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On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 20, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 20, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to add new grounds to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. An amended application raising the new grounds will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before January 18, 2019.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 9, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Per Curiam. The prosecution appeals by leave granted the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for relief from judgment. We reverse. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 1987, following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes, was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his first-degree murder conviction, life with the possibility of parole for his second-degree murder conviction, and a consecutive two years' imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. Following the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the prosecution filed a notice of intent to seek a term-of-years sentence for defendant's first-degree murder conviction. On December 2, 2016, the trial court resentenced defendant to 25 to 60 years' imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, leaving the other two sentences intact. Defendant later filed a motion for relief from judgment in which he argued that he was entitled to resentencing on his second-degree murder conviction because his life-with-the-possibility-of-parole sentence was also invalidated by Miller and Montgomery . The trial court agreed. The prosecution now appeals that decision. II. ENTITLEMENT TO RESENTENCING The prosecution argues on appeal that the trial court lacked the authority to grant the substantive relief requested-resentencing-in defendant's motion for relief from judgment. We agree. "We review a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error." People v. Swain , 288 Mich. App. 609, 628, 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010). Matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Hall , 499 Mich. 446, 452, 884 N.W.2d 561 (2016). MCR 6.508 governs the circumstances under which a trial court may grant a motion for relief from judgment: (D) Entitlement to Relief. The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion * * * (3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. As used in this subrule, "actual prejudice" means that, * * * (iv) in the case of a challenge to the sentence, the sentence is invalid. The parties do not contest whether defendant established good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), so we need not address that issue. The only issue before us is whether defendant established the second prong of the analysis-actual prejudice in the form of an invalid sentence. We conclude that he did not. In the trial court defendant contended that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole for his second-degree murder conviction was constitutionally invalidated by Miller and Montgomery . Defendant also argued that when the trial court sentenced him on his second-degree murder conviction, it was operating under the assumption that "state laws mandating a juvenile die in prison were constitutional." Defendant speculated that if the trial court had been aware that defendant's mandatory life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional, it likely would have given him a term-of-years sentence for his second-degree murder conviction. We first address defendant's argument that Miller and Montgomery invalidated his sentence for second-degree murder and conclude that neither case applies to defendant's sentence of life with the possibility of parole. We then address defendant's argument that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information and misconceptions of law, and we ultimately conclude that the record does not support that assertion. In Miller , the Supreme Court of the United States held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.' " Miller , 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Supreme Court explained: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. See, e.g., Graham [v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 78, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ] ("[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings"); J .D .B . v . North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 269 [131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310] (2011) (discussing children's responses to interrogation). And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it. [ Miller , 567 U.S. at 477-478, 132 S.Ct. 2455.] The Supreme Court went on to clarify that " '[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,' but must provide 'some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.' " Id . at 479, 113 S.Ct. 2711, quoting Graham , 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. After Miller , "the Supreme Court recognized that the ruling ... had resulted in some confusion and disagreement among various state courts about whether Miller applied retroactively." People v. Wiley , 324 Mich. App. 130, 136, 919 N.W.2d 802 (2018). To resolve this confusion, the Supreme Court in Montgomery held that although " Miller 's holding ha[d] a procedural component" because it "require[d] a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics before determining that life without parole is a proportionate sentence," " Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law" that applied retroactively to juvenile offenders. Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 734, 736. Against this backdrop, it is clear that, at a maximum, Miller and Montgomery guarantee that defendants convicted as juveniles are afforded " 'some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.' " Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, quoting Graham , 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. At a minimum, the cases apply only to mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole. See, e.g., People v. Wines , 323 Mich. App. 343, 350, 916 N.W.2d 855 (2018) ("[T]he constitutional holding in Miller applied only in life-without-parole decisions."). Here, under either interpretation, defendant's sentence of life with the possibility of parole satisfied Miller 's mandate. Defendant once served a sentence of life without the possibility of parole but is now eligible for parole on each of his sentences. Stated differently, defendant has been granted a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, see Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, from his sentences for first- and second-degree murder. And because defendant has some meaningful opportunity to obtain release from his sentence of life with the possibility of parole, that sentence was not invalid under Miller . Defendant briefly contends on appeal that obtaining parole in Michigan is more difficult for individuals serving life sentences than for individuals serving term-of-year sentences and that, therefore, defendant's life-with-the-possibility-of-parole sentence does not actually guarantee him a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole. Defendant's argument, however, is incomplete. While defendant explains that obtaining parole from a life sentence is more involved than obtaining parole from a term-of-years sentence, defendant fails to explain how the latter constitutes a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and the former does not. Defendant is not entitled to eventual freedom-only a meaningful opportunity to obtain it. Id. , 132 S.Ct. 2455. We now turn to defendant's argument that his life sentence is invalid because it was based on inaccurate information and a misconception of the law. Defendant premises his argument on the original sentencing court's mistaken belief that defendant's first-degree murder conviction mandated a sentence of life without parole and that defendant would spend the rest of his life in prison. Defendant reasons that, because of this mistaken belief, the trial court necessarily gave less thoughtful consideration to defendant's sentence for second-degree murder. The glaring problem with this argument is that it is purely speculative. Defendant provides no argument grounded in fact to support his contention that his sentence for first-degree murder had an effect on his sentence for second-degree murder. If anything, the original sentencing court's remarks-which the trial court quoted when granting defendant's motion for relief from judgment-suggest otherwise: I hope you understand that as it relates to Count One, I have no discretion, none. So, as it relates to Count One, it is the sentence of the Court that you be committed to the custody of the Michigan Corrections Commission with a sentence mandated by the statute, which is a life sentence with no eligibility for parole. And as it relates to Count Two, Murder in the Second Degree, the kindest sentence I can give to you is life. You will be eligible for parole if you can get that first one off your back . [Emphasis added.] Clearly, the original sentencing judge understood that defendant's life sentence for second-degree murder afforded him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and thus, defendant's argument that the trial court would have sentenced him to something other than life for second-degree murder but for his mandatory life-without-parole sentence is speculative and has no support in the record. In support of its conclusions, the trial court also reasoned that because defendant's life-without-parole sentence was invalidated, the trial court was obligated to resentence defendant on all of defendant's remaining convictions. In Michigan, "[t]rial courts ordinarily lack the authority to set aside a valid sentence." People v. Comer , 500 Mich. 278, 295 n. 40, 901 N.W.2d 553 (2017). The trial court relied on People v. Jackson , 487 Mich. 783, 793-794, 790 N.W.2d 340 (2010), for the contention that "where there are multiple counts within a single judgment of sentence and one or more counts are reversed (or in this case resentencing to a term of years) a Defendant must be resentenced on the remaining counts." Jackson made no such holding, and it in no way suggests that trial courts may alter otherwise valid sentences. The trial court's reliance on the case was therefore misplaced. On appeal, defendant relies on United States v. Tucker , 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Irey , 612 F.3d 1160, 1180-1181 (C.A. 11, 2010), and People v. Moore , 391 Mich. 426, 216 N.W.2d 770 (1974), in support of the trial court's conclusion that when a defendant is entitled to resentencing on one conviction, that defendant is entitled to resentencing as to all other related convictions. In Tucker , however, the defendant's sentence for armed robbery was affected by two previous convictions that were later found to be constitutionally invalid. Tucker , 404 U.S. at 443-448, 92 S.Ct. 589. Because the armed-robbery sentence was based on invalid convictions , the sentence was invalid. Id . at 448, 92 S.Ct. 589. Again, in Moore , the sentencing judge considered a prior conviction that was constitutionally invalid when it sentenced the defendant for possession of narcotics, and accordingly, the defendant was entitled to resentencing. Moore , 391 Mich. at 439-440, 216 N.W.2d 770. Both Moore and Tucker dealt with sentences that contemplated invalid prior convictions , thus invalidating the sentences. Defendant employs these cases to argue that one invalid sentence in a judgment of sentence invalidates all other sentences in that judgment of sentence, but the cases do not support that contention. Therefore, defendant's argument is without merit. Defendant has thus failed to establish that the trial court had authority to set aside his valid sentence for second-degree murder. For all the reasons outlined above, defendant's life-with-parole sentence was a valid sentence, and the trial court lacked the authority to grant resentencing on the basis of defendant's motion for relief from judgment. The trial court's ruling to the contrary is reversed. As an alternative argument, defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because now that his second-degree murder sentence is his controlling sentence, he was sentenced in violation of MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii ). Defendant argues that under that section, his presentence investigation report was required to contain the recommended minimum guidelines range of his controlling sentence, which, in light of his resentencing, it did not. MCL 771.14(2) provides that a presentence investigation report must include (e) For a person to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII, all of the following: * * * (ii ) Unless otherwise provided in subparagraph (i), for each crime having the highest crime class, the sentence grid in part 6 of chapter XVII that contains the recommended minimum sentence range. Although this Court recently recognized in dicta that defendant's argument may have merit, see Wines , 323 Mich. App. at 358-359, 916 N.W.2d 855, we need not discuss defendant's argument in any detail. By its terms MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii ) applies to "a person to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII...." Defendant was sentenced in 1987, and Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not effective until December 15, 1998. 1998 P.A. 317. Defendant was resentenced for his first-degree murder conviction under MCL 769.25a, which is part of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Simply put, defendant was never "sentenced under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII" of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii ), by its plain terms, does not apply. III. CONCLUSION Defendant failed to show actual prejudice by establishing that his life sentence for second-degree murder was invalid. Thus, defendant was not entitled to resentencing under his motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court erred by granting the motion. Defendant is also not entitled to resentencing under MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii ) because, by its plain language, that provision does not apply to defendant. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order denying defendant's motion for relief from judgment. We do not retain jurisdiction. O'Brien, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Fort Hood, JJ., concurred. People v. Williams , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 28, 2017 (Docket No. 339701). The prosecution also argues that the trial court erred by ignoring the mandate of MCR 6.504(B)(4). That rule states that if a trial court decides not to summarily dismiss a motion for relief from judgment, it "shall order the prosecuting attorney to file a response" before proceeding. MCR 6.504(B)(4). Here, the trial court failed to adhere to that mandatory directive and therefore erred. Yet we need not address this error at length because the prosecution's other claim of error is dispositive. We note that other jurisdictions have applied Miller to cases in which a term-of-years sentence constituted de facto life without parole. See, e.g., Kelly v. Brown , 851 F.3d 686, 687 (C.A. 7, 2017) ("Miller applies not just to sentences of natural life, but also to sentences so long that, although set out as a term of years, they are in reality a life sentence."). Defendant cites some of these cases to support his contention that Miller and Montgomery apply to sentences of life with the possibility of parole. But contrary to defendant's argument, none of the cases he cites dealt with a sentence of life with the possibility of parole; all of the cited cases involved lengthy term-of-years sentences that were effectively life sentences without the possibility of parole. Clearly, a sentence of life with the possibility of parole is not a de facto sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Defendant even concedes the speculative nature of his argument in his brief on appeal: "[I]t is impossible to determine whether or not [the] sentencing court would have exercised its discretion differently absent the misconception of the law." In Jackson , the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and two counts of felonious assault. Jackson , 487 Mich. at 787, 790 N.W.2d 340. On appeal in this Court, the defendant's felonious-assault convictions were vacated, but the defendant's request for resentencing on the armed-robbery conviction was denied. Id . at 788-789, 790 N.W.2d 340. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the sentencing decision because the defendant's minimum sentencing guidelines range had been determined based on the inaccurate belief that the defendant was guilty of felonious assault, and the defendant's acquittal on those two charges altered his guidelines range for armed robbery. Id . at 792-793, 790 N.W.2d 340. In no way does the case suggest that trial courts may alter otherwise valid sentences. Rather, the case necessarily determined that the defendant's armed-robbery sentence was based on inaccurate information and was thus invalid. Id . at 793. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court had the authority at the Miller resentencing to resentence defendant for all his convictions, not only to correct the invalid sentence, the issue is moot because the trial court did not exercise that authority. Neither the trial court nor the parties suggested altering defendant's life sentence for second-degree murder during resentencing on his first-degree murder conviction. Instead, the issue was raised in a subsequent motion for relief from judgment, wherein the court was inarguably limited by court rule and caselaw to granting relief only in the event of an invalid sentence. MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv ) ; Comer , 500 Mich. at 295 n. 40, 901 N.W.2d 553.

Shapiro, J. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine and heroin), MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ), second or subsequent offense, MCL 333.7413(2). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 to 30 years in prison. Defendant appeals, challenging the admission under MRE 404(b) of other-acts evidence at trial and the scoring of Offense Variable (OV) 14. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the other-acts evidence and, because the error was not harmless, we reverse defendant's convictions and remand the case for further proceedings. I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The police received a tip that an older GM sedan, carrying three individuals, would be transporting drugs into the county. The informant, who did not testify, also notified the police that the individuals in the vehicle would be a white man, a white woman, and a black man. When the vehicle was spotted, Deputy Paul Belanger initiated a traffic stop. The three individuals were identified as Gary Johnson (a white man), Darlene Keaton (a white woman), and defendant (a black man). Johnson was driving, Keaton was in the front passenger seat, and defendant was in the backseat. Keaton, who owned the car, gave consent for a drug-sniffing dog to search the vehicle. Although the dog indicated at the center console, a search revealed no drugs in the vehicle. The police arrested Johnson for driving on a suspended license. After Johnson was transported to jail, he was searched, and jail personnel found a paper bag in his underwear. The bag contained several small baggies, some containing cocaine and some containing heroin. Johnson was originally charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams, a 20-year offense. He agreed to testify against defendant in exchange for a reduction in those charges to simple possession and sentencing under MCL 333.7411 such that upon successful completion of a term of probation, the charges against him would be dismissed without an adjudication of guilt. At trial, Johnson testified that he was an opiate addict and that he agreed to work with defendant to sell heroin and crack in Kalkaska in exchange for drugs. According to Johnson, he met defendant in Detroit, where defendant obtained the drugs, and they returned together to Kalkaska to sell them. Johnson testified that his role was to line up potential buyers because defendant did not know anyone in the area. He stated that the drugs were found on him rather than defendant because when they passed a state trooper and a truck pulled up behind them, defendant passed him the drugs to hide and he put them in his underwear. Defendant testified in his own defense. He stated that the only reason he was in the vehicle on the night in question was because he had asked Johnson to "get me away from the city." He maintained that he did not know that there were drugs in the vehicle and that Johnson's testimony was a lie. Over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce other-acts evidence through the testimony of two witnesses: Scott Blackwell, a retired narcotics detective, and Dylan Caswell, an illegal drug user. They testified to separate events. Blackwell testified to an incident that occurred in August of 2013. According to Blackwell, a confidential informant told him that defendant was selling drugs in Macomb County, specifically in Chesterfield Township. Blackwell made contact with defendant and recovered narcotics from him. He testified that when this occurred, defendant was in a vehicle that he did not own and that he was not driving. According to Blackwell, defendant admitted that he was distributing drugs in the Chesterfield area. Caswell testified that a few days before the events of the instant case, he had purchased drugs from defendant. He testified that he had asked Johnson for drugs and that Johnson had told him about a house where he could obtain them. He then went to the house, where he purchased crack cocaine from defendant. According to Caswell, defendant told him that the crack was from "[d]ownstate." Whether Caswell and Blackwell should be permitted to testify was the subject of a hearing the day before trial. Defendant argued that the prosecution had failed to give timely notice as required by MRE 404(b)(2) and that the testimony did not meet the substantive requirements of MRE 404(b)(1), which governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Defendant was charged on January 17, 2017. Trial was scheduled for June 20, 2017. The scheduling order set a final pretrial conference for June 6, 2017, and ordered that "trial counsel shall have provided the following to the Court and opposing counsel prior to the conference: ... Final witness and exhibit lists." The prosecution filed a timely witness list, but neither Caswell nor Blackwell was on it. At the June 6, 2017 final pretrial conference, the prosecution gave no indication that it intended to amend its witness list or to seek admission of MRE 404 evidence. Two days later, on June 8, 2017, 12 days before trial, the prosecution filed an amended witness list adding Blackwell and Caswell, and also filed a notice of intent to introduce MRE 404(b) evidence through Blackwell. The notice of intent did not refer to Caswell or the nature of his testimony. On June 16, 2017, defendant served an objection to the notice of intent and a motion to strike Caswell from the witness list. On the same day, the prosecution filed a response in which, for the first time, it indicated that Caswell's testimony would constitute MRE 404(b) evidence. The court heard arguments on June 19, 2017, the day before trial. The prosecution argued that good cause for late notice existed because (a) it took multiple phone calls to reach Blackwell because he had retired from the sheriff's department, and (b) Caswell was not available to be interviewed until after his own sentencing on June 6, 2017, for a drug conviction. The defense responded that Blackwell's intended testimony concerned a four-year-old prior conviction for a drug sale, a conviction that was known to the prosecution at the outset of this case as demonstrated by the fact that it was included in the information as the basis for the second-offender charge. As to Caswell, defense counsel stated that even as of the day before trial, he had not been provided with the police report concerning Caswell. He also argued that the prosecution's explanation that Caswell would not speak with the prosecution until after his sentencing was "disingenuous because much like every other plea that's related to a drug-related crime, most times it's part of a proffer wherein they can talk to the defendant about whatever it is that [he] may or may not know about .... That's usually how it works in terms of working on a resolution. You are interviewed by the police. You tell them whatever information it is that you had." At the close of the hearing, the trial court ruled: For the reasons stated by the Prosecutor, and based on the lack of any evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that these are circumstances which the Prosecutor has discovered since the expiration of [the deadlines], and that the People raised them as an issue as soon as they could after discovering the grounds for testimony of both of these witnesses, as well as for adding Mr. Caswell as a witness in the first place. The trial court also ruled that the testimony of Blackwell and Caswell met the substantive requirements of MRE 404(b) because their testimony would be relevant to a common scheme or plan in carrying out these transactions ... [i]n light of the defense that [defendant] was simply in the car during this incident and not part of any drug transaction .... And I think the testimony of both of these witnesses goes to a material issue and it's likely to be probative on that issue of whether or not he has, in the past, conducted transactions for sales of drugs in a similar way under similar circumstances. The court concluded that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial so as to require exclusion under MRE 403 and stated that it would provide a limiting instruction to the jury before each witness testified and in final instructions. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our review is governed by the following standard: A trial court's decision to admit evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. However, whether a rule or statute precludes admission of evidence is a preliminary question of law that this Court reviews de novo. A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. [ People v. Denson , 500 Mich. 385, 396, 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017) (citations omitted).] III. ADMISSION OF OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE UNDER MRE 404(b) A. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS- MRE 404(b)(2) Before being allowed to introduce evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), the prosecution must provide timely notice to the defense as defined by MRE 404(b)(2). Evidence of other acts may not be admitted unless the prosecution "provide[s] written notice at least 14 days in advance of trial, or orally on the record later if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown ...." It is undisputed that "written notice" was not timely provided to defendant and that "oral notice on the record" was not provided until one day before trial. The question then is whether the trial court erred by admitting the evidence despite the untimely notice, i.e., whether there was good cause to excuse the noncompliance. As the Supreme Court stated in People v. Jackson , 498 Mich. 246, 261, 869 N.W.2d 253 (2015), there are three underlying purposes of the rule that we should consider when reviewing a claim of good cause for a failure to comply with the rule: Requiring the prosecution to give "pretrial notice of its intent to introduce other acts evidence at trial" is designed to "promote[ ] reliable decision making," to "prevent[ ] unfair surprise," and to "offer[ ] the defense the opportunity to marshal arguments regarding both relevancy and unfair prejudice." [Citations omitted.] It is clear that the late notice in this case did "unfair[ly] surprise" defendant and did not provide him with time to "marshal arguments regarding both relevancy and unfair prejudice." Defense counsel was not aware of the other-acts testimony to be offered by Blackwell until 12 days before trial, and he was unaware of the content of Caswell's testimony until it was described at the hearing the day before trial. Defense counsel fairly stated the problem at that hearing when he told the court: So it just blows my mind that we're going to have a trial tomorrow and all of these things are coming up when we have all this time to set up whatever your case is going to be. And now I have to consider these other things when I'm more concerned about the facts that were in front of me before, and now they're just trying to add all these other things .... As to Blackwell, the trial court concluded that the claimed difficulty in contacting Blackwell sufficed. We disagree. First, as defense counsel argued below, the other act in question was a drug offense committed in August 2013, and it is undisputed that the prosecution was aware of defendant's conviction for that crime at the time the information was filed. Therefore, the prosecution's statement at the hearing that "we did not know [the other-acts evidence] existed" holds no weight and appears to have been hyperbole. Moreover, the prosecution's claim that it did not have the police report from the 2013 crime until the day before it filed the notice required by MRE 404(b) is not adequate to show good cause. The prosecution argued that it tried to obtain the report by calling the relevant police department in early June 2017 and that it took many calls to get a response. However, no efforts were made during the six months between the filing of the information and defendant's trial on June 20, 2017. There is no basis on the record to conclude that over a six-month period, the prosecution, with reasonable diligence, could not have obtained the report from either the Macomb County police or the Macomb County prosecutor's office. The same is true as to the whereabouts of Blackwell. The prosecution suggested that because Blackwell was retired, the police department he served in no longer had his telephone number. However, it conceded that no other efforts were made to obtain his address or other contact information until the day the MRE 404(b) notice was filed. Moreover, knowledge of Blackwell's whereabouts was not a prerequisite to filing a 404(b) notice. If after filing the notice Blackwell could not be located, the prosecution could simply forgo calling him as a witness. Similarly, the prosecution did not show good cause for failing to file a 404(b) notice as to Caswell. The prosecution argued that it could not have done so because it had been unable to interview Caswell until June 7, 2017, when he pleaded guilty in his drug case. Caswell was charged in January 2017 with conspiracy to deliver heroin under 50 grams, illegal use and sale of a financial transaction device, and driving without insurance. However, he was permitted to plead to a possession-only charge with sentencing under MCL 333.7411 in exchange for cooperating with law enforcement, which strongly suggests that the prosecution was aware of his potential testimony at an earlier time. Even assuming that the prosecution did not learn that Caswell could provide useful testimony until the day before the prosecution added him to the witness list, it failed to indicate that his testimony would concern other acts. The first time the prosecution advised the defense that Caswell would provide other-acts evidence was on Friday, June 16, 2017, four days before trial with an intervening weekend, and the substance of that testimony was not actually articulated until the hearing the day before trial. A basis for defense counsel's objection to the addition of Caswell as a witness was that Caswell was not a witness to anything concerning the events of defendant's arrest, that he "was not present at the time of the stop or arrest," and that "[t]he police reports, the complaint, [and] information ... are devoid of any reference to Dylan Caswell." It was only in response to this objection that the prosecution explained the general content of Caswell's expected testimony, i.e., that it was 404(b) evidence of a separate drug sale. The prosecution provided a second explanation, i.e., that it had not known that it needed Caswell's testimony because it had another witness who would have offered that testimony, but who could not be located. This argument carries little weight given that no 404(b) notice was ever filed for this witness either. The trial court's error may have resulted from its confusion about which party had the burden to establish that admission was proper. The court stated: For the reasons stated by the Prosecutor, and based on the lack of any evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that these are circumstances which the Prosecutor has discovered since the expiration [of the 404(b) notice deadline] and that the People raised them as an issue as soon as they could after discovering the grounds for testimony. In so reasoning, the court improperly put the burden on defendant to produce evidence while it accepted the prosecutor's statements-which were wholly unsupported by any evidence-as conclusive. This is of particular concern given the fact that the defense was only alerted to the need to look into the other-acts evidence a few days before and had still not been provided with the 2013 police report, a document the prosecution had six months to locate. Accordingly, we conclude that the other-acts evidence was procedurally inadmissible. B. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of Caswell and Blackwell because the other acts they described were dissimilar to the charged offense and because this evidence was unfairly prejudicial. We agree. MRE 404(b)(1) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case. It is a "deeply rooted and unwavering principle that other-acts evidence is inadmissible for propensity purposes." Denson , 500 Mich. at 397, 902 N.W.2d 306. "This rule reflects the fear that a jury will convict a defendant on the basis of his or her allegedly bad character rather than because he or she is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged." Id. Admission of other-acts evidence involves four considerations: First, the prosecutor must offer the "prior bad acts" evidence under something other than a character or propensity theory. Second, "the evidence must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b) [.]" Third, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105. [ People v. Knox , 469 Mich. 502, 509, 674 N.W.2d 366 (2004), quoting People v. VanderVliet , 444 Mich. 52, 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993).] According to the Supreme Court: [A] common pitfall in MRE 404(b) cases is that trial courts tend to admit other-acts evidence merely because the proponent had articulated a permissible purpose. The mechanical recitation of a permissible purpose, without explaining how the evidence relates to the recited purpose[ ], is insufficient to justify admission under MRE 404(b). It is incumbent on a trial court to vigilantly weed out character evidence that is disguised as something else. In other words, merely reciting a proper purpose does not actually demonstrate the existence of a proper purpose for the particular other-acts evidence at issue and does not automatically render the evidence admissible. Rather, in order to determine whether an articulated purpose is, in fact, merely a front for the improper admission of other-acts evidence, the trial court must closely scrutinize the logical relevance of the evidence under the second prong of the VanderVliet test. [ Denson , 500 Mich. at 400, 902 N.W.2d 306 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] Thus, the prosecution "bears the burden of establishing" "a proper noncharacter purpose for the admission of the other-acts evidence." Denson , 500 Mich. at 398, 902 N.W.2d 306. " MRE 404(b) prohibits the admission of other-acts evidence when the prosecution's only theory of relevance is that the other act demonstrates the defendant's inclination for wrongdoing in general and thus indicates that the defendant committed the conduct in question." Id. Other-acts evidence may be admissible when "the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system." People v. Sabin (After Remand) , 463 Mich. 43, 63, 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000). Mere similarity between the other-acts evidence and the charged conduct is not sufficient; rather, "the effort is to establish a definite prior design or system which included the doing of the act charged as part of its consummation." Id. at 64, 614 N.W.2d 888 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The other-acts testimony from Blackwell did not define a definite design or system. The June 8, 2017 notice of 404(b) evidence stated that Blackwell would testify about a prior incident in which defendant "A. Was in possession of heroin. B. Was selling it to other individuals. [and] C. Utilized a separate individual and their vehicle to drive him around and assist him with the sale of illegal drugs." The first two reasons are clearly insufficient as they amount to nothing more than propensity evidence, i.e., implying that because defendant sold drugs before, he likely was selling them now. The third factor was not established. Blackwell testified that in 2013, he arranged a controlled buy from defendant and found that defendant had crack cocaine. According to Blackwell, defendant was in a car owned and driven by someone else. There was no evidence that the driver was involved in recruiting buyers or doing anything other than driving. The mere fact that defendant possessed drugs in a vehicle driven by someone else is not sufficient to establish a common plan or scheme. First, being a passenger in a car owned by another is so commonplace and indistinctive that it fails to demonstrate a common scheme. See Sabin (After Remand) , 463 Mich. at 64-65, 614 N.W.2d 888 (requiring "such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations") (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Second, in the incident described by Blackwell, defendant had the drugs on his person and admitted that they were his, a fact that supports, if anything, the notion that defendant did not have a practice of having others carry his drugs. The incidents are also inconsistent in that the 2013 case involved selling drugs directly out of a vehicle and occurred much nearer to defendant's home. A common scheme or plan was also not established as to the testimony of Caswell. He testified that a few days before the events in this case, he had asked Johnson for drugs, and Johnson gave him the address of a house where he could obtain them. Caswell stated that he went to the house and purchased drugs from defendant, who told him that the drugs were from downstate. This evidence supported the conclusion that defendant was a drug dealer with contacts in southern Michigan, but it did not demonstrate a common plan or scheme in relation to the instant charges. Notably, Caswell did not testify that defendant had a third party carrying the drugs or that Johnson was present or that a vehicle was involved; to the contrary, he testified that defendant was in possession of the drugs and sold them to him directly. In addition, Caswell testified that he approached Johnson and asked where he could purchase drugs; there is no evidence that Johnson sought Caswell out in order to solicit sales. Moreover, the testimony does not indicate that Johnson accompanied Caswell when he went to purchase the drugs or that he took any other action to facilitate the transaction. The overwhelming effect of the other-acts testimony in this case was the inference that defendant had a propensity for distributing drugs, i.e., that because defendant sold drugs in the past, he was acting in conformity with that propensity when he was in the car with Johnson, who had drugs in his possession. This is precisely the inference forbidden under MRE 404(b). Thus, the probative value of the other-acts evidence was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to defendant. The prosecution's case, based only on the facts concerning the instant charge, was far from compelling: drugs were not found on defendant's person, and Johnson-the sole witness who supported the prosecution's theory-was subject to impeachment given that he had received a highly favorable plea deal in exchange for his testimony. However, by showing the jury that defendant had been involved in drug sales several times before, the jury could conclude, on that basis, that he was very likely to have been guilty even though he had no drugs in his possession when arrested. The prosecution used the other-acts evidence to argue that defendant was guilty in this case because he had sold drugs in the past. Specifically, the prosecutor argued in closing: How do we know that he was mixed up in that kind of stuff? Aside from the evidence you heard up here. Oh, wait, he sold the exact same drugs [to Blackwell] a few years before. The exact same drugs. Clearly, he has a method of getting them. He got them before. Clearly, he has an in with somebody who can provide these drugs. Gary Johnson testified to all of this, and that testimony was confirmed by Dylan Caswell. What did the Defendant do with the illegal drugs just days before the arrest in this case was made? He sold them [to Caswell]. In explaining why Johnson and another prosecution witness got plea deals while defendant did not, the prosecutor also implied that the real possessor of the drugs was defendant rather than Johnson or Keaton by stating: "Do they have a lengthy criminal history? Have they sold drugs before? No. Has the Defendant? Yes, he has." This is plainly an appeal for the jury to consider the other-acts testimony for propensity purposes. The prosecutor also referred to Blackwell's testimony, stating, "[W]e brought a detective from downstate who said he sold these same drugs in the past, the common scheme." Again, he also stated, when addressing the fact that no drugs were found on defendant, "Oh, wait, he sold the exact same drugs a few years before. The exact same drugs. Clearly, he has a method of getting them. He got them before." We decline to find that the similarity of the drugs sold, unless of some unusual or unique type, constitutes a common scheme for purposes of MRE 404(b). Sadly, heroin and cocaine are neither unique nor unusual street drugs, nor are they in fact, as the prosecutor repeatedly represented to the jury, "the same." The prosecution's argument directed the jury to improperly consider the other-acts evidence and from that evidence the jury could readily conclude that because defendant had sold drugs on two prior occasions, he was a drug dealer, and therefore, likely to have been in possession of the drugs even though the drugs were found hidden in Johnson's underwear. For these reasons, we conclude that the other-acts evidence was substantively inadmissible. C. HARMLESS ERROR Having concluded that the introduction of the other-acts evidence in this case was procedurally and substantively erroneous, we must consider whether the error was harmless. In applying the harmless-error review, "[w]e focus[ ] on the nature of the error and assess[ ] its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence." Denson , 500 Mich. at 409, 902 N.W.2d 306. Without the improperly admitted testimony, the case against defendant rested exclusively on the testimony of Johnson. That testimony was self-serving, and Johnson's credibility was far from sterling given his initial statement to the police that he did not have drugs in his possession only to have them found later at the police station. As noted by the Supreme Court, "other-acts evidence carries with it a high risk of confusion and misuse. When a defendant's subjective character [is used] as proof of conduct on a particular occasion, there is a substantial danger that the jury will overestimate the probative value of the evidence." Denson , 500 Mich. at 410, 902 N.W.2d 306 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court went on to state that when such evidence is admitted, "[t]he risk is severe that the jury will use the evidence precisely for the purpose that it may not be considered, that is, as suggesting that the defendant is a bad person, a convicted criminal, and that if he did it before he probably did it again." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As described in People v. Allen , 429 Mich. 558, 569, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988), character evidence presents three types of impropriety. First, that jurors may determine that although defendant's guilt in the case before them is in doubt, he is a bad man and should therefore be punished. Second, the character evidence may lead the jury to lower the burden of proof against the defendant, since, even if the guilty verdict is incorrect, no "innocent" man will be forced to endure punishment. Third, the jury may determine that on the basis of his prior actions, the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and therefore he probably is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. All three of these dimensions suggest a likelihood that innocent persons may be convicted. [Citation omitted.] Given the closeness of the properly admitted evidence and the "substantial danger" posed by character evidence to the trial process, we conclude that the error in this case was not harmless. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Stephens, P.J., and Gadola, J., concurred with Shapiro, J. Darlene Keaton's name also appears as "Keeton" in the lower court record. Although the timing is not clear from the record, the police also discovered that Keaton was in possession of a crack pipe. Defendant's conviction by plea arising out of this arrest was not introduced. Defendant testified that he had never met Caswell and did not know him. He stated that he was not in Kalkaska County on the day Caswell testified that he was. Defendant testified that the last time he went to Kalkaska was in June 2016. When asked why Johnson's and Caswell's stories matched up, defendant opined that the two men had talked and aligned their stories about him. Actually, defendant filed a "notice of intent to strike proposed witness, Dylan Caswell," rather than a motion because the motion deadline had passed. MRE 404(b)(2) reads in full: The prosecution in a criminal case shall provide written notice at least 14 days in advance of trial, or orally on the record later if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial and the rationale, whether or not mentioned in subparagraph (b)(1), for admitting the evidence. If necessary to a determination of the admissibility of the evidence under this rule, the defendant shall be required to state the theory or theories of defense, limited only by the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. For the reasons set forth in our discussion of MRE 404(b)(1), we conclude that the evidence in question did not promote reliable decision-making and even if it did to some degree, the circumstances of the other two factors require exclusion. As defense counsel argued at the hearing, "I find that [explanation] to be highly problematic, especially considering [that the witness is] involved with law enforcement, and you have the entire Kalkaska County Sherriff's [sic] Office and [Michigan State Police] at your disposal, why you're unable to obtain a report is very questionable to me or how that takes so long." In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the 2013 incident involved defendant using the driver "to hook him up with people who needed heroin in the area." However, no evidence supported that claim. The prosecution argues that the fact that the 2013 incident occurred outside Wayne County, defendant's county of residence, shows a pattern consistent with the instant case. However, the 2013 incident occurred in Macomb County, a county adjacent to Wayne, and so has little connection to the claim here that defendant traveled all the way to Kalkaska in order to find customers. There is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was charged in connection with the alleged sale to Caswell. Because of our decision we need not reach defendant's claim of sentencing error.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 4, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 16, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

Per Curiam. A jury convicted defendant of two counts of animal fighting, MCL 750.49(2)(a), and one count of possessing animal-fighting equipment, MCL 750.49(2)(h). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent terms of 24 months to 8 years' imprisonment. We affirm defendant's convictions but remand for correction of the judgment of sentence. This case arises from defendant's ownership of five dogs: Chico, Chopper, Daisy, China, and Mayweather. On July 13, 2016, at roughly 3:00 p.m., Sergeant Kurt Roth of the Battle Creek Police Department arrived at a residence in the city to assist with the execution of a search warrant. Not long after Sergeant Roth arrived, he noticed that there were dogs in the backyard, and after seeing that two of them were injured, he contacted Officer Mike Ehart, the Animal Control Officer of the Battle Creek Police Department, to investigate the situation. In the backyard, Chico was in a kennel, while the other dogs were separated and tethered by roughly 15-pound chains attached to tight, heavy collars. When Officer Ehart walked in the yard, none of the dogs was aggressive with him, and he could touch each one. China and Daisy had severe injuries, and because China could not walk on her right front leg, Officer Ehart carried her in order to transport the dogs to the Calhoun County Animal Shelter. Before leaving the residence, Officer Ehart advised defendant that he was taking the dogs to the animal shelter and that there would be a fee. In turn, defendant, as the dogs' owner, surrendered the animals to animal control. Defendant also informed Officer Ehart that Daisy and China had been in a fight and were injured the previous night. While Officer Ehart was at the animal shelter, Corporal Andrew Olsen remained at the residence to take pictures and collect items of evidence related to the dogs. Among the items that Corporal Olsen collected were the four chains used to tether Chopper, Daisy, China, and Mayweather in the yard; a treadmill; a "flirt" pole; and ribbons, awards, and trophies related to the dogs. Tory Haywood, a veterinary technician at the Calhoun County Animal Shelter, recalled that China, Daisy, and Chopper were extremely aggressive with the other dogs at the shelter, although-as with Ehart-the dogs showed no aggression toward Haywood. Dr. Dale Borders, a veterinarian who served as an expert in veterinary medicine at defendant's trial, examined the dogs at the shelter not long after their arrival. Again, the dogs were not aggressive toward Dr. Borders. Dr. Borders first examined China and Daisy. China's right front leg was "badly bitten," and Daisy had puncture wounds and bite wounds around her face. According to Dr. Borders, "whoever [Daisy] was fighting with concentrated on her front end, right on her head." Dr. Borders noted that Daisy, China, Mayweather, and Chopper all had older injuries on the fronts of their bodies-their faces, front legs, chests, or shoulders. Janette Reever, of the Humane Society of the United States, testified as an expert in animal welfare and dog fighting. Reever testified that dog owners preparing their dogs for a fight often use a flirt pole and treadmill. Both items are used to condition the dogs and build up their physical stamina. The flirt pole is also used to develop the dogs' eye coordination. Reever-who had been to two dog shows-explained how these shows related to dog fighting. Reever stated that owners of fighting dogs created the shows for the purpose of legitimizing their possession of items indicative of dog fighting, such as treadmills and flirt poles. According to Reever, a dog can be both a fighting dog and a show dog. Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. Defendant explained that the reason he owned his dogs was to enter them in dog shows. According to defendant, he owned the treadmill for the purpose of training the dogs for upcoming shows. However, he used the flirt pole for simple positive interaction with his dogs. Defendant denied having ever seen any old wounds on his dogs, having ever participated in a dog fight, having attended a dog fight, or having provided any dog or equipment that he knew was going to be used in dog fighting. Defense witness Dennis Michael Norrod, a semiretired judge and sponsor of pit bull terrier shows, testified that a dog-fighting training program would involve equipment such as weight scales, food supplements, and cortisone steroids in addition to other equipment. Norrod confirmed that he had seen defendant present dogs at six or more shows. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of two counts of animal fighting. We disagree. On appeal, a claim of insufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. People v. Meissner , 294 Mich.App. 438, 452, 812 N.W.2d 37 (2011). This Court must review "the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and determine "whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Hardiman , 466 Mich. 417, 421, 646 N.W.2d 158 (2002). "It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences." Id . at 428, 646 N.W.2d 158. "This Court will not interfere with the jury's role of determining the weight of the evidence or deciding the credibility of the witnesses." People v. Fletcher , 260 Mich.App. 531, 561, 679 N.W.2d 127 (2004). The animal-fighting statute, MCL 750.49(2)(a), provides, in pertinent part, that a person shall not knowingly "[o]wn, possess, use, buy, sell, offer to buy or sell, import, or export an animal for fighting or baiting...." In reaching its verdict, the jury found sufficient evidence, with respect to two of defendant's dogs, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant: (1) owned, possessed, used, bought, sold, offered to buy or sell, imported, or exported (2) an animal (3) for fighting or baiting, and (4) did so knowingly. As an initial matter, there is no dispute that defendant owned the dogs; nor is there a dispute that the dogs were "animals" within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to establish the first two elements of the offense. There was also sufficient evidence to establish the third element of the offense-that defendant owned and used at least two of the dogs for fighting or baiting. Although the prosecution's evidence was largely circumstantial, "circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime." People v. Lee , 243 Mich.App. 163, 167-168, 622 N.W.2d 71 (2000). First, the injuries and location of the injuries to the dogs were consistent with fighting dogs. According to Reever, because fighting dogs fight face-to-face, most of their injuries are concentrated around the face and front legs. When the officers discovered defendant's dogs in his backyard on July 13, 2016, Daisy and China had severe fresh wounds. Daisy's injuries were to her face and neck area-her face was swollen and was surrounded by puncture wounds. As would have been the case if Daisy had been in a dog fight, Dr. Borders testified that "whoever she was fighting with concentrated on her front end, right on her head." Also like a fighting dog, both of China's front legs were injured, and she was unable to bear any weight on her right leg. Dr. Borders described China's right leg as "badly bitten." Furthermore, China and Daisy exhibited signs of old wounds, primarily on their faces and front legs. Reever testified: "[B]oth dogs had injuries that were consistent with dog fighting. Extensive both scarring and injuries to the face, the front legs, and also elsewhere on the body." Chico and Chopper also had scarring primarily on the front of their bodies. Additionally, three of defendant's dogs-China, Daisy, and Chopper-exhibited the temperament of a fighting dog. Dr. Borders, Haywood, and Officer Ehart all testified that the dogs were not aggressive with them and that they were able to touch the dogs. However, the three dogs were extremely aggressive with other dogs, to the extent that after spending a few months at the Calhoun County Animal Shelter, China, Daisy, and Chopper had to be euthanized. Mayweather and Chico, in contrast, were fearful when other dogs showed aggression toward them. Thus, of the five dogs, only China, Daisy, and Chopper had the trait of "gameness"-i.e., the desire to fight-that defines a fighting dog. In addition to this evidence, the way that defendant secured the dogs in his yard and the equipment at defendant's residence also assisted in establishing that defendant owned and used the dogs for fighting or baiting. Reever explained that fighting dogs are kept separate from each other, secured by heavy chains attached to heavy, tight collars. Reever further explained that the purpose of keeping dogs in this manner is to avoid a "yard accident"-when a dog breaks free and attacks another dog. Defendant secured the dogs in his yard the same way. Defendant also had a flirt pole and treadmill at his residence. Although these items can be used for training dogs for dog shows, they are also commonly used to prepare a dog for a dog fight. For these reasons, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to establish element three of the offense: defendant owned and used Chico, Chopper, Daisy, and China-Daisy and China in particular-for fighting or baiting. Lastly, given the facts and evidence presented, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant knowingly owned and used Daisy, China, Chopper, and Chico for fighting or baiting. "Even in a case relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant's innocence, but need merely introduce evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide." Hardiman , 466 Mich. at 423-424, 646 N.W.2d 158 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty of two counts of animal fighting under MCL 750.49(2)(a). See Lee , 243 Mich.App. at 167-168, 622 N.W.2d 71. Next, defendant argues that insufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to convict him of possessing animal-fighting equipment under MCL 750.49(2)(h). We disagree. MCL 750.49(2)(h) provides, in pertinent part, that a person shall not knowingly "[o]wn, possess, use, buy, sell, offer to buy or sell, transport, or deliver any device or equipment intended for use in the fighting [or] baiting ... of an animal...." Accordingly, in finding defendant guilty of possessing animal-fighting equipment, the jury found sufficient evidence to establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) defendant knowingly (2) owned, possessed, used, bought, sold, offered to buy or sell, transported, or delivered (3) any device or equipment (4) intended (5) for use in the fighting or baiting (6) of an animal. As an initial consideration, there was no dispute that defendant's dogs were animals as defined under the statute. There was also no dispute that defendant owned and used the treadmill and the flirt pole, which the parties agreed were the only pieces of equipment present in this case. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish elements two, three, and six of the offense described in MCL 750.49(2)(h). Turning to the fourth and fifth elements of the offense, there was also sufficient evidence to establish that defendant owned equipment intended for use in the fighting of dogs. "Intended" is not defined within the statute. However, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) defines "intended" as "expected to be such in the future[.]" Applying this definition, the treadmill and flirt pole were intended for more than one use. Defendant and Reever agreed that the treadmill and flirt pole develop physical stamina and eye coordination. Thus, they are used in dog training in general and more specifically, in training dogs for dog fighting as well as dog shows. Defendant asserts that the flirt pole and treadmill can be explained by his preparation for dog shows. However, in light of the circumstances discussed in relation to the animal-fighting convictions and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant owned this equipment to prepare his dogs for dog fights. See Lee , 243 Mich.App. at 167-168, 622 N.W.2d 71 (providing that "circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime"). Additionally, "the prosecution need not disprove all theories consistent with defendant's innocence; it need only introduce sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable jury of its theory of guilt despite the contradictory theory or evidence a defendant may offer." People v. Solmonson , 261 Mich.App. 657, 662-663, 683 N.W.2d 761 (2004). For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence to establish elements four and five of the offense: defendant owned and used equipment intended for use in the fighting of dogs. Lastly, from the evidence already discussed, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly owned and used the treadmill and flirt pole intended for use in the fighting of his dogs. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offense of possessing animal-fighting equipment. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash because the police initially entered his residence on July 13, 2016, without a warrant and the July 12, 2016 and July 13, 2016 warrants were not supported by probable cause. We disagree. "A trial court's findings on a motion to suppress evidence as illegally seized will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous, while questions of law and the decision on the motion are reviewed de novo." People v. Waclawski , 286 Mich.App. 634, 693, 780 N.W.2d 321 (2009) (citations omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Id . A search warrant cannot be issued unless it is supported by probable cause, which exists when "there is a 'substantial basis' for inferring a 'fair probability' that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." People v. Kazmierczak , 461 Mich. 411, 417-418; 605 N.W.2d 667 (2000). When reviewing a magistrate's decision that probable cause existed, this Court considers "whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a 'substantial basis' for the finding of probable cause." People v. Russo , 439 Mich. 584, 603, 487 N.W.2d 698 (1992). "[A] magistrate's decision regarding probable cause should be paid great deference." People v. Martin , 271 Mich.App. 280, 297, 721 N.W.2d 815 (2006). Probable cause may be based, in part, on information supplied by a confidential informant, provided that the affidavit included "affirmative allegations from which the judge or district magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information is reliable." MCL 780.653(b). "If the search warrant is supported by an affidavit, the affidavit must contain facts within the knowledge of the affiant and not mere conclusions or beliefs." Martin , 271 Mich.App. at 298, 721 N.W.2d 815. "Personal knowledge can be inferred from the stated facts." Id . at 302, 721 N.W.2d 815. "[T]he fact that the police previously had utilized information provided by [a particular] informant in other warrant requests with successful results provide[s] ... support for the magistrate to conclude that the informant [i]s credible and reliable." People v. Stumpf , 196 Mich.App. 218, 223; 492 N.W.2d 795 (1992). As an initial matter, we note that defendant's first argument is factually inaccurate and, as such, is without merit. Defendant alleges that the police entered his home without a warrant on July 13, 2016, and that the prosecution therefore had to demonstrate an exigent circumstance to validate the entry. However, according to the affidavits and search warrants for July 12, 2016, and July 13, 2016, as well as the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, the officers entered defendant's residence pursuant to a warrant that had a mere typographical error. Thus, the officers entered defendant's residence pursuant to a warrant. Nonetheless, upon catching the error, the officers waited until a corrected warrant was obtained before seizing any evidence. Defendant's argument therefore fails because it is based on an inaccurate factual premise. See People v. Traylor , 245 Mich.App. 460, 464, 628 N.W.2d 120 (2001) (explaining that it is the responsibility of the defendant, not the Court, to search for facts underlying the defendant's argument). Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the search warrants were not based on probable cause because the affidavits provided insufficient information as well as unreliable information from the confidential informant. We disagree. The confidential informant in this case, X, spoke with personal knowledge of the information that he provided to the affiant, Officer Kelson Gettel. X performed a controlled hand-to-hand buy at a prearranged location, defendant's house. Officer Gettel observed the buy and searched X before and after the transaction. X provided Officer Gettel with defendant's name, informed Officer Gettel that defendant owned the house, and provided Officer Gettel with a bag of what X suspected was heroin, a fact that Officer Gettel later confirmed. These facts demonstrate X's reliability and personal knowledge as required by MCL 780.653(b). Furthermore, that Officer Gettel observed the transaction and verified the substance as heroin established that the affidavit contained facts within the knowledge of the affiant. See Martin , 271 Mich.App. at 298, 721 N.W.2d 815 (explaining that "[i]f the search warrant is supported by an affidavit, the affidavit must contain facts within the knowledge of the affiant and not mere conclusions or beliefs"). Additionally, Officer Gettel's statement in the affidavit-" 'X' has proven credible in the past by purchasing heroin for the Battle Creek Police Special Investigation Unit which has resulted in the seizure of controlled substances"-further undermines defendant's argument that probable cause did not exist because the affidavit relied on information provided by an informant. See Stumpf , 196 Mich.App. at 223, 492 N.W.2d 795 (stating that "the fact that the police previously had utilized information provided by [a particular] informant in other warrant requests with successful results provided ... support for the magistrate to conclude that the informant was credible and reliable"). Given the foregoing and because this Court has stated in another case that "[t]he controlled purchases of cocaine were sufficient to establish probable cause to permit the magistrate to issue the warrant," it stands to reason that there was probable cause for the warrants in this case. See People v. Head , 211 Mich.App. 205, 209, 535 N.W.2d 563 (1995) ; see also Martin , 271 Mich.App. at 297, 721 N.W.2d 815 (providing that "a magistrate's decision regarding probable cause should be paid great deference"). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Defendant's convictions are affirmed. However, we remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction. Swartzle, P.J., and Sawyer and Ronayne Krause, JJ., concurred. The original charging document and judgment of sentence cite MCL 750.49(2)(c) for the offense of possessing animal fighting equipment. However, MCL 750.49(2)(c) is not the charge discussed throughout the trial. Rather, the applicable statute is MCL 750.49(2)(h). Therefore, we remand for the correction of MCL 750.49(2)(c) to MCL 750.49(2)(h) in the judgment of sentence. See People v. Katt , 248 Mich.App. 282, 312, 639 N.W.2d 815 (2001) (explaining that if a judgment of sentence contains an error, it is appropriate to remand the matter for the ministerial task of correcting the error). A flirt pole is a pole or stick holding at its end an item desirable to a dog, such as a piece of rawhide. Dr. Borders did not examine Chico. "Baiting" is not defined in the statute. However, according to Reever's testimony, "bait dogs" are used to teach younger dogs and to provide insight into whether the younger dogs have the fighting style and drive to fight desired by the dog owner. Bait dogs are typically fighting dogs that have done well in the pit but are too old to keep fighting there. Under MCL 750.49(1), an "animal" is a vertebrate other than a human. Daisy and China had fresh injuries and were two of the three dogs that showed aggression toward other dogs.

Riordan, J. In this contract dispute regarding a referral fee between two law firms, plaintiff appeals as of right and defendant cross-appeals as of right the trial court's entry of judgment after a jury trial. Defendant's cross-appeal is of the trial court's previous order denying defendant's motion for summary disposition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In the years preceding 2012, Jeffrey Sherbow, an attorney and the sole proprietor of plaintiff, had a working relationship with Charles Rice, who ran a business in Detroit. During the early morning hours of July 13, 2012, Charles was in a fatal automobile accident in Ohio. The other passengers in the vehicle at the time of the accident-Mervie Rice, Dorothy Dixon, and Philip Hill-were seriously injured. Dixon was taken to an Ohio hospital and placed in a medically induced coma. When Dion Rice, Charles and Dixon's son, was informed of the accident, he called Charles's business associate, requesting Sherbow's contact information for legal advice. Over the course of the following days, Sherbow and Dion had several conversations via telephone and eventually agreed to meet at Charles's home, where Dion was staying. During that same time period, Sherbow also had several conversations with Jeffrey Danzig, who is an attorney and at the time was a named partner at defendant firm, and commenced the process of referring the personal injury and no-fault cases of Dixon, Mervie, Hill, and Charles's estate to defendant. Danzig agreed that, for Sherbow's referral, Sherbow would be paid ? of any contingent fee that defendant ultimately earned from the cases. Sherbow testified that he told Dion, when they met at Charles's house, that he was not equipped to deal with such serious cases, being a sole practitioner, but that he had a friend at defendant to whom he could refer the case. Sherbow said Dion was receptive to the suggestion and assisted Sherbow in reaching out to the other clients. Dion testified that at the time of the meeting, he and his family had already decided to retain defendant. In either event, Sherbow, Dion, and Danzig set up a meeting for July 26, 2012, at defendant's office. Mervie also was present at the meeting. According to Sherbow, Hill originally was supposed to attend the meeting but could not make it, and Dixon was still in a medically induced coma in Ohio. At the July 26, 2012 meeting, Mervie and Dion signed retainer agreements with defendant. Dion agreed to defendant's representation of Dixon and Charles's estate. While those retainer agreements did not reflect any referral agreement that defendant had with plaintiff, Danzig and Sherbow testified that Danzig informed Mervie and Dion of the agreement and that those two did not object. Mervie and Dion testified that they did not believe they were informed and could not remember everything that was said during the meeting but that if they had been informed, they would have objected. Mervie further testified that she decided to retain defendant after seeing a commercial on television and called defendant's office without being referred. Danzig later met with Hill and Dixon, at which time, according to Danzig, he informed them of the referral fee that plaintiff would be paid and that Hill and Dixon did not object. Like Dion and Mervie, Hill and Dixon testified that they did not believe they were informed of the referral agreement and could not remember the entire conversation with Danzig but that if they had been informed, they would have objected. Danzig sent two letters to Sherbow, one on August 2, 2012, and the second on August 15, 2012, reciting that defendant had "accepted the above-captioned matters on referral from you and your office and are hereby acknowledging your one-third referral fee in these matters." Because the cases were being tried in Ohio, defendant sought the assistance of an Ohio law firm. When the Ohio firm demanded 20% of the contingent fee earned in the case, Sherbow agreed to have his referral fee lowered to 20% as well. Danzig memorialized that new agreement in a letter dated January 2, 2014, which specifically noted that Sherbow was to receive 20% of the contingent fee for his referral of the cases. Eventually, defendant was successful in its representation of the clients, obtaining an award of $10,225,000, out of which a contingent fee of $3,408,333.34 was paid to defendant. When defendant refused to pay 20% of that fee, or $681,666.67, to Sherbow, plaintiff brought the instant litigation, asserting a claim of breach of contract. Defendant moved for summary disposition three separate times, arguing, among other things, that the referral-fee contract violated MRPC 1.5(e), and thus was unenforceable, and that Danzig did not have the authority to bind defendant to a contract with plaintiff. With respect to a violation of MRPC 1.5(e), defendant provided evidence from Dion, Mervie, Dixon, and Hill that they were not aware of the referral-fee agreement and that even if they had been aware of it, they would have objected. Plaintiff countered with evidence from Sherbow and Danzig that the clients were informed and did not object. Further, plaintiff argued that Danzig had the apparent authority to bind defendant because Danzig was a named partner, appeared on the firm's letterhead, and was the head of defendant's intake department. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied the motions for summary disposition. The case then proceeded to trial, largely focused on the issues of whether Danzig had the actual or apparent authority to bind defendant to the referral-fee contract and, if so, whether the contract violated MRPC 1.5(e) and thus was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. After three days of testimony, the trial court, over plaintiff's repeated objections, instructed the jury that plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that MRPC 1.5(e) had not been violated and that, in order for plaintiff to be entitled to judgment, Sherbow had to have had attorney-client relationships with Dion on behalf of Charles's estate, Mervie, Dixon, and Hill at the time of the referral. The verdict form, to which plaintiff also objected, asked the jury to answer two questions with respect to each client: "Were any of the following clients of Jeffrey Sherbow," and "[i]f yes to any part of 1, did Plaintiff refer one, some, or all of the following personal injury cases to Defendant?" The verdict form then had a third, general question: "If yes to any parts of 1 and 2, did Jeffrey Danzig have actual or apparent authority to bind Fieger Firm?" The jury answered that Sherbow had an attorney-client relationship with Dion on behalf of Charles's estate and actually referred that case to defendant. The jury found the opposite for the other three clients. As for the third question, the jury determined that Danzig did have the actual or apparent authority to bind defendant to a contract. Thus, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff with respect to the contingent fee earned for Charles's estate, awarding plaintiff $93,333.33, and for no cause of action for the remaining three claims. Plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) with respect to the fees arising from Dixon's case, arguing that Dion acted on behalf of both Charles's estate and Dixon while she was in the coma. The trial court denied that motion. This appeal followed. II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary disposition. We disagree. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW "This Court ... reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10)." Pace v. Edel-Harrelson , 499 Mich. 1, 5, 878 N.W.2d 784 (2016). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) "tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint ...." Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200, 206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). "In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is proper when there is no "genuine issue regarding any material fact." Id . "A reviewing court may not employ a standard citing the mere possibility that the claim might be supported by evidence produced at trial. A mere promise is insufficient under our court rules." Id. at 121, 597 N.W.2d 817. Similarly, a trial court's "construction of the rules of professional conduct" is a legal issue that this Court reviews de novo. Grievance Administrator v. Fieger , 476 Mich. 231, 240, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006). A trial court's decision regarding the existence of a contract is a question of law that we review de novo. Kloian v. Domino's Pizza, LLC , 273 Mich. App. 449, 452, 733 N.W.2d 766 (2006). "When there is a disputed question of agency, if there is any testimony, either direct or inferential, tending to establish it, it becomes a question of fact...." St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Intermediate Ed. Ass'n/Mich. Ed. Ass'n , 458 Mich. 540, 556-557, 581 N.W.2d 707 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). B. VIOLATION OF MRPC 1.5(e) Defendant argues that there was no question of fact that the referral-fee contract violated MRPC 1.5(e) and was therefore unenforceable as a matter of public policy. We disagree. 1. APPLICABLE LAW "[A] contract is an agreement between parties for the doing or not doing of some particular thing and derives its binding force from the meeting of the minds of the parties ...." In re Mardigian Estate , 312 Mich. App. 553, 562, 879 N.W.2d 313 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd 502 Mich. 154, 917 N.W.2d 325 (2018). "Before a contract can be completed, there must be an offer and acceptance." Clark v. Al-Amin , 309 Mich. App. 387, 394, 872 N.W.2d 730 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "In order for there to be an enforceable agreement between the parties, there must be 'mutual assent' to be bound-that is, the parties must have a 'meeting of the minds' on all the essential elements of the agreement." Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Daniel J. Aronoff Living Trust , 305 Mich. App. 496, 508, 853 N.W.2d 481 (2014). "Parties are free to contract as they see fit, and courts must enforce contracts as written unless they are in violation of law or public policy." Edmore Village v. Crystal Automation Sys., Inc. , 322 Mich. App. 244, 263, 911 N.W.2d 241 (2017). "[A]bsent some specific basis for finding them unlawful, courts cannot disregard private contracts and covenants in order to advance a particular social good." Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 70, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). As this Court has held, Michigan courts apply "the fundamental principle that contracts that violate our ethical rules violate our public policy and therefore are unenforceable." Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza , 251 Mich. App. 187, 196, 650 N.W.2d 364 (2002). "[C]ontracts containing performance requirements that would violate the MRPC are not enforceable because such contracts contradict Michigan's public policy." Morris & Doherty, PC v. Lockwood , 259 Mich. App. 38, 58, 672 N.W.2d 884 (2003). Defendant contends that the referral-fee contract between it and plaintiff violated MRPC 1.5(e). "The rules of statutory construction also apply to rules promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court, such as the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), the MRPC, and the SBR [Rules Concerning the State Bar of Michigan]." Morris & Doherty , 259 Mich. App. at 44, 672 N.W.2d 884. We begin with the plain language of MRPC 1.5(e), which states that "[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if ... the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and ... the total fee is reasonable." 2. ANALYSIS The parties primarily disagree about the meaning of "advised of and does not object to" in MRPC 1.5(e). Defendant argues that the rule requires proof that the client actually affirmatively consented to the agreement after being informed of it. Plaintiff, meanwhile, argues that the rule requires only proof that the client was informed of the agreement and remained silent. Plaintiff is correct. The words used in MRPC 1.5(e) are clear and unambiguous; MRPC 1.5(e) requires only that the client be "advised of" a referral fee agreement and then "does not object" to it. A lack of objection by the client, as required by the rule, does not mean that the client has to affirmatively approve of the agreement. If the drafters of MRPC 1.5(e) wished to require that the client give their affirmative consent to a referral-fee agreement, they would have written that requirement into the rule. As it now stands, the rule unambiguously only requires that the client be advised of and not object to the referral-fee agreement. Id . Thus, summary disposition properly was denied because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the clients were aware of the fee-split agreement and did not object to it. MRPC 1.5(e). Defendant suggests that it submitted evidence in the form of affidavits, letters, and deposition testimony from the clients providing that they were not told of the fee-split agreement, and, had they been, they would have objected. However, Sherbow and Danzig, who both attended the meeting on July 26, 2012, averred and testified that Danzig did advise Dion and Mervie of the fee-split agreement, to which they did not object. Further, Danzig averred and testified that he told Hill and Dixon about the same agreement and that neither of them objected. Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the relevant inquiry. MRPC 1.5(e). Consequently, summary disposition properly was denied. Maiden , 461 Mich. at 120, 597 N.W.2d 817. C. APPARENT AUTHORITY OF DANZIG Defendant also argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary disposition because there was no question of fact that Danzig did not have the authority to bind defendant to the referral-fee contract. We disagree. 1. APPLICABLE LAW "An agent is a person having express or implied authority to represent or act on behalf of another person, who is called his principal." Stephenson v. Golden (On Rehearing) , 279 Mich. 710, 734, 276 N.W. 849 (1937) (quotation marks and citation omitted). More specifically, "[a]n agency is defined as a fiduciary relationship created by express or implied contract or by law, in which one party (the agent) may act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that other party by words or actions." Logan v. Manpower of Lansing, Inc. , 304 Mich. App. 550, 559, 847 N.W.2d 679 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). With respect to agencies, "we consider 'the relations of the parties as they in fact exist under their agreements or acts' and note that in its broadest sense agency 'includes every relation in which one person acts for or represents another by his authority.' " St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. , 458 Mich. at 557, 581 N.W.2d 707, quoting Saums v. Parfet , 270 Mich. 165, 170-171, 258 N.W. 235 (1935). "[F]undamental to the existence of an agency relationship is the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to the matters entrusted to him." St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. , 458 Mich. at 557-558, 581 N.W.2d 707 (citation omitted). "The authority of an agent to bind a principal may be either actual or apparent." Alar v. Mercy Mem. Hosp. , 208 Mich. App. 518, 528, 529 N.W.2d 318 (1995). "Actual authority may be express or implied. Implied authority is the authority which an agent believes he possesses." Meretta v. Peach , 195 Mich. App. 695, 698, 491 N.W.2d 278 (1992). "Actual authority of an agent may be implied from the circumstances surrounding the transaction at issue." Hertz Corp. v. Volvo Truck Corp. , 210 Mich. App. 243, 246, 533 N.W.2d 15 (1995). "These circumstances must show that the principal actually intended the agent to possess the authority to enter into the transaction on behalf of the principal." Id . "Apparent authority arises where the acts and appearances lead a third person reasonably to believe that an agency relationship exists. However, apparent authority must be traceable to the principal and cannot be established only by the acts and conduct of the agent." Alar , 208 Mich. App. at 528, 529 N.W.2d 318. 2. ANALYSIS On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted summary disposition in its favor on the issue of Danzig's apparent or actual authority to bind defendant to the referral contract. In the trial court and now on appeal, the parties' arguments center on the issue of Danzig's apparent authority. When arguing the summary-disposition motion, defendant provided evidence that it had a policy barring any partner or employee from agreeing to pay referral fees without the express approval of Geoffrey Fieger. In response, plaintiff provided evidence that Danzig had such authority, exercised it often, and almost never got approval from Fieger. In determining whether summary disposition was warranted, a trial court is required to consider "all surrounding facts and circumstances" to determine "whether an ordinarily prudent person, conversant with" the business in question, "would be justified in assuming" that Danzig "had the authority to" enter into the relevant contract on defendant's behalf. Meretta , 195 Mich. App. at 699, 491 N.W.2d 278. The inquiry must focus on the actions of defendant when determining whether Danzig had apparent authority. Alar , 208 Mich. App. at 528, 529 N.W.2d 318. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by relying on the statements and actions of Danzig in finding that there was a question of fact regarding Danzig's apparent authority. While defendant claims that it did nothing to establish a third party's reasonable belief in Danzig's apparent authority, the record shows otherwise. First, defendant made Danzig a partner in the law firm, which reasonably suggests to those dealing with Danzig that he acted on behalf of defendant. Second, defendant decided to put Danzig's name in the title of the firm, which is listed on the firm's letterhead. Thus, those dealing with Danzig via written correspondence, as was the case here, could reasonably have believed that defendant had designated Danzig as an agent to make contracts on behalf of defendant. Third, defendant named Danzig as the head of the intake department. Therefore, in addition to being a named partner and appearing on the letterhead, defendant also cloaked Danzig in apparent authority by appointing him as the head of the department that was most particularly involved here-the intake department. Based on that evidence, a reasonable jury could determine (and did in this case) that, given defendant's actions and assertions, a third party could reasonably have believed that Danzig had the authority to enter into the given contract. See id . The fact that defendant had an internal policy that any referrals had to be approved by Fieger does not affect our conclusion because the inquiry properly is focused on Danzig's apparent, rather than actual, authority. See Central Wholesale Co. v. Sefa , 351 Mich. 17, 25, 87 N.W.2d 94 (1957). The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary disposition because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Danzig had the apparent authority to bind defendant to the relevant contract. III. EVIDENCE Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Mervie, Dixon, and Hill to testify about objections to the referral-fee agreement that occurred after the time they were informed of it. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court recently restated the proper standard of review for evidentiary issues such as those presented here: The decision whether to admit evidence falls within a trial court's discretion and will be reversed only when there is an abuse of that discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. However, preliminary questions of law, including the interpretation and application of statutes and legal doctrines, are reviewed de novo, and the trial court necessarily commits an abuse of discretion if it makes an incorrect legal determination. [ Peterson Estate v. Brannigan Bros. Restaurants & Taverns, LLC , 323 Mich. App. 566, 571, 918 N.W.2d 545 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] B. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS "To be admissible, evidence must be relevant." Rock v. Crocker , 499 Mich. 247, 256, 884 N.W.2d 227 (2016), citing MRE 402. "Relevant evidence is 'evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' " Rock , 499 Mich. at 256, 884 N.W.2d 227, quoting MRE 401. At issue here was whether the clients knew of the referral-fee agreement and did not object, so as to conform to the mandates of MRPC 1.5(e). Plaintiff posits that the only objection relevant to the case is an objection by the clients made at the time they were informed of the agreement. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the trial court should have barred the clients from testifying about any objections to the referral fee that arose after the agreement was made. While plaintiff is correct that defendant was required to prove that the clients objected to the referral-fee agreement at the time they were informed, that does not render a later objection entirely irrelevant so as to be inadmissible. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has provided persuasive analysis on the issue of when clients must object pursuant to MRPC 1.5(e) : The rule does not specify when objections to a lawyer's participation must be lodged. Nor does the interpretive ethics opinion provide guidance on this issue; rather, pointing to other ethics rules, the opinion focuses on the type of advice that must be given by both the referring and receiving lawyer, such as "who will be working on the case, what services each lawyer will render to the client, and who is responsible for the matter." [State Bar of Michigan Ethics Opinion] RI-234, at 2 (1995). Since a fee agreement is a contract, obligations became fixed once there was a meeting of the minds. See Port Huron Ed. Assoc. v. Port Huron Area School Dist. , 452 Mich. 309, 326-327, 550 N.W.2d 228, 238-39 (1996) (binding contract created when there is meeting of the minds; meeting of the minds likewise required to modify or cancel contract); Groulx v. Carlson , 176 Mich. App. 484, 491, 440 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1989). To allow subsequent events, such as a mere change of heart, to upset the referral arrangement is inconsistent with basic contract law. Port Huron Ed. Assoc. , 452 Mich. at 326-327, 550 N.W.2d at 238-39. Further, it would be unwise as a matter of policy to permit a client by whim or fancy, or perhaps more nefarious motives, to undo a referral contract after the lawyers' work is finished but before final payment. [ Idalski v. Crouse Cartage Co. , 229 F.Supp.2d 730, 738-739 (E.D. Mich., 2002).] We find this analysis to be persuasive. Plaintiff is correct that the clients must have objected at the time they were informed of the agreement in order for there to be a violation of MRPC 1.5(e). See Idalski , 229 F.Supp.2d at 738-739. However, later objections are not irrelevant and inadmissible. First, looking at the analysis in Idalski , later objections were not deemed irrelevant. The Idalski court only concluded that an objection had to occur at the time the client was informed of the agreement in order for the contract to violate MRPC 1.5(e) and be rendered unenforceable. In a case like this, the later objections remain relevant. At trial, Danzig testified that he informed all the clients of the referral-fee agreement and that they did not object. Sherbow agreed with respect to the July 26, 2012 meeting that he attended. Mervie, Hill, and Dixon, however, testified that they did not believe they had been informed of the referral-fee agreement, because they could not specifically remember the conversation that had taken place more than four years before trial, but that if they had been informed they would have objected. While the clients' objection at trial could not invalidate the contract pursuant to MRPC 1.5(e), it does make it more likely that the clients were not informed of the referral-fee agreement. Obviously, a person cannot object to information that he or she did not receive. Therefore, when the clients testified that they either were not informed or did not remember being informed of the referral-fee agreement, it was only logical that they did not object at the time. Accordingly, their failure to remember objecting to or being informed of the agreement in 2012 and their testimony that they believed they would have objected if informed make it more likely that they were not informed. That testimony is relevant because had the jury believed the clients' assertion that they would have objected if informed but did not object at the time, then it would be logical to infer that they must not have been informed. Therefore, while the objections to the referral-fee agreement at the time of trial were not relevant to whether the clients objected at the time they were informed, those objections were relevant to whether the clients in fact were informed. Because the clients' testimony " 'ma[de] the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable ... than it would be without the evidence,' " it was admissible. Rock , 499 Mich. at 256, 884 N.W.2d 227, quoting MRE 401. The challenged evidence was relevant and admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it at trial. See Peterson Estate , 323 Mich. App. at 571, 918 N.W.2d 545. However, given the limited relevance of the testimony, the trial court should consider any request for a limiting instruction regarding the evidence made by plaintiff during any retrial. IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORM Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the trial court made prejudicial legal errors when instructing the jury and approving the proposed verdict form. We agree. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW "We review de novo properly preserved instructional errors...." Alpha Capital Mgt., Inc. v. Rentenbach , 287 Mich. App. 589, 626, 792 N.W.2d 344 (2010). "Whether the trial court's instruction on the applicable burden of proof was proper is a question law that this Court reviews de novo." Stein v. Home-Owners Ins. Co. , 303 Mich. App. 382, 386-387, 843 N.W.2d 780 (2013). We "consider the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they adequately present the theories of the parties and the applicable law." Alpha Capital , 287 Mich. App. at 626-627, 792 N.W.2d 344. "Instructional error warrants reversal when it affects the outcome of the trial." Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 294 Mich. App. 651, 680, 819 N.W.2d 28 (2011), citing MCR 2.613(A). Stated differently, "a verdict should not be set aside unless failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice." Jimkoski v. Shupe , 282 Mich. App. 1, 9, 763 N.W.2d 1 (2008). B. BURDEN OF PROOF Plaintiff argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by instructing the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proof with respect to defendant's affirmative defense that the contract violated MRPC 1.5(e). We agree. 1. APPLICABLE LAW Pursuant to MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a) and (b), an argument "that an instrument or transaction is void, voidable, or cannot be recovered on by reason of statute or nondelivery" or "that by reason of other affirmative matter seeks to avoid the legal effect of or defeat the claim of the opposing party, in whole or in part," is an affirmative defense. More generally, " '[a]n affirmative defense is a defense that does not controvert the plaintiff's establishing a prima facie case, but that otherwise denies relief to the plaintiff.' " Detroit Edison Co. v. Stenman , 311 Mich. App. 367, 382, 875 N.W.2d 767 (2015), quoting Stanke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 200 Mich. App. 307, 312, 503 N.W.2d 758 (1993). " '[I]t is a matter that accepts the plaintiff's allegation as true and even admits the establishment of the plaintiff's prima facie case, but that denies that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the claim for some reason not disclosed in the plaintiff's pleadings.' " Detroit Edison Co. , 311 Mich. App. at 382, 875 N.W.2d 767, quoting Stanke , 200 Mich. App. at 312, 503 N.W.2d 758. 2. ANALYSIS In this case, defendant and plaintiff had a written contract that required defendant to pay plaintiff 20% of the contingent fee defendant earned in the litigation involving Mervie, Dixon, and Hill. Although defendant challenged Danzig's authority to bind defendant to that contract, the jury explicitly disagreed. Therefore, under applicable agency and contract law, defendant and plaintiff had a contract. Defendant's alternate argument, which is at issue here, was that the contract should be found unenforceable as violative of Michigan's public policy. Defendant contends that the contract violated public policy because it was made without fully complying with MRPC 1.5(e), which required the clients to be informed of the referral-fee agreement and to not object. Defendant sought "to avoid the legal effect" of the contract on public-policy grounds, MCR 2.111(F)(3)(b), or to establish "that [the contract was] void [or] voidable," MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a). Pursuant to MCR 2.111(F)(3), such an argument is an affirmative defense because it "is a defense that does not controvert ... plaintiff's establishing [that] a prima facie [contract exists], but that otherwise denies relief to ... plaintiff." Detroit Edison Co. , 311 Mich. App. at 382, 875 N.W.2d 767 (quotation marks and citation omitted). For affirmative defenses, "a party must assert [them] and has the burden of providing evidence in support." Williamstown Twp. v. Sandalwood Ranch, LLC , 325 Mich. App. 541, 552, 927 N.W.2d 262 (2018), citing Attorney General ex rel Dep't of Environmental Quality v. Bulk Petroleum Corp. , 276 Mich. App. 654, 664, 741 N.W.2d 857 (2007). "Only after such evidence has been introduced does the burden shift to the plaintiff to produce clear and decisive evidence to negate the defense." Williamstown Twp. , 325 Mich. App. at 552, 927 N.W.2d 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, pursuant to the Michigan Court Rules and established caselaw, defendant was required to bear the burden of proof with respect to its affirmative defense. See id . ; MCR 2.111(F)(3). Defendant argues that to prove a contract, a party is required to prove that the contract involved a legal subject matter. It is true that one element of a valid contract is that the contract is in regards to "a proper subject matter." Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Manufacturing , 499 Mich. 491, 508, 885 N.W.2d 861 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, defendant does not actually contend that the "subject matter" of the contract is illegal, because MRPC 1.5(e) specifically contemplates that referral fees between lawyers are legal, except under certain circumstances. See generally Morris & Doherty , 259 Mich. App. 38, 672 N.W.2d 884. Instead, defendant's argument is that the specific contract in question was unenforceable as violative of public policy because it failed to comply with MRPC 1.5(e). Accordingly, the trial court erred by instructing the jury to the contrary. C. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that Mervie, Hill, and Dixon must have had an attorney-client relationship with Sherbow before being referred to defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of MRPC 1.5(e). We agree. 1. APPLICABLE LAW MRPC 1.5(e) provides that "[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if ... the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and ... the total fee is reasonable." (Emphasis added.) Considering the plain language of the rule, as this Court must, Sanders , 323 Mich. App. at 266-267, 916 N.W.2d 305, a contract for a referral fee violates MRPC 1.5(e) and is thus unenforceable as against public policy unless a client has been advised of the agreement and did not object. 2. ANALYSIS Defendant contends, and the trial court agreed at trial, that use of the word "client" in MRPC 1.5(e) means that Dixon, Mervie, and Hill had to be Sherbow's clients in order to conform to the rule. Plaintiff argues to the contrary, alleging that the term "client" means that the person would eventually become the client of the firm or lawyer receiving the referral. We agree with plaintiff. This Court's goal is to discover the intent of the Michigan Supreme Court in drafting the rule and to use the language of the rule, as a whole, to determine that intent. Sanders , 323 Mich. App. at 266-267, 916 N.W.2d 305 ; Morris & Doherty , 259 Mich. App. at 44, 672 N.W.2d 884. As this Court has held, " MRPC 1.5(e) is designed to prohibit brokering, to protect a client from clandestine payment and employment, and to prohibit aggrandizement of fees." McCroskey, Feldman, Cochrane & Brock, PC v. Waters , 197 Mich. App. 282, 286-287, 494 N.W.2d 826 (1992). Requiring a party to establish an attorney-client relationship with the referring attorney before a referral takes place adds a new element to the rule and is not part of MRPC 1.5(e) as it is written. See Id . at 286-287, 494 N.W.2d 826. The requirement to advise the person of the referral-fee split and allow them to object destroys the ability of attorneys to engage in clandestine payments to one another and impairs brokering by allowing the potential client to object to the referral fee. Id . As to Waters 's concern with "prohibit[ing the] aggrandizement of fees," the client requirement proposed by defendant likely would have the opposite effect, encouraging attorneys to engage in billable work with the person being referred so as to firmly ensure that an attorney-client relationship has been established. Id . at 287, 494 N.W.2d 826. After all, as our Supreme Court has held, an attorney-client relationship typically is not formed until an attorney "render[s] ... legal advice and legal services ... and the client[ ] reli[es] on that advice or those services...." Macomb Co. Taxpayers Ass'n v. L'Anse Creuse Pub. Sch. , 455 Mich. 1, 11, 564 N.W.2d 457 (1997). This additional requirement also has the potential to result in situations in which attorneys who typically would immediately refer a case that they knew they were not qualified or adequately able to handle might retain the case for a certain period of time. In so doing, those underqualified or underprepared attorneys might cause a detriment to the injured party's case. After all, Michigan law with respect to personal injury cases often has exacting statutory requirements (including, for example, the requirements for medical-malpractice and no-fault cases and the requirements for cases implicating governmental immunity) that an attorney not versed in that area of law might unwittingly fail to meet. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court wrote MRPC 1.5(e) in a manner that protects clients from the aforementioned dangers by requiring attorneys who will be representing the client to inform the client of the referral fee and to allow for objection. See Waters , 197 Mich. App. at 286-287, 494 N.W.2d 826. Interpreting the rule's use of the word "client" as suggested by defendant and the trial court would add a requirement not explicitly listed in MRPC 1.5(e) and would work to undermine the overriding purpose of the rule, which is to protect clients. See id . In fact, allowing defendant to misconstrue the rule and then use it to void a contract into which it willingly entered would be a plain misapplication of the MRPC in general. To wit, in the preamble of the MRPC, in the section regarding the scope of the rules, the drafters warned that "the purposes of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons." MRPC 1.0, preamble. In sum, MRPC 1.5(e) does not require that Sherbow have an attorney-client relationship with Mervie, Dixon, and Hill. The trial court erred when it instructed the jury to the contrary and included the question on the verdict form. D. REVERSAL IS REQUIRED Errors regarding jury instructions and jury verdict forms only require reversal when they "affect[ ] the outcome of the trial." Hardrick , 294 Mich. App. at 680, 819 N.W.2d 28, citing MCR 2.613(A). Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that erroneous jury instructions require reversal when they "effectively relieved [a party] of [its] burden of proof and [were] not specific enough to allow the jury to decide the case intelligently, fairly, and impartially." Cox v. Flint Bd. of Hosp. Managers , 467 Mich. 1, 15, 651 N.W.2d 356 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court committed two errors when providing jury instructions, and it provided a jury verdict form that was irredeemably deficient. The issues tried were (1) whether Danzig had the actual or apparent authority to bind defendant to the referral contract, (2) if so, whether the clients were informed about the referral fee, and (3) if they were informed, whether they objected. Despite that, the trial court instructed the jury that it had to determine whether Mervie, Hill, and Dixon were clients of Sherbow. The jury verdict form ordered the jury that if it found that the three individuals were not Sherbow's clients then plaintiff had no claim to its share of the attorney fees from Mervie's, Dixon's, and Hill's cases. The jury answered that there was no such relationship, thereby resulting in a verdict of no cause of action with respect to those three cases. Considering that the jury made a dispositive determination of plaintiff's claims against defendant on the basis of an unnecessary requirement, the error clearly affected the outcome of trial. See Hardrick , 294 Mich. App. at 680, 819 N.W.2d 28. Plaintiff and defendant both note, however, that the jury continued to answer the second question in the negative as well, finding that Sherbow did not refer Mervie, Dixon, or Hill to defendant. Given the record provided and the issues that were to be tried, it is not clear what purpose the trial court had in asking that question but, presumably, the trial court was asking the jury to determine if there was consideration for the written referral-fee contract. Assuming the trial court was attempting to determine whether there was an enforceable contract based on an actual referral, we believe it is relevant to consider each element on which the jury was instructed to reach a verdict to determine the existence of a contract. The trial court instructed the jury that in order for an enforceable, binding contract to exist, plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mervie, Dixon, and Hill were aware of the referral-fee agreement and did not object to it. As discussed, defendant actually bore the burden to prove the opposite: that the clients were not informed or did object. Thus, given the instructions the jury was provided, the jury was required to answer the second question on the verdict form in the negative if it found that plaintiff did not meet its burden of proving that MRPC 1.5(e) was not violated. Considering the trial court's confusing and improper instructions regarding MRPC 1.5(e) and the party bearing the burden of proof, defendant was "effectively relieved" of its burden of proof and, as a result, the jury was not allowed "to decide the case intelligently, fairly, and impartially." Cox , 467 Mich. at 15, 651 N.W.2d 356 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We vacate the jury's verdict with respect to the first two questions asked on the verdict form, and we remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. V. JNOV Plaintiff argues both that the trial court erred by denying its motion for JNOV with respect to Dixon and that this Court should grant plaintiff JNOV with respect to Mervie. We disagree. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court "reviews de novo a trial court's decisions regarding motions for JNOV." Hecht v. Nat'l Heritage Academies, Inc. , 499 Mich. 586, 604, 886 N.W.2d 135 (2016). "JNOV is only appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Nahshal v. Fremont Ins. Co. , 324 Mich. App. 696, 719, 922 N.W.2d 662 (2018). "If reasonable persons, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could honestly reach different conclusions about whether the nonmoving party established his or her claim [or defense], then the question is for the jury." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). B. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS Once again, this argument focuses on the interpretation and analysis of MRPC 1.5(e). With respect to Dixon's case, plaintiff presents this particular argument on appeal based on the assumption that the trial court properly instructed the jury and a new trial is not required. Therefore, if plaintiff's argument has merit, a new trial would not be required with respect to plaintiff's claim to 20% of the fees from Dixon's case. Plaintiff's argument for JNOV relies on a series of presumptions, the first of which is that Dion entered into a contract for representation with defendant on behalf of Dixon, and thus, for purposes of MRPC 1.5(e), he was considered the "client" who had to be informed of the referral-fee agreement and not object. Plaintiff insists that the trial court erred by not applying the same logic to Dixon given its determination that Dion acted on behalf of Charles's estate and was considered the "client" under the rule. The trial court's ruling in that regard, however, is not pertinent to the issue presented here. The language of the rule is plain and unambiguous: the client must be advised of the referral-fee agreement and not object. MRPC 1.5(e). The record is not disputed that Dion agreed to defendant's representation of Dixon, his mother, at the July 26, 2012 meeting at defendant's office. Dion did so because Dixon was in a medically induced coma at the time. However, Dixon eventually was brought out of the coma, regained consciousness, and was moved to a rehabilitation facility. While there, testimony at trial showed that Danzig came to visit her and explained defendant's legal representation of her. Danzig further testified that he informed Dixon of the referral-fee agreement and that she did not object to it. Dixon presented contrary testimony. While Dion initially hired defendant on behalf of Dixon, Dixon clearly was given the opportunity to either ratify or exit that contract. As the record makes clear, Dixon approved of the hire. Dixon's acknowledgement that she approved of Dion's decision to retain defendant to represent her does not morph Dion into a "client" with respect to either the contract between defendant and Dixon or pursuant to MRPC 1.5(e). When Dixon recovered from her injuries and had a clear mind, she was told that defendant represented her in the litigation arising out of the automobile accident. At that point, she had the opportunity to terminate that representation and seek alternate counsel. Similarly, when she was informed about the referral-fee agreement-if she was-she also had the opportunity to object. Thus, with respect to Dixon, Dion was not considered the "client" pursuant to MRPC 1.5(e). Consequently, the jury's finding that Dion was Sherbow's client, that Sherbow referred him to defendant, and that Dion was aware of the referral-fee agreement and did not object did not require a judgment with respect to Dixon. If the jury believed that Dixon was not made aware of the referral-fee agreement when she ratified Dion's contract with defendant, then the contract violated MRPC 1.5(e) and was unenforceable as violative of public policy. Morris & Doherty , 259 Mich. App. at 58, 672 N.W.2d 884. Therefore, because judgment in plaintiff's favor was not required as a matter of law based on the jury's findings of fact, the trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion for JNOV. Nahshal , 324 Mich. App. at 719, 922 N.W.2d 662. Next, plaintiff also argues that this Court should grant JNOV in its favor with respect to Mervie. Plaintiff readily admits on appeal that it did not raise this issue in the trial court. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appeal, and we decline to consider it. Elahham v. Al-Jabban , 319 Mich. App. 112, 120, 899 N.W.2d 768 (2017). VI. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court's orders denying summary disposition and JNOV, vacate the jury's verdict with respect to the first two questions regarding Mervie, Hill, and Dixon, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Murray, C.J., and Shapiro, J., concurred with Riordan, J. This Court recently restated the proper procedure for such interpretation: [W]e look to the plain language of the ... rule in order to ascertain its meaning and the intent of the rule must be determined from an examination of the ... rule itself and its place within the structure of the ... [r]ules as a whole. If the rule's language is plain and unambiguous, then judicial construction is not permitted and the rule must be applied as written. [Sanders v. McLaren-Macomb , 323 Mich. App. 254, 266-267, 916 N.W.2d 305 (2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted).] Defendant claimed at oral argument that Sherbow could not have referred all the clients because Mervie testified that she called defendant's office of her own accord on July 17, 2012. However, Sherbow testified that he learned Dion wished to speak with him on July 13, 2012. Sherbow then spoke to Danzig that same day. After speaking with Dion, Sherbow began the referral process on July 14, 2012. Among those whom Sherbow claims he included in that referral were Charles's estate, Dixon, Hill, and Mervie. Further, Danzig testified that he contacted Mervie for the first time using a telephone number provided by Sherbow. Thus, there still is a question of fact regarding the origin of the referral. Defendant contends that we should consider Howard Linden, not Dion, as the client with respect to Charles's estate for purposes of MRPC 1.5(e). We decline to consider this argument for several reasons. First, defendant's cross-appeal was limited to the trial court's opinion and order regarding summary disposition, in which the trial court did not actually address defendant's contention that Linden properly was considered the client. See Elahham v. Al-Jabban , 319 Mich. App. 112, 120, 899 N.W.2d 768 (2017) (holding that an issue is unpreserved and need not be considered when "the trial court did not directly address and decide the ... issue raised"). Second, the trial court actually addressed the issue during jury instructions, when it decided to instruct the jury that Dion was considered the client with respect to Charles's estate. Defendant neither recognizes that decision by the trial court nor mentions anything regarding its argument that Linden actually was the client in its statement of questions presented. Instead, defendant only asserts that the trial court erred in deciding the motion for summary disposition. See Maple BPA, Inc. v. Bloomfield Charter Twp. , 302 Mich. App. 505, 517, 838 N.W.2d 915 (2013) ("A party abandons an issue when it fails to include the issue in the statement of questions presented in its appellate brief...."). Third, we note that defendant's argument that Linden actually was the client for purposes of MRPC 1.5(e) is belied by defendant's own behavior. To wit, throughout discovery, defendant only provided one retainer agreement for its representation of Charles's estate-the one signed by Dion. Thus, it is clear that defendant considered Dion to be the legal representative of Charles's estate, given that a contingent-fee agreement, such as the one at issue in this case, must be in writing. Absent the contract signed by Dion, defendant has provided no written contract with Linden or any other party related to the estate. If there is no written contract with Linden, defendant's relationship with him-if he indeed, as claimed, was defendant's client-appears to be inconsistent with MRPC 1.5(c), which states that "[a] contingent-fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined." Fourth, and finally, at the time defendant signed a retainer agreement with Dion on behalf of Charles's estate, Linden had not yet been appointed as the personal representative of the estate. Consequently, at the time the bargain was struck between plaintiff and defendant regarding the referral fee, both plaintiff and defendant were treating Dion as the client with respect to Charles's estate. The Michigan Supreme Court provided the following relevant summary of law involving apparent authority: "Whenever the principal, by statements or conduct, places the agent in a position where he appears with reasonable certainty to be acting for the principal, or without interference suffers the agent to assume such a position, and thereby justifies those dealing with the agent in believing that he is acting within his mandate, an apparent authority results which replaces that actually conferred as the basis for determining rights and liabilities. The measure of authority consists of those powers which the principal has thus caused or permitted the agent to seem to possess, whether the agent had actual authority being immaterial if his conduct was within the apparent scope of his powers; the question involved is no longer what authority was actually given or was intended by the parties to the agency agreement, but resolves itself instead into the determination of what powers persons of reasonable prudence, ordinarily familiar with business practices, dealing with the agent might rightfully believe him to have on the basis of the principal's conduct. Absence of intention to confer any power of the character of that exercised cannot be asserted so as to avoid or vitiate the authority, for the agent's authority as to those with whom he deals is what it reasonably appears to be." [Central Wholesale Co. v. Sefa , 351 Mich. 17, 25, 87 N.W.2d 94 (1957), quoting 2 CJS, Agency, § 96, pp. 1210-1211.] Longstanding caselaw establishes that such arguments are affirmative defenses for which a defendant bears the burden of proof. See Sands Appliance Servs., Inc. v. Wilson , 463 Mich. 231, 239, 615 N.W.2d 241 (2000) ; see also Rothschild v. Schneider , 167 Mich. 501, 503-506, 133 N.W. 530 (1911) ; see also Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co. v. MacDonald , 193 Mich. App. 571, 576-577, 485 N.W.2d 129 (1992) ; see also Cheff v. Terpstra , 7 Mich. App. 141, 145, 151 N.W.2d 208 (1967) (holding that "illegality [of contract] is an affirmative defense in Michigan"). For example, in Waters , 197 Mich. App. at 287, 494 N.W.2d 826, in considering a case in which two attorneys disputed the share of a contingent fee already paid, this Court reasoned that the dangers from which MRPC 1.5(e) sought to protect clients was only tangentially applicable: "Plainly, none of these concerns is implicated in this case. The agreement is simply a mechanism for dividing an already existing fee. In other words, this is not a referral situation contemplated by the rule." Although a Michigan appellate court has not yet analyzed the word "client" in MRPC 1.5(e), the Kansas Supreme Court did so and reached the same conclusion. Despite lacking precedential value, the Kansas Supreme Court's reasoning in analyzing its identical rule is particularly persuasive: MRPC 1.5(g) lists two requirements for a division of a fee between lawyers: (1) the client is advised and does not object; and (2) the total fee is reasonable. The word "client" could refer either to the status of a litigant with regard to the referring attorney or with regard to the attorney to whom the matter is referred. If it refers to the relationship with regard to the referring attorney, the rule mandates an attorney-client relationship with the referring attorney. It is clear that the litigant would be a client of the attorney to whom the matter is referred. We adopt what we believe to be the logical interpretation, that "client" refers to the status of the litigant with the attorney to whom the matter is referred. Under this construction of the rule and the facts of this case, although it would be preferable, MRPC 1.5(g) does not require that the referring attorney have an attorney-client relationship with the person referred. Of course, the attorney accepting the referral may impose such a requirement before agreeing to pay a referral fee. This referral relationship between counsel is a matter of contract between attorneys. [Ryder v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. , 248 Kan. 352, 363, 807 P.2d 109 (1991).] We now hold similarly. Interestingly, the trial court reached the same conclusion before trial, holding that there was no legal support for requiring Sherbow to have an attorney-client relationship with Mervie, Dixon, and Hill, and that defendant was to bear the burden of proving that MRPC 1.5(e) was violated. Yet, at trial, the trial court reversed course and instructed the jury to the exact opposite.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 24, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 14, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on the application. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the police exceeded the proper scope of a knock and talk when they approached and secured the defendant's home at night while attempting to execute an arrest warrant for the defendant's son, who lived elsewhere, see People v. Frederick , 500 Mich. 228, 895 N.W.2d 541 (2017) ; (2) whether the police had sufficient grounds to believe that the subject of the arrest warrant was inside the defendant's home; (3) the appropriate standard to be used by a reviewing court to determine whether the police are permitted to enter a third-party's home or curtilage to execute an arrest warrant, see Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) ; United States v. Pruitt , 458 F.3d 477 (C.A.6, 2006) ; United States v. Hardin , 539 F.3d 404 (C.A.6, 2008) ; (4) if the proper scope of a knock and talk was not exceeded in this case, whether the plain view or exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement permitted the police to forcibly enter the defendant's home based on an officer's perceptions while posted at the rear of the home in the curtilage or in an "open field"; and (5) whether the exclusionary rule should apply under these circumstances. In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of Michigan One Fair Wage, Michigan Time to Care, National Employment Law Project, and Michigan State AFL-CIO to file joint brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on March 22, 2019, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellants to extend the time for filing their brief to August 7, 2019, and for a 10-page extension to the page limitation is GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 14, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the cases of Mays v. Governor (Docket Nos. 157335-7, 157340-2), --- Mich. ----, 926 N.W.2d 803 (2019) are pending on appeal before this Court and that the decisions in those cases may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases. Clement, J., not participating due to her prior involvement as chief legal counsel for the Governor.

On May 7, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the February 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held that summary disposition for the defendant was proper because the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under the insurance policy's uninsured motor vehicle provision as a matter of law. See MCR 2.116(C)(10). We REMAND this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. Uninsured motorist coverage is not statutorily mandated and, therefore, the terms of the contract control whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. DeFrain v. State Farm , 491 Mich. 359, 367, 817 N.W.2d 504 (2012). We review de novo the interpretation of an insurance contract. Twichel v. MIC Gen. Ins. Corp. , 469 Mich. 524, 533, 676 N.W.2d 616 (2004). "An insurance policy is enforced in accordance with its terms. Where a term is not defined in the policy, it is accorded its commonly understood meaning." Id. at 534, 676 N.W.2d 616. "In determining what a typical layperson would understand a particular term to mean, it is customary to turn to dictionary definitions." Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co. , 445 Mich. 558, 568, 519 N.W.2d 864 (1994), rev'd on other grounds by Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 469 Mich. 41, 664 N.W.2d 776 (2003). Only "[w]here ambiguity is found" will a court "construe the term in the manner most favorable to the insured." Id. at 567, 519 N.W.2d 864. The defendant's policy insuring Tri-Hospital Emergency Medical Services Corporation for the period of September 1, 2014 to September 1, 2015 includes the following in its definition of an "uninsured motor vehicle" in Paragraph (3), Subparagraph (d), of Section F, "Additional definitions": "[A] land motor vehicle or 'trailer' * * * d. [t]hat is a hit-and-run vehicle and neither the driver nor [the] owner can be identified. The vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit, an "insured", a covered "auto" or a vehicle an "insured" is "occupying". If there is no direct physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the "accident" must be corroborated by competent evidence, other than the testimony of any person having a claim under this or any similar insurance as the result of such "accident". The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the unidentified truck in this case did not "cause[ ] an object to hit the insured ambulance" when the ambulance hit the drywall left in the road by the truck. Drouillard v. American Alternative Ins. Corp. , 323 Mich. App. 212, 222-223, 916 N.W.2d 844 (2018). According to the Court of Appeals, the ambulance hit the object, and not vice versa, because the drywall in this case lay "stationary [in the road] at the time of the accident ...." Id. at 223, 916 N.W.2d 844. Neither party disputes that the drywall left the bed of the truck; that the drywall came to rest in the road; and that, shortly thereafter, the ambulance collided with the drywall as the drywall lay stationary in the road. Using the commonly understood meaning of the provision's terms, see Twichel , 469 Mich. at 534, 676 N.W.2d 616, one way of triggering coverage under the provision is for an unidentified vehicle to cause an object to come in contact with a covered auto. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) (defining "hit" as "to come in contact with < the ball [hit] the window>"). See also Merriam-Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus (2007) (defining "hit" as "to make or bring into contact: collide"). That is exactly what happened when the unidentified vehicle in this case lost its load in the path of the oncoming ambulance. By depositing the drywall directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle, the unidentified vehicle caused the drywall to come in contact with the oncoming vehicle. Thus, whether the drywall was moving or was stationary at the time of the contact is not dispositive. We disagree with the defendant and the dissenting statement that coverage is precluded because the drywall was stationary when the collision occurred. The dissenting statement wants to reframe the issue as a theoretical semantic one, asking whether a stationary object can be said to "hit" a moving one. But in doing so, the dissenting statement fails to apply the ordinary meaning of the term "hit" or to interpret it in the context in which it appears in the policy provision at issue. As discussed above, we believe the pertinent inquiry under the policy is whether a vehicle that has lost its load in a roadway, thereby placing a stationary object in the path of a moving vehicle, can be said to have caused the stationary object to come in contact with the moving vehicle. When the question is properly framed, the answer is straightforward: depositing drywall directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle is sufficient to cause it to come in contact with that vehicle. Accordingly, the phrase "cause an object to hit" does not preclude coverage under the uninsured motor vehicle provision in this case merely because the drywall was stationary at the time of the accident. Our conclusion is further supported by the presence of the word "hit" in both scenarios in which a hit-and-run accident may give rise to uninsured motorist benefits as prescribed in the second sentence of Subparagraph (d)-when an unidentified vehicle has "hit" a covered auto and when an unidentified vehicle has "cause[d] an object to hit" a covered auto. The defendant concedes that, when the term "hit" appears for the first time in the second sentence, its meaning does not depend on whether the unidentified vehicle "hits" the insured vehicle, or vice versa, so long as the vehicles come into contact with each other. The defendant nevertheless argues that, when the term appears for the second time in the same sentence, coverage is available only if the object "hits" the insured vehicle, but not if the insured vehicle "hits" the object. Because Subparagraph (d) does not distinguish between "hit" in circumstances involving a collision between vehicles and "hit" in circumstances involving a collision between an object and a vehicle, the defendant's argument is belied by the principle recognized in our Court that "[i]dentical language should certainly receive identical construction when found in the same act." Empire Iron Mining Partnership v. Orhanen , 455 Mich. 410, 426 n. 16, 565 N.W.2d 844 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The dissenting statement's reference to hammers and nails, fists and noses, and golf clubs and balls does not add clarity because the word "hit" has a different meaning in those contexts than it does in the context of the policy provision in this case. As it pertains to hammers and nails (or fists and noses), the word "hit" is defined as "to deal a blow or stroke to: Hit the nail with the hammer. " Dictionary.com, < https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hit#> (accessed July 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CUC7-QDKV]. See also Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) (defining "hit" in this context as "to deliver (as a blow) by action"). As it pertains to golf clubs and balls, the word "hit" means "to strike (as a ball) with an object (as a bat, club, or racket) ...." Id. We choose the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning. See In re Erwin , 503 Mich. 1, 33 n. 15, 921 N.W.2d 308 (2018) ( Viviano , J., dissenting). The dissenting statement's disapproval of this method of construction is misguided. The sole issue before us was and is construction of Subparagraph (d), and we must therefore consider the meaning of the same word used elsewhere in the same sentence of the policy, regardless of whether a party has raised or disputed that specific construction argument. See Michigan Supreme Court, Oral Arguments in Drouillard v. American Alternative Ins. Corp. < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGXiXCaoEaY> at 20:19-22:33 (accessed July 3, 2019). We believe this principle applies equally to contract interpretation and probably with even more force here, where the same word is used not just in the same policy or provision of the policy, but in the same sentence. See Twichel , 469 Mich. at 534, 676 N.W.2d 616.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 7, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 13, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion to remand, the motion to stay or to remand, and the motion to dismiss convictions are DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 18, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion to hold the defendant's application for leave to appeal in abeyance for Jawad A. Shah, M.D., P.C. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Docket No. 157951) is considered, and it is GRANTED. We ORDER that the application for leave to appeal the February 21, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in Shah.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 15, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 3, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 16, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered. With regard to the defendant's claim of new evidence, leave to appeal is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). With regard to defendant's request to reissue the judgment of sentence, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). The motion to stay is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 10, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to appoint counsel and the motion for living irrevocable trust are DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED as moot, in light of the May 22, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 19, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's February 4, 2019 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Court, the motions to hold the defendants' application for leave to appeal in abeyance for Mays v. Governor (Docket Nos. 157335-7, 157340-2) and to expedite consideration are considered, and they are GRANTED in part. We ORDER that the application for leave to appeal the August 16, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in Mays. Clement, J., not participating due to her prior involvement as chief legal counsel for the Governor.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's March 5, 2019 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's February 4, 2019 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 7, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion to supplement is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the September 19, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). The motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's March 5, 2019 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Chief Justice, the joint motion of Turner Construction Company and Gilbane Building Company to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on June 20, 2019, accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of Truck Renting and Leasing Association to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief will be accepted for filing if submitted within 21 days of the date on which plaintiff-appellee files her answer to the application for leave to appeal.

On order of the Court, the motion to respond to amici briefs is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 29, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals judgment. The Court of Appeals found this Court's decision in Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insurance Co. , 500 Mich. 191, 895 N.W.2d 490 (2017), "dispositive." Covenant held that a healthcare provider possesses no statutory cause of action against an insurer for recovery of PIP benefits. Plaintiff is a healthcare provider. But the plaintiff is not seeking payment from an insurance provider for no-fault benefits under a statutory no-fault theory. Rather, the plaintiff's complaint alleges a common-law tort-conversion-against the defendant, an attorney, based on the defendant's retention of one-third of the funds from a check that was made payable directly to both plaintiff and defendant. Although a healthcare provider has no statutory cause of action against an insurer to compel payment under the no-fault act, the act permits insurers to directly pay healthcare providers on the injured person's behalf. MCL 500.3112. The insurer did so here. "[I]f an instrument is payable to 2 or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them ." MCL 440.3110(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the plaintiff, as joint payee, had a right to control the funds. Covenant is not dispositive on the question presented here. We REMAND this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. Bernstein, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 7, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals March 7, 2017 order of dismissal and we REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration of the defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal. On remand, while retaining jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals shall REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings. We note that the circuit court record is incomplete and in disarray. First, the file contains the defendant's timely submitted motion for rehearing of the circuit court's February 9, 2016 order denying the defendant's first motion for judgment relief under MCR subchapter 6.500, but there is no order resolving the motion for rehearing. Second, the file contains the defendant's timely submitted motion for reconsideration of the court's April 26, 2016 order denying the defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment, but there is no order resolving the motion for reconsideration. It appears that as a result of these errors by the circuit court, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing as untimely filed the defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal from the Wayne Circuit Court's February 9 and April 26, 2016 orders. See MCR 7.205(G)(3)(b). On remand, the Wayne Circuit Court shall resolve the defendant's motions, and forward copies of those orders to the parties and the Court of Appeals, which shall then reconsider the defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the motion to add issue is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). WILDER , J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 29, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 21, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 29, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously. Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 29, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 24, 2016 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). WILDER , J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 29, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 21, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 7, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 17, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's December 20, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 4, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. The filing fees include a $375.00 entry fee and a $25.00 fee for commencing an original action, MCL 600.1986, for a total of $400.00. Within 21 days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $16.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the complaint not being filed in this Court. If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to plaintiff's account until the payments equal the balance due of $384.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and return a copy of plaintiff's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 18, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 10, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motions to expand the record, to change the trial court judge, and for an evidentiary hearing are DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 1, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 13, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

O'CONNELL, P.J. Petitioner, Adoption Associates, a child-placing agency, appeals by leave granted the trial court's order denying petitions to terminate parental rights to two children surrendered under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, MCL 712.1 et seq . The trial court concluded that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law only applied to the mother of the surrendered children and not to the legal father. We granted Adoption Associates' application for leave to appeal, and "the nonsurrendering parent" appeared and requested that we affirm the decision of the trial court. We conclude that the existence of a legal father does not affect application of the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law and that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law applies to the husband of a surrendering mother in that the husband may not later assert parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse. I. BACKGROUND In August 2016, a woman gave birth to twins. Under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, she surrendered the twins to the hospital the day after they were born. The surrendering mother did not provide her address or marital status, she gave no indication that she was married, and she declined to identify the father. Adoption Associates took custody of the children and placed them with prospective adoptive parents. In September 2016, the adoption agency filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the surrendering parent and the nonsurrendering parent. Also in September 2016, Adoption Associates requested the children's birth certificates for purposes of the adoption. In October 2016, the Vital Records Office notified the agency that it could not provide the birth certificates because of an "unresolved paternity issue." In December 2016, after the Vital Records Office learned that the mother was married, it produced birth certificates listing the mother's husband as the father. This development raised the issue whether the adoption agency had a duty to notify the man listed as the father on the birth certificates about the surrender of the children. The adoption agency protested that it did not. In a written order, the trial court concluded that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law only applied to the mother in this case and not to the legal father identified on the birth certificates. II. ANALYSIS This case concerns the intersection of the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law with the presumption of legitimacy. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Parks v. Parks , 304 Mich.App. 232, 237, 850 N.W.2d 595 (2014). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature's intent. Sinicropi v. Mazurek , 273 Mich.App. 149, 156, 729 N.W.2d 256 (2006). We do so by applying the statute as written if it is unambiguous. Parks , 304 Mich.App. at 238, 850 N.W.2d 595. This Court reads the statute as a whole and generally reads statutes covering the same subject matter together. Sinicropi , 273 Mich.App. at 157, 729 N.W.2d 256. However, the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law provides that neither "a provision in another chapter of [the Probate Code, MCL 710.21 et seq. ]" nor the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq ., applies to the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law unless specifically stated otherwise. MCL 712.2(3). A. SAFE DELIVERY OF NEWBORNS LAW The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law "encourage[s] parents of unwanted newborns to deliver them to emergency service providers instead of abandoning them[.]" People v. Schaub , 254 Mich.App. 110, 115 n. 1, 656 N.W.2d 824 (2002). The statute permits a parent to surrender a child to an emergency service provider within 72 hours of the child's birth. MCL 712.1(2)(k) ; MCL 712.3(1). When the emergency service provider takes temporary custody of the child, the emergency service provider must reasonably try to inform the parent that surrendering the child begins the adoption process and that the parent has 28 days to petition for custody of the child. MCL 712.3(1)(b) and (c). The emergency service provider must furnish the parent with written notice about the process of surrender and the termination of parental rights. MCL 712.3(1)(d). The emergency service provider should also try to inform the parent that, before the child can be adopted, "the state is required to make a reasonable attempt to identify the other parent, and then ask the parent to identify the other parent." MCL 712.3(2)(e). Finally, the emergency service provider must take the newborn to a hospital, if the emergency service provider is not a hospital, and the hospital must take temporary protective custody of the child. MCL 712.5(1). The hospital must notify a child-placing agency about the surrender, and the child-placing agency has various obligations, including making "reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and provide notice of the surrender of the newborn to the nonsurrendering parent" within 28 days, which may require "publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the newborn was surrendered." MCL 712.7(f). Either the surrendering parent, within 28 days of surrender, or the nonsurrendering parent, within 28 days of published notice of surrender, may file a petition to gain custody of the child. MCL 712.10(1). If neither the surrendering parent nor the nonsurrendering parent files a petition for custody within 28 days of surrender or notice of surrender, the child-placing agency must immediately file a petition with the court to terminate the rights of the surrendering parent and the nonsurrendering parent. MCL 712.17(2) and (3). The agency "shall present evidence that demonstrates that the surrendering parent released the newborn and that demonstrates the efforts made by the child placing agency to identify, locate, and provide notice to the nonsurrendering parent." MCL 712.17(4). If the agency meets its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and a custody action has not been filed by the nonsurrendering parent, the trial "court shall enter an order terminating parental rights of the surrendering parent and the nonsurrendering parent under this chapter." MCL 712.17(5). The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law does not define "parent," "surrendering parent," or "nonsurrendering parent." See MCL 712.1(2) (definitions). B. PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY When a child is born during a marriage, the child is presumed to be the issue of that marriage. Barnes v. Jeudevine , 475 Mich. 696, 703, 718 N.W.2d 311 (2006). The Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq ., defines a "presumed father" as "a man who is presumed to be the child's father by virtue of his marriage to the child's mother at the time of the child's conception or birth." MCL 722.1433(e). The RPA governs actions to determine whether a presumed father is actually a child's father. MCL 722.1435(4) ; MCL 722.1441. A biological father has no standing to seek a declaration of paternity under the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq ., when the child's mother is married to another man unless a court has previously determined that the child was born out of wedlock. Pecoraro v. Rostagno-Wallat , 291 Mich.App. 303, 311-313, 805 N.W.2d 226 (2011). The Paternity Act defines a child born out of wedlock as "a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage." MCL 722.711(a). Until the biological father of a child obtains a declaration of paternity, he has no lawful rights to a child who has a presumed father because "a child may have only one legal father." Helton v. Beaman , 304 Mich.App. 97, 106, 850 N.W.2d 515 (2014), aff'd 497 Mich. 1001, 861 N.W.2d 621 (2015). C. SYNTHESIS We conclude that the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law does apply to the husband of a surrendering mother. The trial court's decision and the nonsurrendering parent's argument rely on the fallacy that the child of a married mother could have two legal fathers. The trial court and the nonsurrendering parent are concerned about a situation in which an order terminating the parental rights of the mother and the nonsurrendering parent would only terminate the rights of a biological father but not the husband of the surrendering mother. In this scenario, the husband of the surrendering mother could seek to assert his parental rights to the surrendered child after the child has been adopted. However, "a child may have only one legal father," Helton , 304 Mich.App. at 106, 850 N.W.2d 515, so the legal father of a child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the mother's husband until that presumption is defeated, Barnes , 475 Mich. at 703, 718 N.W.2d 311. The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law tests this presumption through DNA testing of "each party claiming paternity" and attempting to gain custody of the child, leaving only one as the true legal father. See MCL 712.11(1). If the nonsurrendering parent has not filed a petition for custody, the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law provides for termination of the parental rights of the nonsurrendering parent. MCL 712.17(3). The Safe Delivery of Newborns Law refers to the "nonsurrendering parent" in the singular, MCL 712.7(f), MCL 712.10(1), and MCL 712.17, and requires a party claiming paternity to submit to DNA testing, MCL 712.11(1). Therefore the parental rights at issue in a surrender proceeding concern the biological father. If a presumed father later appeared to challenge the children's adoption, either he would be precluded from asserting paternity because he was the biological father whose parental rights were terminated, or he would have to demonstrate that he was not the biological father whose parental rights were terminated, effectively defeating the presumption of legitimacy. Accordingly, there are no circumstances in which a party would later be able to challenge the adoption by claiming paternity and asserting his parental rights. Applying this discussion to the present case, the husband of the surrendering mother was presumed to be the legal father of the children by virtue of the marriage. See MCL 722.1433(e). If the husband had filed a petition for custody of the children within 28 days of published notice of the surrender, see MCL 712.10(1), he would have been required to submit to a DNA test to determine paternity, see MCL 712.11(1). If the testing established that he was not the children's biological father, the trial court would have dismissed his petition for custody. See MCL 712.11(5). This dismissal would be consistent with the rules governing the presumption of legitimacy. The DNA test would have demonstrated that the children were not the issue of the marriage, thereby defeating the presumption of legitimacy. See 722.711(a); Barnes , 475 Mich. at 703, 718 N.W.2d 311. On the other hand, if the husband of the surrendering mother was the biological father, the trial court would have held a best-interest hearing to determine the children's custody. See MCL 712.14. If the children's biological father never claimed paternity or petitioned for custody, the child placing agency would have had to "immediately file a petition with the court to determine whether the court shall enter an order terminating the rights of the nonsurrendering parent." MCL 712.17(3). In this case, no one claimed paternity. If the trial court terminates the parental rights of the nonsurrendering parent and the husband of the surrendering mother later seeks to assert his parental rights, he would have to demonstrate that he was not the biological father to show that the order terminating parental rights did not apply to him. However, in doing so, he would be defeating the presumption of paternity, and he would be without parental rights to assert to disrupt an adoption. Accordingly, the termination proceedings under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law apply to the legal father of the children. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Beckering and Stephens, JJ., concurred with O'Connell, P.J. Effective January 28, 2018, a birth certificate for a newborn surrendered under the Safe Delivery of Newborns Law must list the parents as " 'unknown' and the newborn ... as 'Baby Doe.' " 2017 PA 142.

On January 10, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the October 25, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. McCormack, J. (concurring ). Retroactive laws are often unfair. They upset settled expectations, impose new burdens, and disrupt old agreements. And so we presume laws are prospective unless they say otherwise in very clear terms. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed this foundational principle, and we rightly leave its work in place. The Pontiac Police and Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health and Insurance Trust (the Trust) was organized to pay the healthcare benefits of retired police and firefighters. Under the agreement, the city of Pontiac made retirement benefit payments. But in 2012, the city came under the control of an emergency manager, and after following the necessary steps, the emergency manager issued Executive Order 225 on August 1, 2012. Order 225 read in relevant part: Article III of the Trust Agreement, Section 1, subsections (a) and (b) are amended to remove Article III obligations of the City to continue to make contributions to the Trust as determined by the Trustees through actuarial evaluations. The Order shall have immediate effect. As a result, the city stopped contributing to the retirement trust fund, and the Trust sued. The only question for us is whether Order 225 has retroactive effect. If the order is retroactive, the city would not need to make contributions for the period from 2011 to the date the order issued, August 1, 2012. If the order is not retroactive, the city must make the contributions that accrued up until that date. Several million dollars hang in the balance. Following a lengthy procedural journey, the Court of Appeals held that LaFontaine Saline, Inc v. Chrysler Group, LLC , 496 Mich. 26, 852 N.W.2d 78 (2014), in which we clarified the test for determining the retroactivity of statutes, governs the analysis of whether an executive order has retroactive effect. Applying that framework, the panel held that Order 225 should not be given retroactive effect. I see no flaw in the panel's work; our decision today to deny leave is appropriate. The rules of statutory interpretation about retroactivity are settled and sound. When determining whether a statute should be given retroactive effect we look first to legislative intent, Frank W Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies, Inc. , 463 Mich. 578, 583, 624 N.W.2d 180 (2001), and the plain text of the statute is our starting place, Madugula v. Taub , 496 Mich. 685, 696, 853 N.W.2d 75 (2014). LaFontaine created a four-part framework to determine the retroactivity of statutes, and two parts are particularly salient: we must consider whether (1) there is specific language providing for retroactive application, and whether (2) retroactivity would impair vested rights or create new obligations. LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 38-39, 852 N.W.2d 78. Although LaFontaine 's four-part framework was new, its requirement that the Legislature must speak with clarity to make a law retroactive is a traditional rule of statutory interpretation. Harrison v. Metz , 17 Mich. 377, 382 (1868) ("[I]t is a sound rule of statutory construction that legislation is to have a prospective operation only, except where the contrary intent is expressly declared or is necessarily to be implied from the terms employed."). See also Murray v. Gibson , 56 U.S. (15 How.) 421, 423, 14 L.Ed. 755 (1853). There is no compelling reason to treat executive orders differently for retroactivity analysis. An executive order is quasi-legislative and should be interpreted with the same approach used to interpret a statute. Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Natural Resources Comm. , 415 Mich. 728, 756-757, 330 N.W.2d 346 (1982) ; Aguirre v. Dep't of Corrections , 307 Mich. App. 315, 321, 859 N.W.2d 267 (2014). And emergency managers derive their power from the Legislature, which further supports the conclusion that the same rules should apply to determine whether their orders are retroactive. See former MCL 141.1519, as enacted by 2011 PA 4. The United States Supreme Court has held that the heightened clarity required for retroactivity applies to statutes and administrative rules alike. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ Hosp , 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988). Nothing about this conclusion is groundbreaking, as "[c]ourts have long used the same set of tools to interpret both executive orders and statutes." Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court , 124 Yale L J 2026, 2069 (2015). The dissent agrees that the rules for interpreting statutes apply to interpreting executive orders. ("There is no doubt that courts must interpret an executive order using the ordinary means of statutory interpretation."). Given that, I see no principled way to exempt retroactivity analysis. The settled precedent that governs courts' interpretations of statutes provides a readily understandable set of expectations for interpreting executive orders. If we were to announce some new, yet-unspecified, set of rules to discern retroactive application of executive orders, we would be sending parties off to sea without a compass, and inviting a host of new litigation. Underlying concerns about unfairness do not change, and neither should our rules: emergency managers must clearly demonstrate their intent that an order be retroactive. Because these same rules apply, precedent stacks the deck against finding retroactivity here. The " 'general rule is that a statute is to be construed as having a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that its terms should operate retroactively.' " Barber v. Barber , 327 Mich. 5, 12, 41 N.W.2d 463 (1950) (collecting cases; citation omitted). This presumption of prospectivity "is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic." Landgraf v. USI Film Prod , 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). And it applies even if "the words of the statute are broad enough in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases ... unless a contrary intention is unequivocally expressed...." Todd v. Board of Election Comm'rs , 104 Mich. 474, 478-479, 62 N.W. 564 (1895) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Against this backdrop, LaFontaine instructs courts to consider whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application. The expression of retroactive intent must be "clear, direct, and unequivocal...." Davis v. State Employees' Retirement Bd. , 272 Mich. App. 151, 156, 725 N.W.2d 56 (2006). The expression here is not; there is no express language signaling retroactive effect. The absence of such language is important to concluding that the order should not be retroactive. See Frank W. Lynch & Co. , 463 Mich. at 583-584, 624 N.W.2d 180 ; White v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 431 Mich. 387, 398, 429 N.W.2d 576 (1988) ; Van Fleet v. Van Fleet , 49 Mich. 610, 613, 14 N.W. 566 (1883). And the order contains a telltale forward-looking phrase: "The Order shall have immediate effect." When the Legislature provides that a law will take immediate effect, that supports a finding of textual prospectivity. LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 40, 852 N.W.2d 78. See also Pohutski v. City of Allen Park , 465 Mich. 675, 698, 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) ; Davis , 272 Mich. App. at 157, 725 N.W.2d 56. The Legislature, moreover, knows full well how to make laws retroactive, and the emergency manager could have used similar language if retroactivity was the goal. See, e.g., MCL 141.1157 ("This act shall be applied retroactively...."); MCL 324.21301a(2) ("The liability provisions that are provided for in this part shall be given retroactive application."); MCL 224.19(2) ("The authority and powers granted in this section relative to bridges over navigable streams and the grant of that authority are retroactive...."). See also LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 40 n 30, 852 N.W.2d 78 (noting that MCL 445.1567(1) - (2), MCL 445.1568, and MCL 445.1570 each begin with the preface "Notwithstanding any agreement" as a sign they were retroactive). Any of these phrases would show retroactive intent, but none were used. Nor does the language of Order 225 give rise to a "necessary, unequivocal and unavoidable implication" that the manager intended it to apply retroactively. Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co. , 379 Mich. 160, 165, 150 N.W.2d 752 (1967) (cleaned up). As a result, Order 225 fails to overcome the heavy presumption against retroactivity. Whether the Legislature was clear in its grant of authority to the emergency manager to devise retroactive orders, as the dissent emphasizes, is beside the point. Our focus must be on the text of the executive order that abrogated the contract, not the authority to issue the order. The question is not whether the emergency manager could have issued a retroactive order, it is whether he did. Settled expectations matter too. Retroactive application of the order would upend the rights and obligations of those affected by it. The presumption of prospectivity is therefore especially strong "if retroactive application of a statute would impair vested rights, create a new obligation and impose a new duty, or attach a disability with respect to past transactions." Frank W Lynch & Co. , 463 Mich. at 583, 624 N.W.2d 180. See also Johnson v. Pastoriza , 491 Mich. 417, 429, 818 N.W.2d 279 (2012) ; Hansen-Snyder Co. v. Gen Motors Corp. , 371 Mich. 480, 484, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963). That concern is significant here. Pontiac's police and firefighters may have spent years-or entire careers-expecting that benefits would be paid out upon retirement. The city's financial distress may support the need for drastic action, but it does not weaken the plaintiff's reliance interests. Even assuming the emergency manager had the authority to invalidate contracts (a constitutional question not before us here), the plaintiff's reliance interests would still stand. There is a crucial difference between affecting a future source of income and taking property away. These are central principles in our jurisprudence. "All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro ...." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. *46. Our own Justice COOLEY said that "[r]etrospective legislation ... is commonly objectionable in principle, and apt to result in injustice...." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1868), pp 62-63. Without clear language to the contrary, these critiques apply with equal force to executive orders. The Court of Appeals got this right, and for that reason, I support this Court's denial of the defendant's application for leave to appeal. Viviano and Bernstein, JJ., join the statement of McCormack, J. Zahra, J. (dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from the majority's order denying leave in this case. "A statute presumptively has no retroactive application.... As a general, almost invariable rule, a legislature makes law for the future, not for the past." "Retroactive application of legislation ' "presents problems of unfairness ... because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions." ' " "We have therefore required that the Legislature make its intentions clear when it seeks to pass a law with retroactive effect." This requirement, in essence, is a departure from our traditional rules of statutory interpretation that would ordinarily provide that "[w]hen a statute's language is unambiguous, 'the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted.' " In LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC , this Court provided a framework to further evaluate whether the Legislature clearly intended that a new law be given retroactive application. In my view, LaFontaine has no application to executive action implemented through executive orders. The Court has erroneously applied the LaFontaine retroactivity framework to set aside the legitimate action of the emergency manager. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals to address the issues plaintiff presented in that court but were not decided. Thirty years ago, faced with the insolvency of certain local units of government, the Legislature passed the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act (LGFRA), which provided for the appointment of an emergency financial manager upon a determination of a financial emergency in a local unit of government. In 1990, the Legislature expanded the power of the emergency financial manager to include all matters of finances of a distressed local unit of government and extended the LGFRA to the management of insolvent public school districts. Faced with the effects of the Great Recession, in 2011 the Legislature again expanded the powers of the emergency manager in the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act (LGSDFAA), which provided a properly appointed emergency manager with power to declare "[t]he modification, rejection, termination, and renegotiation of contracts...." In each legislative action described above, the Legislature declared, in identical or similar terms, that "the public health and welfare of the citizens of [Michigan] would be adversely affected by the insolvency of units of local of government[.]" In order to protect against these hazards and remedy the financial crises experienced by insolvent units of government, appointed emergency managers would implement the vast powers bestowed upon them by the state to achieve "prudent fiscal management." There is no dispute that the city of Pontiac was in financial distress and that the Governor properly appointed an emergency manager to address the financial insolvency and instability of the city. Acting pursuant to the LGSDFAA, the city's emergency manager issued Executive Order (EO) 225 on August 12, 2011, which declared, in part, that the city was no longer obligated to make contributions to the police and firefighters voluntary employees' beneficiary associations (VEBA), which is a trust created to provide health insurance to retired police and fire personnel. Specifically, EO 225 provided: [The Trust is] amended to remove [the] obligations of the City to continue to make contributions to the Trust as determined by the Trustees through actuarial evaluations. The Order shall have immediate effect. Plaintiff, the board of trustees of the VEBA, contested the authority of the emergency manager to set aside the contributions to the VEBA on several grounds, and the trial court rejected them in total. Plaintiff appealed. In its March 17, 2015 published opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that the emergency manager was authorized to retroactively modify the VEBA. Nonetheless, the panel concluded that the language of EO 225 only "remove[d the contractual obligations] of the City [of Pontiac] to continue to make contributions to the Trust[.]" Focusing on the word "continue," the panel concluded that EO 225 did not set aside the accrued amount of $3,473,923 that was past due and owing to the VEBA. The city of Pontiac sought leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that because the past due contribution had not been funded, it was an obligation included within the scope of EO 225. This Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held: EO 225 clearly states that, as of August 1, 2012, the [city of Pontiac] no longer has an obligation "to continue to make contributions" under Article III of the Trust Agreement. It does not differentiate between already accrued, but unpaid obligations and future obligations, and thus by its terms applies to both. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the emergency manager did not intend to extinguish the [city]'s 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution.[ ] This Court also remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address an issue not raised or argued by plaintiff in the lower courts: whether the emergency manager's action was impermissible under the test for retroactivity set forth in LaFontaine . Specifically, we asked the Court of Appeals to consider, among other things: "(1) whether the retroactivity analysis stated in LaFontaine applies to EO 225; [and] (2) if so, whether the extinguishment of the defendant's accrued, but unpaid, 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution by EO 225 is permissible under LaFontaine [.]" On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the retroactivity analysis of LaFontaine applied to EO 225 and that application of EO 225 to the nearly $3.5 million past due contribution violated LaFontaine . The city of Pontiac again sought relief in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application for leave to appeal. Today, a majority of this Court denies the city's application for leave to appeal. The LaFontaine retroactivity analysis should not apply to action taken by an emergency manager. Simply put, the emergency manager's order was not "legislative action" subject to LaFontaine . The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded the LaFontaine retroactivity analysis applies because executive orders are interpreted under the same rules of interpretation applicable to statutes, not the nontraditional rules of statutory interpretation that are designed to evaluate whether a statute applies retroactively. There is no doubt that courts must interpret an executive order using the ordinary means of statutory interpretation. This Court has stated that "[t]he use of the same rules of construction for both statutes and executive orders or administrative regulations is not illogical because executive orders and administrative regulations are both quasi-legislative in nature." But there is no justification for subjecting the plain language of executive orders to the elevated or further degree of certainty required for retroactive application of laws enacted by the Legislature. Here, the Michigan Legislature provided emergency managers with broad authority under the LGSDFAA, including the power to reject, amend, modify, or terminate terms of existing collective bargaining agreements. There is no dispute that this Court agreed that the language of LGSDFAA is "so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt" that the Legislature intended it to grant duly appointed emergency managers the power to set aside contractual obligations. The clarity with which the Legislature declared the power of emergency managers appointed under the LGSDFAA alleviates the very reason that heightened review is used to determine whether legislation is retroactive. That is, there can be no doubt that the clear, plain, and direct language of the LGSDFAA afforded the public the " 'opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly....' " Plaintiff knew or should have known on March 16, 2011, the date the LGSDFAA became effective and more than a year before the emergency manager exercised that power in the instant case, that a properly appointed emergency manager would have the power to modify any contract. Thus, it cannot be viewed as "unsettling" for the city of Pontiac's emergency manager to have exercised power under LGSDFAA to retroactively amend existing collective bargaining agreements through EO 225. Given this understanding, EO 225 should not be subject to the elevated degree of certainty required for retroactive application of laws enacted by the Legislature. Rather, EO 225 should merely be subject to a "[c]ontemporaneous and practical interpretation." Further, I believe the Court of Appeals misconstrued this Court's ruling in LaFontaine . In LaFontaine , this Court simply provided a multi-factor test to determine whether to apply the canon of presumption against retroactivity. No LaFontaine principle is dispositive on whether legislation may be applied retroactively, but instead the factors are guideposts for courts reviewing the law in question. The plain language of EO 225 is ultimately the best indicator of what the emergency manager intended when issuing EO 225, rather than a court's application of the LaFontaine analysis. Thus, I am not convinced that LaFontaine applies here. Assuming arguendo that the LaFontaine retroactivity framework applies to EO 225, the panel erred in concluding that retroactive application was impermissible. Preliminarily, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Principle Two does not apply under the facts and circumstances of this case. But I disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that LaFontaine Principle Four "does not support retroactive application of EO 225 given that a vested right would be affected." Principal Four is only implicated by an act that is remedial or procedural, and EO 225 is clearly substantive. Thus, I conclude that Principle Four offers little guidance, and the LaFontaine analysis in this case is controlled by Principles One and Three. In regard to LaFontaine Principle One-"whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application" -the language of EO 225 provides for retroactive application. The plain language of EO 225 clearly states that, as of August 1, 2012, the city no longer had an obligation "to continue to make contributions" to the Trust. The order's language does not differentiate between already accrued, but unpaid obligations and future obligations, and thus expressly applies to both. This is precisely the reason this Court previously ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the emergency manager did not intend to extinguish the defendant's FY 2011-2012 contribution. Given that this Court already said EO 225 was "clear," meaning "free from obscurity or ambiguity : easily understood : UNMISTAKEABLE," requiring a greater degree of clarity for that which is already clear strikes me as not only unnecessary but an exercise in futility. Executive orders are reviewed by the ordinary means of statutory interpretation, and LaFontaine does not place upon executive orders what amounts to a redundant elevated burden that they be crystal clear to apply retroactively. In regard to LaFontaine Principle Three-keeping in mind that retroactive legislation impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or created new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past-there is no doubt that the retiree's vested rights were impaired with the issuance of EO 225. But impairment of vested rights does not per se render retroactive application impermissible. Principle Three only requires the reviewing court to "keep in mind" that retroactive application of a law may impair vested rights. And because retroactive application of EO 225 is exactly the purpose of the emergency manager's powers to amend, modify, or terminate terms of existing agreements (i.e., vested rights), I am restrained by the Legislature's determination and will not thwart its prerogative by applying an overly critical view of the very executive orders that the Legislature intended be issued. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues that plaintiff presented in that court but were not decided. Wilder, J., joins the statement of Zahra, J. The city agreed that we should look at the plain text of Order 225 to determine the emergency manager's intent in its original application brief before this Court. See Defendant's June 4, 2015 Application for Leave to Appeal, pp. 20-21. Otherwise, there would be no need to subject the Legislature to a heighted clarity requirement. The Michigan Constitution vests the Legislature with broad legislative powers and does not limit it to prospective legislation. Const 1963, art IV, § 1. But the fact that the Legislature indisputably has authority to pass retroactive laws does not relieve it of the obligation to make its intent clear. The same principle should hold true for emergency managers. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p. 261; see also 2 Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed.), § 41:2, p. 386 ("A fundamental principle of jurisprudence holds that retroactive application of new law is usually unfair."). LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC , 496 Mich. 26, 38, 852 N.W.2d 78 (2014), quoting Downriver Plaza Group v. Southgate , 444 Mich. 656, 666, 513 N.W.2d 807 (1994), in turn quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992). LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 38, 852 N.W.2d 78, citing Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Technologies , 463 Mich. 578, 583, 624 N.W.2d 180 (2001). Madugula v. Taub , 496 Mich. 685, 696, 853 N.W.2d 75 (2014), quoting Malpass v. Dep't of Treasury , 494 Mich. 237, 247-248, 833 N.W.2d 272 (2013) (emphasis added). LaFontaine , 496 Mich. 26, 852 N.W.2d 78. 1988 PA 101, former MCL 141.1101 through MCL 141.1118. 1990 PA 72, former MCL 141.1201 through MCL 141.1244. 2011 PA 4, former MCL 141.1501 through 141.1531. Former MCL 141.1518(1)(c). Former MCL 141.1102 and former MCL 141.1202 ; see also former MCL 141.1503 (stating that "the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of [Michigan] would be materially and adversely affected by the insolvency of local governments"). Public Act 436 of 2012 has since replaced former MCL 141.1501 through 141.1531, but MCL 141.1543(a) currently contains this same language as former MCL 141.1503 under the now-named Local Financial Stability and Choice Act. Former MCL 141.1102 and former MCL 141.1202. This goal was expanded in later acts to include the "efficient provision of services." See former MCL 141.1503 and current MCL 141.1543(b). Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees v. City of Pontiac No. 1 , 309 Mich. App. 590, 608, 873 N.W.2d 121 (2015). Id . at 608, 873 N.W.2d 121. Id . at 594, 608-609, 873 N.W.2d 121. Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees v. City of Pontiac , 499 Mich. 921, 921, 878 N.W.2d 477 (2016). Id . Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees v. City of Pontiac (On Remand) , 317 Mich. App. 570, 574, 895 N.W.2d 206 (2016). Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees v. City of Pontiac , 500 Mich. 1011, 896 N.W.2d 9 (2017). Soap and Detergent Ass'n v. Natural Resources Comm. , 415 Mich. 728, 756-767, 330 N.W.2d 346 (1982), citing 1 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 219, and Asselin, Executive Orders: Discretion vs. Accountability , 51 Conn. Bar J. 383 (1977). Landgraf v. USI Film Prod. , 511 U.S. 244, 272, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In fact, we previously agreed that the city of Pontiac's emergency manager had the power under the LGSDFAA to unilaterally amend existing collective bargaining agreements. See 499 Mich. 921, 878 N.W.2d 477. Davis v. State Employees' Retirement Bd. , 272 Mich. App. 151, 166, 725 N.W.2d 56 (2006), quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483. 2B Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed.), § 49:3, p. 11. Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees , 317 Mich. App. at 586, 895 N.W.2d 206. LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 38, 852 N.W.2d 78. This Court stated that EO 225 by its plain language expresses the intent of the emergency manager to extinguish the defendant's 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. Although that contribution accrued on June 30, 2012, the defendant had not yet paid the obligation when EO 225 went into effect. EO 225 clearly states that, as of August 1, 2012, the defendant no longer has an obligation "to continue to make contributions" under Article III of the Trust Agreement. It does not differentiate between already accrued, but unpaid obligations and future obligations, and thus by its terms applies to both. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the emergency manager did not intend to extinguish the defendant's 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. [Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Trust Bd. of Trustees , 499 Mich. at 921, 878 N.W.2d 477 (emphasis added).] Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). LaFontaine , 496 Mich. at 39, 852 N.W.2d 78.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 29, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to extend the time for filing her supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before August 24, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc. to extend the time for filing a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on June 1, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 3, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 6, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 23, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's December 27, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's December 27, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 17, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

By order of October 3, 2017, the application for leave to appeal the April 11, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in Ozimek v. Rodgers (Docket No. 154776) and Marik v. Marik (Docket No. 154549). On order of the Court, the orders having entered on November 16, 2017, 501 Mich 918-919, 919, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017), the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the order of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of this Court's November 16, 2017 order in Marik v. Marik , 501 Mich 918-919, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017). On remand, we DIRECT the Court of Appeals to issue an opinion specifically addressing the issue whether the order in question may affect the custody of a minor within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii), or otherwise be appealable by right under MCR 7.203(A). If the Court of Appeals determines that the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division's order is appealable by right, it shall take jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant's claim of appeal and address its merits. If the Court of Appeals determines that the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division's order is not appealable by right, it may then dismiss the defendant-appellant's claim of appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or exercise its discretion to treat the claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal and grant the application. See Varran v. Granneman (On Remand) , 312 Mich. App. 591, 880 N.W.2d 242 (2015), and Wardell v. Hincka , 297 Mich. App. 127, 133 n. 1, 822 N.W.2d 278 (2012). We direct the Court of Appeals' attention to the fact that we have also remanded the related case of Royce v. Laporte (Docket No. 156766) to the Court of Appeals and that Marik v. Marik (Docket No. 155833), and Madson v. Jaso (After Remand) (Docket No. 154529), have also been remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. We further note that this Court has opened an administrative file, ADM File No. 2017-20, to consider amending MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). The motion to consolidate is DENIED. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Per Curiam. At issue in this case is whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to change the domicile of a minor child established by a custody award in a divorce judgment while that underlying judgment is pending on appeal. To answer that question, we must determine whether MCL 722.27(1)(c) -a provision of the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq ., governing circuit courts' powers to resolve custody disputes-falls under an exception to the rule in MCR 7.208(A) that a trial court may not amend a final judgment after a claim of appeal has been filed or leave to appeal has been granted. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals and hold that MCL 722.27(1) is an exception "otherwise provided by law" under MCR 7.208(A)(4). MCR 7.208(A) provides: Limitations. After a claim of appeal is filed or leave to appeal is granted, the trial court or tribunal may not set aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from except (1) by order of the Court of Appeals, (2) by stipulation of the parties, (3) after a decision on the merits in an action in which a preliminary injunction was granted, or (4) as otherwise provided by law. MCL 722.27(1) states, in relevant part: If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following: * * * (c) ... modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age and, subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605b, until the child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. This Court reviews de novo both a trial court's jurisdictional rulings, Jeffrey v. Rapid American Corp. , 448 Mich. 178, 184, 529 N.W.2d 644 (1995), and the proper interpretation and application of statutes and court rules, Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 578-579, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008). De novo review means we review this issue independently, without any required deference to the trial court. See Fletcher v. Fletcher , 447 Mich. 871, 882, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994) (discussing the nature of de novo review). We have answered a question closely related to the one presented here. In Lemmen v. Lemmen , 481 Mich. 164, 167, 749 N.W.2d 255 (2008), we held that the Legislature's grant of continuing jurisdiction to modify child and spousal support orders in divorce proceedings in MCL 552.17(1) and MCL 552.28 satisfies the "otherwise provided by law" requirement of MCR 7.208(A)(4). In so holding, we made clear that another law need not grant jurisdiction specifically for judgments pending on appeal to qualify as an exception under MCR 7.208(A)(4). Rather, a statute satisfies MCR 7.208(A)(4) when the Legislature has authorized continuing jurisdiction to amend or modify a final judgment. In Lemmen , we examined the language of MCL 552.17(1) and found that its authorization to amend or modify a judgment "as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children require" suggested "that the purpose of allowing modification of a final judgment regarding child support is to ensure the welfare of the children when the circumstances of the parents or the needs of the children have changed." Lemmen , 481 Mich. at 167, 749 N.W.2d 255. "[T]o require the trial court to wait to make modifications until after an appeal is completed is contrary to the plain language of the statutes and would defeat their purpose ...." Id . In this case, the Court of Appeals found Lemmen 's reasoning equally applicable to situations involving custody. But the court reasoned that because a motion for change in domicile is brought under MCL 722.31(4) of the CCA, rather than under MCL 552.17, an additional interpretive step was necessary to connect Lemmen 's statement about child support modification to the dispute over domicile at issue here. It reasoned that MCL 552.17(1) must be read in pari materia with the CCA because both "relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things." Safdar v. Aziz , 321 Mich. App. 219, 226, 909 N.W.2d 831 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, it concluded that a circuit court may derive continuing jurisdiction over a motion for change in domicile from MCL 552.17(1) and that such jurisdiction attaches whenever a parent's motion concerns custody. See id . at 227, 909 N.W.2d 831. We mostly agree. Lemmen 's reasoning applies to the Legislature's broad grant of authority in the CCA, but the circuit court's jurisdiction to modify a final judgment with respect to the child custody dispute may be derived exclusively from MCL 722.27(1) of the CCA, without resort to MCL 552.17. As between two applicable provisions, we favor the more specific. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 648, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) ("When the conduct at issue falls within the scope of both provisions, the specific presumptively governs, whether or not the specific provision also applies to some conduct that falls outside the general."). A motion for change of domicile brought under MCL 722.31(4) falls within the scope of a "child custody dispute" as the term is used in MCL 722.27(1). See Grange Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Lawrence , 494 Mich. 475, 511, 835 N.W.2d 363 (2013) (concluding that "the custody order controls the determination of a minor child's domicile" under both the common law and the CCA). MCL 722.27(1) reflects the Legislature's intent to protect the interests of children in the face of changing circumstances by authorizing jurisdiction in the circuit court until the child reaches adulthood. MCL 722.27(1)(c) specifically permits the circuit court to modify or amend its orders when proper cause is shown or when there has been a change of circumstances. Its sole limiting principle is that the modification be in the best interests of the child. As in Lemmen , it would be contrary to the plain language of the CCA to require a court to wait for the conclusion of an appeal to address a change in circumstances that would affect the interests of the child. Therefore, we hold that MCL 722.27(1) authorizes the continuing jurisdiction of a circuit court to modify or amend its previous judgments or orders and is an exception to MCR 7.208(A)"otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals decision to the extent it derived jurisdiction from MCL 552.17, affirm the result reached, and remand to the Oakland Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Markman, C.J., Zahra, McCormack, Viviano, Bernstein, Wilder, Clement, JJ., concur.

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice The issue in this case concerns the manner in which a magistrate may consider the credibility of witnesses' testimony in determining whether to bind over a defendant. We hold that a magistrate's duty at a preliminary examination is to consider all the evidence presented, including the credibility of witnesses' testimony, and to determine on that basis whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a crime, i.e., whether the evidence presented is "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." People v. Yost , 468 Mich. 122, 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the magistrate in this case did not abuse her discretion in determining that the complainant's testimony was not credible and there was no other evidence presented during the preliminary examination, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the charges against defendant. I. FACTS AND HISTORY Defendant, Tremel Anderson, was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83 ; carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227 ; felonious assault, MCL 750.82 ; and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. At the preliminary examination, the complainant, Michael Larkins, testified as follows. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 24, 2014, defendant was driving Larkins home when they got into an argument. Larkins and defendant had a newborn baby together, but they were not in a relationship. Defendant was angry because Larkins did not buy a swing for their infant son and because she believed that Larkins was in contact with his ex-girlfriend. During the argument, defendant threatened to kill Larkins, grabbed a gun from between her thighs, and pointed it at him. Defendant kept driving for five minutes with the gun pointed at Larkins but eventually pulled over to the side of the road approximately two blocks from Larkins's home. For five to seven minutes, defendant and Larkins continued to argue while defendant kept the gun pointed at Larkins. Defendant then demanded that Larkins return a spare set of keys to her car, while the latter sought to negotiate a trade of the keys for Christmas gifts that were in defendant's car. When Larkins refused to give defendant the keys, defendant called the police. Larkins believed that defendant called the police in order to create a diversion. While defendant was on the phone with the police, Larkins yelled for help. Defendant then attempted to fire the gun at Larkins, but the gun failed to discharge. Larkins jumped out of the car and ran away as defendant fired three more shots in his direction, but none of the shots hit Larkins. Finally, defendant threw Larkins's belongings out of her car and drove away. Larkins reached a neighbor's home and called the police. Larkins's testimony constituted the only evidence presented at the preliminary examination. The magistrate found this testimony not credible and therefore dismissed the complaint: [W]ell, let me tell you what my issues are so that we can go straight to the point, huge issues with credibility. This young man wants me to believe that somebody had a gun on him; they pulled the car over; he asked to get out; but he wanted his Christmas gifts. He is afraid because this person had threatened to kill him and they're pointing a gun at him, but he wants to get his Christmas gifts for his family. I don't [sic] any testimony about a handgun. If I don't believe this witness, if I find him to not be credible, which in a preliminary examination, I have to determine the credibility of the witness. You've put on no witness to tell me that there was a handgun recovered. You've put on no witness to tell me that there was some spent casings, shell casings that were recovered. There's no witness, other than this young man, who is just all over the place everywhere and although he's claimed that this gun was pulled out, I'm just going to tell you, I am having a hard time believing that his life was at stake and we have no tape of the 911 call that supports that he felt that he was in danger. We have nothing else but his testimony that is, quite frankly, that is just incredible. He is not a credible witness. The magistrate also noted that, despite having allegedly been threatened by defendant in the past, Larkins never called the police and that he entered the car with defendant even though he did not have a functioning cell phone with him to seek help. The prosecutor appealed the magistrate's decision in the circuit court, which treated the claim of appeal as a motion and denied it without further explanation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. People v. Anderson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Nov. 29, 2016 (Docket No. 327905), 2016 WL 6992198. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court recently described the standard of review applicable to a magistrate's determination as to whether to bind over a defendant: In order to bind a defendant over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause that the defendant committed a felony. This standard requires evidence of each element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements may be inferred. Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court should not disturb the district court's bindover decision. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. [ People v. Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 116, 879 N.W.2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Calloway , 500 Mich. 180, 184, 895 N.W.2d 165 (2017). III. ANALYSIS A. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS While "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention," Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 126, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975), a defendant has no constitutional right to an adversarial hearing to challenge the existence of probable cause, id . at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854. However, in Michigan, "[t]he state and the defendant" do have a statutory right "to a prompt examination and determination by the examining magistrate in all criminal causes ...." MCL 766.1. Therefore, the proper role of a magistrate during a preliminary examination constitutes a question of statutory interpretation, the resolution of which begins with an examination of the language of the statute. People v. Feeley , 499 Mich. 429, 435, 885 N.W.2d 223 (2016). When interpreting a statute, "[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." MCL 8.3a. "When the language of a statute is clear, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed therein." Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration LLC , 498 Mich. 518, 529, 872 N.W.2d 412 (2015). MCL 766.4(6) provides that "[a]t the preliminary examination, a magistrate shall examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution, on oath ... concerning the offense charged and in regard to any other matters connected with the charge that the magistrate considers pertinent." The rules of evidence apply (with limited exceptions) to the proceeding, MCL 766.11b(1), and a defendant may cross-examine the prosecutor's witnesses and present witnesses on his or her own behalf, MCL 766.12. If the magistrate determines at the conclusion of the preliminary examination that a felony has not been committed or that there is not probable cause for charging the defendant with committing a felony, the magistrate shall either discharge the defendant or reduce the charge to an offense that is not a felony. If the magistrate determines at the conclusion of the preliminary examination that a felony has been committed and that there is probable cause for charging the defendant with committing a felony, the magistrate shall forthwith bind the defendant to appear within 14 days for arraignment before the circuit court of that county, or the magistrate may conduct the circuit court arraignment as provided by court rule. [ MCL 766.13 (emphasis added).] Thus, a magistrate is required to "determine at the conclusion of the preliminary examination" whether there is "probable cause" that the defendant has committed a crime. "Probable cause requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." Yost , 468 Mich. at 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The relevant definitions of "determine" are "to settle or decide by choice of alternatives or possibilities" and "to find out or come to a decision about by investigation, reasoning, or calculation[.]" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.), defs. 1c and 4. The use of the word "determine" communicates that the magistrate must exercise some judgment in analyzing the evidence at the preliminary examination when deciding whether there is probable cause to bind over a defendant. Finally, a magistrate's "determin[ation]" regarding the existence of probable cause must be made "at the conclusion of the preliminary examination ...." MCL 766.13. This strongly suggests that a magistrate must consider the totality of the evidence presented at that juncture, and that a magistrate must do so even if evidence introduced at the outset of the preliminary examination initially appears to have satisfied the elements of a criminal offense. See People v. King , 412 Mich. 145, 154, 312 N.W.2d 629 (1981) ("The magistrate is required to make his determination after an examination of the whole matter[.]") (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). In sum, MCL 766.13 requires a magistrate to consider all the evidence presented and on that basis to "determine" whether there is "a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." Yost , 468 Mich. at 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court has held that during a preliminary examination, "the magistrate ha[s] not only the right but, also, the duty to pass judgment not only on the weight and competency of the evidence, but also [on] the credibility of the witnesses." People v. Paille #2 , 383 Mich. 621, 627, 178 N.W.2d 465 (1970) ; see also King , 412 Mich. at 153, 312 N.W.2d 629 (quoting Paille ). We have also held that a magistrate may not decline to bind over a defendant "where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt; all such questions should be left for the jury upon the trial." Yaner v. People , 34 Mich. 286, 289 (1876) ; see also People v. Doss , 406 Mich. 90, 103, 276 N.W.2d 9 (1979). In Yost , we stated that "[t]here is some tension between" these two principles, but we declined "to clarify the interplay between" these principles in that case. Yost , 468 Mich. at 128 n 8, 659 N.W.2d 604. The prosecutor argues that this Court should now resolve this "tension" by adopting the standard from People v. Lemmon , 456 Mich. 625, 576 N.W.2d 129 (1998) -limiting a judge's authority to assess witnesses' credibility in ruling on a motion for a new trial-in the context of preliminary examinations. Specifically, the prosecutor argues that a magistrate must accept the veracity of testimony offered at a preliminary examination unless the "testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or [the testimony] contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities ...." Id . at 645-646, 576 N.W.2d 129 (quotation marks and citations omitted). We respectfully decline the prosecutor's invitation to incorporate the Lemmon standard into preliminary examinations. Initially, we disagree with the prosecutor that a magistrate's "duty" to consider the credibility of witnesses' testimony is inconsistent with the proposition that a magistrate should bind over a defendant if "there is a conflict of evidence or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." Yost , 468 Mich. at 128-129, 659 N.W.2d 604. Rather, we believe this proposition is essentially an alternative articulation of the probable-cause standard for binding over a defendant in contrast to the standard for conviction at trial. That is, "where there is a conflict of evidence or where there is a reasonable doubt as to [a defendant's] guilt," Yaner , 34 Mich. at 289, there generally will be probable cause to bind over a defendant, even if "the magistrate may have had reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime," Yost , 468 Mich. at 133, 659 N.W.2d 604. Accordingly, while there may indeed be "some tension" between these two principles, there is no actual conflict that requires resolution by this Court, but rather only clarification. Nothing in MCL 766.1 et seq . suggests that a magistrate's consideration of credibility should be limited to whether "testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value ... or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities ...." Lemmon , 456 Mich. at 645-646, 576 N.W.2d 129 (quotation marks and citations omitted). To the contrary, the adversarial nature of a preliminary examination would be largely meaningless if a magistrate were required to accept as true any testimony that is not patently incredible or that does not defy physical reality. See People v. Richardson , 469 Mich. 923, 938, 669 N.W.2d 797 ( MARKMAN , J., dissenting) ("[I]f a magistrate is obligated to accept at face value any testimony, there would be little reason to allow for cross-examination or for a defense presentation at all at the preliminary examination. ... Because MCL 766.12 specifically provides for the operation of the adversarial process at the preliminary examination, it is reasonable to conclude that the magistrate is not precluded altogether from assessing witness credibility."). Moreover, the Lemmon standard is designed in particular to prevent a court from acting as a "thirteenth juror and overrul[ing] the credibility determinations of the jury ...." Lemmon , 456 Mich. at 637, 576 N.W.2d 129. This limitation makes sense in the context of a motion for a new trial because it is the jury's constitutional duty as the trier of fact to assess credibility and to render the ultimate factual findings necessary to convict a defendant. Id . at 637-638, 642-643, 576 N.W.2d 129 ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 14. By contrast, a preliminary examination is a statutory creation in which the magistrate is the trier of fact; it is thus the magistrate's duty to "determine" whether there is probable cause to bind over a defendant. MCL 766.13. A necessary corollary of this general duty is "the duty to pass judgment not only on the weight and competency of the evidence, but also [on] the credibility of the witnesses." Paille , 383 Mich. at 627, 178 N.W.2d 465. We therefore conclude that the Lemmon standard is inapplicable to a magistrate's review of the evidence presented during a preliminary examination. None of this is to suggest that a magistrate may weigh witnesses' credibility in the same manner as a jury. While a jury must find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt , a magistrate must only determine that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a crime. "[T]he gap between probable cause and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is broad," Yost , 468 Mich. at 126, 659 N.W.2d 604, and therefore, unlike a jury, "a magistrate may legitimately find probable cause while personally entertaining some reservations regarding guilt," id . at 133-134, 659 N.W.2d 604. Accordingly, in considering the credibility of witnesses, a magistrate may only decline to bind over a defendant if a witness's lack of credibility, when considered together with the other evidence presented during the examination, would preclude "a person of ordinary prudence and caution [from] conscientiously entertain[ing] a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." Id . at 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, we decline to adopt the Lemmon standard in the context of preliminary examinations. Instead, we clarify that a magistrate's duty at a preliminary examination is to consider all the evidence presented, including the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses' testimony, and to determine on that basis whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a crime, i.e., whether the evidence presented is "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief in the accused's guilt." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a witness's lack of credibility, when considered together with the other evidence presented during the examination, is so lacking that "a person of ordinary prudence and caution [would not] conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt," a magistrate may not bind over the defendant for trial. Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MCL 766.13. B. APPLICATION The magistrate in this case determined that the complainant's testimony was not credible and, absent any other evidence implicating defendant, declined to bind her over. This determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Seewald , 499 Mich. at 116, 879 N.W.2d 237. "At its core, an abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome. When the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court's judgment." People v. Babcock , 469 Mich. 247, 269, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, in reviewing a magistrate's credibility determination, an appellate court must remain mindful that "the judge who hears the testimony has the distinct advantage over the appellate judge, who must form judgment solely from the printed words." Paille , 383 Mich. at 627, 178 N.W.2d 465 ; see also Lemmon , 456 Mich. at 646, 576 N.W.2d 129 ("The credibility of a witness is determined by more than words and includes tonal quality, volume, speech patterns, and demeanor, all giving clues to the factfinder regarding whether a witness is telling the truth."). The magistrate here articulated several reasons in particular for finding the complainant's testimony not credible. Specifically, she noted that: (1) the complainant had a gun pointed at him, yet he wanted his Christmas gifts and sat in the car negotiating for those gifts; (2) despite allegedly having been threatened by defendant in the past and not having access to a cell phone to seek help, the complainant freely entered the car with defendant; (3) the complainant never called the police to report defendant's earlier threats; and (4) the complainant's testimony was "all over the place everywhere." These reasons, considered in light of the magistrate's superior ability to observe the demeanor of the complainant while testifying, afforded the magistrate a "principled" basis for concluding that the complainant's testimony was not credible and therefore her credibility determination was not "outside the range of principled outcomes." Because there was no other evidence upon which the magistrate could find probable cause to bind over defendant, the magistrate did not abuse her discretion by dismissing the complaint. IV. CONCLUSION We reaffirm and clarify that a magistrate possesses a duty to consider the credibility of witnesses' testimony, in conjunction with all the other evidence presented at a preliminary examination, in determining whether there is probable cause to bind over a defendant, i.e., whether the evidence presented is "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt." Yost , 468 Mich. at 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We further hold that the magistrate in this case did not abuse her discretion in determining that the complainant's testimony was not credible and, in the absence of any other evidence, declined to bind over defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the charges against defendant. Brian K. Zahra, Bridget M. McCormack, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Kurtis T. Wilder, Elizabeth T. Clement, JJ. Larkins testified that he did not call the police because his phone's battery was dead. As the Court of Appeals noted, the circuit court erred by treating the prosecutor's appeal as a "motion" and "denying" the "motion" without issuing an oral or written opinion. MCR 7.103(A)(1) (providing a circuit court jurisdiction over an appeal of a final judgment of a district court); MCR 7.114(B) (requiring a circuit court to decide such an appeal "by oral or written opinion and issue an order"). However, because the prosecutor does not seek any relief for this error, the issue must be deemed abandoned. People v. Bean , 457 Mich. 677, 685 n. 13, 580 N.W.2d 390 (1998), citing Mitcham v. Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). Yaner , 34 Mich. at 289 ("We do not desire to be understood that the magistrate must nicely weigh evidence as a petit jury would, or that he must discharge the accused where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt; all such questions should be left for the jury upon the trial."); People v. Medley , 339 Mich. 486, 492, 64 N.W.2d 708 (1954) ("The object of the examination is not to determine guilt or innocence, and it is not as necessary to make strict proof as on the trial. The magistrate ... is not required to nicely weigh the evidence as a petit jury, or to discharge the accused where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as all such questions should be left to the jury upon the trial. It is not necessary to establish the respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before the examining magistrate, but only to offer proof that an offense ... has been committed, and there is probable cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof."). In addition, where a magistrate declines to bind over a defendant for trial, the prosecutor may simply recharge the defendant and provide additional evidence at a subsequent preliminary examination. See MCR 6.110(F). By contrast, when a judge grants a motion for a new trial, the prosecutor must retry the defendant. Conducting two jury trials requires the expenditure of significantly more time and resources than conducting two preliminary examinations. These widely disparate consequences arguably justify providing a magistrate with greater authority to examine credibility during a preliminary examination than a judge has in entertaining a motion for a new trial.

Per Curiam. In this dog-bite case, plaintiffs, Carolyn Kelsey and David Kelsey, appeal as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendant, Nita Lint, and denying plaintiffs' motion for sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Because the trial court erred by concluding that Kelsey was a trespasser as a matter of law and dismissing plaintiffs' dog-bite claims on this basis, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition to Lint and remand for further proceedings. In addition, because the trial court failed to determine whether Lint's attorney conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts that formed the basis for the documents he signed under MCR 2.114(D), we vacate the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' request for sanctions and remand for specific findings on this issue. On August 31, 2013, Kelsey was bitten by Lint's dog while on Lint's property. Kelsey had attended a garage sale at Lint's house on August 30, 2013. She returned to Lint's property about 5:00 p.m. on August 31, 2013, after the sale had ended, to inquire about an item that had been for sale the previous day. When Kelsey exited her vehicle, Lint's dog ran at Kelsey from the back of the house and bit Kelsey's leg. Following this incident, plaintiffs filed the current lawsuit alleging (1) a statutory dog-bite claim under MCL 287.351, (2) a common-law dog-bite claim premised on the assertion that Lint knew of the dog's violent propensities and acted negligently by failing to properly control the dog, and (3) a claim for loss of consortium. Lint moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), asserting that plaintiffs' dog-bite claims must fail because, when Kelsey returned to the property after the yard sale ended, she was a trespasser on Lint's property. Lint contended that, as a trespasser, Kelsey was not lawfully on the property for purposes of MCL 287.351. Likewise, for purposes of Kelsey's common-law dog-bite claim, Lint maintained that her only obligation to a trespasser was to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct and that her ownership of a dog with no history of biting did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct. Plaintiffs opposed Lint's motion for summary disposition, arguing that Kelsey was a licensee because, like the general public, Kelsey had an implied license to enter Lint's property and approach the house to knock on the front door. In opposing Lint's motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs also sought sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Plaintiffs presented a recorded statement in which Lint admitted that her dog had previously bitten a mailman. On the basis of this statement, plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) because Lint or Lint's attorney signed documents that were not well grounded in fact insofar as the documents indicated that Lint had no knowledge of her dog biting anyone before Kelsey. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary disposition to Lint. The trial court reasoned that Kelsey was an invitee when she attended Lint's garage sale, but the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned to Lint's property after the sale. In light of the trial court's conclusion that Kelsey was a trespasser, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' statutory and common-law dog-bite claims. The trial court also denied plaintiffs' request for sanctions under MCR 2.114(E). Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right. I. KELSEY'S STATUS ON LINT'S PROPERTY On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their statutory and common-law dog-bite claims on the basis that Kelsey was trespassing. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that everyone, including Kelsey, has an implied license to enter property and knock on the front door. According to plaintiffs, in the absence of a fence or "no trespassing" signs, Lint acquiesced in the general public's customary use of property. While there was a "no soliciting" sign on Lint's door, plaintiffs maintain that this does not render Kelsey a trespasser because she was not soliciting and, in any event, the dog attacked Kelsey before she had an opportunity to observe the sign. With regard to the garage sale, plaintiffs argue that the sale did not alter the general implied license that exists to enter property. Plaintiffs contend that, if anything, Lint's practices showed that she had acquiesced in allowing people to return to her property after a garage sale to take a second look at items. In these circumstances, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Kelsey was a trespasser. "This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo." Barnes v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 308 Mich. App. 1, 5, 862 N.W.2d 681 (2014). Lint moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). However, the parties and the trial court relied on evidence outside the pleadings, meaning that Lint's motion is properly reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Sisk-Rathburn v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 279 Mich. App. 425, 427, 760 N.W.2d 878 (2008). "When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, this Court considers all the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and grants summary disposition only where the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). Plaintiffs brought both a statutory dog-bite claim and a common-law, negligence-based dog-bite claim. We begin with plaintiffs' statutory claim. The dog-bite statute is MCL 287.351(1), which states: If a dog bites a person, without provocation while the person is on public property, or lawfully on private property, including the property of the owner of the dog, the owner of the dog shall be liable for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. The statute imposes " 'almost absolute liability' " on the dog owner, except when the dog bites after being provoked. Koivisto v. Davis , 277 Mich. App. 492, 496, 745 N.W.2d 824 (2008) (citation omitted). However, to succeed on a claim under MCL 287.351(1), the plaintiff must be on public property or "lawfully on private property." See Cox v. Hayes , 34 Mich. App. 527, 531, 192 N.W.2d 68 (1971). A person is lawfully on the private property of the owner of the dog within the meaning of this act if the person is on the owner's property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him or her by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States, or if the person is on the owner's property as an invitee or licensee of the person lawfully in possession of the property unless said person has gained lawful entry upon the premises for the purpose of an unlawful or criminal act. [ MCL 287.351(2) (emphasis added).] Licensees and invitees-in addition to trespassers-are common-law categories for persons who enter upon the land of another. Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship , 462 Mich. 591, 596, 614 N.W.2d 88 (2000). Under MCL 287.351(2), invitees and licensees are "lawfully" on the property, but a trespasser cannot maintain a statutory dog-bite claim. See Alvin v. Simpson , 195 Mich. App. 418, 421, 491 N.W.2d 604 (1992). In this case, the parties focus their arguments on whether Kelsey was a licensee or a trespasser when she returned to Lint's property. "A 'trespasser' is a person who enters upon another's land, without the landowner's consent." Stitt , 462 Mich. at 596, 614 N.W.2d 88. In comparison, "[a] 'licensee' is a person who is privileged to enter the land of another by virtue of the possessor's consent." Id. Consent to enter may be either express or implied. Pippin v. Atallah , 245 Mich. App. 136, 142, 626 N.W.2d 911 (2001). "Permission may be implied where the owner acquiesces in the known, customary use of property by the public." Alvin , 195 Mich. App. at 420, 491 N.W.2d 604. Plaintiffs maintain that Kelsey had an implied license to enter Lint's property. In considering whether Kelsey had implied consent to enter Lint's property, we begin with the proposition that in the United States, and in Michigan in particular, given the established habits in this country, there is an implied license that permits ordinary persons to enter property, approach a home, and knock. See Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ; Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ; People v. Frederick , 500 Mich. 228, 234-235, 895 N.W.2d 541 (2017). More fully, the United States Supreme Court has explained this implied license as follows: "A license may be implied from the habits of the country," notwithstanding the "strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close." McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136[, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167] (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, [71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233] (1951). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no more than any private citizen might do." [ Jardines , 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409.] Relying on the Court's decision in Jardines , the Michigan Supreme Court has similarly recognized "an implied license to approach a house and knock." Frederick , 500 Mich. at 238, 895 N.W.2d 541. The scope of this implied license is "defined by what anyone may do" based on "custom" and the " 'background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door.' " Id. at 238-239, 895 N.W.2d 541 (citation omitted). Quite simply, as a general proposition, the established customs in Michigan grant anyone, including Kelsey, an implied license to approach a house and knock on the front door. Turning to the more specific facts of this case, reasonable minds could conclude that Lint acquiesced in the known, customary use of residential property by the public that involves approaching houses and knocking on the front door to make contact with the occupants. For instance, Lint's property did not have a fence that prevented entry. The record also indicates that when approaching Lint's house from the street, there were no signs prohibiting entry or stating "no trespassing." Instead, an individual approaching Lint's home found an open, ungated driveway devoid of signs prohibiting entry. Cf. People v. Taormina , 130 Mich. App. 73, 80, 343 N.W.2d 236 (1983) ; Smith v. VonCannon , 283 N.C. 656, 662, 197 S.E.2d 524 (1973). From these circumstances, it could be inferred that Kelsey had an implied license, consistent with the accepted habits in Michigan, to enter the property and to approach Lint's front door. In contrast to this conclusion, in terms of evidence suggesting that Kelsey should not have been on the property, it appears that there was a small "no soliciting" sign posted on a door leading to a portion of Lint's garage where she had previously operated a beauty parlor. Posting a notice may serve to prevent the creation of an implied license. See Restatement Torts, 2d, § 330, comment e, pp. 173-174. However, whether signs posted on property revoke the public's implied license to approach the house and knock depends on the context in which a member of the public would have encountered the signs and the message that those signs would have conveyed to an objective member of the public under the circumstances. United States v. Carloss , 818 F.3d 988, 994 (C.A. 10 2016) (quotation marks omitted). See also Restatement, § 330, comment e, p 173 (1965) ("[T]he decisive factor is the interpretation which a reasonable man would put upon the possessor's act."). Viewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to Kelsey, it could be concluded that the location of the "no soliciting" sign was such that someone would have to drive down Lint's driveway to her house and approach the door before realizing that soliciting was not allowed. Further, "no soliciting" is not synonymous with "no trespassing" or "do not enter" and therefore reasonable minds could conclude that a small "no soliciting" sign on a door to the garage would not prevent Kelsey from driving up Lint's driveway and exiting her vehicle. Cf. Pippin , 245 Mich. App. at 142, 626 N.W.2d 911 (stating that a sign "forbidding people to park their vehicles in a particular place does not necessarily convey the message that they may not walk or ride through that same place"). According to Kelsey's description of events, she was attacked by Lint's dog within seconds of exiting her vehicle and did not have a chance to approach Lint's door on which the sign was posted. In these circumstances, even if Kelsey's proposed inquiry could be considered "soliciting," given Kelsey's assertion that she was bitten as soon as she exited her vehicle, before she approached Lint's door or had a chance to speak with Lint, reasonable minds could conclude that she was still within the scope of the public's implied license when she exited her vehicle and was attacked by Lint's dog. The only other fact presented by the parties as bearing on Kelsey's status is the garage sale held by Lint on the weekend of Kelsey's visit. Lint argues, and the trial court concluded, that because the sale had ended, Kelsey was a trespasser when she returned. However, this reasoning ignores the public's implied license to enter the property and approach the door. That is, as noted by the trial court, when inviting the general public to her property for a sale, it could be concluded that Lint welcomed those individuals as invitees and, when the sale ended, it could be concluded that Kelsey lost her invitee status. But the end of a garage sale-and the loss of invitee status-did not eliminate the implied license that normally exists. In other words, while heightened invitee status may have existed during the sale, the end of the sale returned things to their normal state, which typically includes an implied license for anyone to enter the property and knock on the door. See Jardines , 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409 ; Frederick , 500 Mich. at 234-235, 238-239, 895 N.W.2d 541. Overall, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Kelsey, while Kelsey did not have Lint's express permission to return to the property, it could be inferred that Kelsey had an implied license to enter the property and to approach Lint's house. Generally, when considering an entrant's status on the land, "if there is evidence from which one could infer a particular person's status on land, then the question is one for the jury." Pippin , 245 Mich. App. at 141, 626 N.W.2d 911. Consequently, because reasonable minds could conclude that Kelsey was a licensee, the trial court erred by determining that she was a trespasser as a matter of law and by concluding that Kelsey was not lawfully on the property within the meaning of MCL 287.351. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition to Lint on plaintiffs' statutory dog-bite claim under MCL 287.351. With regard to plaintiffs' common-law dog-bite claim, plaintiffs' common-law theory is premised on negligence. "[A] negligence cause of action arises when there is ineffective control of an animal in a situation where it would reasonably be expected that injury could occur, and injury does proximately result from the negligence. The amount of control required is that which would be exercised by a reasonable person based upon the total situation at the time, including the past behavior of the animal and the injuries that could have been reasonably foreseen." [ Trager v. Thor , 445 Mich. 95, 106, 516 N.W.2d 69 (1994) (citation omitted).] "To make a prima facie showing of negligence, a plaintiff need only establish that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to control or restrain the animal." Hiner v. Mojica , 271 Mich. App. 604, 613, 722 N.W.2d 914 (2006). In this case, the trial court determined that Kelsey was a trespasser, such that Lint's duty to Kelsey with regard to the dog only required her to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct. See Stitt , 462 Mich. at 596, 614 N.W.2d 88 ("The landowner owes no duty to the trespasser except to refrain from injuring him by 'wilful and wanton' misconduct."). On the basis of this conclusion, the trial court also reasoned that Kelsey could not show a breach of this duty because keeping a dog on one's property did not constitute a willful and wanton act. However, as discussed, the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Kelsey was trespassing when she was bitten by Lint's dog. Accordingly, the trial court erred by applying the willful-and-wanton standard of care and by dismissing plaintiffs' common-law claim on this basis. Therefore, we also reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition to Lint on plaintiffs' common-law dog-bite claim. II. SANCTIONS UNDER MCR 2.114(E) In the trial court, plaintiffs requested sanctions under MCR 2.114(E), asserting that Lint or her attorney signed documents-including pleadings, Lint's summary disposition motion, and requests for admissions-that were not well grounded in fact. Plaintiffs also sought an evidentiary hearing on this issue to determine whether Lint's conduct, and that of her attorney, was reasonable in light of Lint's recorded statement in which she admitted that her dog had previously bitten a mailman. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying their request for sanctions and by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's decision regarding whether to impose sanctions under MCR 2.114. Guerrero v. Smith , 280 Mich. App. 647, 677, 761 N.W.2d 723 (2008). "A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. Under MCR 2.114(D), the effect of signing a document is as follows: The signature of an attorney or party, whether or not the party is represented by an attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer that (1) he or she has read the document; (2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Under this rule, "an attorney is under an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into both the factual and legal basis of a document before it is signed." Guerrero , 280 Mich. App. at 677, 761 N.W.2d 723. "The reasonableness of the inquiry is determined by an objective standard and depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case." LaRose Market, Inc. v. Sylvan Ctr., Inc. , 209 Mich. App. 201, 210, 530 N.W.2d 505 (1995). "The filing of a signed document that is not well grounded in fact and law subjects the filer to sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114(E)." Guerrero , 280 Mich. App. at 678, 761 N.W.2d 723. Specifically, MCR 2.114(E) provides: Sanctions for Violation. If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including reasonable attorney fees. The court may not assess punitive damages. "[I]f a violation of MCR 2.114(D) has occurred, the sanctions provided for by MCR 2.114(E) are mandatory." Guerrero , 280 Mich. App. at 678, 761 N.W.2d 723. In this case, in documents signed by Lint's attorney, including her motion for summary disposition and requests for admissions, Lint repeatedly denied knowing that her dog had bitten anyone other than Kelsey or that the dog was aggressive. However, in February 2014, Lint gave a recorded statement while speaking with a representative from her insurance agency. In this statement, she admitted that her dog had previously bitten a mailman, that the dog was "protective" of her, and that the dog had "shown aggression" toward people. This recording was referred to during Lint's deposition in June 2016, at which time Lint acknowledged that she had given a recorded statement, and Lint's attorney said that he would "look into whether or not there was actually a recorded statement taken or not." Yet according to statements by Lint's counsel in the trial court, he did not obtain the recording until two or three weeks before the summary disposition hearing, which was held in November 2016. Apparently without obtaining this recording or listening to its contents, Lint's counsel moved for summary disposition and signed other documents, asserting that there was no indication that Lint's dog was dangerous and that Lint had not kept a dog that was known to bite people. There is no indication that defense counsel attempted to correct these representations after obtaining Lint's recorded statement. While Lint gave obviously inconsistent statements, the question for purposes of MCR 2.114(E) is whether, as the person signing the motion for summary disposition and other documents under MCR 2.114(D), Lint's attorney made a reasonable inquiry into both the factual and legal basis of the documents before they were signed. Guerrero , 280 Mich. App. at 677, 761 N.W.2d 723. Whether counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry should be determined by the trial court and reviewed by this Court for clear error. Id. However, in this case, the trial court failed to consider this question and made no findings regarding whether Lint's attorney made a reasonable inquiry. Instead, the trial court remarked that, in general, Lint's attorney was a "gentlemen" and that his "integrity" was not in question. But, an attorney's general character is not at issue under MCR 2.114(D) and (E). Rather, the question is whether, based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case, see LaRose Mkt., Inc. , 209 Mich. App. at 210, 530 N.W.2d 505, Lint's attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting the motion for summary disposition and other documents before signing those documents. On the facts of this case, given that the issue was raised below and that the trial court failed to decide whether defense counsel conducted a reasonable inquiry within the meaning of MCR 2.114(D), we vacate the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and remand to the trial court to make specific findings regarding this issue. See In re Forfeiture of Cash & Gambling Paraphernalia , 203 Mich. App. 69, 72-73, 512 N.W.2d 49 (1993). If defense counsel violated MCR 2.114(D), sanctions under MCR 2.114(E) are mandatory. Guerrero , 280 Mich. App. at 678, 761 N.W.2d 723. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. Having prevailed in full, plaintiffs may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. Markey, P.J., and Hoekstra and Ronayne Krause, JJ., concurred. Plaintiffs Carolyn Kelsey and David Kelsey will be referred to collectively as "plaintiffs" in this opinion. References to "Kelsey" are to plaintiff Carolyn Kelsey in particular. Lint attempts to distinguish Jardines and Frederick by emphasizing that they are police "knock and talk" cases. However, while decided in the context of the Fourth Amendment, these cases "employed a property-rights framework" to determine what actions the police could lawfully take. See Frederick , 500 Mich. at 235, 895 N.W.2d 541. In other words, the ability to approach a house and knock on a door is not unique to the police; rather, it is the well-established principle that anyone may approach a house and knock on the door that leads to the conclusion that the police also have an implied license to engage in that activity. Id. at 238-239, 895 N.W.2d 541. In contrast to this basic proposition, Lint relies on three cases: Ramonas v. Grand Rapids R. Co. , 194 Mich. 69; 160 N.W. 382 (1916) ; Alvin , 195 Mich. App. 418, 491 N.W.2d 604 ; and Tieman v. Grinsteiner , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 27, 2011 (Docket No. 300265). Contrary to Lint's arguments, these cases do not compel the conclusion that Kelsey was a trespasser. First, Ramonas is easily distinguished because it involves a situation in which the plaintiff rode a train at an amusement park when the train was not being operated for public use. Ramonas , 194 Mich. at 73, 160 N.W. 382. While it is customary for the general public to approach a residential front door (and thus there is an implied license to do so), there is no implied license for the public to ride a train at an amusement park when the train is not open for business. Similarly, Alvin involved a situation in which the plaintiff acted outside accepted customs. In Alvin 195 Mich.App. at 419, the plaintiff-a child trying to retrieve a ball-climbed over a fence into an enclosed back yard, and the plaintiff admitted that he was trespassing when he did so. Again, while it is customary to approach front doors and knock, it is not customary to climb over fences and enter someone's backyard. Finally, Tieman v. is nonbinding, MCR 7.215(C)(1), and unpersuasive because this Court did not consider authority supporting the proposition that the public has an implied license to enter property, approach the front door, and knock. See Jardines , 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S.Ct. 1409 ; Frederick , 500 Mich. at 234-235, 238-239, 895 N.W.2d 541. See also State v. Crowley , 232 So.3d 473, 476 (Fla.App.2017) ; (" 'No Soliciting' signs can be found in places where visitors are plainly welcome and expected, including supermarkets, malls, neighborhoods, hospitals, and stadiums."); Furman v. Call , 234 Va. 437, 441, 362 S.E.2d 709 (1987) ("The only signs read: 'Private Property, No Soliciting.' Clearly, the purpose of the signs is to prohibit soliciting, not the entry of motor vehicles operated by members of the public."). "An 'invitee' is a person who enters upon the land of another upon an invitation which carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make [it] safe for [the invitee's] reception." Stitt , 462 Mich. at 596-597, 614 N.W.2d 88 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in Stitt ). While Kelsey may have been an invitee on Friday when attending Lint's garage sale, Kelsey does not contend on appeal that she was an invitee on Saturday when she returned after the sale. Additionally, on the more specific facts of this case, the trial court's conclusion that the end of the garage sale rendered Lint a trespasser ignores evidence that Lint had acquiesced to a practice by which Kelsey, and others, returned to Lint's property after a garage sale for a second look at items that had been available during the garage sale. Kelsey testified that on a previous occasion she had returned to Lint's property for a second look at an item after a sale. And Lint confirmed that it was not uncommon for people to return to her property in the day or two following a garage sale. She stated that she preferred for people to call first but conceded that they did not always do so. Faced with this practice, Lint made no effort-such as posting signs-to prevent people from returning. Therefore, notwithstanding her "no soliciting" sign and the end of the garage sale, it reasonably could be concluded that Lint had acquiesced in a practice of allowing people to return to her property following a garage sale to take a second look at items. Having concluded that Kelsey's status is an issue for the jury, Pippin , 245 Mich. App. at 141, 626 N.W.2d 911, we reject plaintiffs' assertion that they were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). Veterinarian records for Lint's dog also indicate that the dog was "very aggressive with people coming to the home." On appeal, Lint does not deny that her dog bit a mailman. Instead, she contends that sanctions are not appropriate because she has a "bad memory." No finding has been made that Lint has a "bad memory." In any event, considering her attorney's conduct before signing documents under MCR 2.114(D), the fact that Lint has a "bad memory" could be seen to suggest that counsel's inquiry was inadequate. In other words, in light of Lint's "bad memory," a reasonable inquiry might include obtaining and listening to a statement made by Lint relatively close in time to the dog-bite incident.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 22, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the November 22, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals reversing the Wayne Circuit Court's June 22, 2017 order, and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 27, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's December 27, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 16, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 7, 2017 orders of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to remand is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 22, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 3, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 17, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 11, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 11, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the motion for miscellaneous relief is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the June 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.