guide. However, it's a bit of a misnomer because no entity has a monopoly on citation style, although the Bluebook has a big influence. Justia even mentions, "this universal citation is not necessarily the official citation, the latter which should be used when citing to primary and secondary legal materials in court filings, scholarly publications, etc."

Referencing books or researches in a medium article for a potential profit

So, I'm writing an article for Medium and I need to back up my words with some proofs. I found the researches all publicly available, via Google Search, some just PDF's from, some are leading to jstor.org. And my work of course is not a standalone resource, but just a review of closely related topics and results we are having up to this day. Part of the topics are common engineering knowledge, some is more specific. Is it legal to do such referencing (in any form, but with acknowledgment to origin of some data or facts I'm using) in my Medium article, if I can enable partner program and get money for that?

It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [ imaginary example ] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.

Referencing books or researches in a medium article for a potential profit

So, I'm writing an article for Medium and I need to back up my words with some proofs. I found the researches all publicly available, via Google Search, some just PDF's from, some are leading to jstor.org. And my work of course is not a standalone resource, but just a review of closely related topics and results we are having up to this day. Part of the topics are common engineering knowledge, some is more specific. Is it legal to do such referencing (in any form, but with acknowledgment to origin of some data or facts I'm using) in my Medium article, if I can enable partner program and get money for that?

David Siegel’s answer that it is legal is substantially correct, but there are some edge case scenarios. Whether you are paid for your work is irrelevant for almost all of them. Substantial copying and copyright violation Your work can use previous works as sources of information/knowledge, including with short citations. However, if you use large amount of the original work with no modifications or only minor ones, it potentially becomes a copyright violation of the original work. If the original work was published with an sufficiently permissive license, you may still do it as long as you comply with the license. For instance, Wikipedia uses the CC-BY-SA license, which means you can publish books made entirely of copy-pasted Wikipedia articles (some people have done that) , legally (as long as you put the appropriate license information). That is the only case where the fact that you are paid may matter, for two possible reasons: some licenses allow reuse only for non-commercial purposes (e.g. CC-BY-NC), which makes reusing material in a commercial context a copyright violation. in the US, reusing copyrighted content is allowed if one meets the condition of fair use; one part of the test is "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes " (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions may employ similar tests. Trade secrets and other insider information An employer or former employer may restrict your ability to disclose information that you obtain in the course of your job. Similarly, you (or your company on your behalf) may have signed non-disclosure agreements with other parties. The details of what restrictions are allowed varies considerably across jurisdictions, though the general principle is the same. Citing an internal report of a company you worked for without their permission is asking for trouble - it will be pretty strong evidence that you got internal information from that report, even if the same information would be available from public sources. Classified information Virtually all countries deem certain information to be state secrets, and disclosing said information bring harsh penalties to people who are supposed to keep it secret (military staff, defense contractors etc.). Some countries prohibit the publication of classified information by anyone under their jurisdiction. Such restrictions are regularly challenged on freedom-of-speech grounds with more or less success.

I am writing a service agreement, how do I cite a legal code in the agreement?

I am writing a service agreement, how do I cite a legal code in the agreement? As a company, I need to state what we will do and what the law requires us to do This is the law: cvc 22658 (m) (1) A towing company that removes a vehicle from private property under this section shall notify the local law enforcement agency of that tow after the vehicle is removed from the private property and is in transit. (2) A towing company is guilty of a misdemeanour if the towing company fails to provide the notification required under paragraph (1) within 60 minutes after the vehicle is removed from the private property and is in transit or 15 minutes after arriving at the storage facility, whichever time is less.

how do I cite a legal code in the agreement? Saying " section 22658 of the California Vehicle Code " or " Vehicle Code section 22658 " would work. See, for instance, Coffey v. Shiomoto , 60 Cal.4th 1198 (2015) (" pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13382 ").

Do I have any recourse outside of the third party that processes red light camera violations in Illinois?

I received a letter in the mail yesterday from payonlineticket-dot-com with a "Final determination of violation liability" for supposedly violating some red light law. The video on the site shows that I stopped before the white line, and then proceeded to turn right on red after checking traffic, which as far as I know is not a violation of Illinois law. There was nothing in the letter about contesting the citation, so I called the phone number and was told that the letter I received yesterday was the second of its kind and that I had missed my opportunity to contest. I explained that I had not received any other letter and wanted to contest but was not given the opportunity to do so. A supervisor who had not watched the video advised me to work directly with the police department which is out of state but only about an hour from me. She also said if I don't pay, then the $200 fine (which supposedly was $100 when the first letter was sent) then an additional $70 gets tacked on for the collection agency. Is there a way to contest such a citation?

The procedure for contesting such tickets varies by the municipality where the alleged violation occurred. Chicago, in particular, has its own specific procedures. There is often a strict deadline for the challenge process, and fines do escalate significantly if they go unpaid for even a short time. One who wants to challenge such a ticket would do well to find the name and address of the court where the ticket is returnable. This may be on the ticket, or a google or other online search may reveal it. Having found the address, send a letter explaining why you think the ticket is in error. Be clear and polite but concise, and include the ticket number and other inditing details. Include copies of the letter and anything that came with it. Send this by certified mail, return receipt. (One may wish to send a second copy, clearly marked "second copy" by regular mail.) The letter should specifically request an in-person hearing if the count does not drop the ticket. One may wish to engage a lawyer, preferably one who has has some experience with traffic camera tickets, and who has an office somewhat near the relevant court.. Whether this is worth while depends on the situation, including the possible fine or other penalty involved. A telephone call to the police station may help, but the police usually do not have authority to cancel tickets once they have been subm,itted for central processing. The court does. [ I intend to add to this answer, including addign sourcves, in a few hours. ]

Do I have any recourse outside of the third party that processes red light camera violations in Illinois?

I received a letter in the mail yesterday from payonlineticket-dot-com with a "Final determination of violation liability" for supposedly violating some red light law. The video on the site shows that I stopped before the white line, and then proceeded to turn right on red after checking traffic, which as far as I know is not a violation of Illinois law. There was nothing in the letter about contesting the citation, so I called the phone number and was told that the letter I received yesterday was the second of its kind and that I had missed my opportunity to contest. I explained that I had not received any other letter and wanted to contest but was not given the opportunity to do so. A supervisor who had not watched the video advised me to work directly with the police department which is out of state but only about an hour from me. She also said if I don't pay, then the $200 fine (which supposedly was $100 when the first letter was sent) then an additional $70 gets tacked on for the collection agency. Is there a way to contest such a citation?

Illinois law allows automated traffic law enforcement systems which detect running a red light. Under that law, notice is to be given to the vehicle owner listing various things such as name, address, registration number, the charge including date, time and location, copy of the images, the fine and related impositions (traffic education program), warnings about non-compliance, and: (10) a statement that the person may elect to proceed by: (A) paying the fine, completing a required traffic education program, or both; or (B) challenging the charge in court, by mail, or by administrative hearing; and (11) a website address, accessible through the Internet, where the person may view the recorded images of the violation. There is no legal requirement that they describe the procedure for contesting the charge. For that you would have to identify the relevant court. for example if it was in Chicago, read this page for your options. The notice does not comply with state law if it really says nothing about contesting the fine. However, if this is a second notice and you did not receive the first notice, then there is no requirement to notify you about contesting the fine. Presumably, they will claim that they mailed the first notice, and for some reason you didn't get it. That does not mean that you can't contest the disposition of your case, but you will have to allege that the company failed to comply with the requirement to mail a notice to you, and they can just respond "Our records show that we mailed it on such-and-such date". In that case, you would be well advised to hire an attorney.

Citing an employment contract using APA style

I am not sure if this is the right community for what I'm looking for, but here goes. I would like to make an APA style citation of an employment contract using LaTeX document generator for personal use. I have found some resources in the Purdue website regarding how to make APA citations of international treaties or other major legal agreements. However I'm not sure if the same is applicable for a simply employment contract between employer and employee. Has anyone ever had to make a proper citation of an employment contract using APA style? If so please let me know what is the proper way of doing it.

There is no worldwide standard for legal citation Each nation uses its own style and citation guide. Most of these will indicate how to reference contracts. However, in most cases they will simply be an ad hoc method of unambiguously identifying the contract “The contract between X and Y for Z entered into on 12 Sometime 1666” or of identifying the documents that evidence the contract. However, none of them use APA. APA is the American Psychological Association style and is used in medical and allied health and is an Author, Year in-line style. Legal citation is universally footnote style. If you want to use APA, a contract would be cited like any other unpublished document.

How to cite a court case found online

I need to cite one court case for a project I am researching. The Chicago Manual of Style says to use Bluebook citation for legal materials. I have a link to the document that I am using, but I am not sure how to cite it. This is the link to the case: link here . I think my citation should look something like this: USA vs. Hasbajrami _____ (E.D.N.Y. 2016) Since I found it online, I'm not sure how to mark the "reporter" field, which I believe should be in the empty space I marked. How should I cite this? I apologize, I have no experience with law, and despite about an hour of trying to figure out this one citation, I don't think I'm searching for the right things because I can't find anything.

This is an unreported case, so there is no "reporter" designation. You can cite like this: United States v. Hasbajrami , No. 11-CR-623 (JG), 2016 WL 1029500, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) .

Can a police car follow you to increase citations and fines?

Let's say you are traveling on city streets. A police cruiser notices you are speeding and starts following you from an inconspicuous distance. During the time he follows you, he sees more violations. Is it legal for a police cruiser to keep following you, and tallying additional citations and fines? I am wondering specifically whether they could follow you to see if your excess in speed lasts for a distance / time, and further penalize you, but am also interested to learn whether they would tally several distinct citations by following you for a long time. I am asking specifically of United States law. I am unsure if it would be different for state police and local police.

In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.

Is it legal to download and host your own copy of a PDF (or any file) that you didn&#39;t originally author?

New York state (US) here. I am putting together a presentation for my company and found a PDF online that I would like to provide a link to, so that anyone reviewing my presentation after the fact can click, download and read. I am not the author of the PDF nor do I have any association with the author or the company for whom the work was published. Its subject material is simply relevant to my presentation. Because I need a reliable link to this PDF, and because I don't have any control over its online hosting, I would like to download this PDF, store it on a company drive, and then provide links to it (as its stored on the drive) from my presentation. That way, if someone views my presentation, say, 5 years from now, they'll still have access to it because the PDF is hosted from our own infrastructure. Is it legal to do this? That is, can I: download the PDF from the external website where its hosted save it on our drive reference it (as its hosted from our drive) in my presentation all without the express consent of the PDF author or the organization for whom the PDF is hosted by

No, that would infringe copyright. Unless the copyright holder has released the PDF under a free license, or in some way granted permission to make copies of it, making such a copy and hosting it on your company server would infringe the holder's copyright. 17 USC sec 106 says that: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; ... (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Making a copy in his way would clearly cio0late 17 USC 106 (1) and possibly 17 USC 106 (3), as posting to the web is a form of distribution. Note that it is likely thst the copyright is held by the author's employer, not by the author, although either is possible. If you do this, the holder could sue for damages. If there is no economic impact, the chance of a suit is not large, although a DMCA takedown notice is more likely. But the holder could sue if it chooses to. Why do you not want to ask for permission? It might well be granted. Alternatively, a copy might have been archived with the Internet Archive or another archive site, which would be a stable location that y0u could freely link to.

How to cite an Act of Parliament that varies by jurisdiction?

By way of example, the following is a citation using the OSCOLA style: Companies Act 2006, s 162(7) However, that provision contains different text depending on whether the jurisdiction is Scotland (which relies on the original text of the Act) or England and Wales (which relies on amended text). I couldn't find anything in OSCOLA which deals with this situation. My proposed solution is to write it as above for the case of Scotland, and for the case of England and Wales to write it with reference to the instrument which amended the text: Companies Act 2006, s 162(7) as amended by Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Fines on Summary Conviction) Regulations 2015, sch 3 pt 1 para 9(5) Does anyone know if my approach is correct? Answers don't have to be specific to OSCOLA; it's the general approach I am interested in rather than the specific citation style.

I would cite it as: Companies Act 2006, s 162(7) as amended by Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Fines on Summary Conviction) Regulations 2015, sch 3 pt 1 para 9(5) if doing so is necessary to establish the relevant context for the reader.

Interim Charging Order on Property was never changed to a Final Charging Order

If an Interim Charging Order on a property was never updated to a Final Charging Order can I get it removed? It has been over 13 years. Edit to add more detail. The creditor managed to sneak the interim charging order in the day before my bankruptcy hearing. So literally the very next day I was declared bankrupt. This was back in October 2009 and I am in England & Wales. I have not heard from the creditor since 2009, the debt has not been paid off, and as I say the interim charge was never made in to a final charge on the property title. Thanks for the help!

I suspect what has happened is the court has set aside, or refused to enter, a Final Charging Order because you were made bankrupt before the Final Charging Order could be issued. In Nationwide Building Society v Wright [2009] EWCA Civ 811 the Court of Appeal held that bankruptcy was a barrier to a Final Charging Order being issued if the bankruptcy commenced before the Final Charging Order could be issued. On the facts in your question, it is clear that no such Final Charging Order was issued before the bankruptcy commenced. An Interim Charging Order will by necessity end unless a Final Charging Order is made. Since no such Order was made, it would seem that the Interim Charging Order has ended: the interim order is designed to stop someone from disposing of assets until the court can decide whether a final order is necessary. If no final order is made, the interim order dies with it. A check on the Land Registry against the property would be needed to ensure that any notices or restrictions have been removed. If they are still present against the property's entry, an application to have them removed will have to be filed. Furthermore, the Limitation Act 1980 provides a time limit of six or twelve years (cause of action dependent) for the creditor to take action to enforce their rights. In relation to enforcing judgments, the creditor has six years from the date of judgment to enforce it ( Section 24 of the Limitation Act 1980 ) In relation to recovering money secured by a charge or to recover the proceeds relating to a sale of land, the creditor has twelve years from the date that their right to receive the money started ( Section 20 of the Limitation Act 1980 ) In either case, even if a Final Charging Order were able to be made in these circumstances, it is possible to argue that the relevant sections of the Limitation Act 1980 prevent the creditor from pursuing any right of action and so the debt (and any enforcement action) is statute-barred.

How to accomplish a court hearing after arrest without being stuck in prison cell for more than 4 years like Assange?

TLDR / UPDATE / SUMMARY: Police: I'm arresting you. Me: You are breaking the law, what I do is minor. Police: No, I'm arresting you, what you do is more than minor. Arrested. Now the question is: how quickly can I land in court to dispute the arrest? Me discussing with the police: it is on the level "he said" / "she said" but they have monopoly on using force and it is only them who can arrest me (I cannot arrest them). I have never been arrested, I do not know how long it takes to land in court after the arrest. I would like to know how to professionally challenge authority and their interpretation of "anything more than minor" Since "anything more than minor" is not strictly defined, due to Climate Emergency, the threshold has been moved, therefore burden of proof is now on law enforcement. How long before we can cross-examine each other in the court of law? Sitting in a cell while waiting for a trial - MEH . Going to a court to have a debate with law enforcement - HELL YEAH . The reason why I can be inclined to do it: Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (protest illegal) Public Order Act 2023 (intention of protest illegal) Secondary legislation through a back door ("anything more than minor") Judge Silas Reid putting people to jail for telling the truth More people arrested for sitting on a pavement and holding a sign Please allow me to quote: https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2023/9-june/news/uk/retired-priest-among-protesters-referred-to-attorney-general “When you take the stand, you take an oath to speak the ‘whole truth’. Our motivation is a crucial part of why we are there. I’m not a hoodlum sitting in the road for the fun of it. By not being allowed to speak about our motivation for taking action, we are being asked to break that oath by the judge.” Some reading on "more than minor": Policing Insight: https://policinginsight.com/features/opinion/the-end-of-protest-service-values-and-public-trust-are-more-important-than-assessing-more-than-minor-hinderance/ openDemocracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/police-powers-ban-protest-laws-suella-braverman/ EDIT / UPDATE: More resources, just search this phrase, use the quotes for more precise results: "more than minor" protest That's why was repeating "more than minor" Legal challenge by Liberty: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-overriding-parliament-on-protest-powers/ The Justice Gap: https://www.thejusticegap.com/liberty-launches-legal-action-against-home-secretary-for-breaching-constitutional-principles/ The Home Secretary has now altered the law, constituting anything causing “minor disruption” to being “serious disruption” and worthy of police action. According to a cross party parliamentary committee, this is the first time the government has turned to secondary legislation to make changes to a law already rejected in primary legislation by parliament. Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-06/Amnesty%20International%20UK%20-%20%20Briefing%20on%20Revised%20Protest%20Regulations.pdf You can definitely dig deeper into protesting / intention of protest, but in the meantime please advise how to quickly and efficiently land in court after a potential arrest?

canada There is a presumptive ceiling on the allowable time between charge and trial: 18 months for offences to be tried in provincial court, and 30 months for cases to be tried in the superior court ( R. v Jordan , 2016 SCC 27). Delays that are longer are presumptive infringements of an accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time protected by s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . If the delay (excluding delay attributable to the defence) exceeds the presumptive ceilings, and if the Crown cannot establish the presence of exceptional circumstances, the court will stay (terminate) the proceedings.