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On order of the Court, the motion to file pro per supplement, motion to file pro per motions, and motion for immediate consideration are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for appeal bond is DENIED.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing his supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before July 13, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for an appeal to be filed, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order . By doing this, appellant becomes responsible to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

Ronayne Krause, J. Defendant appeals by right the trial court's order denying his motion for reconsideration, rehearing, and relief from judgment; substantively, he appeals the parties' judgment of divorce, which was entered pursuant to a memorandum signed by the parties following a mediation meeting. The memorandum outlined and resolved all the disputes for the divorce, and it was adopted by the trial court. We affirm. We note initially that defendant complains that plaintiff allegedly failed to disclose an interest in certain real estate during the mediation meeting. However, it appears that the trial court addressed that issue, and in any event, defendant makes no argument pertaining to it and no request for relief for it. We deem it to be a "red herring" that is not properly before this Court or relevant to the issue before us, and even if defendant had made a relevant request for relief, his failure to present any argument on point would have waived any basis for such relief. See Mitcham v. City of Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). The parties married in 2015 and had one minor child together. The marriage did not last long, and plaintiff filed for divorce approximately five months later. In a motion for custody, parenting time, and child support, plaintiff expressed a number of concerns, including an alleged lack of caretaking interest or ability by defendant, an alleged abuse of drugs and alcohol by defendant, and a variety of violent threats or outbursts by defendant. Plaintiff sought full physical custody of the parties' child with some weekly supervised parenting time for defendant; defendant denied the allegations and sought joint legal and physical custody. The trial court entered a temporary order granting joint legal custody, granting plaintiff sole physical custody, granting defendant parenting time 3 times a week, and ordering defendant to pay $700 a month in child support. Following the temporary order, the parties participated in facilitated mediation. Both parties had retained counsel. The parties reached an agreement on all issues in the divorce. Among other agreements, defendant's child support was reduced to $300 a month, his parenting time was extended, and the parties agreed to review parenting time and custody when the child reached certain ages. The memorandum signed by the parties reflecting their agreement concluded with the following provision: This memorandum of understanding spells out the agreement that we have reached in mediation. This resolves all disputes between the parties and the parties agree to be bound by this agreement. The memorandum also seemed to resolve disputes over personal property, and it enumerated the parties' specified real estate. As noted, defendant contends that plaintiff did not fully disclose her interest in certain real estate, but that issue has either been addressed by the trial court or waived, and it is not before us. The parties held a settlement conference before the trial court. Plaintiff subsequently moved for entry of judgment, while defendant moved to set aside the settlement memorandum. The trial court held a hearing on the parties' respective motions and entered the judgment of divorce. The trial court observed that defendant had signed the memorandum in the presence of counsel and that defendant's signature was expected to "mean something." The trial court also asked that this Court provide express guidance regarding "whether or not the parties have the right to make decisions for their own children." We do so, and we agree with the trial court's assessment of the situation. Unlike virtually all other civil litigation between competent individuals, a divorce, even when settled, requires a hearing in the circuit court and the taking of proofs before a judgment can be entered. MCR 3.210(B)(2). As we pointed out in Koron v. Melendy , 207 Mich.App. 188, 191, 523 N.W.2d 870 (1994), this requirement allows for an exercise of judicial discretion. In contemplation of this judicial activity, when the terms of the parties' agreement are placed on the record there must at least be an admission, i.e., acknowledgment, by the parties that the agreement contains the terms of the settlement and the parties' signatures. This acknowledgment of the settlement's terms and the parties' signatures allows the court to exercise the anticipated discretion in an informed manner. [ Wyskowski v. Wyskowski , 211 Mich.App. 699, 702, 536 N.W.2d 603 (1995).] "A trial court commits clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law." Fletcher v. Fletcher , 229 Mich.App. 19, 24, 581 N.W.2d 11 (1998). "The finding of the trial court concerning the validity of the parties' consent to a settlement agreement will not be overturned absent a finding of an abuse of discretion." Vittiglio v. Vittiglio , 297 Mich.App. 391, 397, 824 N.W.2d 591 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes." Edry v. Adelman , 486 Mich. 634, 639, 786 N.W.2d 567 (2010). "This Court will defer to the trial court's credibility determinations, and the trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors." Berger v. Berger , 277 Mich.App. 700, 705, 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008). In this case, the parties came to an agreement, which was embodied in the memorandum. Notwithstanding his protestations that he felt pressured, defendant does not seriously dispute that the memorandum reflected the agreement and bore his signature. Even if he attempted to seriously engage in that dispute, the trial court clearly found that defendant had in fact agreed to the memorandum, which, given the deference given to the trial court's findings, would be conclusive at this stage. Instead, it appears that defendant simply regretted making the agreement. He now attempts to raise essentially procedural challenges, in particular noting that the memorandum was not read into the record in open court and that it was not signed by the parties' mediator or attorneys. In support, defendant likens the agreement to a mediation settlement, for which MCR 3.216(H)(7) and MCR 2.507(G) require certain procedures to be followed during mediation. However, there was a hearing held, and the agreement was scrutinized before it was entered into the proposed judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement that was valid. This Court has ruled that "in cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best interest factors. Implicit in the court's acceptance of the parties' agreement is its determination that the arrangement is in the child's best interest." Koron , 207 Mich.App. at 192-193, 523 N.W.2d 870. "Implicit in the trial court's acceptance of the parties' custody and visitation arrangement is the court's determination that the arrangement struck by the parties is in the child's best interest." Id . at 191, 523 N.W.2d 870. Although the trial court is not necessarily constrained to accept the parties' stipulations or agreements verbatim, the trial court is entirely permitted to accept them and presume at face value that the parties actually meant what they signed. See id. There is no coherent reason presented why the trial court could not do so in this case. Defendant cites Rivette v. Rose-Molina , 278 Mich. App. 327, 332-333, 750 N.W.2d 603 (2008), and Harvey v. Harvey , 470 Mich. 186, 187-188, 680 N.W.2d 835 (2004), to support his argument that the trial court was required to make an independent factual determination of the statutory best-interest factors even in the face of a mediated agreement between the parents. Neither case is applicable because in both the issue was the extent to which a trial court may "rubber stamp" a decision made by a referee to resolve a dispute between parents who could not agree. In other words, those cases involved the exact opposite of an agreement reached by the parties. In fact, our Supreme Court explicitly held that its "holding should not be interpreted, where the parties have agreed to a custody arrangement, to require the court to conduct a hearing or otherwise engage in intensive fact-finding." Harvey , 470 Mich. at 192, 680 N.W.2d 835. Defendant is correct in stating that the court remains obligated to come to an independent conclusion that the parties' agreement is in the child's best interests, but again, the court is absolutely permitted to accept that agreement when the dispute was resolved by the parents instead of a stranger. See Koron , 207 Mich.App. at 191-192, 523 N.W.2d 870. We note that it is inherently an abuse of discretion if a trial court fails to exercise discretion on the incorrect belief that no discretion exists to exercise. People v. Merritt , 396 Mich. 67, 80, 238 N.W.2d 31 (1976). However, the trial court did not indicate a belief that it was bound by the parties' agreement. Rather, the trial court correctly expressed the belief that it was empowered to accept it. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court was required to make a finding regarding the minor child's established custodial environment, so as to determine if the entry of judgment would change that environment. "The established custodial environment is the environment in which 'over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.' " Pierron v. Pierron , 486 Mich. 81, 85-86, 782 N.W.2d 480 (2010), quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c). Defendant's argument is nonsensical in the context of an agreement between the parties. As defendant himself points out, the purpose of making a determination of an established custodial environment is to determine whether the trial court may award custody "simply by determining the child's best interests" or whether the trial court must more stringently find by clear and convincing evidence that changing any established custodial environment is in the child's best interest. Baker v. Baker , 411 Mich. 567, 577-579, 309 N.W.2d 532 (1981). Critically, the context is one in which the trial court is making a custody determination for the parties . The requirement of making an express determination of whether there is an established custodial environment is as inapposite to effectuating an agreement reached by the parties as is the requirement of conducting intensive fact-finding. The agreement between the two parties was signed by both parties and therefore valid. The trial court concluded that the agreement appeared to be in the best interests of the child and included that finding in the court's order. In context, the trial court was not required to make a finding of an established custodial environment, although of note, defendant actually received increased parenting time from the prior arrangement as well as reduced support payments. The evidence shows that there was no clear legal error or abuse of discretion falling outside of the range of principled outcomes. Defendant was aware of the provisions in the agreement that settled the disputes over parenting time and custody, as shown by his signature. The trial court did not err by entering the order effectuating the parties' agreement, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant defendant's motion for reconsideration, rehearing, and relief from judgment. Affirmed. MARKEY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA, J., concurred with RONAYNE KRAUSE, J.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 8, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Bernstein, J., would grant leave to appeal.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 14, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 9, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 18, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion to remand is DENIED. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 29, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's November 16, 2017 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

By order of February 20, 2018, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the January 4, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered, and it is DENIED as moot. Because the defendant did not file a motion for relief from judgment, the Wayne Circuit Court order that the defendant seeks leave to appeal has now been set aside in the June 29, 2017 order of that court, and the defendant has already received the hearing on remand that this Court ordered on March 8, 2016. The motion to amend the application for leave to appeal is DENIED, without prejudice to the defendant pursuing appellate relief from the Wayne Circuit Court order of December 21, 2016.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Ordinarily, MCL 600.2963(8) would preclude appellant from seeking leave to appeal in this Court because of the outstanding fees he owes in other civil case filings. However, applying that statutory section to bar review of appellant's complaint for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v. Bennett , 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1961). Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for an appeal to be filed, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order . By doing this, appellant becomes responsible to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to file an in pro per supplement to application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The supplement submitted on March 8, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 20, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for the appointment of new appellate counsel to represent the defendant as on direct appellate review. See Halbert v. Michigan , 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005). The record reflects that defendant's appellate counsel did not file an application for leave to appeal, seek any other relief on the defendant's behalf, or move to withdraw based on the attorney's determination, after a thorough review of the trial record, that the appeal was wholly frivolous. Thus, through no fault of the defendant, he lost the right to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals on direct review. On remand, new appellate counsel, once appointed, may file an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals for consideration under the standard for direct appeals, and/or any appropriate postconviction motions in the circuit court, within six months of the date of the circuit court's order appointing counsel. Costs are imposed against the attorney, Tracie Gittleman, in the amount of $500, to be paid to the Clerk of this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant file a pro per supplement to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The pro per supplement filed on March 26, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant file a pro per supplement to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The pro per supplement filed on March 21, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to extend the time for filing their answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before May 3, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to extend the time for filing her answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before May 2, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the numerous Boards of County Road Commissioners to participate in these proceedings as an amicus curiae and to file an amicus brief in support of the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on March 28, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellant to stay proceedings is DENIED as moot.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 6, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan to file a brief amicus curiae and to extend the time for filing the brief is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on March 22, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration and motion to amend application are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the October 30, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to remand is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 15, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 27, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). We further ORDER the Jackson Circuit Court, in accordance with Administrative Order 2003-03, to determine whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint attorney Michael A. Faraone, if feasible, to represent the defendant in this Court. If this appointment is not feasible, the trial court shall, within the same time frame, appoint other counsel to represent the defendant in this Court. The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of the order appointing counsel addressing: (1) whether Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), should control the resolution of the question whether the police officer had lawful consent to search the backpack found in the vehicle; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver's consent to justify the search; and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified or the evidence may be deemed admissible. In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 6, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Bernstein, J., would grant leave to appeal. Viviano, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with the presiding circuit court judge in this case.

On order of the Chief Justice, the second motion of defendant-appellee to extend the time for filing her answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before March 20, 2018.

On order of the Court, the motion of the Michigan State Medical Society to participate as amicus curiae and file an amicus brief in support of the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on February 16, 2018 is accepted for filing. The motion for reconsideration of this Court's January 12, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 4, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the order of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to that court for further consideration in light of this Court's November 16, 2017 order in Marik v. Marik , 501 Mich. 918 -919, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017). On remand, we DIRECT the Court of Appeals to issue an opinion specifically addressing the issue whether the order in question may affect the custody of a minor within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii), or otherwise be appealable by right under MCR 7.203(A). If the Court of Appeals determines that the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division's order is appealable by right, it shall take jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant's claim of appeal and address its merits. If the Court of Appeals determines that the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division's order is not appealable by right, it may then dismiss the defendant-appellant's claim of appeal for lack of jurisdiction, or exercise its discretion to treat the claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal and grant the application. See Varran v. Granneman (On Remand) , 312 Mich.App. 591, 880 N.W.2d 242 (2015), and Wardell v. Hincka , 297 Mich.App. 127, 133 n. 1, 822 N.W.2d 278 (2012). We direct the Court of Appeals' attention to the fact that we have also remanded the related case of Royce v. Laporte (Docket No. 156131) to the Court of Appeals and that Marik v. Marik (Docket No. 155833), and Madson v. Jaso (After Remand) (Docket No. 154529), have also been remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. We further note that this Court has opened an administrative file, ADM File No. 2017-20, to consider amending MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of James Dayson to file a brief amicus curiae brief is DENIED without prejudice to Mr. Dayson submitting a proposed brief amicus curiae within 21 days of the date of this order, along with a new motion asking the Court to accept the brief.

By order of November 22, 2017, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether MCL 769.34(10) has been rendered invalid by this Court's decision in People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), to the extent that the statute requires the Court of Appeals to affirm sentences that fall within the applicable guidelines range "absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant's sentence." See People v. Schrauben , 314 Mich.App. 181, 196, 886 N.W.2d 173 (2016). In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers.

On order of the Court, motion to add issue is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the February 2, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 15, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of People v. Ames (Docket No. 156077) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to file an application for leave to appeal in excess of the 50 page limitation is GRANTED. The application submitted on March 9, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the February 7, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the request for a stay is GRANTED as to enforcement of the Washtenaw Circuit Court's November 29, 2017 Order Regarding Adoption of FOC Recommendation that expands the defendant's parenting time with the minor child. On motion of a party or on its own motion, the Court of Appeals may modify, set aside, or place conditions on the stay if it appears that the appeal is not being vigorously prosecuted or if other appropriate grounds appear.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 10, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the separate motions of (1) Life Skills Center of Pontiac, Inc., and edtec central, LLC, (2) Michigan Education Association and Michigan Parent Teacher Association, (3) Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and (4) City of Ann Arbor to file briefs amicus curiae are GRANTED. The amicus briefs submitted by those entities are accepted for filing. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion to allow out-of-state attorney Paul B. Carberry to temporarily appear and practice is GRANTED.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for an appeal to be filed, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order . By doing this, appellant becomes responsible to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

By order of February 3, 2017, the application for leave to appeal the August 25, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in Ozimek v. Rodgers (Docket No. 154776) and Marik v. Marik (Docket No. 154549). On order of the Court, the orders having entered on November 16, 2017, 501 Mich. 918-919, 919, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017), the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that court: (1) for a determination of whether the question presented is now moot, and (2) if not moot, for reconsideration-in light of this Court's order in Marik v. Marik , 501 Mich. 918-919, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017) (overruling Ozimek v. Rodgers (On Remand), 317 Mich. App. 69, 893 N.W.2d 125 (2016) )-of the question whether the February 2, 2016 order of the Lenawee Circuit Court that directed that the plaintiff would have parenting time every other weekend "affect[ed] the custody of a minor" within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). We further note that this Court has opened an administrative file, ADM File No. 2017-20, to consider amending MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. The filing fees include a $375.00 entry fee and a $25.00 fee for commencing an original action, MCL 600.1986, for a total of $400.00. Within 21 days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $28.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the complaint not being filed in this Court. If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to plaintiff's account until the payments equal the balance due of $372.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and return a copy of plaintiff's pleadings with this order.

On January 11, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the October 13, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Markman, C.J. (concurring). I concur in this Court's order denying leave to appeal because petitioner has failed adequately to brief the specific issue raised by this Court in its order for supplemental briefing, which was "whether Ladies Literary Club v. Grand Rapids , 409 Mich. 748, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980), and David Walcott Kendall Memorial School v. Grand Rapids , 11 Mich.App. 231, 160 N.W.2d 778 (1968), continue to provide the appropriate test of what constitutes a 'nonprofit ... educational ... institution[ ]' under MCL 211.7n." Harmony Montessori Center v. Oak Park , 500 Mich. 1016, 895 N.W.2d 928 (2017) (alterations in original). I write separately because I believe that this Court's current interpretation of what constitutes an "educational institution" under MCL 211.7n is a "strained construction that is contrary to the Legislature's intent." SBC Health Midwest, Inc. v. Kentwood , 500 Mich. 65, 71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In a future case, this Court should consider adopting a definition of "educational institution" that is more consistent with the plain meaning of that phrase. The General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. , provides that "all property, real and personal, within the jurisdiction of this state, not expressly exempted, shall be subject to taxation." MCL 211.1. Section 7 of the GPTA provides property tax exemptions for properties put to particular uses. As relevant here, MCL 211.7n provides: Real estate or personal property owned and occupied by nonprofit theater, library, educational , or scientific institutions incorporated under the laws of this state with the buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which the institutions were incorporated is exempt from taxation under this act. In addition, real estate or personal property owned and occupied by a nonprofit organization organized under the laws of this state devoted exclusively to fostering the development of literature, music, painting, or sculpture which substantially enhances the cultural environment of a community as a whole, is available to the general public on a regular basis, and is occupied by it solely for the purposes for which the organization was incorporated is exempt from taxation under this act. [Emphasis added.] Thus, "nonprofit educational institutions" are exempt from property taxes under the GPTA if they are "incorporated under the laws of this state with the buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which the institutions were incorporated." Id . In Detroit v. Detroit Commercial College , 322 Mich. 142, 153, 33 N.W.2d 737 (1948), this Court held that an institution is only entitled to a tax exemption as an "educational institution" if it "fit[s] into the general scheme of education provided by the State and supported by public taxation." This Court went on to hold that, because the institution seeking an exemption in that case was "a specialized school operated for the purpose of training its students to enter into specialized fields of employment," it was not entitled to a tax exemption as an "educational institution." Id . In David Walcott Kendall Mem Sch . ( Kendall ), the Court of Appeals addressed the Detroit Commercial College case, opining: To apply the rule of [that] case to the present case, we must find that even if a school exists, and is created or is expanded to meet the needs of these students in a specialized major field of advanced study which substantially parallels the same major field of study as a State supported college or university, tax exemption cannot be granted for that school. It must be a "general educational institution"; not a "special school". [ Kendall , 11 Mich. App at 238, 160 N.W.2d 778.] The Court of Appeals then noted the change in educational demands and the public need for such education since this Court's decision in 1948, and how specialized schools addressing a particular area of study might meet these needs. Id . at 238-240, 160 N.W.2d 778. In light of these developments, the Court of Appeals, in an apparent attempt to expand the scope of institutions entitled to an exemption, "formulate[d] the following test to be applied in dealing with schools of higher education" that seek an exemption as an "educational institution": If the particular institution in issue were not in existence, then would, and could, a substantial portion of the student body who now attend that school instead attend a State-supported college or university to continue their advanced education in that same major field of study? [ Id. at 240, 160 N.W.2d 778.] In Ladies Literary Club , this Court adopted the test from Kendall : In [ Detroit Commercial College ], our Court determined that an institution seeking an educational exemption must fit into the general scheme of education provided by the state and supported by public taxation. This proposition was refined in [ Kendall ], which declared that an educational exemption may be available to an institution otherwise within the exemption definition, if the institution makes a substantial contribution to the relief of the burden of government. It cannot be maintained that were it not for the Ladies Literary Club's programs, which enhance educational and cultural interests, the burden on the state would be proportionately increased. The club's programs do not sufficiently relieve the government's educational burden to warrant the claimed educational institution exemption. [ Ladies Literary Club , 409 Mich. at 755-756, 298 N.W.2d 422 ; see also Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing Twp. , 423 Mich. 661, 669-670, 378 N.W.2d 737 (1985).] Thus, this Court has held that an entity is entitled to a tax exemption as an "educational institution" if it can show (1) that it is part of the "general scheme of education provided by the state and supported by taxation" and (2) that it "makes a substantial contribution to the relief of the burden of government." Ladies Literary Club , 409 Mich. at 755-756, 298 N.W.2d 422. I believe that this standard is unsupported by the statutory text. Nothing in MCL 211.7n suggests that an entity only constitutes an "educational institution" if it "makes a substantial contribution to the relief of the burden of government." Id. This requirement effectively limits tax exemptions to those institutions that perform a quasi-governmental function by relieving the government of some public responsibility. However, the statute does not require that the institution have any particular effect on the government's burden. Rather, it only requires that the institution be "educational." That is, the relevant inquiry is the nature of the institution-whether the institution is "educational"-not the effect that the institution has upon the government's burden. Respondent argues that a tax exemption is an "unequal removal of the burden generally placed on all landowners to share in the support of local government" and therefore must be strictly construed in favor of the taxing entity. Mich. Baptist Homes & Development Co. v. City of Ann Arbor , 396 Mich. 660, 669-670 (1976) ; see also Ladies Literary Club , 409 Mich. at 753, 298 N.W.2d 422. It further contends that because an exempted institution is no longer supporting services alternatively provided by public taxation, it is reasonable to require an institution to show that its activities relieve the government's burden to provide such services. Essentially, respondent argues that the "educational institution" exemption is a sort of quid pro quo; if the institution relieves the government's burden to provide education to the public, then it receives a tax exemption. However, nothing in the language of the statute suggests such a requirement, and it is well established that the perceived purpose of a statute may not supersede the statutory text. See, e.g., Perkovic v. Zurich American Ins. Co ., 500 Mich. 44, 53, 893 N.W.2d 322 (2017) ("The Court of Appeals' reliance on the perceived purpose of the statute runs counter to the rule of statutory construction directing us to discern legislative intent from plain statutory language."). This principle applies with equal force when interpreting a statute that provides a tax exemption. As this Court has recently explained: When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. This requires us to consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. ... ... This Court has historically required that tax exemptions be narrowly or strictly construed in favor of the government. Yet at the same time, we have held that this requirement does not permit a strained construction that is contrary to the Legislature's intent. [ SBC Health Midwest , 500 Mich. at 70-71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In my judgment, engrafting a requirement that an institution relieve the government's burden in order to receive a tax exemption as an "educational institution" is a "strained construction that is contrary to the Legislature's intent." Id . at 71, 894 N.W.2d 535. Moreover, even if the Legislature's ostensible "purpose" for exempting "educational institutions" from property tax assessment were relevant to the interpretation of MCL 211.7n, the quid pro quo relationship suggested by respondent is not the only possible justification for such an exemption. Rather, it is possible that the Legislature simply wanted to promote the existence of "educational institutions" by lessening the financial burden on them. This Court has long recognized the benefits derived from providing tax exemptions to "educational institutions": We need not, in our history, go beyond the ordinance of 1787, which declares that- "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Exemption from taxation is the only form of encouragement that our laws provide. ... The advantage of multiplying the facilities of learning has been rightly regarded as worth to any decent community very much more than can be counted in money. [ Detroit Home & Day Sch. v. Detroit , 76 Mich. 521, 523-524, 43 N.W. 593 (1889).] Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the role of tax exemptions in promoting the development of "educational institutions": New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. [ Walz v. Tax Comm. of City of New York , 397 U.S. 664, 672, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970).] This alternative understanding of the "purpose" for providing a tax exemption to "educational institutions" is supported by the fact that MCL 211.7n also provides a tax exemption to nonprofit theaters, and it is difficult to see how those institutions relieve any governmental burden. Therefore, even if the Legislature's "purpose" for providing a property tax exemption were relevant to defining an "educational institution" under MCL 211.7n, I see no reason why that "purpose" is limited to the quid pro quo relationship advocated by respondent. I also find no statutory basis for concluding that an entity is only an educational institution if it fits within the "general scheme of education provided by the state and supported by public taxation ." Ladies Literary Club , 409 Mich. at 755, 298 N.W.2d 422 (emphasis added). While there is a strong and proud tradition of publicly funded education both in Michigan and in the United States as a whole, there is a similarly proud tradition of private educational institutions. Indeed, "tax exemption for private educational institutions extends to the beginning of colonial America." Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions) , 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 841, 844 (1993). There is no statutory basis for concluding that an "educational institution" must be part of the "general scheme of education provided by the state " rather than a part of the general scheme of education provided by the state and private institutions. For these reasons, I believe that, in a more appropriate case, this Court should reconsider what constitutes an "educational institution" under MCL 211.7n. While I do not purport to articulate a definitive standard in this statement, I share a few initial observations that I believe warrant further consideration by this Court. Taken in isolation, the definition of the word "educational" could be broadly interpreted to provide a property tax exemption for most properties, which would clearly be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. However, when viewed in the context of MCL 211.7n as a whole, I believe that a more reasonable interpretation emerges. MCL 211.7n does not only provide a tax exemption for "educational institutions," but also for theaters, libraries, scientific institutions, and properties "devoted exclusively to fostering the development of literature, music, painting, or sculpture which substantially enhances the cultural environment of a community as a whole, [and] is available to the general public on a regular basis...." "This Court must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute nugatory." People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 433, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017). Accordingly, it appears that theaters, libraries, scientific institutions, and properties devoted to promoting cultural development will generally not constitute "educational institutions," even if they are "educational" in the broadest sense of the term. In addition, the history of the American educational experience itself provides at least some guidance as to the meaning of an "educational institution." There are certain kinds of institutions that, in the American experience, have traditionally been viewed as "educational institutions." Such institutions include public schools, parochial schools, liberal arts colleges, graduate programs, and vocational schools. The common thread among these institutions is that they instruct students in order to promote intellectual growth or employment-related skills. By contrast, other kinds of institutions that "educate" in the broadest sense, such as baby-sitting programs, zoos, dance academies, and athletic teams, are not, in common parlance, generally considered to be "educational institutions." Thus, it appears to me that an "educational institution" must be of a kind that, in the perspective of the overall American experience, has been traditionally viewed as an institution that instructs students to promote intellectual growth or employment related skills. But these are all tentative ruminations and speculations, and await specific development in a future case. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire aptly noted when defining an "educational institution" under its own tax exemption statute, "the construction of a brightline test is impossible; each case will necessarily depend on its own peculiar facts." New Canaan Academy, Inc. v. Town of Canaan , 122 N.H. 134, 137, 441 A.2d 1174 (1982). Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court, as the highest court in this state, to provide an appropriate framework for determining whether an entity constitutes an "educational institution" that is entitled to a property tax exemption. In my judgment, the current framework is clearly contrary to the statutory text and imposes an unwarranted burden on an institution seeking a tax exemption to show that it performs a quasi-governmental function. I welcome the opportunity in a future case to formulate a new standard for what constitutes an "educational institution" that is more consistent with the plain meaning of that phrase and within the American educational tradition. This Court has never clearly explained whether an entity is entitled to an exemption if it satisfies either of these requirements, or whether it is only entitled to an exemption if it satisfies both of these requirements. However, multiple Court of Appeals decisions have cited Ladies Literary Club for the proposition that an entity is only entitled to an exemption if it satisfies both of these requirements. See, e.g., Harmony Montessori Ctr. v. Oak Park , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 18, 2014 (Docket No. 312856), p. 2, 2014 WL 667792 ; Telluride Ass'n Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 16, 2013 (Docket Nos. 304735 and 305239), pp. 5-6, 2013 WL 3717798 ; Mich. Laborers' Training & Apprenticeship Fund v. Breitung Twp. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2012 (Docket No. 303723), p. 3, 2012 WL 5233635. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "educate"-the verb form of "educational"-as "1 a : to provide schooling for < chose to [educate] their children at home> b : to train by formal instruction and supervised practice esp. in a skill, trade, or profession 2 a : to develop mentally, morally, or aesthetically esp. by instruction b : to provide with information[.]" This category would also seem to include "public school academies," i.e., charter schools. See Council of Orgs. & Others for Ed. About Parochiaid, Inc. v. Governor , 455 Mich. 557, 576, 566 N.W.2d 208 (1997) ("[W]e find that public school academies are 'public schools.' "). See Walz , 397 U.S. at 703, 90 S.Ct. 1409 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Parochial schools teach religion; yet they are also educational institutions offering courses competitive with public schools. They prepare students for the professions and for activities in all walks of life. Education in the secular sense [is] combined with religious indoctrination at ... parochial schools...."). See generally Bauer, Small Liberal Arts Colleges, Fraternities, and Antitrust: Rethinking Hamilton College , 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 347, 354-357 (2004) (describing the origin and expansion of American liberal arts colleges). See generally Kimball, The Context of Graduate Degrees at Harvard Law School Under Dean Erwin N. Griswold, 1946-1967, Commentary on Gail Hupper's Educational Ambivalence: The Rise of a Foreign-Student Doctorate in Law , 49 New Eng. L. Rev. 449, 450-455 (2015) (describing the development of graduate programs throughout the United States from 1870 to 1970). See James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict between Public Good and For-Profit Higher Education , 38 JC & UL 45, 104 n 322 (2011) ("Vocational education has had a long history in the United States, starting in the form of apprenticeships in the early colonial period. Land-grant institutions continued this tradition, with an early mission of training farmers and home-economists. Today, vocational training is offered at high schools, training centers, and two and four-year colleges and universities ....").

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion of the Arab American Chamber of Commerce, the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, the Arab American Civil Rights League, and the Arab American News to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on December 27, 2017 is accepted for filing. The application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 9, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 26, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. WILDER, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 28, 2016 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

McCormack, J. In this case we consider whether the admission at a joint trial with a single jury of an unavailable witness's prior testimony about a codefendant's confession violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, notwithstanding the redaction of the defendant's name and the reading of a limiting instruction to the jury. It did. The defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and because the substance of the witness's testimony-the codefendant's confession that implicated the defendant-was so powerfully incriminating, the limiting instruction and redaction were ineffective to cure the Confrontation Clause violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for that Court to consider whether the prosecution established that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Anderson (After Remand) , 446 Mich. 392, 406, 521 N.W.2d 538 (1994). I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The defendant, Carl Rene Bruner II, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) ; assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83 ; being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f ; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Bruner's convictions arose from the shooting of two security guards outside a Detroit nightclub in June 2012. One guard was struck in the back, but he was wearing a bulletproof vest and was not harmed. A second guard was killed. No eyewitnesses saw the shooter. Bruner was tried jointly with codefendant Michael Lawson before a single jury. The prosecution argued that Bruner was the shooter and that he was aided or abetted by Lawson. Bruner's defense was that he was not present and was not the shooter. Lawson's defense was that he was merely present at the scene and was not otherwise involved in the shooting. The prosecution planned to call Westley Webb as a witness. Importantly, Webb had testified at Lawson's preliminary examination about statements he claimed Lawson had made to him a few days after the shooting; Webb did not testify at Bruner's preliminary examination. At Lawson's preliminary examination, Webb testified that Lawson told him that the police were investigating Lawson because of an incident at a nightclub. Webb testified that Lawson said the bouncers threw Bruner out for fighting and therefore Lawson left the club with Bruner and they drove around the area in Bruner's car. Webb further testified that Lawson said that the two men parked down the block from the nightclub, Bruner walked off, and Lawson stepped out of the car for a cigarette. Webb testified that Lawson went on to say that he got back into the car and drove away because he heard gunshots. Although Webb did not offer the fact that Lawson described Bruner having a gun or committing a shooting, Webb was impeached with his police statement, in which he said Lawson described Bruner coming back with a gun. The prosecutor understandably viewed Webb as a critical witness against Bruner. At trial, the prosecutor emphasized in his opening statement that Webb would be the key witness whose testimony would place the gun in Bruner's hands. But things do not always go as planned. And at the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the prosecutor informed the court that Webb could not be located and asked to read Webb's prior testimony to the jury. The trial court declared Webb unavailable. The prosecutor conceded that the prior testimony could not be admitted against Bruner and offered to remove mention of Bruner from the transcript of Webb's testimony. The trial court determined, over defense counsel's objection, that a limiting instruction would be adequate to ensure that the jury would not consider the redacted testimony against Bruner. But the trial court found the testimony admissible against Lawson and it was read into the record. Each mention of Bruner's name was replaced with the word "Blank" and the court instructed the jury to consider the testimony only against Lawson. The Court of Appeals affirmed Bruner's convictions, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated by the admission of Webb's preliminary examination testimony because Lawson's statements to Webb were not testimonial and Webb's testimony was neither offered nor admitted against Bruner. Bruner filed for leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application, instructing the parties to address whether the admission of Webb's preliminary-examination testimony at Bruner's joint trial with Lawson violated Bruner's constitutional right to confrontation, despite the trial court's redaction of that testimony and limiting instruction to the jury, see Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) ; Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) ; and, if there was a Confrontation Clause violation, whether the error of admitting the testimony was harmless, see People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 774, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). II. DISCUSSION Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has been violated is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Fackelman , 489 Mich. 515, 524, 802 N.W.2d 552 (2011). De novo review means we review this issue independently, without any required deference to the courts below. People v. Barrera , 451 Mich. 261, 268, 547 N.W.2d 280 (1996). The Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. Const., Am. VI. The confrontation right is incorporated to apply to states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The right is implicated only for "testimonial" evidence, because the Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses" against the accused-in other words, those who "bear testimony." Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The threshold question for any Confrontation Clause challenge, therefore, is whether the proffered evidence is testimonial. "Testimony" is "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although there may be ambiguity at the margins, "some statements qualify under any definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing." Id . at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. "Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial" may be admitted "only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." Id . at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Joint trials with a single jury present a special problem. Some evidence may be admissible as to one defendant but violate a codefendant's confrontation right. When that is the case, a court must either exclude the testimony or take measures to eliminate the confrontation problem. See Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 200, 209-212, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). What measures are sufficient depends on the context and content of the evidence. If, for example, a witness's testimony can be redacted to eliminate reference to the codefendant's existence, that witness will not have borne testimony against the codefendant in any Sixth Amendment sense. Id . at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Sometimes the court can accomplish the same by instructing the jury to consider testimony against one defendant, but not the other. Cruz v. New York , 481 U.S. 186, 190, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) ("[A] witness whose testimony is introduced in a joint trial with the limiting instruction that it be used only to assess the guilt of one of the defendants will not be considered to be a witness 'against' the other defendants."). Since we presume juries follow their instructions, the result of a limiting instruction can often be as effective as excluding or redacting the testimony. But other times evidence is too compelling for a jury to ignore even with a limiting instruction. Especially relevant here, limiting instructions are categorically inadequate to protect against evidence that a nontestifying defendant confessed and implicated a codefendant in that confession. Bruton , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. In such a case, the confrontation problem persists as if no instruction had been given at all. Id . at 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620. III. APPLICATION Finally, to the issues here, of which there are two. First we must consider the threshold question whether Webb's preliminary examination testimony is "testimonial." That question answers itself. It is Webb's testimony that presents a straightforward confrontation problem. And the content of Webb's prior testimony places it squarely in the category governed by Bruton . The pitfall that must be avoided in this case-and that which the Court of Appeals landed in-is ascribing significance to the nontestimonial nature of the statements Webb attributed to Lawson. To be sure, Lawson's nontestimonial hearsay statements would not have implicated the Confrontation Clause if Webb had testified at trial-Bruner's confrontation right would have been vindicated by cross-examining Webb. But Bruner never got to cross-examine Webb. Because Webb's prior testimony was, of course, testimonial , the admission of that testimony implicates Bruner's confrontation right. The second question we must answer is whether Webb was "a witness against" Bruner, in spite of the remedial steps taken by the court to attempt to limit the jury's consideration of Webb's testimony as only against Lawson. U.S. Const., Am. VI. Specifically, did the court's limiting instruction to the jury and redaction of Bruner's name cure the confrontation problem? To answer that question, we consider the content these measures purported to limit. And here, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bruton and Gray provide meaningful rules. The Bruton Court held that a jury cannot be expected to wholly disregard a confession in which one codefendant implicates another at their joint trial. Bruton , 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. It reasoned that an accused admitting both his and his codefendant's guilt is such powerfully incriminating evidence that allowing it to go uncross-examined deprives the nonconfessing defendant of a fair trial. In such a case, we cannot trust a limiting instruction to eliminate the risk of prejudice. While generally we presume juries follow their instructions, Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, a presumption is just that-and Bruton held the presumption rebutted when one nontestifying codefendant implicates another. And, importantly for our purposes, a cautionary instruction does not eliminate this particular confrontation problem: "The effect is the same as if there had been no instruction at all." Bruton , 391 U.S. at 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Webb's testimony presented such a problem. Because Bruner did not cross-examine Webb, and the substance of Webb's statement placed it in a category "in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored," id . at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, the limiting instruction was not an adequate remedy for the Confrontation Clause violation. Nor was the redaction. There are measures a court can take that permit the admission of a codefendant's confession that would otherwise violate Bruton without the need for separate trials or juries, including, in some cases, redaction. A codefendant's confession may escape Bruton 's protective rule if it is "redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The obvious redaction used here (inserting the word "Blank" in place of Bruner's name), however, did not achieve that result and specifically ran afoul of Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294. In Gray , blank spaces or the word "delete" were substituted for the defendant's name to attempt to avoid the Bruton problem. The United States Supreme Court held that "[r]edactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration, however, leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton 's unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result." Gray , 523 U.S. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Far from eliminating any reference to Bruner's existence, the jury instead got a wink and a nod about an unnamed person, "Blank." Blank's conduct was not just uncannily similar to what the prosecutor told the jury Bruner had done. No, it was the same. And the prosecutor's opening statement had stressed that Webb's testimony would be the linchpin of the case against Bruner: And [the evidence] is going to corroborate directly with what Mr. Webb is telling you that Mr. Bruner came back with a gun involving got involved [sic] in a shooting and tie it up directly with where these shots came from. * * * I think the statement from Mr. Webb is very clear. He knew that Mr. Bruner had a gun.... Bruner and Lawson were the only people charged; there was no other person to whom "Blank" might have referred. The prosecutor told the jury that two people were involved in the murders, to expect Webb to incriminate Bruner, and that Webb's testimony would place the gun in Bruner's hand. In such circumstances, any juror who "wonders to whom the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer...." Gray , 523 U.S. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Because Bruner never had the chance to cross-examine Webb, Webb's testimony was inadmissible against Bruner under a straightforward application of the Confrontation Clause, as the prosecutor conceded and the trial court held. But while the testimony was technically admitted only against Lawson, the limiting instruction and crude redaction were inadequate to protect Bruner. Bruner was thus deprived of his right to confront Webb, a witness against him. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the prosecution has established the preserved constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson (After Remand) , 446 Mich. at 406, 521 N.W.2d 538. McCormack, Markman, C.J., Zahra, Viviano, Bernstein, Wilder, Clement, JJ., concur. Judge Shapiro concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to disagree with the majority's conclusion that the limiting instruction was curative. He reasoned: "[I]t would be erroneous to conclude that the jury could ignore the significance of the statement as to Bruner because it was the only evidence that put a gun in his hand at the time of the shooting. Expecting jurors to compartmentalize the relevancy of this very significant evidence so as to apply it only to one defendant is simply unrealistic." People v. Bruner , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 11, 2016 (Docket Nos. 325730 and 326542), 2016 WL 5930110 ( Shapiro , J., concurring), p 1. Judge Shapiro agreed with the majority, however, that no confrontation issue arose because Lawson's statements were nontestimonial and, finding that no other rule of evidence barred admission of the testimony, he felt bound to affirm. Id . at 1-2. The codefendant must be truly erased from the testimony, and in such a way that does not raise suspicion. See Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Thus, blank spaces, blackouts, code names, or even grammatical structures that tip the jury off to the defendant's erasure may not be enough to cure the confrontation problem. See, e.g., Gray , 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294. That Lawson 's counsel cross-examined Webb does not mitigate the confrontation problem. In fact, as a result, the jury heard an account of Lawson's alleged statements that had been shaped by Lawson's cross-examination to benefit Lawson's defense that he was merely present and Bruner alone was to blame, and correspondingly, therefore, even more damaging to Bruner. Obvious deletion may in fact aggravate the testimony's prejudicial effect. The Gray Court, quoting Judge Learned Hand, noted that even if there had been "the slightest doubt as to whose names had been blacked out," blatant redaction "would have not only laid the doubt, but underscored the answer." Gray , 523 U.S. at 194, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (cleaned up). The defendant's motion to remand for consideration of the issues raised in his Standard 4 brief (per Administrative Order 2004-6) is denied.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to file a pro per supplement to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The pro per supplement submitted on June 12, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of People v. Dixon-Bey (Docket No. 156746) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 30, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration in light of Marik v. Marik , 501 Mich. 918, 903 N.W.2d 194 (2017), and Royce v. LaPorte , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 8, 2018 (Docket Nos. 337549 and 340354). The motion for sanctions for vexatious proceedings is DENIED. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the motion to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the September 28, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellants shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the creation of a fee surplus generated by an enforcing agency under the Construction Code Act (CCA), MCL 125.1501 et seq ., and the use of that surplus to pay for shortfalls in previous years by transfer of the surplus into the city's general fund, violates the constraints of § 22 that fees be reasonable, be intended to bear a reasonable relation to the cost of acts and services provided by the enforcing agency, and be used only for the operation of the enforcing agency or the construction board of appeals, or both; (2) if so, whether appellants have a private cause of action against a governmental subdivision for enforcement of the CCA, MCL 125.1508b(1) ; (3) whether appellants are "taxpayers" that have standing to file suit pursuant to the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 32 ; and (4) if so, whether the challenged fees violate the Headlee Amendment, Const. 1963, art. 9, § 31. In addition to the brief, the appellants shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellants' brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellants. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellants within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Michigan Municipal League, the Michigan Township Association, the Government Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, and Michigan Realtors are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 17, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the plaintiff waived any statute of limitations defense; (2) whether Joughin v. Joughin , 320 Mich. App. 380, 906 N.W.2d 829 (2017), was correctly decided; and (3) when a claim for retirement benefits under a judgment of divorce accrues. In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant's brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan and the Michigan Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Court, the motion to dismiss is considered, and it is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 10, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court to address whether, in light of this Court's decision in People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983), the defendant's continued detention, after she produced a valid temporary driver's license and the police confirmed that the car she was driving was registered to the holder of the license, was supported by "specific and articulable facts," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provided the police with "a particularized and objective basis," for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 30, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered. We DIRECT the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney to answer the application for leave to appeal within 28 days after the date of this order. We further ORDER that trial court proceedings in the Wayne Circuit Court are stayed pending the completion of this appeal The application for leave to appeal remains pending.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellant to extend the time for filing its reply brief is GRANTED. The reply brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before July 26, 2019.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's September 28, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's October 30, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that reconsideration of our previous order is warranted. MCR 7.311(G).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 19, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 30, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for leave to amend the application is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the October 16, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 20, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 26, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 15, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 15, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

On order of the Court, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of this appeal is considered, and the motion for reconsideration is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. The filing fees include a $375.00 entry fee and a $25.00 fee for commencing an original action, MCL 600.1986, for a total of $400.00. Within 21 days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $21.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the complaint not being filed in this Court. If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to plaintiff's account until the payments equal the balance due of $379.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and return a copy of plaintiff's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 26, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that evidence of the 2011 robbery served the proper purpose of showing intent, MRE 404(b)(1). People v. Denson , 500 Mich. 385, 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017). We AFFIRM, however, the Court of Appeals holding that any error in this regard was harmless in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence.

On order of the Court, the motions to supplement are GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the August 24, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion to remand is DENIED.

By order of April 4, 2018, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals judgment addressing the scoring of Offense Variable 19 (OV 19), MCL 777.49 (interference with the administration of justice), and we REMAND this case to the Lenawee Circuit Court for the resentencing ordered by the Court of Appeals. On remand, the circuit court shall not assign 10 points for OV 19 without specifically articulating the basis for the assignment of any points. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Murphy, J. In this custody dispute, plaintiff, Mary I. McRoberts, appeals by right the trial court's opinion and order granting the motion of defendant, Kyle A. Ferguson, for sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child. We affirm. I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The parties were never married, and their child was born in March 2011. Sometime later that year, defendant joined the United States Navy. It appears that there was little to no communication between the parties until plaintiff sought child support in April 2013. Defendant then sought to revoke paternity and requested DNA testing, which later established defendant's paternity by a high probability. In December 2013, the parties were awarded joint legal custody, and plaintiff was awarded sole physical custody. Defendant was ordered to pay monthly child support. Since that time, defendant sought and was awarded an increasing amount of parenting time with the child. A reoccurring issue, however, was plaintiff's repeated violations of the court's visitation orders. Specifically, plaintiff denied in-person visitations and Skype visits between the child and defendant. Pursuant to a stipulated order entered in January 2016, the parties resolved various issues that had been brought to the court's attention. Specifically, it was established that the child would refer only to defendant "as father, dad, [or] daddy," whereas previously the child had been referring to plaintiff's boyfriend in that manner. Further, the court ordered that defendant would receive "make-up parenting time" with the child in California, which is where he was stationed. Shortly after the stipulated order was entered, however, defendant filed a show-cause petition, alleging that his current wife had flown "into Detroit to pick[ ]up the minor child but plaintiff failed to show at the airport." Following a March 2016 hearing, the trial court found plaintiff "in contempt of court for willful violation of [the] Court's visitation order" and cautioned that further violations would result in "30 days incarceration" and the child being placed in defendant's custody. The court also ordered that defendant would select a counselor in Michigan for the child and placed the burden on plaintiff to object to the selection. In May 2016, defendant filed another show-cause petition, alleging, in part, that plaintiff "continues to support the minor child addressing Defendant as 'Kyle' and her boyfriend as 'daddy....' " Defendant also alleged that plaintiff had failed to schedule an appointment for the child with the selected counselor. After a June 2016 hearing, the court found plaintiff in contempt of court. The court imposed a suspended 10-day sentence, conditioned on plaintiff's compliance with court orders. The court also ordered that the child would be "picked up" by defendant's wife and accompanied to San Diego, California, for summer parenting time with defendant. In fall 2016, the child returned to Michigan and plaintiff's custody to begin school. In December 2016, defendant filed a show-cause petition, alleging that certain Skype visits had not occurred since the child had returned to Michigan. Defendant also averred that plaintiff had failed to arrange counseling for the child. At the show-cause hearing, plaintiff did not dispute those allegations and admitted that 17 out of the possible 34 Skype visits had not occurred in the prior six-month period. Other concerning matters included the child's numerous absences and tardies incurred during the 2016 school year and that the child had arrived in California the previous summer with untreated cavities. The trial court found plaintiff to be in contempt of court with regard to the Skype visits and the lack of counseling. The court reasoned that "each little thing on its own is not huge; but it is the conglomeration of all of those things over time together that makes it contempt of court." The court sentenced plaintiff to 30 days in jail and awarded "temporary custody" to defendant. In January 2017, defendant filed a supplemental petition, requesting sole legal and physical custody. A custody hearing was held on February 6, 2017. Defendant and his wife testified that the child was adjusting well to Suffolk, Virginia, which was where defendant was then stationed. They provided positive academic reports, specifically that the child's recognition of "sight words" had increased significantly. They also indicated that they had arranged for a doctor, counselor, and dentist for the child and that they were in the process of arranging individual speech therapy because the child was speaking at a substantially younger age level. Defendant also informed the court that he would be stationed in Suffolk for the "foreseeable future" and that his military duty no longer required deployments at sea. Defendant acknowledged that the child "misses" plaintiff but also informed the court that he had paid for Skype and telephone calls between the child and plaintiff while the latter was incarcerated. The court heard testimony from plaintiff and her parents, and it took the matter under advisement. In a 14-page opinion, the court found that there was proper cause and a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant revisiting the custody order: "namely Plaintiff's deliberate and repeated obstruction of Defendant's parenting time and relationship with the child." The court then found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of the child for defendant to have sole legal and physical custody. The court considered each best-interest factor set forth in MCL 722.23, weighing six in defendant's favor while not expressly weighing any in plaintiff's favor. Notably, with respect to Factor (j), the court stated, "One of, if not the biggest concern for this Court over the lifespan of this case has been Plaintiff's unwillingness to facilitate a close relationship between the child and Defendant." The court found that "Defendant is heavily favored under this factor." The trial court awarded plaintiff parenting time in accordance "with the Midland County Long Distance Parenting Plan." This appeal followed. II. PROPER CAUSE OR CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by finding proper cause and a change of circumstances warranted revisiting the existing custody order. We disagree. A trial court's order resolving a child custody dispute "shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue." MCL 722.28. "This Court reviews a trial court's determination regarding whether a party has demonstrated proper cause or a change of circumstances under the great weight of the evidence standard." Corporan v. Henton , 282 Mich. App. 599, 605, 766 N.W.2d 903 (2009). A trial court's factual findings are against the great weight of the evidence when "the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction." Ireland v. Smith , 214 Mich. App. 235, 242, 542 N.W.2d 344 (1995), aff'd as mod on other grounds 451 Mich. 457, 547 N.W.2d 686 (1996). Section 7 of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq. , allows a trial court to "modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances," as long as the modification would be in the child's best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c). "[P]roper cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child's life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child's custodial situation should be undertaken." Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer , 259 Mich. App. 499, 511, 675 N.W.2d 847 (2003). "[I]n order to establish a 'change of circumstances,' a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child's well-being, have materially changed." Id . at 513, 675 N.W.2d 847 (emphasis omitted). To constitute a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), "the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child." Vodvarka , 259 Mich.App. at 513-514, 675 N.W.2d 847. Plaintiff calls attention to our acknowledgment in Vodvarka that caselaw established that "minor allegations of contempt or visitation complaints," id . at 509-510, 675 N.W.2d 847, are insufficient to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances and contends that the trial court relied on such conduct in this case. First, we disagree with the premise that there were "minor allegations" of contempt in this case. To the contrary, plaintiff was found in contempt of court on three separate occasions, the last of which resulted in a 30-day jail sentence. Further, there were ongoing visitation complaints in this case, including that plaintiff had failed to produce the child at the airport for a prearranged pick-up, causing defendant's wife to fly needlessly from California to Detroit. Second, as stated, the test for proper cause examines whether there is an appropriate ground that "could have a significant effect on the child's life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child's custodial situation should be undertaken." Id . at 511, 675 N.W.2d 847. And plaintiff's interference with the child's and defendant's relationship is plainly such a ground. In addition to the parenting-time violations, plaintiff encouraged the child to call plaintiff's now ex-boyfriend "dad" and to call defendant by his first name. For those reasons, the court's finding that proper cause existed was not against the great weight of the evidence. Further, defendant's circumstances had changed significantly since the last custody order in December 2013. Throughout most of the proceedings, defendant's military duty required him to be deployed at sea for months at a time. At the custody hearing, however, defendant explained that he is now essentially "land based." Moreover, defendant was married in April 2014 and had purchased a home in Virginia, where he would be located for the foreseeable future. Hence, defendant was now in a position to provide full-time physical care and custody to the child. Further, there was sufficient evidence from which to conclude that "the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child." Id . at 513-514, 675 N.W.2d 847. Specifically, defendant and his wife have addressed medical issues for the child, such as untreated cavities and immunizations. They have also provided a counselor for the child and have helped to greatly improve her recognition of sight words. Considering that evidence in addition to defendant's new living situation, it cannot be said that the evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's finding that there was a sufficient change of circumstances, allowing the court to consider a modification of the custody arrangement. III. CHANGE OF CUSTODY Plaintiff's final argument is that the trial court erred by finding that defendant proved by clear and convincing evidence that granting him sole legal and physical custody was in the child's best interests. We disagree. We review the trial court's findings regarding the best-interest factors under the "great weight of the evidence" standard. Fletcher v. Fletcher , 447 Mich. 871, 881, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994). We review the court's ultimate custody decision for an abuse of discretion. Phillips v. Jordan , 241 Mich. App. 17, 20, 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000). In the context of a child custody dispute, an abuse of discretion is found only in extreme cases wherein the trial court's decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences the exercise of passion or bias or a perversity of will. Rains v. Rains , 301 Mich. App. 313, 324, 836 N.W.2d 709 (2013) ; Shulick v. Richards , 273 Mich. App. 320, 324-325, 729 N.W.2d 533 (2006). In this case, the trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with plaintiff and therefore correctly concluded that defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that modifying the custodial environment was in the child's best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c) ; Pierron v. Pierron , 486 Mich. 81, 92, 782 N.W.2d 480 (2010). MCL 722.23 defines the "best interests of the child" as "the sum total of the ... factors" set forth in MCL 722.23(a) - (l ), which are to be "considered, evaluated, and determined by the court." "In child custody cases, the family court must consider all the factors delineated in MCL 722.23 and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of them." Spires v. Bergman , 276 Mich. App. 432, 443, 741 N.W.2d 523 (2007). "This Court will defer to the trial court's credibility determinations, and the trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors." Berger v. Berger , 277 Mich. App. 700, 705, 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008). Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in how it weighed the following best-interest factors: (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. * * * (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference. (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child's other parent. (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child. (l ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. [ MCL 722.23.] We have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court's findings on these factors. Ireland , 214 Mich. App. at 242, 542 N.W.2d 344. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by finding that neither party was favored under Factor (a) when defendant had "abandoned" the child until support proceedings were initiated. Plaintiff's argument focuses on defendant's history with the child, but Factor (a) calls for the court to examine the "existing" "ties" between the parent and child. MCL 722.23(a). Since the support obligation was imposed, defendant has received an increasing amount of parenting time with the child. At the time of the custody hearing, the child had been in his care for over a month. Defendant described his relationship with the child as "the normal father/daughter relationship [he] always wanted." Although it was undisputed that the child missed plaintiff, there was no testimony to suggest that the child did not also care for and love defendant. The trial court's finding that this was a neutral factor was not against the great weight of the evidence. As for Factor (b), the trial court found that the "distinguishing element of this factor arises in the parties' ability to provide the child guidance and continued education." In weighing this factor in defendant's favor, the court noted the disparity between the child's school attendance under each parent's care. The court also acknowledged testimony that the child's recognition of sight words had increased significantly while in defendant's care and that defendant practiced that skill with the child daily. Plaintiff argues that the trial court's focus on school attendance was "obviously imbalanced" because the child had only resided with defendant for a short period of time. However, it was established that the child had nine absences, four of which were unexcused, and numerous tardies in the first three months of the 2016 school year while under plaintiff's care. In contrast, in over a month in defendant's care, the child had only missed a few hours of school for a dentist appointment. Given the disparity, we fail to see how the trial court erred by relying on that evidence. Further, plaintiff does not acknowledge the child's increased proficiency in sight words. She fails to demonstrate that the court's finding was against the great weight of the evidence. Additionally, the same evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's finding that Factor (h) weighed in defendant's favor. With respect to Factor (c), plaintiff fails to dispute the ample evidence relied on by the trial court in determining that defendant had a greater capacity to provide life's necessities for the child. For example, the court noted that defendant was "a Second Class Petty Officer," that defendant and his wife addressed the child's untreated cavities, and that they were in the process of arranging individual speech therapy for the child. Plaintiff asserts that defendant took the child to "specialists" and that he would arrange "expensive follow-up appointments in Michigan" to reduce his child support obligation. Plaintiff has effectively abandoned this argument by failing to identify support in the record for this assertion. "This Court will not search the record for factual support for a party's claim." McIntosh v. McIntosh , 282 Mich. App. 471, 485, 768 N.W.2d 325 (2009). Further, it is not apparent from the record that the costs associated with the specialists were unnecessary. Even assuming that defendant's child support obligation was reduced, there is still ample evidence to support the trial court's finding on this factor. Next, plaintiff argues that there was error in weighing Factor (d) in defendant's favor given that the child had lived with plaintiff, as the trial court stated, " 'for nearly all of the child's life' " and had only been in defendant's temporary custody for "two months" at the time of the hearing. The trial court acknowledged that the child had lived with plaintiff most of her life but also found that period to be marked by instability, noting numerous residences during that time and plaintiff's various debts. In contrast, defendant had purchased a home in Virginia and was current on all his bills. The court reasoned that "[t]he change in custody requested by Defendant would keep continuity with the current living arrangement, which it is clear Defendant and his wife have gone to great lengths to establish for the child in the short time they have had custody of her." We fail to see how the court erred by considering the desirability of continuing the "temporary custody" arrangement, especially when the child was excelling in school and defendant had already arranged doctors, a counselor, and individual speech therapy for the child. The evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court's finding that Factor (d) weighed in defendant's favor. The same can be said for Factor (e), which the trial court weighed on the basis of similar evidence. Plaintiff also contests the trial court's finding under Factor (f) that there was no evidence presented regarding either party's moral fitness. Plaintiff again asserts that the court should have considered defendant's "abandonment" of the child. While we do not rule that the trial court was precluded from considering defendant's behavior before the support obligation was entered in 2013, we cannot say that the court erred by choosing to focus on the parties' most recent behavior. After defendant's paternity was determined, it appears that he fulfilled his child support obligation, followed court orders, and sought an ever-increasing role in the child's life. Further, defendant disputed that he ever abandoned the child. The trial court's finding was not against the great weight of the evidence. For the same reasons, we reject plaintiff's argument that the court should have considered this matter under Factor (l ) as "[a]ny other [relevant] factor." MCL 722.23(l). Plaintiff argues that Factor (i) weighs in her favor because the child expressed a preference to live with her. The trial court interviewed the child and stated that it took her preference into consideration, but the court did not reveal the preference. Plaintiff's claim is therefore not supported by the record. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court's finding that defendant was heavily favored under Factor (j), which, again, concerns one parent facilitating and encouraging a close relationship between the child and the other parent. The trial court thoroughly recounted how plaintiff had repeatedly violated its orders "that were specifically imposed to try and foster a relationship between Defendant and his daughter, despite his being on the other side of the country." The court also noted the hostile attitude toward defendant and his wife and that plaintiff had consistently failed "to list Defendant as a parent on all documents and forms pertaining to the child," whereas defendant had accomplished that task. Plaintiff does not address the trial court's specific findings or the mountain of evidence supporting them. Instead, she merely maintains that "[b]oth parties have obstructed the parenting time of the other party" without providing record citations for the position that defendant "intentionally" caused some of the missed Skype visits. See McIntosh , 282 Mich. App. at 485, 768 N.W.2d 325. Considering the numerous contempt orders issued against her on this matter, plaintiff's contention that Factor (j) should have been evaluated as a neutral factor is simply without merit. Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by finding that Factor (k), domestic violence, did not weigh in either party's favor. Plaintiff testified that defendant once pushed her against her vehicle in the presence of the child. The trial court found this testimony lacking in credibility. We defer to the court's credibility determinations. Shann v. Shann , 293 Mich. App. 302, 305, 809 N.W.2d 435 (2011). In sum, there were legitimate concerns with plaintiff's care of the child, including untreated cavities and numerous unexcused absences from school. Defendant has addressed those issues while also arranging for counseling and individual speech therapy for the child. Additionally, the court plainly placed great weight on Factor (j), which was within its discretion. Berger , 277 Mich. App. at 705, 747 N.W.2d 336. "It is presumed to be in the best interests of a child for the child to have a strong relationship with both of his or her parents." MCL 722.27a(1) (governing parenting time). It can be inferred from the court's analysis that it doubted whether the child would be able to have a strong relationship with defendant if plaintiff retained sole physical custody. Indeed, plaintiff's repeated acts of contempt relative to parenting time were troubling and reflected an inability by plaintiff to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between defendant and his daughter. Conversely, there was no evidence suggesting that defendant had interfered with the relationship between plaintiff and the child. The trial court's custody decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, defendant is awarded taxable costs under MCR 7.219. O'Connell, P.J., and K. F. Kelly, J., concurred with Murphy, J. Defendant does not dispute the trial court's ruling with respect to the established custodial environment. Indeed, aside from citations of the trial court's opinion, plaintiff fails to provide any record citations as required by MCR 7.212(C)(6) and (7). We note that the child was only five years old at the time of the custody hearing. Moreover, even if the child expressed a preference for plaintiff, we would still conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the change in custody.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing a supplement to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The supplement submitted on May 7, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee to extend the time for filing her answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before May 25, 2018.

Per Curiam. Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of third-degree arson, MCL 750.74, and one count of second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1). The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 17 to 30 years' imprisonment for each conviction. On appeal, we vacated defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the denial of counsel at defendant's preliminary examination amounted to a structural error requiring automatic reversal. People v. Lewis , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 21, 2016 (Docket No. 325782), pp. 3, 10, 2016 WL 3945944. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed our judgment and remanded for application of the harmless-error standard. People v. Lewis , 501 Mich. 1, 12, 903 N.W.2d 816 (2017). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm defendant's convictions, holding that any error resulting from the denial of counsel at his preliminary examination was harmless, but we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether, in light of People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), the trial court would have imposed a materially different sentence. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE In our earlier opinion, we stated the relevant facts as follows: At the start of defendant's preliminary examination, the trial court asked defendant to state his full name on the record. In response, defendant stated, "I'm not talking. I don't have no attorney. This man disrespecting me. You all violating my rights. I'm through with it. I'm through with it." The trial court then stated that it had appointed lawyers for defendant on multiple occasions, that defendant had indicated his displeasure with each of the lawyers that were appointed, and that defendant had in fact grieved each of the prior counsel. In light of this, the trial court found that defendant had "elected that he would prefer not to have a lawyer to represent him and we're going to proceed." In response, defendant stated, "I never said that." The trial court then reiterated that the preliminary examination would proceed and that defendant's former trial counsel, Brian Scherer... would act as stand-by counsel. As the prosecution called [a witness] to testify, defendant stated, "I'm not going to participate in this legal bullshit." The court then warned defendant that he would be expelled from the courtroom if he continued his outburst. Defendant continued to interrupt the court while using profane language, so the trial court expelled defendant from the courtroom. After defendant was removed, the trial court told [defense counsel] that he was free to leave as well. The court then continued with the preliminary examination, and after hearing testimony from six witnesses, the trial court held that there was sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over for trial. [ Lewis , unpub. op. at 1-2.] As provided above, defendant was subsequently convicted of four counts of third-degree arson and one count of second-degree arson following a jury trial, and he appealed as of right. Bound by Michigan caselaw holding that the complete deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding requires automatic reversal, we concluded in our prior opinion that because defendant was denied counsel at his preliminary examination, a critical stage of the proceedings, reversal of his convictions was required. Id. at 3, 10. However, the two-judge majority in that opinion, citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. Alabama , 399 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970), expressed the belief that the deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding should not always require reversal and that harmless-error review should apply where the deprivation does not affect the entire proceedings. Lewis , unpub. op. at 4-5. The Supreme Court agreed, relying on Coleman to reverse our judgment and hold that a claim of error based on the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary examination is subject to harmless-error review. Lewis , 501 Mich. at 12, 903 N.W.2d 816 . It then directed us, on remand, to consider "the substantive criteria or the procedural framework that should attend [harmless-error] review" and apply that standard to the facts at issue. Id . II. HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW With regard to the procedural framework that should be applied for preserved nonstructural constitutional errors, the prosecution must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 774 (appendix), 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). However, determining the substantive criteria that should attend harmless-error review under these circumstances-where a defendant has been denied counsel at a preliminary examination-is more difficult. The Supreme Court admitted that it was "uncertain about just how a court is to evaluate the effect of this error on a verdict," Lewis , 501 Mich. at 10, 903 N.W.2d 816, but it provided "guideposts," stating: At each extreme, we know what is not permitted. At one end, a court may not simply presume, without more, that the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary examination must have caused the defendant harm. Although consistent with the presumption accorded to the complete denial of counsel at some other stages of a criminal proceeding, such an approach would be treating the error as structural-a result foreclosed by Coleman . Neither, however, may we presume the opposite.... Coleman does not permit us to presume that a defendant, who was ultimately convicted at an otherwise fair trial, suffered no harm from the absence of counsel at his preliminary examination. And that is true even if no evidence from the preliminary examination was used at trial, and even if defendant waived no rights or defenses because of the absence of counsel at the preliminary examination. [ Id . at 10-11, 903 N.W.2d 816 (citations omitted).] Thus, contrary to the dicta in our earlier opinion, Lewis , unpub. op. at 3-5, we cannot conclude that the error here was harmless simply because defense counsel conceded that no evidence from the preliminary examination was used at trial and that no rights or defenses were waived by defendant's lack of participation in the preliminary examination. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Coleman provides further guidance. There, the Court identified four reasons why having counsel at a preliminary hearing may be essential to protecting a defendant's rights: First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail. [ Coleman , 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999.] These factors have been used by other courts to determine whether the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary hearing amounted to harmless error. See, e.g., State v. Canaday , 117 Ariz. 572, 575-576, 574 P.2d 60 (1977) ; State v. Brown , 279 Conn. 493, 509-510, 903 A.2d 169 (2006) ; People v. Eddington , 77 Mich.App. 177, 190-191, 258 N.W.2d 183 (1977). Additionally, in her concurring opinion in this case, Justice MCCORMACK opined that counsel's presence at the preliminary examination may be essential to negotiating plea deals. Lewis , 501 Mich. at 14, 903 N.W.2d 816 ( MCCORMACK , J., concurring). And defendant suggests, in his brief on remand, that counsel could discover the need to file pretrial motions at a preliminary examination. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that to determine whether the denial of counsel at a preliminary examination amounts to harmless error, courts must consider the factors discussed in Coleman , as well as any other factors relevant to the particular case, including the lost opportunity to negotiate a plea deal and any prejudice resulting from the failure to file pretrial motions. III. APPLICATION OF HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW TO THE FACTS Turning to the specific facts at issue and the arguments raised by defendant on remand, we hold that any error resulting from the denial of counsel at defendant's preliminary examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Looking to the first Coleman factor, defendant appears to argue that counsel could have objected to his bindover on the basis that no evidence was presented regarding the "condition of the buildings" he was accused of damaging or regarding whether the house on Russell Street qualified as a dwelling. However, a review of the preliminary-examination transcript and the relevant law makes clear that no such arguments by counsel would have altered the court's decision to bind defendant over for trial. Defendant fails to explain what he means by the "condition of the buildings," but assuming that he is referring to the element necessary for conviction of both second- and third-degree arson-that a defendant burn, damage, or destroy buildings or dwellings by fire or explosives, MCL 750.73(1) ; MCL 750.74(1)(a) -the prosecution presented testimony at the preliminary examination regarding fires at each address. Further, defendant was convicted of third-degree arson regarding the building on Russell Street. In contrast to second-degree arson (requiring that damage be done to a dwelling), third-degree arson requires only that damage be done to buildings or structures. Moreover, this Court has held that "the presentation of sufficient evidence to convict at trial renders any erroneous bindover decision harmless." People v. Bennett , 290 Mich.App. 465, 481, 802 N.W.2d 627 (2010). Although " Coleman does not permit us to presume that a defendant, who was ultimately convicted at an otherwise fair trial, suffered no harm from the absence of counsel at his preliminary examination," Lewis , 501 Mich. at 11, 903 N.W.2d 816 (opinion of the Court), it is relevant to our consideration of the first Coleman factor. Given that defendant was convicted at trial on the basis of sufficient evidence, the possibility that counsel could have detected preclusive flaws in the prosecution's probable-cause showing is moot. Coleman , 399 U.S. at 18, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed. 2d 387. Defendant's arguments with regard to the second Coleman factor are no more persuasive. He asserts that he had no opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary examination because the court precluded his participation and that, as a result, witnesses were never asked to provide a description of the person they saw committing the crimes, making impeachment impossible. But "[a] defendant's opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing is only a limited one." Canaday , 117 Ariz. at 576, 574 P.2d 60. See also Adams v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 278, 281-282, 92 S.Ct. 916, 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1972) (recognizing limitations on the use of preliminary hearings for discovery and impeachment purposes). And although defendant was unrepresented at the preliminary examination, he was appointed new counsel at the next hearing, who it appears was given a transcript of the preliminary examination. This newly appointed counsel could have used the transcript for impeachment at trial. See Thomas v. Kemp , 796 F.2d 1322, 1327 (C.A. 11, 1986) (concluding that the absence of counsel at a preliminary hearing was harmless error where, inter alia , the defendant's "counsel had access to the transcript of the preliminary hearing because he used the transcript to impeach the testimony of the State's main witnesses"). Further, defendant's argument that testimony about the perpetrator's identity at the preliminary examination would have been useful at trial for impeachment purposes is purely speculative. Defendant references inconsistencies between the witnesses' descriptions at trial, but the jury heard this testimony, as well as defense counsel's closing argument calling attention to the inconsistencies, and still voted to convict. See Ditch v. Grace , 479 F.3d 249, 257 (C.A. 3, 2007) (concluding "that the denial of counsel ultimately did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's ultimate verdict" because "[t]here was substantial evidence of guilt, and the jury was well-apprised of the weaknesses in [the witness's] identification testimony," despite the fact that trained counsel could have conducted a cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing to expose weaknesses in his testimony and for use as an impeachment tool at trial). With respect to the third Coleman factor, defendant argues that his inability to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary examination hampered his pretrial discovery, but he fails to identify any evidence used at trial that counsel could have discovered by virtue of participation in the preliminary examination. And neither the fourth Coleman factor nor the additional factor identified by Justice MCCORMACK , affects our determination that the deprivation of counsel at defendant's preliminary examination was harmless error. Defendant does not argue that counsel could have requested an early psychiatric evaluation, and the record establishes that he was referred to the Forensic Center before the preliminary examination. Further, defendant lost no opportunity to negotiate a plea deal because he lacked counsel. At the August 8, 2014 hearing, the prosecutor stated that the plea deal offered to defendant would be available until the final conference. Defendant's additional arguments related to the specific circumstances of his case also fail. He asserts first that he was denied the defense of misidentification because counsel could have moved for a corporeal lineup at the preliminary examination based on the fact that a witness had identified someone other than defendant in a photographic lineup. The witness was not, however, the only witness who identified defendant at the preliminary examination. Lieutenant Jamel Mayers testified that he apprehended defendant, who matched the description provided by the witness, and Lieutenant Daniel Richardson testified that he also apprehended defendant, who matched the description provided by a different witness. Moreover, defendant merely speculates that the result of a corporeal lineup would have been favorable to his defense. But as we concluded in our earlier opinion, the use of a photographic lineup instead of a corporeal lineup did not affect defendant's substantial rights. Lewis , unpub. op. at 6-7. Defendant also argues that counsel could have questioned the officers about the lighters and moved to suppress them if they were lost, asserting that the lighters were incapable of starting a fire. However, he fails to explain what such questioning would have revealed, and it is unclear how or why counsel would have moved to suppress lost items. Moreover, counsel appointed for defendant at the next hearing could have filed a motion to suppress the evidence before trial but chose not to do so. And regardless, no prejudice resulted from the failure to suppress the lighters because they were not introduced at trial. Instead, photographs of the lighters were introduced, and defendant does not argue that the photographs were improperly admitted. Further we note that, as in Canaday , defendant was appointed new counsel at the hearing after the preliminary examination. Neither defendant's newly appointed counsel, nor his counsel at trial, ever argued that defendant was prejudiced by the denial of counsel at the preliminary examination. This suggests that neither defendant, nor his attorneys, "immediately perceived any prejudice resulting from [defendant's] failure to be represented at his preliminary hearing." Canaday , 117 Ariz. at 575, 574 P.2d 60. Based on the foregoing, we hold that any error resulting from the denial of counsel at defendant's preliminary examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions. IV. SENTENCING Because we conclude that the deprivation of counsel at the preliminary examination was harmless error, we must address the sentencing issue raised by defendant on appeal. See Lewis , 501 Mich. at 12, 903 N.W.2d 816 ("If the Court of Appeals concludes that the error was harmless, it must also address the sentencing issue raised in defendant's brief in that Court."). Prior Record Variable (PRV) 5, MCL 777.55 (prior misdemeanor convictions), was scored correctly, but defendant was sentenced before our Supreme Court decided Lockridge , and the facts used to score Offense Variable (OV) 9, MCL 777.39 (number of victims), were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or admitted by defendant. Thus, the mandatory application of the guidelines at sentencing violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. And because the scoring affected the sentencing guidelines range, defendant is entitled to a remand. On remand, the trial court must determine whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the unconstitutional restraint on its sentencing discretion. See Lockridge , 498 Mich. at 395-397, 399, 870 N.W.2d 502. V. CONCLUSION We affirm defendant's convictions, holding that any error resulting from the denial of counsel at his preliminary examination was harmless, but we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction. Talbot, C.J., and Murray and Servitto, JJ., concurred. Specifically, our Supreme Court stated: "Although it is short on explanation for its remedy, the [Coleman ] Court plainly held that the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary examination is subject to harmless-error review under the federal Constitution. Accordingly, we apply that decision...." Lewis , 501 Mich. at 9, 903 N.W.2d 816 (citations omitted). In our prior opinion, we concluded that, despite defendant's conduct at the preliminary examination, defendant did not forfeit his argument regarding the denial of counsel because the prosecution failed to raise the issue on appeal. Lewis , unpub. op. at 3 n. 4. We recognize that caselaw from foreign jurisdictions is not precedentially binding in Michigan, but it may be considered persuasive. People v. Blanton , 317 Mich.App. 107, 122 n. 6, 894 N.W.2d 613 (2016). On remand, this Court granted defendant's motion to file a supplemental brief. People v. Lewis , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 28, 2017 (Docket No. 325782). Specifically, MCL 750.74 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in sections 72 and 73, a person who does any of the following is guilty of third degree arson: (a) Willfully or maliciously burns, damages, or destroys by fire or explosive any building or structure, or its contents, regardless of whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant at the time of the fire or explosion. We note that, unlike in Ditch , it cannot be said that the evidence of guilt at trial was substantial. The only items of evidence linking defendant to the crimes, other than the identifications, were the lighters found in his pocket. Nonetheless, the jury found defendant guilty.

On order of the Court, the motion for miscellaneous relief is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the May 12, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for miscellaneous relief is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 31, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 24, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 25, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 27, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 10, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 15, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.