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would rise significantly due to bank reimbursement demands, regulatory |
fines, and direct customer service costs.8 About 90 lawsuits were filed, |
leading to massive lawyer bills.9 |
What made this all the more unnerving for Target is that it had devoted |
quite a lot of time and resources to its information security. Target had more |
than 300 information security staff members. The company had maintained |
a large security operations center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and had a |
team of security specialists in Bangalore that monitored its computer |
network 24/7. In May 2013—just six months before the hack—Target had |
implemented expensive and sophisticated malware detection software from |
FireEye.10 |
With all this security—an investment of millions of dollars, state-of-the- |
art security software, hundreds of security personnel, and round-the-clock |
monitoring—how did Target fail? |
A common narrative told to the public is that this entire debacle could be |
traced to just one person who let the hackers slip in. In caper movies, the |
criminals often have an inside guy who leaves the doors open. But the |
person who let the hackers into Target wasn’t even a Target employee and |
wasn’t bent on mischief. The person worked for Fazio Mechanical, a |
Pennsylvania-based HVAC company, a third-party vendor hired by Target. |
The Fazio employee fell for a phishing trick and opened an attachment in a |
fraudulent email the hackers had sent to him. Hidden in the email |
attachment lurked the Citadel Trojan horse—a malicious software program |
that took root in Fazio’s computers.11 |
The Citadel Trojan horse was nothing novel—it was a variant of a well- |
known malware package called ZeuS and is readily detectable by any major |
enterprise anti-virus software. But Fazio lacked the massive security |
infrastructure that Target had, allowing the malware to remain undetected |
on the Fazio computers. Through the Trojan horse, the hackers obtained |
Fazio’s log-in credentials for Target’s system. |
With access to Target, the hackers unleashed a different malware |
program, one they bought on the black market for just a few thousand |
dollars.12 Experts such as McAfee director Jim Walker characterized the |
malware as “absolutely unsophisticated and uninteresting.”13 |
At first, the malware went undetected, and it began compiling millions |
of records during peak business hours. This data was being readied to be |
transferred to the hackers’ location in Eastern Europe. But very soon, |
FireEye flagged the malware and issued an alert. Target’s security team in |
Bangalore noted the alert and notified the security center in Minneapolis. |
But the red light was ignored. |
FireEye flagged as many as five different versions of the malware. The |
alerts even provided the addresses for the “staging ground” servers, and a |
gaffe by the hackers meant that the malware code contained usernames and |
passwords for these servers, meaning Target security could have logged on |
and seen the stolen data for themselves.14 Unfortunately, the alerts all went |
unheeded. Furthermore, given that several alerts were issued before any |
data were actually removed from the Target systems, FireEye’s automated |
malware deletion feature could have ended the assault without the need for |
any human action. However, the Target security team had turned that |
feature off, preferring a final manual overview of security decisions.15 |
With FireEye’s red lights blinking furiously, the hackers began moving |
the stolen data on December 2, 2013. The malware continued to exfiltrate |
data freely for almost two weeks. Law enforcement officials from the |
Department of Justice contacted Target about the breach on December 12, |
armed not only with reports of fraudulent credit card charges, but also |
actual stolen data recovered from the dump servers, which the hackers had |
neglected to wipe.16 |
The aftermath of the breach caused tremendous financial damage to |
Target. It remains unknown what the precise cost of the breach was, but an |
estimate in Target’s annual report of March 2016 put the figure at $291 |
million.17 The company’s reputation was harmed. The CIO resigned. For |
customers, there was increased risk of future fraud. Daily spending and |
withdrawal limits had to be placed on many affected accounts, and new |
credit cards had to be issued, causing consumers significant time loss while |
updating their card information everywhere.18 |
The breach went down in the annals of data breach history—one for the |
record books. But it would soon be overshadowed by even bigger breaches. |
THE SYSTEM IS DOWN |
On paper, the hackers never should have been able to breach Target. The |
hackers used cheap methods, such as readily detectable malware that wasn’t |
state-of-the-art. They were quite sloppy and made careless mistakes. Target |
had much better technological tools and a large and sophisticated team. It |
conducted phishing tests and employed forensic investigators. The hackers |
were grossly outspent and outnumbered. Yet Target was still felled. |
At first glance, it seems that Target’s Achilles’ heel was one employee at |
one of its third-party vendors. Most large companies have hundreds of |
third-party vendors. This person made just one wrong click of the mouse, |
and that was all the hackers needed. Had that one person not clicked, then a |
data breach leading to more than half-a-billion dollars might not have |
occurred. That’s one very expensive mouse click! |
However, a prolonged look reveals a host of systemic vulnerabilities. |
Although on a checklist Target looked healthy, it lost because one key factor |
wasn’t accounted for—human behavior. Spending millions of dollars and |
installing high-tech software still couldn’t prevent the humans from their |
fateful blunders. |
It doesn’t necessarily take technical wizardry or great skill to be a highly |
successful criminal on the Internet. Technologies and data ecosystems are |
so fragile and flawed that it is far too easy for hackers to break in. The black |
market is overflowing with cybercrime start-up kits.19 Just download the |
tools and it’s off to the races. Because crime committed using the Internet is |
rarely tracked down and enforced, in most cases, the fraudsters get away |
with it. |
WE HAVE MUCH TO LOSE |
The stakes for data security are enormous. Data breaches, by which we |
mean the unauthorized exposure, disclosure, or loss of personal |
information, are not only more numerous; they are more damaging. Every |
year, millions of people are victimized by identity theft. Their personal data |
is used by fraudsters to impersonate them. Victims suffer because their |
credit files become polluted with delinquent bills. Creditors go after victims |
for the unpaid bills, and victims struggle to prove that the bills weren’t |