wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Figure 2.3
We should note that the numbers reflect reported breaches. Many
breaches aren’t reported, either because they don’t fit the requirement to
report or because they are unknown. According to an estimate by the Online
Trust Alliance, the actual number of security incidents is more than 20
times the number of reported breaches.86 Reported breaches are thus the tip
of a much larger iceberg.
Each year brings more bad news. Each year steals the crown for the most
awful year for data breaches. Are there any records left that haven’t been
compromised? Will we ever have a good year?
Figure 2.4
THE COMMON PLOTS OF DATA BREACH STORIES
If you are getting tired of hearing similar data breach stories over and over
again, welcome to the world of data security. By now, you might have been
hoping for something new. But, alas, to quote the eminent data breach
expert, Yogi Berra, it has been “déjà vu all over again.”
In a famous book, The Seven Basic Plots, Christopher Booker concludes
that all stories use one of only seven plot structures.87 A similar book could
be written about data breaches, which seem to follow a few basic patterns
again and again.
The Big Spend Wasn’t Enough
Many organizations spent a lot of money on security yet still had big lapses
in oversight. Throwing cash at the problem didn’t stop the breaches.
Some organizations didn’t seem to care at all, but even those that did
devote a lot of resources to security were lacking. They would buy
expensive shiny armor, but then forget to put on key pieces like the
breastplate.
Human Error Opened the Door
Many breaches were facilitated by human error. Humans fell for a phishing
scam. Humans failed to patch vulnerable software promptly. Humans lost
devices with data on them. Humans misconfigured servers. One of the
major imbalances in the world of data security is that defenders need to
constantly protect the entire perimeter—every entry point and vulnerability.
Meanwhile attackers need just one entry point and only must be successful
once.
Vendors Were a Weak Link
Many large organizations had sophisticated defenses, but hackers figured
out that they had a big vulnerability—their vendors that had access to their
computer system. The vendors, typically small- to medium-sized companies
that provided ancillary services to larger companies, had much weaker
security. This allowed hackers to break into the vendors, steal their
credentials, and then use these credentials to break into a company’s
computer system.
Too Much Data Was Being Kept (and Stored Together)
Many organizations were collecting data that they shouldn’t have been
collecting or retaining it when they should have been deleting it. Breaches
grew bigger and bigger, mainly because organizations increased the
quantities of records they maintained.
Organizations have been collecting and using data faster than they have
been able to keep it secure—just like during the Industrial Revolution when
factories sprouted up long before safety and pollution controls were
introduced. Law professor Danielle Citron has called these bloated
databases “reservoirs of danger”—an allusion to the precarious but
profitable underregulated water dams during the Industrial Age.88
To make matters worse, many organizations stored the vast troves of
data they were amassing all in one place. Because data wasn’t adequately
segmented, once the hackers broke in, they could quickly hit the mother
lode and access everything.
Devices Always Seemed to Disappear
Lost or stolen devices played a big role in breaches. Storywriter and
playwright Anton Chekhov famously noted that if there is a gun in Act One
of a play, it surely will be fired by Act Three. When personal data is loaded
onto a portable device such as a laptop or a thumb drive, it is often lost or
stolen. These thefts are a disaster if the data on them isn’t encrypted.
Data Was Not Encrypted
Many breaches involved failing to encrypt data. In a study from 2004, only
15 percent of organizations had an enterprise-wide encryption strategy. By
2014, 36 percent had such a strategy. Given the breach experience in the
decade between 2004 and 2014, it is shocking that 64 percent still lacked a
strategy.89
One Click Was All It Took
Phishing played a big role in data breaches. For many breaches, all it took
was one gullible employee to click, and the hackers were able to get inside.
For large organizations with thousands of employees, the risk can be
enormous. And yet, despite the huge risk, many organizations have not been
focusing enough on phishing prevention.
Lessons Weren’t Learned
Despite the parade of horror stories, organizations have continued to make
the same mistakes and have kept getting burned. Short-term thinking, as
well as an it-won’t-happen-to-me attitude, have been pervasive. For
example, despite the fact that human error is an aspect of most data
breaches, many organizations have failed to train employees about data
security. In the healthcare sector, despite HIPAA’s requirement to have
security training, a quarter of U.S. healthcare employees have never
received such training. It’s even worse in Canada, where 40 percent of
employers in the health care sector do not receive training. Of those that do,
it’s often not frequent enough—only 38 percent were trained annually.90
These stats are not from 2000 or 2005—they are from 2019, after years and
years where the healthcare industry experienced relentless hacking attacks
and security blunders.
Breaches Often Involved Careless Simple Mistakes
There is an even broader, more overarching lesson to be learned from the
miserable past 15 years in data security. Most of the breaches involved
rather small, overlooked mistakes. It can be easy to get caught up focusing
on the Leviathan and miss the low-hanging fruit. This low-hanging fruit
consists of rather simple and easy-to-fix vulnerabilities and bad practices.
After reviewing more than 1,000 data breaches from 2018, the Online
Trust Alliance (OTA) found that more than 95 percent could have been

stats not yet available

Figure 2.3

We should note that the numbers reflect reported breaches. Many

breaches aren’t reported, either because they don’t fit the requirement to

report or because they are unknown. According to an estimate by the Online

Trust Alliance, the actual number of security incidents is more than 20

times the number of reported breaches.86 Reported breaches are thus the tip

of a much larger iceberg.

Each year brings more bad news. Each year steals the crown for the most

awful year for data breaches. Are there any records left that haven’t been

compromised? Will we ever have a good year?

Figure 2.4

THE COMMON PLOTS OF DATA BREACH STORIES

If you are getting tired of hearing similar data breach stories over and over

again, welcome to the world of data security. By now, you might have been

hoping for something new. But, alas, to quote the eminent data breach

expert, Yogi Berra, it has been “déjà vu all over again.”

In a famous book, The Seven Basic Plots, Christopher Booker concludes

that all stories use one of only seven plot structures.87 A similar book could

be written about data breaches, which seem to follow a few basic patterns

again and again.

The Big Spend Wasn’t Enough

Many organizations spent a lot of money on security yet still had big lapses

in oversight. Throwing cash at the problem didn’t stop the breaches.

Some organizations didn’t seem to care at all, but even those that did

devote a lot of resources to security were lacking. They would buy

expensive shiny armor, but then forget to put on key pieces like the

breastplate.

Human Error Opened the Door

Many breaches were facilitated by human error. Humans fell for a phishing

scam. Humans failed to patch vulnerable software promptly. Humans lost

devices with data on them. Humans misconfigured servers. One of the

major imbalances in the world of data security is that defenders need to

constantly protect the entire perimeter—every entry point and vulnerability.

Meanwhile attackers need just one entry point and only must be successful

once.

Vendors Were a Weak Link

Many large organizations had sophisticated defenses, but hackers figured

out that they had a big vulnerability—their vendors that had access to their

computer system. The vendors, typically small- to medium-sized companies

that provided ancillary services to larger companies, had much weaker

security. This allowed hackers to break into the vendors, steal their

credentials, and then use these credentials to break into a company’s

computer system.

Too Much Data Was Being Kept (and Stored Together)

Many organizations were collecting data that they shouldn’t have been

collecting or retaining it when they should have been deleting it. Breaches

grew bigger and bigger, mainly because organizations increased the

quantities of records they maintained.

Organizations have been collecting and using data faster than they have

been able to keep it secure—just like during the Industrial Revolution when

factories sprouted up long before safety and pollution controls were

introduced. Law professor Danielle Citron has called these bloated

databases “reservoirs of danger”—an allusion to the precarious but

profitable underregulated water dams during the Industrial Age.88

To make matters worse, many organizations stored the vast troves of

data they were amassing all in one place. Because data wasn’t adequately

segmented, once the hackers broke in, they could quickly hit the mother

lode and access everything.

Devices Always Seemed to Disappear

Lost or stolen devices played a big role in breaches. Storywriter and

playwright Anton Chekhov famously noted that if there is a gun in Act One

of a play, it surely will be fired by Act Three. When personal data is loaded

onto a portable device such as a laptop or a thumb drive, it is often lost or

stolen. These thefts are a disaster if the data on them isn’t encrypted.

Data Was Not Encrypted

Many breaches involved failing to encrypt data. In a study from 2004, only

15 percent of organizations had an enterprise-wide encryption strategy. By

2014, 36 percent had such a strategy. Given the breach experience in the

decade between 2004 and 2014, it is shocking that 64 percent still lacked a

strategy.89

One Click Was All It Took

Phishing played a big role in data breaches. For many breaches, all it took

was one gullible employee to click, and the hackers were able to get inside.

For large organizations with thousands of employees, the risk can be

enormous. And yet, despite the huge risk, many organizations have not been

focusing enough on phishing prevention.

Lessons Weren’t Learned

Despite the parade of horror stories, organizations have continued to make

the same mistakes and have kept getting burned. Short-term thinking, as

well as an it-won’t-happen-to-me attitude, have been pervasive. For

example, despite the fact that human error is an aspect of most data

breaches, many organizations have failed to train employees about data

security. In the healthcare sector, despite HIPAA’s requirement to have

security training, a quarter of U.S. healthcare employees have never

received such training. It’s even worse in Canada, where 40 percent of

employers in the health care sector do not receive training. Of those that do,

it’s often not frequent enough—only 38 percent were trained annually.90

These stats are not from 2000 or 2005—they are from 2019, after years and

years where the healthcare industry experienced relentless hacking attacks

and security blunders.

Breaches Often Involved Careless Simple Mistakes

There is an even broader, more overarching lesson to be learned from the

miserable past 15 years in data security. Most of the breaches involved

rather small, overlooked mistakes. It can be easy to get caught up focusing

on the Leviathan and miss the low-hanging fruit. This low-hanging fruit

consists of rather simple and easy-to-fix vulnerabilities and bad practices.

After reviewing more than 1,000 data breaches from 2018, the Online

Trust Alliance (OTA) found that more than 95 percent could have been